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Notes for Address by
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Introduction

The United States and the Soviet bloc approaches to Asia, Africa and other underdeveloped areas, have differed because we are pursuing fundamentally different purposes. The Soviet bloc has undertaken to accelerate and direct the dynamic changes of our era to its own purpose: the establishment of a new empire. In reaction we have been thrust into defending a part of the status quo.

In one sense, the status quo is in our vital interests. We support the international system of independent nations -- nations independent of Soviet domination. But most other aspects of the status quo

are not necessarily in our interests. We have found it all too difficult to pursue our vital interest without actually resisting all change. Our challenge is to find the means to promote change, and thus move with the currents of our era, while resisting successfully the particular changes pressed by the Soviet bloc which endanger us.

In a number of countries -- Iran is one -- we face awkward dilemmas. The Soviet bloc is pressing to overthrow the government and we must give the government the support against this pressure. Yet if the stability of the country is ultimately to be ensured, a number of sweeping changes must be made within the country and these reforms are resisted by the men surrounding the Shah. They are resisted, of course, because they

mean inevitably the eventual replacement of the existing government. Our true interests lie in supporting ^{the existing} government for the time being, but at the same time in working (largely through this government) toward changes which will mean its replacement by another government -- one more stable because it will have a broader base of political support.

In other countries, of which India is a prime example, our problem is less difficult. Here the existing government would not necessarily be undermined, but should be strengthened by change. The Indians are ready for many changes and we can work with them to induce the essential changes. How to induce change fast enough by methods which will retain the values of democracy and protect the dignity of human beings is the essential dilemma.

Failure to proceed with sufficient speed will undermine the existing government and open the threat of replacement by a Soviet-dominated regime.

The Soviet bloc on its side has set itself, at least superficially, the easier task. It need only attempt to accelerate the internal pressures for change faster than they can be met, forcing radical solutions.

The Soviet Bloc: China and the Soviet Union

Clearly a highly important rift has developed between the Soviet Union and China over tactics in dealing with the non-Communist nations of the underdeveloped world. China has been pressing for radical action by military and all other means to secure control of new countries as soon as possible and even at considerable risk of conflict with the West. The Soviet Union, in line with its "co-existence"

policy, has insisted that the risks of going too fast are unacceptable. Soviet leaders appear to believe that with properly subtle policies of political penetration and organization, the underdeveloped nations will fall into Soviet hands at much less risk.

This difference between China and Russia, which has existed for some time, is reliably reported to have led to diverging pressures on the Communist Party of Iraq in 1959. The Chinese are supposed to have pressed the Iraqi Communists to seize power from Kassim by whatever force was necessary while Kassim was still weak. The Soviet Union, however, is reported to have issued orders to the Iraqi Communists to bide their time, enter the Kassim Government and build their strength within that government so that at some time in the ^{future} ~~future~~ they could take power in a quiet, possibly bloodless coup -- minimizing the danger of a violent reaction from the United States.

Traces of the rift can also be found in Somali, in East Africa, where the Chinese have supplied funds for the purchase of arms; and in Laos where the decision as to whether the Pathet Lao press on by military means or accept some temporary political settlement may lie in whether China or the Soviet Union is exerting the greater influence.

The rift probably began with Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Party Conference in 1956. The Chinese were continuing and continue to pursue neo-Stalinist policies and were unhappy with the denunciation. Since then the Soviet Union and the Chinese have differed over a variety of highly important issues: Hungary, Poland, Albania, Yugoslavia, and reportedly over Chinese policy and actions toward Formosa. The rift, particularly as it bears on underdeveloped nations, appears to have been a central issue in the November-December 1960 meeting of Communist parties in Moscow. Here the argument

centered on the proper approach to the "national bourgeoisie" leaders of the underdeveloped nations; such men as Kassim of Iraq, Nasser of Egypt, U Nu of Burma, Sukarno of Indonesia. The Soviet position is that Communists should work in alliance with these leaders. If these leaders fulfill their aims of true neutrality, loosening most ties with the West, the Russian argue, this weakens the West and prepares the eventual condition for Communist power in their own countries.

The Chinese position is that these leaders must be undermined by all means; that they enlarge the area of effective anti-Communism; and that resources spent in the form of aid are a waste of money better spent on strengthening the Communist camp-Communist China presumably first of all.

It must be carefully kept in mind that the Soviet Union -- despite its relative failures in agriculture -- is a have nation. It is a modern, industrialized, even urbanized nation, and its reactions are increasingly not that of a revolutionary power which has "nothing to lose but its chains." Remember that there has been a sharp change in the Soviet Union's foreign economic relationships since 1955. For most of the decade ending in 1954, the Soviet Union extracted, sucked in, equipment, capital, technicians, from all its satellite areas and from Communist China. But since 1955, the program of foreign economic aid of the Soviet Union has constituted a significant output of the Soviet economy.

Without anticipating a deepening policy split between the two major Communist powers, American policy-makers must understand that the two nations have distinct and sometimes conflicting interests.

Economic Aid and Economic Development

The United States has sought economic development, frequently hampered by political and social difficulties it encounters in each country. We have been forced to go slow in countries like Iran, where reform is resisted and impeded by the government, and development consequently made difficult. In countries like India, on the other hand, a good argument can be made that we have not made available the full resources that could have been utilized by the Indians.

The Soviet Union in its economic aid has focused on "display pieces," notably in heavy industry. It appears to have done so for two reasons.

One, it is much more concerned with the political psychology of foreign aid and its political and propaganda effects than has the United States. Khrushchev, essentially, is a political leader, who works instinctively through political methods. The Soviet Union has been less concerned

with economic development as such. It has started to compete with the United States in foreign aid late in the game and it has aimed to offer an alternative source of aid. It appears to have often provided aid for projects which the United States rejected precisely because the United States had rejected them.

Previous to the Soviet Union's foreign aid program, it had denounced aid as a tool by which the United States continued economic domination over the new nations after the political domination of the West failed. In 1954, after the United States had declined to pave and light the streets of Kabul in Afghanistan, on the grounds that there were many higher priorities for Afghan development, the Soviet Union stepped in to pave and light the streets. They gained both a "display piece" and the political advantage of posing as friends of the Afghans willing to do what the Afghans wanted rather than what the United States thought was good for the Afghans.

A similar opportunity brought the Soviets into India to build a steel mill. The United States government had delayed an answer to an Indian request for help on steel for many months. The American government was unhappy with the fact that the steel mill would be owned by the Indian government, and hence "socialistic"; it was also less than eager to eliminate a good market for steel by building up India's steel capacity when other problems, such as food supply, seemed of more pressing import to India.

Again, in Egypt, the Soviet Union financed the Aswan Dam, a display piece of the very first order, after Secretary of State Dulles had first indicated American willingness to help on this project and then dramatically rejected it in 1956.

The Soviet Union also appears to have been interested in building heavy industry for reasons purely political within the recipient country. Heavy industry draws unskilled

labor from the country-side into the city where these displaced peasants form, in Soviet terms, an "industrial proletariat." Soviet ideology, of course, stresses the role of the "proletariat" in eventual Communization.

Experience in the underdeveloped countries by no means bears out Marxist ideology, but it does indicate that these displaced peasants in the cities are among the most discontented elements in the society and among the most easily organized for radical purposes.

The United States in its aid has been more concerned with laying the foundation for self-sustaining balanced economic growth. This requires some heavy industrial development, but the more immediate requirement is usually the development of existing agriculture to provide adequate food supplies and a surplus for investment.

Technical Assistance

In line with these differing approaches, the United States has been much interested in supplying broad forms of technical assistance -- our "Point Four" program. Our essential effort (while quite limited) has been to work to bring about economic changes at the "grass roots" level -- changes which will spread and start an underdeveloped economy on the path of self-generating growth. We have been interested equally in broad planning and other central efforts -- such as the establishment of agricultural research centers. The Soviet Union's technical assistance programs, has been somewhat different. Its technical assistance has been directly tied to the construction of a plant or other facility purchased from a Soviet Bloc country, either with or without a Soviet loan. Czech advisors have assisted in the construction of a cement (Czech) plant in Yemen.

Hungarian experts have helped install
Hungarian hydroelectric stations in Indonesia.

But the Soviet Union has not undertaken broader
attempts to start the wider growth which is necessary
for economic development. They have confined their
assistance to very specific conspicuous projects
requested by the recipient government.

In a different type of technical assistance --
education -- the Soviet Bloc has had very broad and
extensive programs. The Soviet Union especially has
been eager to attract Asian and African students to
study in its universities and special institutes, and
to attract visiting missions of technical experts who can
be shown advanced Soviet technical achievements. Here
the Soviet political motive in its foreign aid seems quite
clear.

We, ofccourse, have also encouraged students and visiting missions. But given our resources, we have not done as much in this direction as is either desirable or possible. For it is clear that education -- or improving human resources -- is at the very heart of the problem of economic development.

We also have a very particular advantage over the Soviet Bloc in the wealth of our economy. In a world that is in general hungry and poor, the Soviet Union is in the midst of an agricultural crisis of years duration and China is in the midst of famine.

American food and fiber can provide a leverage of great importance.

The President's Food for Peace program is a major attempt to consolidate and intensify the programs for making constructive use of this great wealth to the benefit of American foreign policy.

In India, the United States, with Indian initiative and imagination, has already been able to establish what are essential reserve banks of food grains. These reserves allow the government to release food grains when and where needed -- to reduce the risks of famine and, more to the point, to avoid hoarding and speculation in food which has so disrupted food supplies in India in the past.

Military Assistance

The United States has undertaken programs of military assistance which in many instances exceed its programs of economic assistance. Clearly there are a number of special cases where this military assistance has been essential. South Korea, South Viet-Nam, Formosa and Turkey needed large amounts of military aid if ^{they} ~~there~~

were to continue to exist, and the supply of military assistance to these countries relieved the United States of maintaining a heavy commitment of its own forces in this area.

Equally clear, there are numerous instances where large amounts of military assistance were not required by an external military threat bearing on the interests of the United States. Our military assistance to Batista's Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America falls into this category.

Then there is a third group of countries where some limited amount of military assistance was logical. Iran, for example, borders on the Soviet Union and needs limited defense forces, but can never expect to provide for her own defense even with our military assistance program.

Here the question has been how much and what kind of military assistance it is proper for us to provide.

Cutting across all of these groups, but of more importance in some than in others, we have supplied military assistance (and sometimes economic aid as well) simply because the other country demanded it and because the consequences of refusal seemed unpleasant. In some cases the recipient country wanted arms for prestige purposes.

In other cases we appear to have hoped that by strengthening the Army through our military assistance we might build a bulwark against the overthrow of the existing government.

Our military assistance program badly needs new thought. In Latin America we appear to have fed a local arms race, impeding economic development of that area by diverting resources, and doing nothing to ensure stable, popular governments. In other places our military assistance has gone into the ^{hands} ~~heads~~ of an army which has proceeded to overthrow the government.

We must be much more sophisticated about the amounts and kinds of assistance we supply to nations faced with a real military threat. In Laos, for example, we built an extraordinarily large conventional army to deal with an essentially guerrilla force. It failed to do so, and indeed its most effective unit under Captain Kong Le became disgusted with the government and the continued strife and overthrew the government.

Then the remainder of the army forced Kong Le into the arms of the Pathet Lao and into open civil strife. At this point, the Pathet Lao, presumably through its Viet-Minh advisors and Soviet equipment, converted into a conventional army able to challenge the Lao army we had built with such effort. Laos is not a case which encourages us to believe that our military assistance programs have been uniformly successful.

Equally, we have invested heavily in conventional armed forces in South Viet-Nam, only to find that the Viet-Minh are able to resume guerrilla terrorism on a large scale and without serious hindrance from the Viet-Nam army.

The Soviet Union and Communist China have supplied arms both to rebel movements and to governments. In all cases they appear to be concerned above all with the psychology of giving, and with providing an alternative to the United States. But military assistance is also a great troublemaker and the Soviet bloc has used it for this purpose, too. The Middle East, for example, is in the midst of a continued arms race. Recently Iraq and the U.A.R. have received MIG-19's, clearly in response to the concern of Nasser and Kassim about Israeli Super-Mystere fighters and Israeli orders for the French Mirage-3. Soviet military assistance makes a major contribution to the tensions in this area. Equally, the Gizenga forces in the Congo, and Castro in Cuba, have been

strengthened as troublemakers for the United States by direct or indirect Soviet military assistance.

Competition with the Soviet Union in Foreign Aid

One of the major effects of Soviet entry into competition with the United States in the field of foreign aid has been that our conduct of our own programs has in turn been more and more colored by consideration of what the Soviet Union is doing or might be doing. Reaction has increasingly replaced initiative.

We should not, for example, provide a certain type or kind of aid simply because we anticipate that if we do not, the Soviet Union will.


Simply to respond to this Soviet inclination, for all practical purposes, places the control and direction over our aid programs in Soviet hands.

We must instead clarify in our own minds precisely what it is that we seek to accomplish with a particular type and amount of aid. If it appears that we can accomplish what we wish, then we should proceed. Otherwise, let us refrain and let the Soviet Union undertake what it will.

Soviet aid, often can be a mixed blessing so far as Soviet purposes are concerned. In India the Soviet steel mill will contribute to economic development, and in this sense will free Indian and our own resources for other projects. Equally, the Soviet aid for the Aswan dam will be highly important to Egyptian development, and in the long run, may well be beneficial to what we seek for Egypt.

The usual objection to this approach is that Soviet aid is accompanied by Soviet prestige, Soviet experts,

propaganda, and infiltration. This has been highly exaggerated. There is very little evidence that either Soviet or American aid, as it has been administered, is winning the people of recipient countries over to be docile followers of either side. The issue is not likely to be resolved on such simple terms. Instead, it is likely to ^{be} resolved on the longer-term results of development, and on whether people's anticipations for the future are met or are not met.



Finally, we come to the delicate question of which group or groups we work with in a given nation. Frankly, it is my view that we have been spending too much time in the cemetery and not enough in the maternity wards. Too often, the very people we have been most intimately dealing with in our assistance programs have been just one jump ahead of the firing squad.

In the new nations of the world -- and in the nations whose economic potential is only now being developed after centuries of political existence -- the "ins" must be considered to be strictly temporarily in.

While our official dealings must include the governments of countries whose people we are aiding, it is surely incumbent upon us to understand the social and political forces at work in those countries, and to

consciously, systematically and thoroughly make contact with the non-communist "outs."

Our objective must be to make possible the development of stable popularity-supported political and economic institutions -- not necessarily in the precise image of the institutions of the United States.

Too often we have been caught disastrously short -- when our narrow concern with the viewpoints of existing governments has made us overlook the powerful thrust toward broader participation in government by the people.

Our policies must be used to promote reform, not to suppress it. We must seek always to make possible the constructive evolution of society -- lest our hopes and our fortunes go hurtling down with the overthrow of the dictator. If for no other reason than our own self-interest, we cannot continue to be caught in bed with the oppressors and exploiters of the masses of the people.

No military assistance, no last-minute inflow of capital, can stem the rising tide of a popular revolution -- which can in a matter of hours capture military bases, wipe out the investment of millions of capital, and simply destroy what was mistakenly imagined to be a "bastion of anti-Communism."

It is for this reason that I have hopes that the President's Peace Corps may help to establish contact -- at the village level -- between the United States and the people of the nations we seek to maintain as independent, non-Communist areas.

But the task of establishing contact, and of bringing the weight of United States policy to bear in support of social and economic progress in the nations receiving our aid, cannot be left simply to a Peace Corps -- no matter how carefully selected, trained and dedicated.

The officers of the Armed Forces, of our Foreign Service, our businessmen, must understand that their bearing, their conduct, their attitudes, are critically important.

For one thing, they must be able to see that a man may be a leader of the trade union movement in Latin America without being a Communist. They must be able to recognize in a man who advocates sweeping land and taxation reforms a man who may at the same time be profoundly anti-Communist. Not everyone who is bitterly against an existing Government is necessarily a "Red."

In other words, it is time to become sophisticated^{icated} about the irresistible popular revolutions which are over-turning the old orders in Asia, Africa and Latin America. I call to your attention, for an example,

a recent description of ~~the~~^{the} growing movement in Latin
America centered in the person of the Peruvian left-wing
leader Victor Raul, appearing in the Washington Post
this week.

(HERE READ FROM ARTICLE)

The most important fact to remember in gauging the relative effectiveness of the overseas programs of the United States and of the Communist bloc is that a struggle which is essentially political cannot be won by simply providing arms, nor even through economic and technical assistance alone. There must constantly be kept in mind that the ultimate decision as to whether a given nation or bloc of nations will remain out of the Communist orbit will be made by the people of those nations.

The popular will may be thwarted, postponed, delayed. But eventually -- whether in the form of a bloody uprising or in the form of gradual reform -- it will prevail.

To convince the people of these have-not nations --
and not their governments alone -- to make a choice for
independence from the new Communist imperialism is the
central task of our overseas programs.

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