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2 TELEVISION PROGRAM TO "ABC'S ISSUES AND ANSWERS."

3 I S S U E S A N D A N S W E R S

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5 SUNDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1966

6
7 GUEST: Hon. Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice President
of the United States

8 INTERVIEWED BY: Howard K. Smith,
and
9 Edward P. Morgan, ABC Commentators.

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12 MR. SMITH: Mr. Vice President, one of your predecessors,
13 Vice President Nixon, the other day quoted President Johnson
14 as saying that a vote for Republicans could cause the nation
15 to falter and fall back and fail in Vietnam, and Mr. Nixon
16 commented that this was a vicious, unwarranted, partisan
17 assault on the Republican Party that could destroy bipartisan
18 attitudes towards Vietnam. What is your comment on that?

19 VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Well, my recollection is that
20 President Johnson asked for the election of a Democratic
21 Congress to support his policies. This was obviously a
22 political rally that the President addressed and you would
23 expect, I am sure, the President of the United States, as the
24 head of the Democracy party, as well as being the President
25 of our great nation, to ask for the election of Democrats that

1 support his policies.

2 Mr. Nixon often finds partisanship in statements of
3 others. I regret that in this instance because Mr. Dirksen,
4 for example, the Minority Leader of the Senate, only recently
5 paid very high tribute to President Johnson at a luncheon
6 over at the United States Senate, a sort of a going-away party
7 for the President on his Manila trip, and both leaders of the
8 Senate, Mr. Mansfield and Mr. Dirksen, praised the President
9 for his leadership, for his willingness to make this journey
10 and wished him Godspeed and all possible success.

11 As I recollect, most of the Republican leaders have expres-
12 sed themselves the same way.

13 I think Mr. Nixon is reading a little of his own partisan
14 attitudes into some of Mr. Johnson's utterances.

15 MR. MORGAN: Mr. Vice President, while we are on the
16 inevitable subject of Vietnam, some people feel that although
17 our military position is certainly secure there, that we may
18 be overdoing it. Indeed, there are more American ground
19 troops in Vietnam today than there are first-line troops in
20 the entire South Vietnamese Army.

21 Now, all three of us have been in South Vietnam and we
22 know the marshy conditions of the Delta. The Americans have
23 just committed some troops to the Delta. Do you feel that this
24 is going to be a quicksand area that is going to suck us in,
25 so to speak?

1 VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: I can say for the information
2 of the American people that the military situation in South
3 Vietnam is considerably improved from the allied point of view
4 that our military successes have been very, very important
5 and they have been, as I indicated, successes. Our military
6 activities have been successes.

7 Our problem in Vietnam today, while, of course it is
8 one of military confrontation with the enemy, is essentially
9 political and economic and diplomatic. Militarily we have
10 gained many victories. Militarily we have administered a series
11 of defeats to the enemy. Militarily we have proven our strength
12 and our ability to conduct a struggle in this kind of an
13 environment such as you find in Southeast Asia. Hopefully,
14 we will not have to commit large numbers of troops into the
15 area, the Delta area that you speak of. Thus far the number
16 that have been committed to that region I think is very small.
17 I am not sure. I think it is less than a battalion if I am
18 not mistaken.

19 MR. MORGAN: It is about a battalion of ground troops.

20 VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: It is about a battalion. And
21 we do hope we can push on the political and diplomatic front
22 so we can bring this confrontation in Southeast Asia to a head.

23 It is my view that the Delta region is very, very
24 important; it is the source of food for most all of
25 Vietnam and, indeed, for a good deal of Southeast Asia, and

1 it is there where the AROSVN -- that is, the Army of South
2 Vietnam, -- has been taking on the major responsibility, and
3 we hope that that military force will be able to meet the
4 basic military requirements of the area.

5 MR. SMITH: What about this political question
6 you are talking about? Now, this past week President Johnson
7 and Mr. McNamara have said that pacification is not doing too
8 well. You went there and you studied pacification for a while.
9 What is wrong?

10 VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Well, quite frankly, as I have
11 indicated, militarily -- as I have indicated -- we have done
12 very, very well, and I thought we were doing well when I re-
13 turned last February, as you gentlemen may recall -- militarily.
14 I said we had reason for restrained optimism, reason for en-
15 couragement, but then I noted that the major problem confronting
16 us -- and you gentlemen likewise have seen this -- is in the
17 area of what we call the revolutionary rural development or the
18 pacification program.

19 What is wrong, it seems to me, is that the civilian com-
20 ponents that are responsible for pacification have not been
21 able to really fulfill the requirements of that task. Of
22 course, you require -- first of all, you must have security
23 before your civilian officers or your civilian forces can
24 really do the job as you expect them to do. The cadres that
25 have been trained -- that is, the South Vietnamese that are

1 being trained to move in, these teams of 59 that moved into a
2 village and into an area, they have been coming along, but
3 the training was not as good as it should have been and it has
4 had to be improved.

5 I can say that the pacification program has not worked
6 as well as we had hoped it would on the basis of our goals
7 at the Honolulu Conference. I can also say that we are going
8 to redouble our efforts. Not only we, but one of the things
9 undoubtedly that will be discussed at the Manila Conference is
10 this whole matter of the social-economic conditions in
11 South Vietnam, the rural development, the pacification, the
12 post-war plans for South Vietnam. This will be the central
13 point, I am confident, of the discussions.

14 MR. MORGAN: Well, this tees up the question that I wanted
15 to ask next, Mr. Vice President, and I was wondering if one of
16 the difficulties with pacification has been that we have
17 been too much emphatic on the military side.

18 Now, the President leaves for the Manila Conference tomor-
19 row. One of the first things he said about the conference was
20 that the United States and its allies were going to examine
21 their military position in Vietnam. A liberal Republican that
22 I talked to in New England while I was up there with you actual-
23 ly criticized that statement and said that he should have said,
24 first, that the conference should be looking for peace in
25 Vietnam.

1 VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Well, I remember the press
2 conference that the gentleman refers to and, as a matter of
3 fact, the President's emphasis on the military matter came
4 at the end of his statement about the purpose of the Manila
5 Conference. Needless to say, allies that are in combat,
6 that are working together in common cause in South Vietnam,
7 will, of course, evaluate the military situation. However, as
8 President Johnson has made it quite clear, the purpose of the
9 Manila Conference is not to design any great new strategy,
10 nor does it have as its purpose the twisting of arms, so to
11 speak, to gain new military commitments. The men that --
12 remember, this conference was not called by the United States
13 and I think this is very important for us to underscore,
14 gentlemen. The Manila Conference is not an American conference.
15 The Manila Conference was not called by President Johnson.
16 The Manila Conference was called by Ferdinand Marcos, the
17 President of the Philippine Republic. A similar conference was
18 suggested some time back by President Pak of Korea. It
19 is really the outgrowth of two or three meetings, one at
20 Honolulu where President Johnson said it would be desirable
21 later on to take another look at how we were doing, how all
22 nations were doing in Southeast Asia, what the situation was
23 in Southeast Asia, and then it was in Seoul, Korea, some months
24 back, where nine of the Asian nations met and suggested that
25 it might be well to have another conference later on. This is

1 an Asian conference in which we are a participant and this
2 conference will, I am sure, give an opportunity for consider-
3 able coordination of effort in the social-economic-political
4 aspects of the struggle in Southeast Asia. To be sure, the
5 political matter -- the military matters will have to be review
6 ed and evaluated. After all, men are giving their lives there.
7 The nations that are at this conference will be nations that
8 are committed militarily in Southeast Asia, in Vietnam, but
9 we know what the real problem is in Southeast Asia today. It
10 is, of course, first, the confrontation, the battle against
11 the Viet Cong and North Vietnam. But the major weakness that
12 we sense today is in pacification. It is in rebuilding the
13 nation. This is the real struggle, the building of the nation,
14 and I would suppose that the Manila Conference could be called
15 the Nation-Building Conference. How you best can join your
16 efforts or combine your efforts, not only as military partners
17 in a struggle against a common enemy, but how best you can
18 combine your efforts and join together collectively to improve
19 the life of the people.

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1 1 MR. MORGAN: Vice President Humphrey, Foreign Minister
2 Gromyko of the Soviet Union saw President Johnson at the
3 White House on Monday. After that there was a slight atmosphere
4 of encouragement in Washington, but yesterday Chairman Breznev
5 in Moscow sharply poured cold water -- if I can make a clumsy
6 figure -- in American-Russian relations and today there has
7 even been a stronger communique from the Russians saying
8 that we can't really have any rapport without the
9 U. S. settling in Vietnam more or less on the Communist
10 terms. (A), what is your reaction to that; (B), how much
11 of a blight will it be on the Manila Conference?

12 VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Well, first of all I did feel
13 as you have indicated -- I mean I think there was a feeling
14 as you have indicated, that there might be some hope for
15 improved relations between ourselves and the Soviet Union
16 vis-a-vis the activities in Southeast Asia, after Mr.
17 Gromyko's visit here at the White House. I'd like to
18 examine what has happened since. Breznev's statement of a day
19 or so ago, while it was hard, a hard line on Vietnam, did not
20 foreclose other developments between ourselves and the
21 Soviet Union. It did not repudiate, for example, what has
22 been said by President Johnson that the peace of the world
23 depends upon cooperation between the United States and the
24 Soviet Union. That important statement has never been denied
25 or repudiated by the Soviet leaders.

2 1 Furthermore, President Johnson indicated that there
2 were other areas that were of vital importance. While we
3 sought the good offices of the Soviet Union in terms of
4 its influencing Kanoi to bring about negotiations for a
5 peaceful settlement, those other areas of discussion
6 and hopeful settlement would be, for example, civil aviation
7 between the United States and the Soviet Union, the opening
8 on consular offices, the expansion of trade, the improvement
9 of trade between our two countries, and more importantly than
10 anything else, on the matter of nuclear proliferation, to
11 engage in discussions and negotiations that would result in
12 a pact that would prohibit further proliferation of nuclear
13 weaponry. The non-proliferation agreement, as we call it.

14 I think this is the top priority of American foreign
15 policy today, and I believe that it is of vital importance
16 to the Soviet Union. On those issues of aviation, of trade,
17 of improved relationships relating to our consular services,
18 and on nuclear proliferation, and the space treaty, what we
19 call the "Moon Treaty," keeping space as an area for
20 peaceful exploration rather than a new battlefield, on
21 these areas the Soviets have not closed the door. As a
22 matter of fact, they are moving towards a better understanding
23 with the United States all of the time.

24 But when it comes to Vietnam, once again I think we see
25 the Soviet Union in its ideological struggle with Red China.

3 1 This regretablely is one of the sad facts of our time. Here
2 is China in turmoil, in confusion; China bitter, militant,
3 aggressive and dangerous -- not only to Southeast Asia, but to
4 the Soviet Union and to ourselves. Here is the Soviet Union
5 contesting for leadership in the Communist world, and
6 really the test of that leadership in many ways is in
7 Vietnam, because it is there that China and the Soviet Union
8 have literally locked forces. You maybe recall the other
9 day where the Chinese have accused the Russians of being the
10 lackey of the United States. And then the other day where
11 the Russians accused the Chinese, saying that if there was fail-
12 ure of Communist success or if there was lack of Communist
13 success in Vietnam it would be due to Communist China's delay
14 in getting materials through and all of their obstructionist
15 tactics.

16 So I think we have to weigh all of these things,
17 gentlemen, that we hear from the Kremlin, very, very carefully
18 and with the backdrop, to look at them with the backdrop of
19 their relationships with China. Now I am not encouraged by
20 what I heard and what I read from Breznev in Pravda and the
21 official statement of the Soviet Union today. On Vietnam,
22 this makes it exceedingly difficult. And once again the
23 Communist powers have slammed the door -- at least slammed
24 it shut, I don't say they have locked it but they have
25 slammed the door in our face in every effort that we have made

4 1 to open up the talk for peace and a peaceful settlement.

2 MR. SMITH: Mr. Humphrey, more than half our time is
3 used up so I am going to change the subject abruptly and
4 ask you about elections. Now you are campaigning in 38
5 states, I believe. Do you think you have been doing much
6 good for the Democratic candidates?

7 VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Some -- I hope. I qualify
8 that. I said "I hope," Mr. Smith. I am not sure that I will
9 make my goal of 38 states, because I will be staying a little
10 closer into Washington for a few days here while the President
11 is away, but on week-ends I am stepping up my tempo in order
12 to move around quite rapidly.

13 The candidates feel that we are of some help. I am sure
14 that we get, by a Vice President or other,
15 or a Senator, ^{or the President} /obviously, coming in, those that are running
16 for reelection get a good deal of exposure in the public press
17 and the media. We do a good deal of fund raising at these
18 dinners. For example, I was in Bangor, Maine, the other night.
19 We had a huge dinner, the largest one they have ever had in the
20 history of Democratic politics in Maine. It was a marvelous
21 dinner, proving that Ed Muskie, by the way, is a very strong
22 leader in Maine, and I think we were of a little help there.

23 MR. SMITH: Mr. Vice President, before you took over
24 your present job and were interrupted by the hand of fate and
25 President Johnson, you were a commentator, a political

1 commentator on this network. Could we ask you to
2 comment now, how do you think these elections are going to
3 turn out, do you think there are going to be big losses
4 for the Democrats in the House and the Senate?

5 VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Now you have really put me on
6 the spot for objectivity and as I have said to your associate
7 here, Ed Morgan, I try to be objective about this because it
8 is really unforgivable to fool yourself. Sometimes people
9 fool others, but you ought not to mislead yourself.

10 The situation politically as I see it is now that
11 for the -- at this moment, about this week on, political
12 interest is beginning to grow. There has been a sort
13 of voter apathy, up until now. I think most of you
14 men who have been out in the hustings feel that way. There
15 are some contests that are hot contests. The Governorship
16 in California, the Senatorship race in Illinois, just to
17 select two. Those are -- the focus of national attention is
18 on those contests. But even in those areas the voter
19 interest has been modest up until now. I have a feeling that
20 it is growing.

21 Now my own view is that if there is a reasonably good
22 turnout on election day -- and I tell my Democratic friends that
23 this is their first responsibility, to get that voter turnout --
24 that the Democratic Party will fare very well in the election.
25 I can't tell you that we are going to hold every seat. No one

1 knows that. As a matter of fact, the odds are against
2 us doing so, simply because in the 1964 election we gained so
3 many seats. You will remember, I think, Mr. Nixon predicted
4 that we would lose 40 and we gained 38. I don't pay too much
5 attention to Mr. Nixon's predictions on any of these things.

6 MR. MORGAN: Mr. Vice President, voter interest in civil
7 rights and the so-called white backlash has been undeniably
8 revived. In Boston on Thursday you said that the Senate
9 would have passed the '66 Civil Rights Bill, including the
10 housing section, except for the 19th Century machinery of the
11 filibuster.

12 Now you are the presiding officer of the Senate and
13 we have a new session of Congress coming up in January. How
14 might you rule as the presiding officer of the Senate that
15 would affect a filibuster?

16 VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: If I were to answer that
17 question now, Mr. Morgan, there would be no suspense. There
18 would be no drama, there would really be no interest in the
19 opening of the 90th Congress.

20 I can only say this, that the filibuster was one of the
21 factors, and a very significant factor in preventing
22 the passage of the 1966 Civil Rights proposals of President
23 Johnson, because we did have a majority vote in the Senate
24 for those proposals. There will be an effort made, I am
25 confident, in the opening of the 90th Congress, to change the

1 Rule 22, the so-called filibuster rule. As presiding officer
2 of the Senate I would owe it both to the Senate itself and my
3 own conscience not to predict what my rulings might be, but
4 I have indicated that the filibuster rule is an impediment
5 to what I consider to be necessary social progress.

6 I believe, however, in the Senate having firm rules, and I
7 think my past/^{actions} indicate pretty much my views on
8 the filibuster rule, so you do a little research and
9 you might have some predictions to make.

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1 MR. MORGAN: Howard, before you move to another political
2 topic, may I just follow up this civil rights thing in a
3 question for clarification? You got a big hand at Phila-
4 delphia the other day when you addressed the International
5 Police Chiefs Convention when you said that when you were Mayor
6 of Minneapolis you did the civilian review board thing your-
7 self. Now, some people inferred from that that you were against
8 civilian review boards, which is a hot contest, in New York
9 particularly.

10 Would you clarify that a little?

11 VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Well, I noticed that one of the
12 leading newspapers tried to make quite a bit out of that state-
13 ment. I had many things to say to the Chiefs of Police. What
14 I did say was that I had a law enforcement commission when I
15 was the Mayor of Minneapolis that advised me on all matters
16 of law enforcement, how to improve police training, how to
17 improve police-community relations, how to improve the working
18 conditions of our police department; in other words, to advise
19 and counsel the Mayor. I said in my experience -- and that is
20 1945, not 1966, in a city of a half a million, not a city of
21 several million -- that my law enforcement commission and my-
22 self handled the police problems, that I did the matter of
23 review.

24 Now, civilian review boards may be desirable in some
25 cities. I have heard, for example, that in New York City that

1 it has worked well. If it has worked well, that is their
2 business. I don't have any particular antipathy, or any
3 particular antagonism towards a civilian review board, provid-
4 ing that the Mayor still assumes the ultimate responsibility
5 or the Commissioner of Police assumes the ultimate responsibility
6 for his police department. I just don't want a civilian re-
7 view board to be one that undermines the authority of the
8 police. If it is a board that is designed to promote better
9 relationships between the police and the community and to ex-
10 amine into so-called infractions of police authority, then
11 it has a very usable and I think helpful role to play. But
12 if it is an escape hatch for a public official to avoid taking
13 on the responsibility of law and order, and the enforcement
14 of law and order, then I am opposed to it.

15 Now, I have a feeling that in New York City that this
16 board may have worked quite well. That is what I have been
17 told, and I don't want to have any statement of Hubert
18 Humphrey's as Mayor of a city of half a million act as a
19 national pattern. I never knew anybody to put that much
20 emphasis upon it.

21 MR. SMITH: Mr. Vice President, you have spent most of
22 your career taking initiatives on almost everything. How has
23 it been for two years, not being able to take initiatives, but
24 having to accept someone else's?

25 VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Well, I have tried to take

1 some initiatives, but I have taken them within the confines
2 of a cabinet and within the limitations of an administrative
3 establishment. There is a great deal of difference between
4 being a Senator where you are totally a free agent and one
5 where you are a part of a team where you have one President
6 and that is all that this nation needs and wants, and it has a
7 good President. I work within the confines of the Cabinet.

8 Now, I have had the chance to take some initiatives,
9 Howard, when I have been out, for example, on our Youth Oppor-
10 tunity Program. I have strongly advocated, for example, the
11 non-proliferation agreement in the field of nuclear weapons.
12 I spoke to a group of young people the other day and I said,
13 "Now, if we can get this war settled in Vietnam, will you back
14 me? Will you back me if I ask the country to start to dedicate
15 the resources that we are spending in this war to rebuild our
16 cities? Will you back me when I ask that we spend some of this
17 money to help an impoverished and a hungry world? Will you have
18 the same kind of enthusiasm for a better world that you have
19 had for carrying those signs saying that we ought to end the
20 war in Vietnam?"

21 No I doubt that you can stifle Hubert Humphrey's initia-
22 tive?

23 MR. MORGAN: Can I make one quick one: It looks in-
24 evitable that a third party, a sort of a Dixiecrat outfit,
25 will come up in '68. Isn't this going to damage both the

1 moderates in Democratic and Republican parties?

2 VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: I am not quite sure. In some
3 sense it might be helpful. It will maybe clean out of both
4 parties those that ought not to be there.

5 MR. SMITH: I am sorry we can't let you expand on that.
6 Thank you very much, Mr. Vice-President, for being with us on
7 ISSUES AND ANSWERS.

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