

From the Office of
Senator Hubert H. Humphrey
Room 1311, New Senate Office Building
Washington, 25, D. C.

FOR RELEASE
MONDAY A.M.
DECEMBER 7, 1959

HUMPHREY: A DISARMAMENT POLICY FOR THE FUTURE

New Haven, Conn., December 6 -- Senator Hubert H. Humphrey today offered three proposals that would give the United States "a policy for the future" in arms control negotiations.

In noting that "the most recent overall position of the United States on the broad subject of disarmament was stated in August, 1957", the Chairman of the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee stated: "What is urgently needed is a policy for the future, one that can be used as a basis for discussion and negotiation."

Senator Humphrey spoke at Yale University, as final speaker in a two-day colloquium on "The Challenge of the Nuclear Age." The major proposals he suggested the United States put forth were these:

1. Control and reduction of long-range missiles and bombers, and the maintenance of outer space for peaceful purposes.
2. The cessation of nuclear weapons production.
3. A world-wide multi-nation system against surprise attack.

On his first two proposals, Humphrey called for immediate studies, both internally and with other nations of the world to set up the necessary controls system. His third proposal -- which would encompass a pull back of troops, demilitarized zones and a U.N. international police force -- would have to be met by a series of regional conferences. "Perhaps the greatest contribution the forthcoming ten-nation disarmament conference can make", he noted, "is to undertake serious negotiations for a system to prevent surprise attack in Europe."

Senator Humphrey reiterated his proposals for breaking the Soviet-U.S. impasse at the current Geneva test ban negotiations, which he made recently in Pontiac, Michigan. (At that time, the Swedish Representative stated in the U.N. that the Humphrey proposals might be the way around the obstacles remaining in the way of a nuclear test-ban agreement. The proposal -- meeting both the U.S. requirement for adequate controls and the Soviet objection to "too much" inspections -- included a two year moratorium by all powers on tests below a five-kiloton range and on-site inspections for all tests above five-kilotons.)

Senator Humphrey emphasized that his proposals rested on the assumption that these negotiations for the test ban agreement will continue. "I give the test ban talks a better than even chance of being successful," he stated.

The Minnesota Senator criticized the attitude of the Administration, noting that "many people within the Administration have fought the concept of a comprehensive and controlled test ban agreement.

"I was sorry to note opponents of a test ban seem to have recruited Governor Rockefeller to their side. Whether Vice President Nixon is there, too, no one can be sure. The political wind evidently is not yet strong enough for him to tell which way it is going, and therefore, which direction he should likewise go."

In his comprehensive speech, Senator Humphrey touched on other problems -- other areas on which work must be done, noting the "special problem of China."

"The Communist Government of China would have to be bound by any arms control system that dealt effectively with missiles and bombers and the prevention of surprise attack.

"Unfortunately, Communist China is still highly irresponsible and aggressive. It may take the combined persuasiveness of the Soviet Union, the United States and all the countries of Asia to impress on China the need to forego plans of aggression and defiance of the international community. Strange as it may seem, to think of U.S.-Soviet cooperation on persuading China to participate in a disarmament agreement, the world situation may yet produce such a result."

"Peace demands a continuity and depth of public policy," Humphrey concluded. "My wish is that my program of disarmament offered here today will help to stimulate and inspire others."

(Text of the speech is enclosed)

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Disarmament in the Nuclear Age
(Speech of Senator Hubert H. Humphrey
at Yale University, December 6, 1959)

Disarmament should be the core of American foreign policy. We are a nation dedicated to peace and we know that peace is always threatened by an arms race. A case can be built for an armament structure as a holding action, but a world armed to the teeth is a dangerous world. Progress on controlling arms is urgently needed so that the people of all nations may devote their full talents and energies to peaceful and constructive pursuits. The control and reduction of armaments is an immensely difficult problem. I have chosen this evening to discuss certain of its aspects and to put before you a program for the future.

During the early part of this year's session of the United Nations General Assembly, Premier Khrushchev spoke on the subject of disarmament. He made some rather sweeping proposals including a proposal for total disarmament in four years. The Soviet Union was not the only country to offer disarmament proposals before the U. N. The British advanced an equally comprehensive scheme for substantial cutback in armaments in stages. The Irish submitted a resolution to bar the transfer of nuclear weapons from nuclear powers to non-nuclear. A resolution, adopted by the U. N. General Assembly, and sponsored by a large group of nations in Asia and Africa, called on the French to call off their scheduled atomic tests in the Sahara.

The significance of this activity in the United Nations, to me, is two-fold. First, the question of disarmament, or arms control to use a broader phrase, is mounting in interest and intensity throughout the world. Second, it was most unfortunate that in all of this debate and discussion, the United States was on the sidelines because we did not have any concrete proposals of our own to advocate. Our position throughout the debate was confined to one of assuring U. N. members that our policy is under review and that all proposals of other nations should be submitted to the forthcoming disarmament negotiations between five Western nations and five Soviet bloc nations.

My complaint is not that we told the U. N. that we were studying the matter. My criticism is that such a position was far from adequate - a far cry from the position the leader of the free world should be prepared to take on one of the most vital issues facing the world at this time.

The most recent overall position of the United States on the broad subject of disarmament was stated in August, 1957. Yet the Administration waited until August of 1959 before appointing a group to review the policy to determine what we should seek in 1960.

Our policy should be under constant scrutiny all the time. But to say we are reviewing past policy on arms control puts the matter in the wrong perspective. It is not enough to review what has gone before. What is urgently needed is a policy for the future, one that can be used as a basis for discussion and negotiations. A policy that states goals and the concrete steps to realize the goals is what the world wants to hear from the United States.

Progress toward any kind of arms control requires infinite patience. But there is a difference between the patience that is based on planning and prodding and the patience of procrastination, timidity and indecision.

The President in a letter to me of November 17, did reaffirm his belief in the need for progress on disarmament. I commend the President for his statement of purpose. Too bad so many of his advisers fail to share his aims and vision. Although it is belated, it is encouraging that the President has begun to see that goals, in order to be translated into specific steps, demand preparation, study and even funds.

Progress on arms control can be made. But it takes the kind of stubborn concentration of people who refuse to give up at the first signs of delay or the first obstacles to progress.

During the recent session of Congress I tried on four different appropriation bills to get \$400,000 earmarked for disarmament studies. Each time the Administration failed to give support. Regrettably, the Congress failed also.

Next year I shall try again. The Department of State has indicated that it will recommend funds for arms control preparation and studies.

Nuclear Test Ban Agreement Closer

Today, I offer three arms control proposals which should be given the highest priority. In proposing them I am assuming there will be continued negotiations for a ban on nuclear weapons tests. I give the test ban talks a better than even chance of being successful. I believe the outcome will be based on a control system for the cessation of all atomic tests, initiated perhaps in stages and possibly along the lines I recently outlined in an address at Pontiac, Michigan.

Many people within the Administration have fought the concept of a comprehensive and controlled test ban agreement. They have fought it all year and they are still fighting it. I was sorry to note opponents of a test ban seem to have recruited Governor Rockefeller to their side. Whether Vice President Nixon is there too no one can be sure. The political wind evidently is not yet strong enough for him to tell which way it is going and, therefore, which direction he should likewise go.

One of the ways test ban opponents try to scuttle an agreement is to call for a control and inspection system that is 100 per cent perfect. The AEC and the Pentagon know themselves that perfection in an arms control system is no more possible than perfection in an early warning radar system against surprise attack or perfection in the safety precautions taken to prevent radioactivity from escaping from a nuclear reactor.

The President has now begun to shake up his subordinates on this matter. In his November 17 letter to me he said:

" . . . The best and most carefully elaborated disarmament agreements are likely to carry with them some risks, at least theoretically, of evasion. But one must ponder, in reaching decisions on the very complex and difficult subject of arms control, the enormous risks entailed if reasonable steps are not taken to curb the international competition in armaments and to move effectively in the direction of disarmament."

The President is right. There are risks in the failure to act - just as there are risks in carefully designed action.

With continued and concentrated bargaining and perseverance a test ban agreement may be reached within the next several months. The President wants a test ban agreement before he leaves office and the Russians seem to want to limit the nuclear club. The votes in

the U. N. General Assembly indicate world opinion insists upon a test ban. I am convinced the people of the United States want the tests stopped. They want to make a start on controlling the arms race. When Governor Rockefeller made his unfortunate, and in my opinion, misguided statement over TV on resuming underground tests, the TV studio was besieged with calls of protest.

But we must prepare to go beyond a controlled and inspected nuclear weapons test. This merely opens the door to genuine disarmament. We should make a concerted attack on three major problems in the arms control field.

Goals to Work Toward

Let me make it clear I stand for a world free from the burden of massive armaments. I support the goal of a United Nations Police Force equipped to guard all nations, large and small, from aggression. I am for a system of world order in which law takes the place of force as a means of settling disputes. And I believe that eventually the nations of the world must agree to view any act of an individual, group or nation that seeks to disturb world peace as a crime against mankind. Specific steps now must be taken to assure the ultimate fulfillment of these long-range goals.

Defense Must be Maintained Until Disarmament is Reached

The proposals I offer are all based on the concept of mutual agreement. I do not support unilateral disarmament. We have already had too much of this in the name of a balanced budget. Until we have concrete progress in arms control our own defense posture must not only be maintained but even strengthened in key respects.

Now my proposals.

No. 1. Control and Reduction of Missiles and Bombers And Maintenance of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes

We must seek the control and reduction of long-range missiles and long-range bombers. We must increase our efforts to preserve outer space for peaceful purposes.

The universe waits to be explored and understood. The nations of the earth must together seek knowledge about the unknown. They must simultaneously develop a law of conduct in the universe if peaceful undertakings are not to be turned into warfare. Insofar as we possibly can, therefore, the delivery vehicles of warfare should be controlled and curtailed. Of these the most important are the missiles and then the bombers.

This means inspectors and control posts located at every strategic air base. Inspectors and control posts will need to be established near the launching sites for missiles as well as aboard every naval vessel equipped for missile launchings.

But control is not enough. The missiles and bombers must either be eliminated or they must be placed under international control. Further tests of missiles under such a system would be prohibited and a monitoring system installed to see that they were, in fact, stopped.

Such a program as this cannot be accomplished over night. Long-range missile and bomber control is an enormously difficult problem. I am told, for example, that enough missiles might be launched from one site to effect a majorknock-out blow. A control system for missiles and bombers involving bases and launching sites throughout the world would be far more difficult to negotiate than a ban on nuclear weapons tests. Therefore, studies on control measures should be begun immediately. They should be started at home, internally by the U. S.,

and also joint talks should be proposed with the Soviet Union and other powers that would be affected. The studies might first be conducted on a technical level prior to political negotiations.

For years we have talked about the threat of the nuclear delivery systems. The talk must now be translated into action.

No. 2 Cessation of Nuclear Weapons Production

The production of fissionable material for weapons purposes should be curtailed under effective safeguards.

Here again there has been a lot of talk but little action. We need first to work out, preferably jointly with the Soviet Union and Great Britain, the necessary technical means of control. We need a control system adequate to prevent the secret diversion of fissionable materials from peaceful pursuits to weapons purposes. This control system should be adequate but not more than is required. The last estimate I have seen given by the AEC for such a control system involved about 5,000 inspectors in the Soviet Union. I cannot judge at this point whether this is necessary. It appears to me rather high considering that the test ban control system for the U. S. S. R. would involve far less than 1,000 inspectors.

A controlled ban on the production of nuclear weapons would affect not only the three nuclear powers. It would also stop other nations from arming themselves with their own nuclear weapons. The French, for example, have said repeatedly they would give up their plans to test and produce nuclear weapons if other nations stopped their nuclear weapons production. A control system for the prohibition of nuclear weapons production might be fitted into the functions of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

No. 3 World Wide Multi-Nation System Against Surprise Attack

We need a world-wide anti surprise attack system against the use of any kind of military force by one country against another.

The term, surprise attack, has come to mean within the United States, primarily an attack by long-range missiles and aircraft. This does not include all that I mean. The problem is not solely one of missiles and bombers nor of the three nuclear powers. It includes surprise attack by Chinese Communists on India, Nepal, Burma, Laos, Korea, or Formosa. It concerns a possible aggression in the Middle East. It concerns a possible aggression in Central and Eastern Europe. And finally it even concerns possible aggression in Latin America.

A focus on the prevention of this kind of surprise attack is essential and urgent for two major reasons. First, it is important because most of the real threats of warfare come from the kinds of situations I have mentioned. Every time a local or regional war breaks out it threatens to drag in the major powers with their large scale and devastating weapons.

Second, it is important because if the nuclear powers place under control and limit their missiles, bombers, and fissionable material for weapons purposes this might give other powers the idea they can afford to become more reckless. In other words, the possession of weapons of mass destruction has acted to some extent as a deterrent on non-nuclear powers as well as nuclear. No nation can be sure that what it hopes may be a small war won't turn into a world-wide catastrophe. If the big weapons were controlled or removed, some irresponsible dictator with heavy conventional armaments somewhere might feel the risk of aggression was not too great. Until you have assurance of protection from surprise attack you have an unstable world situation where the finger is never far from the trigger.

An anti-surprise attack system should include many elements. In some areas the withdrawal or pullback of troops would be called for. In other areas a controlled demilitarized zone would be needed. Still other areas might require the stationing of an international police force. Special inspection posts would need to be established in all areas. The U. N. would truly become the eyes and ears of peace.

You may think this sounds like a lot of inspection and inspectors. It would be. But it is necessary to have what each situation demands.

Importance of Inspection for a Peaceful World

In our country I think we believe inspection and control are necessary because we don't trust the Russians. This is certainly an element but this is not the entire explanation. It is deeper than that.

Inspection and control recognize something about human nature. It recognizes that man is not perfect.

If controls and regulations are needed in a well-organized national society, and they certainly are, they are even more important in relations among nation states.

Americans are a peace-loving, honest and just people. The overwhelming majority of us want to obey the law, do well unto others, and avoid harm wherever and whenever we can. Yet we have dotted our society from stem to stern inside and out with inspectors. Just let me list for you some of the ways we inspect each other.

At the Federal level we have inspectors for a multitude of purposes:

- Food and Drug Inspectors
- Coast Guard Inspectors
- Narcotics Inspectors
- The Customs Service
- The Secret Service
- FBI Agents
- Civil Service Investigators
- Atomic Energy Inspectors

In the Armed Services we have a military police system that consists of 23,976 Army police; 2,407 Navy police; and 34,894 Air Force police.

And in the Internal Revenue Service we have inspectors in the thousands including a couple of hundred to inspect the inspectors.

James Madison said many years ago: "If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary." It goes without saying, I think, that international relations are not conducted by angels either.

Inspection, therefore, is highly essential for a peaceful world as well as a just and functioning society. The sooner we start detailed studies and negotiations combining inspection and control with the reduction of armaments and the prevention of surprise attack the sooner we may reach our goal.

I cannot emphasize too strongly the need to get started. We are going into our third year of serious discussion for a test ban. Each of the three fields I have mentioned may take at least that long to show progress.

Regional Disarmament Conferences Needed

These three proposals cannot be negotiated by the same people at the same conference. The missile-bomber problem and the cut-off of fissionable material for weapons purposes can be undertaken primarily by the nuclear powers with assistance from others. But separate conferences will be necessary. It will be necessary to initiate regional conferences to handle the creation of anti-surprise attack systems in the different areas of the world.

What I am suggesting here is that the ten-nation disarmament negotiations to be convened early next year can only make a start on the problem. They will not be able in one conference to settle the problems I have discussed here as well as others that also must be tackled. Perhaps the greatest contribution the forthcoming ten-nation disarmament conference can make is to undertake serious negotiations for a system to prevent surprise attack in Europe.

Other Arms Control Problems

As I have advanced my three major proposals many of you may have been thinking about still other problems. We are all aware of many other areas on which work must be done. In the arms control field there are weapons of bacteriological and chemical warfare. There are the armed forces of nations. There are the delivery vehicles other than missiles and bombers. In the matter of prevention of aggression there is the overriding problem of settling the disputes and removing the friction among nations that lead to aggression. And there is the special problem of China.

All of these matters require thought, study, and action. But I submit we must make a start. I have chosen three areas that are particularly important.

The Special Problem of China

Now, before closing a word about China. The Communist Government of China would have to be bound by any arms control system that dealt effectively with missiles and bombers and the prevention of surprise attack. Without China no system for the prevention of surprise attack in Eastern and Southern Asia could be successful. Without China in an arms control agreement affecting Asia, the entire power balance in the world could be dangerously upset. National security and world security demand the inclusion of Communist China in major arms control agreements.

Unfortunately, Communist China is still highly irresponsible and aggressive. It may take the combined persuasiveness of the Soviet Union, the United States, and all the countries of Asia to impress on China the need to forego plans of aggression and defiance of the international community. Strange as it may seem to think of U. S.-Soviet cooperation on persuading China to participate in a disarmament agreement, the world situation may yet produce such a result.

We are entering a period in which the subject of arms reduction and control is taking on new meaning. There are dangers as well as opportunities. But the goal of a peaceful world demands our best efforts.

And the goal of peace must not be a sterile and cold concept meaning merely the absence of war or hostilities. It is a peace with justice and opportunity, better living conditions, education and health for all mankind. Peace is not slogans but programs. This kind of peace is not easy; it is sacrifice. Peace requires more than public relations. It demands a continuity and depth of public policy. My wish is that my program of disarmament offered here tonight will help to stimulate and inspire others.

21. To Lead the Search for Peace

The end sought by the foreign policy of a Democracy is to assure a just peace. The most important issue in the world today is the issue of peace. The search for peace is more urgent than ever in this age of nuclear weapons, for a Third World War may destroy civilization. And the Democratic Party, as always is committed to the search for peace.

Let no one deceive himself: the road to peace is long, torturous and difficult. Peace cannot be magically achieved by a parley at the summit, nor can it be guaranteed by signatures at the bottom of a statement of pious principles. We see ^{little} (no) possibility of a once-and-for-all settlement among heads of state which will relieve Americans of the burden of continuing international responsibility.

Nevertheless, we Democrats affirm our profound conviction that the pursuit of justice and of peace must never flag. We are determined to achieve the preconditions of peace and to bring closer to reality this deepest aspiration of mankind.

The world is in a constant process of change and communist states are no more exempt from this inexorable condition than are free states. Western policy must be oriented, not just to meeting, but to influencing and guiding, changes in the world situation. We believe the condition of change provides opportunities and that new challenges call for new responses.

We must keep open the lines of communication with our opponents. People can appreciate the difficulties in the way to peaceful agreement but they expect every avenue to be aggressively explored. While political leadership has a responsibility to explore the possibilities of meetings at the summit, it also has

a responsibility to inform the people honestly of what it believes can reasonably be expected from diplomatic conferences at all levels.

But new departures in foreign policy are accompanied by perils as well as by opportunities. We steadfastly oppose, for example, any retreat from our fundamental commitments in Berlin. And to permit the Communist world to achieve superiority in military power could be disastrous to the cause of peace. At the same time, as peace is our greatest goal, the achieving of disarmament with inspection and control should have top priority in our policy.

Above all, we cannot permit the Communist world to usurp the role of peacemaker. We should seize the opportunity provided by Soviet talk about disarmament to test the sincerity of Soviet intentions by offering concrete proposals of our own for effective disarmament -- reliable, inspected and enforced.

We are not afraid to have the United States raise the banner of idealism. We hope that a just and enduring peace will become the all-pervading purpose of the foreign policy of the United States and that disarmament, as one of the necessary steps toward peace, will become a major item in all the diplomacy of our country and at all the meetings in which our country will take part -- in the meetings of the ten-country Disarmament Committee to start at the beginning of next year, in the discussions in the United Nations, and in the summit and other high-level meetings of the future. We hope and expect that the National Peace Agency we have recommended will be established promptly to further this cause.

In the meantime, and until we have seen the response of the world to this new drive for disarmament and peace, we favor a continued suspension of atomic testing.

Foreign policy, to be effective, must be underwritten by performance. It is not enough to perceive a change in world affairs; it is rash and reckless to suppose that this change justifies us in reducing our military power, cutting back our overseas responsibilities and concentrating national attention on lesser concerns. The Eisenhower Administration, by failing to inform us about the realities and to prepare for the problems of the coming epoch, has invited disaster for our nation and the Free World. We cannot hope to meet the challenge of Khrushchev on a wing and with a prayer.

The Democratic Party has the energy and determination to maintain our own national growth and strength, and at the same time the bold idealism to achieve a sound reduction of world tensions and solid steps toward world peace.

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J. Owen
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*Review at
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Dec. 6/59*

During the early part of this year's session of the United Nations General Assembly, Premier Khrushchev spoke on the subject of disarmament. He made some rather sweeping proposals including a proposal for total disarmament in four years. ^{But} The Soviet Union was not the only country to offer disarmament proposals before the U.N. The British advanced an equally comprehensive ^{proposal} ~~scheme~~ for substantial cutback in armaments in stages. The Irish submitted a resolution to bar the transfer of nuclear weapons from nuclear powers to non-nuclear ^{then} A resolution, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, and sponsored by a large group of nations in Asia and Africa, called on the French to call off their scheduled atomic tests in the Sahara.

The significance of this activity in the United Nations, to me, is two-fold.

① First, the question of disarmament, or arms control to use a broader phrase, is mounting in interest and intensity throughout the world. Second, ~~it was most unfortunate that~~ *during*

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My complaint is not that we told the U.N. that we were studying the matter. My criticism is that such a position was far from adequate -- a far cry from the position the leader of the free world should be prepared to take on one of the most vital issues facing the world at this time.

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U. N. Studies
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Project

For years we have talked about the threat of the nuclear delivery systems. The talk must now be translated into action.

No. 2. Cessation of Nuclear Weapons Production

The production of fissionable material for weapons purposes should be curtailed under effective safeguards.

Here again there has been a lot of talk but little action. We need first to work out, preferably jointly with the Soviet Union and Great Britain, the necessary technical means of control. We need a control system adequate to prevent the secret diversion of fissionable materials from peaceful pursuits to weapons purposes. This

again
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control system should be adequate but not more than is required. The last estimate I have seen given by the AEC for such a control system involved about 5,000 inspectors in the Soviet Union. I cannot judge at this point whether this is necessary. It appears to me rather high considering that the test ban control system for the U.S.S.R. would involve far less than 1,000 inspectors.

A controlled ban on the production of nuclear weapons would affect not only the three nuclear powers. It would also stop other nations from arming themselves with their own nuclear weapons. The French, for example, have said repeatedly they would give

up their plans to test and produce nuclear weapons if other nations stopped their nuclear weapons production. A control system for the prohibition of nuclear weapons production might be fitted into the functions of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

No. 3. World Wide Multi-Nation System Against Surprise Attack

We need a world-wide anti surprise attack system against the use of any kind of military force by one country against another.

The term, surprise attack, has come to mean within the United States, primarily an attack by long-range missiles and aircraft. This does not include all that I mean. The problem is not solely one of missiles and

bombers nor of the three nuclear powers. It includes surprise attack by Chinese Communists on India, Nepal, Burma, Laos, Korea, or Formosa. It concerns a possible aggression in the Middle East. It concerns a possible aggression in Central and Eastern Europe. And finally it even concerns possible aggression in Latin America.

A focus on the prevention of this kind of surprise attack is essential and urgent for two major reasons. First, it is important because most of the real threats of warfare come from the kinds of situations I have mentioned. Every time a local or regional war breaks out it

threatens to drag in the major powers with their large-scale and devastating weapons.

Second, it is important because if the nuclear powers place under control and limit their missiles, bombers, and fissionable material for weapons purposes this might give other powers the idea they can afford to become more reckless. In other words, the possession of weapons of mass destruction has acted to some extent as a deterrent on non-nuclear powers as well as nuclear. No nation can be sure that what it hopes may be a small war won't turn into a world-wide catastrophe. If the big weapons were controlled or removed, some

irresponsible dictator with heavy conventional armaments somewhere might feel the risk of aggression was not too great. Until you have assurance of protection from surprise attack you have an unstable world situation where the finger is never far from the trigger.

↳ An anti-surprise attack system should include many elements. In some areas the withdrawal or pullback of troops would be called for. In other areas a controlled demilitarized zone would be needed. Still other areas might require the stationing of an international police force. Special inspection posts would need to be established in all areas. The U.N. would truly become the eyes and ears of peace.

You may think this sounds like a lot of inspection and inspectors. It would be. But it is necessary to have what each situation demands.

Importance of Inspection for a Peaceful World

~~In our country I think~~ We believe inspection and control are necessary because we don't trust the Russians. This is certainly an element but this is not the entire explanation. It is deeper than that.

Inspection and control recognize something about human nature. It recognizes that man is not perfect.

If controls and regulations are needed in a well-organized national society, and they certainly are, they are even more important in relations among nation states.

Americans are a peace-loving, honest and just people. The overwhelming majority of us want to obey the law, do well unto others, and avoid harm wherever and whenever we can. Yet we have dotted our society from stem to stern inside and out with inspectors. Just let me list for you some of the ways we inspect each other.

At the Federal level we have inspectors for a multitude of purposes:

- Food and Drug Inspectors
- Coast Guard Inspectors
- Narcotics Inspectors
- The Customs Service
- The Secret Service
- FBI Agents
- Civil Service Investigators
- Atomic Energy Inspectors

In the Armed Services we have a military police system that consists of 23,976 army police; 2,407 navy police; and 34,894 air force police.

And in the Internal Revenue Service
we have inspectors in the thousands
including a couple of hundred to inspect
the inspectors.

James Madison said many years ago:

"If men were angels, no government would
be necessary. If angels were to govern
men, neither external nor internal controls
on government would be necessary." It goes
without saying, I think, that international
relations are not conducted by angels either.

↳ Inspection, therefore, is highly
essential for a peaceful world as well as
a just and functioning society. The sooner
we start detailed studies and negotiations
combining inspection and control with the

reduction of armaments and the prevention of surprise attack the sooner we may reach our goal.

I cannot emphasize too strongly the need to get started. We are going into our third year of serious discussion for a test ban. Each of the three fields I have mentioned may take at least that long to show progress.

Regional Disarmament Conferences Needed

These three proposals cannot be negotiated by the same people at the same conference. The missile-bomber problem and the cut-off of fissionable material for weapons purposes can be undertaken primarily by the nuclear powers with assistance from

others. But separate conferences will be necessary. It will be necessary to initiate regional conferences to handle the creation of anti-surprise attack systems in the different areas of the world.

What I am suggesting here is that the ten-nation disarmament negotiations to be convened early next year can only make a start on the problem. They will not be able in one conference to settle the problems I have discussed here as well as others that also must be tackled. Perhaps the greatest contribution the forthcoming ten-nation disarmament conference can make is to undertake serious negotiations for a system to prevent surprise attack in Europe.

Other Arms Control Problems

As I have advanced my three major proposals many of you may have been thinking about still other problems. We are all aware of many other areas on which work must be done. In the arms control field there are weapons of bacteriological and chemical warfare. There are the armed forces nations. There are the delivery vehicles other than missiles and bombers. In the matter of prevention of aggression there is the over-riding problem of settling the disputes and removing the friction among nations that lead to aggression. And there is the special problem of China.

All of these matters require thought, study, and action. But I submit we must make a start. I have chosen three areas that are particularly important.

The Special Problem of China

Now, before closing a word about China.

The Communist Government of China would have to be bound by any arms control system that dealt effectively with missiles and bombers and the prevention of surprise attack. Without China no system for the prevention of surprise attack in Eastern and Southern Asia could be successful. Without China in an arms control agreement affecting Asia, the entire power balance in the world could be dangerously upset.

National security and world security demand the inclusion of Communist China in major arms control agreements.

Unfortunately, Communist China is still highly irresponsible and aggressive. It may take the combined persuasiveness of the Soviet Union, the United States, and all the countries of Asia to impress on China the need to forego plans of aggression and defiance of the international community. Strange as it may seem to think of U.S.-Soviet cooperation on persuading China to participate in a disarmament agreement the world situation may yet produce such a result.

We are entering a period in which the subject of arms reduction and control is

taking on new meaning. There are dangers as well as opportunities. But the goal of a peaceful world demands our best efforts.

And the goal of peace must not be a sterile and cold concept meaning merely the absence of war or hostilities. It is a peace with justice and opportunity, better living conditions, education, and health for all mankind. Peace is not slogans but programs. This kind of peace is not easy; it is sacrifice. Peace requires more than public relations. It demands a continuity and depth of public policy. My wish is that my program of disarmament offered here tonight will help to stimulate and inspire others.



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