

OPEN ENL

with

DAVID SUSSKIND

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GUESTS:

Rt. Hon. Philip Noel-Baker

Hon. Sen. Hubert Humphrey

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SUSSKIND: Good evening and welcome to OPEN END. Our subject tonight is peace, foreign policy and politics. Our guests are two extraordinary men: one a declared candidate for the Democratic Presidential nomination in 1960, the other a distinguished statesman of Great Britain, a member of her House of Parliament and winner of 1959's Nobel Peace Prize. And now with great pleasure, I present our distinguished guests.

Our first guest is the Rt. Honorable Philip Noel-Baker who is one of Britain's foremost labor party statesman and a former minister of state. He was the first British delegate to the United Nations. Mr. Noel-Baker has been active in British foreign affairs since the end of World War I, and has actively participated in disarmament conferences for more than 30 years. He is the author of THE ARMS RACE, and for his constant devotion to the cause of peace, Mr. Noel-Baker won the 1959 Nobel Peace Prize.

Our second guest, Senator Hubert Humphrey, was elected to the United States Senate for Minnesota in 1948. Prior to entering politics Mr. Humphrey was a member of the staff of the University of Minnesota and later was assistant state supervisor of adult education. He was Mayor of Minneapolis from 1945 to 1948 from which he went to the United States Senate. Sen. Humphrey is the chairman of the sub-committee on disarmament in the Senate. He has shortly after the first of the year announced his candidacy for the Democratic Presidential nomination. We'll join our guests in just a moment after a brief word from our sponsor.

COMMERCIAL (SUTRO BROS)

SUSSKIND: Gentleman thank you for being with us tonight on OPEN END, this is a very prideful occasion for this program. I wanted to start immediately by quoting a speech you made recently, I think last night, Mr. Noel-Baker, in which you said that the Soviet Union is genuinely prepared to disarm drastically, and to accept strict controls if the western nations will do likewise. The particular point you made makes me very curious as to the answer is this: You attribute to the Soviet leaders deep and genuine conviction, and you declared they have a much more vivid understanding of what these modern weapons of destruction mean than many people of authority in the West.

NOEL-BAKER: Well that was the impression that I formed when I saw them last December. I went especially to find out whether what they've been saying Krushchev, Mikoyan, and all of them, for the last four years, mainly that they wanted drastic disarmament, and would accept drastic control. I went there to find whether it was true or not. And I came to the conclusion that for perfectly good materialistic reasons, that would appeal to any Communist, they thought that disarmament was the right thing, policy in the interest of their own country. They told me frankly that they want to raise the standards of their own country, to those of the United States and do it by 1970. And they said if we have to spend the 90 thousand billion rubles which we spend on defense, that would be a difficult task. If we could save that, those resources and put them into raising the standard of living, we could do it as we hoped to. They said secondly: If you have the arms race going on with the tension which it creates, it may at any time have a sudden crisis, one may lose his head, you may have a war break out, and no one will be able to stop it. And the existing weapons you would have such appalling devastation that while something of Russia could survive, we think much of our work would be destroyed. And I think those reasons are sound.

SUSSKIND: What convinces you of that deep sincerity you spoke of?

NOEL-BAKER: Well, I didn't mean it in any sense--I'm not talking about their morals or their motives--I'm talking about what I think they want, and I think they want an armament reduction for those two reasons given. That they think the present arms race is immensely dangerous, and I believe they keep in very close touch with their general staffs with weapons developments and so on, and they seem to me to have a very vivid realization as I said last night, of what the weapons would mean if they were used. Now we talk about Hiroshima, but we don't really remember what Hiroshima was like. My government published an official manuscript on civil defense and in those manuals they say that one ten megaton bomb would destroy London. They say there wouldn't be, or rather there would be an inner circle of devastation eight miles across--dust and rubble--an outer ring 20 miles across, of all engulfing and all consuming flame. But we don't take it in. It doesn't seem that our ministers

Talk about a general nuclear war in the House of Commons. Or when they talk about being prepared for the gravest disasters that we must be able to retaliate and so on. I don't think they realize that this means the total destruction of civilization. And if the war once started, it would be total destruction. On the Beach is a true picture of what would happen to the world if the present weapons were used.

SUSSKIND: Sen. Humphrey you have had the now famous talkathon with Mr. Krushchev, did you come away with the same attitude toward disarmament and arms reduction as Mr. Noel-Baker?

HUMPHREY: Well, I've listened to Mr. Noel-Baker's comments, and I think we ought to underscore what he was saying in terms of the motivations of the Soviet leaders. He wasn't speaking of any morality as he said or any set of ethical standards, but rather from a very practical point of view as to what the Soviet leaders want. I did come back and report, Mr. Suskind, that I had a feeling that in the years ahead that the Soviet leaders would want an easing of international tensions, and with that of course a sharp reduction in arms. I have felt that Mr. Krushchev's speech before the United Nations was not good propaganda from his point of view in the kind of speech that should have been made by our President, to be frank about it. But I also felt that it may have had considerable substance to it. Regretably the whole framework of disarmament has now been outlined by the Soviet initiative. We've again found ourselves discussing these matters within their framework, within their orientation, within their frame of reference, rather than within ours, or may I add most respectfully within, when I say ours I say within the western nations, Mr. Noel-Baker. I don't think for a minute that we ought to underestimate the desire of the Soviets at this time for settlement of reduction in armament. There's some... I think there's a very substantial reduction. In fact, I've been asked to write an article for Pravda by the editor of Pravda, the Soviet newspaper relating to Mr. Krushchev's speech before the Supreme Soviet which he discussed recently. His reduction in military man-power, and in which he discussed in some detail and some length, disarmament. And particularly nuclear testing suspension. I have a feeling that in that speech there is a good deal to be told on our part. We ought to do some searching and chemical analysis of what he said. I do feel that there is--I'm going to come back to that speech a little bit later, because this is a remarkable speech--I venture to say that of all of our viewers tonight, not a handful has read it. I had a difficult time getting it. This speech is hours long. You see the Soviets don't believe in three minute speeches, if they have something to say. When they make a speech, believe me it's a small book. I do think though that I'd like to get Noel-Baker's reaction as to whether the Soviets would really permit an international inspection of the kind that I believe is necessary to have reasonable surity, or of assurance that they're not going to be cheating. Now let's go back and say this. Let's assume for a moment that they would not cheat. I don't presume that, but if we wanted to, we would never be able to sell a treaty or give a treaty in agreement signed by the Congress of the United States unless we were sure, reasonably sure at least that the inspection and the detection mechanisms and the control mechanisms was the effective one. Now this means internationalizing inspections, it doesn't mean Soviets inspecting Soviet territory, it doesn't mean English inspecting England, it means in fact an internationalized inspection apparatus and machine that is not dominated by the Soviet. It doesn't need to be dominated by either the United States or the U.K. either, but maybe the United Nations type of mechanism in which there was at least a non-Communist orientation to it and in which there would be ingress and egress into the Soviet Union itself, and into other parts of the world. Now it's here that the Soviets have really tried to avoid what I think is responsible inspection. They talk inspections, I believe they want disarmament, but I think there is a genuine fear on the part of the Soviet leaders who have lived in a tightly knit secretive society in which very few people have penetrated. I believe they have literally nightmares of having a team of inspectors roaming around the country to see whether or not the disarmament proposals are being fulfilled. And this is particularly true in atomic explosions. Now so on the one hand they want some disarmament, quite sincerely, from the point of view that they need it for their economic development. This is surely why there was a reduction in the military man-power here the other day the announced reduction. But on the other hand while they want it, they don't have or want to pay the price for genuine international inspection. That is my view. Now that I might add, finally, Mr. Noel-Baker that we've been on the foot dragging side too. I've kept very close track of our proposals, some of the proposals that have been advanced, primarily with the backing of the Defense Dept. and the Atomic Energy Commission and I must say that the State Dept. has been much better about it. Those proposals have really been too far reaching. I think that they're that there is an in-between ground which some of us tried to take out.

SUSSKIND: Generally. We're kind of roaming around here. In very practical political terms here, how can you reconcile the seemingly insoluble dilemma of the state-

ments of their leaders that they genuinely want arms reduction, suspension of nuclear testing, with their absolute reluctance, and I suppose that's a mild word, to have disinterested inspection teams, that's... how is that dilemma to be resolved?

NOEL-BAKER: First to define my own attitude to inspection. I was at the peace conference in 1919, after the first world War. I came straight back from the front and went into the peace conference. And I remember after we'd been working for some months, a French colleague saying in a committee of course everything we do must be based upon the sacred principle of allied, of mutual allied distrust. And I've always thought that that was the basis on which you got to work disarmament. You must have an inspection system that applies to everybody which is a Senate affair and is worked not by the Soviets for the Soviets in or by Americans for America, but by a United Nations team which in the majority is not of the nations being inspected. And without that you won't have disarmament. Now I've talked to Russians from 1915 until now and the first time when they said that that they would accept inspection. And when they went ever far in stating their principles--I've got them here, I can read them out, and they have always said to me that by merely stopping tests, we can't have very much inspection. Of course, so long as the rush of the arms race is going on, so long as you are putting up new missile bases in Turkey and Italy and Germany and Britain, and they're not going to have a lot of fun in going all over Russia finding out the targets which you don't know yet about and marking them upon the NATO maps in Paris. At best if it's real disarmament, if it's the kind of thing that Khrushchev talked about, the kind of thing which our own government announced as the objective in 1952, when we started in the UN Commission, disarmament down to the level at which no nation has enough arms to attack its neighbors, then we're ready for any kind of inspection and if you remember, in the Assembly this year, Khrushchev did say "When you have world disarmament, the inspectors can go everywhere, they can do anything to their heart's content and we impose no limits." They have convinced me over the last few years that they are ready to accept it, but don't ask anybody else to accept my convictions. All I say is let's start a negotiation. If we have a negotiation, we shall find out in a week if they're sincere, and if we don't have a negotiation, they will prove to the world that we are insincere, because we've said we want it and we won't even talk...

SUSSKIND: Well, Senator, will the Ten Nation disarmament conference that will commence soon--is that prepared to deal on the level with the Khrushchev proposal at the United Nations? I don't think so...

HUMPHREY: Well, this is where they will start. Again I say that I want to go back if you don't mind, David, back to my comment about the Khrushchev speech before the U.N... That was a powerful speech and I when I said that I thought it was one that our President should have made, or your Prime Minister, or someone from the Western world, I really meant it, because what was said there was something that the world longs to hear and it was another example of the Soviet really moving in and seizing the initiative, as we say in these disclaims all the time. But really staking out the ground that in terms of what worries the world most, this terrible arms race, and the possibility of a nuclear explosion, I also feel that you have to keep in mind that the Communist, the totalitarian is a very pragmatic fellow in many ways, despite his dogma and his doctrine, and his doctrine, and this is particularly true of Khrushchev, and I want to warn the American people, you have a trained Bolshevik but you have a pragmatist. Don't think you don't. I sat and talked to that fellow for eight hours and twenty-five minutes and I didn't come away with a sneer, I didn't come away saying that this man is a weakling, or incompetent, or a braggadocio, or you know, I came away, I want to tell you, deeply concerned. I didn't feel that he threatened anything like that, he got a little tough a couple of times during the conversation, but so did I speak up, but I did come away saying that there was a man who took the long view in terms of his objectives. Communism he believes in, Bolshevism yes, and he has said repeatedly right to our own people over here, as he said to me for so long that night when we talked for so long that Communism will be the way in the future as he puts it. It will encompass the world, but how... how? I think they realize that they cannot win this Communist dream of theirs, this Communist goal by nuclear war and there's only, if you get into a war, let's quit kidding ourselves, if the major powers get into a war, it'll be a nuclear and biological and a chemical war, it'll be one for keeps. I don't think people appreciate this at all. We're talking about really destruction of all of this great creation of ours on this world at least in so far as the civilized, industrialized western world is concerned. Now, Khrushchev is of the mind that if the Soviet Union and the Communist countries that have brought within the orbit of the Soviet power by their military machine, that if they can organize their productive capacity plus their distribution system, plus a program of foreign aid, and of infiltration and ideological warfare, propaganda warfare, that they will move on the trade front, the economic front the ideological front, the philosophical front, the cultural front, they'll wage war with us, but it'll be a different kind of a struggle. This is a ceaseless struggle and what worries me is that Americans

are all too often of the opinion that you can get a stalemate--you don't get a stalemate there's no such thing. There is a struggle going on all the time--life itself is a struggle. Just studying biology, bacteriology, there's always a struggle. And what makes anybody think that we can have what we call containment, or what makes anybody think you can have a stalemate? This struggle goes on in, if nothing else, then in propaganda. I wonder how many people know that since Khrushchev returned to the Soviet Union, Soviet propaganda has doubled in to the rest of the world, in terms of what he is proposing, his visit to the United States, what he saw, what he said, what he proposes to do, all around the world. Now what I've said is that Khrushchev has possibly outlined for us a change in Soviet tactics, main objectives, and the tactical change is a basic one. Very important. The practical change is an extra emphasis on disarmament, and extra emphasis by the Soviet as a driver for reduction of arms.

I think this is very true, but the strategic objective is the same. The objective is to spread their ideology, their system; they believe in it, they have goals, objectives. We're standing around thinking that somehow or another, that you have peace, you just have absence of war, that you have a stalemate when you just start counting bombs, that they have the same number of missiles that we have, and we have the same number they have; we have people saying all the time why we have not now a balance of power. But in fact, power today is not related directly to weapons, power is related to spirit--it's related to books, to literature, to music, to culture, to the arts, to science, to technology to education, to people. In fact, I think the Soviets relate power more to people than we do. What a paradox. The great democracies which are based on the sovereignty of the people, and yet the Soviets themselves look to people all over the world as their base of power. Now it's getting back again to this theme and the--of course no one knows more about this subject in my mind than at least in my lifetime, than Mr. Noel-Baker. I think what he has tried to say, and has said to me so well is that fears we say, well do they accept inspection--do they? I don't believe they will. This question and answer. But he is saying, and with which I thoroughly concur is let's try it, let's be negotiable.

And why do we have to go to the negotiating table under their impetus? I have felt for years that we should be challenging the Soviet leaders every week. We have everything to gain from this in a free society, challenging them for disarmament in every conceivable way. I might add, the trouble is, I'm afraid, that while we talk it, we haven't thought through the technical problems, and I can say with a degree of authority that we have not spent the time of our resources or the energy or the talent upon how you really pursue disarmament. What kind of an inspection system do you need? How much do you need later on? What kind of plans do we have? We do go to these disarmament conferences and we've been to a lot of them, by the way, the last big one of course was in London, when Mr. Stassen was our negotiator. Now, I was privy to much of the information on that which went on in that conference, to arrangements with the late Secretary of State, Foster Dulles and I want to say that we were given all the information, yet, I can say here tonight that we were not prepared, had the Soviet Union agreed to our proposals. I don't know what we would have done. We didn't have the mechanism or the machinery to even carry out what we were contemplating what we were talking about. I guess we presumed that they wouldn't agree, so we couldn't talk. I'd advise us--we'd better be careful. Some time they might agree.

SUSSKIND: May I ask you a question? This brings to mind--you said the other night...

HUMPHREY: It's a pretty long speech, I'm sorry...excuse me.

SUSSKIND: You said the other night, Mr. Noel-Baker, that they, the Soviet Union leaders, seem to have in your view a much deeper sense of the meaning of these destructive weapons that terrorize the world today than our leaders do. Why is that?

NOEL-BAKER: Well...

HUMPHREY: I'd be interested in that too.

NOEL-BAKER: It's under the impression made on my mind by comparing what they said to me with what our leaders say in public they say of course these are horrible weapons, we know it would be a grave disaster. But they don't somehow seem to feel that one bomb, finishing London means that 10 or 15 bombs finishing Britain, and that Britain finishing is the end of their life's work, and the end of many centuries of civilization in our British Isles. But as the Russians this season seems to feel that if there was a nuclear war everything they've tried to do would be destroyed, something would survive they said, I tried to assure Mr. Khrushchev that nothing would survive, but he maintained that something would survive in Russia because it was such a big country and they would start again as we and the United States would be finished off. Now I don't want to make too much of this. Perhaps our people do feel very weakly about it. Your President said the other day in the State of the Union address that now that both sides had weapons of such devastating power that total annihilation

was possible, that this was the most important fact in the world--I've got his words right here, I'll quote them--" No other fact of today's world equals this in importance. It colors every thing we say, or plan to do." Now if that's true I come back to what the Senator ended by saying it's about time we put up a plan. Since 1952 we've been talking in the U.N. commission and other places in general terms about objectives, would be do this, would be have a manpower of 1 and a half million. I would like to see our Western government writing out a draft disarmament treaty with solutions to all the technical problems which the Senator spoke of saying to the Soviets, well you have this plan don't you like article one? Write your amendments in the column at the right hand side. Get down to a discussion about how the thing is to be done.

SUSSKIND: An idea occurs to me that I wanted to ask you about it both gentlemen. And it is this: Is it possible that the leaders of the Western world are equally aware and equally miserable about the potential of disaster, but because their totalitarian structure would admit to swift adjustment to a true reduction of arms a true throwing away the weapons of war, whereas our economies are completely attuned to war production and it could be economic disaster for us...

SUSSKIND: Is there an alternative plan.

NOEL-BAKER: If this is true... in Britain after 1945, we demobilized--I was in the government--we demobilized 12 million people from the armed forces and munitions production. Twelve million people out of a total population of fifty. And we didn't have any unemployment at any point. Now of course there was a great demand for civil goods. Housing, every kind of thing, but this is now.

SUSSKIND: Now our statement...

HUMPHREY: Wait a minute now, go ahead.

NOEL-BAKER: I was just going to make one remark. I have in my constituency what I think is the greatest firm of aero engines in the world, the Rolls Royce, I represent them in Parliament. The greatest man Rolls Royce ever had said to me last year, we don't want military orders, we'd much rather have civil aviation orders. We do better out of them, there is an immense development coming. He said suppose there aren't enough civil aviation orders to keep us going? We're engineers, we'll go round the world and get orders for ourselves. Factories, stamp making machines, whatever you like. We'll do it, just give us a little time and we'll make the plans. Now don't believe this business as a real one, and after all the Communists used to say Capitalism must keep the arms race going because of the disaster that would happen--Kruschev came here last summer and said having visited America I see quite well that you could disarm without any economic disaster.

SUSSKIND: When Senator Humphrey says we show up at disarmament conferences with the most fuzzy agenda and that nothing could be more embarrassing to us than agreements since we haven't got a specific plan, it would indicate that either we don't believe in disarmament genuinely, secondly that we don't want it, and thirdly we're not prepared for it.

HUMPHREY: I don't think it means that at all. I think it just means we've been lazy, yeah, bluntly, lazy. Indifferent, haven't been doing our homework. And there's been far too much of it, for too long. That's one of the real problems in America today. We settle for mediocrity, we've been settling for it all along the line, not merely in Washington. We've even settled for it in our schools, we've settled for it in, I regret to say, in far too many communities. I suppose I'm guilty of it as anyone else, I don't stand here as anybody else's critic. It's just one of those unfortunate things that's happened to us and we've got to do something about it. Let me get at what I was talking about, the preparations. Disarmament is not just a pious hope. It isn't just a dream for Utopian philosophers. It is an absolute necessity. It is a technical problem as well as a political problem. It is a military problem as well as a military problem. And therefore you must have people in your governments and in the development of arms in the use and their deployment, who are experts in the development of disarmament in the deployment of facilities that would ultimately be made available, the technical aspects that are required to assure a doubting people who have been hurt many times out of trust with alliances and treaties that have been broken. Nor these people that have been burned as we say, disarmament is not going to leave them helpless. That is really disarmament that it isn't a fraud, a hoax, it is something that they can depend on. Now here's where I complain, and I do it rightly justly without partisanship because we're all guilty of it. A democracy controlled Congress last year, I'm a Democrat, refused to appropriate 40,000 dollars

for disarmament studies. we put up 41 almost 41 billion dollars for arms and four times I tried to amend four different acts including mutual security defense appropriations, supplemental appropriations, and another bill once for 40,000 dollars, once i even tried 75,000 dollars and it was rejected.

SUSSKIND: why?

HUMPHREY: Because people don't seem to understand that this this is a possibility. Everyone wants disarmament. Everybody wants peace, but too many people are cynical about it. I say if we'll listen now to the experts on weapons, on technology in fact some of the generals are better than some of the civilians, if you'll pardon me for saying so, I talked to many generals who are more passionate for peace than some of the civilians because they do know what these weapons will do. They do understand, as do the scientists what these weapons will do. They do understand as do the scientists what these terrible thermo-nuclear weapons mean. Fantastic I think. Mr. Noel-Baker has been kindly about it, but when you get into 25 megaton bombs, 15 megaton bombs, and when you have rockets that can fire like the Soviet's rocket with the precision that they have which is a topic within itself, you have a problem. Now for the first time therefore it seems to me is the technical competence we need to develop, and we're late in it. I like what the President said, but Mr. President let me tell you, you have no plan. Let me tell you that there is no one in the State Dept. with the rank of assistant secretary in charge of disarmament. We have no peace agency. I think we ought to have one if we really mean it. We ought to set up within the State Dept. or in the White House under the President, this separate agency of the government into which we bring the best talent in which we have an agency which dedicates itself to the pursuit of disarmament and any possible plan of disarmament of securing peace, it ought to be under the Dept. of State. You know what we have? We've been making a study lately as to what our disarmament proposals were. I want to state here, we have no disarmament plan until within the last few days. If we have one, it hasn't been unfolded. We've had Mr. Charles Coolidge of Boston, Mass. a very competent gentleman who has been making a study of our previous disarmament proposals, so that we can have an analysis for future disarmament proposals, and the U.N. session is over. And we just missed the ball game that's all. The gates were open, the game was on, Khrushchev at the bat, hits a home run, and we haven't even got a ticket. Now that's exactly what happened. Now we were preparing that we have a gentleman by the name of Mr. Easton, that will be going to the ten nation conference, these are very fine people, don't misunderstand me, there is nothing personal about this, they're conscientious people. But it is a fact that we still do not have a Western-agreed upon proposal. The British have one. The French are acting their own way. We sort of have something, but we don't have a proposal, but Mr. Khrushchev does. Now let me tell you, you give me a man who knows what he wants and where he's going and you can have 25 others who are confused, doubtful, timid, and uncertain, and the one man will be better than all twenty-five. In terms of being able to get his way--this is what I think Mr. Baker, Mr. Noel-Baker agreed upon. We may have some mild disagreement here, I doubt it. But the one thing in which I have always agreed with him on, is that you can't rely on the good luck of accident for peace negotiation... it is more difficult to negotiate disarmament, or any peace treaty than it is to make any battle plan, by any means. Because both of them are filled with risks. Both of them require statesmanship, brilliance, intelligence, perseverance, which I must say we just don't put the time in on it. And the same thing is true on economic aspects. I want to salute Mr. Noel-Baker and what he said about disarmament and economics. Capitalism can take disarmament. We don't need arms to keep our country going. But I must say that Capitalism cannot take disarmament by accident, we'll have to plan it, we'll have to phase it in, we'll have to know what we're going to do if it happens for instance tomorrow morning, that Mr. Khrushchev should say the price of peace is a 50 percent reduction in arms spending in the next year, let's say that he said literally that the price of peace then let's say he put it that way. The price of a free Berlin is a 50 percent reduction in arms spending. They need that money desperately. They need those rubles for economic development in the Soviet Union, they're hard pressed, very hard pressed, more so than we are. What if he should say that we're prepared to accept your inspectors in our missile factories, in our bomber plants in our nuclear plants, but we want to send ours over to you, it's a 50 percent reduction. Now, now what would we do in our budget of approximately 25 billions of dollars. If it happened like that, Gracious we know we need it for schools, we need it for roads, we need it for hospitals, for stream pollution control, we need it for housing, for urban renewal, for slum clearance, for tax adjustments, for tax reduction, a host of things, But I remind you we have few plans if for any of it.

And as the other question; would we have the same willingness to clean out the slums. To build homes, to build the schools, to build the roads, would we put the same 40 billions of dollars or 25 billions dollars into these projects. More importantly would we share some of it a world-wide economic development. And I noticed when Mr. Noel-Baker spoke of the Rolls-Royce engineers, their engineers, he said they would manage to go to the other parts of the world to get tractor orders, and large equipment development. And I noticed when Mr. Noel-Baker spoke he said yes, providing if there was capital. Phased in with disarmament must always come the economical

design, and you have to be as bold, and imaginative and as daring in economics of disarmament as in the economics of armament. In other words we didn't hesitate to put our billions into the Atomic bomb, it was a gamble even to get it. We didn't hesitate to put hundreds of millions, billions into our rockets, we've put billions of dollars into them, and a lot of them don't work. Would we be willing to put billions into Asia? Maybe knowing the chances that it might not work, it might not, I think it would. When I say work, I mean for freedom, and for economic opportunity. But I ask the question, are we, as civilized people prepared to put billions, billions, and billions, I mean many billions into Asia, Africa, Latin America, and our own countries in peaceful development, like we put it into arms. I hope and pray we are, but I asked the question, but what I think you've said to Mr. Noel-Baker that if the British did demobilize quickly, didn't do it without some planning, didn't do it without some design, they didn't say, well the show is over, let's tear up the tickets, go home and play bridge. No you said we've got something to do...

SUSSKIND: I don't doubt...

HUMPHREY: That's the long speech of the night, I'm sorry.

SUSSKIND: I don't doubt that we could do what you suggest overnight, under a philosophy of progressive moderation, which is it seems to me the philosophy of our present administration. I wonder if we could pause for just a moment for a word from our sponsor.

COMMERCIAL

(SUTRO BROS)

SUSSKIND: Sir, you were saying something about the Declaration of Independence?

HUMPHREY: Well, Mr. Suskind, I couldn't help but during the commercial, with this honored guest this evening, a member of the British Parliament, that the Declaration of Independence was unfolded. Now I know he's a gentle, kind, considerate man, and I know he's taking no offense at all.

SUSSKIND: I hope it didn't hurt your feelings, Mr. Noel-Baker.

NOEL-BAKER: You can't hurt my feelings about the War of Independence. I had two great-great grandfathers who fought in the War of Independence, one on each side.

SUSSKIND: You were covered both ways.

HUMPHREY: You had a ticket in both games.

NOEL-BAKER: The one who fought for King George and was defeated, went off to Canada as a United Empire Loyalist and was when he got up near the frontier, was caught by the Yankees and strung up to a tree and left for dead. But his fourteen year old son hid behind a bush; when the Yankees had gone, he came out and cut him down, and that's why I'm here tonight.

SUSSKIND: I'm glad about that. Incidentally the next commercial we shan't drag the Declaration of Independence into it. I wanted to go back to what you both were discussing. It seems to me to be utterly shocking that our government has no plan for peace and no plan for adjustment of the economy... it's almost beyond--it staggers the imagination that this could be true.

HUMPHREY: I'm sure the government would deny this, because I'm sure they have plans for peace. I was speaking primarily on disarmament which I feel to be fundamentally a part of the pursuit of peace. Disarmament perhaps maybe will not bring peace within itself, but it will trigger it. But I repeat that we have been without a real up-to-date plan. We've had the '52 proposals, we've had the 1955 proposals, but... and we've had some in 1957, but we have not kept up; to date in terms of our disarmament discussions, they were all broken off here awhile ago, the Soviet refused to discuss under the auspices of the Un. And now we have just begun, and I say after the N. session is over, and it is the main arena for armament discussion, we've just begun to put together our proposals. And I say most respectfully to Mr. Noel-Baker that the United States proposals are not adequate. We need proposals that our Allies agree upon. We are a member of NATO, we must have a united co-ordinated effort and it requires something more than just a meeting. I believe what is fair to say it requires that was indicated here a draft treaty, the technical aspects the technical aspects the technical designs that are required, and this can be done. And in the economic area we do not any prescribed or designed proposal for the economic adjustment that would be required, and this can be done. And in the economic area we do

not have any prescribed or designed proposal for the economic adjustment that would be required for any kind of massive disarmament. No, most industry in America, I think all industry in America, would be delighted to have a chance to pursue its endeavors in peaceful activity. I read this speech of Mr. Cordonier of General Electric, not long ago, a very fine speech on this very matter. And I've been in touch with many of our industrialists. They're not happy about these munitions orders, frankly there is too much red tape dealing with the government, so much monkey business to put in the vernacular, that they would be delighted most of them to be able to pursue their economic activities in a freer market removed from the governmental red tape and examinations. But again may I add, it takes some thinking ahead. What would happen for example if the long range bomber plan in this country was stopped? In terms of the thousands and thousands of employees. Just talking about the employees--well now 2 years from now they'll be fine, 2 years from now they'll be bankrupt. They have homes to pay for.

SUSSKIND: I wonder, your government, Mr. Noel-Baker, has any plan for disarmament?

NOEL-BAKER: Well, they certainly got to the point of stating headline objectives. Selwyn Lloyd did that in September when he spoke the day before Khrushchev. And he said that the ultimate objectives for negotiation ought to be after a series of stages, reduction down to the level that no country had enough to commit aggressive war against its neighbors. Now that sounds very ambitious--it's not new. I'm going to quote something else I've brought with me. In 1952, the American delegate to the U.N. Disarmament Committee Mr. Benjamin Cohen said this: "The goal of disarmament is not to regulate, but to prevent war. By making war impossible is a means of settling disputes. To achieve this goal all states must cooperate."

Establish a disarmed world in which armed forces and armaments would be reduced to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no state will be in a condition of armed preparedness to start a war. Now that's what Khrushchev said in September, but it's what the United States said in 1952. And if we go back on it, then of course the Communists say to the world, we were insincere, it's the worst. They declare it and they don't live up to it.

SUSSKIND: May I point to something from your acceptance speech when you were awarded the Nobel peace prize, last, past December. You said: "It's the strangest paradox in history, every new weapon is produced for national defense but all experts are agreed that the modern mass destruction, instantaneous delivery weapon have destroyed defense. We are arming for defense but there is no defense anymore. Isn't that kind of insane?"

NOEL-BAKER: Well, that's where I should like the inquiry of each government to begin. Tell their general staff to re-assess what is called the defense policy in terms of how the weapons will make their own people safe from attack. A missile with eight thousand mile range does not apply to a missile with 7 thousand mile range. You can go a thousand miles further, is that any importance when 5 thousand miles is enough to destroy New York. The--it isn't defense. And that's what I think people haven't grasped. Once people get into the arms race, and I think this the answer to what you started our talk by saying, is it that we have no plan. Once you get into an arms race, the minds of the people in power are concentrated in armament that the other side, and everything else seems to be secondary to that. When I was at Cambridge as an undergraduate before the first World War, we were in an intense dreadnought race against Germany, who could build more big battleships. And we thought of nothing else. And everyone thought that if we had more dreadnaughts, we should make our selves safe, we should stop the war. When the war was over all the men who fought with Lloyd George, Grey, and Cecil and all the rest, Smuts, all unanimously agreed that one of the things that made the war, the major cause of the war, but in fact the arms race itself. And the dreadnaughts, so far from increasing our naval strength against Germany, made a lot of our ships obsolete, it made four British ships obsolete for every German ship. When we came to the battle of Jutland, instead of being two to one, we were more nearly two to one, and might nearly have lost the war. Now that is the paradox, of modern--of the modern arms race. It's exactly the same in principle, as the arms race that brought the first World War, as the arms race which resulted from the failure of the disarmament conference of 1932 when Hoover's proposals were not accepted as they should have been. And now we've got into a third arms race, your first, but our third in which the weapons are so immensely destructive, but no one really believes there can really be a defense.

SUSSKIND: Sen. Humphrey, something occurs to me, in our country we're subjected to such a barrage of conflicting testimony--when a Teller and a Libby, and Pentagon

officials terrify us in the area of we must invest more, we must have more weapons we must have more bacteriology warfare, bigger megatron bombs, when the truth is that more only leads to more on their side and the balance of terror becomes more terrifying. How can a public awaken to the truth of the desperate insanity and inevitable disaster of a limitless arms race. When their experts are sending out blasts of conflicting testimonials...

HUMPHREY: Well you see the--as I have said earlier, so many people and nations have been burned, as we say, deceived treaties, did not prove to be what they said they were. Alliance had been broken. Leaders had double-crossed their own nations and other people. Every body is a bit suspicious. This happened not only a bit suspicious, but it's become a neurosis, a national neurosis. And when this happens people fall back on what seems to be their protection, they build these walls and here we have many experts, because this is when the scientific mind really comes to the forefront in many of these fantastic new weapons. There is a drama about all of this, it does have economic implications. There is something dramatic about the uniform, the military services. Now that is when--here's where you see a policy getting in motion. It seems to have it's own momentum, it seems to have a cause and relationship, one country builds and one country adds and so forth, and as it was said by Mr. Noel-Baker, the policy of government becomes centered on building what we call strength, military strength. When what we need is a counter-balance without necessarily for the moment now destroying this general staff that you may have for you military, why don't we have a general staff over here that pursues relentlessly, the with same vigour that brings into the service the same brains and intelligence the thousands of people who pursue the aim of disarmament instead of just making it a by-product of negotiations up at the U.N. I repeat that most nations if not all, and think it fair to say that all nations are derelict in the purpose of arms reduction. The Soviet has talked a great deal, but it was indicated here by Benjamin Cohen, one of our finest citizens, I think, and a remarkable man and a truly great representative of the U.N. back in 1952 laid down a splendid plan, the Western Proposal on Disarmament, in 1952, those should be reiterated. Those should be stated again and again every month, every year and up-dated. The general philosophy of those proposals is fine but they haven't been stated for a long time. Now what we need I repeat, there are no gimmicks here, I want to be careful about having it sound like there's a gimmick. But you need at least somebody in the State Dept. with the protocol stature of an Asst. Secretary to be the spokesman in disarmament, building a whole staff around it. Or you need a peace agency. To emphasize the word peace. Why not? We've got a Defense Dept. We've had, used to have a War Dept. Now we have all kinds of programs out, such as the International Administration. Our Exchange programs, our Information programs, our Overseas Food program. We have dozens of programs that are dedicated to the pursuit of peace. I think we need these programs with a kind of intellectual and philosophical environment that invigorates them, plus bringing in the people, and the same means and the equipment to effectuate them. We don't do it, we're sort of half-hearted about it.

SUSSKIND: May I ask this. The comment on another point made by Mr. Noel-Baker while speaking before the Nobel Peace Prize group, he said: "It's the patent error to speak as though definite future there will be two military giants and no more. If the arms race goes on, in ten years there may be six, or even more and who knows which nation will be the greatest giant."

HUMPHREY: Quite obvious.

SUSSKIND: The nuclear war club is extending its membership quite rapidly. Mr. DeGaulle wants to do something in the Sahara desert, China I presume must be preparing its own Hydrogen bombs. What could be done specifically at the upcoming ten nation disarmament conference to at least limit the nuclear war clubs to present membership? That might indicate an inch of progress, wouldn't it?

NOEL-BAKER: Well, if you could do it. But it is my profound prediction that the chance that France or China or Germany and Japan and India and other nations to renounce having nuclear weapons unless we are willing ourselves to give them up. If you say to China, you shouldn't make a nuclear weapon, it's a very wicked thing to do. Why expand the club? China will say, why should I go without nuclear weapons, while there are American nuclear bases in Korea, in Japan, in Okinawa, in the Philippines, in Formosa--all along our great expansion to the number of nuclear powers is the renunciation of all nuclear weapons by all those who have them now. If we were to say we would give up all nuclear weapons, DeGaulle would say yet tomorrow.

SUSSKIND: Mr. Noel-Baker do I detect in which you say a predilection for unilateral disarmament? Is that...

NOEL-BAKER: No, not at all. There are--I have friends in Britain who think that much the best defense of Britain would be unilateral disarmament. I have never never advocated unilateral disarmament, I say it, I repeat it in every possible form, thos that I put forward those which I think is the only practical proposal is multi-lateral disarmament. I think it's far easier to carry it through than to get a nation to do unilateral disarmament. And people say unilateral disarmament. I think it is--and people say unilateral has never been tried. It has been tried. We tried it on Germany, and Germany remained disarmed and wanted to remain disarmed provided that other nations would disarm too. Then the other nations didn't disarm they broke it up. Denmark disarmed, I saw the Danish foreign minister in March 1940 after the war had begun, and he said, we feel very satisfied, were on very good terms with the Germans, we hope to be able to negotiate as a neutral and get peace soon. In a few weeks they were occupied. Now I'm not for unilateral disarmament. And I believe that if our Eastern powers would take Kruschev up on it, up on what he said, and would make an initiative for getting a treaty on just disarmament, we should find it would be no difficulty to getting all the nations of the world to follow.

SUSSKIND: May I pause for a moment, for another commercial message, and I promise you no reference to the Declaration of Independence.

COMMERCIAL
(FRANKLIN NAT.
BANK)

SUSSKIND: Senator Humphrey, you wanted to comment on the unilateral disarmament issue.

HUMPHREY: Well, first I merely wanted to say that in our discussion on disarmament, neither of us are proposing any unilateral disarmament. And not only do I think that unilateral disarmament serves no good purpose, I think it could be in the kind of wicked world in which we live, a very serious matter, in a fact you talk about the terror that comes from the arms race, and the terror that could come from the arms race that gives you a balance of power. Imagine the terror that comes from an imbalance. That is the uncertainty and the possibility of some madness or some madman destroying the kind of world in which we live. I do feel also that our country has made reductions in arms, and we have, at least in military manpower. That we've done so rather quietly and we've done so without opening up negotiations to say we're prepared to reduce a million, are you? Just to have something, so to speak, to get your teeth into a negotiating point. We are contemplating for example withdrawing from certain bases in North Africa, well, we've known this for some time. Surely it was an opportunity for us to try to open up some negotiation on the withdrawal of troops and bases, not only on our part, whatever the reason for our withdrawal but to have pressed some withdrawal on the part of the Soviets from let's say Eastern Europe. I'm not saying that this all works, but you need some kind of entry wedge that is more than just talk, you need some kind of practical proposal that you start out on. And it is that thought that I wanted to offer here in reference to unilateral disarmament. I think we've been guilty of some uni-lateral disarmament without much to show for it.

SUSSKIND: May I ask both of you this question? It seems to me that disarmament will come in one of two ways in the Western world, an urge for it, a passion for a dedication to it, and a dedication do something about it. It will either come from an enlightened, effective brilliant statesmanship, leadership which is consecrated to disarmament and determined to do something about it which we have not had in recent years. Or it will come from the other direction, a ground-swell of popular opinion and pressure that forces it on the cognizance of our leaders. Now that seems to me the second alternative to be the immediate hope. Why is it in our country and I don't know about your country, England, Sir, but it's difficult to whip our people up to galvanize them on the issue of disarmament. You can make them quite hot-up on the issue of labor legislation or the farmer, or on most any other subject, but disarmament for the majority of our population is an amorphous mistique which they can't comprehend and about which they can get terribly little excitement generated. Why is that? Is that true in England, Mr. Noel-Baker?

NOEL-BAKER: No, if it's true it's less true now than it was 3 or 4 years ago. There is a growing realization of the very great danger in the arms race to bring it to an end, but I think, fundamentally it is that two things: The war is now already a long way away, 15 years since we stopped fighting. In Europe after the first World War there was a passionate feeling for disarmament in the League of Nations. Which lasted until the Conference failed 13 years, 14 years later. And then people more or less disparied, wrongly as I think, but for 14 years there was what you call, a ground-sell of public opinion, that very nerely succeeded in getting the governments to make the treaties. This time after '45 everybody was so horrified by the Heros-

hima bomb that there wasn't a voice raised against total nuclear disarmament in any country in the world. Fifteen years have gone by, they've got used to the fact there are a lot of nuclear weapons, they think they can live with them. And...

SUSSKIND: Is that what you think about America? Are we kind of lethargic, sympathetic?

HUMPHREY: No, no, it's difficult to excite people except in a very Utopian way, and you see that the subject of disarmament, you talk about it strictly in its most idealistic terms many of the more practical people in the world say we've been through this before; and don't do this to us. Plus the fact that you're dealing with these Communists, and they're tricky, they're deceitful. You can't rely on them. And therefore, even to discuss disarmaments tonight as we're doing, it's apt to be grossly misunderstood as if somehow or other he wants to throw away the security of his country which is anything but the truth. In fact I happen to think disarmament properly pursued gives us more security than what we're doing. So the subject matter is oftentimes somewhat taboo, amongst what we call politicians or statesmen. It's a subject that is discussed in Churches by spiritual leaders, our ethical and moral leaders, but often by our political leaders. Now I think you have to do what you also need to do is as I've said before is put the emphasis within the government on it. Within the structure on disarmament. This little subcommittee on disarmament that we have in the Congress came about by a special resolution I introduced some years ago. What do we have for a budget? 30,000 dollars a year. This great America, I have a staff of about three people, when I say I, I say the subcommittee. One full time staff member, two clerks and a part time worker. Now that's the Congress of the United States in the field of disarmament. We spend six times more, five times more to study juvenile delinquency.

SUSSKIND: Is that your current--30,000 dollars a year?

HUMPHREY: Oh, yes, about 30 to 35 thousand dollars a year, and we have a tough time getting that. Now, why isn't it more of an issue? Because it hasn't had the kind of probing and constant effort that is required. When a Nobel Prize winner can be on TV tonight, I think it may take on some new interest. Also I think the literature we've been developing on it, explaining the complexities, the intricacies of disarmament, I think will help in our schools, in our clubs, in our trade unions, in our business groups. I think this is what you need more than anything else on disarmament, is from the free world the effective dramatic, yet practical presentation for the greatest forum in the world the United Nations. Do you realize there hasn't been a major speech on disarmament by the President of the United States for I don't know how long in the UN. It's only a few minutes away from Washington, you know the U.N. it's right here in New York City. Why do we permit, I don't mean permit, of course Mr. Krushchev is welcome to the rostrum, but these are the places, these are the kinds of messages I mean, the disarmament message that need not be presented by even an, even a competent ambassador or foreign minister, but these are the messages that should be presented by the Chiefs of State. This is the world's most important business, because without it, just as sure as we were sitting her around this table on television tonight, if the thing continues for a few more years, it will get out of control, the nuclear club will expand, it is expanding right now. China will have her weapons. And with that man-power, that fantastic man-power that she has, and this restlessness and this bitterness which is so evident among her leaders, ---Germany is being re-armed, the Japanese are being re-armed, let's face it. Let's face what's happening to us. A few years ago Germany was not armed. A few years ago Japan wasn't--now they're all being armed. And we're helping them arm and arm and arm, and once they get armed you can't be sure what kind of a government they're going to have. I happen to think that the government of an Adenaur and the government of a Kishi in Japan, these governments are responsible governments, and pray that they will always be responsible. We've had some sad experience, mighty sad ones, and you have the Soviets.

SUSSKIND: You hit on a point made the other evening by Noel-Baker, he said: "If Germany joins the arm race as it inevitably will, then the danger of another Hitler is great indeed."

NOEL-BAKER: I argued, I argued last night that Hitler came out of German military. If we had disarmed as we were all pledged to do by the treaty of Versailles in the conference of 1932 when President Hoover put up the proposal of which I spoke. Every body then agreed and Chancellor Brüning who was in power can tell you so today, I talked to him in Germany, oh two years ago, that Hitler could never have come to power in Germany. It was only because Germany was being treated as a pariah, she was to be disarmed while all the other countries kept immense armaments all around, that was why she rearmed. And if the general staff built up Hitler, it's not

generally known that the arms firms of Germany who never believed in disarmament who didn't think that we could carry out our pledges, they turned out to be right, the arms firms had a weekly levy, they raised so much money per firm, per man employed and handed it over to Hitler for uniforms, for drill, for camps, for his stormtroops. They made Hitler. They made the storm troops with which Hitler took over Germany. Now if the arms race comes up again and Germany gets nuclear weapons, and all the other countries around have, then the power, the military cast will inevitably become bitter in Germany, I saw it before the first world war, I saw it between the wars, and I think it might well happen again. And when you've had one Hitler, you might easily have another.

SUSSKIND: Senator Humphrey, how can we deal with China on the level of disarmament or not joining the nuclear club when we have no form in which both of us can participate and urge upon each other the consideration of disarmament. The refusal of admission of Red China into the United Nations forums seems to me to cut off the only avenue of negotiation with her.

HUMPHREY: No, that's not true. You can still negotiate with China without her being in the United Nations or even without recognition. Now these, this is something that is being misunderstood. We had a conference with China already, a conference on Indo-China. We have been in a conference on Korea.

SUSSKIND: Isn't that kind of back-door?

HUMPHREY: Well, it may be back-door, be that as it may, it is not an impossibility, in fact it's not even difficult, in fact we have been negotiating with the Chinese in Poland--I believe it was Czechoslovakia--for a long period of time. What I'm getting at of course is that a disarmament worth the paper that it's written on will have to include, and I want to commend our Secretary of State, Mr. Herter, for his statement before the Foreign Relations Committee the other day--must include China. First of all, what a disservice it would be to all of us, if our governments, the British and the United States for example were to negotiate with the Soviet Union a disarmament treaty and excluded through some kind of blindness or inadvertence or ignoring the facts of life, Red China. This massive country with 650 million people bulging at the seams, militaristic, and a powerful army. We learned something about her in Korea. I must say China would have to be brought into a disarmament treaty. In fact a disarmament treaty must be world-wide. All of the major powers at least, the major powers that are capable of waging aggressive war, must be brought into the purview of that disarmament treaty, and to talk otherwise is to deceive the people. It is to be unrealistic, it is just to plain ignore the diplomatic and political facts of the world in which we live.

SUSSKIND: Some months ago, Mr. Krishna-Menon of India was on this program and he made the point that if amoral approval was the specific criterion of admission to the United Nations that its membership would be considerably reduced from what its membership now enjoys. We seem to be keeping China out because we disprove of her on all levels, moral, military, and everything else. Would you favor or, the admission of Red China?

NOEL-BAKER: Well, I can say it here, because I've said it many times in the House of Commons, I think we ought to admit China to her seat in the United Nations and I think it would help in the problem of negotiations. But the Senator was quite right, you could have a disarmament conference outside the U.N., or caused by the U.N., and if China agreed to come and take part, all right. You can have her there, but the Senator and I both agree that you can't make a disarmament treaty and leave China out, and I'm very frightened of what is happening in China today. China has this immense man-power as the Senator spoke of. China has been militarized. China is making its own nuclear weapons. I saw a French scientist who was there in 1958 who believes that they will have them by 1961. I believe they won't. I don't believe they'll have them until 1964 or '65. But what difference does it make. Four or five years is nothing. They will have them, unless there is a disarmament treaty in which they are full partners from the start. Now I think it's immensely dangerous to let things go on drifting as they are now. I remember how the Western countries militarized Japan, and we did it. Germany, France, Britain sent military, naval air millions, our arms firms went there and built warships, and guns, and aircrafts for them, Japan very nearly conquered Asia. And China, if she goes the same way, might be an immense danger to the whole world. I'm not sure that it's too late too, well I must say that I think we're running a great risk. I asked Khrushchev in the Kremlin, did he still think China would come in. And he said yes, I have no doubt that China will come in. He repeated it with great emphasis. And it was interesting that after his speech in the United Nations here, the Chinese government, after an interval of two or three weeks, issued a government statement that they would agree to whatever Khrushchev proposed.

HUMPHREY: You know, one of the points was made here on the nuclear weapons in China, this is something Mr. Noel-Baker that I have commented on in the Senate, I have said that I thought within a very near very close future--that means within a few years because it does take time--that Red China, Communist China would have her own nuclear weapons. She obviously has nuclear technology now our own scientists know this, and this is going to come on us some day just like Sputnik. You know we go around saying and pretending that it won't happen. It's jolly to live through these periods of make believe, and then all at once bang. There's an explosion. They've tested a weapon, and they're in the nuclear club, as they say. This is one of the reasons that I have been such an advocate of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. Because while they may have a nuclear technology and may be able to develop nuclear devices, they cannot develop a nuclear weapon, Mr. Susskind, unless they can test that system. We can police testing, and I believe one of the most important conferences working today of all time, is the conference in Geneva relating to the cessation of further nuclear tests. We have everything in the world to gain from the success from this conference if the scientists and military men are right, and I think they must be or they wouldn't tell us these things. We're supposed to be ahead in the number of nuclear weapons on the design, the sophistication, the diversity, or the variety of nuclear weapons, and if this is true, and this is what we've been told, it must be to our advantage to stop the nuclear weapons race, at least the nuclear testing. From the point of expansion of the nuclear club, it seems that we have everything to gain from pursuing this. Now the Soviets have objected on sight inspection. Which means that if there is a suspicious event within the territory of the Soviet, and inspection can go in and investigate whether it was a nuclear explosion, a conventional explosion or an earthquake. Well, we have objected on the basis of underground explosions. So what's the--how do we get around this impasse? Well, some of us have advocated the signing of the treaty to ban high altitude tests in space and outer space, atmospheric tests which give you fall-out, and submarine tests that is underwater tests. Now all of these can be inspected, all of these can be policed, and when it comes to underground tests my proposal has been that we join a three year moratorium on with present members where we pledge that none of us will test underground. And then we have a series of joint tests, testing underground under U.N. auspices and observation, letting the whole world know so that every nation can observe to test to improve our detection and identification system. This would mean to improve the seismographic instrumentation, to improve on-sight inspection to improve all conceivable kinds of geological structure for underground tests. I think we must do this, and while we're trying to do it, I believe that it is imperative that we pursue this relentlessly, and I have said, and I want to repeat on this program, that the military and Atomic Energy people should hush. They can talk to the president, they can talk to the Congress but this business of these outside statements that nothing will work, that you can't rely on it, this just feeds the grist mills of Soviet propaganda. Let our President, let our negotiators know just what the facts of life are, let them know the scientific facts, but quit giving the Communists the chances to say that we are wrecking the nuclear test conference. Sometimes I wonder if we have any concept of public relations at all. We seem to know how to sell Bank stocks, and savings, and soup and Coca-Cola and what else, pardon the commercial here, we know how to sell commercial goods here. And I don't like to talk about selling an idea, because it is cheapening it. But I think we ought to have some idea that the Soviets grab every little point. And every time they can use it against us, they do, because they are waging a war of words against us. They are waging a competition of ideology against us, they are waging a philosophical contest against us, we just insist on helping them. I for the life of me cannot understand it. When I was with Mr. Krushchev, he had literally listed in his mind the statement of every American General that he was going to bomb the Soviet Union, and he walked over to the map in his office and he said, well, your generals said they are going to bomb this and bomb this and bomb that. What do you expect I can say, I have to say something back, because that's just what he told me because we had been discussing--I had said to him: "it seems to me that the one thing we could do to contribute to world peace was to quit this loud talk. This irresponsible talk. I said, Mr. Krushchev, why don't we at least try to quit calling each other names for awhile. We have our disagreements on systems on values, and ideology, but why not talk a little quieter, by not a little more responsible," and he said, well looks who's talking, he said General so and so said this, and General so and so said this, and I remember one Easter just about 2 years ago, when Mr. Humphrey and I were spending a few pleasant days in Miami, Fla. where they had five headlines in 8 days over the Easter holidays which is supposed dedicated to peace, in which there were five headlines talking about how we could destroy vast areas of the world. I suggest we remember what Teddy Roosevelt said about speaking softly and carrying a big stick. At least speak softly.

SUSSKIND: You gentlemen discussed this idea, which is frequently advanced by way of procrastinating the disarmament possibility. And this is the idea that disarmament must follow political settlement, the argument that only when you settle the Berlin crisis, the Indonesian crisis, this crisis and that crisis, can you then turn your attention to disarmament. Isn't that fallacious?

NOEL-BAKER: Well, I would say two things about that. Firstly, I think you ought to try to negotiate all political settlements that you can get, at the same time you are negotiating disarmament. One because of other. If you can make a progress on Berlin first, on settling Formosa third, it seems to me very wrong. It seems to me to put disarmament out of the question for a very long time, and it seems to me to render almost impossible the settlement of those many questions that you professed you want to settle. Take Berlin. Why didn't the Soviets care so much about Berlin? Because it's an enclave inside their half of Germany, because their half of Germany is a big large extra barrier, between them and the armed forces of the west. When we proposed this engagement, when MacMillan came back from Moscow, and said something about thinning out the troops--it wasn't very clear what he said--immediately General Norstad said on the one side, why we wouldn't do that, weaken our defenses. And I feel absolutely certain that on the other side, the Russians said, we can't give up Czecho-Slovakia and the uranium mines, we can't give up Silesia and the coal, we can't give up the manufacturing capacity of Eastern Germany, that's absurd. As long as we're expecting a war we must, to keep these military aspects in in our hands. But if you've got a disarmament, say that we got an agreement in 1945 to reduce manpower in the armed forces in the United States, Russia and China to a million men, that's 60, 70 per cent reduction then, or 80 percent for the Chinese, say you got that, the pressure for the settlement of Germany for the re-union of Germany would have been tremendous. What's the real importance of Formosa? Is it that it is an American naval air base? I don't know, but the Chinese certainly think so. And I think myself could that if you could lick the disarmament, these political questions would be much easier to settle.

SUSSKIND: In other words disarmament must precede apace irrespective of the outstanding political disputes between the contending philosophies.

HUMPHREY: I think that is a view that one can hold, I think here's merit to it. My feeling is that we've made a mistake with the Soviets in permitting ourselves to be literally negotiated on items that they want to negotiate on. Now let's take for example the question relating to this whole Berlin question. Long before that should have happened literally, we should have been standing on every public platform of the world through our diplomatic facilities saying we want to talk about all of central Europe. Because I believe the Soviets are not going to be willing to negotiate with us on any terms that will be at all detrimental to themselves. And what you have to find is a so called quid pro quo, something that is a balance between the sides. And if you're going to find that you're going to have to broaden the area of negotiation. So you don't talk about Berlin as much, you talk the reunification of Germany, talk about a possibly, an area supervised, or demilitarized zone. You may talk about aerial inspection over some particular zone. You may talk about troop withdrawal, phased withdrawal. You put a whole lot of things in a negotiation package, and put it on the table and start piecing it together. You give here and take there, you adjust here and re-adjust there. But if you get one subject, and this is what the Soviets do to us incidentally because we let them, we waited--I was in Europe last year when Khrushchev said get out of Berlin--well who's he to say get out of Berlin? My response to him would have been quickly, We won't. Period. Now Mr. Khrushchev if you want to talk about the whole subject matter of disarmament and we'll include in that nuclear testing, if you want to talk about your commitments under the Potsdam treaty, if you want to talk about all the other commitments that have made and the ones that we've made, we're prepared to talk Berlin and all. But for Mr. Khrushchev to be able to swagger around through the world, and be able to say well we're going to talk about what I want to talk about, and we respond automatically our own Yankee nyet. And end it there, is very foolish. I think you have to state quite firmly that we are not about to be told by the Soviet Union what we are going to do. But we are prepared to discuss with the leaders of the Soviet Union the manifold and multitudinous problems that exist between us. And we'll regionalize them. We'll put them into areas that are negotiable. And sit down and talk. But we're not ready to have Mr. Khrushchev decide it's our turn to lead someplace. Now these men in the Soviet Union, we have to understand this, they understand power and they understand the use of power. They also know when they are riding high, and they know they are riding high, now, they have a psychological advantage, we've been lazy, we've been tired, we've been acting like that really the best years of the world are over. We've been living in luxury, we've dedicated to--as I've said only a moment ago--not only intellectual

mediocrity but mediocrity in goods, and in this kind of a framework with the zeal and the ambition of these Soviets, and anybody that's been in the Soviet Union for 24 hours is immediately impressed. The drive, the zeal, the dedication, the fervor, the work, ambition that seems to manifest all over the place. Not only by their leaders, but even amongst the people in the street as you meet them. Now you can't beat that with half-hearted, timid, fearful, cautious, operations and sort of a timid, muted leadership. You have to know what you want, you have to have some grand design. And you have to be willing to be firm in terms of what are your real values, the real things. And not on all the fringes, and that's a subject all within itself, but I saw this, I saw in the Soviet Union, they know what they want, but may I say Mr. Susskind, they know what they want in the next seven years, they know they have goals of production for their schools for their hospitals, for their doctors, they know what in Eastern Europe, they're blending Eastern Europe into their whole Soviet economy. They know exactly what they want, do we? I wonder you're an intelligent man...

SUSSKIND: I don't know.

HUMPHREY: You've been an observer of the American scene. What do we want. What are we talking about. Do you know what we've been talking about, stopping the New that isn't enough, to have a negative reaction to a positive force is to lose, and I have a feeling that Mr. Khrushchev feels that if the arms race keeps up, and we keep that arms race up, that he can't win that, and it may explode, but he may come to the conclusion that we can't take what I call the competition of peace. That is the maneuver, the adjustability, the flexibility, the movement in diplomacy that comes in this competition for peace, the economic, the ideology, the eroding away of our position. I have said repeatedly that I doubt that the Soviet wants to blow the world to pieces. They kind of like it, they'd like to have it, they'd like to pick it up piece by piece. Operation nibble. And they're nibbling a little here and a little there. Not only physically but politically. Nibbling in terms of our own spiritual values. And whenever you have a philosophy or an attitude, or you exaggerate to the other degree that everything is worse than it seems, and live in a fit of anxiety, you are bound to be nibbled to death.

SUSSKIND: Gentlemen may we pause for just a moment for a word from our sponsor.

COMMERCIAL
STATION BRK

SUSSKIND: In the interval, Sen. Humphrey just told us what he said on disarmament he had planned to deliver in a speech next week. I'm sorry Sen. Humphrey... no I'm not, as a matter of fact.

HUMPHREY: I'm supposed to be a speaker at the Roosevelt day dinner, the ADA Roosevelt Day Dinner on January 28th, Thursday, and I, our distinguished guest is Adlai Stevenson and...

SUSSKIND: He receives an award that night, doesn't he?

HUMPHREY: That's right, he does. Dore Schary is the chairman, Mrs. Marshall is the co-chairman. We're going to have Mrs. Roosevelt with us. I'm afraid that many of those people who were going to attend may have listened in. I'll have to add a paragraph or two to this speech which I haven't yet written.

SUSSKIND: I was going to say there must be a postscript somewhere...

HUMPHREY: I'm going to get something from Philip Noel-Baker something brand new for my meeting.

SUSSKIND: The presence of you tonight suggests this to me. You are in my view both an excellent statesman, you are also something else, you are both politician and to me that word is a good word, because it has to do with students of politics. And I wondered Mr. Noel-Baker, your country had a national election last Nov. you are a member of the British Labor Party, your party was defeated and I wondered Sir, since in your country Nov. last, you ran against the Conservative party in power, basically ran on the platform of peace and prosperity, however mildewed both seem in actual terms, that was the campaign essentially. Your party was defeated. We have an election up-coming in November this year, and I wonder what lesson you would draw for us.

NOEL-BAKER: Well, you put me in a very awkward position...

SUSSKIND: I don't intend that.

NOEL-BAKER: Because I've made it a principal all my life never to attack my government when I'm abroad, I do that when I'm home. And never to interfere in the politics of the country where I'm guest.

SUSSKIND: No, not really that. I was thinking of something more broad. You were the party out of power running against an in-power party. Whose basic platform was we preserve the peace thus far, and we have given you relative prosperity. Your party failed to beat that double-header platform. I rather suspect the Republican party will run on a similar platform in this country in November and I rather suspect the Democratic party will be challenging the truth of both of those statements. Do you as a consequence of the traumatic experience of your last election have anything to offer, not in personality, but in that situation?

NOEL-BAKER: Well, I think it is right for all parties which are proposing change, as essentially the Labor Party is, to recognize that in a large degree the changes that they were recommending 40, 30, 20, 10 years ago have been carried out. And I don't know or think we recognize how much we had abolished poverty in Britain. I think it's largely the result of what our government did from 1945 to 1951. We laid the foundation of what's called the welfare state, we put the trade union in a very strong position and insured that industry work in cooperation for an increase in output. And I think that substantially we were fighting on the same kind of attack against our opponents that we had 10 or 20 years ago, and it was out of date.

SUSSKIND: You were using old slogans for a new time.

NOEL-BAKER: And I would like us to have done much more on the constructive use of the United Nations and on the disarmament program we've been talking about tonight. And I personally believe that had we done that, I believe we would have done much better.

SUSSKIND: Let me ask...

HUMPHREY: There's a lesson in here somewhere for us, but one point, Mr. Suskind. You see the party in power in the United States today is a Democratic party, it is forgotten that we have won the party elections. Since 1952, we won in 54, we won in 56 and we won in 58. Now in 56 we lost the Presidential election with Mr. Eisenhower at the head of the ticket. But millions of people in this country do not recognize Mr. Eisenhower as a Republican, they identify him as General Eisenhower. When it comes to the Congressional election where you really test party strength the party, we won it hands down, going away, never was there such a great election victory as in 1958, and never had an incumbent President who had just been elected receive a rebuff, a defeat at the Congressional elections such as Mr. Eisenhower's administration received in 1954. Now having said that, that the danger I see to Democrats in 1960 is very much to be found, or is to be found in the speech of our friend Mr. Noel-Baker. Because we have a tendency as Democrats to talk about the new deal, the fair deal, to talk about our social security and our Public Utility holding act, and our regulatory commission that have been set up under the new deal and the fair deal. And I know sometimes people describe me as a new dealer, well, if you're a new dealer, you'd better be a New new-dealer, because we have accomplished much in America that we were seeking to accomplish only a few years ago. The reforms the tremendous innovations in American economic and political life. The Roosevelt administration and the Truman administration are now firmly embedded. As a matter of fact, reforms attained through a very difficult and turbulent period in the post war years, that in itself was a singular accomplishment. So now we come to the new era of politics, the 60's. The era of "Omnet" needs through out America, education has taken on a new dimension in American public life. Education, science, after all, the next president must be fully aware that science is a tremendous force for both the evil or good. He must be intimately acquainted with the relationship of science with science to politics and public policy. This is very important. Surely foreign policy has taken on a great new importance in our presidential elections, and I would hope in our Congressional elections. And I think the political party that pioneers in our in what we call for lack of better phraseology, a kind of qualitative liberalism, rather than just speaking all over the lot. The kind of liberalism that recognizes the fact of our interdependence in this world. This is the fact of our century, and we can have this interdependence without the sacrifice of our independence. Without the sacrifice of our freedom. I think we can, that gets back to the United Nations, strengthening it it... what about a little campaign making the world court than just

A sort of symbol of justice, but in fact a conveyor or a dispenser of justice, where the whole question of nuclear technology for peaceful uses, this whole issue of outer space research, the importance of having a cooperative endeavor among the nations of the world in the fantastic wonders of outer space. Young people know about this. I'll tell you, you now where I measure my policies, I measure my policies in what I'm doing with two people. ; My mother who is a very fine and religious and moral woman who tells me when I'm off base, and scholds me when I say I ought not to say, and reminds me that her neighbors are a republican and are people whom I don't have to act as if they were not. And secondly, my children. My children, when I speak of them I mean my 15 year old son, my 17 year old son, our 20 year old daughter, they're living in an age when they do not remember the depression of the 30's. As a matter of fact they can scarcely remember the war, indeed Nancy was only five years old when the war was over. What are they thinking about? They are thinking about a period of time which the contest is one of ideology. In which there are new frontiers being opened all over the world. I have two boys who are constantly talking about what they might be able to do in other parts of the world, in terms of their jobs, in terms of their responsibilities. Well, this is the new politics of the age, these youngsters in high school, I talked to them and in college, they're not talking about some of the stuff I talked about in college, they're talking about, they're talking about the cold war, to be sure, but internatinadism, economic development, technological assistance, they're wondering why there has to be a famine any place in the world ever again with this fantastic amount of abundance that we have. These are the issues. I don't know whether we're able to dramatize these as yet, but we don't have to have drama all the time do we? Isn't ... Do we have to have in America everything in red lights? And screaming headlines? Isn't it possible that maybe we can just pick up a book like Philip Noel-Baker's the ARMS RACE and read. I suggest that we have had one sickness in this country is getting the best of us...being briefed. wanting that book on one page in 15 minutes...

SUSSKIND: Or in a picture magazine.

HUMPHREY: Or in a picture magazine. Well that is true that a picture is worth a thousand words, I'll tell you a thousand words understood, gives one time for meditation and thought.

SUSSKIND: Can I ask you this Mr. Noel-Baker? As a citizen of England, a European, how does our civil rights struggle in this country seem to affect the peoples of Europe and the other places you mentioned? Does it have a telling effect in the world contest of ideology?

NOEL-BAKER: Well, in the days when the Kremlin was trying to use everything it could against you, the segregation issue was undoubtedly important, they were able to use it in the other continents in and among the colored the colored people of the world a great deal. But I think in Britain we recognized that an enormous progress had been made, perhaps I can speak for myself. I came to this country as a student to do freshman year at Haverford College, Penna. in the year 1906. I became for the first time aware of lynching. At that time there had been thousands of lynchings over a period of 40 years, white and colored people, and they were running about 4 a week when I was an undergraduate at Havorford College. And it was only after the first World War that enlightened people got together and made a giant campaign here--I used to get monthly accounts as to what was happening--I was in the League of Nations Secretariat and it was sent me officially--what was being done to get done of lynching. And year by year the number wetn down until it dissapeared. And now when you have one lynching, last year it was a national sensation. I think we do realize in Britain that you've made enormous progress and it --that's so easy to go all the way, and we have great confidence that you will.

SUSSKIND: May I ask you this Senator Humphrey? When I on, or rather introduced the both of you, I used the phrase that you were both extraordinary men in my view. An American politician, and again I use the word in it's best sense, you are a man in my view of considerable accomplishment, you are a statesman, you are a truth-teller, you are a fighting liberal, you are consistent and it's a remarkable opportunity your appearing on this program to ask you some very direction questions about the up-coming presidential struggle. For instance I would like to ask you this: With all of your talents which make you a notable figure on the American political scene, how has the mirage, the delusion that you are somehow a dark horse candidate, why the idea surrounding you, because you should be a fron runner. There are few men of your equipment, yet you know abroad there is a conception that Hubert Humphrey is a hell of a guy, but he probably can't make it. Where does that come from? What is the fabric of American political life that breeds that kind of an idea about one of our most illustrious politicians?

HUMPHREY: Well, it's certainly something that I've obviously asked myself, because it's not very reassuring or gratifying.

SUSSKIND: I don't believe it for a moment.

HUMPHREY: To be told or even believe that you haven't a chance. Of course it is obvious that I believe I have some chance or I wouldn't be doing what I'm doing. I am not engaged in these activities because there's nothing else to do. Frankly, I'm very much in love with my work as a United States Senator, and the work of the Senate, and the challenges of the Senate are great, but I felt there was an even bigger constituency, an even bigger audience, a great audience to get to, and talk to about some of the things we're talking about tonight. Of course many of these things, Mr. Suskind, are not reported. I don't say that anybody keeps them from being reported as we've said, but they don't make the headlines you see, but getting back to this whole business about being the under dog or being the sort of the dark horse, there's an tremendous amount of what we call public relations and public identification in American politics. In my own state, I think you know that I work very earnestly with great output of energy and effort at least, and with some effectiveness. I know thousands of people in my state, very frankly, most of the weekly newspapers are editorially opposed to me, some of them vigorously, some of them irresponsibly. The daily newspapers are not on my side, I don't mean that they are opposed to me, but that they are Republican. The Twin-City papers always report the news they're very good, the Minneapolis and St. Paul papers are very good. But it is very difficult to get known nationally, and I haven't seized upon any great issue like the labor bill, the rackets or crime investigation or something like that, in fact this runs a little counter to my nature. I prefer to talk about what we're talking about here tonight. Now when I was mayor of my city of Minneapolis, I fought the rackets, gave the city clean government, I think my own severest critics would say that. We gave it energetic and enthusiastic government. Wide citizenship participation. It was a great experience for me, and I think the community. But since I've been in the Senate, I've interested myself with such matters as urban development, the problems relating to our city life, the housing problems, schools...

SUSSKIND: You still make the headlines.

HUMPHREY: Not too often, I regret to say, unless you find one all too often to chastise. Now we could make headlines here tonight, by making some very bitter or sharp statement about some Soviet or some member of the government here or in England, but why do that? Government is not just personalities, government is attitudes, philosophies, policies, programs, issues, and I must say one of the weaknesses in American politics today is that it has become personality politics. Party responsibility has been frittered away all too often. We haven't become issue conscious, possibly. And somebody told me the other day that the reason was there were no issues, and my reply was that we have permitted our sensitivity to human problems to be dulled, to have become opiated so to speak, paralyzed in, spiritually in a kind of spiritual paralysis. No issues?

SUSSKIND: There are thousands of issues.

HUMPHREY: When I think tonight of the thousands of young men and women who represent God-given brain power and talent who are not going to go to colleges, why the answer to cancer, David, is in somebody's mind tonight who isn't going to go to College. The answers to a hundred and one of our problems and yet what do we have to argue about? We got to argue about a couple of hoodlums who get into the Labor movement or a couple of thieves who get in the business. The business of America is basically good and the labor movement is basically good. I want to get it into discussion of politics up to the level where our honored guest here tonight our friends put it. Let's talk about disarmament before our children are dead. And let's talk about stopping this madness in which the world pours a hundred billion dollars of resources every year in organized madness called the arms race. Why if we find somebody out here taking some Union health and welfare funds, we want to put him in jail. We have a three year investigation down in Washington. How many people have thought about the fact that this nation has spent five hundred billion dollars since World War two in what we call defense. And I ask the question tonight, do we have any defense? Is there any man in America tonight that can assure the mothers of America, the sons, and the daughters and the fathers that we could defend ourselves for one week. This is the issue, one of the issues. I'm getting all steamed up... this is the thing that really gnaws at my innards in politics and whether I get anyplace or not, in elective office, I have made up my mind in the brief span of life that I have, I'm going to talk about these things, and one of the reasons I may be out on the Presidential platform is because I think we have to talk

about them, and they won't listen to you all too often unless you get higher on the platform to talk, you see?

SUSSKIND: Senator, our audience is an unusual one. It's a large one, and it's an alert one. And I would be remiss if I didn't ask some specific question which will involve your educated political guess. One of them is this: If Mr. Adlai Stevenson were to irrevocably withdraw from the race--he's not in the race--but let's say a thing as the famous American expression "If nominated I will not run, if elected I will not serve." Who would be the specific beneficiary of this definitive withdrawal? Do you imagine it would be for you Sir, or Sen. Kennedy?

HUMPHREY: I think we would both benefit, but I think I would more so. I mean that's my really honest judgment, I suppose it's always subject to being accused of prejudice, but I really believe that there are many people who would come to my banner, or come with me, in fact I'm sure you know some of these people right here in New York who have said I'm for Adlai first, and Hubert, you're my second choice, but frankly what Adlai Stevenson has done for our great country and the kind of nobility he represents and I mean that in the finest way, in politics and intellectual attainment, this is the sort of thing that has a lasting hold on these people. And I will understand it, it has one on me, it has a big one on me, as a matter of fact.

SUSSKIND: Senator, if the Wisconsin primary should go against you, and I deeply hope it goes for you,...

HUMPHREY: Thank you.

SUSSKIND: Boy do I hope so. But if it were to have the other result, and you decided to withdraw at that point, would you countenance the vice-presidency with either Sen. Kennedy who is an easterner, or ... who else could it possibly be?

HUMPHREY: Stuart Symington.

SUSSKIND: Stuart Symington of Missouri, would you countenance--or Lyndon Johnson of Texas, --would you countenance the vice presidency position?

HUMPHREY: Well, I have said, and I must repeat it, I'm up for re-election to the United States Senate this year, my term runs out you see, I'm in a little different position than most of my colleagues, I have to make one of two decisions. Either I shall succeed in this effort as a Presidential nominee on the Democratic ticket or to do what I think is the best, to go back and run for the United States Senate. Now this does not mean that when one is in a convention situation, where your party may call on your self where you can automatically reject it out of hand, I don't believe that it's right to do that. I surely don't have any intention of being a vice-presidential candidate, and I have said quite categorically that I do not want people to consider me as a vice-presidential potential, then if I am not successful in this effort as a Democratic Presidential potential, then I will go home to Minn. where the people have been wonderful to me, considerate, and forgiving as may I add, and cooperative, and run for the United States Senate again. The reason is that I have now had 12 years almost in the Senate, I've learned a great deal about how to be a legislator and I hope an effective one. The Senate is a great parliamentary institution. I think can continue to make a great contribution and maybe a greater contribution to the politics in the best sense to the policy of our country, and I would hesitate to sacrifice that experience and that opportunity and that seniority which I now have in the Senate when there are many other men, very talented men in our party who would do extraordinarily well as a vice-presidential candidate, or a Presidential candidate. I was at a Democratic dinner last night, and when I looked over the audience I said to myself what am I doing up here making this speech? I saw so many capable people that I know in and out of Congress--Governors and just genuinely good citizens that I thought to myself what kind of a selective process do we have that I get up here and maybe some other, because there were many in the audience who are tremendously capable. Brain, great spirit, great intellect. And you see there is no dearth of talent.

SUSSKIND: Who has great spirit, great dearth of brains and great intellect? Lyndon Johnson of Texas?

HUMPHREY: Johnson is an effective leader, he's an intelligent man, I don't agree with Lyndon on many of these issues, but I have a great respect for him. Senator Kennedy is an extremely able man. A very intelligent, competent, hard working, --Sen. Symington is one of the men whom I think is underestimated by many of his critics. I say this most respectfully. I'm very fond of Stuart Symington. I've known him over these years, and like many of us, an image gets built up about you, which does not show the full truth about him. He's a warm, kind, considerate man. Sen. Monroney, Sen. Albert Gore. I should just speak of governors--Gov. Pat

Brown of California, my own governor Freeman, Gov. David Nelson, Oh, I know a host of them, when you start mentioning names, it's impossible. When I look at my political party of which I am privileged to be a member, with all its troubles and all of its conservatives, a handful of people who make us very unhappy about their intransigence attitude on civil rights, when I look around and think of what has come up the ranks, the Governors, the Lt. Governors, the legislators, the Congressmen, really I say to you Mr. Suskind, this is a tribute to American Politics.

SUSSKIND: Would a strong civil rights plank in the Democratic platform, would it be compromised in any sense this year, Sir?

HUMPHREY: No sir, I don't think it will gain you a thing politically. I think it'll lose us politically and from a moral view, a platform is where you state your conscience. That's a platform, now you may not always realize the fulfillment of that platform within the next two to four years. But One has amoral obligation as well as a political responsibility to state your convictions, now frankly all this stuff about a tough civil rights ;you know, what's being tough about it? When you want to guarantee the American people their Constitutional rights.

SUSSKIND: It's tough for southerners.

HUMPHREY: Yes it is tough for ;southerners, and we understand, we are very mindful of this, and understand their problems. But they must not deny us. The chance to at least name forward progress. And when I talk of civil rights, I'm not talking about giving somebody privileges, special privileges, I', against that, I simply say for example, one civil rights, that no man can really deny in good faith is the constitutional legitimate right of the right to vote. Unfettered, unabridged, untouched, and yet there are millions of Americans today who are denied to vote. Now we sure look sick, morally sick, and politically hypocritical. When we go on out to the world and scold the Soviets and scold the colonial powers about their failures to do things that ought to be done when right in our own America we deny people who are taxpayers the right to vote, taxation without representation lives today in America. We deny people who have served in the armed forces, who have been wounded in battle who carried the flag of the United States to the beaches in the Pacific, and in Korea up those mountains, the right to vote...I...

SUSSKIND: Sen. You will not temerize on that platform.

HUMPHREY: Not on that one, not on your life.

SUSSKIND: Even if people said, you do that, we walk?

HUMPHREY: David, some people have said to me that this banner I carry, and for what I call constitutional and legitimate rights for American people makes me, well unavailable, undesirable, so to speak, as a political candidate for my party. I'm too controversial. I may add that in the period in which we live, to be called too controversial is to say you disagree with the weatherman. This has been a period of orthodoxy and mediocrity if there's ever been one. But if, if the price of my political success, David, is to give up on my convictions on a matter of morality, of legitimacy of constitutionality of human rights, if I've got to peddle that one of, and water it down in order to get a nomination, I will just have to forgo the opportunity and the privilege of seeing the nomination or getting it. This price I refuse to pay. Any more than I would pay the price to renounce my country. I refuse to pay that price.

SUSSKIND: I like you Sen. Humphrey.

HUMPHREY: Well this is just something in the family. There are some things I just won't do. I love this country, and all that it stands for. And I happen to think that the fulfillment and the attainments of these great constitutional rights is one of our strong weapons in the cold war. It's one of the great moral forces in the world. And every time we have a blemish it hurts us. Thank goodness we've made great progress. And I want to herald the progress that Noel-Baker mentioned a moment ago, a tremendous progress, and we're going to make a whole lot more.

SUSSKIND: We're not through, but it is...

HUMPHREY: Oh, we got to go...

SUSSKIND: It is the moment of station identification, we won't hold you much longer. I promise. We'll be back in an instant.

STATION IDENTIFICATION

SUSSKIND: Senator Humphrey, do you have the conviction that anybody who seriously and earnestly seeks the nomination of his party to the presidency should enter the primaries with all the struggles that that means, and all the fatigue, and all the lack of a definitive national public response; with all the built-in limitations of the primaries? Do you think the fellows would get in there and scrap? Do you think Senator Symington should go to Wisconsin and Nebraska - he's obviously a candidate -- just a reluctant bashful one at the moment -- should he get in there and scrap with you and Senator Kennedy? You're a truth-teller...

HUMPHREY: Yes, I'm going to tell you the truth. The primary system of this country is a hodgepodge of uncertainty and vagueries in the state all too often. There is no central primary system, every primary is different. The Wisconsin primary is one when when you win it, you win something. You get the votes. But the primary let's say in Nebraska you can win the primary in Nebraska and not get a single delegate, because it's nothing but a popularity contest, advised. You don't even require advice to the delegates, you can win the primary in West Virginia and get nothing but expense and trouble. Now, I happen to think if you're going to have a primary system, you ought to have a national standard it it's for a national election so that when you win something, I mean, when you go into it -- it's very expensive. It's exhausting physically, and worse than that, as Adlai Stevenson pointed out so well, by the time you've gone up and down the hill on all these primaries, what is there left to talk about when you come to the general election. This is the real problem. Now, with myself, speaking of myself, I felt I had an obligation to enter the Wisconsin primary, first of all I'd been challenged. Wisconsin is in the midwest, even though it's a very different state in ... Minnesota. Plus the fact that there was... the only way, maybe, that I could attract the national attention that was required if the candidacy was to get off the ground, as some people say. I don't know why it had to be this way. But it seemed the way, and my advisors -- and I have some good ones -- said, "Senator, there's only one way for you to command the attention that your message ought to command, or that you as a potential candidate ought to have, and that's to enter the primaries." Now, I'm not one that feels that Mr. Symington or somebody else ought to enter all the primaries...

SUSSKIND: Just the one that would be binding.

HUMPHREY: I think it would be well, if they could enter at least one or more primaries. Just because this is some of the things that is being done, so to speak. It surely doesn't mean you're going to get the nomination, and maybe his blood pressure will be a little better than ours, when we're through, and he'd be a little healthier, the fellow that doesn't when he's through. Because, I can tell you that by the time -- and you remember the time that Adlai Stevenson and Estes Kefauver after 1956 - I'm very fond of both of these great gentlemen, and I saw both of them in the campaign after the primaries and after the general election, and what happened to them was cruel and inhuman punishment. It takes months to recover from the physical beating. I seldom get over 4 hours a night of sleep in this kind of business, four to five hours a night. Now my schedule's a little different. I'm not complaining. I don't have a private plane. That makes a difference. But it's very expensive. I take commercial airplanes. This means for example, I was willing to make a couple meetings in Colorado. I got back from Ogden, Utah into Salt Lake City at 3 AM in the morning, up at Smithfield the airport, was I had to go to Logan, Ogden and back to Salt Lake City - icy roads, I was up at 20 minutes to five the next morning to catch a 6:40 plane. I had exactly 2 hours and twenty minutes, and flew to another community. I flew 13 hours that day and arrived back in Washington, D.C. through storms, sleet and what have you, because the only way I had to go was a commercial airline. Now, don't misunderstand me. There's one advantage in commercial - I talked to all the passengers.

SUSSKIND: You win some votes enroute.

HUMPHREY: I had a chance to visit with them en route. I would not say that you have to enter these primaries to be a really serious and sincere candidate. I do think however, and I say this most respectfully, I hope my friend Stuart Symington will take my advice, or Lyndon Johnson, or any of the others.

If you are a candidate, please say so. And you don't have to enter the primaries. Don't be coy about it. Senator Symington in my mind is a candidate, and he's a good one ...

SUSSKIND: So is Lyndon Johnson.

HUMPHREY: So is Lyndon Johnson. He's an able and good one. They're good candidates. So let them declare it.

SUSSKIND: Isn't there something really wrong about the backroom conferences with the Carmine de Sapio, the other leaders around the country, while still resisting those few primaries where the effect would be binding and telling at the convention. Why don't they get in there as opposed to huddling with the quasi-major or New York.

HUMPHREY: Well, I'll tell you. A man shouldn't judge another man without recognizing that he's apt to be judged very severely himself. My daddy once told me, son, if you're scheduled for a concert and a wrestling match at Madison Square, don't fool around at county fairs, cause somebody's apt to pin you. In other words, what he was saying was that you can get into some of these minor struggles and you may have an off day so to speak, and things just don't go right, and maybe you're not quite prepared for it. You're done if you happen to slip. I recognize this, take for example in Wisconsin. I happen to feel that if I defeat Senator Kennedy, that this would be a very serious blow to his presidential hopes. It is not just a wound, it would be a major blow to him. If he defeats me, it is indeed a major blow, and I know. In other words, here we've almost put ourselves in a major struggle in one state, and by the way, imagine this: no state, no party registration...

SUSSKIND: Republican crossovers ...

HUMPHREY: Oh they can cross over in the thousands, as they have in the past, and they maybe will as Democrats have. You come in and get your ballots, and then go into the booth and nobody knows whether you're a Republican, Democrat or independent. There's no party registration, no party responsibility. Now what kind of a primary is that one and yet, the results of the primary are binding. The brass say that you can only vote as a Democrat in the Democratic primary there's a party registration, but after you vote it doesn't mean anything. Except that you ... somebody says, I like you better than I like the other fellow. It doesn't get you any delegates at all. In fact you can lose every single delegate, win the popularity contest and all amongst democrats. In Wisconsin you can win every delegate in Wisconsin and possibly not even have the majority of the Democratic vote for you, because the Republicans can cross on over. Now, if these are primary systems, all I can say is that they're about as good as some of the systems that have been used in our missiles that didn't get off the Cape Canaveral launching pads.

SUSSKIND: A defeat for either of you in Wisconsin would compel an agonizing reappraisal of the whole business, wouldn't it?

HUMPHREY: To pick up an old agonizing phrase, you're right.

SUSSKIND: The other thing I wondered about was this. You'd love to get in there and tangle with Mr. Nixon. If Mr. Nixon were elected to the presidency of the United States, would this make you deeply disconsolate from your partisan politics, you are a Democrat, no Republican victory is going to make you shout hallelujah. But would you be deeply and particularly disturbed about the election of Vice-president Nixon?

HUMPHREY: I think I would. I know I would. I'd want to judge, I'd want the way to judge. I believe one ought to try to give a man the benefit of a doubt. But there are developments that are, that have happened to Mr. Nixon's career which disturb me a great deal and I'm sure they do others. I surely would feel very uncertain. I'd want to give him, as I said, the benefit of a doubt. You said I am a man who speaks the truth, and I'm trying to speak the truth with all my heart. I happen to feel that Mr. Nixon has grown. I know that he is an informed politician, I know that he is capable of political calculation, political judgment,

but the real thing, the real important aspect in an American politician is his heart. You know, it's something intangible. It's not that he knows politics, knows management, knows executive ability, knows the issues of foreign policy, but it's that something intangible, that unconscious, that spiritual aspect of his identification with the real yearnings and needs of people. It's really much more than an emotional thing. But it's very deep, a God-given kind of thing. I've often felt that the Presidency of the United States has a much power as almost any office in the world, maybe more. The article the Constitution relates to the Presidency is the shortest article in the Constitution. All of the vents of the 20th Century have lent themselves to the concentration of power and responsibility to the executive and elsewhere. Now what is this that keeps our executive from acting like dictators? It's a whole framework, the whole atmosphere of American life, the volunteerism of it, the church, the family, the background, the history, the heritage, these great intangibles that move in on one that doesn't even know how it happened. It just comes upon that time of environment. It's what's stood us well, more than the courts, more than the Constitution. Even though we built in the Constitution the separation, the checks and balances, we put the mechanics in to prevent any dictatorial operation by our executive. But the real reason - remember Roosevelt took office the same month that Hitler took office - Germany was prostrate and we were we economically, but one was Germany, one was a country where it was Prussianism, and one was in a country where it was Jeffersonianism, the Emancipation Proclamation, and the other one was in a country where it was Bismarck and Kauewitz and the writings of some of the old Prussianistic totalitarian philosophers. This is the difference. Now, getting back to Mr. Nixon, I say I want to give him the benefit of the doubt, and I'm sure every American would want us to do this, I only hope that whoever becomes the president of the United States will remember one thing: that in the grandeur of that office, in the power of it, there's a greater necessity for humility, for a deep faith, for a kind of realization of your inadequacy in terms of the problems of the world, and yet, your appeal to your fellow man and to your God for help than any office in the world. Now maybe I'm not expressing this well. I just worry about people that crawl, that move too fast in this political arena, too ruthlessly.

SUSSKIND: Does what you've said add up to the fact that in your deepest heart and mind there is a question mark about the basic character of Richard Nixon?

HUMPHREY: I don't want to judge a man's character.

SUSSKIND: When you talk of these spirit things ...

HUMPHREY: I have, I worry that so much emphasis on the mechanics and on the calculations of politics, that there may not be enough emphasis of humanity of politics. And I don't want to do him a disservice. I hope that I'm so wrong that I should be ashamed of myself. I really do, and I do not make an accusation. I think these observations are made very broadly, far too, well far too, they're much too frequent, they're too irresponsible. I prefer to give a man the benefit of a doubt. And say that if elected he would serve responsibly. I think he would serve conservatively. I do not believe that a Republican conservative, and I say this respectfully, is really in tune with the great social forces that are in the world today. The social forces that we see in Africa and Asia, Latin America and I think this is the weakness, this is the basic weakness. It is not for Hubert Humphrey to judge a man's character. I can't do that, and do that honestly. So, rather judge his character or anyone's character for that matter in America, in contemporary American political scene until the facts are in, the evidence is in. When I say that a man is innocent in America until proven guilty and one should presume his innocence even though there may be a body of evidence that could challenge at least a degree of it. That's ... I guess that's enough.

SUSSKIND: Do you think that Mr. Rockefeller's withdrawal gives the Democrats the best chance they've had in the past year or so? I'm interest in looking at the political horizon. There was a ... an exciting political phenomenon which as for ... who has for reasons of his own withdrawn from the political race. Doesn't the Democratic Party have its best chance against Mr. Nixon? In your view.

HUMPHREY: Yes, sir, I think so, because Mr. Nixon, able and capable as he is, as a tactician and as an informed politician, and that he is, very able, and has demonstrated this ability, he is known as a partisan as a full-fledged capital R Republican as I said in a jocular very meaningful way, warts and all. You can't erase them, no amount of make-up will overcome this. He happens to represent the minority party in the United States which is the Republican party. Now Mr. Rockefeller while a Republican has broadened his base so to speak. He was able to attract a tremendous amount of independent support. I don't believe that Mr. Nixon can do that as well. Now he'll get some independent support, of course, unless the Democrats let him do it. Now if the Democrats go willy-nilly, Caspar Milquetoast on civil rights, if we start to think we must pursue the course of moderation and conservatism rather than a degree of dedication and of progressivism, why then Mr. Nixon will, going away, don't underestimate him. Mr. Nixon will campaign as a liberal. And Mr. Nixon will make it quite clear in this country that he wants to help them. I will dispute his record before I disagree with him. His record in the field of civil rights is not good -- his pronouncements are excellent as a candidate. Mine goes way down the line, but I've stood with him in Congress. I know what his record was and it is not good. If the Democrats think that just because of that we Democrats can win just by pretending some how or other that we have to be only one degree better than Nixon, record in order, to please and placate forces in our own party, forces that are a very small portion of the total structure of the Democratic party, if we think we can do that, Mr. Nixon, will be the next President of the United States. Because this man is a tough competitor and he can speak well. He's an organizer, he's well equipped as a political leader in terms of being able to move people, and I only hope the Democrats realize that our strength is in our conviction is in our sense of social consciousness. Is in our idealism, in the fact that we are the great idealists and the do-gooders. I'm not ashamed of being a do-gooder and good doer. I think it's wonderful, and anybody that wants to call me that, well and good, and if they want to call me an idealist, I accept it.

SUSSKIND: They call you that and you are. That's the good thing to be. If the political war should go against you, is there in your mind the way you'd go who is there ...

HUMPHREY: Not yet. Not yet. Plus the fact that a man, may I add in my position should not make that personal decision. He has associates and if I went to the convention with certain others with me, as I will not matter what happens in Wisconsin, and I think what happens there will be good, I want you to know, I must consult with them, because a man is not an island unto himself in this sort of a situation, he has associates, he has conferees, he has compatriots with whom he must work and get their advice and counsel before he makes any decisions.

SUSSKIND: Mr. Noel-Baker, you have been very indulgent with you ...

HUMPHREY: Local politics, I'm afraid.

NOEL-BAKER: I would like to make just one observation, two observations on what the Senator has said, firstly having been in Parliament for nearly thirty years, I hope he won't give himself too many days with 13 hours flying and 2 hours sleep. If he's going to be president of the United States he's got to keep his health, and he's got to keep it now. Secondly, I would like to say that the people who call themselves realists in the world today, are the people that a conservative Prime Minister said in our country a hundred years ago, who are determined to repeat the blunders of their ancestors. People who call themselves realists are the illusionists and that's particularly true about the subject we've mainly disarmed, I mean mainly discusses, the problem of disarmament. Realists who say, of course, you must go on with the arms race, and Utopians who think you can stop it are people who pretend that the arms are giving you safety where in fact they are destroying safety in the world until you have world disarmament. That is what the best men in armaments themselves, in the Armed Forces and among the ministers themselves of the world really believe.

SUSSKIND: Would you think both of you gentlemen, what the world needs, what our country needs, yours and the universe is the beginning of an articulate, intelligent, honest, great dialogue with the fussiness and the obscurantism of the big issues of our times, the personality cults might give way to the deepest kind

of discussion of the things that will determine life or death.

NOEL-BAKER: There are three immense issues now before the world. What are we going to do with the new industrial revolution? Automation, atomic power, within 20 or 30, or 40 years will finish poverty, it will give immense leisure, to a really great proportion to the human race. How are we going to train men and women who are now young to use the leisure when they get into it 20 years from now? Secondly, we've got the problem of bringing up the standards, the underdeveloped countries of which the Senator spoke. There ought to be a world crusade against the present poverty and want that exists. And thirdly, this business of armaments. And on this we use exactly what you said that one of their philosophers called the great dialectic of public debate. Of all mediums television, radio, press, universities featuring general discussion in every form we ought to get down to these basic problems.

SUSKIND: You have a final statement for us?

HUMPHREY: Well, I was just taken by the succinct and concise analysis of Philip Noel-Baker has just given us of the truly human challenges ahead of us. I'm just realizing my own inadequacy again, I looked at these challenges in a much less meaningful and rich manner because that first one of the industrial possibilities of the technology, the technological advance, the atomic energy, automation, this is unbelievable, and that food, food production. Never again does famine need to stalk the earth. In fact, our country today, Mr. Suskind, America today can give a pledge to the world, that never again will famine be the burden of mankind. We have it right now, and believe me if I were privileged to represent our country, I would give that pledge to the world, instead of trying to tell our farmers to quit producing, asking them to do something that's almost immoral. In a world of the hungry we can banish much of sickness, and of course, we can do so much with this burden of ignorance and illiteracy. You know, I've often thought, how are you ever going to have peace in the world today with sick, physically, mentally and morally, hungry-- in terms of their lack of food -- poverty illiterate, and there with all the passion of prejudice that comes with it, fear. You see we have to wage a mighty war upon hunger, and we can. And we have the means literally to hold at bay sickness and make real inroads on it. And we have the means to obliterate illiteracy. Why doesn't America take this lead. We only touch it, only nibble at it. This is what I mean by the dramatic presentation, the grand design for us for the future, the real America coming to life. Why I'd like to see our President to say to the world for once and for all illiteracy will once and for all be done with. We can start in our own back door right down in Latin America. We'll do more to prevent the resurgence of Castros, Trujillos and others than anything you can think of. These are things that we need to do. Oh, we can get this job done. I tell you, some people want to do it. This is what I meant a while ago about this new dimension of politics, that all of the talk the people have about delinquency, there's a new morality in America and in the world, I really believe it. It's a morality of social justice which after all one of the great, great attributes of a decent and a wholesome man, justice, social justice, the prophets of old asked for, my favorite prophet, Amos, the Testament speaks of it, the promise of Democracy and social justice. This is what we ought to be for. And not only be for, live for it. Give your life for it. That's my message and I'll quit on that tone.

NOEL BAKER: Well, I'd like just to make two observations about what we were saying on the main subject at this time which I'm principally concerned: can disarmaments be reduced? The first is this. Supposing we got down to the kind of disarmament the United States delegate declared in 1952 which Khrushchev declared this year. When there isn't enough armament to make this possible of one nation to attack another, well, therefore you've really got rid of war. Need we be afraid of the Soviet challenge? In my view, certainly not. Because the people of the uncommitted countries, the fifteen hundred million, two thousand people who don't belong to the pillar block want to keep their freedom, would much prefer the democratic system, provided we use the resources which were released by disarmament to help them to get rid of poverty as the Senator has been saying. Therefore, I'm not at all afraid of the Soviet challenge on that basis, indeed I think it's most desirable that our competition with the Soviets should be on that level and that ... I also of course, as we've said all evening

disarmament is essential to humanity to get rid of war. Now, secondly, why is it difficult to make people grasp the idea of disarmament? Why is it there's the great feeling, now, why isn't there the upsurge, the groundswell of which you spoke? Two factors, in my view. Firstly, people think of the word disarmament as merely the reduction of their own disarmament, giving up their own bombers and battleships and missiles, bombs. And not those of the potential enemy. In other words, subconsciously it means unilateral disarmament to them. But, of course, that isn't going to come about and none of us are proposing that. In my view, the essence of disarmament in our point of view is the Russians will give up their armaments, as we're doing, and thereby we shall be very much safer than we are now. In other words, the only real policy of national defense is disarmament. And again Duncan Sands practically said that, I'm only paraphrasing his words in the House Of Commons last year. And the second factor and the last word I say is this. One of your great scientists, Isadore, Rabbby, who was chief scientific advisor to President Eisenhower until last year, wrote an article in one of our Sunday papers in July 1958. He said the facts have just not penetrated, people do not understand the modern weapons. He says that this goes for the governments as well as the people. If it were not so, they would make disarmament the first issue. They'd considered when they they consider every morning when they got up. Now, I think we've got to somehow make the people understand that it really is true that the arms race goes on, and we allow it suddenly to erupt into a war, I would like to -- I'm afraid of the man being in the supreme power like the, one of your secretaries of whom... you had in Washington. He had a good mind until he made it up -- I'm afraid of the man who in a crisis makes the wrong decision, lets the war loose and sinks all mankind.

BRUSKIND: Gentlemen, all I can say to you is that you have made this an exciting night for me and I thank you very much.

Ladies and Gentlemen, our guests have been Mr. Philip Noel-Baker of England and Senator Hubert Humphrey. Thank you for being with us tonight. We'll return again for Open End next week at this same time. Goodnight.



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