

FOR RELEASE: FRIDAY PM's  
April 21, 1967

REMARKS OF VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT H. HUMPHREY  
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS  
WASHINGTON, D. C.  
APRIL 21, 1967

Several days ago I returned from a mission which involved discussion with European ministers and chiefs of state, and with officers of several international organizations, covering all the problems and issues which jointly concern the United States and Western Europe.

I thought I might share with you today some tentative observations about where we stand in relation to our Western European partners, and some thoughts about where we are, and should be, headed.

The first and overwhelming conclusion which I bring home is this: We are entering a new period in our relations with the peoples of Europe.

The postwar period is ended. The reconstruction of Western Europe has been consummated -- far earlier than any of us would have dared to hope only 20 years ago.

And, lest we lost sight of it, we stand in the position of seeing our policies not only vindicated, but a concrete success. And since it doesn't happen every day, we ought to enjoy it while we have the chance.

But with the end of the postwar era, both we and our Western European allies face the necessity of adopting a new outlook and new habits of thought and action. This will not be easy, or always pleasant, to do.

During the past 20 years, Western Europeans have thought of us as their benefactor, their protector, and all too often, their demanding senior partner.

We, in turn, have thought of the Western European nations as friends and allies, but all too often as compliant junior partners.

Now, a new relationship and a new understanding will be needed.

We must recognize that there is a new spirit of "European" nationalism -- a nationalism expressing itself as pride both in Europe as a whole and in the individual European nation states. With this nationalism, and with this pride, we can expect an increasing European sensitivity.

The question is asked: Where will this new nationalism lead? Will it lead to an inward Europe or an outward Europe?

The answer will depend in some part on the way we conduct ourselves.

We have two choices: One is to look upon this new "European" nationalism as not in consonance with our interests and to try to maintain the old senior-junior partner relationship.

In my view, this course would lead to the rapid disaffection of our allies and, ultimately, to the isolation of our country among its partners.

The other course -- the course we will and must continue to pursue -- is to welcome this increasing spirit of "European" nationalism for what it is: The natural consequence of our postwar policies and of Western Europe's heroic efforts toward self-renewal.

I believe we must capitalize on this spirit. If our European partners wish to play a greater and more important role in the world, so much the better. But we should not be surprised if that role sometimes turns out to be a more independent one.

No self-respecting nation, or group of nations, wishes to remain forever in a subsidiary position, or for that matter to be reminded of past favors done.

Therefore, on my mission, I made it clear that we welcome Western Europe's new spirit. The task now is not to tacitly resist it, but to work with our friends to channel it constructively and outwardly.

On our part, as erstwhile senior partners, this will require increasing self-discipline, and the necessity for far greater and deeper consultation than we have undertaken with our partners thus far.

On the European side, this will require a greater sense of international responsibility and far-sightedness, and less preoccupation with problems which are within European borders alone.

If both we and our European partners can adjust to this new era -- and I believe we can -- we have the chance to build upon our progress of the past 20 years and to move beyond the reconstructive tasks of the postwar period into new areas of wider opportunity: I mean, the healing of the old wounds and divisions in Europe . . . the peaceful reunification of Germany . . . the vital effort to halt, and to slow down, the madness of the international arms race . . . the nurturing of scientific and technological innovation . . . the closing of the dangerous and widening gap between the rich nations and poor . . . and the creation and strengthening of international institutions for peace.

\* \* \*

. . .more . . .

Now, I would like to take a few moments with you to survey several matters which today concern both our allies and ourselves, and which I discussed at length with the leaders of Western Europe.

#### Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

As you know, I have devoted a good share of my public life to nuclear arms control and disarmament. We are now at a critical point in our efforts in those areas -- a point at which fearful weapons of destruction can be developed by a dozen to 20 countries, or at which this dangerous race may be slowed and, hopefully, halted.

We have made it a matter of high national priority to conclude a non-nuclear proliferation treaty.

But, if it is to be a lasting and effective treaty, it must be one which protects the vital interests of all those who sign it.

While in Western Europe, I discussed at some length the provisions and intent of the tentative draft treaty now under consideration. I found concern among some of our allies concerning both the treaty's provisions and intent -- concern, I might add, often based on misapprehension or misunderstanding.

This treaty would not impede peaceful development of civilian nuclear technology. It would not deny any future ~~unified~~ Europe the means of its own nuclear defense. It would not lay Western European nations open to industrial espionage.

It would contribute to a more stabilized and healthy international environment -- an environment in which each nation would not have to fear some future nuclear blackmail by its neighbor.

I believe that, in a short time, our partners will join with us in agreed language of a draft treaty.

We can then sit down with the Soviet Union, in the framework of the 18-nation disarmament conference, to work toward an effective and lasting final document.

#### Kennedy Round

The Kennedy Round trade negotiation is also entering its final and crucial stage.

In all the European capitals, and with the EEC Commission, I stressed our full American commitment to a successful Kennedy Round in both the industrial and agricultural sectors.

I stressed that we have far more than economics at stake in this negotiation -- even as important as the economics of it are.

I expressed my belief that, if the Kennedy Round were to fall, old forces of reaction and inwardness would be unleashed in our country with effects going far beyond international trade.

I told our European partners that, if the Kennedy Round were to fail, we might see attacks following on our troop commitments overseas . . . on our economic assistance to developing countries . . . and on the whole array of constructive, internationalist policies which have helped build a safer and freer world since World War II.

European leaders, by the same token, said that they recognized the same forces within their own countries and that they too recognized the high political importance of a successful Kennedy Round.

In my detailed Kennedy Round discussions, I emphasized not only the need for access for American farm production in Europe, but also for food aid for the developing countries.

There will be a good deal of hard bargaining in these next few days, but I believe that we will have a successful Kennedy Round, and, as a result, will be able to move forward to development of new trade policies which not only benefit the industrialized countries but really get down to the enduring problems of the poor nations.

#### NATO

I emphasized the President's belief that, if we wish NATO to continue as a viable instrument for peace and peaceful progress, the first priority for both ourselves and Western Europe must be to maintain its deterrent strength as insurance against disarray in the West and temptation in the East.

All the Atlantic nations -- including our own -- face budgetary or international payments problems.

But now, as new opportunities are apparent in the East, it is more important than ever that we maintain both an effective military deterrent and our political cohesion.

What we have gained so painfully in face of a common threat over the past generation, we cannot afford to lose at the moment when that threat may finally seem to lessen.

And that will mean, for all of us, some measure of sacrifice--including financial sacrifice.

I restated the President's pledge that we were prepared to meet our full commitment to NATO, but that others must be willing to do the same. I found a positive response and an eagerness to give NATO new life--especially in the areas of nuclear planning and political consultation.

#### East-West

A few weeks ago at Fulton, Missouri, I looked ahead to the time when the Iron Curtain might be replaced by an open door. I found our Western European partners just as eager as we are to pursue that objective.

There is a deep desire in Western Europe for reconciliation with the East.

I look upon this as positive, provided that we all move East together.

(If you'll pardon what a friend of mine calls my Wild East analogy, we stand a far better chance of safely reaching our Eastern destination if our wagons are in line, and if we mount a reliable shotgun guard, than if the wagons set out separately, each in its own direction.)

I also found a belief in Western Europe--one not widely held even a few months ago that our new peaceful engagement with the East might eventually lead, in the future sometime far ahead, to a peacefully reunited Germany and settlement in Central Europe.

#### Western European Unity

Now, what about the shining new united Western Europe for which we held such hope only a few years ago?

I found a new momentum toward that unity.

The British Government is clearly committed to Europe. British public opinion is clearly favorable. And five of the six Common Market partners are clearly ready to support a forthright British initiative.

British entry into the Common Market--and entry for the EFTA partners and other European nations--will not take place tomorrow. But, for the first time in a long time, there was a feeling that it will happen. European unity is moving again.

For our part, we welcome this new momentum. But I made it equally clear that we regard construction of Western European unity as a business for European nations. I can think of nothing which could deter this great enterprise more effectively than to be stamped "Made in America."

### MONETARY REFORM

There was another major subject discussed during my trip: international monetary policy.

I am convinced that this is a subject understood by no one, including the experts. Therefore, I will not spend any time today trying to convince you of the merits of one or another plan of reform.

Most of you associate me too greatly with reform as it is.

However, I will make clear that, in international monetary policy, we are the ones who are for reform, and I found that most of our partners are, too.

I think we are making some progress and that, at the Rio Conference in September, we may finally be able to begin to break the log jam on international liquidity with resulting opportunities for growth for both the industrialized and developing nations.

Finally--and I am sure you thought I would end this speech without mentioning it--I will say a word about Vietnam.

Contrary to one or two news reports, I did not embark on any Vietnam sales mission. But where others raised the question of Vietnam, I outlined our country's policies and objectives.

I think it should be understood that the overwhelming majority of national leaders with whom I spoke understand our presence and objectives in Vietnam.

If we have problems in Europe concerning Vietnam, they are problems involving some segments of public opinion. But I emphasize that they are not problems with the people who make decisions and policies on behalf of their governments.

It was not lost on any European national leader that, in Vietnam, we are keeping a commitment. But that is another speech, and I will not give it here.

Twenty-years ago, Western Europe lay in ruin--helpless and prostrate at the end of long and terrible night.

How many in this room believed then that today we would be able to talk about the end of the postwar period and, eventually, the end of the Iron Curtain? Yet, we are able to do just that.

If we enter the last third of this century weak, dis-united and uncertain...with little or no faith in ourselves or anyone else...and with each nation going its separate way...then this will be the last century for the cause of freedom and self-determination.

But if we maintain in the years ahead the cohesion, the vision, and the common purpose which we have sustained since World War II, I have no doubt that the remainder of this century can bring even greater results than those of the past 20 years.

If we have come this far while our European partners have only begun to regain their strength, how far can we go when the Atlantic world stands prosperous and free as never before?

\* \* \*

Now we stand at the threshold of a new age--an age in which all of us along the Atlantic basin...all of us who share a common heritage and common values will be able to work together toward man's final liberation around the world.

Now we can have the chance to make into living reality the words of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in his Inaugural Address thirty years ago:

"The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abundance of those who have too much; it is whether we provide enough for those who have too little."

Now we of the Atlantic family must lift our sights to the world beyond that has lain silent and in poverty for far too long.

Let the course ahead be clear. We shall not achieve great goals with limited investments. We shall not achieve mighty purposes with petty actions. We will not find our way guided by small dreams.

There is a long road ahead which will test our character and our fiber.

Only one week ago in Punta del Este, Uruguay, President Johnson set forth the task that lies ahead for us as Americans.

"We no longer inhabit a new world. We cannot escape from our problems, as the first Americans could, in the vastness of an uncharted hemisphere. If we are to grow and prosper, we must face the problems of our maturity. And we must do it boldly, wisely--and now..."

"The time is now. The responsibility is ours. Let us declare the next ten years the Decade of Urgency. Let us match our resolve and our resources to the common tasks until the dream of a new America is accomplished in the lives of all our people."

President Johnson set forth our vision of a free and peaceful hemisphere.

In partnership with the nations of the Atlantic, that vision can and will be extended to a free and peaceful world.

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# United States Senate

## COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

*John R.*  
TO: Kenneth Gray

FROM: Dorothy Fosdick *DF.*

*file*

The Vice President might be interested to know that we have reprinted his speech of April 21 in this Subcommittee publication. If you want additional copies, we will be happy to provide them.

THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE:  
CURRENT VIEWS

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PREPARED BY THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND  
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(Pursuant to S. Res. 54, 90th Cong.)

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UNITED STATES SENATE



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FOREWORD

The Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations has been making a nonpartisan study of the Atlantic Alliance. Over the past two years, the subcommittee has published detailed testimony and staff reports with suggestions for corrective action.

This publication is intended to make readily available to the subcommittee recent statements on relations between the United States and our partners in the Atlantic Alliance. The views printed here are drawn from American and allied sources. They do not, of course, necessarily represent the opinions of the subcommittee members.

HENRY M. JACKSON,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security  
and International Operations.*

MAY 1, 1967.

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## MAKING EUROPE WHOLE: AN UNFINISHED TASK

By President Lyndon B. Johnson

ADDRESS TO THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF EDITORIAL WRITERS,  
NEW YORK, OCTOBER 7, 1966

I remember some years ago Franklin Roosevelt addressed the Daughters of the American Revolution. His opening words were not "My Friends," but "Fellow Immigrants."

And he was right. Most of our fathers came from Europe—East or West, North or South. They settled in London, Kentucky; Paris, Idaho; and Rome, New York. Chicago, with Warsaw, is one of the great Polish cities of the world. And New York is the second capital of half the nations of Europe. That is the story of our country.

Americans and all Europeans share a connection which transcends political differences. We are a single civilization; we share a common destiny; our future is a common challenge.

Today two anniversaries especially remind us of the interdependence of Europe and America.

—On September 30, seventeen years ago, the Berlin airlift ended.

—On October 7, three years ago, the nuclear test ban treaty was ratified.

There is a healthy balance here. It is no accident. It reflects the balance the Atlantic allies have tried to maintain between strength and conciliation, between firmness and flexibility, between resolution and hope.

The Berlin airlift was an act of measured firmness. Without that firmness, the Marshall Plan and the recovery of Western Europe would have been impossible.

That hopeful and progressive achievement, the European Economic Community, could never have been born.

The winds of change which are blowing in Eastern Europe would not be felt today.

All these are the fruits of our determination.

The test ban treaty is the fruit of our hope. With more than 100 other signers we have committed ourselves to advance from deterrence through terror toward a more cooperative international order. We must go forward to banish all nuclear weapons—and war itself.

A just peace remains our goal. But we know that the world is changing. Our policy must reflect the reality of today—not yesterday. In every part of the world, new forces are at the gates: new countries, new aspirations, new men. In this spirit, let us look ahead to the tasks that confront the Atlantic nations.

Europe has been at peace since 1945. But it is a restless peace—shadowed by the threat of violence.

Europe is partitioned. An unnatural line runs through the heart of a great and proud nation. History warns us that until this harsh division has been resolved, peace in Europe will not be secure.

We must turn to one of the great unfinished tasks of our generation: making Europe whole.

Our purpose is not to overturn other governments, but to help the people of Europe to achieve:

—a continent in which the peoples of Eastern and Western Europe work together for the common good;

—a continent in which alliances do not confront each other in bitter hostility, but provide a framework in which West and East can act together to assure the security of all.

In a restored Europe, Germany can and will be united.

This remains a vital purpose of American policy. It can only be accomplished through a growing reconciliation. There is no shortcut.

We must move ahead on three fronts:

—First, to modernize NATO and strengthen other Atlantic institutions.

—Second, to further the integration of the Western European community.

—Third, to quicken progress in East-West relations.

Let me speak to each in turn.

#### VITALITY OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

I. Our first concern is to keep NATO strong and abreast of the times.

The Atlantic alliance has proved its vitality. Together, we have faced the threats to peace which have confronted us—and we shall meet those which may confront us in the future.

Let no one doubt the American commitment. We shall not unlearn the lesson of the thirties, when isolation and withdrawal were our share in the common disaster.

We are committed, and will remain firm.

But the Atlantic alliance is a living organism. It must adapt to changing conditions.

Much is already being done to modernize its structures:

—We are streamlining NATO command arrangements;

—We are moving to establish a permanent nuclear planning committee;

—We are increasing the speed and certainty of supply across the Atlantic.

However, we must do more.

The alliance must become a forum for increasingly close consultations. These should cover the full range of joint concerns—from East-West relations to crisis management.

The Atlantic alliance is the central instrument of the Atlantic community. But it is not the only one. Through other institutions the nations of the Atlantic are hard at work on constructive enterprise.

In the Kennedy Round, we are negotiating with the other Free World nations to reduce tariffs everywhere. Our goal is to free the trade of the world from arbitrary and artificial constraints.

We are also engaged on the problem of international monetary reform.

We are exploring how best to develop science and technology as a common resource. Recently the Italian Government has suggested an approach to narrowing the gap in technology between the United

States and Western Europe. That proposal deserves careful study. The United States is ready to cooperate with the European nations on all aspects of this problem.

Last, and perhaps most important, we are working together to accelerate the growth of the developing nations. It is our common business to help the millions in these nations improve their standards of life. The rich nations cannot live as an island of plenty in a sea of poverty.

Thus, while the institutions of the Atlantic community are growing, so are the tasks which face us.

#### PURSUIT OF FURTHER UNITY IN THE WEST

II. Second among our tasks is the vigorous pursuit of further unity in the West.

To pursue that unity is neither to postpone nor neglect the search for peace. There are good reasons for this:

—A united Western Europe can be our equal partner in helping to build a peaceful and just world order;

—A united Western Europe can move more confidently in peaceful initiatives toward the East;

—Unity can provide a framework within which a unified Germany could be a full partner without arousing ancient fears.

We look forward to the expansion and further strengthening of the European community. The obstacles are great. But perseverance has already reaped larger rewards than any of us dared hope 20 years ago.

The outlines of the new Europe are clearly discernible. It is a stronger, increasingly united but open Europe—with Great Britain a part of it—and with close ties to America.

#### IMPROVING THE EAST-WEST ENVIRONMENT

III. One great goal of a united West is to heal the wound in Europe which now cuts East from West and brother from brother.

That division must be healed peacefully. It must be healed with the consent of Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union. This will happen only as East and West succeed in building a surer foundation of mutual trust.

Nothing is more important for peace. We must improve the East-West environment in order to achieve the unification of Germany in the context of a larger peaceful and prosperous Europe.

Our task is to achieve a reconciliation with the East—a shift from the narrow concept of coexistence to the broader vision of peaceful engagement.

Americans are prepared to do their part. Under the last four Presidents, our policy toward the Soviet Union has been the same. Where necessary, we shall defend freedom; where possible, we shall work with the East to build a lasting peace.

We do not intend to let our differences on Vietnam or elsewhere prevent us from exploring all opportunities. We want the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe to know that we and our allies shall go step by step with them as far as they are willing to advance.

Let us—both Americans and Europeans—intensify our efforts.

We seek healthy economic and cultural relations with the Communist states.

—I am asking for early congressional action on the U.S.-Soviet consular agreement.

—We intend to press for legislative authority to negotiate trade agreements which could extend most-favored-nation tariff treatment to European Communist states.

And I am today announcing these new steps:

—We will reduce export controls on East-West trade with respect to hundreds of nonstrategic items.

—I have today signed a determination that will allow the Export-Import Bank to guarantee commercial credits to four additional Eastern European countries—Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. This is good business. And it will help us build bridges to Eastern Europe.

—The Secretary of State is reviewing the possibility of easing the burden of Polish debts to the United States through expenditures of our Polish currency holdings which would be mutually beneficial to both countries.

—The Export-Import Bank is prepared to finance American exports for the Soviet-Italian Fiat auto plant.

—We are negotiating a civil air agreement with the Soviet Union. This will facilitate tourism in both directions.

—This summer the American Government took additional steps to liberalize travel to Communist countries in Europe and Asia. We intend to liberalize these rules still further.

—In these past weeks the Soviet Union and the United States have begun to exchange cloud photographs taken from weather satellites.

In these and many other ways, ties with the East will be strengthened—by the United States and by other Atlantic nations.

Agreement on a broad policy to this end should be sought in existing Atlantic organs.

The principles which should govern East-West relations are now being discussed in the North Atlantic Council.

The OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] can also play an important part in trade and contacts with the East. The Western nations can there explore ways of inviting the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries to cooperate in tasks of common interest and common benefit.

Hand in hand with these steps to increase East-West ties must go measures to remove territorial and border disputes as a source of friction in Europe. The Atlantic nations oppose the use of force to change existing frontiers.

#### ENDING THE BITTER LEGACY OF WORLD WAR II

The maintenance of old enmities is not in anyone's interest. Our aim is a true European reconciliation. We must make this clear to the East.

Further, it is our policy to avoid the spread of national nuclear programs—in Europe and elsewhere. That is why we shall persevere in

efforts to reach an agreement banning the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We seek a stable military situation in Europe—one in which tensions can be lowered.

To this end, the United States will continue to play its part in effective Western deterrence. To weaken that deterrence might create temptations and endanger peace.

The Atlantic allies will continue together to study what strength NATO needs, in light of changing technology and the current threat.

Reduction of Soviet forces in Central Europe would, of course, affect the extent of the threat.

If changing circumstances should lead to a gradual and balanced revision in force levels on both sides, the revision could—together with the other steps that I have mentioned—help gradually to shape a new political environment.

The building of true peace and reconciliation in Europe will be a long process.

The bonds between the United States and its Atlantic partners provide the strength on which the world's security depends. Our interdependence is complete.

Our goal, in Europe and elsewhere, is a just and secure peace. It can most surely be achieved by common action. To this end, I pledge America's best efforts:

—to achieve a new thrust for the alliance;

—to support movement toward Western European unity;

—and to bring about a far-reaching improvement in relations between East and West.

Our object is to end the bitter legacy of World War II.

Success will bring the day closer when we have fully secured the peace in Europe, and in the world.

[NATO Letter, October 1966]

### THE OBJECTIVE OF NATO COOPERATION

By Halvard Lange

(Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway, 1946-1965)

The French decision to withdraw from the integrated NATO defense system has brought to a head the whole question of the form and functioning of the Atlantic Alliance. It is now for the other member countries to make up their minds how *they* envisage future NATO cooperation. The decisions taken today will be felt long after the first twenty years of the 1949 Treaty have expired. The fourteen partners of France have agreed to continue their collaboration along the broad lines pursued so far. A balanced common defense system will be maintained in peacetime, supported by an integrated command system and jointly financed infrastructure.

It is essential, especially from the point of view of the smaller member countries, that these basic principles should be maintained. Certainly in the case of my own country, Norway, the only solution to our security problem is an international, or Allied, one. Under present

conditions responsibility for nuclear deterrence rests almost solely with the United States. The ability of the USA to retaliate effectively in case of aggression, and the credibility of her deterrent, combined with the conventional forces of the Alliance as a whole, still remain the most effective guarantee against war in the North Atlantic area. This guarantee, and the physical presence of American troops in Europe, give the European member countries the security they need to carry out a fearless policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the other Communist-governed countries of Eastern Europe.

The change in the situation in Western Europe as compared with that of the early postwar years is very striking. Europe, which used to be the focal point of political conflict, has become relatively speaking the world's most stable area. Despite such unresolved problems as Berlin, no responsible authorities believe that there is any short-term danger of war in Europe. Against this background there are new opportunities for economic and cultural contacts and cooperation between Eastern and Western Europe. Looking further ahead we see the possibility of greater understanding and even gradual solutions of security problems by controlled reduction of military activity on both sides. General de Gaulle is of course right in saying that the situation has changed considerably since 1949. But I am convinced that the institutionally based and integrated cooperation which he rejects has been—and remains—a decisive factor in bringing about the improvements we are now witnessing.

This being said, I readily admit that other factors have played their part. Above all, by attaining the status of a nuclear super power the Soviet Union has acquired a new sense of her responsibilities and her leaders recognize that nuclear war must be avoided. Important changes in the social structure of the USSR and Eastern Europe, brought about by industrialization, have also occurred. The demand by the new educated classes for material welfare, greater personal security and more contact with the outside world is bound to influence foreign as well as domestic policy. By world standards the Communist countries of Europe are gradually entering the circle of wealthy nations. This partly accounts for the existing tension between them and China, who wants to make herself the spokesman of the world's vast majority of poor and colored peoples.

Opinions may differ as to the relative importance of these various factors in bringing about a change in the relations between members of NATO and those of the Warsaw Pact. But I fail to see how there can be any doubt that North Atlantic solidarity and the common defense system remain necessary for the continued balance and stability of power. In spite of all the changes, Communist ideology with its emotional appeal to revolutionary sentiments still represents an element of uncertainty and puts limitations upon the *détente* we so desire. The realities of power are still decisive elements in the thinking of Soviet leaders and those of the other Communist countries. The Atlantic security system is perhaps the most important of these realities.

The North Atlantic Treaty was made for defense; military cooperation is its primary purpose. But the NATO defense system is of an entirely different character from the ancient power alliances which General de Gaulle appears to favor. It was the idea of an Atlantic community in the broader sense that inspired the founders of the

Treaty. By Article 2 the member countries are committed to further the development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by promoting conditions of stability and well-being and by eliminating conflicts in their international economic policies. The question put to the Committee of Three by the NATO Council ten years ago was what could be done to meet these commitments in the nonmilitary field. The Committee concluded that improved cooperation in the *political* field was essential. Economic cooperation was already covered by other existing international organizations such as the OEEC and GATT. This is even more true today—true also in the scientific and cultural fields.

However, today as in 1956, the need for an improvement in political cooperation is the same. The Alliance should be better able to deal with critical international situations. More positively, it should contribute to solving the problems which create tension between ourselves and Warsaw Pact countries. It should also constantly seek practical ways to achieve arms control and disarmament. Such thoughts have been in the minds of many of those who call for NATO's adaptation to changing conditions in a period of relative *détente* between East and West in Europe. To alter the "machinery" is far less important than to develop a set of policy priorities and attitudes which are in accord with new conditions.

#### SPECIAL POSITION

The main problem in the relations between France and the other European countries is the leading part played by the United States in the Alliance. This special position is recognized by the other members as a logical and natural consequence of the predominance of American military power and economic resources. There are, of course, considerable shades of difference in the attitudes of the European member countries towards the rôle of the United States. Small countries may, perhaps, accept America's special position more readily than those who have behind them a long history as great powers. But France alone has made it a point of principle to challenge American leadership.

Only the United States can deal with the Soviet Union on a basis of parity. However, for US diplomacy to be fully effective, it is essential for the American Government to be fully aware always of the positions and interests of its Allies. In times of crisis, Allied views should be made known to the maximum extent possible and early enough to be considered before definite positions are taken. I think that a suggestion made by Mr. Alastair Buchan in his recent booklet on "Crisis Management" published by the Atlantic Institute is well worth considering. He proposes that a forum be established in *Washington* for emergency policy planning. It is in my view important that member governments keep their Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council fully briefed and in a position to discuss authoritatively both short- and long-term policy problems. These delegates should perhaps have political rather than diplomatic status.

In adapting the political functioning of the Alliance to changing international conditions I do not think that the arrangements with regard to the responsibility for nuclear deterrence should be fundamentally altered. Any basic changes in this field are bound to be unfortunate from the point of view both of East/West *détente* and of

efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. Whatever one may think of the motives behind, and the validity of, Soviet contentions that projects such as the MLF would tend to spread nuclear weapons and pave the way for Germany to become a nuclear power, it is true that so far these projects have made it more difficult to reach an agreement on nonproliferation. I note with satisfaction that there now appears to be much greater emphasis on the need for a nonproliferation treaty and more readiness to solve, in a less controversial way than so far envisaged, the question of the influence of European NATO members on nuclear policy.

In view of the worldwide responsibilities and interests of the United States, it is hardly surprising that considerable sections of American opinion expect solidarity on the part of NATO members even in conflicts outside the North Atlantic area. The crisis centers have shifted from the areas where they were concentrated seventeen years ago, to Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The Allies of the United States within the Alliance have not felt committed to practical military solidarity with the USA in the Vietnam war, and only some of them have been willing to identify themselves fully with the US political position there. There is of course no Treaty commitment to solidarity except in case of aggression against a member country within the area defined by the Treaty. World peace is, however, indivisible and it is in everybody's interest that political consultation and exchange of information should not be limited geographically. Nevertheless, because of the limitation of both the resources and the interests of other member countries, if for no other reason, there is a regional limitation upon the commitment to take common action.

NATO is no worldwide organization; nor is it in any way an organized ideological crusade against Communism. As far as international organizations are concerned, it is elsewhere, above all in the United Nations, that the members of the Alliance take their positions with regard to current or potential conflicts in other parts of the world. It is good that policies of member countries should be coordinated to the extent compatible with different national interests and views. But it would serve no purpose for NATO to act as a bloc in questions not affecting the security of the North Atlantic area.

#### INCREASED DÉTENTE

In my view, efforts to assure common policies by way of consultation should above all concentrate on questions which are directly relevant to the peace and security of the Alliance, such as relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, disarmament and arms control. The objective of political cooperation during the next few years should be to formulate effective policies for an increased *détente* in our relations with the Soviet Union and her Allies—policies which may one day lead to a solution for Europe's political problems and a reduction of both nuclear and conventional armaments.

["News From The German Embassy", December 16, 1966, Vol. 10, No. 15]

### GOVERNMENT DECLARATION TO THE BUNDESTAG, DECEMBER 13, 1966

(Foreign policy sections)

By Chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger

That peace may be preserved is the hope of all nations, and the German Nation desires this no less than others. The will to preserve peace and to promote international understanding is, therefore, the first word and the primary concern of this Government's foreign policy. It is true that it is the purpose of every foreign policy to serve the interests of the Nation, but in a world in which the destinies of nations are so closely bound up with each other, nobody is permitted to divest himself of his share in the responsibility for this world and the peace of this world.

The German Government advocates a consistent and effective peace policy apt to remove political tension and to check the arms race. We shall cooperate in any proposal for armaments control, for a reduction of armaments, and disarmament. The Federal Republic has given an undertaking to its partners in the alliance to renounce the production of atomic weapons, and has in that respect submitted to international controls. We seek neither national control nor national ownership of atomic weapons.

We are determined to maintain relations with all nations, based on understanding, on mutual confidence, and the will to cooperation.

#### RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

This applies also to our relationship with the Soviet Union, although our relations are still under the strain of the unsolved problem of reunification of our people. During our visit to Moscow in 1955 I was one of those who strongly advocated the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union. The development of these relations has certainly disappointed the expectations on both sides. But this should not be a reason for us to reduce our efforts to achieve an understanding step by step and to nurture increasing mutual confidence.

In my last speech before the Bundestag in Berlin on October 1, 1958, I said that the Germans harbored neither ill-will nor hatred towards the peoples of the Soviet Union; that, on the contrary, they wanted to live side by side with them on peaceful and good-neighborly terms, and that they did not think of interfering with the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. In connection with the reunification of Germany, which might seem to the Russians to present problems difficult to solve, political wisdom and a farsighted determination to promote understanding on all sides would surely surmount such difficulties. This is still my conviction today. And this Government will act according to this conviction. The previous Federal Government in its peace note of last March offered an exchange of declarations renouncing the use of force also to the Soviet Union, in order to make it clear once again that it did not seek to attain our aims by other than peaceful means. The Federal Government today repeats this

offer which was addressed also to the other Eastern European countries. It is prepared to include in this offer the unsolved problem of the division of Germany. In order to establish the preconditions for future successful discussions and negotiations, we hope through the development of our economic, intellectual and cultural relations steadily to further and to deepen our mutual understanding and trust.

#### RELATIONS WITH THE OTHER COUNTRIES IN EASTERN EUROPE

Germany was for centuries the bridge between Western and Eastern Europe. We should like to fulfill this mission also in our time. We are anxious to improve relations with those of our eastern neighbors who share our desire in all fields of economic, cultural, and political life and to establish diplomatic relations wherever this is possible under the circumstances.

Large sectors of the German people very much want reconciliation with Poland whose sorrowful history we have not forgotten and whose desire ultimately to live in a territory with secure boundaries we now, in view of the present lot of our own divided people, understand better than in former times. But the boundaries of a reunified Germany can only be determined in a settlement freely agreed upon with an All-German Government, a settlement that should establish the basis for a lasting and peaceful good-neighborly relationship agreed to by both nations.

The German people also wish to come to an understanding with Czechoslovakia. The Federal Government condemns Hitler's policy which was aimed at destroying the Czechoslovakian State. It shares the view that the Munich Agreement which came into being as the result of the threat to use force, is no longer valid. Nevertheless there still exist problems requiring a solution such as, for instance, that of the Law of Nationality. We are aware of our obligation to take care of our Sudeten German countrymen and all other expellees and refugees and we are taking that obligation seriously. Just as the Czechoslovakians had previously, these people have suffered bitter sorrow and injustice. The Federal Government wishes to close this sad chapter in the history of our two nations and to establish with Czechoslovakia good-neighborly relations based on mutual trust.

#### RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

We are closely associated with the United States of America by many and varied friendly relations and within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which we are very anxious to see consolidated and developed in keeping with present-day requirements. This Government will not forget any of the extensive measures of assistance which the United States has afforded us in the past two decades.

It is aware that its alliance with the United States and the other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is still of vital importance to it today and in the foreseeable future. Every alliance is only worth so much and has so much cohesion as the mutual confidence of each partner that the other will show understanding and consideration for its vital interests. That applies equally to the relations existing between the United States and us. Perhaps, in the

past year, we have sometimes put too much emphasis on our own trials and worries and interests in our relations with the United States—which, of course, was understandable in view of our position as the weaker and afflicted partner—without realizing, however, that a big power like the United States also has its worries and problems and expects to find understanding and, if possible, support on the part of its allies. This powerful nation has almost against its own will got into a position that engages it in all continents. We should not forget this and should consider in what way we can share more resolutely than hitherto in the responsibility for the preservation of world peace.

#### DESIRE FOR A UNITED EUROPE

Every European country willing to do so should, of course, admit that its own strength is limited, and that the European nations could render a much more effective contribution to world peace and the welfare of nations if they were to join forces with one another. We are, therefore, convinced that the economic and political union of Europe is in the interests of the European nations as much as that of the United States. And I venture to express the hope that eventually also the Soviet Union will regard such a united Europe as an essential factor contributing to world peace. To some this may seem too bold a hope, but the magnitude of our task requires us to have the courage to plan ahead, beyond all present-day worries and problems, for a future peaceful order on this planet.

But we do not want to use the desire for a united Europe as an excuse for neglecting to do what we can do now. This Government is therefore determined to make its contribution towards a just and lasting peace in a manner appropriate to the vigor and capabilities of our people.

The existing European Communities, which the preceding Governments of the Federal Republic have supported with steadfast energy, have achieved great progress. We shall exert our influence in favor of the consistent development of the European Economic Community and its institutions. The Community of the Six should be open to all those European States who agree with its aims. We should in particular be gratified if Great Britain and other EFTA countries were to become members of the European Communities.

Progressively we wish to develop and deepen our relations with Great Britain. We shall continue to carry on close and trustful cooperation with Italy. This applies in the same degree to the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. This Government will urge that, hand in hand with the internal development of the Common Market, a world-open trade policy should be pursued. It will therefore use its influence for a successful conclusion of the Kennedy Round.

#### FRENCH-GERMAN RELATIONS

As to the future of Europe, the development of Franco-German relations will play a decisive role. The peaceful order in Europe hoped for by East and West is inconceivable without a close and trustful relationship between Germany and France. Farseeing statesmen in our neighbor-countries, in the United States and in the Soviet Union,

have recognized this elementary fact, although from different points of view.

In its attitude towards France, the Federal Government is guided by the following considerations:

1) The facts of European geography and the balance sheet of the history of our continent make apparent under present day conditions a specially high degree of identity of interest of our two nations and countries.

2) Together with France, the oldest ally of America in Europe, we regard a firm alliance between the free and united nations of Europe and the United States of America as indispensable, even if the structure of this alliance may be shaped in future in view of a changing world. We refuse to be persuaded into a false and dangerous alternative to this choice.

3) Together with France, we support the restoration of a European family of nations which has grown up throughout history, an aim which includes the termination of the tearing apart of our nation which is unnatural and in defiance of history.

4) The Franco-German cooperation which we desire is not directed against any other nation. Rather it is the point of crystallization of a policy the aim of which is the unification of Europe. It is indispensable if Europe is to become a partner sharing responsibilities. A steadily growing convergence of German and French policy is a condition necessary for that Europe which speaks with one voice, as called for by American statesmen. Europe can only be built with France and Germany, but not without one or the other and by no means against one of the two countries. What is important is that concepts involving practical steps should be pursued uncompromisingly. What is desirable must not be allowed to prevent what is possible.

5) Franco-German cooperation in as many fields as possible will be of the greatest value for efforts to improve relations with our East European neighbors.

6) For all these reasons, the Federal Government wishes to make as much concrete use as possible of the opportunities for coordinating mutual policies afforded by the Franco-German treaty signed on January 22, 1963, and will make appropriate proposals.

The peculiar situations of our two nations will show differences of interest and views in the future as well, yet the Federal Government is convinced that such problems carry less weight than the need for economic, technological, cultural, military and political cooperation in ever-widening spheres, a need which is imperative for the future of our two peoples and of Europe.

#### REUNIFICATION AND RELATIONS WITH THE EAST ZONE

We are grateful to our allies for supporting our standpoint in the question of our divided nation and of its right of self-determination. The political circumstances have so far prevented the unification of our country. And there is still no foreseeing when this aim will be achieved. Even in our efforts to solve this problem, which is so vital to our people, we wish to promote peace and understanding; we are not frivolous troublemakers, for our aim is to remove on the basis of peace and understanding that very source of tension, the partition of Germany, which is also the partition of Europe, and to restore to our

people its peace of mind and its peace with the world. The present Federal Government, too, considers itself the only German Government to have been freely, lawfully, and democratically elected and therefore entitled to speak for all Germans. This does not mean that we want to treat in a patronizing manner our countrymen in the other part of Germany who cannot freely decide their own destiny. We wish to do our utmost to prevent the two parts of our nation from drifting apart as long as the country is divided; we wish to ease the situation, not harden it; we wish to bridge the gulfs, not deepen them. That is why we wish to do all we can to encourage human, economic and cultural relations with our countrymen in the other part of Germany.

Where this requires the establishment of contacts between authorities of the Federal Republic and of those in the other part of Germany it does not imply any recognition of a second German State. We shall treat each case on its merits and in such a way that world public opinion cannot gain the impression that we are abandoning our legal standpoint.

The Federal Government is endeavoring to expand internal German trade, which is no foreign trade. It will at the same time seek to provide wider opportunities for granting credit and will consider certain organizational means of strengthening inner German contacts.

The Federal Government will do everything in its power to make sure that Berlin remains a part of the Federal Republic, and will examine with the Senate and the protecting powers how Berlin's economy and status in our legal structure can be strengthened.

We desire to do all that is possible for the welfare of the people in divided Germany, and to make possible all that needs to be done.

#### RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES

As regards our foreign policy, we shall preserve and cultivate all our good traditional relations with many nations all over the world.

Since the last war many new states have emerged in Asia and Africa and are now struggling to create internal stability and consolidate their economies. The German people, especially the young people, are following this development with keen interest and sympathy. Our policy, aware of its responsibility for ensuring a just and lasting peace in the world, requires that we should do our best to assist these nations in establishing their economic and political existence within the limits set by our own resources. This also applies to the countries of Latin America. When we think of this objective we remember the great amount of assistance we ourselves and other European countries received after the last world war under the Marshall Plan.

I regret to say that there are at present ten Arab States with whom we do not have diplomatic relations. But we are confident that the traditionally good cooperation with those countries will soon be resumed and further developed in our mutual interest.

The name of our people has been abused by those who committed terrible crimes against Jewish people. Those crimes made our relationship with Israel problematic and difficult, but it has been improved and fostered by the establishment of diplomatic relations. The Federal Government intends to continue this policy.

In this Government statement it was decided not to divide the whole range of political tasks into various sections, as has been the

custom in the past. It is a policy statement by a Government that has emerged not from a brilliant election victory but from a crisis which our people have been following with deep concern. But it is precisely this fact which gives it its strength, namely the strength to decide what has to be decided without regard for any interest other than the common weal, or, I do not hesitate to say, our nation and fatherland.

This hour does not herald the birth of a new nationalism in Germany, not in this Government, not in this august House, not in our people. Even in the recent landtag elections the overwhelming majority of voters, in Hesse 92.1 percent and in Bavaria 92.6 percent, pledged their support for the democratic parties which in the last two decades have built a democratic state and integrated the Federal Republic of Germany in the European, the Western family of nations, whose ideals and political ethos we share.

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[NATO Letter, February 1967]

## EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN PROBLEM

By George Brown

(Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Great Britain)

FROM SPEECH TO THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHING CORPORATION  
CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN EDITORS

Sir Isaiah Berlin was recently quoted as saying that he did not think it was necessary for statesmen to have a great knowledge of history. I agree, but if it is not necessary for politicians to be historians, it is surely necessary that they should have a sense of history. One can hardly make sense of present-day Europe, or help to build the Europe of tomorrow, unless one has a feeling for the great historical forces which have brought it where it is today.

In talking of East-West relations, I have found myself coming straight away to the subject of Europe. This is not because I think of East-West relations as bounded by the frontiers of Europe itself. As a matter of fact I am rather suspicious of the words East-West relations. This has become a formula both too convenient and potentially misleading. What it must not come to be is some theoretical concept, a slogan which we think has a value in itself, without considering what it means in practice. What I take the expression to mean is a great complex of relations, some of them institutional but most of them at present bilateral, which link the European Communist countries and the countries of what is generally known as the West.

One fact affects the whole complex of relations. This is the massive industrial and military power of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is also a fact that a war between these two countries would mean the end of Europe and of much besides. Fortunately since there is evidently a strong disposition—to put it mildly—on the part of both the United States and the Soviet Union not to engage in war with each other, the comprehensive and final nature of their military

strength does not have the inhibiting effect on East-West relations which might at first sight be expected.

It would be otherwise if the balance were to be seriously upset, whether this resulted from developments within those two countries, or developments elsewhere in the world which obliged the United States and the Soviet Union to revise their present attitudes. But while this fact of American and Russian power cannot be denied or ignored, it need not, and as we have seen, it does not, prevent the countries in East and West from developing their relations, and thus reshaping the vast community of which we are all members. Europe remains the focal point of those relations.

I am not going to define Europe as stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals. This involves an act of partition which I am sure would hardly commend itself to our friends in Moscow, though it might be viewed with favor in Peking. Europe cannot be defined simply in geographical terms. European culture and European ideas about society, links of history and shared interests: all these make it unreal to stop short at the Atlantic or at the Eastern frontiers of Poland. Our friends in North America are an extension of Europe, if they will forgive me for so describing them. And who can say, other than in a strictly geographical sense, just where the Soviet Union ceases to be European?

But there are some points to be made about Europe, defined in the geographical sense. One point is that, while history has taught us some of the right lessons, it has also taught us some wrong ones. In the popular mind, and that includes politicians, history is so often a catalog of what one comes to regard as other people's vices and our own virtues. The experience and memories of living generations become formalized into so-called eternal truths. Enmity between Britain and France was once thought to be one of these eternal so-called truths. I suppose the same was true of Poland and Russia, but nowadays we recognize life as much more complicated and sophisticated, and no one thinks in those terms any longer.

### GERMANY

But surely the dislike and fear which some countries feel about Germany is another example of out-of-date history being a bad teacher. So many people have suffered in the past half-century in the wars with Germany that it is not surprising that this dominates their feelings. But feelings can be a very poor counsellor, and anyone who has studied Germany today knows how completely different it is from the Germany of the two world wars. Its leaders are genuine democrats and internationalists. And they are supported by a public opinion which in the great majority not only accepts but positively desires that Germany should be part of larger European international groupings.

But even if one were to take a poor view of human nature and human ambition, it would still be unrealistic to suppose that Germany could even think in terms of military aggression. She knows that she, like others, can no longer be a first-class military power compared with the two giants; and she sits in the middle of Europe knowing that war would devastate her. Nor can I take seriously the suggestion which we have sometimes heard that Germany would have the means,

if she had the will, to drag the United States and other members of NATO into a revanchist war. This proposition simply does not bear examination.

This is not intended to develop into a defense of Germany, but I have brought the point up now because we all know that a settlement in central Europe must come some time, and that until it does come there will be quite unnecessary and harmful political tensions, and Europe will not be able to develop to the full the prosperity and the civilization of which she is capable.

This brings me to the question of European security, or as I prefer to say European stability and European prosperity. There have been a number of attempts, since the war, to settle the German problem. They have not succeeded because between us we have had very different views of what we want. We must recognize that those differences remain. It is not likely that we shall make progress in the near future on those particular lines which we have explored in the past. But that only emphasizes the need to find the lines on which progress is possible.

There have also been many suggestions from both sides about ways in which we might reduce military tension and the very costly military investment in Europe; about how to remove some of the uncertainties and suspicions which we have about each other. From the Eastern side, Poland has taken a leading part in producing plans, especially with a view to controlling and limiting the nuclear establishment in Europe. And anyone who has been there understands why. Others among us have put forward ideas about observation posts, military missions, inspections, and so on. For reasons which are understandable, if sometimes regrettable, these many ideas have not yet got us very far, but the effort has not been wasted, and we must go on trying.

We must remember the years of work that went on in Geneva on the banning of nuclear tests, when people knew that the ban was militarily acceptable, economically desirable, and for the sake of humanity absolutely necessary; but governments still could not reach agreement. Then suddenly, out of a complex of political factors, agreement became politically possible and we got the 1963 Treaty. The years of work at Geneva were not wasted. When the political conditions were right, the ground work had been done and the decision could be reached quickly. So we must go on exchanging ideas about the measures that might be taken in Europe, and there will come a time when all this work will prove not to have been wasted.

#### THE BUCHAREST DECLARATION

I thought the Declaration of the Warsaw Pact published in Bucharest this summer was a very interesting document. It was interesting to me as a working politician because I could see in it the reflection of many viewpoints. There were however several things about it which were of greater interest than that. There was the call for the liquidation of military alliances, the suggestion of a European Security Conference and the call for increased contacts between all the countries of Europe.

Let me say first that the idea of a European Security Conference is not one that I cast lightly aside. We must work towards one, and so long as it is carefully prepared, the quicker the better. Of course, it will have to be a conference which includes those not insignificant

extensions of Europe which I have already mentioned, that is to say the Soviet Union, and the United States and Canada. But before we hold a conference, we must create the conditions in which it will have a good chance of succeeding. We must define the steps to be discussed and agree on the results we wish to see obtained, so that the purpose of the Conference would be to find the way towards those agreed objectives. If we do not do that, we shall find that the Conference only confirms us in the error of all our present ways and reinforces the divisions of opinion which now exist. What we must do therefore is to build up the conditions in which we can find agreement on the sort of Europe that would be acceptable to all of us. Then will come the time to hold the Conference, the task of which will be to ratify our agreement and to devise the means by which it will be fulfilled.

Then there was the suggestion about liquidating the military organizations of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Put in these terms it is surely putting the military cart before the political horse. You do not remove political difficulties by abolishing armies. Indeed it is clear that in the present state of human society armies will not be abolished so long as there are deep political difficulties, and so long as people are prepared to resort to force in order to defend what they regard as their vital interests. If national armies are not to be abolished, it does not make either military or political sense to abolish the Alliances. Indeed, if in present-day Europe the military sides of the two Alliances were to be dismantled and we simply had a number of separate and independent national armies, this would be much more likely to create dangers than to remove them.

There is however a modification of this idea which could, I believe, contribute in a major way to the improvement of the position in Europe. This is the idea that there should be force reductions all round. This is not of course simply a matter of cutting all the troops by say 20 percent. The military balance must be preserved. But there should be, indeed I am sure there is, a margin between present force levels and what one might call a basic minimum within which there could be reductions which would not expose either side to any increased risk. Perhaps for political reasons, this is a matter which it would be difficult to arrange by formal agreement. Perhaps it is an area where mutual example might work. I have an open mind on this. But a lot of men and a lot of money are tied up on both sides and if it were possible to release some of this it would be an enormous gain and in the interest of all of us. And it would also be in the interest of those parts of the underdeveloped world which Europe should be helping with more of its own resources, and where possibly our civilization's greatest challenge lies.

#### EAST-WEST CONTACTS

Now as regards increasing our contacts. Of course this is right and it is a question on which the members of the Warsaw Pact and the members of NATO agree. It is very satisfactory that, as the Bucharest Declaration shows, the Warsaw Pact countries are developing this side of their activities. This should become a powerful instrument for *détente* in Europe. We for our part regard this side of NATO's work as being as important as any other and I hope this fact will be increasingly recognized in the Soviet Union and among the countries of

Eastern Europe. Recent NATO Ministerial Meetings have given particular attention to the importance of developing East-West relations. This does not mean that we are thinking particularly of what you might call institutional contacts between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Our view, and perhaps this is also the view of members of the Warsaw Pact, is that the development of contacts will be largely on a bilateral basis. But it is useful to exchange ideas within the Alliances on ways in which these bilateral contacts can be expanded, and to exchange experiences. There is nothing restrictive about this.

We in the United Kingdom can, I think, claim to have taken a lead in developing bilateral relations. In the past few years we have had many exchanges between foreign ministers or their deputies, and between ministers responsible for other departments, such as technology, trade, education, economics, health and so on. On some international political questions, progress is bound to be slow. But in the other fields I have mentioned it is often possible to agree on positive acts of cooperation here and now, and these help to establish understanding and trust. Of course it is not only a question of ministers or top officials getting together. The exchanges of students, and ordinary private visits, are enormously useful.

I noted at the beginning that East-West relations involved relations between Eastern European countries themselves and Western European countries themselves. An obvious case of this is in our economics and trade. If the Eastern European countries can use COMECON to strengthen their economies, and their currencies, this can be to our advantage as well. Similarly if greater cooperation throughout Western Europe helps us to strengthen our economies this can be to the advantage of the members of COMECON. I am very much aware of the need to ensure that any arrangements that are made in Eastern Europe or in Western Europe are such that they will be to the advantage of all Europe and beyond.

[Knickerbocker International, April 1967]

## RELATIONS BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

By Ernst H. van der Beugel

(Professor of Postwar Western Cooperation, Leyden University; former Deputy Foreign Minister, The Netherlands)

In the first year of the Kennedy Administration it looked as if the organization of the Atlantic World moved into its crowning achievement, a close partnership between the United States and a United Europe capable of preserving peace, working for a détente with the Soviet Union and fulfilling its task towards the developing countries in the "third world".

The commitment of the United States to Western Europe began in 1947 with the unprecedented offer of Marshall aid. Unprecedented in the scope and generosity, also unprecedented in the wisdom of its execution and in the strict limitation of imposed conditions.

The only basic condition was the organization of cooperation between European countries.

From that day on, the unification of Europe has been the central theme of American foreign policy towards Europe.

These efforts were first directed towards a looser and broader form of European cooperation, particularly the Organization of European Economic Cooperation in Paris, but since the emergence of the Schuman Plan and especially the Common Market, American foreign policy focused its attention and support on this new and unorthodox form of integration. The reasons for this support were manifold. The conviction that the economic, social, and political problems of Europe could only be solved in a larger framework, the belief that the blessings of the American system should be transferred to the mother countries in Europe, the knowledge that the United States had gone to war twice because of intra-European rivalries, the very important consideration that a position of strength had to be built towards the expansionist Communist world, the belief that the problem of Germany could only be solved and the danger of its resurgent nationalism only embedded in a European framework, all this led to a strong, from time to time even rigid, support of the integration efforts in Europe.

For those who criticize United States policy as an indispensable item on their daily menu, it is good to stress that American policy towards Europe has been characterized by the complete reverse of the old European political dogma of "Divide et Impera".

Where in history can one find an example where a strong, mighty power accepts as a main principle of its foreign policy, the effort to build up another major power, in this case a United Europe?

In 1961 it seemed as if, at last, this American policy and European activities directed to this same end began to bear fruit. The economic strength of Europe had increased to an amazing extent. The Common Market was a fait accompli and had at last brought Great Britain to the conviction that it could play its indispensable role in world affairs better from within the Community than as a weakened power outside the process of close links between the United States and Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization fulfilled its task of preserving peace by the irrevocable commitment of the United States and the process of military integration. Western Germany was deeply committed to the process of Atlantic cohesion and European integration. The Trade Expansion Act would be the first symbol of a working Atlantic Partnership between the United States and Europe.

And then, in January 1963, General de Gaulle held his press conference in which he challenged practically every aspect of the process of Western organization as we had known it before.

This does not imply that the present paralysis of the process of Western cooperation is entirely due to De Gaulle. This would give France and French policy more importance than it really deserves. The changing character of the cold war, the reluctance toward a continued dependence of Europe on the United States, the changing circumstances of economic and monetary strength on both sides of the ocean, the preoccupation of the United States with its Pacific problems, all this would have arisen even without the destructive activities of our French allies, but the brutal way in which it was done and the tenacity of this strange French aberration of self-fulfilling prophecy certainly created a situation in which so many things went wrong at the same time.

And now we live, and it would be unwise to belittle it, in a period of disintegration after more than fifteen years of integration. France, for all practical purposes, has left the alliance. The Brussels institutions still function in the technical field of implementation of the Rome Treaty—a highly important aspect—but they have lost their political glamor and their absolute priority on the European scene. Nobody can deny that the intense preoccupation with Europe by the United States has been substituted by its commitment to the war in Vietnam. I belong to those who support in general America's role in that area because I feel that the outcome of this struggle is as much in our interest as in that of our American friends. We all are committed to America's position and prestige because it is the position and prestige of the only relevant power in the free world of which we are a part.

But the fact remains that Asia is first in America's foreign policy of today and that perhaps by their lack of available attention and time (every Government unfortunately has only a limited time and energy in action and in thinking at its disposal) it has no European policy at present.

I do not doubt the United States' basic commitment to Europe but I equally am worried about the concrete form of that commitment today.

Germany, so well on its way to an honorable and democratic partner of the Western world, shows increasing signs of instability, and the instability of 60-70 million highly industrious people in the heart of Europe and in a divided country is not something to be easily dismissed as a minor detail.

While the United Kingdom has made what looks like the decision to join the Common Market, which could be a step of immense importance, I am very pessimistic about the possibility that the French Government having already lost so much of its absurd illusion of the hegemony of the continent of Europe, will permit Britain to come in.

More than ever it is now necessary, in this frightening period of paralysis, to be clear about our priorities.

These priorities are:

1. Our system of democracy, personal freedom and the structure of our society will not survive unless there is the strongest possible link between the United States and Europe. Europe has regained its economic strength but for all purposes, which are relevant for power relations on a global scale, no structure in the West can function without active participation and engagement of the United States.

This certainly is true in a situation where there is no unified Europe and no prospect of one in a foreseeable future. But it will be even true if some day this unified Europe is established.

In the present circumstances to talk about a European foreign and defense policy is dangerous, absurd and irresponsible.

2. The United States should try to combine its heavy task in the Pacific with a more active and positive European policy. The way, for example, the German problem has been treated by Washington in the last three years has been far less than adequate.

3. Peace in the world has always been and should always be the ultimate goal of any Atlantic policy.

But the process of détente with the Soviet Union should not be monopolized by the Americans (who have the power to do so) without their European friends, nor by Europe (which has no power to do it) without America.

4. There is no other solution for the vital German problem than the principle of absolute nondiscrimination in every field and the strongest possible ties with the process of Atlantic cooperation and European integration.

German reunification is the last act of the process of détente; it never can be the first.

5. Everything should be done to get Britain into the Common Market. If this would succeed, the process of the organization of the Western world could move on again.

6. One should try to outlive De Gaulle without too much undue damage to our relations with France. I do not believe that France will be totally different after De Gaulle, but at least there will be a new situation with new possibilities.

These six points are by no means a complete program. But they are a few tendencies which we should follow in order to have a chance to take up again at a later date what we had hoped to achieve around 1960.

[Release from the Office of the Vice President, April 21, 1967]

## A MISSION TO EUROPE

By Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey

REMARKS TO THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS,  
WASHINGTON, D.C., APRIL 21, 1967

Several days ago I returned from a mission which involved discussion with European ministers and chiefs of state, and with officers of several international organizations, covering all the problems and issues which jointly concern the United States and Western Europe. I thought I might share with you today some tentative observations about where we stand in relation to our Western European partners, and some thoughts about where we are, and should be, headed.

The first and overwhelming conclusion which I bring home is this: We are entering a new period in our relations with the peoples of Europe. The postwar period is ended. The reconstruction of Western Europe has been consummated—far earlier than any of us would have dared to hope only 20 years ago. And, lest we lost sight of it, we stand in the position of seeing our policies not only vindicated, but a concrete success. And since it doesn't happen every day, we ought to enjoy it while we have the chance.

But with the end of the postwar era, both we and our Western European allies face the necessity of adopting a new outlook and new habits of thought and action. This will not be easy, or always pleasant, to do. During the past 20 years, Western Europeans have thought of us as their benefactor, their protector, and all too often, their demanding senior partner. We, in turn, have thought of the Western European nations as friends and allies, but all too often as compliant junior

partners. Now, a new relationship and a new understanding will be needed.

We must recognize that there is a new spirit of "European" nationalism—a nationalism expressing itself as pride both in Europe as a whole and in the individual European nation states. With this nationalism, and with this pride, we can expect an increasing European sensitivity.

The question is asked: Where will this new nationalism lead? Will it lead to an inward Europe or an outward Europe? The answer will depend in some part on the way *we* conduct ourselves.

We have two choices: One is to look upon this new "European" nationalism as not in consonance with our interests and to try to maintain the old senior-junior partner relationship. In my view, this course would lead to the rapid disaffection of our allies and, ultimately, to the isolation of our country among its partners.

The other course—the course we will and must continue to pursue—is to welcome this increasing spirit of "European" nationalism for what it is: The natural consequence of our postwar policies and of Western Europe's heroic efforts toward self-renewal. I believe we must capitalize on this spirit. If our European partners wish to play a greater and more important role in the world, so much the better. But we should not be surprised if that role sometimes turns out to be a more independent one.

No self-respecting nation, or group of nations, wishes to remain forever in a subsidiary position, or for that matter to be reminded of past favors done. Therefore, on my mission, I made it clear that we welcome Western Europe's new spirit. The task now is not to tacitly resist it, but to work with our friends to channel it constructively and outwardly.

On our part, as erstwhile senior partners, this will require increasing self-discipline, and the necessity for far greater and deeper consultation than we have undertaken with our partners thus far.

On the European side, this will require a greater sense of international responsibility and far-sightedness, and less preoccupation with problems which are within European borders alone.

If both we and our European partners can adjust to this new era—and I believe we can—we have the chance to build upon our progress of the past 20 years and to move beyond the reconstructive tasks of the postwar period into new areas of wider opportunity: I mean, the healing of the old wounds and divisions in Europe . . . the peaceful reunification of Germany . . . the vital effort to halt, and to slow down, the madness of the international arms race . . . the nurturing of scientific and technological innovation . . . the closing of the dangerous and widening gap between the rich nations and poor . . . and the creation and strengthening of international institutions for peace.

\* \* \*

Now, I would like to take a few moments with you to survey several matters which today concern both our allies and ourselves, and which I discussed at length with the leaders of Western Europe.

#### NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

As you know, I have devoted a good share of my public life to nuclear arms control and disarmament. We are now at a critical point in our efforts in those areas—a point at which fearful weapons of destruction can be developed by a dozen to 20 countries, or at which this dangerous race may be slowed down and, hopefully, halted. We have made it a matter of high national priority to conclude a non-nuclear proliferation treaty. But, if it is to be a lasting and effective treaty, it must be one which protects the vital interests of all those who sign it.

While in Western Europe, I discussed at some length the provisions and intent of the tentative draft treaty now under consideration. I found concern among some of our allies concerning both the treaty's provisions and intent—concern, I might add, often based on misapprehension or misunderstanding.

This treaty would not impede peaceful development of civilian nuclear technology. It would not deny any future unified Europe the means of its own nuclear defense. It would not lay Western European nations open to industrial espionage. It *would* contribute to a more stabilized and healthy international environment—an environment in which each nation would not have to fear some future nuclear blackmail by its neighbor.

I believe that, in a short time, our partners will join with us in agreed language of a draft treaty. We can then sit down with the Soviet Union, in the framework of the 18-nation disarmament conference, to work toward an effective and lasting final document.

#### KENNEDY ROUND

The Kennedy Round trade negotiation is also entering its final and crucial stage. In all the European capitals, and with the EEC Commission, I stressed our full American commitment to a successful Kennedy Round in both the industrial and agricultural sectors. I stressed that we have far more than economics at stake in this negotiation—even as important as the economics of it are. I expressed my belief that, if the Kennedy Round were to fail, old forces of reaction and inwardness would be unleashed in our country with effects going far beyond international trade. I told our European partners that, if the Kennedy Round were to fail, we might see attacks following on our troop commitments overseas . . . on our economic assistance to developing countries . . . and on the whole array of constructive, internationalist policies which have helped build a safer and freer world since World War II.

European leaders, by the same token, said that they recognized the same forces within their own countries and that they too recognized the high political importance of a successful Kennedy Round.

In my detailed Kennedy Round discussions, I emphasized not only the need for access for American farm production in Europe, but also for food aid for the developing countries. There will be a good deal of hard bargaining in these next few days, but I believe that we *will* have a successful Kennedy Round, and, as a result, will be able to move forward to development of new trade policies which not only benefit

the industrialized countries but really get down to the enduring problems of the poor nations.

## NATO

I emphasized the President's belief that, if we wish NATO to continue as a viable instrument for peace and peaceful progress, the first priority for both ourselves and Western Europe must be to maintain its deterrent strength as insurance against disarray in the West and temptation in the East.

All the Atlantic nations—including our own—face budgetary or international payments problems. But now, as new opportunities are apparent in the East, it is more important than ever that we maintain both an effective military deterrent and our political cohesion. What we have gained so painfully in face of a common threat over the past generation, we cannot afford to lose at the moment when that threat may finally seem to lessen. And that will mean, for all of us, some measure of sacrifice—including financial sacrifice.

I restated the President's pledge that we were prepared to meet our full commitment to NATO, but that others must be willing to do the same. I found a positive response and an eagerness to give NATO new life—especially in the areas of nuclear planning and political consultation.

## EAST-WEST

A few weeks ago at Fulton, Missouri, I looked ahead to the time when the Iron Curtain might be replaced by an open door. I found our Western European partners just as eager as we are to pursue that objective. There is a deep desire in Western Europe for reconciliation with the East. I look upon this as positive, provided that we all move East together. (If you'll pardon what a friend of mine calls my Wild East analogy, we stand a far better chance of safely reaching our Eastern destination if our wagons are in line, and if we mount a reliable shotgun guard, than if the wagons set out separately, each in its own direction.)

I also found a belief in Western Europe—one not widely held even a few months ago—that our new peaceful engagement with the East might eventually lead, in the future sometime far ahead, to a peacefully reunited Germany and settlement in Central Europe.

## WESTERN EUROPEAN UNITY

Now, what about the shining new united Western Europe for which we held such hope only a few years ago? I found a new momentum toward that unity.

The British Government is clearly committed to Europe. British public opinion is clearly favorable. And five of the six Common Market partners are clearly ready to support a forthright British initiative. British entry into the Common Market—and entry for the EFTA partners and other European nations—will not take place tomorrow. But, for the first time in a long time, there was a feeling that it *will* happen. European unity is moving again.

For our part, we welcome this new momentum. But I made it equally clear that we regard construction of Western European unity

as a business for European nations. I can think of nothing which could deter this great enterprise more effectively than to be stamped "Made in America."

## MONETARY REFORM

There was another major subject discussed during my trip: international monetary policy. I am convinced that this is a subject understood by no one, including the experts. Therefore, I will not spend any time today trying to convince you of the merits of one or another plan of reform. Most of you associate me too greatly with reform as it is. However, I will make clear that, in international monetary policy, we are the ones who are *for* reform, and I found that most of our partners are, too.

I think we are making some progress and that, at the Rio Conference in September, we may finally be able to begin to break the log jam on international liquidity with resulting opportunities for growth for both the industrialized and developing nations.

## VIETNAM

Finally—and I am sure you thought I would end this speech without mentioning it—I will say a word about Vietnam. Contrary to one or two news reports, I did not embark on any Vietnam sales mission. But where others raised the question of Vietnam, I outlined our country's policies and objectives.

I think it should be understood that the overwhelming majority of national leaders with whom I spoke understand our presence and objectives in Vietnam. If we have problems in Europe concerning Vietnam, they are problems involving some segments of public opinion. But I emphasize that they are *not* problems with the people who make decisions and policies on behalf of their governments. It was not lost on any European national leader that, in Vietnam, we are keeping a commitment. But that is another speech, and I will not give it here.

\* \* \*

Twenty years ago, Western Europe lay in ruin—helpless and prostrate at the end of a long and terrible night. How many in this room believed then that today we would be able to talk about the end of the postwar period and, eventually, the end of the Iron Curtain? Yet, we are able to do just that.

If we enter the last third of this century weak, disunited and uncertain . . . with little or no faith in ourselves or anyone else . . . and with each nation going its separate way . . . then this will be the *last* century for the cause of freedom and self-determination. But if we maintain in the years ahead the cohesion, the vision, and the common purpose which we have sustained since World War II, I have no doubt that the remainder of this century can bring even greater results than those of the past 20 years. If we have come this far while our European partners have only begun to regain their strength, how far can we go when the Atlantic world stands prosperous and free as never before?

\* \* \*

Now we stand at the threshold of a new age—an age in which all of us along the Atlantic basin . . . all of us who share a common heritage

and common values—will be able to work together toward man's final liberation around the world. Now we can have the chance to make into living reality the words of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in his Inaugural Address thirty years ago:

The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abundance of those who have too much; it is whether we provide enough for those who have too little.

Now we of the Atlantic family must lift our sights to the world beyond that has lain silent and in poverty for far too long. Let the course ahead be clear. We shall not achieve great goals with limited investments. We shall not achieve mighty purposes with petty actions. We will not find our way guided by small dreams.

There is a long road ahead which will test our character and our fiber. Only one week ago in Punta del Este, Uruguay, President Johnson set forth the task that lies ahead for us as Americans.

We no longer inhabit a new world. We cannot escape from our problems, as the first Americans could, in the vastness of an uncharted hemisphere. If we are to grow and prosper, we must face the problems of our maturity. And we must do it boldly, wisely—and now \* \* \*

The time is now. The responsibility is ours. Let us declare the next ten years the Decade of Urgency. Let us match our resolve and our resources to the common tasks until the dream of a new America is accomplished in the lives of all our people.

President Johnson set forth our vision of a free and peaceful hemisphere. In partnership with the nations of the Atlantic, that vision can and will be extended to a free and peaceful world.

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[The Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington, D.C., May 1967]

### POLICY STATEMENT OF THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE U.S.

**Council Officers: Livingston T. Merchant (Chairman); Lauris Norstad and Dean Acheson (Vice Chairmen)**

The Atlantic Council of the United States was founded in the conviction that the nations of the Atlantic area form a community with a common heritage, dependent upon each other in the future as in the past for their freedom and well-being.

We are free societies, determined to defend our freedom. All of our institutions are based on the dignity of the individual, on our respect for law and on our conviction that the human spirit is nurtured and can flower only in freedom and diversity.

In the past, free societies have responded collectively to aggression only belatedly and at great cost. In the nuclear age the cost of such delay would be utterly prohibitive. Security depends upon the maintenance of sufficient collective strength and unity in peacetime to prevent aggression and in the pursuit of far-sighted policies designed to eradicate the desire for aggression.

We of the Atlantic Community should have long since learned that political, military and economic arrangements suitable for the 18th and 19th centuries must be modernized to meet the needs of the 20th and 21st centuries not merely for survival but for the positive development of peace and prosperity.

Neither present factors such as the Vietnam war or the present attitude of the French Government toward NATO, nor future ones such as the emergence of China as a growing threat or the increasing pressures of population in underdeveloped areas upon the world's resources can be allowed to obscure the imperatives of progressive unity within the Atlantic Community. Progress may come slowly and from unpredictable directions. But surely science, technology and the economies of scale are greatly and rapidly changing the face of individual nations and the relations of those of us in the Atlantic Community to each other, to those who would harm us and to those of the developing world. All these changes insistently demand the adaptation of old institutions or the creation of new ones.

The Atlantic Council supports certain specific steps to improve our collective capability to manage our problems in order to avoid being mired in them through continued, unquestioning acceptance of concepts which have seen their day.

In particular the Council advocates greater use of the NATO and OECD machinery to harmonize policies and concert action on matters of common concern. It believes that United States leadership and evidence of willingness to participate fully in this process is an essential ingredient if we are to achieve results.

We support an intensified process of consultation in the North Atlantic Council on potentially dangerous situations to provide timely opportunity for member governments to consider issues and put forward their proposals at the earliest possible stages. We urge that the Council in Permanent Session continue to seek harmonization of our respective external policies.

We welcome the creation of the NATO Nuclear Defense Committee as a step toward promoting joint strategic planning for those members of the Alliance prepared to share its military responsibilities.

The Council strongly hopes that the progress toward agreement already achieved by experts of the Group of Ten on means of strengthening the international monetary system will be promptly advanced to intergovernmental agreement in the overriding common interest.

The Council favors increasingly free trade for the Atlantic area and eventually the entire free world, with first priority accorded to seeking the maximum achievement possible in the Kennedy Round. The Council also urges strengthening the OECD in all practicable ways and putting it to greater use.

The Council recommends a larger, more effective and better integrated contribution by the industrially advanced members of the Atlantic Community to meet the needs and hopes of the developing nations. To achieve the latter, the Council believes that self-help, increased attention to food production and population control are essential elements.

The Council will support all effective measures to improve conditions for international investment and multi-national business operations within the growing Atlantic Business Community and, insofar

as it is within the capability of the Community, within the developing countries as well, in order to promote the economic well-being, the political stability and the freedom of all.

The Council favors the growth of economic and political unity within an expanding European Economic Community in ways which will strengthen rather than weaken the roots of unity between all members of the Atlantic Community. The Council likewise supports continuing efforts to improve economic and cultural relations with the countries of central and eastern Europe within the obvious limits of the security of the Atlantic Community itself.

The Council endorses increased cooperation—in industry and between governments—within the Community in scientific research and in technological development.

The Council favors substantially increasing the exchange of students, teachers, scholars and those engaged in research in order to revitalize the scholarly traditions of our Community. The Council supports a greater flow of information and educational materials and increased artistic and cultural interchanges among all the Atlantic countries. The Council believes that youth and adults alike should be taught the fundamental facts of the common history of our countries which compose the Atlantic Community, stressing contemporary ties and their enormous potential for solving common problems.

In the parliamentary field, the Council supports formal establishment of a North Atlantic Assembly by representatives of the several Parliaments. It expresses the hope that its meetings and discussions will lead to compatible legislation within our several countries designed to stimulate the interchange of goods, capital and technology and otherwise to contribute to a growing sense of unity.

The foregoing policies are generally accepted and actions to ensure their execution are in train. There are other far-reaching areas of our community life, however, which should be seriously studied by governments and private organizations on both sides of the Atlantic. Among these are the feasibility of an Atlantic free trade area, with both its initial and its ultimate membership left for negotiation. Others include:

The freer movement of capital, ideas and people as well as goods;  
Common satellite communications systems for civil as well as military use;

The relationship of greater European unity to greater Atlantic unity;  
The problems which the size and power of the United States in relation to other members of the Atlantic Community pose for greater unity, and means of solving those problems; and

The modernization of existing institutions, or the establishment of new institutions, adequate to meet the political, military and economic challenges of this era. In this connection the Atlantic Council notes with approval the appointment of a study committee by the NATO Council as a result of the Belgian initiative which may become the equivalent of the Special Governmental Commission, recommended by the Atlantic Convention of NATO Nations on January 19, 1962. The Atlantic Council has previously endorsed this recommendation and regards this action on the part of the NATO Governments as a matter of urgency.

Looking toward the future, the Atlantic Council of the United States dedicates itself to the constant search for ways and means to

create the common institutions needed to cement that growing unity. Our purpose is not merely to assure our survival but to demonstrate anew to all men everywhere the achievements of which free men are capable when united in hope and confidence.

Our end goal is the establishment of unified free political institutions to enable the Atlantic Community to deal adequately with the problems of today—problems with which no existing nation-state can cope successfully alone.

Before his death, Christian A. Herter, former Secretary of State and first Chairman of the Atlantic Council, described in one of his last public statements the logical implications of the fact that though now we all belong to separate nations, we are in truth a single community. Mr. Herter said:

I am convinced that in the long-run neither military alliances nor customs unions will survive without the cement of political institutions. This does not necessarily mean the exact type of union which we created here in the United States. It may well be something new. It must be realistically based upon the needs of today's and tomorrow's world and, I believe, it will have to be based upon some form of federal principles. The ties may be looser and more flexible as between different nations. The roots of unity may have to grow slowly and deeply before the tree grows to full height, but we must never lose sight of our objective or tire in our pursuit of it.



REMARKS

VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT HUMPHREY

AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS

WASHINGTON, D. C.

APRIL 21, 1967

Pres. Nixon

V.P. Michael Ogden  
automatically becomes President - kept up!

As a Minister -  
in my field -  
but today all  
men will be  
Europe!

Several days ago I returned from a mission which involved discussion with European ministers and chiefs of state, and with officers of several international organizations, covering all the problems and issues which jointly concern the United States and Western Europe.

I thought I might share with you today some tentative observations about where we stand in relation to our Western European partners, and some thoughts about where we are, and should be, headed.

"One world"  
worldwide

observations

(X)

The first and overwhelming conclusion which I bring home is this: We are entering a new period in our relations with the peoples of Europe.

- There is a new Europe -
- Strong, vital, modern, prosperous -
- Europe of ashes & rubble - gone!
- Europe that has learned.

↳ The postwar period is ended. The reconstruction of Western Europe has been consummated -- far earlier than any of us would have dared to hope only 20 years ago.

↳ And, lest we lose sight of it, we stand in the position of seeing our policies not only vindicated, but a concrete success! And since it doesn't happen every day, we ought to enjoy it while we have the chance.

↳ But with the end of the postwar era, both we and our Western European allies face the necessity of adopting a new outlook and new habits of thought and action. This will not be easy, or always pleasant, to do.

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↳ During the past 20 years, Western Europeans have thought of us as their benefactor, their protector, and all too often, their demanding senior partner!

↳ We, in turn, have thought of the Western European nations as friends and allies, but all too often as compliant junior partners.



In my view, this course would lead to the rapid disaffection of our allies and, ultimately, to the isolation of our country among its partners.

The other course -- the course we will and must continue to pursue -- is to welcome this increasing spirit of "European" nationalism for what it is: The natural consequence of our postwar policies and of Western Europe's heroic efforts toward self-renewal.

I believe we must capitalize on this spirit. If our European partners wish to play a greater and more important role in the world, so much the better. But we should not be surprised if that role sometimes turns out to be a more independent one.

No self-respecting nation, or group of nations, wishes to remain forever in a subsidiary position, or for that matter to be reminded of past favors done!

*Europe nationalism*

*Capitalize on this!  
Independent*

✓

Therefore, on my mission, I made it clear that we welcome Western Europe's new spirit. The task now is not to tacitly resist it, but to work with our friends to channel it constructively and outwardly.

*can  
consultation*

On our part, ~~as erstwhile senior partners~~, this will require increasing self-discipline, and the necessity for far greater and deeper consultation ~~than we have~~ undertaken with our partners thus far.

*with our Partners*

*European*

h On the European side, this will require a greater sense of international responsibility and far-sightedness and less preoccupation with problems which are within European borders alone.

h If both we and our European partners can adjust to this new era -- and I believe we can -- we have the chance to build upon our progress of the past 20 years and to move beyond the reconstructive tasks of the postwar period into new areas of wider opportunity:

I mean, the healing of the old wounds and divisions in  
Europe ... the peaceful reunification of Germany ... the vital  
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arms race ... the ~~nurturing~~ <sup>closing</sup> of scientific and technological ~~innovation~~ <sup>gap-</sup>  
innovation ... the closing of the dangerous and widening  
gap between the rich nations and poor ... and the creation  
and strengthening of international institutions for peace.

\* \* \*

Now, I would like to take a few moments with you to survey several matters which today concern both our allies and ourselves, and which I discussed at length with the leaders of Western Europe.

### Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

As you know, I have devoted a good share of my public life to nuclear arms control and disarmament. We are now at a critical point in our efforts in those areas -- a point at which fearful weapons of destruction can be developed by a dozen to 20 countries, or at which this dangerous race may be slowed and, hopefully, halted. !

↳ We have made it a matter of high national priority to conclude a non-nuclear proliferation treaty.

But, if it is to be a lasting and effective treaty, it must be one which protects the vital interests of all those who sign it.

~~While in Western Europe, I discussed at some length the provisions and intent of the tentative draft treaty now under consideration.~~ *In Europe* I found concern among some of our allies concerning both the treaty's provisions and intent -- concern, I might add, often based on misapprehension or misunderstanding.

This treaty would not impede peaceful development of civilian nuclear technology. It would not deny any future unified Europe the means of its own nuclear defense. It would not lay Western European nations open to industrial espionage.

*But* It would contribute to a more stabilized and healthy international environment -- an environment in which each nation would not have to fear some future nuclear blackmail by its neighbor.

*and I predict* ~~believes~~ that, in a short time, our partners will join with us in agreed language of a draft treaty.

We can then sit down with the Soviet Union, in the framework of the 18-nation disarmament conference, to work toward an effective and lasting final document.

### Kennedy Round

↳ The Kennedy Round trade negotiation is also entering its final and crucial stage.

↳ In all the European capitals, and with the EEC *Committee* Commission, I stressed our full American commitment to a successful Kennedy Round in both the industrial and agricultural sectors.

↳ I stressed that we have far more than economics at stake in this negotiation -- even as important as the economics of it are.

I expressed my belief that, if the Kennedy Round were to fail, old forces of reaction and inwardness would be unleashed in our country with effects going far beyond international trade.

*! new escalation!*

I told our European partners that, if the Kennedy Round were to fail, we might see attacks following on our troop commitments overseas ... on our economic assistance to developing countries ... and on the whole array of constructive, internationalist policies which have helped build a safer and freer world since World War II.

European leaders, by the same token, said that they recognized the same forces within their own countries and that they too recognized the high political importance of a successful Kennedy Round.

~~In my detailed Kennedy Round discussions, I~~  
emphasized not only the need for access for American farm production in Europe, but also for food aid for the developing countries. — *Europe must help feed the hungry*

There will be a good deal of hard bargaining in these next few days, but I believe that we will have a successful Kennedy Round, and, as a result, will be able to move forward

*Success*

to development of new trade policies which not only benefit the industrialized countries but really get down to the enduring problems of the poor nations.

NATO

~~I emphasized the President's belief that, if we~~

*If we* wish NATO to continue as a viable instrument for peace and peaceful progress, *T* the first priority for both ourselves and Western Europe must be to maintain its deterrent strength as insurance against disarray in the West and temptation in the East.

*L* All the Atlantic nations -- including our own -- face budgetary or international payments problems.

But now, as new opportunities are apparent in our relations

*With the Soviet Bloc,*

~~East,~~ it is more important than ever that we maintain both an effective military deterrent and our political unity.

↳ What we have gained so painfully in face of a common threat over the past generation, we cannot afford to lose at the moment when that threat may finally seem to lessen.

↳ And that will mean, for all of us, some measure of sacrifice -- including financial sacrifice.

↳ I restated the President's pledge that we were prepared to meet our full commitment to NATO, but that others must be willing to do the same. I found a positive response and an eagerness to give NATO new life -- especially in the areas of nuclear planning and political consultation.

#### East-West

↳ A few weeks ago at Fulton, Missouri, I looked ahead to the time when the Iron Curtain might be replaced by an open door. I found our Western European partners just as eager as we are to pursue that objective.

↳ There is a deep desire in Western Europe for reconciliation with the East.

*This attitude is constructive*

I look upon this as positive, provided that we all

move ~~out~~ together *in concert*

(If you'll pardon what a friend of mine calls my Wild East analogy, we stand a far better chance of safely reaching our Eastern destination if our wagons are in line, and if we mount a reliable shotgun guard, than if the wagons set out separately, each in its own direction.)

I also found a belief in Western Europe -- one not widely held even a few months ago -- that our new peaceful engagement with the East might eventually lead, in the future sometime far ahead, to a peacefully reunited Germany and settlement in Central Europe.

*East + Peaceful Engage*

*(X)*

Western European Unity

Unity.

Now, what about the shining new united Western Europe for which we held such hope only a few years ago?

↳ I found a new momentum toward that unity. !

↳ The British Government is clearly committed to Europe. British public opinion is clearly favorable. And five of the six Common Market partners are clearly ready to support a forthright British initiative *to join the Common Mkt.*

↳ British entry into the Common Market -- and entry for the EFTA partners and other European nations -- will not take place tomorrow. But, for the first time in a long time, there was a feeling that it will happen. European unity is moving again!

↳ For our part, we welcome this new momentum, But, I made it equally clear that we regard construction of Western European unity as a business for European nations. I can think of nothing which could ~~derail~~ *derail*

*this* great enterprise more effectively than to be stamped "Made in America."

MONETARY REFORM

There was another major subject discussed during my trip: international monetary policy.

L I am convinced that this is a subject understood by no one, including the experts. Therefore, I will not spend any time today trying to convince you of the merits of one or another plan of reform.

L Most of you associate me too greatly with reform as it is.

However, I will make clear that, in international monetary policy, we are the ones who are for reform! and I found that most of our partners are, too.

I think we are making some progress and that, at the Rio Conference in September, we may finally be able to <sup>begin to</sup> break the log jam on international liquidity with resulting opportunities for growth for both the industrialized and developing nations.

Finally -- and I am sure you thought I would end this speech without mentioning it -- I will say a word about Vietnam.

Contrary to one or two news reports, I did not embark on any Vietnam sales mission. But where others raised the question of Vietnam, I outlined our country's policies and objectives. Military, Pol, Economic & Dipl.

I think it should be understood that the overwhelming majority of national leaders with whom I spoke understand our presence and objectives in Vietnam.

~~If we have problems in Europe concerning Vietnam, they are problems involving some segments of public opinion. But I emphasize that they are not problems with the people who make decisions and policies on behalf of their governments.~~

It was not lost on any European national leader that, in Vietnam, we are keeping a commitment. But that is another speech, and I will not give it here.

Viet  
Viet

Integrity  
of  
the  
commitment

-17-  
Summary

↳ Twenty-years ago, Western Europe lay in ruin --  
helpless and prostrate at the end of long and terrible night.

How many in this room believed then that today we would be able to talk about the end of the postwar period and, eventually, the end of the Iron Curtain? Yet, we are able to do just that.

↳ If we enter the last third of this century weak, disunited and uncertain ... with little or no faith in ourselves or anyone else ... and with each nation going its separate way ... then this will be the last century for the cause of freedom and self-determination!

↳ But if we maintain in the years ahead the cohesion, the vision, and the common purpose which we have sustained since World War II, I have no doubt that the remainder of this century can bring even greater results than those of the past 20 years.

~~If we have come this far while our European partners have only begun to regain their strength, how far can we go when the Atlantic world stands prosperous and free as never before?~~

\* \* \*

L Now we stand at the threshold of a new age -- an age in which all of us along the Atlantic basin ... all of us who share a common heritage and common values will be able to work together toward man's final liberation around the world. *- Ager movement, Science Technology Ideas*

L Now we can have the chance to make into living reality the words of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in his Inaugural Address thirty years ago:

"The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abundance of those who have too much; it is whether we provide enough for those who have too little."

Now we of the Atlantic family must lift our sights to the world beyond that has lain silent and in poverty for far too long.

Let the course ahead be clear. We shall not achieve great goals with limited investments. We shall not achieve mighty purposes with petty actions. We will not find our way guided by small dreams.

There is a long road ahead which will test our character and our fiber.

Only one week ago in Punta del Este, Uruguay, President Johnson set forth the task that lies ahead for us as Americans.

"We no longer inhabit a new world. We cannot escape from our problems, as the first Americans could, in the vastness of an uncharted hemisphere. If we are to grow and prosper, we must face the problems of our maturity! And we must do it boldly, wisely -- and now ...

"The time is now. The responsibility is ours.

Let us declare the next ten years the Decade of Urgency.

Let us match our resolve and our resources to the common tasks until the dream of a new America is accomplished in the lives of all our people."

President Johnson set forth our vision of a free and peaceful hemisphere.

In partnership with the nations of the Atlantic, that vision can and will be extended to a free and peaceful world.

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**In the matter of:** AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS

FRIDAY LUNCHEON SESSION

**Place:** Washington, D. C.

**Date:** April 21, 1967

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JLD/jbj

## FRIDAY LUNCHEON SESSION

April 21, 1967

The Luncheon Session convened at one-thirty o'clock p.m., Mr. Michael J. Ogden, First Vice President, ASNE, presiding.

PRESIDENT NOTSON: May I have your attention, please.

Mr. Vice President, Mrs. Humphrey, Other Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen: In the interest of time, I think I will take a few minutes while dessert is being served to introduce our guests at the head table. Thereafter we will pause for a little while for you to finish your dessert and then we will ask the waiters to clear the room and our speaker will be presented.

First, I should like to present to you Mr. Cecil King, Publisher of the London Daily Mirror, who is to be one of our chief speakers this afternoon and who will be more adequately introduced at that time.

Mr. King.

(Mr. King rose; applause.)

This is a day of recognition to a group of men who have rendered important service to the Society all year long. I am proud of the work that these men have done.

JLD/jbj

They are the Committee Chairmen. May I present them to you.

First, the Chairman of the Membership Committee, Arthur C. Deck.

(Mr. Deck rose; applause.)

The Chairman of the Program Committee, Mr. Newbold Noyes.

(Mr. Noyes rose; applause.)

The Chairman of the Editorial Futures Committee, Mr. Norman E. Isaacs.

(Mr. Isaacs rose; applause.)

The Chairman of the Freedom of Information and Bar-Press Committee, Mr. J. Edward Murray.

(Mr. Murray rose; applause.)

The Chairman of the International Communication Committee, Mr. Vincent S. Jones.

(Mr. Jones rose; applause.)

The Chairman of the Committee for Education for Journalism, Mr. Sylvan Meyer.

(Mr. Meyer rose; applause.)

Our Press Chairman, Mr. Earl Richert.

Mr. Richert rose; applause.)

The Election Committee Chairman, Mr. William I.

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Ray, Jr.

(Mr. Ray rose; applause.)

Our Microphone Chairman, Mr. Mort Stern.

(Mr. Stern rose; applause.)

And the Aide to the President, Mr. Howard  
Cleavinger.

(Mr. Cleavinger rose; applause.)

These men are deserving of your gratitude and  
applause.

Now the polls for the election of new Directors  
will be closed promptly at two o'clock, irrespective of the  
ending of this luncheon.

The Elections Committee at that time will go  
promptly to G-608 to make the count. It will be necessary  
for them to go promptly at two o'clock. So, if you see  
them leaving the room a little before we conclude, you will  
understand why.

We hope to have the results and expect to have  
them before the conclusion of our afternoon session.

Now may you resume enjoying your dessert and we  
shall pause briefly until we are ready to hear the main  
speaker's statement.

(Dessert.)

1D/jbj

PRESIDENT NOTSON: May I have your attention, and I will ask the waiters now to clear the room.

It is now my pleasure to turn this meeting over to our First Vice President, Michael J. Ogden, who will preside.

Mr. Ogden.

(Applause.)

FIRST VICE PRESIDENT MICHAEL J. OGDEN: Ladies and Gentlemen: Last year, in Montreal, I had the honor of introducing to the members of this Society Defense Secretary McNamara. Because I happen to feel it is completely superfluous to introduce to newspaper editors speakers whose careers it is the job of these editors to know, I omitted the background and, instead, I introduced the Society to the speaker.

I can do no less today.

There cannot be a soul in this room unfamiliar with our speaker's rise from soda fountain to pharmacist to teacher to Mayor of Minneapolis to United States Senator to his present post. And, certainly, everyone knows he is happily married to Muriel, who is so photogenic that all of us, to a man, ran the picture of her taking a snapshot of him last month in Europe, and no one ran the picture she

JLD/jbj

took of him.

(Laughter.)

There is only one further personal note and it is, perhaps, more personal to me than to anyone else. It is that Mr. Humphrey is precisely three days, or 72 hours, younger than I am, and I find it very disconcerting to reach a point in life when you are older even than the Vice President of the United States.

(Laughter.)

As to our Society, Mr. Humphrey has been our guest before. Hence, he may even know that we are an anomalous organization unlike almost any other national professional body in any field. He may even have heard what I believe was originally Russ Wiggins' description of us: that if we were any more tightly organized the Justice Department would be after us; if we were any more loosely organized, we would fall apart.

Now, the obvious ploy in the Program Chairman's assignment of me to present Mr. Humphrey is that we are both Vice Presidents, even though his organization is somewhat larger.

(Laughter.)

I don't know how many in our audience could leap

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up and promptly identify George M. Dallas. But I'll bet Mr. Humphrey can, and so can I. He can also identify Daniel D. Thomkins, William A. Wheeler, Thomas A. Hundricks and Garret A. Hobart. And so can I.

I can, because I looked them up in the World Almanac. They're all predecessors of Mr. Humphrey, under Polk, Monroe, Hayes, Cleveland and McKinley. He can identify them because I am sure he must have wondered wistfully on occasion whether future generations would have to be looking him up in the World Almanac.

(Laughter.)

He can take some solace in the fact that whereas it is extremely difficult for a Vice President of our Society to get a word in, that is not Mr. Humphrey's problem.

(Laughter.)

When an ASNE Vice President becomes President, he is not permitted, by tradition, to say more than "Ladies and Gentlemen, this convention is adjourned". That is the full text of an ASNE President's inaugural address.

And when, in turn, it becomes time for him to give the gavel to his successor, he cannot do any more than say a few words about his successor.

J1D/jbj

So ASNE Vice Presidents, pent up with large thoughts they may want to deliver, have no rostrum to give them from. They know what it is to be wistful too.

Not only that, but we have a Second Vice President, and he is not permitted to say anything at all.

(Laughter.)

So, Mr. Humphrey, I envy you your opportunity to speak to this gathering. And, if I envy you, just think how deep must be the feelings of Vin Jones of Rochester, our Second Vice President.

(Laughter.)

Ladies and Gentlemen, the one and only -- The Vice President of the United States.

(Applause; attendance standing.)

THE HONORABLE HUBERT H. HUMPHREY (Vice President of the United States): Thank you very much, Mr. Vice President.

May I say that I would be willing to be quiet for four years, if I was as sure of my future as you are of yours.

(Laughter.)

I don't mean it's fixed. It just works that way.

(Laughter.)

JLD/jbj

Mr. Notson, I know now how President Johnson feels when he has a Vice President that gets out of hand.

(Laughter.)

I think I should say to those who were here last night that I did leave. It was the same chair that I was sitting in last night for the Women's National Press Club. I did get home. I didn't wait for you today. I knew you'd come here anyway.

(Laughter.)

And I want to thank Mr. Ogden for making me feel exceedingly happy and gay and young. I've always been worried about the generation gap and, after his introduction, I now know what they mean when they talk about it. It's good to be the young man on the team here.

(Laughter.)

J2D  
You speak about how loquacious Vice Presidents can be. Apparently you have never served in Vice President Johnson's Cabinet.

(Laughter.) (Applause.)

This is a backgrounder, I want you to know. Not a word I say is for attribution.

(Laughter.)

Can I welcome our distinguished friend from Great

J2D/jbj

Britain, the Publisher of the London Daily Mirror. He is here to get equal time.

I was in his great city of London not long ago and, after he saw my carryings on, he demanded the right to come over here and explain exactly what happened, and I want to say right now there's a credibility gap in London.

(Laughter.)

I have looked over your program -- by the way, I hadn't intended to say any of this. I had timed myself today. I thought I'd make this speech short but I gave that up right after the introduction.

(Laughter.)

I feel there is no reason that I should in any way upset your calculations. None of you planned on leaving on time anyway, except the Elections Committee.

(Laughter.)

I do think it was a rather subtle and nasty way of reminding me when I ought to quit, though --

(Laughter.)

-- when this says -- I looked on the program and right under my name it says: Polls close at 2.

(Laughter.)

This is what they say about those ministers,

JLD/jbj

there are no souls saved after the first 20 minutes.

(Laughter.)

I don't think some of you can be saved anyway and I'm just going to go ahead and do what I want to do.

(Laughter.) (Applause.)

I have been in a quandary as to what I might do here today. I sought the advice of several publishers and editors and correspondents and reporters, friends. Everybody has given me different advice. I want to thank them very, very much.

This is what keeps a man calm and rested and sure of himself.

(Laughter.)

So I decided to go ahead and make my own mistake.

(Laughter.)

And not attribute it to you at all.

I could give you what we call out home in Minnesota a smorgasbord address, which I frequently do. The trouble is, I sometimes don't get away from the hors d'oeuvres into the main portion of the meal. Today I thought I'd just keep my menu somewhat restricted.

I am going to talk to you about my observations on the very interesting, if not important and I hope it was

J2D/jbj

useful, mission and journey into Europe.

Wendell Willkie, I believe, was more than a great American. I think he was a great prophet. It was Wendell Willkie who said in 1940: This is one world, and it took a World War to prove it and all of the 20 years since that time to make it demonstrably clear that it is one world.

You cannot talk about any part of the world today or anything that is going on in this world without knowing that what you say and what you observe and what you see and what happens affects another part of the world. There is no such thing as compartmentalized thinking.

In a very real sense, a man in public life ought to be, as they say in medical terms, a general practitioner. He ought to have his experts on tap but never on top. They ought to be available to him and then, hopefully, he ought to be able to synchronize or harmonize or homogenize the information that he receives into the formulation of public policy.

So, if I stress today my observations on Europe, it is not because I am any less concerned about Latin America or Asia or Africa or, indeed, about Southeast Asia, because all of these areas are of prime concern to us.

It is only because this area of the world means

J2D/jbj

so much to us and it is so vital to each and every one of us.

If we can't understand what's going on in Europe, my fellow Americans, what makes you think you can understand what's going on any place else?

If we can't know what Europeans feel, say and do and how they react, since we are the children, the daughters and the sons of Europe, most of us at least, how can we hope to ever understand all the nuances, all of the intangibles, all of the many little things and great things that happen in the other continents?

So today I talk of Europe and give you a few of my observations.

I would like to just say in the beginning what it was a most enjoyable trip. I found out that you have to learn how to be able to duck and bow and weave and dodge and smile at the same time.

(Laughter.)

And hopefully not forget the purpose of your mission.

But I came back with some observations and I want to give them to you.

The overwhelming conclusion that I came back with

J2D/jbj

was that there is a new Europe, my fellow Americans. I have often thought, if a man of my age could only get what Europe has apparently found, the recovery of youth, to really find a whole new life, because the Europe that stood in ashes and rubble 20 years ago is gone and a Europe that is vital and young and spirited and vigorous and strong and glowingly independent is here and, for Americans, I think this is good to remember.

Europe has been reborn. The post-war period is ended. The reconstruction of Western Europe has been consummated and I think earlier than any of us ever dreamed.

I've been there a half a dozen times and the Europe that I saw in 1967 was not the one that Mrs. Humphrey and I saw in 1961 or even 1963. Its attitudes were different, its whole posture was different and yet it was on balance a constructive, optimistic and reassuring Europe.

Lest we forget it, because there are so many things that we like to know that are wrong, I think we can say that what has happened in Europe today is the indication of policies that were conceived and carried out. In other words, it's a concrete success for us.

But, with the end of this post-war era, and an era has ended, a generation of work has been completed,

J2D/jbj

there is a different Europe. I think that we need to, therefore, recognize the importance of adopting a new outlook and some new habits of both thought and action.

Now, this isn't going to be easy. Nobody likes to do that. We like to stay in the old familiar paths, and what was that old familiar path for Americans? What was it for you as you wrote in those editorial columns of yours and as you looked at the copy that came across your desk? It was a Europe that was dependent on America. We were their benefactor, their protector. It is the Europe of the Marshall Plan, 20 years now, by the way, since its inception, and we were the demanding and yet, in a sense, the all-commanding senior partner.

And we expected all too often our European friends to be junior partners. Now there is a new relationship and I think we need to recognize it; otherwise, we are going to make some grievous errors.

We must recognize that there's a new spirit, and I sensed it the first time I talked to a European, and I am not saying the first time I talked to a Swiss or a German or an Englishman or a Dutchman or an Italian; I said, the first time I talked to a European I sensed it, and it is called European Nationalism, a nationalism that expresses

J2D/jbj  
itself as a pride both in Europe and in the individual European nation states.

This is a new thing that has happened, the Europe that has grown, the Europe that is bigger, the Europe that is stronger.

Now, the question I think we have to ask our European friends, and some of them are here with us today, is: Where will this nationalism lead? Because nationalism can provoke many problems or it can be a very powerful force for good.

J3D  
Will it lead Europe to an inward Europe, a kind of an old American isolationism that has been applied to a new Europe?

Or will it lead Europe to an outward movement, reaching out to world-wide responsibilities and world-wide cooperations?

I don't think we know yet, even though I must say that I was of the opinion that the hour of decision is there now.

Ten years after the Treaty of Rome, the European Common Market, 20 years after the Marshall Plan, 22 years after the end of World War II Europe is deciding its future, this hour, this month, between now, may I say, and

J3D  
~~JED~~/Jbj

the coming end of this year.

I think the answer also depends on how we conduct ourselves. Now, if we look upon this European nationalism as opposed to our interests, we can expect some trouble. This could, of course, lead to disaffection amongst our allies. It could leave us isolated.

Or, we can take that other choice, which I hope we will, and that is to welcome this increasing European pride and independence and strength and vitality, this new spirit of European nationalism.

I think we ought to capitalize on it. If our European partners wish to play a greater role and a more important role in the world, let's open the door and say, Come in.

But we shouldn't be surprised at times if they want to walk alone or if they have a different point of view or if they want to be a little independent. No self-respecting person or nation, or group of nations wishes to remain forever in a subsidiary position, as a matter of fact to be reminded of favors done in the past. They just can't do it.

My fellow Americans, remember how big we are and remember how almost overwhelming we seem and how much we

JED/jbj

could be domineering, if we let it be.

The total gross national product of all of Europe, outside of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc, of EFTA, this outer seven and the inner six was under \$500 billion last year.

The total gross national product of the United States alone was \$750 billion. Our great giant corporations almost overwhelm nations and, therefore, the job of self-discipline, the job of modesty, of humility, the job of Americans walking, if you please, as equals and not as domineering bosses, that job is going to be a difficult one for us but an absolute essential one.

We must consult, we must work together and we must consult in depth and in greater degree than ever before.

But then, may I be frank with our European friends, it is going to require that they have a sense of consultation too and not go it alone, a sense of international responsibility and farsightedness, and not quite so much preoccupation with problems and opportunities solely within their own borders.

But, I would be less than honest with these fine men who are responsible for the information of the American

J3D/jbj

people, if I didn't tell you that the temptation in Europe to just develop what it has, because they have found out how great it can be, is there.

The temptation comes because they have lost their colonies, their empires, and now they see this market that can be a great source of wealth and power and independence. And I submit to you that an isolationism could grow, unless we exemplify qualities of understanding, of leadership and statesmanship from this side of the partnership that will have us walk together, walk together down the same road pursuing the same course.

I happen to think that we are looking forward to the next 20 years with great reason for optimism, if we will but put ourselves to the task, and I mean that we can heal the old wounds and divisions in Europe. It can be done.

Look what has happened in 20 years. Many of you visited Europe many times these last 20 years. Not a one of you, if you will be candid with yourself, could have dreamed that Europe today would be what it is in light of what you knew it to be in 1950, 1945, 1947, in those days of unbelievable distress, panic, poverty and rubble and ashes.

So we can heal the old wounds. I believe this,

J3D/jbj

and we must. We can see the peaceful reunification of Germany, the vital effort to halt and slow down this madness that grips mankind, the arms race, the greatest waste of human resources that the world has ever known, and we can close, if there is, and I believe there is a technological gap.

And we can help create new technology and science together. We can close this dangerous gap that is the all-embracing threat to world peace, the gap between the rich and the poor nations, one that widens every day.

And I think we can create or aid in the strengthening of the creation of institutions of law and order and peace.

Now let me just cite then very quickly, and I know that the time runs out, some of the things that I have worked on as your representative. After all, you are entitled to a report. Mrs. Humphrey and I lived well on this trip and I think that as taxpayers you ought to get a full report. However, I'll send that to you in written form. I want to just glance over quickly what we tried to do.

I have devoted a great share of my public life to the whole subject of nuclear arms control and disarmament,

J3D/jbj

not naively, not unilaterally but controlled, multilateral, balanced arms control and disarmament, and I think it's one of the most vital topics before the statesmen of the world.

We are now at a very critical point in these efforts, a point where we could see the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the next five years into 20 nations, and that would mean 20 more fingers on the nuclear trigger.

It's dangerous enough now, my dear friends, with the nations that presently have those nuclear weapons. So we have made it a matter of high national priority to engage the Soviets and others in consummating a treaty for the non-proliferation of these weapons, to prevent their spread.

Why? So you can live. So that the children that are in your home, as they take over duties in this nation and elsewhere, will not have to face the possibility and, indeed, almost the certainty of a nuclear holocaust.

But, if we are going to have a lasting and effective treaty, it must be one that protects all of the interests of all of the signers and, my fellow Americans, we must never think that we have all the answers. I served in Congress long enough to know that good questioning by sincere people improves the product. The Executive Branches

J3D/JbJ

of Government have a hard time believing that but 16 years I sat there as a Senator, ten years as a Subcommittee Chairman, and I believe that much of the good legislation that comes out of this Government comes because of the refinement processes of Congress, not simply because of the great brilliance of the executives and executive departments.

It takes the amalgam, and that's what we're finding now in Europe. They are asking us questions.

I found concern in Europe about the non-proliferation treaty, often based on misunderstanding and misapprehensions. I spent my time trying to clear away that misunderstanding and misapprehension.

Having given at least 15 years of my life to this work, I think this treaty will be a milestone in peace, if we can consummate it. It will not impede peaceful development of nuclear energy for civilian purposes. It will not in any way deny adequate defense to the nations of Europe.

4D

It will, indeed, even permit Europe, if it is united, to have its own means of nuclear defense and it will not lay Western Europe open to industrial espionage.

In other words, I happen to think that, if we can get agreed-upon language, which I predict we will, you will be a happier people and we will have made our contribution

4D/jbj  
in our time to see that the Twentieth Century does not end in flames.

Now, there is another topic, the Kennedy Round. The Kennedy Round trade negotiation. Why is it called that? Because our late, beloved President initiated these negotiations and they are being carried out now under the President of the United States, President Johnson and his representatives.

What's it all about? It's merely the lowering of trade barriers, the opening up of markets. And I went, as your representative, to stress to the Common Market countries and others the imperative importance of the Kennedy Round.

Why? Not only for trade and commerce but, as I said to them, the politics involved is so important that if this trade negotiation fails the most conservative and reactionary influences in many countries will be on the ascendency, that it could very well alter all of our policies.

Those who have opposed aid in our troop commitment to Europe, those who have opposed our building international institutions that can make this a more secure world, they will have their day. So I literally pleaded

4D/jbj

with our friends in Europe to stop these old forces of reaction and inwardness by consummating this treaty not only as an economic achievement but also as a way of releasing a whole array of constructive internationalist policies for the years to come, to build on what we have done since World War II.

I also stressed, and may I quickly note it, that Europe now is at a point where it must help others even more than it has. America cannot police the world alone, nor should it. Let me make it quite clear.

I believe that America's reputation ought not to be as a world policeman but as a world teacher, as the world healer, as one of conciliation and reconciliation and not one of destruction and battling all of the time, even though at times we have to do that.

But let it be our commitment, let it be our commitment to expand the frontiers of opportunity. Let it be our commitment to build international institutions of understanding.

Europe needs to help feed the hungry. We can do it no longer alone and, even if we could, we shouldn't do it alone because all of the more fortunate peoples in the world have an obligation in this.

4D/jbj

So we argued hard and worked for what we call the principle of food aid, food aid for the world's hungry in the Kennedy Round negotiations.

Now a quick work about NATO, because that was another topic that I discussed.

If we wish NATO to continue as a viable instrument for peace and peaceful purposes, then we have to keep it alive, and it is living. With all of its troubles, it has new strength.

Like many other things, you never realize what you have until somebody disrupts it or challenges it, and NATO today is being revitalized. There is a new spirit of commitment.

The Atlantic nations are working together. The first priority for ourselves and Western Europe must be to maintain its deterrent strength as insurance against disarray in the West and temptation in the East.

I think it would be a terrible blow to the cause of world peace to leave the thought in the minds of those who have used force as a means of obtaining political objectives that NATO was weak. It would be too tempting to try something only to find out that it would end up in war.

So we have new opportunities now. They are

4D/jbj

opportunities that are apparent in our relationships with the Soviet Bloc.

Because there are new opportunities, it is more important than ever that we work as a team, as a partnership, and not go it on our own. The strength of freedom is in its unity.

Remember Ben Franklin was very right when he said: We either hang together or we hang separately. And in this business of NATO when I hear people say, Well, why do you need it, there seems to be a *détenté* with the Soviet Union, or it stands in the way of better relationships with the Soviet Union, to that I say, You are so wrong. The West must pursue policies in concert, common policies worked out. The Soviet Union will then know what it is working with and it will give some reasonable degree of balanced consultation and balanced negotiation.

All of this is going to take sacrifice, sometimes financial sacrifice, but I believe that it is worth it.

On East-West relations. I spoke at Fulton, Missouri, on the 21st anniversary of Winston Churchill's great "Iron Curtain" speech, the same platform, the same university. And I looked ahead on that occasion to the time when the Iron Curtain might be replaced by an Open

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Door.

I am often accused of being overly optimistic. Well, I like to be that way. There are people who specialize in being unhappy and there are those--and I don't like to intrude on their jurisdiction. I just don't do well in that area and it gives some balance in this city too for those that --

(Laughter.)

You're right.

(Laughter.)

But I found that our Western partners were eager to pursue this objective of that Open Door. They know it's not wide open but it is ajar, and there is a great desire in Western Europe for reconciliation with the East, and why not? They're Europeans. This veneer of communism that has been laid over all of Eastern Europe does not penetrate the total cultural pattern of hundreds of years of Europe.

We need to appeal to that autonomy, that sense of national pride, that sense of self-interest but yet we need to do it in a way that does not appear negative.

I think that if we work in concert with common policies that we can do much to open that door to the East and thereby through our new peaceful engagement with the

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East in the future some time looking ahead see a peacefully reunited Germany and a settlement in all of Central Europe.

We must have those as our hopes and our objectives.

Now, what about Western unity, Western European unity? Well, it's there. Make no mistake about it. There is a new -- there is an inevitable forward momentum of it.

The British Government is clearly committed to Europe now. British public opinion, in the main, is favorable to it. Six of the Common Market partners are ready and clearly ready to support a forthright British initiative to join the Common Market and British entry into that Market will mean the opening of the door for the other six of the EFTA group, the outer seven as they call them.

Now, this isn't going to take place quickly and, by the way, don't be in too big a hurry as we write the stories. The only thing that is instant is instant tea and instant coffee. I don't know anything else that's really instant. There is no instant success, no instant diplomacy, no instant peace.

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Peace is like a cathedral: It takes decades to build it and we build it block by block, stone by stone. Sometimes we are interrupted but we must have the dream of it, the master plan of it and we must work for it, and it

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is in the policy of the United States to encourage European unity, even though it means greater competition to us. We welcome this momentum.

But I want to make it equally clear on this platform that we regard the construction of Western European unity as the business of European nations. I can think of nothing which could derail this great enterprise more surely or more effectively than to have it stamped and labeled "Made in America". Hands off, my fellow Americans. Let Europe decide that part of its own future.

Now, you'd be surprised to note that even on this journey I talked of monetary reform. I said here a moment ago that the greatest compliment Mrs. Humphrey has ever paid me is when we moved into our new apartment. She asked me to sign a 30-year mortgage. I thought that was so interesting that she had such faith in me.

(Laughter.)

And all of this gave me a new insight into international monetary reform because we must look ahead. Now, I must say that this is a subject understood by few, if any, including the experts, and I didn't try to be an expert. But I did make it clear that we were for a modification of present international monetary policies, that we

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were for reform, that the blood lines, so to speak, of nations needed to be larger, that you cannot have the credit and monetary policies of a post-war Europe -- I mean, of a pre-war Europe and a pre-war world in this post-war world, that the Europe of today needs more capital.

It needs a greater means of capitalizing its great investments. So international liquidity was high on the agenda.

Now you wouldn't expect me to come to you, and I want to leave you with this thought, without mentioning, of course, an area of great concern to our own America and I trust to the whole world, and it is. I am not going to give you a speech on it today. I would like to come back another time. I have a couple of good ones in hand.

(Laughter.)

I was working over some of your members here the other night when we were together at one of the private residences in this city. I tried them out for a long time until all the wives were yawning and I said, That must be the signal that somebody is boring at this party. I knew it wasn't me but I got up and left.

(Laughter.)

I want to say a word about Vietnam. The reason

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I say it is twofold. Europeans are concerned lest we are too concerned and too involved, and yet, with equal candor, may I say that I think it should be understood that the overwhelming majority of European leaders with whom I spoke understood why we were there and the objectives that we pursued.

Of course there are rumbles of public opinion of disagreement here and there but men who are required to guide the destiny of nations should not be engaged in a popularity contest. They should be engaged in doing what they believe to be right, to the best of their ability to ascertain what is right.

So wherever I went I answered questions on Vietnam when asked. I did not embark on a sales mission. I didn't think that's what I ought to be doing.

What is more, I found that Europeans are pretty much like we are. They are concerned about their own problems mostly and they weren't quite as concerned about all of ours.

But I did speak of the military, the political and the economic developments and may I just put this caveat in right now, my fellow editors, because I'd like to be an editor too. It's one of my great, you know,

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subconscious desires. I may be one sooner than you think.

(Laughter.)

Not sooner than you think, sooner than I think, excuse me.

(Laughter.)

But what is transpiring<sup>in</sup>/Vietnam is not just a military struggle, as interesting and as exciting and sometimes as anguishing as that appears. What is happening there is not just destruction. It's construction, the building of a nation, nation-building, which is the work of this country.

Some day I want to tell you about that, the economic developments, the political developments.

Mr. Editor, don't you underestimate what it meant to have a constituent assembly, to write a constitution, to elect a constituent assembly, to have district elections, to have a national election this September, to have a parliamentary election.

Don't underestimate what this means in the ultimate purposes and objectives that we pursue.

It wasn't lost on any of my friends in Europe when I spoke to them about our presence in Europe, that we were there keeping a commitment, and I will sign off on

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Vietnam by saying this, that one of the real stabilizing forces in this world for peace is the integrity of the American commitment. The day we welsch on that, the day that we say something that we intend to do and not do it, it is on that day that the fabric of Western security starts to fall apart.

People do have to depend on our word. Europeans, with all of their independence and prosperity, know that they stand helpless unless the United States and Europe walk together in partnership with high priorities.

When I was in Berlin, let me tell you the people of Berlin, more than anyone else, understood the importance of our commitment, because, without our commitment to West Berlin, there is none. Without our commitment to the Western Alliance, there is no real alliance and the people in Europe more than Americans sometimes understand that.

20 years ago Europe lay in ruins. Today it stands strong and proud. If we enter the last third of this century weak, and we are in the last third, and anybody who is worthy of public trust either in publishing or politics ought to be thinking of Century 21, not the Twentieth Century.

Will we be here as a nation as we are in Century

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21? What kind of a world will it be?

If we are disunited and uncertain in this last third of the Twentieth Century, if we are without any faith in ourselves or anyone else, if we are filled with suspicion, doubt and uncertainty and weakness, if each nation goes its own way because it thinks that's the best way to do it, I then predict that this will be the last century for the cause that we hold dear, this last best hope on earth of freedom and self-determination.

But I also say with even more conviction that, if we maintain in the years ahead the cohesion and the vision and the common purpose which have sustained us since World War II, despite all of our minor disagreements, I have no doubt that the remainder of this century, this last third of the Twentieth Century can bring even greater results than we have ever known before.

We stand on the threshold of a whole new age and I love to think of it. I have little patience with those who say, Oh, what unbelievable problems we have today.

What I say to you is, What unbelievable opportunities we have today. Every problem is a challenge. Every difficulty is an opportunity. It just depends on what we do with it.

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This is the age of movement, of science, of technology, of innovation, creativity and it is the age of ideas, and the greatest idea is the unity of mankind. The greatest idea is the unity of mankind living in freedom, and it is the moving idea of the day.

Franklin Roosevelt once said that the test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abundance of those who have too much; it is whether we provide enough for those who have too little.

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That's still true because those who have too little in this world can destroy those who already have too much.

So let us be of kind heart and compassion and yet of clear purpose. The course ahead I think is pretty clear. We will not achieve great goals with limited investments and we'll not achieve mighty purposes with petty actions. We will not find our way gilded or guided by small dreams.

There is a long road ahead which will test our character and our fiber. The President spoke of the road ahead as those who believe in the strength and the endurance race. We are in the endurance race. I like what President Johnson said at Punta del Este:

We no longer inhabit a new world. We cannot

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escape from our problems, he said, as the first Americans could, in the vastness of an uncharted hemisphere. If we are to grow and to prosper, we must face the problems of our maturity.

My fellow Americans, we are a mature people. We have had to put away childish habits and childish thoughts.

Then he went on to say: We must face these problems boldly and wisely and now. We can't put it off. The time is now. The responsibility is ours. So let us declare the next ten years the Decade of Urgency. Let us match our resolve and our resources to the common tasks until the dream of a new America is accomplished in the lives of our people.

I think that is a vision of a free and peaceful hemisphere and because I believe this is one world I think that same vision of a free and peaceful hemisphere must be extended to the world. The world must know that we care and the world must know that we care enough to act and the world must know that those of us who have been privileged to be the inheritors of what we call the Western culture are sufficiently wise and understanding to know that we do not have it all, that we need everybody and that in partnership in the Atlantic we can make a great contribution to a

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free and peaceful world.

I want to thank you very much for giving us your guidance, your counsel, for ventilating the policies of this Government, for giving us not only a ventilation but, may I also say, an inspiration. Do so. This America is as much yours as mine.

No President has more responsibility than you and surely no Vice President has more to say about America than you. You have your job to do; I have mine. Let them not be separate jobs. Let them be jobs in partnership for our country and, above all, for the kind of a world we envision.

(Applause; attendance standing.)

FIRST VICE PRESIDENT OGDEN: Thank you very much, Mr. Vice President.

That ends this afternoon's session at lunchtime. We will meet again in 15 minutes for the afternoon session at which we will have Mr. Cecil King as our speaker and I advise you all to get there early and get front-row seats because I'm sure that seats will be at a premium.

This meeting is adjourned.

(The meeting adjourned at two-twenty-five o'clock p.m.)

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