TAYLOR
rb-1

CBS NEWS
Broadcast House
Washington 16, D.C.
EM 2-9300

"THE TEST-BAN TREATY"

as broadcast over the

CBS Television Network

September 3, 1963 - 7:30-8:30 PM EDT

CORRESPONDENTS:	Eric Sevareid Richard C. Hottelet
PRODUCER:	John Sharnik
DIRECTOR:	Martin Carr
ASSOCIATE PRODUCERS:	Robert Wussler William Eames

- - -

TAY(1)
jt-1

ANNOUNCER: This is the hallmark of our age. It is possible that Americans and Russians will never see this sight again.

(Russian text of Test Ban Treaty.)

ANNOUNCER: The United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have agreed as follows, to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion in the atmosphere beyond its limits including outer space or under water including territorial waters or high seas.

(President Kennedy on film.)

PRESIDENT KENNEDY: This limited test ban in our most careful judgment is safer by far for the United States than an unlimited nuclear arms race. For all these reasons I am hopeful that this nation will promptly approve the limited test ban treaty.

There will, of course, be debate in the country and in the Senate. The Constitution wisely requires the advice and consent of the Senate to all treaties and that consultation has already begun.

All this is as it should be a document which may mark a historic and constructive opportunity for the world deserves an historic and constructive

debate.

ANNOUNCER: The Test Ban Treaty, a special broadcast on the issue before the Senate and the nation.

Reporting from Washington, Eric Sevareid.

MR. SEVAREID: Good evening.

Peaceful coexistence is a Russian slogan and an American policy. For some twenty years the United States has been trying to reach agreements with the Soviet Union that would leave room and air for both nations and smaller ones on this indivisible planet. The U.S.S.R. has broken many agreements. The last big one they signed with us and which still holds was the Treaty for Austria in 1955.

If the present treaty does not hold, the world may never have another chance to get the atomic genie even part way back in the bottle.

All three American Presidents during this atomic era have believed that if we can slow down developments of nuclear weapons, our lives and everybody's lives will be that much safer. Hopes have risen and fallen time after time. Fears that agreement would never be reached have been and are now matched by fears that agreement would harm, not help, American security.

President Kennedy believes in the hope. So does the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. But the full Senate must approve the treaty and by a two-thirds vote. Debate begins next Monday. It is a fateful debate.

Later in this program we will have a miniature debate in our studio with four distinguished men who are parties to the issue. On Capitol Hill the alignment of Yes, No and Yes, If, has already taken shape. One of the early and ardent supporters of the treaty is John O. Pastore, Democrat of Rhode Island.

SENATOR PASTORE: Well, my impulsive answer would be at long last. We have beenwaiting for this sort of thing for a long, long time.

ANNOUNCER: Any risk to our security in this treaty?

SENATOR PASTORE: Absolutely not. As a matter of fact, this is a judgment that has to be made by the President of the United States. I have been contending right along that there is no man in the United States of America who has more knowledge, that is, speaking now of Central Intelligence, than the President of the United States.

SENATOR JACKSON: I think that it is very important that we get all the facts so that as Senators we can discharge our constitutional obligations in a responsible way. This is not just another treaty. We are discussing the means by which we have maintained the peace since the end of World War II. This has been our superiority in nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. We must on a priority basis protect that deterrent.

First things first, and the first thing is to make sure that our means of maintaining the peace is adequately and properly protected.

(SENATOR DIRKSEN ON FILM): Of course, I have been curious as to why we made such speedy progress here when after sixteen years we got nowhere on the old Baruch proposal. After fifteen years we got nowhere on disarmament. After fourteen years we have gotten nowhere on Berlin. After ten years we have never made any progress in the reunification of Korea. And it took eight years to get an Austrian treaty. And so almost overnight something happens. Who wouldn't be curious?

MR. SEVAREID: By the Constitution the President negotiates treaties but the Senate must not only advise but consent. The Senators don't have to just take the treaty or leave it. They can amend it with what are known as reservations.

Now, if they do that, the treaty would have to be renegotiated with a majority of the countries that have now signed it, including both Russia and Britain, and it could be lost in the process.

One or two things are hardly debatable. Most ordinary human beings everywhere never want to see another atomic shot fired in anger and most are apprehensive about radioactive fallout. But the issue is not quite as simple as that. Through most of the history of nations the peace has been kept, when it has been kept, by a balance of power. There is a rough balance

of power today. Some call it a balance or terror. And there are responsible Americans deeply convinced that this treaty will sooner or later upset that balance in our disfavor. That is what the current debate is really about, which means to a great extent the military and scientific debate.

Now, Senators are not generals or admirals or physicists. They can only listen to the technical evidence pro and con and make up their own minds out of their sense of history and where they think history is going. They confront a treaty rare for its brevity and simplicity. It is about 1500 words long, not much longer than the deed to your house and easier to understand. It says five principal things. It says that the signers hope some day to work out an agreement on real disarmament, including some method of policing it; that they hope to put an end to all forms of muclear testing; that in the meantime they will stop some forms of testing, in the air, in space, and under water. They will not help any other country to do such testing and anybody can pull out of this treaty on three months' notice if something happens to make it seem dangerous to their security.

This amounts to a limited ban on testing. What it still permits is nuclear explosions underground.

Now, this is something that we gave up on after five years of negotiation, a delay that has raised some questions now about Russia's motives and interests in this ban on nuclear tests.

Geneva is the traditional resort of diplomats, often the last resort, a place to cool off hot issues if not to resolve them.

In this building full of sad echoes, the old League of Nations headquarters, East and West have met often and long on the conflicts of the cold war, Indo-China, Berlin, disarmament. Here the test-ban issue heated and cooled and finally froze in deadlock on what seemed to be the very verge of agreement among the three great nuclear powers.

The representative of the Soviet Union just went in -- Tsarapkin. Mr. Arthur Dean, representing the United States. For Great Britain a young foreign service professional, David Ormsby-Gore. These are the members of the cast assembling in room eight. Over the years the cast has shifted and so have the arguments. The crux of it remains -- underground testing, how to make sure that any agreement would not be violated, how to enforce a ban against explosions that are hard to detect.

Time moves slowly in the world of diplomacy and here it dragged more than usual. Five years of negotiation. This city on a lake in Switzerland became the

unsteady focus of the hopes. Its peaceful images could never blot out the awful shape of the bomb. Meetings became routine. Members of the negotiating staff temporarily assigned to Geneva settled down as permanent residents.

In room eight the Americans offered one way out of this deadlock, to forget about underground tests and simply ban the others, but the Russians walked away from it again. And the American delegate concluded that Moscow simply was not interested in a treaty to check the bomb. Instead of a step towards disarmament, the test ban meetings then began to look like another step backward. But suddenly this summer Moscow's interest seemed to perk up. A series of secret communications between the Kremlin and the White House and a special delegation arrived in Moscow just one month ago. At its head the President's special envoy, The Under Secretary of State, Mr. Averell Harriman. In a matter of weeks a treaty would be discussed, initialed, and would be really a limited ban on tests. The troublesome issue of underground testing left for some future agreement.

It was almost identical with the old American proposal offered long ago in room eight in Geneva and there rejected? Why had it suddenly received Khrushchev's blessings? What possible clues to Russia's motivies as to the value of the treaty?

TAY(3)
jt-1

To Ambassador Harriman, now home from Moscow, some questions were put by CBS News Correspondent, Mr. Richard Hottelet.

MR. HOTTELET: Mr. Harriman, the Soviet Union could have had this test ban treaty a year ago, even two years ago. Why have they signed it now?

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN: Now, your question is very interesting. One can only guess but I think there are three basic factors which one can be pretty sure of.

One is that Mr. Khrushchev, since the confrontation over Cuba last October, does not want to have nuclear war. He realizes that his own country will be destroyed, and they have put a lot of effort into developing great scientific institutions, great universities, as well as great industries. The only failure is agriculture But this generation of Kremlin leaders don't want to see that all destroyed and they know, even on a second strike basis, that their nation would go up in smoke.

Now, the other one is that he is finding that the cost of a nuclear arms race is very expensive. It is the same number of manhours as it is in the

United States and their productivity is only half of ours, so that you can see that it is a greater burden on them, and he has indicated, in fact, he told me so, that he wanted to get on with the increased production of food, which means a very large increase in production of the chemical fertilizer, and also he wants to improve the clothing. They haven't gotten enough cotton and wool, and therefore he wants to get into the synthetic fibers.

And third, and perhaps the controlling reason, as far as timing, as to timing is concerned, is this conflict with Peiping, the Chinese Communists.

MR. HOTTELET: On balance who gains more from this treaty politically, the Soviet Union or we?

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN: I don't think anyone gains more. I think the fact that 80 nations have signed it indicates the people of the world gain.

MR. HOTTELET: Is this a political breakthrough in East-West relations towards a solution of some of the long-standing problems?

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN: You know, Mr. Khrushchev said the day after we initialed the treaty that this might be a breakthrough and President Kennedy said it might be a first step, but it is in the area of controlling nuclear weapons, possibly even other forms

of disarmament. But it is very clear Mr. Khrushchev does not want the Kremlin engaged in a nuclear war.

On the other hand, we have to believe him when he says that there is no coexistence in the ideological conflict. That goes on. He is determined to communize the world. He hasn't changed, and therefore the basic struggle between free men and communism goes on.

MR. SEVAREID: In the Senate Committee hearing there was no disposition to write off the Soviet challenge, either political or military. Soviet interests and intentions have been examined like x-ray photos in the dimmest possible light. The treaty may represent, as the President has suggested, an international opportunity, but the issue has been national security.

In this new quest for peace, Washington has been examining the power for war, how it stands now, how it might be affected by the treaty provisions. On the broadest outline of American military strength, the testimony of Defense Secretary McNamara has pretty well stood up without much serious challenge. The United States now owns tens of thousands of nuclear bombs, says Mr. McNamara's rough count,

bombs of all types and sizes. The country has missiles, planes, and guns capable of delivering these goods, and this is all adding up to enough power to destroy the Soviet Union even if we were first caught by surprise attack.

In designs and numbers and diversity of nuclear weapons it is generally believed that the U.S. is ahead of the U.S.S.R., so they have an edge when it comes to the big bombs, the monsters of many megatons.

In other words, they have the biggest and we have the most.

Beyond this point the question of security under the test ban treaty breaks down into a series of doubts, challenges and speculations which could be filed under three main headings.

First, the question of those super bombs. The Russians have tested a device of nearly 60 megatons. Our biggest is about 25. There is an argument over whether under the treaty we could manage to produce the big bomb or whether we really need it.

Second, there are doubts about our own underground missile sites. In their underground launch silos, how well protected are these Minutemen

Missiles against enemy attack? Can we be sure without testing them against big blasts in the atmosphere?

Third, the anti-missile missile, the last word in power in the nuclear age. These weapons are in the primitive stage of development. Some experts, like Physicist Edward Teller, think the Russians know more about them than we do and they claim that we could not catch up without high level testing.

Well, all these questions are magnified and encompassed by another worry, that the Soviet Union might be able to increase her advantages and overcome ours by cheating on the treaty, and there is an argument over whether they could do that successfully without getting caught.

The doubts on the military side were summarized in one piece of testimony by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Air Force Chief, General Curtis LeMay, speaks first.

GENERAL LeMAY: I would say probably the key factor was political in this case. We examined the military and the technical aspects and came up with a net disadvantage in that field.

VOICE: In the military?

GENERAL LeMAY: In the military, yes, sir. And then we examined the political gains that were possible and we came up with a net advantage there which we thought offset the disadvantages if we were able to reduce those disadvantages by the proper safeguards.

(4)

A VOICE: If we now knew that either the Administration or the Congress were not to take action to carry out these safegusrds, would you feel obligated to protest now against the signing of the treaty?

GENERAL LEMAY: Yes, I would, I would, because I feel that these safeguards must be provided for if we are going to have the treaty.

A VOICE: I agree with General LeMay.

A VOICE: So do I.

A VOICE: General Shoup?

GENERAL SHOUP: Yes, sir, I agree.

MR. SEVAREID: National security and the test-ban treaty. In a moment we will examine this issue in detail, the doubts, the convictions, the question, with two distinguished members of the United States Senate and two expert witnesses to the matter.

First we pause briefly for the following message.

- - -

MR. SEVAREID: As Senator Jackson has said, this is not just another treaty. This document involves the security of the United States and the welfare of the world. The deadly serious committee argument about it over the last couple of weeks will, I am sure, be reflected in the discussion that follows now.

With me are four distinguished men, two of whom support

this treaty and two of whom are opposed to it. They are Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota, Democrat, and deputy majority leader of the Senate. Dr. Herbert York, Chancellor of the University of California at San Diego. He is a physicists, was director of the Defense Research and Engineering for the Defense Department. Senator Carl T. Curtis, Republican of Nebraska, member of the Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee and of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. And Admiral Arleigh Burke, Retired, former Chief of Naval Operations, now Director of Strategic Studies, Georgetown University.

Well, gentlemen, first of all, thank you very much for joining us tonight. This is a very solemn matter indeed and I wonder if each of you could state to begin with in just a sentence or two your attitude about the treaty and the overriding reason that you have come to this attitude.

Senator Humphrey?

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Well, I believe our President summarized it very well and I can only paraphrase it. This treaty I believe will assure the security of the United States better than continued unlimited testing. I think it will inhibit the nuclear arms race even though it doesn't prohibit it.

I believe it will make a contribution to world peace

even though it doesn't prohibit it.

I believe it will make a contribution to world peace even though it doesn't guarantee it. And finally I believe that it will prevent the pollution of the atmosphere.

All of these I think are worthy reasons.

MR. SEVAREID: Senator Curtis?

SENATOR CURTIS: Well, I yield to no American in my desire for peace. I have served in Congress during two wars, when the draft calls were heavy and the casualties were numerous.

I regard this treaty as an invitation to war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have just been quoted as saying that the military, on the military side we are at a disadvantage. I believe that it will promote a complacency and a spirit in the country and in our dealings that may lead to a surprise attack from the Communists.

MR. SEVAREID: Admiral Burke.

ADMIRAL BURKE: The Soviets have never signed a treaty unless it was to their advantage and they have violated nearly every treaty that they have signed when that was to their advantage.

They have proved their untrustworthiness.

This treaty has many military disadvantages, disadvantages to the United States, and the political advantages are not necessarily in favor of the United

States.

This treaty requires a great many safeguards and this treaty has very many imprecise terminology terms in it which will require interpretation in the future and when they do require interpretation, the Soviets will interpret them to suit themselves.

And finally, this treaty came after extensive Soviet testing, testing in which they gained a great deal of knowledge, and this treaty may be the result of having gained technical knowledge which we do not have and which they want to prevent us from having.

MR. SEVA EID: Dr. York?

DR. YORK: I am for the treaty and without reservations. I am for it because it is necessary in the interests of American national security to first diminish and then reverse the arms race.

The arms race has resulted in a steady increase over the last fifteen years, a steady increase in American military power. At the same time, it has resulted in a steady decrease in American national security.

The partial nuclear test-ban is a first step in the direction of reversing the arms race.

MR. SEVAREID: Thank you, gentlemen.

In your own remarks and in the Committee hearings of the last couple of weeks, this thing has seemed to

break down into two rather separate categories, or the overlapping points, the military and scientific arguments on one side and the rather long-range political matters on the other side. The military-scientific testimony seemed to rather dominate the testimony in the news in the last few days.

Let's try to deal with some of the high points of that part of it first.

Admiral Burke, do you think that this treaty is going to decrease or increase the actual accumulation of these awful weapons on both sides?

ADMIRAL BURKE: I don't think it will have any effect at all on the numbers of weapons. What I think it will have will increase the tension and it will increase the sion because of the very safeguards which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and many others have proposed.

I have said it is necessary for this treaty to be militarily acceptable. One of them is that there must be a great amount of underground testing. The amount of underground testing will actually increase.

The second is that the laboratories must, the nuclear laboratories must be kept at full strength and ready and working all the time.

The third one is that we must be ready to test immediately in the atmosphere in the event that some other

nation breaks this treaty. It is very difficult to do on a stand-by condition as the President said in March I think of 1962.

SENATOR CURTIS: May I add that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have said that this treaty will cost more money because to do what must be done to protect ourselves will call for being done in a more expensive way.

MR. SEVAREID: Dr. York, would you like to address yourself to what the Admiral has just said?

DR. YORK: Well, I don't think that the treaty itself has any direct bearing either on the question of whether we will produce more or less weapons in the future. This treaty. It is a step in the direction of arms control and disarmament and as we go further down this road, it may very well result in lesser production or even stop production.

The reservations that some people have put great emphasis on, the need for increase in underground testing, and so on, I think are somewhat exaggerated. The American program of underground testing is already a vigorous program and under the conditions that we are going into probably should continue at about the same rate.

It will never be possible, as the President himself pointed out, to actually satisfy the laboratories with regard to their ideas of how many tests there should be.

I was director myself of a nuclear weapons laboratory for five years and I know that in those days we never had as many tests as we thought there ought to be, and, of course, test bans and political considerations were not the determining factor at that time.

MR. SEVAREID: Senator Humphrey, the treaty says that this we hope is a first step towards complete disarmament. That is the number one objective laid down in the text as I recall. Yet all the Committee testimony seemed to be to a point of how we could have this treaty and still go on with an arms race. Why this?

5

TAY(5)
jt-1

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Well, of course, the stated objective of our country as well as our commitment to the charter of the United Nations is a world of peace and a world in which mankind doesn't use weapons to settle his disputes, and therefore with proper safeguards, and this, of course, is a long-term objective and it is indeed an ideal, that we might sometime be able to arrive at a point where we could have safeguarded disarmament.

In the meantime we don't have it. But I think the point needs to be emphasized here, Mr. Sevareid, and I say this to my esteemed colleagues on this program, we had unlimited nuclear superiority some years ago and we had unlimited testing, and testing hasn't given us more superiority. Testing in fact, nuclear testing, has diminished our superiority. The gap has been closed and the body of evidence, gentlemen, before the three committees that listened to the testimony is conclusive without doubt that testing does not continue to give us the unlimited advantages that a pronouncement of testing would so indicate.

The Russians have closed the gap.

Furthermore, I think the testimony indicates without exception that at the present time in the

overall of all types of weaponry, we have a nuclear superiority. This is as it is as of this date in September 1963.

Now, gentlemen, if it is true that the arms race unlimited doesn't seem to give you the superiority and security that you would like, then why wouldn't a test ban treaty that would limit testing have some advantages from the technical, military point of view?

I think there are many political advantages, gentlemen, that we will get to and I think it ought to be talked of in terms of political advantages rather than just the arms race itself.

MR. SEVAREID: Admiral?

ADMIRAL BURKE: I would like to answer Senator Humphrey.

In the first place, he is quite right, that when we were having nuclear testing, that the Russians, at that time we were superior and now we don't know whether we really are or not.

How did that come about? It came about because the moratorium in which we stopped testing, and we really stopped testing, and the Russians stopped testing, too, but they were preparing to test and they broke the moratorium and they

suddenly started testing with a great number of weapons.

It took us eight, seven, eight, nine months before we were ready to start, and then not with a program as well conceived perhaps as the Russians.

Now, during this last test series of the Russians, that the Russians held, where they had a great many large yield weapons and a great many more weapons, I understand, than we tested, they gained perhaps great advantages.

Perhaps the things that they learned on that recent test is the reason now why they want a test ban so that we don't have those similar tests.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Well, Admiral, may I just rejoin you there.

We have had more tests than the Russians.

ADMIRAL BURKE: Not in the last --

SENATOR HUMPHREY: No. Not --

ADMIRAL BURKE: Not with the last test ban.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Well, whether in the last two years or not, the totality of nuclear weapons development gives the United States more, and if you add the United Kingdom in, we have had many more. We have had more in the atmosphere than they had.

Before the moratorium we had many more. After the moratorium they had more.

But I want to repeat that in the totality of the nuclear weapons development, in the total picture, we have had more tests than they have, and if you continue to say perhaps they have acquired new knowledge, perhaps they have done this, may I say perhaps we have.

Why don't we put them on the worry side, because obviously everybody doesn't know all the facts of this.

ADMIRAL BURKE: That is quite right.

MR. SEVAREID: May I let Dr. York speak on that point.

DR. YORK: The facts that Admiral Burke has stated have had some contribution to closing this gap but they are not the basic reason that the gap has been closed at all. The basic reason that the difference has shrunk, that is, that our superiority over the Russians has decreased, is simply that they like we have exploited the possibilities of modern technology and science. And there is, and since defense is either impossible or practically impossible, they have closed the gap.

They like we can build an atomic bomb and have

been able to for some years which can destroy a bridge on the one hand or the largest city in the world on the other hand. The situation has reached what you might think of as a saturation condition.

As one progresses, you can do this a little more elegently. You can do it with something which is scientifically more interesting, but once you have reached the condition where you can destroy the biggest city in the world, you don't from an applications point of view progress much beyond that point.

We got there first. Therefore we were ahead. Now they are there, and so our superiority has disappeared, but it is not due to anything we failed to do. It is solely due to what they did.

SENATOR CURTIS: Well, now, if I may say something about that, the testing that the Soviets have done in recent years after they broke the moratorium very likely has given them the information to proceed a long ways with the anti-missile missiles, and admittedly we do not have it.

Now, the doctrine of my friend, Senator Humphrey, is a strange one. If we would carry it through, we would quit testing airplanes. Ladies

would quit testing their ovens before they bake. We would quit testing rifles. We would quit testing everything else because to test what we produce doesn't help.

It does help. The Russians will go on.

Now, here is what Khrushchev told the Chinese on August 21, 1963, as a reason for this test.

"With the new balance of power, the nuclear test ban would perpetuate not the American nuclear monopoly but the fact of its liquidation."

They were against a treaty when we were ahead. They broke a moratorium, gained considerable knowledge. Now they want a treaty which we know they won't live up to. They make it when it is to their benefit.

MR. SEVAREID: Excuse me, Senator. I am afraid we have got to interrupt this discussion for just a moment. We will pause for station identification.

- - -

MR. SEVAREID: Gentlemen, let us resume now about where we left off.

I would like to ask Dr. York, do you think that looking way ahead there will ever come a point

of lasting and decisive security superiority by means of weapons superiority? I think you said something in the testimony about the fallacy of inventing ourselves into security.

DR. YORK: Yes. The arms race from my point of view, and I have spent most of my professional life in weapons development, has progressed from a case where, say, in the early 1950's, the Russians using bombers and atomic bombs could have attacked the United States, caused a few million casualties, and could have made this attack on their own sole decision had they chosen to accept the inevitable retaliation.

In the late fifties they could have attacked with better airplanes, with thermonuclear weapons, produced tens of millions of casualties.

By the mid-sixties they will be able to attack with rockets and airplanes with thermonuclear weapons and produce perhaps 100 million.

Now, the defenses that we installed back in the fifties made some difference but not substantively, and as we get further into the missile age, the possibility of making any difference in this picture whatsoever from the defense approach that is trying to find a technical means for coping with the offense looks to me to be ever dimmer.

I don't believe that there is any hope at all in trying to find a solution to this steady diminution in the national security that has come about from the arms race if we look only in the area of science and technology. We have to look some place else where there might be hope, and in the political realm that the test-ban treaty opens up, I think, I hope there is hope. I think there is hope. But there is not in science or technology.

MR. SEVAREID: Admiral, is it your feeling that the Russians might come to a point of an anti-missile defense system that really was operable?

ADMIRAL BURKE: Yes, they might, but that is not my major point. My major point Dr. York just made a moment ago. He says, and quite correctly, that the Russians, the Soviets, have made tremendous advances, a more rapid rate of advance than we have recently.

DR. YORK: I didn't say it was more rapid but they made advances.

ADMIRAL BURKE: First they were way behind and now they have caught up or nearly caught up or slightly exceeded, some place along there.

Then he made a statement that the advances in nuclear weapons is not an answer to the problem, that what is the answer, he thinks, is the hope that some

other way will be the answer. And that is what I am afraid of on this treaty, that we are hoping, we are wishful thinking ourselves into a disadvantageous position at the same time when the Soviets have made big advances in recent years, no matter what our relative standards are, the status is now, and I am fearful that three or four years from now when this treaty is re-interpreted then by the nations of the world, and when the Soviets will have developed weapons which we will not have developed, we will be in very serious straits, both politically and militarily.

MR. SEVAREID: Senator Curtis, would you approve this treaty if you could put reservations in it of your own choosing?

SENATOR CURTIS: I don't know. I think that all of the reservations suggested by the military, although they were put in forms of reservations, would have to be carried out but I think it proceeds on the principle that you can deal with the Communists.

They do not keep their treaties. It was borne out in the testimony before the Committee that they even objected to this 90-day so-called escape clause. It has been said in this country, well, if this doesn't work out, we can serve 90-day notice. They said, we do not need that because we hold it in our sovereign power to break a treaty

any time we choose. So they have no waiting period. We have ninety days.

I think it is a delusion. I think it is flying in the face of everything that we have learned from history. And certainly the men of the Joint Chiefs of Staff just today, the testimony was released that General Taylor said he expected the Communists to cheat. It is on the record. There are military disadvantages and with a country that has broken every treaty, has put millions and millions of people into slavery, I just can't understand this mad rush to enter into a treaty with them that is full of words and nobody knows what they mean.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Well, Mr. Sevareid, three Presidents of the United States, President Truman, President Eisenhower and now President Kennedy, have sought for years and they have sought with great sincerity and dedication to find a way to ban further testing of nuclear weapons and to slow down this arms race.

Now, those three Presidents have been advised by men such as the two distinguished gentlemen on the ends of this table, Admiral Burke and Dr. York, and many others, and these Presidents have the responsibility for the security of this country as Commander-in-Chief, the Chief Executive, and all three without exception have said that this type of

treaty is in our national interest.

The overwhelming body of evidence, gentlemen, without trying to be unkind to those who have opposed it, the overwhelming body of evidence is for this treaty. The scientific evidence -- Dr. Kistiakowsky, former science adviser to President Eisenhower, Dr. Bradbury, the head of the Los Alamos laboratory, Dr. Harold Brown, present Defense Research Director, Dr. York, former Defense Research Director under President Eisenhower -- the overwhelming body of evidence, scientific and military, gentlemen, despite the doubts of the military -- the Chiefs came out for this treaty. They endorsed this treaty.

I noticed, for example, in this week's News Week magazine that the former Chief of the Air Force, General White, came out for this treaty. Yes, he had some doubts. Of course we have some doubts, and when you get down to trusting the Russians, this treaty isn't built on trust. This treaty is built on what we consider to be our national interests, the fulfillment of our objectives.

We have means of detection. We have means of inspection. We have means of identification. We do not rely upon the Soviet Union to agree with us as to whether or not our national interests are being violated. We can at any time resume testing if we feel it is within our national interests. We can give the 90-day notice.

If the Soviets violate the treaty, we can test immediately.

I am for the safeguards. Every prudent person ought to be for the safeguards. This has been window dressing, gentlemen. Any member of Congress that isn't for the security of this country doesn't deserve to be there, and any President that wouldn't see that this country was properly protected doesn't deserve the honor of the office and wouldn't maintain it.

I think much of this talk about safeguards is just talk. Of course we are going to do something about these safeguards if we have the will to do it. And if we don't have the will to do it, it won't make any difference whether you write them into the treaty or not.

MR. SEVAREID: Admiral?

ADMIRAL BURKE: Yes, I would like -- Senator, a good deal of what you just said I thoroughly agree with because I am sure that all the people in the world hope that this treaty will work. I do, too. Just like the people before in Munich hoped that that would work, and it didn't.

Now, I don't mean that this is like Munich. It isn't. But still wishful thinking, the desire to have a peaceful world, is of paramount interest to all of the people of the United States and lots of times we let those

hopes interfere with our judgment, and that is what I am afraid is happening now, that there -- you said something about detection, that we have ways of detecting.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Yes.

ADMIRAL BURKE: Our ways of detecting are built on a fission weapon primarily. We get radioactivity, radio degree from a fission explosion, and we can determine what kind of a fission explosion there is. It is also built on seismic information, on sound, on seeing it, other similar things. But basically it is a radio, radioactive degree.

Now, it is very difficult without that to determine whether or not there was a nuclear explosion, some other kind of an explosion, or whether there was a nuclear explosion underground. Radioactive degree in a fusion weapon is very difficult. You don't get it.

Also we say we hope to have in a year or so some method of testing of checking in space, something in space. We don't have it now. There are other holes in our monitoring techniques which we will have some day if we keep on working towards it, but we don't have it now, and maybe we will get it, maybe we won't.

MR. SEVAREID: Dr. York, is there a quick answer to that?

DR. YORK: I would like to comment on both of the

points. One of them is the matter of hope. It is certainly true that a great deal of the support for this treaty is founded at least partly on hope. My own is partly on hope, although as Senator Humphrey said, it is not founded on trust. But there are other things that involve hope.

The program of the Department of Defense to attempt to develop an anti-ballistic missile, which I supported when I was in the Defense Department and still do support the program to try to develop one, is based on hope, a probably much more futile hope even than any that are involved here.

We spend hundreds of millions of dollars a year in the Defense Department on the hope that we might find some solution around this great series and mass of problems that we have in the anti-ballistic missile, almost none of which, incidentally, and it should be brought up at some point, involved the nuclear weapon. We have had a nuclear weapon for years which, if it could be delivered to the right place at the right time, would destroy an incoming missile. The problem is to know where the missile is, which one is the missile. As the Secretary of Defense has said, and almost everyone else, it is an electronics problem. It is a missile problem. It is not a nuclear weapon proolem.

TAY(7)
jt-1

SENATOR HUMPHREY: And therefore this treaty doesn't cover that.

DR. YORK: The treaty is not involved at all because the problem is not a nuclear weapon problem anyway. And second, the detection system, of course, one can always hypothesize that there is some hole hear or some hole there.

On the other hand, as I know the detection system and the features of weapons tests and so on, I am not concerned about the question of not being able to detect any kind of Soviet test that would be a significant test.

MR. SEVAREID: Gentlemen, there was mentioned by Secretary McNamara -- I will come right to you, Senator, the danger of political euphoria that might follow this agreement with the Russians, a general let-down, partly with our allies in NATO, the kind of thing that happened after the Camp David meeting or the 1955 Summit Meeting in Geneva.

Senator Curtis, do you fear this kind of reaction?

SENATOR CURTIS: Yes, and I think it is quite significant that these high Defense officials say here is a treaty that militarily is bad. Now, to go along for some mystic reason, it has never been

listed or identified, some faint hope, but for goodness sakes, keep up your guard. They are going to cheat. We have to maintain a strong defense. We will have to spend more to accomplish the same thing underground. That in substance is what they say.

Now, I believe, too, that the record will show that testing in the atmosphere is necessary to the development of an anti-missile missile, and we heard considerable evidence along that line.

MR. SEVAREID: To turn again to the political aspects of this, if I might, Senator Humphrey, do you have much hope that this agreement actually will seriously discourage development of nuclear weapons in countries like France and China?

SENATOR HUMPHREY: No. I don't feel that it will necessarily stop them, but I do feel that it provides an opportunity for the mobilization of world opinion to bring pressure to bear at least upon some responsible nation like France. It might, it surely will inhibit or impede the flow of nuclear information for weapons purposes.

This treaty is designed in part to inhibit or to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It would be wrong for any of us to tell the American

people that this treaty is the perfect instrument, that it will bring peace, or that it will stop nuclear arms race. I didn't say that. I say that it is a step in the right direction. It does inhibit the arms race. It does impede the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It does set roadblocks to the dissemination of nuclear weapons information, and all of this I think is in our national interest.

The Soviets know we are not going to attack them.

ADMIRAL BURKE: And have known it, have all along.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: They know it and therefore they can enter into this kind of a treaty, to be sure, with a degree of security. We know that the Soviets are apt to cheat and therefore we have set up appropriate safeguards in this treaty for withdrawal and for systems of detection and identification. But gentlemen, I want to get back to this euphoria business. I sat through these hearings and the amazing thing to me in the Congress of the United States was that seldom was the word "peace" mentioned. It is astounding. All we talked about was weapons and weapons development and missiles

4 and anti-missiles and bigger bombs and smaller bombs and tactical and strategic bombs when in fact the prime objective of all of our military and all of our defense structure is the securing of a just and enduring peace, and every instrument that we can sign that we think we can properly police, that we think will make a contribution to that noble objective, I think is in our national interest.

ADMIRAL BURKE: I do, too, Senator, but I don't think that this treaty --

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Well, may I say that at least this treaty offers us an opportunity. We are not trapped. If this treaty violates our national security and national interest, the withdrawal item in this -- what is it, Article IV -- provides for withdrawal.

ADMIRAL BURKE: After 90 days.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Unless we feel, may I say, that there has been a violation of the treaty, and then we have the national, the sovereign right to withdraw immediately.

SENATOR CURTIS: That is too late. That is too late, Senator.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: No, it is not.

SENATOR CURTIS: Yes, it is.

DR. YORK: 90 days is an unimportant figure here because the length of time it takes from when an idea is conceived and tested and then engineered and then put into stockpile, and an even longer time before the delivery vehicle is developed is five, ten years. And the 90 days is just unimportant.

ADMIRAL BURKE: That is exactly right, Herb. That is one of my points. I think on these last tests the Russians got that material, that knowledge, that information, on which to do the research work, the development work, and perhaps the initiation of production while they are assured in the meantime that we will not attack, we will not bother them, and I am afraid that one of the things that we are going to find out is that they have leap-frogged us technically and that we are left with the same kind of weapons that we have now.

DR. YORK: There is no question but what they got more information in their last test series than they did before. If testing continues unabated, they will continue to get more information. So will we. But our national security will not increase. Our national power will increase

slightly.

MR. SEVAREID: From the center of this bear pit, may I ask the Admiral, something he said at the beginning, I would like him to explain that. He said that this treaty signing would actually increase international tensions, not decrease them. Why do you think that?

ADMIRAL BURKE: Well, the reason for that is the increase in underground testing, more testing than we have done recently if we carry out these safeguards, and that means because we will know less about what the Soviets are doing, they will, of course, know a great deal about what we are doing because we are pretty open, but we will know less. We will have less knowledge of what is happening in their underground testing than we had of their testing before.

Consequently, when you have no knowledge or decreasing amount of knowledge, you get worried about what they are doing, and if we don't get worried about what they are doing, then we are foolish indeed because they are out, as they have stated over and over again, they keep reassuring their own people and Red China and all the others of their satellites that this treaty is a victory for them, this is a liquidation of the nuclear power of

the United States.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: The nuclear monopoly. That is a great deal of difference.

ADMIRAL BURKE: Yes.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: May I say that if the Soviets were so worried about this situation of knowledge and wanted to keep it secret, they could have done it long before with underground testing. With unlimited testing they can have underground, in the atmosphere, under water and outer space.

ADMIRAL BURKE: But they have now prevented us from testing in the atmosphere. They have gotten their tests maybe in the atmosphere that they want.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Admiral, let's not deceive the American people or mislead them. We have been testing in the atmosphere and I don't think we are dolts.

ADMIRAL BURKE: But not the same type of weapons.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: No. Many more variations.

ADMIRAL BURKE: But a long time ago, I mean, true, we have had total number of test explosions greater than the Soviets but not recently. The recent ones, the last few years --

SENATOR HUMPHREY: They have had more.

ADMIRAL BURKE: They have increased and they are different kinds. They are bigger.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: But, Admiral, we also tested in

1962.

ADMIRAL BURKE: True.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: We made a decision not to test the big weapon. That was a military decision as well as a scientific decision.

ADMIRAL BURKE: That is right.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: This was a calculated judgment on our part.

Now, I think that when you get right back to this business about who has the greater knowledge of weaponry and nuclear information, the only thing we can do is to add up the evidence that we get.

Now, there have been one or two witnesses come before our Committee, and let's put it three or four to give a maximum number, that have said that we are behind the Soviet in certain types of nuclear knowledge, but every other witness --

ADMIRAL BURKE: Like big weapons.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Yes. Well, just, for example, in the anti-ballistic missile.

ADMIRAL BURKE: Yes.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Yet the main witness that came in and testified about our being behind in the knowledge of the anti-ballistic missile had to admit also that he wasn't privy to the most inside intelligence information and he

hadn't been privy to it.

Now, I happen to think that Dr. Harold Brown, for example, who is presently the Director of Research Development for the Department of Defense, who is able to evaluate the intelligence information, the weapons information, as well as the scientific information, and Dr. Glenn Seaborg, for example, who are up-to-date on this, may be in a little better position to be able to give us a factual objective judgment than someone who is two or three years removed from all of the information.

ADMIRAL BURKE: You mean like me.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: No, no. I didn't mean -- I wasn't speaking of you as the witness. May I say, Admiral, my respect for you you know is great and sincere and indeed --

ADMIRAL BURKE: I am pulling your leg.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: And I know of your deep concern in these matters. All I am saying is that as a Senator I must sit somewhat as a judge, and I have listened to these witnesses, and what have they come up with, most of them? Most of them, with few exceptions, have said, and all of the military chiefs with one, I believe with the exception of General Power, have said under the present Chiefs that the treaty ought to be ratified. When they are put right up to it, should we ratify the treaty, they said yes.

ADMIRAL BURKE: For the political advantages.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Well, you must consider it in all of its aspects.

ADMIRAL BURKE: That is true. You must consider it in all of its aspects, but, Senator, one of the things that worries me about this is what are the political advantages of this treaty? I don't think it will reduce tensions. I think they will actually increase. I think we will find that out in, not in the next six months or so but in the next two or three years. I don't think it will reduce the proliferation of weapons because the proliferation was only going to Red China and France and it is not going to --

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Well, that isn't quite sure. We were sort of watching to see whether Egypt and Israel would sign this treaty. We will be interested as to whether Cuba will sign it. There are many that we would be interested in.

MR. SEVAREID: Gentlemen, we have got less than a minute of this discussion.

Let me ask the two Senators, does your mail show any change in public opinion against the treaty as Senator Goldwater I think claimed on Sunday? Did you see that?

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Not at all. I was home in my home state, Mr. Sevareid, and 83 per cent of the people of Minnesota in the Minnesota public opinion poll endorsed this treaty.

MR. SEVAREID: Senator Curtis?

SENATOR CURTIS: I don't think there has been much change, maybe a little change against it. I think they are waiting to hear what these political advantages are. They have never been listed and they have never been defined, and they haven't been in this program.

MR. SEVAREID: Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you all for coming.

I will be back in a moment with a postscript to this discussion of the test-ban treaty. First a pause for this brief message.

- - -

MR. SEVAREID: Well, much more, of course, could be said about this unprecedented treaty to stop all but underground nuclear tests. Much will be said when the debate begins on the Senate floor next week. But perhaps enough has been said here tonight so that even those citizens who did not follow the Committee testimony will understand the magnitude of what is at stake, the great hope that rides with this treaty and what may be the great dangers.

This is one of those issues to which only time and history can provide the final judgment, but the treaty is also one of those human acts that can create and channel history.

Now, this is hardly a matter to be settled by popular referendum. It is for the judgments, for such judgments as this, that we elect Presidents and Senators, and it is a supreme example of the kind of responsibilities that they accept when they accept their offices.

So I guess all the rest of us can do, all that we can do now is to just pray that their collective judgments turn out to be right.

This is Eric Sevareid in Washington. Good night.

- - -

Minnesota
Historical Society