

June 1, 1965. National War College.

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ADDRESS OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

JUNE 1, 1965

It is a pleasure and an honor to address the elite of the armed forces of the United States and of the civilian agencies which guide our national security.

With all branches of the Armed Services represented here, I want to avoid partiality to anyone. In this regard, I am reminded of the remark of General Malin Craig, Army Chief of Staff in the 1930's to President Franklin D. Roosevelt:

"Sir, I don't mind when you speak of the Army as 'them', but I find it disturbing that you always refer to the Navy as 'us'."

✓ In this group today are both the architects and the implementors of American national security in the future. It is on this subject of national security that I would like to focus my remarks today.

✓ Most of you here today have lived most of your professional lives in a world in which national security was equated with the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. ✓ As recently as two and one-half years ago, the attention of the world focused on the direct nuclear confrontation between Washington and Moscow over Cuba. Only a few months earlier, American and Russian tanks had stood face to face on the border of Berlin.

✓ Today that bipolar world has dissolved. The nuclear confrontation of the superpowers has given way to less obvious but no less important confrontations stretching from Vietnam to Santo Domingo, from Laos

to the Congo.

∠ We have moved from a period of "dangerously abnormal simplicity" into a period of more normal diversity.

∠ The conflicts we face -- the challenges we confront -- are no less important for our national security though they may entail less immediate physical danger.

∠ We face the present array of "wars of national liberation," border conflicts, and internal rebellions without the unifying cement of fear which bound the wartime allies into an effective cohesive alliance -- from the days of the Greek-Turkish crisis of 1947 to the missile crisis of October 1962.

∠ With the decomposition of the bipolar world and the emergence of other independent centers of power -- such as Europe and Communist China --

∟ the pattern of confrontation between Communist imperialism and the defenders of free society has radically changed.

∟ It is no longer a question of holding back Soviet-directed imperialism across national boundaries.

∟ The leaders of the Soviet Union may still desire to remake the world according to a model shaped in Moscow. But today they attempt to use their nuclear weapons for purposes of political intimidation rather than overt attack.

∟ Tomorrow a militant Red China may do the same.

∟ So long as we match our strategic nuclear advantage with a demonstrated willingness to resist aggression, we can limit the ability of both Communist giants to extend their sway through nuclear intimidation.

↳ But if deliberate nuclear war is less likely today than two and a half years ago . . . if subversion of weak nations through nuclear intimidation is unlikely, it does not follow that international violence has diminished or is likely to diminish.

In fact, as nuclear violence has receded, other forms have increased.

↳ Since October of 1962 we have witnessed conventional warfare in the Himalayan Mountains between China and India.

↳ We have seen a surge of subversion in Latin America through guerrilla training and launching, sabotage and infiltration.

↳ We have painfully observed the systematic campaign of terror and military aggression launched by Communist guerrillas against the government of Vietnam.

These situations are a peril to both the peace of the world and the security of unstable nations. They may provoke great power intervention and the possibility of rapid escalation.

Our experience in Southeast Asia shows the increasing militancy of Communist forces intent on deliberate subversion of ^acountry from within.

Vietnam is an excellent example.

There we have seen a Communist ^{regime} state refuse to leave its neighbors in peace.

We have seen the infiltration of Communist cadres to strengthen and direct guerrilla warfare in violation of international accords.

We have seen the Communists who control and direct the war from Hanoi insist that the war in South Vietnam is internal ^{- a civil war -} because many of the Vietcong are South Vietnamese.

↳ We have seen them portray the struggle as a civil war -- in which the "popular forces" are arrayed against "American imperialism."

↳ It is this new sophisticated form of warfare that is becoming the major challenge to our security and to the security of all free nations.

↳ This new warfare is often more dangerous than the old -- a war in which the leaders cannot be located . . . in which the sources of supply cannot be easily cut off . . . in which the enemy forces are not outsiders but indigenous troops . . . in which signed truces do not halt the struggle.

↳ The supreme challenge today is to prove to our Communist foes and our freedom-loving friends that the new face of war is no less pernicious than the old -- and that it can be defeated by those of strong mind, stout heart and a steel will.

∟ We know now that most Communist regimes do not desire to blow the world to pieces.

∟ They prefer to pick it up piece by piece.

∟ How do we successfully meet the challenge posed by "wars of national liberation," by Communist-infiltrated revolutions?

∟ It is obvious that nuclear power is not enough.

∟ We need a balanced military force of air, sea, and land power.

∟ We need maximum flexibility in our forces -- making it possible to respond rapidly to any situation.

∟ We need men experienced in guerrilla and psychological warfare -- in all the paramilitary arts that are practiced in "wars of national liberation."

∟ We must adapt our aircraft and ships to the conditions we find.

△ We must relearn the tactics of ground warfare in a guerrilla setting and adapt our equipment and our weapons accordingly.

But, △ Overwhelming military power alone is not an adequate response to "wars of national liberation."

△ Since these wars feed on seething social discontent, they must be met with a subtle blending of economic aid, political expertise, educational efforts, information and propaganda programs -- combined with military power.

△ Where "wars of national liberation" flourish, the military struggle is but one part of a larger social and political struggle.

△ And these struggles will continue, and revolutionary ferment will increase until governments come to power capable of implementing systematic social and economic programs which can abolish shocking social and economic inequality --

inequality between the privileged few and the
impoverished masses . . . between glittering capitals
and festering slums . . . between favored urban conclaves
and primitive rural areas.

↳ For the masses of the people in our own
hemisphere and in the developing countries of Asia
and Africa who have never known the benefits of
modern civilization, the status quo is no longer a burden
to be patiently borne. It is an oppressor to be cast off.

↳ It is this type of situation found in many parts
of the non-Communist world that presents the
Communists with "targets of opportunity."

↳ The primary responsibility for preserving the
independence and security of a country remains with
the people and the government of that country.

∠ If the people and their leaders have no will to preserve their independence, no outside force can save them.

∠ If the government can provide the people with a cause for which to fight, with a program inspiring sacrifice and effort, that government can be capable of defending itself against Communist infiltration and subversion from within.

∠ Where subversion from within is supported from outside, as is the case in Vietnam, outside assistance is needed if such a government is to achieve this capability. ∠ In many areas of the world, the United States has inherited the role of protector and defender of non-Communist nations which are under Communist assault.

It is a role we have not sought.

It is often a painful and expensive one.

But it is an essential one -- both to the security of the non-Communist world and to our own.

And President Johnson has made it unmistakably clear that we intend to fulfill our responsibilities. In his John Hopkins speech of April 7, President Johnson explained why we are involved in the revolutionary struggle in Southeast Asia: "We fight because we must fight if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own destiny, and only in such a world will our own freedom be finally secure."

In those situations where American power must be committed to defend the independence of struggling nations, we must, the President continued, "be prepared for a long continued conflict. It will require

patience as well as bravery -- the will to endure as well as the will to resist. "

This is it.

↳ ^{must} We have that patience and that endurance.

↳ Our perseverance in this struggle is required in all areas -- not just the military.

↳ We must persist in the social and economic struggle by encouraging a full mobilization of resources and accomplishment of reforms by local governments . . .

↳ by continuing and in some cases accelerating our development lending programs . . . by sustaining our Peace Corps . . . by perfecting our technical assistance and Food for Peace programs.

↳ These are as indispensable to the preservation of peace and security as is military strength.

↳ We must learn that Communist terrorism cannot be defeated by good works alone, or by good intentions, or by slogans , or by propaganda alone.

There is a tendency among commentators to divide the critics of American foreign policy into the convenient, if not fully accurate, categories of liberals and conservatives.

Liberals must learn that there are times when American power must be used, and that there is no substitute for power in the fact of a determined terrorist attack.

Conservatives must learn that in defeating a Communist insurgency the use of military power can be counter-productive without accompanying political effort and the credible promise to the people of a better life.

We must learn to be patient. The Communists are very patient.

↳ We must learn to persist. They are persistent.

↳ We must learn to use political techniques as well as counter-terrorist military force.

↳ We must learn to adapt our military planning and tactics to the new conditions of communist warfare, and we must learn to coordinate military efforts, propaganda, effective political organizational efforts, and economic investment far better than we have done so far.

↳ Our willingness to meet our obligation to assist free nations should not be confused with a desire to extend American power or impose American ways.

↳ We do not aspire to any Pax Americana.

We have no desire to play the role of global gendarme.

Where multilateral organizations are ready and capable of assuming the burden of defending independent nations from Communist assault -- of preventing internal rebellions from leading to chaos and anarchy -- we welcome their intervention. As we know from recent history, international organizations like the UN and the regional organizations like the OAS are not always capable of stepping in quickly -- whether in distant Asia or in our own hemisphere.

But the present inadequacy of regional and international peacekeeping machinery in no way diminishes the urgency of building multi-national peacekeeping forces which can truly maintain peace and order.

This should be a top priority for all nations large and small.

Eventually we would hope that UN machinery would be in a position to seek the peaceful resolution of disputes and incipient conflicts.

This would be done ideally by quiet conciliation . . . if need be by verbal confrontation before the bar of world opinion . . . and in extremis by placing whatever kind of peacekeeping force is needed in a position between antagonists.

In this way no sovereignty would be without potential international protection and no nation would have to call on other nations for help against predatory neighbors.

Given the scope and scale of major power interests and commitments around the world, we are required to assume that any armed conflict may bear within it the seeds of a nuclear disaster.

So a workable peace system must be able to resolve by non-violent means the kinds of disputes which in the past have led to wars -- to keep disruptive change in non-violent channels.

As the UN Charter recognizes, the responsibility for preserving peace and security rests with regional organizations as well as international.

If recent events in our own hemisphere have dramatized the incompleteness of our inter-American system, they have also presented a great opportunity to use this tragic occasion to build an effective peacekeeping system through the Organization of American States.

This occasion should stimulate all members of the OAS to seek to equip the organization for political action — *and prompt, timely action.*

At a minimum, an effective regional organization must be capable of taking prompt action to meet crisis situations -- situations in which delay can mean the difference between life and death, between order and anarchy.

Out of the painful and tragic days in the Caribbean must come some forward movement in the development of the inter-American system.

Out of it should come an awareness that -- in a world where violence is contagious and can endanger the peace of a whole area -- there may be cases where the only alternative is prompt multilateral action or unilateral action.

If unilateral action is to become unnecessary, effective regional action must be made possible.

∟ In an interdependent world -- where revolution can ignite world conflagration -- effective tools of regional action must be found.

∟ The United States has always shown its willingness to participate in international peacekeeping missions.

∟ Today we ~~are happy to~~ ^{readily} participate in the developing OAS Military Force in the Dominican Republic.

∟ In concentrating my brief remarks today on the threat posed to our security by new revolutionary situations, I have omitted completely any discussion of many other important aspects of the struggle in which we are now engaged.

∟ This includes the potential nuclear conflict between Communist China and the United States.

∟ It includes the potential conflict between Communist China and her potentially powerful Asian neighbors -- India, Japan and Indonesia.

< It includes the dangers inherent in nuclear Proliferation -

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< It includes the profound implications for American national security of the rift between China and the Soviet Union.

< It includes the consequences of growth of greater freedom and autonomy in the Communist world as a whole.

< All these -- and many more -- are problems which I have not covered which have profound implications for American national security.

< I have no doubt that the men here in this room will play a major role in shaping the response of this country to each of these challenges.

< As a citizen and a public official, I am ~~deeply~~ pleased to know that the security of our nation and of the world is in the hands of men of such demonstrated intelligence, courage, dedication and judgment.

The fact that men of your calibre would choose to devote your lives to public service -- whether military or civilian -- is an indication that President Kennedy and President Johnson have brought back to American life the spirit described by John Adams as one of "public happiness."

It was this spirit, said Adams, that possessed the American colonists and won the revolution even before it was fought -- a spirit which is reflected in delight in participation in public discussion and public action, a joy in citizenship, in self-government, in self-control, in self-discipline, and in dedication.

To you who are military officers, it is a privilege to say that no nation has ever been as well served by its professional military leaders as ours is today.

Since the end of World War II, we have maintained the largest peacetime military establishment ever raised by a democracy.

↳ The importance of military policy in our national existence has never been so great for so long.

↳ Our military leadership has been dedicated, imaginative and always responsive, in our American tradition, to the ideal of civilian supremacy.

↳ Although I have dwelt on the subject of security today, I would emphasize that security should always be considered together with our desire for peace.

↳ Our commitment to strengthening the peace has not weakened. ↳ We seek a peace that is more than a pause between wars. ↳ But our knowledge of ourselves tells us that we can expect no sudden epidemic of peace,

that we have far to go before, as President Johnson said, "the greatness of our institutions" matches the "grandeur of our intentions." The pursuit of peace is a gradual process.

All of us must continue this slow pursuit -- knowing that our objective is progress toward that peaceful -- if distant -- day when no man rattles a saber and no one drags a chain.

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JOINT LECTURE

ADDRESS

By

The Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey, Jr.

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1 June 1965

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ADDRESS

By

The Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey, Jr.

(1 June 1965)

ADMIRAL LEE: (Introduced the speaker).

MR. HUMPHREY: Thank you, Admiral Lee and gentlemen.

I understand that I had been scheduled to appear here a little earlier this morning. I was in St. Louis yesterday engaging in the activities of the local government with the United States Conference of Mayors and returned rather late to our city of Washington. I had another conference last night and left my office about 1:30 a. m. this morning. I told my Staff Assistant, who contacted me about this hour that I had been originally scheduled for: "Will you please tell the officers of the War College and the Industrial College that I consider this illegal, immoral, irresponsible, and ridiculous and that under no circumstances will I find myself present for some sort of sadistic endeavor at 8:45 a. m."

I am happy to say that because of the kindness of heart and the sense of humanitarianism that persists in this body, the officers in charge have permitted me to come a little later. Besides that, I needed more time to work on a speech. In the meantime I received another assignment which will take me out to the Michigan State University to discuss at a seminar some of our policies in Southeast Asia. This is an assignment that was not asked for but one that I shall gladly and readily and, I hope, successfully fulfill.

I have been before some of you on other occasions and I have generally talked, as we say, off-the-cuff with a few notes. But today I want to confine myself more directly to prepared remarks because I find that my present position necessitates a bit more prudence and careful statements of where we stand, what we think, and what we hope to do. However, I want to feel very free in discussing matters with you in the question period. I shall state to you my views on matters of foreign policy and national security as clearly and as frankly as I possibly can.

I consider it a pleasure and truly a high honor to address the elite of the Armed Forces of the United States and of the civilian agencies which guide our national security. National security is the highest priority of a man in public life and I give a good deal of my time to it. I think you ought to know that.

As Vice President and your Vice President I feel a deep sense of moral and political obligation - patriotic obligation - to be well-informed on matters of national security -- where we are, what we are doing, what is happening, what our policies are, and how they are implemented. I am not in charge of national security. We have only one President; he is the Commander-in-Chief. We have no assistant presidents.

The Vice Presidential Office is a very unique office in the American system and, in fact, in many governmental systems. It has very limited functions and powers. It has many responsibilities as delegated by the President. It also has, I would say, a position of

respect in the American community. But you, as leaders in this nation, entrusted with the decision-making processes, as well as the management functions and advisory functions, have a right to know that not only does your President give his full time to these matters of great importance but the Vice President at least tries to keep himself informed.

These are very precarious days. We can take no chances. You cannot afford to have a cram course in the middle of the night if need be; you need to be informed every day, every hour of the day. That is the first priority of my day -- it starts early in the morning and ends late at night -- to be as informed as you are. And, may I say, I hope in some instances even a little better informed, because there are matters that need to be thoroughly understood by every person on the National Security Council and in the Cabinet.

With all branches of the Armed Services represented here, I want to avoid partiality to anyone. In this regard, I am reminded of the remark of General Malin Craig, Army Chief of Staff in the early 1930s to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. I am sure some of you recall it, but it seems rather apropos. General Craig said:

"Sir, I don't mind when you speak of the Army as 'them', but I find it disturbing that you always refer to the Navy as 'us'."

I hope you officers in the Air Force will notice that you were not even considered.

I come here with no partiality at all.

In this group today are both the architects and the implementors of American national security in the future. It is on this subject of national security that I would like to focus my remarks today.

Most of you here today have lived most of your professional lives in a world in which national security was equated with the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. As recently as two-and-one-half years ago the attention of the world focused on the direct nuclear confrontation between Washington and Moscow over Cuba. Only a few months earlier, as you recall, American and Russian tanks had stood face-to-face on the border of Berlin.

Today that bipolar world has dissolved. The nuclear confrontation of the superpowers has given way to less obvious but no less important confrontations stretching from Vietnam to Santo Domingo, from Laos to the Congo. This is not to say that the nuclear power is not there; it is. Nor is it to say that a nuclear confrontation could be or that a nuclear confrontation would never take place again. But it is to say that at this moment and in the foreseeable future it appears that the type of confrontation we will have will be not of the superpowers with nuclear weapons but of another sort.

We have moved from a period of "dangerously abnormal simplicity" into a period of more normal diversity.

The conflicts we face and the challenges we confront are no less important for our national security, though they may entail less immediate physical danger.

We face the present array of "wars of national liberation", border conflicts, and internal rebellions without the unifying cement of fear which bound the wartime allies into an effective cohesive alliance -- from the days of the Greek-Turkish crisis of 1947 to the missile crisis of October 1962.

With the decomposition of the bipolar world and the emergence of other independent centers of power -- such as Europe and Communist China -- the pattern of confrontation between communist imperialism and the defenders of free society has radically changed.

It is no longer a question of holding back Soviet-directed imperialism across national boundaries.

The leaders of the Soviet Union may still desire to remake the world according to a model shaped in Moscow. I presume that we have to assume that that is what they want. But today they attempt to use their nuclear weapons for purposes of political power and political intimidation rather than overt attack.

Tomorrow a militant Red China may do the same. And, indeed, this militant China stands today as much more a threat to the peace than any other nation.

So long as we match our strategic nuclear advantage with a demonstrated willingness to resist aggression, we can limit the ability of both communist giants to extend their sway through nuclear intimidation.

But if deliberate nuclear war is less likely today than two-and-a-half years ago -- if subversion of weak nations through nuclear

intimidation is unlikely, it does not follow that international violence has diminished or is likely to diminish. In fact, it may very well increase. As nuclear violence has receded, other forms have increased.

Since October of 1962 we have witnessed conventional warfare in the Himalayan Mountains between China and India.

We have seen a surge of subversion in Latin America through guerrilla training and launching, sabotage, and infiltration.

We have painfully observed the systematic campaign of terror and military aggression launched by communist guerrillas against the government of South Vietnam.

These situations are a peril to both the peace of the world and the security of unstable nations. They may provoke great power intervention and the possibility of rapid escalation.

Our experience in Southeast Asia shows the increasing militancy of communist forces intent on deliberate subversion of a country from within.

Vietnam is an excellent example of all that concerns us today.

There we have seen a communist regime refuse to leave its neighbors in peace -- in fact, refuse to even think or talk about peace.

We have seen the infiltration of communist cadres to strengthen and direct guerrilla warfare in violation of international accords.

We have seen the communists, who control and direct the war from Hanoi, insist that the war in South Vietnam is internal because many of the Viet Cong are South Vietnamese.

We have seen them portray the struggle as a civil war, in which the "popular forces" are arrayed against "American imperialism". And they have done a mighty good propaganda job on that one.

It is this new sophisticated form of warfare that is becoming the major challenge to our security and to the security of all free nations and, I should add, to the security of every small nation and every new nation. Every little nation and every new nation on the face of this earth should be aware of it. But, regrettably, not so.

This new warfare is often more dangerous than the old -- a warfare in which leaders cannot be located, in which the sources of supply cannot be easily cut off, in which the enemy forces are not at times outsiders but indigenous troops, in which signed trustees do not halt the struggle.

The supreme challenge today to you, to me, to every leader, and to every person in free countries is to prove to our communist foes and our freedom-loving friends that the new face of war is no less pernicious than the old and that it can be defeated by those of strong mind, stout heart, and a steel will.

We now know that most communist regimes do not desire to blow the whole world to pieces. They prefer to pick it up piece by piece.

How do we, therefore, successfully meet the challenge posed by "wars of national liberation", by communist infiltrating revolutions? That is what we are going to face.

We either learn how to deal with this one or we will have failed completely in our programs of national security and international security.

It is obvious that nuclear power is not enough. No matter how many bombs we talk about or how big they are, it is not enough.

We need a balanced military force of air, sea, and land power. I repeat and underscore once again: We need a balanced military force of air, sea, and land power.

I might add that we are essentially an air and naval power and we ought to utilize that power to the maximum.

We need maximum flexibility in our forces -- making it possible to respond rapidly to any situation.

We need men experienced in guerrilla and psychological warfare -- in all the paramilitary arts that are practiced in "wars of national liberation".

I digress once again, gentlemen, to say that it would be good for you to read of the French and Indian wars and learn who lost the battles and who won. And I want to remind you that those British squires that came down those primitive country lanes were decimated by the French and the Indians.

Guerrilla warfare is nothing new. We started it. How we have forgotten how to manage it and handle it is beyond me. But we

are the ones who started it.

We even started the idea of revolutions. Sometimes we get a little smug about that, wondering whether we really should be advocating self-government. But we are the ones who started that, too.

We must adapt our aircraft and our ships to the conditions that we find.

We must relearn the tactics of ground warfare in a guerrilla setting and adapt our equipment and our weapons accordingly. And, if I may speak quite frankly, why have we been so tardy? We have great insight. We are supposed to be bright people. We ought to have learned a long time ago that weaponry ought to be adapted to the conditions of the battlefield. Even a plain old civilian knows that; and yet we waited a long time.

Now don't misunderstand me. We do have many weapons adapted to the battlefield. Late! Late! Late!

We even found out that some of the old propeller-driven aircraft might even be a little bit better than some of the jet aircraft-- Late! Late! Late! -- in the guerrilla type of campaign.

Overwhelming military power is important, but alone it is not an adequate response to the "wars of National Liberation".

Since these wars feed on seething social discontent, they must be met with subtle blending of economic aid, political expertise, educational efforts, information and propaganda programs, combined with effective military power. And effective military power, gentlemen,

does not necessarily mean supersonic jets flying like you see on MGM film. It may require something not quite so sophisticated.

Where "wars of national liberation" flourish, the military struggle is but one part of a larger social and political struggle. These struggles will continue and revolutionary ferment will increase until governments come to power capable of implementing systematic social and economic programs which can abolish shocking social and economic inequality.

I wish to remind you again of some of the experiences in recent years. In the instance of the freedom of Indonesia as a colony from the Dutch, the Dutch had all the weapons and the Indonesians had the people; and the Dutch lost. In every instance where weapons have been placed against masses of people, people have won, particularly if there is social discontent.

If there happens to be a revolutionary ferment based upon unbelievably bad social, economic, and political conditions, we simply have to learn this. The trouble is that it is much more easy to calculate in terms of things and power, military equipment, military tactics, and military strategy than it is to be able to outline an effective, cohesive, saleable program of political action. I have seen this many times in recent months, where the military are able to come in and say: "We will put in so many troops, so many planes, so many ships; there will be so many sorties." And they calculate how many people will be killed, how many bridges will be knocked out. It all sounds so good, just so effective.

Then the political man comes in and says: "Well, I am not sure. I hope we can do something about that governmental situation. I trust that we will be able to find a local leader who will be able to do this. Maybe we can get somebody to do that."

By the time you are through with the hopes, the maybes, and the possibllys you begin to say: "Well, let's take a look at the things that are for sure. We can drop 10,000 bombs; they will go off. We can fly airplanes. We can shoot guns." And the tendency is to follow the certainties of the mechanics of the military rather than the uncertainties of the judgments, possibilities, hopes and aspirations of the political.

We have as yet not learned how to phase together a propaganda-informational-educational program with a political operation. Maybe we will. If we don't, why you can fold up your tent.

This is not much different than local politics at times. It does not do you much good to have a good cause if you don't know how to exploit it. Most elections are lost by people who fail to identify the issues.

You know, I have been in politics a long time and I have had a chance to beat some people who have had some pretty good forces on their side; they have had the press, the radio, and the money; but they never could find the issue. They were talking to the group down at the Country Club; or they visiting with a little segment off in one corner, the group they had been living with, their social friends.

A successful man in political life, in any kind of political life, is the man who finds the issue and identifies himself with it, knows what to do about it, and at least has a program that he can sell at that particular moment. Whether he can produce on the program is yet another question, but at least he has got to sell his ideas.

We have to learn what it is that people want, what it is that they seek, and how we formulate a policy or program that indicates to those needy people, to those wanting people that we have what it takes.

That is about as simple a way as I can put it, and maybe I becloud the issue by its simplicity.

As I was saying, these struggles will continue and this revolutionary ferment will increase until governments come to power capable of implementing systematic social and economic programs which can abolish shocking social and economic inequality -- inequality between the privileged few and the impoverished masses (and that is the central fact of the rest of the world), between glittering capitals and festering slums, between favored urban conclaves and primitive rural areas.

Those are the facts of the world in which we live. And if you will just add to that the simple fact that fifty percent of the total gross national product of this world (that is a rough figure; it is about 49 - between 49 and 50 percent) is produced and consumed by the 192-193 million people in the United States, then you can see

what I mean by the privileged few and the impoverished masses, the glittering capitals and the festering slums, and the favored urban conclaves and the primitive rural areas.

Gentlemen, we are identified with the privileged few and we are identified with the glittering capitals and the favored urban conclaves. That does not mean in truth that we are unconcerned about the masses or about the poor or the slums. To the contrary, I know of no people that has a greater social conscience. Our problem is to get people to believe it.

For the masses of the people in our own hemisphere and in the developing countries of Asia and Africa who have never known the benefits of modern civilization, the status quo is no longer a burden to be patiently borne. It is an oppressor to be cast off. And, I might add, the words "order" and "stability" are not friendly words to people who have been living under some imposed order and forced stability.

It is this type of situation found in many parts of the noncommunist world that presents the communists with "targets of opportunity". And how they exploit them!

The primary responsibility for preserving the independence and security of a country remains, of course, with the people and the government of that country.

If the people and their leaders have no will to preserve their independence, no outside force on earth can save them.

If the government can provide the people with a cause for

which to fight, with a program inspiring sacrifice and effort, that government can be capable of defending itself against communist infiltration and subversion from within.

Where subversion from within is supported from outside, as is the case in Vietnam, outside assistance is needed if such a government is to achieve this capability. In many areas of the world, the United States has inherited the role of protector and defender of noncommunist nations which are under communist assault.

As you know, it is a role we have not sought. It is often painful and expensive, but it is an essential one both to the security of the noncommunist world and to our own.

President Johnson has made it unmistakably clear that we intend to fulfill our responsibilities. In his Johns Hopkins speech of April 7, President Johnson explained why we are involved in the revolutionary struggle in Southeast Asia. Here are his words:

"We fight because we must fight if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own destiny, and only in such a world will our own freedom be finally secure."

Gentlemen, that is the lesson of the '30s.

I said to my Staff Assistant on the way over here that if we have not learned from the 1930s two lessons, then we do not deserve freedom or security. Those two lessons are, namely, appeasement of an aggressor is not only morally wrong, it violates every tenet of

of security; and (2) racism is consummate evil. If we have not learned that you cannot appease an aggressor and that racism poisons the well of humankind and poisons the bloodstream of humanity, then we have learned nothing; and I must say that there has been some evidence that we have learned very little in many areas of the world.

I was once termed (and I hope I still am, although I have never been quite able to define the word) "a Liberal".

I remember in the '30s when the Liberals were the Internationalists; they were the ones that saw the threat of Hitlerism and Fascism and Communism and Japanese Imperialism. They were not the America Firsters. They were not the old populous isolationists. They were the New Liberals that understood that there was an international community, that you could not violate or permit violation of international law and order without having it ultimately threaten your own security.

It disturbs me no end now to find people who claim themselves to be Liberals, who somehow or other want to withdraw from the world because they don't like the looks of it, or want to divide the world into spheres of influence, or somehow or another make rationalization for any kind of retreat or withdrawal or defeat that we may want to engage ourselves in. I don't agree with that kind of Liberals, and I surely don't think it is very moral.

In those situations where American power must be committed to defend the independence of struggling nations, we must, the President continued, "be prepared for a long continued conflict. It will

require patience as well as bravery -- the will to endure as well as the will to resist."

My fellow Americans, I think that is the central need of our time -- patience, a willingness to stick to it.

We have to tell the people of this nation that we are going to be confronted with this kind of a world for the foreseeable future and to start to tune up psychologically the nerve system, the whole nerve structure, the whole emotional structure to take it.

We have too many people these days that want to sort of stop the world and get off; they just don't like it. They see an ugly United Nations and they say: "Let's do away with it." Of course, the United Nations just represents the kind of confused world we live in. That's what it is all about.

Unless we are willing to project our lives in terms of national security policy on the basis of continued tension, difficulty, and danger for the foreseeable future, then we have already lost and we are only fooling ourselves as to our strength and our purpose.

Therefore, I say that we must have the patience and that endurance.

The greatest mistake we could make would be to try to hurry these things.

We must indicate to the world that we have the patience to stay in South Vietnam, no matter how long it takes; and, believe me, it will take a long time -- five years, maybe more (that is just a

figure), but not five months. The worst mistake we could make would be to proceed pell-mell, hurrying up the decision.

We have the resources. It is the American people and the American nation that is rich and powerful and mighty, not the others. We ought to utilize that basic strength of ours, but utilize it prudently, with every step being carefully measured. But let the world know that we have the will, the endurance, the patience, the perseverance -- just let them know and let them make plans accordingly. Once they get that message, even the dogmatists of the communist world will begin to do some rethinking.

I am convinced that the Soviet Union started to do some rethinking after 1961 when we started to beef-up our defenses. We gave them a sort of nice easy ride for a few years. We had just enough defense so that they could match it. But when we started to beef it up they had to make some tough choices: Were they going to have to spend more of their limited resources on defense? or Were they going to have to spend it on agriculture? They didn't have enough for both. Were they going to have to spend more of their limited resources on military? or Were they going to spend it on industry? They didn't have enough for both.

My fellow Americans, you have enough for both. You could double the defense of this country and still live prosperously. We have it. Our only question is what we are willing to do with it. We can have both guns and butter. In fact, we have too much butter as it is.

If we will just get that message into our heads and quit talking about that we can't take it or that somehow or other it is eroding our economy -- it is not eroding our economy. When I say "it" I mean our national security program is not eroding our economy. If anything, it is strengthening it. Surely it strengthened our educational structure because you cannot have a modern defense structure without more intelligent people; and out of the needs of national security higher education is much improved today.

So you are listening to a man who really believes that this nation can take much more than it has been asked to give. And I happen to think that the American people are prepared emotionally, financially, psychologically, politically, every way to follow firm leadership. This is one of the reasons that some of the most recent acts that have been taken by this Government have a very good rating in the public opinion poll.

I think that our perseverance in this struggle is required in all areas -- not just the military.

We must persist in the social and economic struggle, as well as the military, by encouraging a full mobilization of resources and accomplishment of reforms by any local governments that we seek to aid, by continuing in some cases accelerating our development lending programs, by sustaining our Peace Corps, by perfecting our technical assistance, and by expanding our Food-for-Peace programs.

In other words, you are not listening to a man who thinks that we ought to start shutting down and getting out of these strange

places and in faraway areas of the world. These are as indispensable to the preservation of our peace and security as is our military strength.

We must learn that communist subversion, however, cannot be defeated by good works alone, or by good intentions, or by being nice people, or by slogans, or by propaganda alone. I repeat: Communist terrorism cannot be defeated by just good works.

There is a tendency among commentators to divide the critics of American foreign policy into the convenient, if not fully accurate, categories of Liberals and Conservatives.

Liberals must learn that there are times when American power must be used, and that there is no substitute for that power in the face of a determined terrorist attack.

Conservatives (and you can decide where you fall in these general categories; I have a difficult time trying to really make them precise) must learn that in defeating communist insurgency the use of military power also is limited and can be counterproductive without the accompanying political effort and the credible promise to the people of a better life.

We must learn how to synchronize these efforts -- how to homogenize them, in a sense.

We must learn to be patient. The communists are very patient.

We must learn to persist. They are very persistent.

We must learn to use political techniques, as well as counter-terrorist military force.

We must learn to adapt our military planning and tactics to the new conditions of communist warfare, and we must learn to coordinate military efforts, propaganda, effective political organizational efforts, and economic investment far better than we have done so far. That is why you are here. That is why I am here.

I do not know the answer, but I am surely working on it and so are you. This is the highest priority. It is even a greater priority than getting any man on the Moon. It is the highest priority we have. I do not think we have really put all our best talent to it, nor have we properly prorated the amount of time and effort to it.

Our willingness to meet our obligation to assist free nations should not be confused with a desire to extend American power or impose American ways.

We do not aspire to any Pax Americana.

We have no desire to play the role of global gendarme.

Where multilateral organizations are ready and capable of assuming the burden of defending independent nations from communist assault -- of preventing internal rebellions from leading to chaos and anarchy -- we welcome the intervention of those multilateral organizations. As we know from recent history, international organizations like the U.N. and regional organizations like the O.A.S. are not always capable of stepping in quickly -- whether in distant Asia or in our own hemisphere.

But the present inadequacy of regional and international

peacekeeping machinery in no way diminishes the urgency of building multinational peacekeeping forces which can act quickly and can truly maintain peace and order. This should be a top priority for all nations, large and small. Unless we Americans want to have our forces scattered all over the world, we have a real interest in multilateral or multinational peacekeeping operations.

Eventually we would hope that U.N. machinery would be in a position to seek the peaceful resolution of disputes and incipient conflicts.

This would be done ideally by quiet conciliation -- if need be by verbal confrontation before the bar of world opinion -- and in extremis by placing whatever kind of peacekeeping force is needed in a position between antagonists.

In this way no sovereignty would be without potential international protection and no nation would have to call on other nations for help against predatory neighbors. But until that day is here, until that situation prevails, we have to be prepared to serve in the peacekeeping role ourselves in some instances.

Given the scope and scale of major power interests and commitments around the world, we are required to assume that any armed conflict may bear within it the seeds of a nuclear disaster.

So a workable peace system is of high priority to us and must be able to resolve by nonviolent means the kinds of disputes which in the past have led to wars and to keep disruptive change in nonviolent channels.

As the U.N. Charter recognizes, the responsibility for preserving peace and security rests with regional organizations as well as international. I mention this because every so often now I hear some columnist or commentator say: "Well, now, how come you are violating the U.N. Charter by asking the O.A.S. to go to the Dominican Republic?" There is nothing quite so dangerous as a little knowledge, except possibly just being purposely confused.

If recent events in our own hemisphere have dramatized the incompleteness of our inter-American system, they have also presented a great opportunity to use this tragic occasion to build an effective peacekeeping system through the Organization of American States.

This occasion should stimulate all members of the O.A.S. to seek to equip the organization for political action.

At a minimum, an effective regional organization must be capable of taking prompt timely action to meet crisis situations -- situations in which delay can mean the difference between life and death, between order and anarchy.

I will never forget an old economics professor of mine was once explaining the difference between the long run and the short run in economic theory. Some student said: "What is the difference, professor?" He said: "The difference is, in the long run you are all dead." We need some short-run solutions -- short-range, immediate, timely action.

Out of the painful and tragic days in the Caribbean, therefore, must come some forward movement in the development of the

inter-American system. And do not be at all upset if people say that we are trying to promote it, because we are; we have every reason to. We are going to have to pay every bill. Unless there can be an inter-American system of peacekeeping, then there will have to be an American system of peacekeeping.

I happen to believe that it is to the advantage of the whole world and to the advantage of the maturity of the republics in Latin America that there be an inter-American peacekeeping system. We have the obligation to say so and to say so frankly; and I have said so to some of my Latin American friends. I have said that it is time for the O.A.S. to assume the tour of responsibility; it cannot be just a society for discussion or a forum for international lawyers. It is now a matter of whether or not the O.A.S. can be a viable political and peacekeeping instrument, and we must encourage it to be such.

Out of this should come an awareness that -- in a world where violence is contagious and can endanger the peace of a whole area -- there may be cases where the only alternative is prompt multilateral action or unilateral action.

My fellow Americans, we need to tell people that the danger to peace is not just between the big powers. Actually, it is less so. The danger to the peace of the world is a little brush-fire war, a little war, a little rebellion. This gets into anarchy and chaos that starts to spread; and then, without any desire on the part of the major powers, they are dragged into it, pulled in by the force

of events. If there is to be a world war, that is the way it will start most likely.

If unilateral action is to become unnecessary, effective regional action must be made possible.

In an interdependent world -- where revolution can ignite world conflagration -- effective tools of regional action must be found.

The United States has always shown its willingness to participate in international peacekeeping missions. Today we are readily participating in the development of the O.A.S. Military Force in the Dominican Republic.

I want to make sure that you encourage a continuity of that position, that you become a little more insistent and demanding on the matter of international peacekeeping.

In concentrating my brief remarks today on the threat posed to our security by new revolutionary situations, I have omitted completely any discussion of many other important aspects of the struggle in which we are now engaged. I have done this purposely.

This includes, of course, the potential nuclear conflict between Communist China and the United States.

It includes the potential conflict between Communist China and her potentially powerful Asian neighbors -- India, Japan, and even Indonesia.

It includes the dangers in nuclear proliferation -- which

dangers I happen to think are the most serious.

It includes the profound implications for American national security of the rift between China and the Soviet Union.

It includes the consequences of growth of greater freedom and autonomy in the communist world as a whole -- an encouraging sign, I might add.

All these -- and many more -- are problems which I have not covered which have profound implications for American national security. And they are problems I am sure you have carefully studied.

I have no doubt that the men here in this room will play a major role in shaping the response of this country to each of these challenges.

As a citizen and a public official, I am heartened and pleased to know that the security of our nation and of our world is in the hands of men like yourselves of such demonstrated courage, dedication, intelligence, and judgment.

The fact that men of your caliber would choose to devote your lives to public service -- whether military or civilian -- is an indication that President Johnson and President Kennedy have brought back to the American life the spirit described by John Adams as one of "public happiness".

It was this spirit, said Adams, that possessed the American colonists and won the revolution, even before it was fought -- a spirit which is reflected in delight in participation in public discussion and public action, a joy in citizenship, in self-government,

in self-discipline, and in dedication. This is the spirit of public happiness.

To you who are military officers, it is a privilege to say that no nation has ever been as well served by its professional military leaders as our nation is today. Since the end of World War II, we have maintained the largest peacetime military establishment ever raised by a democracy; and that peacetime military establishment has not corroded or eroded our democracy.

The importance of military policy in our national existence has never been so great for so long.

Our military leadership has been dedicated, imaginative, and always responsive, in our American tradition, to the ideal of civilian supremacy.

If anything has proven the durability of our self-government and representative government and democracy, it is this of which I have spoken, this long period of mobilization, of massive military power, and the fact that it has not weakened the institutions of representative government.

Although I have dwelt on the subject of security today, I would emphasize that security should always be considered together with what is our main purpose, our desire for peace.

Our commitment to strengthening the peace has not weakened. We seek a peace that is more than a pause between wars. But our knowledge of ourselves tells us that we can expect no sudden epidemic of peace, that we have far to go before, as President Johnson said,

"the greatness of our institutions" matches the "grandeur of our intentions". The pursuit of peace, as the late President Kennedy put it, is a process and it is a gradual process.

It would be well, gentlemen, if we would once again read that June 10 message at American University of the late President. I happen to believe that the peace is the work of generations. It is like the building of a mighty cathedral. It is not done in one decade or even in one span of life. It shall be done by the labors of many, but there must be a concept of the peace that we seek; there must be an architect of that peace that gives us the concept that we need.

All of us, therefore, must continue to participate in this process, slow though it may be, knowing that our objective is progress towards that peaceful and distant day when no man rattles a saber and no one drags a chain.

Thank you.



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