

From the Office of  
SENATOR HUBERT H. HUMPHREY  
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*Ingean ATLANTIC  
Charter*

HUMPHREY SEES PASSAGE OF TRADE EXPANSION ACT AS  
FIRST STEP IN FORGING OF "ATLANTIC CHARTER"

~~Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, the Democratic Whip of the Senate, told an audience in Minneapolis Sunday night that,~~ "passage of the Trade Expansion Act will be the greatest step the United States can take toward the construction of a genuine Atlantic Community."

"As demonstrated so clearly in the creation of the European Community, political ties follow the strengthening of economic bonds, and with the passage of the Trade Expansion Act, the President of the United States will have the basic tools to lead our country into close economic partnership with the 300 million people of the new Europe," Humphrey said in an address to the Midwest Regional Meeting of B'nai B'rith.

"We need a true Atlantic Charter for the Sixties and Seventies," ~~he declared.~~

"What we seek to establish, and what we have consistently sought during the seventeen years we have poured our resources into Europe, is a partnership of the West -- an

Atlantic Community overwhelming in its economic poise and power, guided by common principles of representative government, and dedicated to the task of raising living standards throughout the world.

"We do not seek the creation of a 'third force' in Europe, but rather the creation of an economic and political order on the shores of the Atlantic which can meet any challenge -- military, economic, or political."

Excerpts <sup>from</sup> remarks delivered at Regional Conference of B'nai B'rith,  
Leamington Hotel, Minneapolis -- Sunday, July 8, 1962

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The Trade Expansion Act of 1962:

Key to Atlantic Partnership

Speech by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey

Ladies and gentlemen, without our fully realizing it, the movement toward European economic and political unity has snowballed until today is one of the most prominent--if not the most prominent--feature on the international landscape. The accelerated momentum of the European idea has taken the United States somewhat unawares, despite our warm sponsorship of European integration ever since World War II. In the immediate postwar era, the United States must have appeared, in relation to Europe, like a mother hen standing guard over a brood of frightened, wet, bedraggled chicks. Exhausted by mankind's greatest conflict to date, Europe was in no condition to stand up by itself to aggressive Communism or to give itself

the needed impetus to economic recovery. Now all that is a thing of the past. Yesterday's chicks have come of age. Individually, the nations of Western Europe have demonstrated enormous productive, and managerial capacity. Some countries--such as West Germany and Italy--have expanded their economies at a rate more than twice that of the United States. Others, such as politically troubled France, have used their internal resources so effectively that United States experts are inquiring as to whether the European success story can be emulated on this side of the Atlantic. Overshadowing all other achievements has been the flourishing European Common Market, that great area of progressively freer trade which as of now comprises six nations in the industrial and cultural

heart of Europe.

Proceeding gradually--and not without controversy and heartache--the Common Market has evolved into a trading bloc which already stands on its own feet as a formidable economic entity. Early this year, the Six agreed upon their transition to the second stage of the Common Market, which in turn means that the eventual formation of a genuine free trade area, with a common external tariff and no internal trade barriers, is virtually unstoppable. In view of this development the United States has had to consider vigorous measures--measures not of reprisal or resistance but measures of adjustment. Foremost among these has been the President's proposed "Trade Expansion Act of 1962," a radical new departure from the old Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, which the

Trade Expansion Act is designed to supplant. The new trade bill has successfully--indeed, with flying colors--hurdled partisan obstruction in the House of Representatives and now awaits only favorable action in the Senate Finance Committee and on the floor of the Senate. Of all the principal measures of the 1962 Kennedy program, the trade bill stands the best chance of passage in the form desired by the Administration. Its cheerful prospects for success reflect what has come to be a national consensus in favor of giving the President the power, on his own discretion, to make reciprocal trade agreements in the broad interests of the United States. As granted by the House and almost certain to be approved by the Senate, the President will have the authority to reduce existing tariffs by 50 percent, and instead of becoming tied up in

trivial, item-by-item negotiations, he may bargain for tariff reductions by broad categories or sub-categories of products. Secondly, he will have a special authority to reduce or eliminate all tariffs on products or groups of products where the United States and the European Common Market together account for 80 percent or more of world trade.

As an inalienable part of his program, the President envisages broad safeguards to American industry. However, in cases where unavoidable damage through imports is suffered by companies, farmers and workers, the trade bill provides revolutionary trade adjustment assistance--in the form of financial help and training to displaced workers or advice, tax benefits, and loan guarantees to businessmen and farmers.

Thus the Trade Expansion Act is a comprehensive program of adjustment to the radically changed world economic pattern of the 1960's. Although primarily designed to cope with the challenge of the Common Market, the Trade Bill will be of material assistance in our relations with our traditional trading partners in Latin America and the Far East, whose interests we have not forgotten.

Of course, ladies and gentlemen, it goes without saying that the Trade Expansion Act is only our first reaction to the European Common Market and it is a reaction to only one aspect of the Common Market, namely, its importance to the continued health and vitality of our foreign trade. Statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic have frequently maintained that the logical result of European economic

integration is a wider political unity, perhaps even a submergence of individual sovereignty into a United States of Europe capable of playing a role in world politics equal with that of the United States and Soviet Russia. Hence, political unity looms as the culmination of a process of which the Common Market is the first and most significant step.

Indeed, immediately after World War II, talk of a United States of Europe was on the lips of many influential individuals. It remained idle talk, however, as long as three factors were lacking: first, an economically strong Europe; second, elimination of the divisive rivalries and hatreds of leading European nations (principally France and Germany); and third, the unstinting willingness of

Great Britain to participate on terms of equality with its continental partners.

The last few years have seen the almost miraculous fulfillment of these conditions. Through the help of the United States and the marshalling of its own genius, Europe has more than regained its prewar prosperity. The necessity to guard Western civilization against Communist imperialism has made close allies of countries which only a few years before had been at each other's throats. Despite the failure of certain ambitious undertakings--such as the proposal to merge German troops into an integrated European defense establishment--NATO has given each country a sense of contribution to the common Western defense effort. Above all, the eyes of Europeans

have been opened to the economic possibilities of cooperation. Through trial, error, and patient persistence, through the experience of the Common Market, the European Coal and Steel Community, EURATOM and other institutions, nations have learned that their pooled efforts far outweigh their individual capacities.

As a result, the goal of political unity has been an implicit and explicit corollary of European cooperation in the economic sphere. In applying for full membership in the Common Market, Great Britain, too, has in effect resolved to merge <sup>her</sup> ~~its~~ separate political destiny with that of her cross-Channel neighbors. To do so required a great effort of will, a conscious divorce from exclusive imperial tradition. Even today, conflict rages in the

chancelleries of Europe as to the nature and the timetable of European unity: should Europe be, as the Germans seem to be saying, a closely knit fraternity of club members prepared to accept all the rules of membership and abide by the collective will? Or should it be, as in the French view, a looser union of "fatherlands" in which each country surrenders a minimum of sovereignty while retaining a maximum quantity of national grandeur. Should the European club be made exclusive, for the sake of a more perfect and efficient union, or should weaker, smaller nations be allowed to partake of the advantages of membership even though constitutionally or otherwise they are unable to shoulder the full political burden of membership?

To a large extent these are the questions facing the architects of European unity today. They cannot

cannot be resolved quickly, nor is there any guarantee that they will be resolved at all. It should be clearly understood, however, that they are the last remaining obstacles to the formation of a single political entity numbering some 270 to 300 million souls, with an economic and military potential equal to or surpassing our own. Furthermore, there is a firm will in Europe to overcome all problems.

For instance, on July 18, 1961, a European "Summit" conference at Bonn, Germany, declared that the six Common Market countries intended to give "shape to the will for political union already implicit in the treaties establishing the European Communities." Day before yesterday in Paris (July 5),

President De Gaulle of France and Chancellor Adenauer of Germany (whose views on this question are known to differ at least superficially) declared that it was "desirable to bring the discussions on the creation of a political federation, which would consolidate achievements already made in the economic field, to a conclusive agreement with their partners."

Given this will to cooperate in Europe, it was singularly appropriate that President Kennedy should have chosen the Fourth of July in Philadelphia's Independence Hall to make his historic and ringing call for a "Declaration of Interdependence" between the United States and a United Europe. President Kennedy drew a consistent parallel between the experience of the United States in forging

a workable federal constitution out of the raw material of independence and the slow, sometimes painful stages by which a similar process would have to take place in Europe. Yet he left no doubt that he expected the European movement to be crowned with success, and equally clearly, he staked out the claim of the United States to have a special, mutually beneficial relationship *with Europe.*

The President left no doubt that he conceives of a "partnership" between Europe and America which would consist of more than sentimental ties and less than the ties between vassal and suzerain. On the contrary, the proposed relationship would be one of equality--a relationship in which both Europe and the United States could provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and carry out

their mutual obligations for the emerging nations and the underdeveloped areas of the world.

The President likewise left no doubt that a United Europe must not become a "third force" counterpoised between the United States and the Soviet Union. In his own words:

We do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival but as a partner. To aid its progress has been the basic objective of our foreign policy for seventeen years. We believe that a united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in the common defense, of responding more generously to the needs of poorer nations, of joining with the United States and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving problems of currency and commodities, and developing coordinated policies in all other economic, diplomatic and political areas. We see in such a Europe a partner with whom we could deal on a basis of full equality in all the great

and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations.

In short, what the President proposes, and what every American should welcome, is a discussion between the United States and Europe (once its unity has been established) as to "ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic Partnership." Already, this partnership exists in more or less solid form-- in the shape of institutions such as the Organization for Economic Development, the Development Advisory Group, NATO, and others. But the West needs a much more comprehensive, a much more detailed and institutionalized instrument of cooperation, the more so as relations between North American and Europe become less and less multilateral and more bilateral. We need a true Atlantic Charter for the '60's and '70's.

The President, says the Times of London, has advanced "an imaginative idea, typical of his sense of style and history." His speech, I would say, makes a double contribution of unsurpassed value to the cause of Western unity. First, he frankly admits that the goals of international justice, domestic tranquillity, defense against aggression, general welfare, or the blessings of liberty can be achieved by any one nation in today's world. This would seem to answer the fear of some who might object that the United States is trying to horn in on Europe and establish Anglo-Saxon domination over continental institutions. Secondly, he states just as frankly that his grand scheme is not a blueprint for tomorrow but a goal to be striven for over the years: "All this," he says,

"will not be completed in a year, but let the world know it is our goal."

The United States, therefore, will neither withdraw from Europe nor will it seek to reestablish hegemony over Europe. It is going to cooperate closely with Europe once the latter has solved its constitutional problems. If this remains our goal, despite all the setbacks and disappointments which may be encountered, then the West will have found nine-tenths of its answer to the Communist threat.

This, then, is the environment in which the Trade Expansion Act must be considered and passed.



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