IS ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP STILL VALID?

An Address by Senator Hubert Humphrey

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President Hallstein, Ambassador Tuthill, distinguished journalists, ladies and gentlemen...

It was indeed my pleasure to receive an invitation to speak here today. I can think of no better time or place to discuss quite frankly the mutual problems and future challenges which face us on both sides of the Atlantic. I wish particularly to explore---perhaps even painfully---the differences which separate us. For I am convinced that it is only through such exploration that we may be able to resolve these differences.

It was Francis Bacon who said that prosperity is not without its fears and distastes, while adversity is not without its comforts and hopes. During time of common threat, we in the United States found comfort and hope in the rebuilding of Western Europe and its initiatives toward unification, to which we gave our wholehearted support. You in Europe equally found comfort and hope in American assistance and military protection. It is only now---in our common "prosperity"---that we have each found cause to question the intentions and policies of the other. Our mutual success has made dissension possible.

But this, of course, is oversimplification. There are quite natural reasons why there should now be points of friction between us. First of all, there is the fact of Western Europe's rapid recovery and renewal. Today the Common Market is a major force in the world. But less than seven years ago it did not exist. Such a development inevitably must cause dislocations in the normal way of doing things for all countries of the world.

Then there is the psychological readjustment which we in the United States have not yet fully made. We have been pleased and astounded by Europe's renewed strength and assertiveness. But we are uncertain as to our courses of action in light of the fact that our country is no longer the West's sole guardian and arbiter. Our uncertainty is heightened too by changing currents in East-West relations.

And then there are several quite concrete and practical problems to which the United States and Europe, quite understandably, do not have identical approaches and answers.

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These problems are military, economic and, above all, political. I will save fuller discussion of these for a few minutes later.

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One cause of any present friction, I believe, is what I only half-jokingly call the American Syndrome. This syndrome manifests itself in the belief of many Americans that there is a direct, simple solution to any problem and that this solution, efficiently applied, will provide all the desired results.

We see the syndrome specifically at work on examining American reaction to Great Britain's present exclusion from the European Community. It was our hope that Great Britain would enter the Community as a full member, that other Western European nations would closely follow, and that this enlarged Community could move toward full unification and, then, full partnership with the United States. Such developments would certainly, in American eyes, have immeasurably strengthened all the West and avoided problems to be found in division of our European allies. In short, British entry into the Community seemed to us to be "common sense."

Encouraged by the Common Market's uninterrupted success from 1958, we in the United States had come to regard the desired sequence of events as a certainty. We thus, on January 14, 1963, found ourselves quite unprepared for any alternative.

Our American Syndrome also made it impossible for most of us to believe that the Pact of Nassau could at all have influenced General deGaulle in his action of January 14 which, temporarily at least, arrested our hopes. To most Americans, the Pact of Nassau was seen as something quite obviously concluded in the interest of military efficiency---the logical answer to a highly-costly duplication of weapons systems. Nassau's political overtones were not clearly seen.

I am afraid that much of American opinion has not yet learned to live with the discovery that the Community, for the foreseeable future, will consist of its present six members. And this disappointment has hardly been concealed. Thus, while January 14, 1963, marks a milestone in the history of Europe's unification, it also marks the point at which part of United States opinion began to question the validity of its previous Atlantic policies. Since that time there is no doubt that there has been a greater in-

patience in the United States than might otherwise have been the case toward policies of the Community and its member states which have come into even minor conflict with our own.

It is thus our task, I believe, to overcome to some degree our syndrome. We must view events in Western Europe in their proper perspective and with greater understanding of how they do and do not alter the principles on which we have previously built our Atlantic Partnership policy.

But we in the United States are not alone in possessing syndromes. I must point to a European Syndrome, as well. The European Syndrome is one which matches our oversimplification with overcomplication. It finds duplicity and power politics where none exist or are intended. Thus we find a few people in Europe who charge that Atlantic Partnership is only a slogan behind which the United States seeks to make Europe a satellite, that the Kennedy Round trade negotiation is a means of U.S. economic domination of the continent, and that we in the United States design to blackmail Europe into support of American policies by maintaining our nuclear veto.

These syndromes---these tendencies of thought pattern---have resulted in oversensitivity in both Europeans and Americans to actions by the

other, and have created misunderstanding.

We must recognize them for what they are.

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Let us now go back to the realities which caused Americans and Europeans to first embark on the course of partnership.

It was quite clear to us in the past that, in partnership, Europe and America stood a far greater chance of maintaining peace and security than in division. It also was quite clear that a united Western Europe would be a far stronger and, hence, more valuable partner than a fragmented Western Europe susceptible to the balance-of-power politics which in the past had so often led to disaster.

Beyond maintenance of peace and security, it also was apparent to us that an Atlantic Partnership could marshal resources for common Western tasks which no single nation---even the United States---could hope to provide.

Are there any realities which should make us change our course?

Does a change in East-West relations in any way render these premises invalid? I fail to see that it does. There are those in Europe and America who say that an integrating Europe and Atlantic Partnership are wholly

incompatible with lessening of East-West tension. I challenge this. Indeed, I say that only our unity of the past has brought us safely to the time where such easing of tension is possible. We particularly see this now in the initiatives being taken by the Bloc countries to adjust to Western Europe's vigor---initiatives toward GATT membership, greater trade with the West, and, eventually perhaps, diplomatic relations with the Community itself. We in the United States welcome the Community's recent steps which leave the door open for such relations. We also watch with close and friendly interest the Community's efforts toward a common commercial policy, which is being formulated with particular attention to Community-Eastern Europe trade.

Should we abandon our successful policies? Indeed, we should pursue them even more resolutely. It is we in the partnership who have something to offer, not those who moderate by fact of our strength. And it is in this knowledge that I feel Atlantic Partnership offers the greatest single opportunity for creating conditions which will bring about eventual reunification of the German people---a goal we must resolutely strive for.

Do urgent and stronger voices in the developing nations render our premises invalid? Again, my reply is that together we in the partnership can do far more for and with the "have not" peoples than we could separately. The fact that the Common Market has ties and gives assistance to Africa should in no way cause us concern in the United States. Nor should you in Europe be dismayed by our special efforts in Latin America. There is no reason why we both cannot do more in all parts of the world. It is only in partnership that we will be able to withstand the pressures, to foster the democratic governments, to inspire the now-undirected aspirations of the developing

world.

Is a Community of the Six inconsistent with construction of a partnership? Why should not a Community of the Six be at home in the environment of partnership--if that Community is democratic, looks outward, and shares the common goals of its partners? We have seen no evidence thus far in the Community of autarky. There are those men within the Six who would make it so. But thus far they have not been successful. If, for all time, the Community should remain closed to those who would subscribe to its trenties; if, in the future, the Community should turn inward economically and militarily, then we would indeed have cause for abandoning our support for it. But I for one have confidence that in the next few years the Community will not only maintain its present awareness of international responsibility but will expand it. For obvious reasons, the time is not right for new initiatives toward full Community membership by other European countries. But there certainly will be a time again when those democratic European nations who meet the Community's obligations will be able to enter. In the meantime a strong Community of the Six is far to be preferred over a weak Community of the Six, or of 10 or 12.

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Will American initiatives toward arms control preclude Europe from reaching military equality with the United States? And will this, in turn, make real partnership impossible? I am convinced that steps toward arms control--which I submit are equally in European and American interest--need not keep Europe in a position of too-great military dependence on the United States, thus inhibiting our relationship.

I maintain indeed that arms control and security do not tread separate paths, but that the first contributes to the second when prudently applied. I will speak further in a moment of how specifically Europe and the United States can reach a more healthy military relationship.

My commitment to Atlantic Partnership thus is firmer than ever before. For I believe the need is greater and the goals more promising than we might dared have dream only a short while ago. But what are the concrete, practical steps which can be taken now to keep that partnership dynamic and healthy?

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The Kennedy Round and Economic Relations

The Kennedy Round offers a major opportunity to develop our partnership. And I maintain my optimism concerning it.

One can forget that the Kennedy Round, about which it is so

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easy to be pessimistic, is the greatest attempt at trade liberalization in the history of the West. It is no undertaking to be taken lightly. Nor is it a purely commercial negotiation. Those who see it in these terms are mistaken. The Kennedy Round offers the opportunity to make a better allocation of Western resources, to create a more rational economy for developed and developing countries alike, and to stimulate further change for the better in the Eastern bloc. Perhaps it can also help us establish new habits of Western cooperation, develop new international problem-solving machinery, and expose problems inhibiting Atlantic accord which have not yet been fully realized.

There can be no doubt that agriculture will provide the most difficult task of the negotiation. We already are experiencing tensions here. But surely---on the example of a Community which is merging six longstanding national agricultural policies into a single Community policy---we must challenge the task of agriculture in the knowledge that the Kennedy Round offers a beginning and good chance toward managing the present chaos in world agriculture.

The Kennedy Round is lost if we lose our tempers or our patience.

I, for one, will not be dismayed if it takes two years or more. For the potential rewards are well worth a much longer period of effort. In every aspect of the Kennedy Round where there is the slightest chance of progress, we must press on with it. The Kennedy Round transcends the commercial interests of any nation or continent. We owe it all our energy.

As a means of bringing the Kennedy Round to success---and of furthering our partnership outside it---I personally support proposals for a committee of economic problem-solving between the European Community and the United States. This committee, formulating joint American-Community positions on world economic problems, would be a valuable embryo for future development of Atlantic Partnership. Such a committee would not discriminate against other countries of the world, but would be formed with full understanding that it would take into full consideration the interests of all nations. The European Community should be represented in this committee on a basis of full parity with the United States.

Nuclear and Military Relations

The great question of our time is this: Can we control nuclear weapons so as to avoid our destruction?

The tasks of arms control and disarmament are those of first priority

in the world. All other tasks must remain secondary. We in the United States who have witnessed the atom's past and potential future destructiveness know this too well. As I have said earlier today, well-conceived arms control is truly our best form of security.

But as each day passes with further development of independent national nuclear forces, our peril of destruction increases. In this second half of the 20th century---in which our security can only be collective---nuclear proliferation offers a frightening prospect to all of us.

It is in this context that I will discuss the issue which both inhibits and can be the great accomplishment of our partnership.

The Community and United States have already established partnership in peaceful use of atomic energy. It is a good beginning.

But we must ask: How can Europe be denied military (that is, nuclear) equality with the United States if it is to be a real and honest partner?

I reply that Europe must achieve equality. But all of us must seek a way to do it so that we avoid proliferation of national atomic forces and, consequently, the danger of annihilation. We must also do this in a way so

that such equality does not create more political problems than it provides military answers.

I have for many months considered the various alternatives. One fact is clear: The greatest efficiency in Western defense could be achieved through leaving all nuclear capabilities in the hands of the United States. But efficiency does not, as I have pointed out before, always provide the best final answer. Such efficiency as this would leave Europe forever dependent on American good will and forever seeking reassurance. This is no relationship on which to base partnership.

Were the unification of a democratic, federal Europe, including all our Western allies, complete as of today, there would be little question of the proper steps to be taken. But there is no such single Europe.

A first step toward nuclear partnership is the proposal for a Multilateral Nuclear Force. It is admittedly imperfect in form. But, ~~until better and more workable proposals are made,~~ I am convinced we should go ahead with this venture as a first step toward organization of the West in nuclear affairs, which can only be achieved through successive steps. Experience gained in development of the MLF will prove just where and how it should develop (unfortunately, few worthwhile undertakings come attached with neat, ready-made, foolproof blueprints). ~~Perhaps~~

~~there will be those in Europe who will have proposals for improving the force.~~ ~~If so, let these proposals be made. At any rate, the MLF is tangible and it is here.~~

I can foresee a time when the MLF ~~might provide the framework for~~ will develop into a ~~truly European~~ partnership between the United States and nuclear ~~force under control of~~ a Western Europe far further along the path of political unification. ~~Such a European force, responsibly~~ To move forward in the most important of all questions — that is, control and limitation of arms and collectively controlled, would provide Europe with its own means of de- leading finally to disarmament — it is essential that Europe fense. It would appreciably reduce the possibility of nuclear war. Its and America should act together. This unity of view and action strength would deter any aggressor. And its existence would make national can only be achieved if Europe fully shares in the responsibilities ~~forces unnecessary---national forces which might begin a nuclear war, but~~ which in the nuclear field, up to now have been American responsibilities. ~~could never end it.~~

If there are those in Europe who, in good conscience, prefer to develop their own national nuclear forces, let them do so in knowledge of The question is not to be able to start a nuclear war — it is to be able to prevent it. the risks. But let them know that, should they in the future wish to participate in the MLF, the door will be open.

Finally, I would be remiss if I did not warn that nuclear equality, even if achieved, will not end our need for reaching a more satisfactory conventional military partnership. We know today the necessity for balanced,

well-equipped conventional forces able to respond to a broad range of political/military challenges.

What makes us think we can establish nuclear partnership if unable to maintain wholly-satisfactory conventional cooperation? Many of us, for instance, feel need for examination of our present NATO command and control procedures. But certainly such examination will not be fruitful if it takes place at a time when pledged force levels are not met, ~~and when withdrawal of a single American battalion from the continent can be interpreted as symptomatic of U.S. withdrawal from European defense.~~

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I know that, particularly at this time, there is great concern throughout the world over the movements in thought now manifesting themselves in the United States. Similar movements are equally at work here on the continent. There are those in the United States and Europe who favor a withdrawal from world responsibility. There are those who favor impetuous action which would endanger the lives and fortunes of all of us.

I give you my assurance today that, on November 4 of this year, the American people will clearly reject such proposals just as you in Europe are rejecting them. We in the United States are committed to tomorrow, not

yesterday---partnership, not brinksmanship.

Finally, as an advocate of Atlantic Partnership, I will read the words of three men:

Robert Schuman said in 1949:

> "Nations are more and more convinced that their fates are closely bound together; their salvation and their welfare can no longer be based on egotistical and aggressive nationalism, but must rest upon the progressive application of human solidarity."

John F. Kennedy said in 1962:

> "The Atlantic Partnership of which I speak would not look inward only, preoccupied with its own welfare and advancement. It must look outward to cooperate with all nations in meeting their common concerns. It would serve as a nucleus for the eventual union of all free men---those who are now free and those who are vowing that some day they will be free."

Lyndon B. Johnson said in 1964:

> "The ways of our growing partnership are not easy. Though the union of Europe is her manifest destiny, the building of that unity is a long, hard job. But we, for our part, will never turn back to separated insecurity. We welcome the new strength of our transatlantic allies. We find no contradiction between national self-respect and interdepen- mutual reliance. We are eager to share with the new Europe at every level of power responsibility. We aim to share the lead in the search for new and stronger patterns of cooperation."

I pledge today that we in the United States will not turn back to separated insecurity. All of us must cast our lot together. If, in full realization of this fact, we fully devote ourselves to our partnership, it will succeed.

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