

⑦ Al Hartnett
⑧ Ken Peterson

Jim Caray (X) Joe Gloyd - to Mexico!

Ben Segal

THE PROSPECTS FOR DISARMAMENT

Excerpts of Remarks By
SENATOR HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

Morse
Goldwater

International Union of Electrical Workers
Washington, D. C.
Feb. 12, 1962

Ben Segal
minutes

It was indeed a pleasure for me to
accept your invitation to speak on the
subject of nuclear warfare and disarmament.

I realize that the electrical workers have
a double interest in the subject. First
many of you are actually working on the
weapons being constructed today to help
defend the United States and other free
countries in case of attack. But you are
also citizens of this great country and

✓

Al - Kennedy

Mad Aid
Urban Affair

you are leaders and participants in the
labor movement and you want your country,

I know, to do everything possible to
prevent such an attack from occurring.

↳ There are two approaches the United
States is pursuing to prevent the Soviet
Union from starting a thermonuclear war.

Both approaches involve risks and danger.

↳ One approach is the short range one of
armaments and armed strength. The other
approach is the long range one of disarmament
and arms control. We are engaged today in a
deadly and costly arms race with the Soviet
Union.

In the short run, maintaining our armed strength is the principal way to achieve military security for ourselves and the many nations the United States is committed to help defend in case of communist attack.

If the Soviet Union thought its armed strength were greater than that of this country it ~~would~~ ^{could} use this advantage in every way it could: economic pressure, ^{military} blackmail, outward support of civil wars and local aggressions, and even possibly surprise

nuclear attack on the United States. Like the United States, the Soviet Union is spending enormous ^{sums} ~~amounts~~ of money and resources to achieve military superiority.

In some areas such as ~~in the area of certain~~
~~categories~~ of conventional armaments and
space the Soviets today ^{seem to} have an advantage.

In other areas of military strength, such
as in the missile race and in ~~the number~~ ^{manned}
~~of~~ ^{nuclear submarines with Polaris missiles} bombers and surface naval craft, ^{the} ~~for~~

United States is considered to have an
advantage.

Since we are in a race the situation
may change. With technology changing from
day to day, the military balance of power
can be altered. We can never view the
military picture as being stabilized. A
see-saw race can erupt into actual military

conflict. An accident on a radar screen

could be the start of an exchange of

missiles equipped with megaton nuclear

warheads. A local aggression may ^{escalate} escalate

into full scale nuclear war. The security

we are trying to buy with the fifty billions ^{that}

we are pouring into weaponry today, and

which will increase to 60, 70, and maybe

100 billions within the next several years,

^{at best}
is a tenuous security. We need to keep

ahead in the arms race but it is a race

that may in the end exhaust both ~~us~~ ^{ourselves} and the

Soviets if it doesn't end in war first.

The danger, cost, and instability of

accidental
war!

the arms race is the compelling reason why the United States seeks to achieve disarmament and arms control agreements with the Soviet Union and other countries.

The Soviet Union is sufficiently concerned with the dangers and costs of the arms race, *have reason to think, so* we ~~think~~, that it too is interested in seeking ways to stop it.

↳ The problem is where to start. The United States is prepared to consider general and complete disarmament or any measure short of that worthy but difficult goal. We *for 3 years* tried to negotiate a test ban agreement with the Soviets and this so far

has not been accepted. We ^{have} tried to suggest
measures against surprise attack and these
too have been rejected.

The stumbling block is usually the
refusal of the Soviet Union to accept
adequate inspection to assure that the
disarmament measure is being fulfilled.

The United States ^{believes} ~~has felt~~ that without
inspection the Soviets might be tempted
to fail to live up to the letter and
spirit of the agreement. If the United
States disarmed and the Soviet Union did
not, our ~~security~~ security ^{would} be
jeopardized ~~just as much as~~ and perhaps

even more than ~~it might be jeopardized~~ in
a continued arms race. The choice between
an uninhibited arms race and a bad disarmament
agreement is a choice no one wants to make.

What we want ^{and seek} is an effective and workable
disarmament agreement. That is the objective
of the United States.

Can the Soviet Union be persuaded to
accept inspection? Can the Soviets be made
to realize that some inspection on Soviet
territory by foreigners is a better
alternative than a continued arms race?

In March, the United States will again attempt
to seek a Soviet response. On March, 14, 1962

18 nations, five Western, five Soviet bloc,
and eight not alligned militarily either to
the United States or the Soviet Union will
convene a major disarmament conference.

*His invite
to Kennedy!*

The United States and the Soviet Union
last year agreed to seek, once again, a
comprehensive disarmament agreement. They
agreed to continue to meet until substantial
progress has been achieved. Our Government
is now preparing for these negotiations.

The planning is centered in the new United
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
which the Congress created last year. Along
with this agency the Defense Department, the

military services, the Atomic Energy
Commission, and other agencies are
contributing their views to the formulation
of effective and substantial disarmament
measures.

In order to seek meaningful and workable
disarmament measures the new Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency is ~~planning~~ ^{undertaking} a
research program to look into many of the
problems of inspection of armaments that
have not yet been solved. ~~It is understandable~~
~~that~~ the Soviets wish to keep inspection to a
minimum, ^{and} I am sure that we in ~~this country~~
do not wish to have an undue ^{number} ~~amount~~ of Soviet

agents lurking behind factory walls,

military installations, and nuclear power

plants. How much inspection ^{here and in the Soviet Union} is enough

from our point of view for security is

hard to determine. We have now started a ^{new expanded}

research program to answer this question.

↳ Not only do we need to know how much

inspection is enough ~~to have~~ in any given

disarmament measure, ^{but} We must also know

the answer to many other questions. How

much disarmament might we agree to without

the existence of an international peace

force to guard against local aggressions?

Can the United States and the Soviet Union,

to mention only two of the countries to

be involved, ever, agree on the political *and administrative*
direction of an International Peace Force?

And when will the United States decide the

time has come to request the presence of

Communist China in disarmament negotiations?

*G. J. F. F.
near conference
2/14/62*

Some of the answers to these questions can

come from computers, gaming exercises, and

industrial experimentation. Other answers

must come from ~~enough~~ ^{technical} people with knowledge

as well as good common sense concentrating

quietly without the day to day worries of

political crises.

It will not be easy to persuade ~~some of~~ *the Congress or the*

public
~~my colleagues~~ that research on questions
relating to
~~on~~ disarmament is at least as important
as research on the development of modern
weapons. Last year, Senator Goldwater
wanted to deny to the new Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency the authority to conduct
any research. He could not see that our
own security ~~would~~ be jeopardized if we
did not conduct studies and gaming exercises
in order
~~on how~~ to determine *how* ~~that~~ disarmament
agreements ~~are being~~ *could & would be* observed.

In order to create a climate of opinion
in this country sympathetic to disarmament
there are other points that ought to be

*We can
Have full
Employment!*

brought before the American people. There is still not sufficient appreciation of what modern warfare could be like. We ~~have some~~ *cling to* notions about warfare that the thermonuclear age has rendered obsolete. Let me list a few of these.

Fallacy Number 1. Wars can be won. If nuclear war breaks out the notion that it can be won in the old fashioned sense is a fallacy. ~~Even~~ Many in the military today use the term "prevail" rather than the word "win." "Prevail" means that we can inflict greater damage and ~~take~~ *destroy* more of the weapons of the enemy than he can inflict

damage on us. To prevail in this sense might mean we end up with half our population dead and the other half threatened with various degrees of radioactive contamination. "To win a thermonuclear war" no longer has meaning to people who think of winning a war as they have been won in the past, with *limited* ~~relatively little~~ physical damage to the total resources of a country and its people.

Fallacy Number 2. War is one of the instruments of national policy. War used to be considered available to a nation if all avenues to reach an objective had been

blocked. War in the thermonuclear sense can
no longer be thought of ^{as a means} to achieve a given
objective. National objectives must be
sought by other means. To use ^{thermonuclear} war to reach
an objective will in the course of ^{the} fighting
~~be~~ change the objective itself. It may be
necessary ~~still~~ to fight to prevent Communist
take over of Berlin, but both we and the
Communists must recognize that a nuclear
war fought over Berlin will have consequences
far greater than the loss or preservation of
a given piece of territory. We are trying
hard to make this point to the Soviets before
they think they can take Berlin by force and

incalculable
not suffer ~~the~~ consequences.

Fallacy Number 3. An adequate defense
continue to
can be found. Many people believe that
with enough effort we can survive with
relatively little damage a large scale war.
There is no question that with the adoption
of some measures we can reduce some of the
impact of a thermonuclear exchange. Civil
Shelters,
defense measures and the development of an
anti-ICBM are directed to reduce the damage
from megaton war heads. We would be foolish,
however, if we believed that such measures
constitute an adequate defense. The search
for some defense is one of the elements of

the arms race itself. As one side states
it has found a defense, the other side is
compelled to rededicate its efforts to
build greater offensive weapons.

Recent
USSR
Atom tests
Proactives
point -
now we
test!

I could cite other examples of ^{commonly accepted} principles
^

of warfare, defense, and international politics
that the thermonuclear age has rendered
obsolete. The ones I have mentioned should

be sufficient, however, to give us pause ~~and seek~~

and underscore that
~~that~~ ways to end the arms race must be sought

and with all the thoroughness and urgency
that we can muster. We must not fool ourselves
that because we are superior today we can
maintain this superiority indefinitely. Or,

that superiority has meaning in the sense of
preserving civilization as we know it. We

have often said we cannot negotiate except
we arm to parley!
from strength. Let us not now fall into the

trap of believing we cannot negotiate from
superiority. I have great respect for the
people who run our military establishment.

Our officers and our armed forces are
dedicated to the cause of peace. We cannot
expect them, however, to be in the forefront
of efforts to reach effective disarmament
agreements, or even to initiate disarmament
proposals. At all times the views and
knowledge of the military must be sought.

Disarmament policy itself, however, must
be a civilian function. —

↳ With our own government geared to pursue disarmament agreements backed by a sound research and thorough consultation with our military leaders, we have an opportunity to press the Soviet Union to negotiate in earnest. If we cannot soon make some progress, the outlook becomes bleak. I am not so much of a pessimist that I have abandoned hope. There is a possibility that a breakthrough can be achieved. We must do all that we can to make a breakthrough possible.

(END)

I suggest one additional idea you might expand on.

One of the major problems of disarmament today is to inform the American people of the need and value of negotiations with the Soviet Union and other nuclear nations. Many Americans are dubious about negotiations. Many equate "negotiations" with "compromise" or "appeasement." But if there is any group of Americans who should realize the value of negotiations --- on any issue --- it would be trade unionists. They know that negotiations are vital to their self interest and the progress of their side. Thus, we need the help of such groups as the electrical workers to spread the word of the need for periodic negotiation in the field of disarmament, and to convince others that negotiation on disarmament can be conducted honorably and without compromise.

There is no advance release out on your speech, ~~It is not being released.~~
you can release the extra copies in your folder.

Win



Minnesota Historical Society

Copyright in this digital version belongs to the Minnesota Historical Society and its content may not be copied without the copyright holder's express written permission. Users may print, download, link to, or email content, however, for individual use.

To request permission for commercial or educational use, please contact the Minnesota Historical Society.



www.mnhs.org