

[ca 1961-1969]

No, I say that in reference to whether or not our economy can stand the extra burden and the extra shock of these wars, like in Viet Nam, or the National emergency such as we had in 1961 over Berlin, this will be the real long-term test of the viability and the strength of the American purpose and the American system. We're geared up to a seven hundred billion dollar economy; it's obvious that by the nature of things with reasonable growth and population increase, ~~the~~ economy will be larger than seven hundred billion dollars next year and the year after. But, also at the same time, ~~but~~ we have tremendous obligations overseas in a turbulent, uncertain, and disorderly world. We surely don't want to be the world's policeman, but there are times when it is definitely in our national interest, and it is in the interest of international peace that we must act. Some times that action will be additional economic aid; some times it will be collective action with other countries, such as in the instance of India. Sometimes the aid will have to be dramatically expanded, such as the food aid for India. There'll be times that we become ^{INVOLVED} ~~militarily~~. Now if our economy is so fragile that any one of these new involvements or additional burdens seems to shake it to its foundations or seems to heat it up to ^a ~~the~~ point where it can explode, then we're in serious danger. Because we're no better abroad, we're no stronger overseas, than we are at home. Our military arm is no stronger than our economy, and we have to have an economy that can take it for the long run; that has the strength for the long pull. In other words, we have to be a distance runner that can on occasion enter into a sprint....

Yes. We have to demonstrate that our economic system has the capacity to outlast, out perform, out run, any combination of obstacles or enemies. Now, I use an analogy here, that under normal circumstances, even at ^{high} velocity, ~~you know~~ the economy seems to do well. But it's sort of like in the space business, once one of the Gemini capsules is in flight and just in orbit, the built in protections guarantee a rather safe flight. But it's when that capsule has to take on extra burdens, extra exercises, or when it has rendezvous and docking, and when it has to make twists and turns, that you can get into trouble. And that's why a great deal of time and attention is given to all of the extra protections that you need, the extra props, the extra controls that are required. And, also, the self-discipline and ^{the} training of the pilot going through all of the simulated exercises of danger, all the early warning systems that are involved.

Now this is like our economy, it's the take-off that you have to make, sometimes it's the re-entry. I mean after all the ^{take-off of} tuning up for a great international crisis, the abilities to sustain that, and then when you have to, in a sense, disarm or de-escalate, the re-entry. So how do you do this, without blowing up or falling apart? You see.

Now I think that these are some of the things we have to ask ourselves. I want to refine this now with the ~~C~~ounsel of ~~E~~conomic advisors and some of our people. Do you get my point?

Now, when we talk about the international question I want to get again on the whole subject of not just Viet Nam but of Asia. I want to talk about Asia; I don't know enough about it yet, I want to get more input into this. . . .

Yes, I'm talking AP now... Well, I think that you have to have a focus in which this. Now here is Viet Nam, and as I have said, and I want to repeat it, with all of the tragedy of Viet Nam, there is a valuable lesson. Everything that ~~we~~^{we've} learned, everything that ~~has~~^{has} happened to us in recent years in terms of international politics and international relations has come as a result of ~~the~~^a shock.

Most every breakthrough that we've had of recent years that affected our national security, has been the result of some shock. World War II came upon us when we had a number of people thinking that it wouldn't happen. The attack of the Japanese on Pearl Harbor surely was a shock to us. But out of all this came recognition on the part of the United States that we had to embrace collective security; there had to be more than the traditional bilateral alliances; that we must play a role in the world; that we ~~had~~^{we've} had to take leadership in the international scene; and, ~~we~~^{we've} proceeded even in the midst of war to design the United Nations, to think about World Bank at Dumbarton Oaks and Breton Woods, to talk about a whole new world and our role in it. Then came along Sputnik....

Yes, surely, the explosion of the atomic bomb taught us the tremendous, well the great moral burden that we had, as well as moral responsibility for the use of this weapon or non-use of it. But I think that the best example is Sputnik. We'd been coasting along ~~we~~ with a degree of self-pride and self-satisfaction, and all at once one day a new star appeared in the sky. And it was the star of the Kremlin and called Sputnik, and it shocked us into a whole reevaluation of our educational structure. Also to take a good look at ~~our~~ our scientific endeavors at the governmental and ~~the~~

private levels. We were looking at how we were taking care of scientific information. Up until then we weren't even filing it, it was stacking up. Well, in other words, Sputnik gave us the spur for education; it gave us the renaissance in science and technology, it took us out of the atomic age in the space age. Right. Now comes along the next thing that happens to us.

Of course we had the test in Europe all the time of Soviet probing. Korea taught us, quite frankly, that you can't go around the world saying that ^{look} these are perimeters ~~that~~ and we'll have nothing to do on the other side. ^{It's} When you leave areas of the world sketched out or blacked out, so to speak, their filled in.

But more importantly now, I think you don't want to get too many, I think you ought to take collective security, World War II, and the U.N., Sputnik, space, and science, and education, Viet Nam, Asia. ~~What~~

What Viet Nam has taught us more than anything else is that Asia is astir, ~~Asia~~ there's a flame in Asia. It's brought even new focus on India. New focus on Indonesia. The things that are happening in Asia today from Viet Nam to Indonesia and India are demonstrating that we cannot escape responsibility ^{is} here, we are involved. There isn't any use ^{of} ~~in~~ going around with these academic arguments ~~of~~ "Are you involved, or aren't you?" You are, it's inevitable. You not only involved, your beseeched and beseiged. I want to get that down, I want to just nail it down, ^{That} Arguments about whether we have a sphere of influence or who has the sphere of influence or whether we're involved or whether we're not involved, belie all the facts of life. There isn't any way you can escape from involvement....

Yes, but even without any regard to principle, if you didn't even know

know how to spell the word "principle", your just involved. It's a small^{er} world. You can't escape it. They even come to you. Madam Gandhi came here, she says, "you are involved." The Indonesians proved that you're involved. This is the great world capitol today. And as I've said you cannot be a world leader with a half world knowledge. Nor can you be a world leader with a half world involvement. You are involved, there is a totality here. Wnd we ought to come to grips with it.

Now there are some simple lessons and simple truths. You cannot really be intelligently involved unless you know the area that ~~you're~~ you're to work with or to be involved in. So want are we doing? Before we land on the moon, we spend billions to learn of the surface of the moon, The enviroment of the moon, before we even plan to send man there, to become involved with it, we learn about it. We build a great bank of knowledge before we seek draw from it. We build up our assets. Now we have to learn more about Asia. And, regrettable, though, what happens^{ed} to us was that we were literally like a man being thrust onto the moon without any knowledge of the enviroment. ~~We are in Viet Nam without any knowledge of the~~ intimate ~~environment.~~ We are in Viet Nam without any/knowledge of the background except in limited circles. So Viet Nam forces us into learning; forces us into contact; and, you have to take all of these things in balance and perspective. There is sacrifice and pain, but there's always been such. We learned about polio because of the tragic number of deaths.....



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