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COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT

Participants: Adlai E. Stevenson, U. S. Ambassador to the U.N.
Arnold Michaelis, Public Affairs Commentator
Guest: Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, U. S. Senator
from Minnesota

ADLAI STEVENSON REPORTS IN CONVERSATION WITH ARNOLD MICHAELIS

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ADLAI STEVENSON REPORTS

Sunday, April 1, 1962

ABC TELEVISION

MICHAELIS: Well, Senator, the eyes of the world are focused on the problem of disarmament, and perhaps the Governor could bring all of us up to date on what the latest developments are in Geneva. What do you hear, Governor?

STEVENSON: The Secretary of State has just returned from Geneva after the first two weeks of the disarmament conference of the seventeen nations that have been meeting there and reported yesterday. I am sure that Senator Humphrey has talked to him personally and has perhaps a better understanding of the current situation than I do.

HUMPHREY: Secretary Rusk could not report to us any achievement as such. That is, we had no agreement. In fact, the Soviet Union -- Mr. Gromyko and other representatives -- were very adamant in their refusal to come to any kind of an understanding on the matter of the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, including international inspection.

It is this inspection item that meets with strong Soviet resistance. I think we ought to note, Governor, that a

year or so ago, the Soviets talked about inspection as if they were willing to accept it, and we were arguing then over details but not over principle. It may well be that the Soviets were running a kind of a bluff on us in the sense that they had more confidence or more power in their missile arrangements or in their missiles and rockets than they really did have. Our intelligence services, I believe, have exposed some of the weaknesses of the Soviet Union.

Therefore, the Soviets have now taken an entirely different attitude. They are in a type of crash military program, strengthening their nuclear power and their rocketry and missile power. And they are vigorously opposed to any inspection.

Now, it is my view -- and I know it is the view of the Secretary and of the President and of Ambassador Stevenson -- that international inspection is a vital part of any disarmament program. We simply cannot trust the Soviets, and they don't trust us.

MICHAELIS: How do we break that deadlock of suspicion?

STEVENSON: We had some experience with relying on uninspected moratoriums last summer, didn't we?

HUMPHREY: Yes, indeed. And that within itself should demonstrate to us the importance of an inspection system.

You ask the question: how can we break through?

Well, it seems to me that we need to develop an alternative for trust. The human factor cannot be relied upon and, therefore, we seek through electronics, through seismographs, through acoustical apparatus, through mechanics to develop an international inspection system that will fill the void and be an alternative to trust.

This is pretty much like -- well, you trust your bank, now, you trust your great savings institutions. And why? Not because you just trust the banker, even though that in our society might be very well to do. But we trust the bank because it is audited.

MICHAELIS: Independently audited.

HUMPHREY: Independently, because it is scrutinized from an outside source. We don't let the cashier audit his own accounts.

And what the Russians were asking for was that they would police their own disarmament. And we are saying, "oh no, we'd like an outside auditor."

And I believe that this analogy of an outside source, an objective party, coming in to inspect the fulfillment of a disarmament agreement, is absolutely essential. And we need to get a beginning on that, and we can't give this up.

STEVENSON: I think it should be understood in that connection that the areas in which we need inspection have contracted since we originally began to talk about this some years ago. So that as the United States moves more in the direction of the Soviet position of requiring less and less inspection, it seems that the Soviet runs away from their position.

HUMPHREY: We made very many concessions in this very recent conference. We have come down a great deal in our demands for inspection. But, as I pointed out, a year ago the Soviets had accepted the principle of international inspection and argued with us on details. We have conceded every detail that the Soviet Union was requesting. We have gone down to limit the number of on-site inspections within the Soviet Union at a minimum, a basic minimum. We are, actually, I think, approaching the area of risk almost beyond prudent judgment.

But we have decided that we wanted to get a beginning on inspection because without the beginnings of an inspection system disarmament is really a forlorn hope. But every time, as the Governor says, every time that you get closer to what was the Soviet position, they back up, and now they have backed up completely.

MICHAELIS: But then what remains the area of hope, Senator, in this whole situation?

STEVENSON: Well, let me just point out one thing.

Our Secretary General, U Thant, spoke as far back as 1957 about the elimination of fear and suspicion as the conditions precedent to any successful disarmament. We have been struggling with that on the assumption that the first way to eliminate fear and suspicion was to establish inspection, verification for any disarmament, so that we would be confident that we could rely on one another.

I happen to be of the opinion that at this present time that the leaders in the Soviet are under severe stress and they are going through what you might call an internal as well as an external crisis. There is a serious disagreement that we all know about now, that is well recognized, between the Soviet Union, the communists in Russia and in China. Now the depth of that disagreement is one again of speculation, but it is apparently a very serious disagreement. We will know more about it after the conference in Peking, the conference that is underway now.

I believe also that the Soviets for a period of time, as I indicated before, had the West believing, particularly the United States, that they had greater capabilities nuclear-wise and in missiles and rockets than they really had. And as long as this sort of attitude could prevail,

or this hoax, so to speak -- that's a harsh word -- but this opinion prevailed as to their strength, they weren't so concerned about the discussion of testing with inspection. But when the intelligence forces of the West revealed that Soviet power was not all that it was, they clammed up again. And I think the Soviet military has forced the hand in the Soviet Union, has demanded a crash program of improved weaponry, particularly in the nuclear field and missile field. And until the Soviets get to a point where they think they have some equality and power, I think they are going to be very difficult.

HUMPHREY: We ought to seek a conference with the Soviets on how to prevent accidental war.

STEVENSON: Well, we made a proposal --

HUMPHREY: Yes.

STEVENSON: -- on that subject --

HUMPHREY: Surprise attack.

STEVENSON: -- as you know, surprise attack.

HUMPHREY: But I think this ought to be renewed again because as these weapons are accelerated in volume, in power and sophistication, the possibilities of accidental war are increased many fold. In fact, the 600-mile-an-hour plane of a few years ago didn't leave much possibility for accidental war. You can always call back a plane. But with the missile that is ascertained coming in flight by the radar scope,

the radar sometimes makes mistakes. And if you are going to respond to what you think is a missile attack that you see on the radar screen by setting off one of our missiles, you can't call it back. And this possibility of accidental war, it seems to me, is well known by the Soviets.

I am getting to believe that the Soviets are becoming less concerned about launching an attack -- they are less concerned about that and more concerned about what they call their own defensive position, just as we had a concern on the defensive position.

So that in this power struggle that seems on its face to be so ugly and so brutal, there may actually be developing two defensive philosophies rather than an offensive philosophy. And if that is the case, and we take precautions on accidental war and surprise attack and can then move out into outer space in the field of scientific exploration, we may in our lifetime get a beginning.

MICHAELIS: Negotiations are being conducted under the auspices of the United Nations.

HUMPHREY: Correct.

MICHAELIS: And I think this is a good time for the three of us to try to set the record straight on recent statements which have been made about the United Nations here in our own country,

and specifically the questions that have been raised about the United Nations here in our own country, and specifically the questions that have been raised about the role the United Nations plays in the conduct of our own foreign policy.

STEVENSON: Yes.

MICHAELIS: And I think we really ought to try to set the record straight on these. Some of the questions that have been raised included questions like: Is the administration turning its responsibilities for our foreign policy over the United Nations?

Now, Governor, this has affected you most personally and most deeply, and I think the country would like to hear what you have to say.

STEVENSON: Well, under our Constitution, the responsibility for the conduct of our foreign policy is squarely placed with the President. And Presidents have, of course, had varying degrees of interest in the conduct of foreign policy. Our President now, President Kennedy, has a very lively interest. I should suspect that few Presidents have had a greater interest in the conduct of foreign policy.

I am merely his Ambassador at the United Nations. So that I think it would be very -- it would be on the face wrong

to even hint, to even suggest that the conduct of foreign policy has been transferred from the normal channels to the United Nations here. I think just the contrary is true. And, actually, that the President seeks the advice of his Secretary of State; he seeks my advice; he seeks the advice of his -- of the State Department. And, as a result of these consultations, policy emerges which we try to execute here.

MICHAELIS: Well, now, there was also the point raised -- and I think Senator Humphrey can be helpful in answering this statement -- that Ambassador Stevenson should conduct his role in exactly the same way as Ambassadors to other nations. This was one of the criticisms.

HUMPHREY: Well, of course, on its face, this doesn't make much sense because the United Nations represents 104 nations. This isn't as if Ambassador Stevenson were assigned to a sovereign state where his role would be limited to the activities within said country. The Ambassador to the United Nations was made, under the Eisenhower Administration, a very close confidant with the President and sat in on the Cabinet meetings and, I believe, the Security Council meetings, specifically because of the difference between the ambassadorial role at the United Nations and, let us say, in France or Jordan or India or some other

country. Here the Ambassador -- must -- is required to interpret and implement American foreign policy that has been arrived at by the President of the United States in consultation with his advisors, to implement that policy with 104 nation states in the United Nations General Assembly and, of course, with the members of the Security Council.

STEVENSON: I can assure you it is fulltime work !

HUMPHREY: It is fulltime work. And may I also add that it is possibly the greatest opportunity that we have for the direct presentation of the American foreign policy unfettered by interpretation. In other words, the Ambassador to the United Nations speaks to the representatives of most all of the nations of the world directly, face to face, open confrontation. This, within itself, is a different role than just being an ambassador to any other -- to any one country.

Now, I don't downgrade the role of a United States ambassador to other countries. But I think it would be -- well, it reveals a shocking lack of knowledge of the world in which we live and of the structure of the United Nations to try to classify the Ambassador to the United Nations as if he were the Ambassador to Guatemala, or Brazil, or Great

Britain. They have their roles to play and the Ambassador to the United Nations has his.

And the President of the United States under two administrations -- well, under three Administrations -- under the Truman, the Eisenhower and the Kennedy Administrations has recognized this unusual and unique role of the Ambassador to the United Nations.

And I say that as an American citizen and as a Senator of the United States that our representation up here is of vital importance because here is where we face the whole world, and we meet with some of the sharpest, the brightest, the most able and intelligent representatives of the other nations of the world. And we need to be well prepared here. We need to be well staffed. We need to have the closest coordination with our government in Washington.

MICHAELIS: The fact that the United Nations' best hope for continued existence rests in the power of our treaties under the Atlantic Community in respect of NATO, rather than the other way around. That was part of the criticism, too, that was leveled, that the United Nations is not the best hope for peace but the best hope for the United Nations ---

STEVENSON: These are entirely complimentary. It would be a great mistake to try to equate -- to try to say that the United

Nations is an alternative to NATO.

Actually, the conduct of our foreign policy is at several levels. We conduct our foreign policy bilaterally. We conduct our foreign policy at the regional level, such as the Organization of American States or NATO. We conduct it also at the universal level, which is the United Nations that the Senator has been talking about.

And I think we struggle here at the United Nations, at that level, to reach common ground with as many nations as we possibly can on these issues. We have -- I think the very fact that we have more friends and fewer enemies here is a contribution to our national security.

It is interesting to recall that over the years in which this institution has existed, the Soviet Union has exercised its veto in the Security Council -- that is, opposed decisions of the United Nations -- in a hundred different cases. The United States has never had to use its veto. That is to say we have had -- in virtually all of these cases -- we have had the other nations going our way, or we have found it compatible with our interest to go their way.

Now, the idea somehow that this is a disadvantage to us

seems to me very odd.

HUMPHREY: This business of trying to inflict upon us a rivalry between our regional organizations in which we have a great interest and a vital stake and the United Nations is a great disservice to American security and American foreign policy.

Now, we are members of the Organization of American States. We are very concerned about the OAS. We want to work with our Latin American neighbors through our own regional organization. But this doesn't mean that you forget the United Nations.

MICHAELIS: Well, that's provided for in the United Nations Charter.

HUMPHREY: Of course it is provided for.

We are members of SEATO. But this doesn't mean that our relationships with the nations in Southeast Asia shall be exclusively a SEATO relationship, or that we depend exclusively upon it.

You know that NATO performs a very great function. And I feel that one of the strengths of NATO is the fact that the position of NATO is fortified by the overall attitude and operations of the United Nations.

Let me give you an analogy here. Some people would like to equate the strength of the United States or the security

of the United States with our military power alone. Now, no President has done that.

STEVENSON: No.

HUMPHREY: And if any one die, he'd be subject to justifiable criticism. We obviously must have military power but we also must have diplomatic know-how. We must have a foreign policy. We need an economic policy, our foreign aid program, our cultural exchange program, our education programs, our programs of foreign trade. These are a vital part of our total national security. And for someone to say, well, the peace of the world depends entirely upon either foreign aid or upon the military would be to show a shocking ignorance of the world in which we live, and of our own policy. Now, I say with equal candor, that to equate the peace of the world with any one alliance is really just to ignore the facts of life. Because, take for example with NATO, NATO is terribly important for Western Europe and for the United States for our own military security; but I cannot imagine NATO today performing in Africa the function that the United Nations is performing, because most of the members of NATO, European members, have been colonial powers, and they are the first to recognize this. I do not see why we, in America, should build up false arguments that are repudiated even by our own NATO members - our own NATO

friends. They would be the first to recognize that NATO should not take the lead in the African situation or even the Asian situation. Here is where the United Nations comes into such a vital function in such a vital area of activity.

And I thoroughly agree with Ambassador Stevenson that we must have a foreign policy that is related to a multi -- to many approaches and to many institutions. We sometimes deal bilaterally. Sometimes we just deal alone, without anybody. Sometimes --

STEVENSON: As in Vietnam or Laos.

HUMPHREY: Yes, exactly.

STEVENSON: Or Berlin. These are bilateral cases.

HUMPHREY: Then we find the United Nations to be so important, for example, in the Middle East. We don't want to find ourselves bogged down in a military struggle in the Middle East. This would be the worst thing that could happen to us. We almost got over there once, and it cost us \$300 million, gentlemen, in one year -- \$300 million. That's a whole lot more than the cost of the UNEF. I think that would be about ten years' cost of the UNEF in the Middle East.

MICHAELIS: And a great deal more than the \$100 million that the President is now asking the Congress to approve.

HUMPHREY: Right. Well, I am pleased that you brought this one up because if there is any kind of fiction that needs to be nailed to the mast as sheer fiction -- and, may I add, almost as promoting dissension -- it is that there is a conflict between our allegiances to NATO and to the United Nations.

STEVENSON: I think the things that the Senator has been mentioning, Arnold, are all contributions aside from the exclusive military security of the United States and of the Atlantic Community -- are all contributions to the most fundamental attribute of national security of all, and that is the ultimate orientation of these vast regions of the world, of Asia, of the Middle East, of Africa, of Latin America, and so on. What their ultimate political orientation is going to determine whether or not we are isolated or whether somebody else is isolated in the world.

And, therefore, we have to put very great emphasis on the conduct of our foreign policy with respect to these countries, these areas. And the place you do is right here in the United Nations.

MICHAELIS: Well, in order to ensure the health and the strength, the continued strength of the United Nations, we must get into a discussion now about the bond issue. And, Senator, isn't

it coming up this week in the Senate for a vote?

HUMPHREY: Yes.

STEVENSON: I think it would be a good idea because if we go on talking about my job any more, I think I'll ask for a raise!

HUMPHREY: Well, I didn't want you to think that you were being over worked, Ambassador.

The issue of the bond -- the bond issue matter ought to be decided this week in the -- or, at least, in the Senate. And, as you know, it has been one of the most controversial matters that we have had there for some time.

Nevertheless, it is my view that this is the proper, the sensible and the prudent way to approach meeting the financial needs of the United Nations at this critical moment in its history.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has advocated and presented to the Senate a proposal based on the bond issue that we would purchase \$25 million worth of bonds immediately and then we would match dollar for dollar up to \$100 million worth of purchases. In other words, if other nations put in \$75 million, we will purchase \$75 million above --

HUMPHREY: In additon to the 25. I think this is sensible and sound. There may be a further adjustment. The newspapers call it

a "compromise".

But that adjustment or change will still hold to the principle of permitting the President of the United States to exercise his authority to purchase bonds, and it might even go so far as to say "or other financial arrangements which may fulfill the needs of the United Nations". We will find the language.

And I am going to make a prediction. I am going to predict that the Senate of the United States will overwhelmingly approve the purchase of the bonds for the United Nations and what other financial arrangements may be needed.

STEVENSON: It will have a very salutary effect throughout the world, too.

HUMPHREY: Indeed, it will.

STEVENSON: Because many of the smaller nations, particularly, are waiting to see whether the United States still means business about the United Nations in view of the criticisms that have been leveled against it.

HUMPHREY: Well, Governor, you know this is the soundest investment we could make. I did some looking into some of our costs of peace-keeping around the world. I wonder if people have ever contemplated how much we have spent in Laos on our own operation.

MICHAELIS: Just bilaterally.

HUMPHREY: A tremendous cost, about \$18 per Laotian is what we have spent. In the Congo it is about \$4, what our contribution would be per Congolese. Vietnam -- we have put billions into South Vietnam, and we still haven't really kept the peace.

If we were to supply American troops in the Congo because it is quite obvious that if the United Nations isn't in the Congo somebody will be there --

MICHAELIS: You'd have to fill the vacuum, certainly.

HUMPHREY: And one of the reasons that the United Nations went there is, as you well know, Ambassador, because you have been such a significant part of all of these decisions, one of the reasons that the United Nations went there is because the United States of America asked the United Nations and supported in the United Nations the request for United Nations forces. Why? Because the Soviets were getting ready to move in with equipment, with technicians, military assistance, and soon I would imagine Soviet power. Now, we didn't want a confrontation there, a battle between the two giants.

MICHAELIS: Like we had in Korea where we spent \$18 billion and hundreds of thousands of casualties.

HUMPHREY: Now, we have 16,000 UN troops, apparently, or approximately in the Congo, at a cost of about \$100 million a year, out of which we have been paying -- what is it -- about fifty per cent. If there were 16,000 United States troops in the Congo, it would cost at least \$160 million a year, which we pay all. That's the minimum. I think that's a very low figure. And how about the casualties? How about the casualties?

I sometimes wonder about us here in this country. Our friends in Sweden have lost many good men. They lost, first of all, a great world citizen in Dag Hammarskjold who was trying to keep the peace in the Congo. And they have lost their sons on the battlefield. Our friends in Ireland have lost their sons.

MICHAELIS: India.

HUMPHREY: India has lost their sons. There is no payment for this kind of loss.

And here we are sitting around here arguing about whether we should buy some bonds that are redeemable with interest! I don't think it is very becoming.

MICHAELIS: It's a little embarrassing.

HUMPHREY: Frankly, I think it makes us a little mean minded and -- well, it just isn't the image of American that is the real

America.

STEVENSON: I don't think there is any doubt but what the United States is going to meet its obligations here, that it is going to demonstrate to the rest of the world our leadership, our determination to give the United Nations our utmost support and confidence, and that we are going to move on step by step to more effective operational activities in the field of peace throughout with this institution.

There has never been an American boy lost in the Middle East, on the Kashmir frontier, in the Congo, in the Suez, in all of these areas where the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations have been effective.

And I hope very much that we don't try to scuttle the ship just when it is beginning to operate.

HUMPHREY: I think we ought to recognize that during this crucial period during the past two or three years there has been a determined effort on the part of the enemies of the United Nations, within and without, to weaken this great organization or to paralyze it, or to choke it. And now there are some that would like to make it the victim of "economic Leukemia". Just drain away its financial resources, its blood line, so to speak.

But the people don't want that. And the message of the people is getting through to the Congress, I tell you. The people are for the United Nations. The people have got good sense. I sometimes wonder what hits us down here in Washington. I tell you, if we just listen enough. I get home to my home state quite often, and when I get there I come back refreshed, physically, spiritually and intellectually. And I suggest that once in a while it might be a good idea if we just recess Congress for a few days at a time and get home for the wells of inspiration.

MICHAELIS: Senator, I want to thank you on behalf of Governor Stevenson for being with us here today. And I want to thank you both for being such outstanding bond salesmen. I now feel assured of passage in both houses.

Thank you very much.

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