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DISARMAMENT and FOREIGN POLICY

speeches and statements by

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INTRODUCTION

Those of us who work in the field of international affairs must constantly remind ourselves that there is no single panacea for peace.

As Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament, I have given much time, thought, and energy to the limitation and eventual abolition of the armaments race. Yet I would be the first to recognize that this is neither the only nor the sufficient means of securing peace with justice and freedom. The competition of the Communists is total and world-wide, and is waged upon the diplomatic, ideological, and economic planes as well as the military. So, in the latter portion of this pamphlet, I have sought to place disarmament in a broader perspective.

I do believe, however, that disarmament is one of the most promising roads to peace now open—if only because both the Communist and the free world have a very strong mutual interest, transcending ideologies, in escaping mutual destruction.

Progress in disarmament would open up other roads to peace—both because it would lighten the deadly clouds of fear and suspicion now overhanging the world and because it would release great resources for a global campaign against poverty and despair, the causes of past wars and the possible causes of future wars.

I hope that these excerpts from my speeches and statements will help to stimulate sober thought and informed discussion on this vital but complex topic.

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY
Washington, D. C.

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What Is Disarmament?

When we talk of disarmament, or of the control and reduction of armaments, we are talking about something which goes to the very root of our national security . . . Today no nation or person on earth can have a reliable assurance of security when weapons exist which are capable of destroying all mankind. On the one hand, we know that an arms race can end in unparalleled disaster. On the other hand, we are equally aware that, if one nation lets down its guard, it invites aggression from a powerfully armed adversary. Unilateral disarmament on our part would be foolhardy. Disarmament, if it is to be possible at all, must be a mutual proposition.[1]

A New Concept of Defense and Disarmament

For too long now the words *defense* and *disarmament* have been treated in our thinking as though they represented the opposite points on a compass or the extremes in the thermometer . . . I do not see why disarmament and defense cannot be made the inseparable twins of national security policy.

We must simultaneously increase our efforts and our expenditures, if necessary, to close the missile gap on the one hand and to devise plans for missile control on the other. Such an effort should be pursued all down the line in areas of defense and disarmament. Alongside such a program of action, our negotiators, our information service, and our diplomats should be waging a campaign to bring pressure on the Soviet Union and other nations to enter into serious negotiations. This campaign should be waged at every level—at the United Nations, at Summit Conferences, at Foreign Ministers' meetings, and at any other forum where representatives of the major powers meet.[2]

Keeping a Balanced Defense

I have been deeply concerned for some time that we are placing all of our so-called defense eggs in one basket, the basket of massive deterrence, massive retaliation, the whole concept of nuclear strategic striking power.

I do not believe that that is a sound defense policy . . . If we are to have a defense structure, which we must have . . . it must be modern, mobile, capable of meeting the kind of aggression or attack that may well take place; namely, attacks on the periphery of the free world, brush fires, limited attacks.[2]

Nuclear Weapons: Development and Control

The assumption that small nuclear weapons must be used as a defense against the large armies of the Soviet Union and Communist China fails to recognize that the Soviet Union also has a large supply of nuclear weapons and that, if we use such weapons, there is nothing to prevent her from using them or making them available for use against us.

Where I part company with many of my friends in the atomic weapons field is in their notion that continued atomic weapons development is more important than anything else we can do, that it is more important than trying to have an effective test ban agreement based on effective controls, more important than trying to slow down the arms race, more important than trying to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons production throughout many countries, and more important than getting the Soviet Union to accept and implement the principle that control and inspection must be part of the reduction of armaments. It is here that balance is lost and judgment becomes blurred. It is on this point that certain military factors are overlooked and political and psychological factors are almost ignored completely. And it is here that the fatalism about the inevitability of another war and the skepticism and cynicism about the prospects for progress on disarmament produce a distorted concept of what the goals of our defense and foreign policy should be.

I shudder to think of the military situation that would confront this nation—and, indeed, the world—if several other nations achieved a nuclear weapons and missile delivery capability of their own. To prevent such a situation is one of the main reasons why a total ban on nuclear weapons tests is more desirable and more urgent than a ban only on tests in the atmosphere and under water. It is to our own national interest—and indeed to the interest and well-being of humanity—to try to limit the membership of the nuclear power club.[2]

Are the Soviets Serious about Seeking Disarmament?

If the Soviet attitude toward arms control has become more serious, I believe there are compelling considerations that may be influencing the Soviet leaders in that direction. These considerations stem from pressures both inside and outside the U.S.S.R.

Among the primary pressures affecting the attitude of the Soviet leaders is the awareness that the new weapons are so destructive that in an all-out war all nations, including their own, might perish. It is becoming more apparent that the Soviet leaders are finding it to their interest to avoid starting or being drawn into a new war . . .

The Soviet hierarchy may also be worried about the danger, increasingly imminent, when other nations—some not so responsible as the United States and Britain—may possess nuclear weapons . . . (and) . . . about the explosive situation that exists in East Germany and in other satellite countries. If the East Germans should rise up as did the people of Hungary against their Soviet and puppet rulers, the West Germans, the Soviet Army, and ultimately American and Western forces stationed in Germany and Berlin could be drawn into the conflict. The Communist leaders may not intend to give up control in that area, but they could well be serious in seeking some arrangement that would lessen the possibility of conflict.

The Soviet leaders must be concerned over their loss of prestige and acceptance due to their ruthless suppression of the revolt of the Hungarian people.[3]

Can We Rely on an Agreement with the Soviets?

. . . The pressures on the Soviet rulers which I have noted may be forcing them to consider measures that are antithetical to the basic nature of their regime. At the same time, the evaluation by the Soviet experts of the problems which the Soviet Union would have in accepting even limited

inspection must cause us to proceed cautiously in considering Soviet proposals on inspection.

While the Soviet Union apparently is showing new interest in a limited arms agreement, we should not expect the Soviet leaders to diminish their cold war tactics. On the contrary, we should expect them to persevere and even increase their broad emphasis on political, economic, and psychological competition. They may decide against blowing the world to bits, but their strategy continues to emphasize absorbing the world bit by bit.

With such sober warnings in mind we can proceed to hard bargaining with the Soviet Union about limited measures of arms control that may lead progressively to more comprehensive disarmament. We cannot trust the Soviet Communists, but we can seek arrangements that do not involve good faith to be effective and workable, arrangements which are self-enforcing, adequately inspected, and which are mutually advantageous . . .[3]

Progress toward Disarmament

(The resumption of disarmament negotiations) . . . is an opportunity to make progress toward a diminution of the pace of the armaments race in which the major powers of the world are now engaged . . . Let us hope that the proposals advanced and the spirit in which negotiations are conducted will be conducive to producing harmonious and positive results.[4]

The Soviet proposal (for total disarmament in four years), although full of propaganda . . . should not be dismissed by our Government. Instead, we should respond with our own plans as to how the world, specifically the great powers, might proceed to have controlled disarmament based on stages that can be taken safely and judiciously considering the national security of all countries. Only in this way can we determine how much of the Soviet proposal is serious and to what extent the Soviet Union is prepared to accept the controls that must accompany each and every disarmament measure.[5]

Proposals for Disarmament in the Nuclear Age

I offer three arms control proposals which should be given the highest priority. In proposing them I am assuming there will be continued negotiations for a ban on nuclear weapons tests. I give the test ban talks a better than even chance of being successful. I believe the outcome will be based on a control system for the cessation of all atomic tests, initiated perhaps in stages . . .

The proposals I offer are all based on the concept of mutual agreement. I do not support unilateral disarmament. We have already had too much of this in the name of a balanced budget. Until we have concrete progress in arms control our own defense posture must not only be maintained but even strengthened in key respects.

Proposal No. 1. We must seek the control and reduction of long-range missiles and long-range bombers. We must increase our efforts to preserve outer space for peaceful purposes.

Proposal No. 2. The production of fissionable material for weapons purposes should be curtailed under effective safeguards.

Proposal No. 3. We need a world-wide anti-surprise attack system against the use of any kind of military force by one country against another.[6]

Will the Soviets Accept Controls?

If the world is to witness any progress toward ending the arms race and toward reducing the burden of vast expenditures for defense, we must determine whether the Soviets mean it when they claim they are willing to accept controls. Our main, and at the moment only, opportunity to find out is through the nuclear test ban negotiations now in progress in Geneva.

If these negotiations succeed, then future arms control talks can be conducted in a much more favorable atmosphere than if they fail or become stalemated indefinitely.

Soviet representatives are beginning to accept some concepts of control to police a nuclear weapons test ban . . . For a country in which secrecy and suspicion are almost a cult, the willingness of the Soviets to accept . . . (some concepts regarding) controls is an advance over previous arms control negotiations. Never in thirteen years of talks on disarming have the Soviets come this close to accepting controls in specified treaty language.

However, the United States finds that the Soviet position on controls is still inadequate in three major respects . . . The big problem . . . is how many of the hundreds of unidentified earthquakes should be subject to inspection to give a high degree of assurance that the Soviet Union is not able secretly to conduct a militarily significant series of nuclear weapons tests.[7]

Proposal to Break the Nuclear Test Impasse

Point 1. Let the United States extend its general moratorium on all nuclear tests . . . for a maximum of one year (December 31, 1959 to December 31, 1960). This would give the nuclear powers ample chance to reach agreement. I would not extend this moratorium more than one year; if the Soviets stall longer than that, it is a sign they are trying to get a test ban with no controls whatsoever. I think the U. S. must not allow this to happen.

Point 2. We should be prepared to enter into an agreement banning nuclear tests equal to and above five kiloton explosions. The agreement would specify that all unidentified events with a signal equal to and above a five kiloton explosion would be subject to inspection. The ceiling on the number of mobile inspections would be somewhere between twenty-five and fifty a year. In this way I believe we could arrive at a number of mobile inspections that would correspond to our present best educated guesses from a scientific point of view as to what is necessary.

Point 3. We should be prepared to join with the other countries for two years from the time the agreement goes into effect in a moratorium on tests below five kilotons. At the end of that time we shall know two things: (a) whether the Soviet Union and other countries are cooperating in installing the control posts; and (b) whether by observation and further research the control posts can be improved to detect and identify most of the unidentified events below a size of five kilotons.

Point 4. During the two year period in which the control posts and inspection system for the five kiloton threshhold agreement were being established we should conduct a comprehensive research program in cooperation with the Soviets, with the United Nations, and also by ourselves. Such a program would be designed to find ways of improving the control system so that all suspicious events would be subject to inspection within a reasonable ceiling.

Point 5. The agreement should specify that, if the international control posts or our own detection system gave evidence that the Soviet Union was not cooperating in the moratorium on tests below five kilotons (those not subject for two years to mobile inspection), then we would be free ourselves to test in this range. We would present our evidence to the international control commission to show that the moratorium had been violated. And if the Soviets do not agree to install appropriate and reasonable controls for tests below five kilotons we should be free to test in this range if our defense requires it.

My proposal is one I believe can be reached within a short time, given the sincere desire to reach agreement on the part of the Soviet Union and the U. S. This is one that should be offered rather than have the negotiations fail or continue indefinitely to a stalemate. This proposal covers the requirements of the U. S., namely that a control system should be based on what scientists estimate can be done. It also covers the requirements of the Soviet Union, that a control system must not be confused with extreme complexity, which to them looks like espionage. And it is a proposal which gives considerable assurance that we can have a total and effective test ban agreement.[7]

What Is Being Done about Fallout?

Of all the problems which affect the well-being of this generation and that of generations yet to come, none is more serious or more filled with unknowns than the problem of radio-active fallout from nuclear weapons testing.

I do not believe the Government of the United States is doing all it should do in the examination of the potential dangers of radioactive fallout . . . I speak not only of radioactive fallout from atmospheric tests, which all of us now recognize as a serious problem; I also speak of the possibility of radioactive fallout from high altitude tests, the dangers of radioactivity from underground tests,

and the dangers of radioactivity from underwater tests.[8]

Observations and Suggestions on Fallout

First, it is becoming apparent that the Atomic Energy Commission, with its important and primary interest in the field of atomic weapons and the production of atomic power, is not the best agency to conduct research on fallout and its effects on human health and heredity. This research should be lodged in another Government agency, one which has adequate funds to do its job and one which can be completely independent in reporting its findings. I suggest that this agency might properly be the U. S. Public Health Service with some assistance from the Food and Drug Administration and the Department of Agriculture. Of course, the valuable data and techniques and talent of the Atomic Energy Commission should not be ignored.

Furthermore, it is becoming apparent that an agency like the World Health Organization ought to play a larger role in coordinating research on this problem in many parts of the world.

It is one thing to conduct more research so that we know more of the complete effects of radioactivity on man and his environment. It is another thing to try to see that this rising radioactivity does not rise further. This means that the efforts to halt nuclear weapons testing must continue to be pursued vigorously.[9]

Should We Stop the Tests Because of Fallout?

Many of our citizens want nuclear tests stopped out of concern for their health and the health of their progeny. I share this concern. I am the father of four children and I want to be as sure as I can that their health and their children's health will not be jeopardized as a result of nuclear weapons tests.

At the same time, I do not wish to act foolishly and call for the cessation of tests on grounds of health if the health issue is not really an issue . . . The arms race and the threat of nuclear war are the main reasons why tests should be suspended. The danger of fallout may be another reason for

ending tests but I am not yet convinced that it is . . .

On the other hand, there is a great deal that apparently is still not known about the problem of radioactive fallout. Information regarding the matter has not always been promptly and thoroughly given to us by the executive agencies most knowledgeable on the question. So I would also argue that, in the absence of complete information, responsible officials should not try to belittle the problem and say the problem of fallout is comparable to wearing a wrist watch . . .[10]

We Must Plan for Disarmament

The Disarmament Subcommittee has made definite recommendations regarding the type of effort that the executive branch ought to make in order to be thoroughly prepared regarding all arms control possibilities. The Subcommittee suggested in its report the "creation of special advisory groups of non-governmental experts who are especially knowledgeable regarding problems related to disarmament." The Subcommittee also recommended that the President and the Secretary of State make sure that the head of the Office of Disarmament has the necessary funds and authority to carry out his assignment.[11]

If the United States is to negotiate effectively with the Russians, our political position must be solidly grounded in the best possible scientific and technical thinking. How can we take the initiative in the area of disarmament unless we have confidence in the scientific reliability of our position? It is inconceivable to me to expect a handful of people in the Department of State—no matter how able and devoted—to develop and assemble all of the necessary information which our government needs to act purposefully and wisely in the complex and many-faceted areas of disarmament. I have reason to believe that the Russians are not slacking in this field.[12]

Preparing for the Economic Impact

We must also be prepared to change a vast segment of our production from arms manufacturing to peacetime pursuits.

There is no doubt in my mind that money saved on armaments will find other uses. It would make it possible to shift emphasis to many urgent peacetime tasks.[7]

I am convinced that it is possible to have an expanding economy without having a large defense budget. But I am likewise convinced that adjustments will need to be made if a substantial cutback in armaments were to occur. To minimize possible adverse aspects of such adjustments we must study and plan . . .[13]

How Would Red China Fit In?

It is essential that Communist China be brought into any disarmament system at an early stage. As long as there are no armament controls on Communist China, that country will be free to continue to strengthen its large military machine. Moreover, until Communist China is included in a disarmament system, it will provide a loophole which the Soviet Union might use to violate obligations undertaken as a result of a disarmament agreement.[14]

N.A.T.O. and the U.N.

The community of nations comprising N.A.T.O. is the core of the Western world. If this community stands firm and united in the cause of freedom and justice, we shall prevail. If it collapses, we shall be in mortal danger . . .

We should not ignore the importance of achieving unity and support beyond the confines of the N.A.T.O. community . . . Let's not hesitate, at the appropriate time, to place our case before . . . (the United Nations.) The U.N. cannot solve our problems for us. It was never meant to be a substitute for the difficult foreign policy decisions all governments must make. But it does present many opportunities for the execution of a responsible foreign policy. And no objective is more important than that of mobilizing the support of the many nations that share our concern for security and justice.[15]

The Reunification of Germany

These two—N.A.T.O. and Berlin—are closely linked together. The first Berlin crisis of 1948-49 brought the N.A.T.O. community into being. The present Berlin crisis tests whether that unique community of nations . . . can long endure.[15]

Of all the problems confronting Europe at the present, the most difficult to solve may be the reunification of Germany . . . No one in the free world should be willing to forego the goal of German reunification in freedom. It is neither necessary nor desirable, however, to have negotiations on all other European problems held in abeyance until German reunification has been achieved. In fact, the solution of the German problem may be facilitated through agreements on arms control and by developing methods to encourage the Eastern European countries to evolve in a more independent way without the political and economic domination of the Soviet Union and without the presence of Soviet troops.[16]

The Advent of the Space Age

In the space age weapons are so tremendously destructive that military rivalry over control of space could be sheer suicide. If in the mid-Twentieth Century man is to master new worlds, the venture will have to be a joint one or the ensuing anarchy might inter man in his earth before he ever gets a chance to leave it.

There are immediate as well as long-range problems posed by the space age . . . These complex questions should be settled soon, or disorder and confusion, and even conflict, could result from rapidly progressing space developments. (Following are) my . . . proposal(s) for dealing with the problems of the space age.

Space Law

First . . . The United States should immediately sponsor in the United Nations a study of the question of bringing space travel and communication under an international legal order and regulation.

Control of Ballistic Missiles

Second . . . All missiles and outer space vehicles should be placed under international surveillance (by the U.N.) to insure that no clandestine tests of rockets or other outer devices are conducted for military ends.

International Space Research

Third . . . As a separate and independent project, the U.S. should take the lead in marshalling the talents and resources of the world to unlock the mysteries of outer space in joint research and exploration under the auspices of the U.N.

Satellites for Peace

Fourth . . . One of the first projects it (the U.N. outer space agency) should sponsor . . . is a priority program for a reconnaissance satellite . . . Such a satellite could cross national borders and Iron Curtains and expose to . . . the world the military preparations of all nations.[17]

Needed: A Total Foreign Policy

A foreign policy which is carried out on many fronts simultaneously is the only kind of policy that makes sense in today's world. Wide-scale, short and long-term foreign economic assistance and investment; expanded and revitalized world trade; a strengthened United Nations and other international institutions; greater acceptance of, and reliance on, international law; a vastly greater exchange of persons; greater respect and concern here at home for the rights and liberties of individuals; the strength and growth of our own economy—all of these must be pursued vigorously and wholeheartedly, all the while we are pursuing just as vigorously and wholeheartedly the solution of political conflicts and the control and reduction of armaments.[18]

Diplomatic Opportunities

On the diplomatic front, we should welcome every opportunity to talk things over. We should make it clear that the willingness to talk is not a sign of weakness on our part, but a sign of strength. For this reason, I support the Eisenhower-Khrushchev conferences.

These talks may help to disarm the diplomatic atmosphere, but they will not disarm the men or machines . . .[19]

The United Nations and its related agencies, such as the World Court, are the best bargains in American foreign policy.

We should be pressing for safeguarded disarmament through the U.N., we should be working for a well-fed and healthy world through the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization, channeling more of our efforts to help underdeveloped nations through the economic agencies of the U.N. And we should be taking the lead in strengthening and broadening the powers of the World Court in solving disputes between nations.[20]

The essence of responsibility in international affairs today is strength—military strength, ideological strength and spiritual strength. It is our hope that this strength can avoid war . . . Through strength we can build friends and allies . . . eliminate the injustices and poverty in the world that breed Communism . . . negotiate, and know that we are negotiating without sacrificing our principles or honor.[21]

The Ideological Challenge

The United States represents the antithesis of Communist totalitarianism and Soviet imperialism. We must be ever mindful that the overriding ambition of the rulers in the Kremlin is to surpass us in all major sectors of human endeavor.[22]

The greatest danger (in the Khrushchev visit) is that some Americans will be tempted to take . . . (his) talk of "peaceful coexistence" at face value. According to his interpretation of coexistence, it is perfectly all right for the Soviet Union to swallow up the Baltic states, to impose its will on Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and to tighten the screws on West Berlin.[19]

Education for Peace

If education has been one of our cherished American ideals, it is also one of the deepest hopes and needs of people everywhere . . . I propose that we launch a broad program of world educational development—a plan of "education for peace." The first step would be for the Congress of the United States to declare to the free world that we share their belief in the values of education and that we are ready to work with them in

building up their own educational systems to train their people.

The program I propose would involve grants for laboratories and facilities, for the endowment of professorships, institutes and research projects and for scholarships and fellowships.[23]

A Joint Committee on National Strategy

Today we are not in a shooting war, and the sacrifices of that kind of war are happily not required. But we are in war, a strange cold war. Some sacrifices, and a great deal of planning, will be required if our cause is to prevail in the world.

To do the job that needs to be done in all these areas the serious problem of fragmentation in our policy-making procedures will have to be tackled. I have recently recommended the creation in the Congress of a Joint Committee on National Strategy . . . I also believe the time has come to consider seriously the creation in the executive branch of a permanent research and policy-analyzing agency charged with the responsibility of thinking about a comprehensive and long-range national strategy which would embrace all essential factors of domestic and foreign policy.[24]

No Substitute for Wise Leadership

This is indeed a time for courage, initiative and determination . . . We have the material resources to do what needs to be done . . . (and) the moral capacity to respond with sustained dedication and, if necessary, with sacrifice.

What is lacking is leadership where leadership is needed most. The perils of aimless drifting and massive apathy have never been greater. There is no substitute for leadership—leadership wise enough to understand our common danger and imaginative enough to enlist the human and material resources to meet it.[24]

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