



FOR RELEASE

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

REMARKS

VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT HUMPHREY

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE

NEW YORK, NEW YORK

MAY 23, 1968

Tonight I wish to share with you my thoughts about a fundamental aspect of our foreign policy -- our relationship with the continent of Europe.

Because of the war in Vietnam, it has been suggested -- and, by some, feared -- that American foreign policy has taken a permanent Asian detour, to the particular detriment of our long-standing and more familiar relationship with Europe.

As one who has participated in policy formulation during this period, I respond by saying this: Yes, America has awakened to Asia. There has been clear and present trouble there.

America has awakened, or is awakening, at the same time to Latin America and to Africa.

But this has not meant -- nor should it

mean in the future -- that America can afford to attach anything but the highest importance to its relationship across the Atlantic.

America has learned painfully that it is a Pacific power. But America is, and must remain, an Atlantic power.

For, in the calculation of problems and possibilities in this world, this is clear: It is still Europe and America which together have both the means and capacity to most directly and effectively influence -- for the better -- the world's future.

* * *

I will not recite tonight in detail all the joint achievements of these past two decades -- the story of Western Europe coming again to its feet ... of its movement toward economic and political unity ... of our joint resistance to Communist pressures from the East ... of our working together to bring new trade and economic growth to the world ... of our steadfast adherence, during times of trouble, to democratic institutions and the rights of man.

Rather, let us look to the future.

One year ago I went, as the President's

representative, to Western Europe with this basic message about the future:

We welcome your new strength, prosperity and unity.

Despite its occasional pain to ourselves, we welcome your new spirit of independence and of "Europeanism."

Let us now, working together in a spirit of greater equality, raise our sights beyond the Atlantic to the opportunities which lie at hand in the wider human society.

I was encouraged by the Western European response to that message. Yet I also came home with the knowledge that both Atlantic partners were in for a period of adjustment.

-- Adjustment by us, to the idea that Western Europe was finally approaching the capacity for becoming an equal partner and must be treated accordingly;

-- Adjustment by Western Europe to the realization that equal partnership brought with it not only the opportunity for new status and growth, but also the responsibility to meet wider challenges reaching far beyond the Atlantic basin.

Both of us have made some of that adjustment. But neither nearly enough.

If our Atlantic Partnership is to grow and prosper, it will inevitably mean not a smaller role for us, but a larger role for Western Europe. And that is as it should be.

An outward-looking Western Europe -- facing not only the Atlantic but the world at large -- can once again become a leading architect of human destiny.

And, as that happens, we can take not alarm but pride in the fact that -- a little more than 20 years later -- a Western Europe that was torn by hate and war has risen to play a large and peaceful role beside us on the world stage.

We are, then, rapidly approaching that time when, as Ambassador George Ball put it, Western Europe "knows the reality of roughly equivalent power."

* * *

I know your industry has a special and particular interest in seeing that our future relationship with this European partner is one based on fair play, close consultation, and a respect for the problems and interests of each partner -- as a good working partnership should be based.

That must surely be our goal.

The shape and organization of that equal Europe is, of course, up to Europeans.

Our hopes have never been disguised.

They have been -- as my previous remarks have implied -- that the common scientific, technological, economic and commercial institutions of the European Community might provide the foundation for common political institutions as well.

They have been that those present and possible future institutions might be open to all who would adhere to them, including Great Britain.

They have not been hopes, however -- and must not be in the future -- put forward across the Atlantic as a take-it-or-leave-it, "Made in USA" blueprint for Europeans to follow.

If those hopes are even partially realized, and I believe they will be, it will be largely because we did not press forward such specific blueprints.

It will be because our partners have been able to make their own decisions in their own time and way.

* * *

Until now, my remarks have dealt almost exclusively with our relationship with Western Europe.

But there is a wider Europe -- a Europe where

the forces of human emancipation are straining a diminishing Iron Curtain ... a Europe which compels now our full attention.

We must not miss the unmistakable signs of change in some of the nations of Eastern Europe.

Increasingly they are following their own national interests -- which are not always identical with those of the Soviet Union.

More and more the younger generation seeks to cast off the ideological shackles of the past -- and to participate in the establishment of a more democratic society.

The dialogue grows about the place of individual freedom in modern technical society, about labor's right to strike, about the role of opposition parties. And steadily, cautiously, the nations of Eastern and Western Europe are drawing together into one wider Europe.

That wider Europe is still divided.

Germany remains divided, despite the fact that German reunification is central to the long-term peace and stability of the world.

Twenty-three years later, there is no peace settlement of World War II.

Millions of men, and billions of dollars, are still being invested, East and West, in the longstanding aftermath of that war and of the immediate post-war period.

So let us speak now of peace and security in that Europe -- which is, of course, in the end result the peace and security of the United States.

Let us speak of European peace and security without illusion, but with the approach of hard-headed optimists who know it remains the work of many years.

For, if things seem easier in the East ... if the Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers no longer threatens missiles over the Parthenon, we nonetheless must know that his successors have far more power today than ever before to carry out such a threat, should they choose to do so.

NATO - the most enduring and successful defense alliance in history -- continues to be a necessity for Western Europe and ourselves.

NATO, for two decades, has contained aggressive power and deterred war.

But, over the long run, a policy of containment alone becomes obsolete -- either because it fails or because it becomes frozen in its pattern of success.

If it fails, there is war. If its pattern of success becomes inhibiting, it will constrain the forces of change and the chances for a new, more positive system of mutual security.

The time of change has come.

We must recognize that, largely due to the

success of our policies, we are in a new period. It can be a period in Europe -- if we maintain cohesion and solidarity in the West -- in which we can break through to peaceful engagement with the East.

The time has come for the NATO Alliance to look to that new, dynamic vision of peaceful engagement.

When I visited the NATO Council last year I called, on behalf of our government, for such a policy. Since that time, NATO ministers have actively explored the ways and means of making it work -- of transforming our Alliance from a defensive, military organization to an active, vital political, social and economic tool which may -- through peaceful engagement -- hasten the replacement of the Iron Curtain with an Open Door.

The imperative need is not to abandon NATO, or to abandon its functions of defense. It is to modernize, transform and redirect it toward the new priorities of a new era.

* * *

Now, to the problem of those millions of men and billions of dollars still being devoted to a rudimentary balance of security forces in Europe.

We cannot abandon a security system which has worked without having something better replace it.

It would be foolish indeed to buy time, as we have, for fundamental change to take place and then to precipitously cancel the whole investment at the first signs of that change.

There is nothing to recommend a one-sided retreat -- by ourselves or our allies -- from our responsibility to our own safety. Such action would destabilize a perilous equilibrium, de-rail a developing detente, resurrect old fears, and intensify lingering insecurities.

The diplomacy of the next decade must recognize that dramatic changes are taking place in all countries. New demands by people all over the world -- in the U. S. and USSR, in France and Czechoslovakia, in Britain and Poland, in Canada and Germany -- will inevitably require in the years ahead a careful re-examination by all governments and all leaders of the priorities of both domestic and international policies.

We would be blind to reality if we did not recognize that people everywhere are insisting on a greater allocation of their respective national resources to the building of freer and more modern societies.

For everyone -- the costs of defense and security forces -- whether paid for in Moscow or Washington -- are staggering and rising.

The time is coming when all nations and governments involved must take stock of new circumstances. Even a nation as wealthy as ours must constantly review its priorities.

Surely if this is true for us, it must be true for those with fewer resources.

The task of statesmanship in 1970 is to de-escalate the arms race -- and to move in common agreement toward a systematic scaling down of the mutually oppressive burden and cost of our vast military complexes.

This must be done in concert with allies -- and in negotiation with adversaries. But it must be done with American initiative -- as the political leader of the West.

There is a great deal now to recommend a mutual reduction of the armed forces and armaments facing each other in Europe.

We must -- as I indicated -- do this in cooperation with, and with the support of, our NATO allies.

We must also do our utmost to communicate to the leaders of the Soviet Union that we seek such reduction of forces and armaments as a tangible means of reduction

of tension -- in short, adding to their security as well as ours.

I do not see this as an impossibility.

I know from close personal experience what we were able to do with the Soviet Union in the case of the nuclear test ban treaty ... in the case of the treaty banning nuclear weapons from outer space ... in the case of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty now before the United Nations.

I would hope the Soviet Union -- and the other countries of Eastern Europe -- might find mutual self-interest in such a proposal (just as I hope it will in our pending offer to discuss the whole matter of offensive and defensive weapons systems.)

For it is the perception of mutual interest that is the starting point for agreement.

I repeat: A mutual thinning out of men and armaments in Europe, following close consultation with allies, would be no American-Soviet deal. It would involve and be to the benefit of the nations of both Eastern and Western Europe.

And this step might, in time, lead to other steps which could one day bring Europe together.

* * *

There is, too, the opportunity for what has been called "bridge-building" to the East through increasingly-accepted commercial, cultural, and educational means.

Contact has been increasing. And, where it has taken place, I believe it has been overwhelmingly to the good.

The old notion that East-West contact might

somehow contaminate our freedom has long since been disproved.

And members of the American business community have been among the first to disprove it.

It is in this area that we can do something tangible and immediate right now at home.

I believe we must give the President the discretionary authority to remove restrictions to trade and investment between the United States and Eastern Europe.

There are legal restrictions now pending this which, if they were valid in the past, now serve only to prevent Americans from helping to build new bridges East.

Some of the Eastern European countries are already members of GATT -- the world trading forum. Others are interested as well in the work of the OECD -- the organization of the developed nations which is concerned with economic and aid policy. This might eventually be followed by membership in other multilateral organizations involving both East and West.

And if these forward steps can be taken at a government level, I have no doubt that at a private level -- businessman to businessman; scientist to scientist; citizen to citizen -- the whole process of bringing peaceful and democratic change to Eastern Europe can be accelerated.

I also believe that the now-famous "technology gap" -- which is in fact first cousin to the "brain drain" and is now being described by Western Europeans as the "American Challenge" - should in fact be seen by us not just as an American-Western European problem, but as a further means of increasing peaceful engagement with the East.

By the technology gap or American Challenge, I mean of course the whole broad advantage we Americans have over the rest of the world in available human and material resources ... scale of industrial organization ... and capacity for scientific and technological expansion.

We, and our Western European partners, have awakened to the problem this gap brings to the action, or business organization, trying to compete with us.

Today this is seen by Western Europeans as one of both political and economic concern to them. They have no desire to be swallowed up by us -- nor should we wish it.

While, in the past decade, Europeans have made great progress in moving toward economic integration, this has not yet found full reflection in the organization of enterprise on the scale demanded by modern requirements.

Choices about future emphases -- about research and development budgets, educational innovations, the benefits of competition and consolidation, the potential growth of

continental sources of talent and capital -- these are clearly decisions for Europeans to make.

We should do everything possible to encourage them. Thus it is important that we maintain a continuous exchange of technological and organizational experience between Europe and the United States -- a flow which someday, we can hope, might include Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

I, for one, would welcome, too, the time when managers, technicians, researchers, agriculturists, and workers of many countries might stand side-by-side in a massive, coordinated, non-political effort in the under- and undeveloped nations of the world to bring the benefits of the technological age to people who still live on the dusty roads of previous centuries.

And I believe that such an effort, once offered or undertaken, should be open for participation to all nations -- including those of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

* * *

And this, finally brings me to the largest of all tasks which faces not only the Atlantic Partnership, but all who profess to membership in the family of man.

Pope John 23rd said it well in his encyclical
MATER ET MAGISTRA:

"... given the growing interdependence among the

peoples of the earth, it is not possible to preserve lasting peace if glaring economic and social inequality among them persist."

We, above all, who share the European heritage -- with all that it infers -- whose nations are today rich and fortunate, bear special obligation to those who live in glaring economic and social inequality.

I speak, of course, of our obligation to those nations which have yet to reap the benefits of a first -- far less a second -- technological and social revolution.

Our obligation to help the so-called "third world" is, of course, in our self-interest. It is not soft-headed, or even just soft-hearted, but an investment in the stability and peace of vast areas.

But it is, more importantly, a moral obligation -- the very obligation Pope John spoke of.

We have a moral obligation -- because of who we are ... of where we came from ... of the teachings our entire civilization represents -- to help all men lift themselves to the state of human freedom and dignity which is our own objective.

And as our fortunate nations have this responsibility to the less fortunate nations of this earth, so do we have this responsibility to less fortunate people within our own borders.

Only in this past quarter-century have nations, on a scale that means something, begun to truly accept this concept.

I count it a major victory for America that our own commitments to that concept since World War II -- commitments at home as well as in the world -- have led others to follow.

We cannot turn back now.

This, then, is the task of we the people who live along the Atlantic: To end the "civil wars" that have torn the European continent for generations ... to make that continent again one continent ... to reduce the causes of tension and conflict which divide men and to engage men together in the works of peace ... to work for the day, as Adlai Stevenson expressed it, "when men have learned to live as members of the same human family, to respect each other's differences, to heal each other's wounds, to promote each other's progress, and to benefit from each other's knowledge."

#

✓ No Seniority Clause

Thanks for the
encouragement
Just stopped by.

Union League -
(Andrew Jackson)

✓ Time for a Winner!!

✓ Non-Partisan Group

✓ When invited - you
A.V.P.

① never Program
Realized what you were setting

not campaign Committee
EDMUND F. MARTIN
Presiding

② Mr Blough - make the
meeting Co-educational!

Congrats to
Roger Blough
Address
by
THE HONORABLE HUBERT H. HUMPHREY
Vice President of the United States

(Gary Memorial
medal)

③ Your Program - Your Concerns.



Menu

BISQUE OF MAINE LOBSTER AU SHERRY
CROUTONS

*

HEARTS OF CELERY RIPE AND GREEN OLIVES

*

MOUSSE OF DOVER SOLE
NANTUA

*

SLICED FILET OF PRIME BEEF
SAUCE PERIGOURDINE
NEST OF BEIGNET POTATOES
BRAISED CELERY

*


SOUTHERN CROSS SALAD

*

BAKED SOUFFLE ALASKA
CHERRIES JUBILEE FLAMBE
PETITS FOURS

*

DEMI TASSE



Mr Roche
Mr Blough
Mr Patton
Mr Beighly

^{Ed}
Mr Martin

REMARKS

VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT HUMPHREY

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE-

NEW YORK, NEW YORK

MAY 23, 1968

Honored
Guests
from Europe
Asia
Africa
J. Amon

World conference!

U.S. in
the world

I speak to you tonight about the role of our
nation in the world for the last third of the 20th
century. An interdependent world - a troubled
world - a dangerous world. ~~but also~~
~~a~~

Tonight I wish to share with you my thoughts
about a fundamental aspect of our foreign policy -- our
relationship with the continent of Europe.

Because of the war in Vietnam, it has been
suggested -- and, by some, feared -- that American
foreign policy has taken a permanent Asian detour, and to
the ~~particular~~ detriment of our long-standing and more
familiar relationship with Europe.

As one who has participated in policy
~~for~~ *To be sure - yes*
~~formulation during this period, I respond by saying~~

~~this:~~ *L* Yes, America has awakened to Asia. There
has been clear and present trouble there.

L America has awakened, or is awakening, at
the same time to Latin America and to Africa.

~~*L* But this has not meant -- nor should it
mean in the future -- that America can afford to
attach anything but the highest importance to its
relationship across the Atlantic.~~

L America has learned painfully that it is a
Pacific power. But America is, and must remain,
an Atlantic power.

For, in the calculation of problems and possibilities,
~~in this world~~, this is clear: It is still Europe and America
which together have both the means and capacity to most
directly and effectively influence -- for the better -- the
world's future!

*And that Partnership is
open to all others who wish
to join.*

I will not recite tonight in detail all the joint achievements of these past two decades -- the story of Western Europe coming again to its feet ... of its movement toward economic and political unity ... of our joint resistance to Communist pressures from the East ... of our working together to bring new trade and economic growth to the world ... of our steadfast adherence, during times of trouble, to democratic institutions and the rights of man.

L Rather, let us look to the future.

(X) L One year ago I went, as the President's representative, to Western Europe with this basic message, ~~about the future:~~

We welcome your new strength, prosperity and unity.

Despite its occasional pain to ourselves, we welcome your new spirit of independence and of "Europeanism."

~~Let us now,~~ ^{we must} working together in a spirit of greater equality, raise our sights beyond the Atlantic to the opportunities which lie at hand in the wider human society.

and, I was encouraged by the Western European response to that message. Yet I also came home with the knowledge that both Atlantic partners were in for a period of adjustment.

-- Adjustment by us, to the idea that Western Europe was finally approaching the capacity for becoming an equal partner and must be treated accordingly.

-- Adjustment by Western Europe to the realization that equal partnership brought with it not only the opportunity for new status and growth, but also the responsibility to meet wider challenges reaching far beyond the Atlantic basin.

↳ Both of us have made some of that adjustment. But neither nearly enough.

↳ If our Atlantic Partnership is to grow and prosper, it will inevitably mean not a smaller role for us, but a larger role for Western Europe. And that is as it should be.

↳ An outward-looking Western Europe -- facing not only the Atlantic but the world at large -- can once again become a leading architect of human destiny.

And, as that happens, we can take not alarm but pride in the fact that -- a little more than 20 years later -- a Western Europe that was torn by hate and war has risen to play a large and peaceful role beside us on the world stage.

Keep We are, then, rapidly approaching that time when, as Ambassador George Ball put it, Western Europe "knows the reality of roughly equivalent power."

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I know your industry has a special and particular interest in seeing that our future relationship

with this European partner is one based on fair play, *Competition*
fair competition
in world
markets
access to markets close consultation, and a respect for the problems and interests of each partner -- as a good working partnership should be based.

That must surely be our goal.

Later on, I want to discuss with your representatives your import steel problems. I want to see that

⑩ need of a world conference
to examine the needs for
increasing steel capacity
so that capacity could
grow consistently
with market demand
and needs.

The American Iron & Steel Industry has a fair hearing, a fair deal, and continues to grow & prosper

The shape and organization of that equal partner of Europe is, of course, up to Europeans.

But, Our hopes have never been disguised.

They have been -- as my previous remarks have implied -- that the common scientific, technological, economic and commercial institutions of the European Community might provide the foundation for common political institutions as well.

They have been that those present and possible future institutions might be open to all who would adhere to them, including Great Britain.

~~They have not been hopes, however -- and must not be in the future -- put forward across the Atlantic as a take-it-or-leave-it, "Made in USA" blueprint for Europeans to follow.~~

If those hopes are even partially realized, and I believe they will be, it will be largely because we did not press forward such specific blueprints.

It will be because our partners have been able to make their own decisions in their own time and way.

~~Until now, my~~ ^{*#*} remarks have dealt almost exclusively with our relationship with Western Europe.

But there is a wider Europe -- a Europe where the forces of human emancipation are straining a diminishing Iron Curtain ... a Europe which compels now our full attention.

↳ We must not miss the unmistakable signs of change in some of the nations of Eastern Europe.

↳ Increasingly they are following their own national interests -- which are not always identical with those of the Soviet Union.

More and more the younger generation seeks to cast off the ideological shackles of the past, ~~and~~ to ~~participate in the establishment of a more democratic society.~~

The dialogue grows about the place of ^{the} individual ~~freedom~~ in modern technical society, about labor's right to strike, about the role of opposition parties. And

Steadily, cautiously, the nations of Eastern and Western Europe are drawing together into one wider Europe.

~~But~~ That wider Europe is still divided.

Germany remains divided, despite the fact that German reunification is central to the long-term peace and stability of the world.

Twenty-three years later, there is no peace settlement of World War II.

Millions of men, and billions of dollars, are still being invested, East and West, in/ longstanding aftermath of that war ~~and of the immediate post-war period.~~

So let us speak now of peace and security in that Europe -- which is, of course, in the end result the peace and security of the United States.

~~and Let us speak of European peace and security without illusion, but with the approach of hard-headed optimists who know ^{that peace and security are required} it remains the work of many years.~~

~~For, if things seem easier in the East ... if the Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers no longer threatens missiles over the Parthenon, we nonetheless must know that his successors have far more power today than ever before to carry out such a threat, should they choose to do so.~~

NATO - the most enduring and successful defense alliance in history -- continues to be a necessity for Western Europe and ourselves.

NATO, for two decades, has contained aggressive power and deterred war.

But, over the long run, a policy of containment
alone becomes obsolete. The time of change
has come, largely due to the success of our policies.
The time has come for the NATO Alliance
to look to ~~that~~ new, dynamic vision of peaceful
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When I visited the NATO Council last year
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The ~~imperative~~ need is not to abandon NATO, or
to abandon its functions of defense. It is to modernize,
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new era.

Now, to the problem of those millions of men and billions of dollars still being devoted to a rudimentary balance of security forces in Europe.

We cannot abandon a security system which has worked without having something better replace it.

It would be foolish, indeed to buy time, as we have, for fundamental change to take place and then to precipitously cancel the whole investment at the first signs of that change.

There is nothing to recommend a one-sided retreat -- by ourselves or our allies -- from our responsibility to our own safety. Such action would destabilize a perilous equilibrium, de-rail a developing detente, resurrect old fears, and intensify lingering insecurities.

↳ The diplomacy of the next decade must recognize that dramatic changes are taking place in all countries. ^{& deferring} New demands by people all over the world -- in the U.S. and USSR, in France and Czechoslovakia, in Britain and Poland, in Canada and Germany -- will inevitably require in the years ahead a careful re-examination by all governments and all leaders of the priorities of both domestic and international policies.

↳ We would be blind to reality if we did not recognize that people everywhere are insisting on a greater allocation of their respective national resources to the building of freer and more modern societies.

↳ For everyone -- the costs of defense and security forces -- whether paid for in Moscow or Washington -- are staggering and rising.

↳ The time is coming when all nations and governments involved must take stock of new circumstances. Even a nation as wealthy as ours must constantly review its priorities.

~~↳ Surely if this is true for us, it must be true for those with fewer resources.~~

↳ The task of statesmanship in ^{the} 1970's is to de-escalate the arms race -- and to move in common agreement toward a systematic scaling down of the mutually oppressive burden and cost of our vast military complexes.

~~But~~ This must be done in concert with allies -- and in negotiation with adversaries. But it must be done with American initiative -- as the political leader of the West.

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↳ We must also do our utmost to communicate to the leaders of the Soviet Union that we seek such mutual reduction of forces and armaments as a tangible means of reduction of tension -- in short, adding to their security as well as ours.

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There is, too, the opportunity for what has been called "bridge-building" to the East through increasingly-accepted commercial, cultural, and educational means.

Contact has been increasing. And, where it has taken place, ~~I believe~~ it has been ~~overwhelmingly~~ to the good.

The old notion that East-West contact might somehow contaminate our freedom has long since been disproved.

And members of the American business community have been among the first to disprove it.

It is in this area that we can do something tangible and immediate right now, ~~at home.~~

~~I believe~~ we must give the President the discretionary authority to remove restrictions to trade and investment between the United States and Eastern Europe. ~~the answer.~~

By so doing we would open new markets and constructively create better understandings.

~~There are legal restrictions now impeding this which, if they were valid in the past, now serve only to prevent Americans from helping to build new bridges East. *gaining new markets and easing tensions.*~~

Some of the Eastern European countries are already members of GATT -- the world trading forum.

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We, and our Western European partners, have awakened to the problem this gap brings to the nation, or business organization, trying to compete with us.

Today this is seen by Western Europeans as one of both political and economic concern to them. They have no desire to be swallowed up by us -- nor should we wish it.

While, in the past decade, Europeans have made great progress in moving toward economic integration, this has not yet found full reflection in the organization of enterprise on the scale demanded by modern requirements.

Choices about future emphases -- about research and development budgets, educational innovations, the benefits of competition and consolidation, the potential growth of continental sources of talent and capital -- these are clearly decisions for Europeans to make.

We should do everything possible to encourage them. Thus it is important that we maintain a continuous exchange of technological and organizational experience between Europe and the United States -- a flow which someday, we can hope, might include Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

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∠ And as ~~our~~ fortunate nations have this responsibility to the less fortunate nations ~~of this~~ earth, so do we have this responsibility to less fortunate people within our own borders.

Only in this past quarter-century have nations, on a scale that means something, begun to truly accept this concept.

I count it a major victory for America that our own commitments to that concept ~~since~~ ~~World War II~~ -- commitments at home as well as abroad ~~in the world~~ -- have led others to follow.

∠ We cannot turn back now.

There is one world - ~~no escape~~
There is no escape - no getting
off or out -

△ This, then, is the task of we the people
who live along the Atlantic; To end the "civil wars"
that have torn the European continent for generations ...
to make that continent again one continent ... to
reduce the causes of tension and conflict which
divide men and to engage men together in the works
of peace ... to work for the day, as Adlai Stevenson
expressed it, "when men have learned to live as
members of the same human family, to respect
each other's differences, to heal each other's wounds,
to promote each other's progress, and to benefit
from each other's knowledge."

Tasks and Responsibilities of the Atlantic Partnership

Address by Vice President Humphrey¹

Tonight I wish to share with you my thoughts about a fundamental aspect of our foreign policy: our relationship with the continent of Europe.

Because of the war in Viet-Nam, it has been suggested—and, by some, feared—that American foreign policy has taken a permanent Asian detour, to the particular detriment of our long-standing and more familiar relationship with Europe.

As one who has participated in policy formulation during this period, I respond by saying this:

Yes, America has awakened to Asia. There has been clear and present trouble there.

America has awakened, or is awakening, at the same time to Latin America and to Africa.

But this has not meant—nor should it mean in the future—that America can afford to attach anything but the highest importance to its relationship across the Atlantic.

America has learned painfully that it is a Pacific power. But America is, and must remain, an Atlantic power.

For in the calculation of problems and possibilities in this world, this is clear: It is still Europe and America which together have both the means and capacity to most directly and effectively influence—for the better—the world's future.

I will not recite tonight in detail all the joint achievements of these past two decades: the story of Western Europe coming again to its feet, of its movement toward economic and political unity, of our joint resistance to Communist pressures from the East, of our working

together to bring new trade and economic growth to the world, of our steadfast adherence, during times of trouble, to democratic institutions and the rights of man.

Rather, let us look to the future.

One year ago I went, as the President's representative, to Western Europe with this basic message about the future:

We welcome your new strength, prosperity and unity. Despite its occasional pain to ourselves, we welcome your new spirit of independence and of "Europeanism." Let us now, working together in a spirit of greater equality, raise our sights beyond the Atlantic to the opportunities which lie at hand in the wider human society.

I was encouraged by the Western European response to that message. Yet I also came home with the knowledge that both Atlantic partners were in for a period of adjustment:

—Adjustment by us to the idea that Western Europe was finally approaching the capacity for becoming an equal partner and must be treated accordingly;

—Adjustment by Western Europe to the realization that equal partnership brought with it not only the opportunity for new status and growth but also the responsibility to meet wider challenges reaching far beyond the Atlantic basin.

Both of us have made some of that adjustment. But neither nearly enough.

If our Atlantic partnership is to grow and prosper, it will inevitably mean not a smaller role for us but a larger role for Western Europe. And that is as it should be.

An outward-looking Western Europe—facing not only the Atlantic but the world at

¹ Made before the American Iron and Steel Institute at New York, N.Y., on May 23.

large—can once again become a leading architect of human destiny.

And as that happens, we can take not alarm but pride in the fact that—a little more than 20 years later—a Western Europe that was torn by hate and war has risen to play a large and peaceful role beside us on the world stage.

We are, then, rapidly approaching that time when, as Ambassador George Ball put it, Western Europe “knows the reality of roughly equivalent power.”

I know your industry has a special and particular interest in seeing that our future relationship with this European partner is one based on fair play, close consultation, and a respect for the problems and interests of each partner—as a good working partnership should be based.

That must surely be our goal.

The shape and organization of that equal Europe is, of course, up to Europeans.

Our hopes have never been disguised.

They have been—as my previous remarks have implied—that the common scientific, technological, economic, and commercial institutions of the European Community might provide the foundation for common political institutions as well.

They have been that those present and possible future institutions might be open to all who would adhere to them, including Great Britain.

They have not been hopes, however—and must not be in the future—put forward across the Atlantic as a take-it-or-leave-it, “Made in USA” blueprint for Europeans to follow.

If those hopes are even partially realized, and I believe they will be, it will be largely because we did not press forward such specific blueprints. It will be because our partners have been able to make their own decisions in their own time and way.

New Priorities of a New Era

Until now, my remarks have dealt almost exclusively with our relationship with Western Europe.

But there is a wider Europe—a Europe where the forces of human emancipation are straining a diminishing Iron Curtain, a Europe which compels now our full attention.

We must not miss the unmistakable signs of change in some of the nations of Eastern Europe.

Increasingly they are following their own

national interests—which are not always identical with those of the Soviet Union.

More and more the younger generation seeks to cast off the ideological shackles of the past and to participate in the establishment of a more democratic society.

The dialog grows about the place of individual freedom in modern technical society, about labor's right to strike, about the role of opposition parties. And steadily, cautiously, the nations of Eastern and Western Europe are drawing together into one wider Europe.

That wider Europe is still divided.

Germany remains divided, despite the fact that German reunification is central to the long-term peace and stability of the world.

Twenty-three years later, there is no peace settlement of World War II.

Millions of men, and billions of dollars, are still being invested, East and West, in the long-standing aftermath of that war and of the immediate postwar period.

So let us speak now of peace and security in that Europe—which is, of course, in the end result the peace and security of the United States.

Let us speak of European peace and security without illusion, but with the approach of hard-headed optimists who know it remains the work of many years.

For, if things seem easier in the East, if the Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers no longer threatens missiles over the Parthenon, we nonetheless must know that his successors have far more power today than ever before to carry out such a threat, should they choose to do so.

NATO—the most enduring and successful defense alliance in history—continues to be a necessity for Western Europe and ourselves.

NATO, for two decades, has contained aggressive power and deterred war.

But over the long run, a policy of containment alone becomes obsolete—either because it fails or because it becomes frozen in its pattern of success.

If it fails, there is war. If its pattern of success becomes inhibiting, it will constrain the forces of change and the chances for a new, more positive system of mutual security.

The time of change has come.

We must recognize that, largely due to the success of our policies, we are in a new period. It can be a period in Europe—if we maintain cohesion and solidarity in the West—in which

we can break through to peaceful engagement with the East.

The time has come for the NATO alliance to look to that new, dynamic vision of peaceful engagement.

When I visited the NATO Council last year I called, on behalf of our Government, for such a policy.² Since that time, NATO ministers have actively explored the ways and means of making it work, of transforming our alliance from a defensive military organization to an active, vital political, social, and economic tool which may through peaceful engagement hasten the replacement of the Iron Curtain with an Open Door.

The imperative need is not to abandon NATO or to abandon its functions of defense. It is to modernize, transform, and redirect it toward the new priorities of a new era.

Deescalating the Arms Race

Now to the problem of those millions of men and billions of dollars still being devoted to a rudimentary balance of security forces in Europe:

We cannot abandon a security system which has worked without having something better replace it.

It would be foolish indeed to buy time, as we have, for fundamental change to take place and then to precipitously cancel the whole investment at the first signs of that change.

There is nothing to recommend a one-sided retreat—by ourselves or our allies—from our responsibility to our own safety. Such action would destabilize a perilous equilibrium, derail a developing *détente*, resurrect old fears, and intensify lingering insecurities.

The diplomacy of the next decade must recognize that dramatic changes are taking place in all countries. New demands by people all over the world—in the United States and the U.S.S.R., in France and Czechoslovakia, in Britain and Poland, in Canada and Germany—will inevitably require in the years ahead a careful reexamination by all governments and all leaders of the priorities of both domestic and international policies.

We would be blind to reality if we did not

² For an address by Vice President Humphrey made before the North Atlantic Council at Paris on Apr. 7, 1967, see BULLETIN of May 1, 1967, p. 681.

recognize that people everywhere are insisting on a greater allocation of their respective national resources to the building of freer and more modern societies.

For everyone the costs of defense and security forces, whether paid for in Moscow or Washington, are staggering and rising.

The time is coming when all nations and governments involved must take stock of new circumstances. Even a nation as wealthy as ours must constantly review its priorities.

Surely if this is true for us, it must be true for those with fewer resources.

The task of statesmanship in the 1970's is to deescalate the arms race—and to move in common agreement toward a systematic scaling down of the mutually oppressive burden and cost of our vast military complexes.

This must be done in concert with allies and in negotiation with adversaries. But it must be done with American initiative—as the political leader of the West.

There is a great deal now to recommend a mutual reduction of the armed forces and armaments facing each other in Europe.

We must, as I indicated, do this in cooperation with, and with the support of, our NATO allies.

We must also do our utmost to communicate to the leaders of the Soviet Union that we seek such reduction of forces and armaments as a tangible means of reduction of tension—in short, adding to their security as well as ours.

I do not see this as an impossibility.

I know from close personal experience what we were able to do with the Soviet Union in the case of the nuclear test ban treaty, in the case of the treaty banning nuclear weapons from outer space, in the case of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty now before the United Nations.

I would hope the Soviet Union—and the other countries of Eastern Europe—might find mutual self-interest in such a proposal (just as I hope it will in our pending offer to discuss the whole matter of offensive and defensive weapons systems).

For it is the perception of mutual interest that is the starting point for agreement.

I repeat: A mutual thinning out of men and armaments in Europe, following close consultation with allies, would be no American-Soviet deal. It would involve and be to the benefit of the nations of both Eastern and Western Europe.

And this step might, in time, lead to other steps which could one day bring Europe together.

Peaceful Engagement With the East

There is, too, the opportunity for what has been called "bridgebuilding" to the East through increasingly accepted commercial, cultural, and educational means.

Contact has been increasing. And where it has taken place, I believe it has been overwhelmingly to the good.

The old notion that East-West contact might somehow contaminate our freedom has long since been disproved. And members of the American business community have been among the first to disprove it.

It is in this area that we can do something tangible and immediate right now at home.

I believe we must give the President the discretionary authority to remove restrictions to trade and investment between the United States and Eastern Europe. There are legal restrictions now impeding this which, if they were valid in the past, now serve only to prevent Americans from helping to build new bridges East.

Some of the Eastern European countries are already members of GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], the world trading forum. Others are interested as well in the work of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], the organization of the developed nations which is concerned with economic and aid policy. This might eventually be followed by membership in other multilateral organizations involving both East and West.

And if these forward steps can be taken at a government level, I have no doubt that at a private level—businessman to businessman, scientist to scientist, citizen to citizen—the whole process of bringing peaceful and democratic change to Eastern Europe can be accelerated.

I also believe that the now-famous technology gap—which is in fact first cousin to the "brain drain" and is now being described by Western Europeans as the American challenge—should in fact be seen by us not just as an American-Western European problem but as a further means of increasing peaceful engagement with the East.

By the technology gap or American challenge, I mean of course the whole broad advantage we Americans have over the rest of the world in available human and material resources, scale of industrial organization, and capacity for scientific and technological expansion.

We, and our Western European partners, have awakened to the problem this gap brings to the nation, or business organization, trying to compete with us.

Today this is seen by Western Europeans as one of both political and economic concern to them. They have no desire to be swallowed up by us—nor should we wish it.

While in the past decade Europeans have made great progress in moving toward economic integration, this has not yet found full reflection in the organization of enterprise on the scale demanded by modern requirements.

Investing in Stability and Peace

Choices about future emphases—about research and development budgets, educational innovations, the benefits of competition and consolidation, the potential growth of continental sources of talent and capital—these are clearly decisions for Europeans to make.

We should do everything possible to encourage them. Thus it is important that we maintain a continuous exchange of technological and organizational experience between Europe and the United States, a flow which someday, we can hope, might include Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

I, for one, would welcome, too, the time when managers, technicians, researchers, agriculturists, and workers of many countries might stand side by side in a massive, coordinated, nonpolitical effort in the under- and undeveloped nations of the world to bring the benefits of the technological age to people who still live on the dusty roads of previous centuries.

And I believe that such an effort, once offered or undertaken, should be open for participation to all nations—including those of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

And this, finally, brings me to the largest of all tasks which faces not only the Atlantic partnership but all who profess to membership in the family of man.

Pope John XXIII said it well in his encyclical *Mater et Magistra*:

... given the growing interdependence among the peoples of the earth, it is not possible to preserve lasting peace if glaring economic and social inequality among them persist.

We, above all, who share the European heritage, with all that it implies, whose nations are today rich and fortunate, bear special obligation to those who live in glaring economic and social inequality.

I speak, of course, of our obligation to those nations which have yet to reap the benefits of a first—far less a second—technological and social revolution.

Our obligation to help the so-called “third world” is, of course, in our self-interest. It is not softheaded, or even just softhearted, but an investment in the stability and peace of vast areas.

But it is, more importantly, a moral obligation—the very obligation Pope John spoke of.

We have a moral obligation—because of who we are, of where we came from, of the teachings our entire civilization represents—to help all men lift themselves to the state of human freedom and dignity which is our own objective.

And as our fortunate nations have this responsibility to the less fortunate nations of this earth, so do we have this responsibility to less fortunate people within our own borders.

Only in this past quarter-century have nations, on a scale that means something, begun to truly accept this concept.

I count it a major victory for America that our own commitments to that concept since World War II—commitments at home as well as in the world—have led others to follow. We cannot turn back now.

This, then, is the task of we the people who live along the Atlantic: to end the “civil wars” that have torn the European Continent for generations, to make that continent again one continent, to reduce the causes of tension and conflict which divide men and to engage men together in the works of peace, to work for the day, as Adlai Stevenson expressed it, when men have learned “to live as brothers, to respect each other’s differences, heal each other’s wounds, promote each other’s progress, and benefit from each other’s knowledge.”³

³ For an address by Ambassador Stevenson made on Oct. 24, 1963, see *ibid.*, Nov. 18, 1963, p. 766.

President Johnson Hails Progress Since Punta del Este Meeting

To mark the first anniversary of the meeting of American Chiefs of State held at Punta del Este, Uruguay, April 12-14, 1967¹ President Johnson sent letters to Latin American Chiefs of State. Following is the exchange of letters between President Johnson and President Fidel Sanchez Hernandez of El Salvador.

Press release 117 dated May 23

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S LETTER

APRIL 16, 1968

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: One year has passed since we met in Punta del Este. During this period we have often been reminded that great achievements can only come from great effort, mutual understanding, and the workings of that most valuable dimension—time.

We have made an auspicious beginning. The Inter-American Cultural Council has prepared a regional plan to modernize teaching methods and to harness science and technology to our hemispheric development efforts. We have signed a new and stronger International Coffee Agreement, established a Coffee Diversification Fund, and founded the Inter-American Export Promotion Center to stabilize and increase Latin America's earnings from foreign trade. The six percent increase in food production during 1967 is an important first step toward making Latin American farms produce the abundance of which they are capable. We have increased the resources of the Inter-American Development Bank by \$400 million and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration by \$35 million. In 1967 alone, the Inter-American Bank loaned almost half a billion dollars—the greatest annual total since it was established. You and your colleagues have taken the first steps toward the establishment of the Latin American Common Market.

I congratulate you and all Salvadorans on your accomplishments. As the major trading partner your country continues to give leader-

¹ For statements by President Johnson and text of the Declaration of the Presidents of America, see BULLETIN of May 8, 1967, p. 706.

1 AMERICAN IRON & STEEL INSTITUTE
2 76TH GENERAL MEETING
3 DINNER
4 May 23, 1968
5 Grand Ballroom - Waldorf Astoria Hotel
6 New York City
7 PRESIDING: EDMUND F. MARTIN

8 CHAIRMAN EDMUND F. MARTIN: It is a real
9 pleasure to begin our program this evening by presenting
10 our new directors. In the past year we have added a num-
11 ber of new faces to our Board. I shall ask them to stand
12 as I call their names and I will ask you to please hold
13 your applause until I have called all their names:

14 Roger Ahlbrandt, President of Allegheny-
15 Ludlum Steel Corporation.

16 Keith Benson, President of Pickens Mather.

17 Phil Block, Chairman of Inland Steel.

18 Ken Daniel, President of American Cast Iron
19 Pipe Company.

20 Fred A. Fielder, President of CF&I Steel
21 Company.

22 Harold Griffith, President of the Steel
23 Company of Canada.

24 Phil Smith, President of Copper Wells Steel
25 Company.

John Laub, President of Crucible Steel, who
is unable to be with us this evening. (Applause)

1 Since our last general meeting 8 of our
2 former directors have resigned from the Board. Unfor-
3 tunately Bill Skully of the Steel Company of Canada,
4 John Sherwin of Pickens Mather, and Rudy Smith of CF&I
5 could not be with us this evening. However, we are for-
6 tunate to have seated on the dias Joe Block of Inland
7 Steel, Jim Darbaker of Copper Wells, Ed Hanley of Allegheny
8 Ludlum, Joe Hunter of Crucible Steel, and Bill Aiken of
9 McClean who's resigned after 22 years of continuous service
10 on the Board. (Applause)

11 Gentlemen, will you please stand? You're
12 way ahead of me. We'll get this thing going right yet.

13 I now come to another pleasant assignment
14 which is to announce to you this evening that Joe Block and
15 Ed Hanley have been elected Honorary Vice Presidents to the
16 Institute. Gentlemen, please stand and be recognized.
17 (Applause)

18 We are honored tonight to have seated on the
19 dias a number of distinguished steel leaders from abroad as
20 our guests. Among them are two honorary members of the In-
21 stitute, and I would like each to stand as I call his name:
22 Baron Pierre van der Rest, President of the Belgian Blast
23 Furnace & Steel Works Association. (Applause) Dr. Hans-
24 Gunther Sohl, President of the German Iron & Steel Institute,
25 (Applause) Chairman of the International Iron & Steel Institute

1 and President of August Tissen-hutta A.G. whom we enjoyed
2 as a speaker at our morning session.

3 Tonight it is my great pleasure to inform
4 you that three other guests from abroad led their respec-
5 tive steel associations have been elected to honorary mem-
6 bership. I would now like to introduce them to you indi-
7 vidually: Dr. John Chesters, President of the Iron & Steel
8 Institute of London. (Applause) Mr. M. N. Dastur, President
9 of the Indian Institute of Metal. (Applause) Sr. Don
10 Carlos Perez de Bricio, Preisident of the Spanish Steel
11 Federation. (Applause)

12 We are also honored to have as our guests to-
13 night the members of the Board of Directors of the Interna-
14 tional Iron & Steel Institute who are seated among you in
15 the ballroom. Gentlemen, will you please join me in show-
16 ing your appreciation of their presence. (Applause)

17 My friends, for the second year in a row
18 I have the pleasure of presenting the highest honor this
19 Institute bestows on a steel man. This is, of course, the
20 Gary Medal. It commemorates one of the true giants of
21 the American Steel Industry, Judge Albert H. Gary who guided
22 the destiny of the United States Steel for many years. The
23 Gary Medal is given only to a man who has served our indus-
24 try uniquely well. It is not a yearly award. In fact, since
25 it was established in 1927, only 19 men have received this

1 honor. This year the Aware Committee selected as the 20th
2 winner a man who has devoted much of his valuable time and
3 many talents to the industry. His contributions have been
4 so numerous and so outstanding that none of you will be
5 surprised when I name him. His own modesty is such that
6 perhaps he will be surprised.

7 By this time all but one of you must realize
8 that I have been talking about Roger Blough. (Applause)
9 Roger, will you kindly rise and face the music? (Applause)
10 If you look up to the balcony box to our left, you will see
11 a familiar face. For the benefit of everyone else (Applause)
12 that's Mrs. Blough, Helen. (Applause)

13 I can imagine how very proud of you your good
14 wife is at this moment. So are we all. (Applause) I think
15 everyone here will agree that if this honor were given to
16 only one man in a generation, in our generation that man
17 would have to be Roger Blough. What has he done for steel?

18 Well, for one thing he is a Director of the
19 Institute and a member of the Executive Committee. He is
20 also a Director of the International Iron & Steel Institute.

21 He has been a spokesman for and a defender of the entire
22 steel industry since 1939 when the famous T.N.E.C. Investi-
23 gations were going. As a member of the New York Law firm
24 of White & Case, Roger was enlisted by United States Steel
25 as Associate Legal Counsel. His work so impressed the

1 corporation they recruited him as General Solicitor.

2 He has spoken for us time and again since
3 those days, and the occasions have not always been easy or
4 pleasant. However, trying the circumstances, Roger's
5 voice has always spoken words of truth and wisdom, earning
6 the respect even of our harshest critics and opponents.

7 Beyond steel Roger is recognized as a leader of all Ameri-
8 can industry. He is a Director or Trustee of several im-
9 portant institutions, the National Industrial Conference
10 Board, The Committee for Economic Development, and The
11 United States Council of the International Chamber of Com-
12 merce.

13 In an even wider sphere ^{he} is a Member of the
14 Council of Foreign Relations, the American Bar Association,
15 the General Advisory Committee of the United States Arms
16 Council Control and the Disarmament Agency, the Interna-
17 tional Studies Subcommittee of the Committee for Economic
18 Development, the President's Committee of the National Wild-
19 life Federation, the Business Committee for the Arts, the
20 Kennedy Memorial Library, and many others.

21 Roger was an athlete at college and has con-
22 tinued to be interested in sports. In 1963 he received the
23 National Football Foundation's and Hall of Fame's Gold
24 Medal Award. He is currently active in behalf of the National
25 Olympic Businessman's Committee. Through the years he has

1 received countless other awards including no fewer than
2 17 honorary degrees. He received the U.S. Old Gold Medal
3 Award in 1964 and the Gold Medal of the Pennsylvania Soc-
4 iety in 1966. Together with tonight's gold medal, you
5 can perhaps see why there is a gold shortage. Roger has
6 more than Fort Knox.

7 That reminds me, Roger: You can do as you
8 like with this medal, but remember, it's dolid gold. So
9 don't try to take it abroad on your next trip. (Laughter)

10 I have mentioned only a few of the honors
11 heaped on this man; I could not name them all. But I will
12 say this: Any one of them would be the achievement of a
13 lifetime for the common man, but as we all know Roger is
14 an uncommon man. He rose from General Solicitor to Execu-
15 tive Vice President of Law as well as Secretary and Director
16 of the company in 1951. He became Vice Chairman of the
17 Board of Directors a year later, and shortly thereafter was
18 elected to the Board of the newly-formed United States Steel
19 Corporation and a member of the Finance Committee. Roger
20 was General Counsel of the corporation from 1953 until 1955
21 when he succeeded Ben Fairless as Chairman of the Board of
22 Directors and Chief Executive Officer. At that point his
23 career came to a dead stop -- and you know something? He
24 hasn't had a promotion since. (Laughter)

25 This is the man we honor tonight. Now let me

1 read the inscription on this citation.

2 "For his unselfish contributions to the
3 Iron & Steel Industry and devotions to the highest prin-
4 ciples of industrial leadership."

5 Now, Roger, is there anything you'd like
6 to say in your own defense? (Applause)

7 MR. ROGER M. BLOUGH: Gentlemen, all I can
8 say is that I'm even more surprised than you are, and I'm
9 very, very grateful. Of all the nice things, and I've been
10 very lucky, that have happened to me in my lifetime, nothing
11 has moved me more than this and I appreciate it more than I
12 can say. Thank you very much. (Applause)

13 CHAIRMAN MARTIN: Thank you, Roger. The
14 ovation you have received tells the story far better than
15 I can. It reveals how your fellow members feel about you
16 and your worthiness for this medal. Let me add my own per-
17 sonal congratulations.

18 During these past two busy days we have heard
19 from a goodly number of distinguished men. Our opening
20 speaker was Dr. Simon Ramon, this year's Swab Memorial Lec-
21 turer and a renowned scientist and industrialist. Then we
22 listened to Mr. Whitney Young, Jr., Executive Director of
23 the National Urban League. Surely the presence of these men
24 on our program is convincing evidence of the broad interests
25 of our membership. Their words seasoned the good red meat

1 served by our fellow men of steel, our President Jack
2 Roache, Bill Getty, John Maxon, Roger Blough and our
3 friend from across the sea, Dr. Hans-Gunther Sohl.

4 Now, everyone here knows that our eminent
5 guest speaker this evening is applying for a bigger job.

6 This is good. Healthy ambition is the finest tradition of
7 individual enterprise. Still, I think it is only fair to
8 warn him that other men with similar ambitions have appeared
9 at this very podium in recent years. (Laughter) In 1957,
10 our distinguished guest was the Honorable Richard M. Nixon,
11 a former public servant, a dog owner (laughter) and now a
12 resident of this very city. In 1962 we welcomed the Honor-
13 able Barry M. Goldwater, former Senator, amateur HAM radio
14 operator from the State of Arizona. Barry wanted to cam-
15 paign in the worst way, and he did. (Laughter) (Applause)

16 Then only last year our speaker was the Hon-
17 orable George W. Romney, a well known runner with a well
18 laundered brain, and governor of the great state of Michigan.
19 A common thread runs through the careers of these men follow-

20 ing their appearances here. (Laughter and applause) I
21 won't say what it is, but I will confess that someone has
22 says "Ed, I don't know who picks our main speakers, but
23 whoever he is, he'd better stay away from the racetrack."
24 (Laughter and applause)

25 Only time and the American voter will tell

1 whether tonight's speaker will get the bigger job he's
2 looking for. This is a completely non-partisan group
3 (laughter) and I won't make any predictions. I will say
4 this: Regardless of what fate may hold in store for our
5 speaker, we know and he knows, and the world knows, that he
6 has come a long, long way from Wallace, South Dakota.
7 (Applause) His presence here is a gilt-edged guarantee
8 that our evening will be a lively one.

9 Gentlemen, it is my honor to present to you
10 the Vice President of the United States, Hubert H. Humphrey.
11 Mr. Vice President.

12 VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT H. HUMPHREY: Thank
13 you very much., Mr. Martin. I want to thank you for those
14 words of encouragement (laughter and applause). It's a
15 difficult enough to be a known democrat coming here without
16 hearing what Martin had to say tonight. But I think you
17 ought to know the only reason I stopped by was to see that
18 Roger got his medal and I'm taking it back to the President
19 to help balance the payments. (Applause)

20 My, I'm glad to talk to this non-partisan
21 group. (Laughter) Yessiree, it's about 50-50 -- 3 or 4
22 democrats (laughter). But I surely was pleased that it
23 was made coeducational at the last moment at least, Roger.

24 Gentleman, I just have one suggestion for
25 you -- It's time for you to pick a winner. (Laughter-applause)

1 Well, Mr. Roche, and my good friend and
2 our honoree tonight Mr. Blough, Mr. Patton, Mr. Beeghly
3 and our honored guests from abroad, may I just say first
4 of all to our guests from other areas of the world, from
5 Europe and Asia and Africa and Latin America, from wher-
6 ever they may come, that when I was invited to this gath-
7 ering I was considered a rather harmless individual.

8 (Laughter) There was no danger may I say of any kind of
9 contagion or contamination. As Vice President -- well,
10 in this country as Vice President I don't think I need to
11 say much more. You're just Vice President. (Laughter)

12 But maybe I should explain to our guests
13 that as Vice President you have a lot of responsibility
14 and absolutely no authority. (Laughter)

15 I want to say to all of those who qualify
16 for being Chairman of the Board, that's not the job I'm
17 after, just in case you wanted to know. I'm perfectly
18 willing to settle for one thing less. And I'm very
19 pleased that our friend Ed Martin saw fit to say that I
20 was looking for new work, which is true. My seniority
21 clause is not very reliable in my contract. (Laughter)
22 And not only that, the shop that I was associated with
23 is closing up business January 20th. (Laughter) I want
24 to know how some of your Vice Presidents would feel if the
25 company said they were through on March 31st. (Laughter)

1 Well, in all seriousness I do want to
2 express my congratulations to this fine and good American,
3 this very distinguished and outstanding citizen, a gentle-
4 man whose friendship I've been privileged to enjoy as one
5 of the more precious gifts of my life, Mr. Roger Blough.

6 He's deserved every honor that's been bestowed upon him and
7 I salute him. (Applause)

8 Now gentlemen, I want you to know some of
9 the things I'm not going to do tonight. I'm not going to
10 tell you how to run your business -- I think you're having
11 enough trouble at that without any help from me. (Laughter)
12 I may toss off a suggestion here or there, but I do know
13 this: That I'm talking to leaders from our country and
14 leaders from abroad that have deep concerns about our
15 country, their country and this world. I know that I'm
16 talking to people that are the movers and the shakers, as
17 they say, in many a community across this nation. And as
18 I listen to the description of your program thus far, it
19 is perfectly obvious the wide range of your concern. Your
20 interest in finding jobs for the jobless. Your interest
21 in the strength of this nation, not only its military
22 strength but its moral strength and economic strength,
23 political strength.

24 And I believe I'm talking to a group of
25 Americans that would like to concentrate upon our strengths

1 | rather than our weaknesses. I think I'm talking to a group
2 | of people whom no matter what the stock market will do will
3 | never sell this country short. And I'm very proud to face
4 | an audience like that. (Applause)

5 | Now, I realize that when I was invited you
6 | didn't quite know what you were going to get, at least
7 | what you'd get tonight. I don't intend to make you all
8 | members of my campaign committee, even though there are
9 | some openings in case you want to join. (Laughter) And
10 | despite everything that you've read, we could use help.
11 | But we'll get to you later on on that -- if ever. But
12 | we'll try.

13 | I want to talk to you this evening about
14 | a matter that I believe is most appropriate in light of
15 | the guests that you have from abroad. Everyone one of
16 | us in this audience knows that what America does, what
17 | America says, what it doesn't do as well as what it does,
18 | affects the world in which we live. I need not tell you,
19 | men of industry, that science and technology alone have
20 | made this a much smaller world. And in many ways it's made
21 | it a very interdependent world. It's a world that Wendall
22 | Wilkie once described as one world. I believe he was a bit
23 | ahead of his time when he spoke in such words of truth.

24 | But it's also a troubled world. And in many
25 | ways it's a very dangerous world. And yet for me it's a world

1 of great opportunity, tremendous challenge. I don't be-
2 lieve that most people do their best by being constantly
3 burdened with the negative neurosis of trouble, despair,
4 and doubt. I think we have to face up to those concerns
5 and the problems, but I believe that we generally do our
6 best when we approach our problems with confidence, with
7 a sense of fate and determination, and above all an opti-
8 mism that is based on our heritage. And that's the way
9 I want to talk to you tonight.

10 I want to share with you one man's thoughts
11 about an aspect of our national security and our foreign
12 policy which is of direct and immediate interest to you.
13 Our relationship, yes with the whole world because it can't
14 be separated any longer into neat compartments, but tonight
15 if you'll permit, our relationship to the Continent of
16 Europe. Because so many of us in this audience are so well
17 acquainted with that part of the world.

18 Now because of the war in Viet Nam, it has
19 been suggested, and by some its been very feared, that
20 American foreign policy, American policy, has taken a perm-
21 anent Asian detour. And to the detriment of our long-
22 standing and what is a much more familiar relationship with
23 Europe.

24 Well, to be sure, America has awakened to
25 Asia, and indeed it should. There is and there has been

1 clear and present danger there. And there is also great
2 prospect for the future. And America has awakened, and
3 I'm happy to say, is awakening to Latin America and to
4 Africa. America has learned very painfully and costly
5 that it is a Pacific power, we have two oceans, you know.

6 And America is and has been and will continue to be an
7 Atlantic power. What I'm saying to you is that we are a
8 very basic part of the total power, economic and social
9 structure of this world. And you can't stop it and say
10 I want to get off. Whether we like it or not, gentlemen,
11 we are aboard. And there isn't anyway that we can escape
12 this journey.

13 Now, in the calculation of problems and
14 possibilities, this is quite clear: It is still Europe
15 and America which together today have both the means and
16 the capacity, the most directly and effectively influence,
17 and I hope for the better, the world's future. This is
18 not an exclusive society. Might I say to our guests from
19 other parts of the world as representatives of those
20 areas, that this partnership is wide open and needs helping
21 hands.

22 One year ago, as some of you may recall, I
23 was sent as the President's representative to western
24 Europe to speak to our associates and our allies there. And
25 I brought them this message: I said recognizing what has

1 happened in these postwar years and the developments that
2 have taken place, we welcome your new strength. We wel-
3 come your new prosperity. We Americans welcome your new
4 sense of unity. Yes, I said, despite its occasional pain
5 to us, and it has been painful once in awhile, we welcome
6 your new spirit of independence. And might I say to my
7 fellow Americans, I said we welcome your spirit of European-
8 ization, because many Europeans today do not speak of them-
9 selves as just Frenchman or Belgians or Germans alone, they
10 speak of themselves as Europeans.

11 And then I said that working together in a
12 spirit of great er equality we must raise our sights jointly
13 beyond the Atlantic to the opportunities which lie at hand
14 in the wider human society.

15 Now we talked about many details around these
16 broad generalizations. And when I returned I was very en-
17 couraged by western europeans response to that message. And
18 I think I spoke for you, as well as for myself. Yet I also
19 came home with the knowledge that both Atlantic partners,
20 both Europe and America, were in for a period of adjustment.

21 Sometimes a difficult adjustment. Adjustment by us to the
22 idea that western Europe was finally approachng the capa-
23 city of becoming an equal partner and, my fellow Americans,
24 must be treated accordingly. The weak, prostrate Europe
25 of 1950 is no more. It is a strong, productive, competitive

1 independent Europe of the late 1960s.

2 And then there is the adjustment by western
3 Europe to the realization that an equal partnership brought
4 with it not only the honors but the opportunity for new
5 status and growth, and the responsibility to meet wider
6 challenges that reach out far beyond this Atlantic basin.
7 In other words to be an outreach society, not an inward
8 society. To keep itself open rather than to close its fron-
9 tiers or its gates.

10 Now both of us, I'm happy to say tonight,
11 have made some adjustment. We've made some progress to
12 these new conditions. But neither has possibly moved far
13 enough. We are, in other words, rapidly approaching what
14 Ambassador George Ball put it this way: Western Europe
15 knows the reality of roughly equivalent power. That's
16 what's happened.

17 Now my fellow Americans, unless we understand
18 that, we're not going to have a lasting relationship with
19 old friends, and with those from whom we have our basic
20 cultural heritage.

21 Now, I know that your industry here has a
22 special and a very particular interest in seeing that our
23 future relationship with this European partner is based on
24 sound premises. Based, for example, on fair play. And
25 surely on fair competition in the market places. And on

1 access to markets. On close consultation and on a res-
2 pect for the problems and interests that each partner --
3 you can't have a partnership without at least those mini-
4 mum standards being applicable. Now later on at another
5 date I want to discuss with the representatives of the
6 Iron and Steel industry your import problems. And I shall
7 be available for that interesting experience. (Applause)
8 Nothing would be more injurious on the part of any public
9 official than to approach a problem with a closed mind.
10 If circumstances have changed in the world, they have un-
11 doubtedly changed in the steel industry as well. (Applause)

12 And I want to see the American iron and steel
13 industry, that this industry has a fair hearing and, if you-ll
14 permit me to quote an old democratic phrase, a fair deal.
15 And I want to see that it continues to grow, to be a funda-
16 mental basic part of this American economy and that it not
17 only continues to grow but to prosper.

18 I have a feeling that somewhere down the
19 line, that you will find it necessary or at least you will
20 look to the possibility of a conference far broader than
21 anything you do here at home. A world conference to exam-
22 ine the needs for increased steel capacity so that that
23 capacity could grow consistently with market demand and
24 needs. I believe that these are matters that are within
25 our reach and ought to be matters that intelligent, reasonable

1 men can discuss with an objective in mind of finding a
2 rational and just solution. And you'll have no problem
3 speaking to, talking to and educating the man that is
4 speaking to you tonight. (Applause)

5 Now let me bring you back once again to the
6 shape and organization of that new partner, that equal part-
7 ner that we call Europe. Of course, its shape and form must
8 be up to the Europeans, we don't want it stamped in the USA,
9 made in the USA. But I think we ought to make it equally
10 clear that our hopes here have never been disguised, we're
11 a rather open people. They have been, as my previous re-
12 marks have implied, the hope of the common scientific;
13 technological-economic and commercial institutions of the
14 European community that those institutions might provide
15 the foundation for common political institutions as well.
16 And they have been that those present and possible future
17 institutions might be open to all who might adhere to
18 them, including, may I say, Great Britain. This has been
19 our hope. But it is not squeeze-play on our part, nor is
20 it a design that we wish to fasten upon others by our will.

21 Thus far my remarks have dealt primarily
22 with western Europe and our relationship thereto. But I
23 must suggest to you tonight that there is a wider Europe,
24 a Europe in which the forces of human emancipation are
25 straining and tugging at and literally tearing and diminishing,

1 an Iron Curtain. A Europe which compels now our full
2 attention. To do less would be to deceive ourselves
3 and to live under false illusion. I think that we must
4 not miss these unmistakable signs of change in some of
5 the nations of Eastern Europe. There is a tremendous
6 force at work in this world, here and elsewhere. A force
7 that says we want to be recognized. A force of emancipa-
8 tion. A force of change. More and more of the younger
9 generation, not just here, but indeed more and more of the
10 younger generation in Eastern Europe seeks to cast off the
11 ideological shackles of the past. They are but the child-
12 ren of the revolutionists, not the revolutionists.

13 So steadily, cautiously, the nations of
14 Eastern and Western Europe are drawing together ever more
15 into one wider Europe, and for Americans to fail to get
16 this message is to fail to make the proper judgements that
17 are required of a nation that seeks to lead.

18 But that wider Europe I know is still di-
19 vided. Germany remains divided despite the fact that German
20 reunification is central to the long-term peace and stability
21 of the world. Twenty-three years after World War II there
22 is no peace settlement. Millions of men and billions and
23 billions of dollars are still being invested by east and
24 west in the long-standing aftermath of that war. Being
25 invested, may I say, men, technology, science and money in

1 vast amounts even as people cry out for a better day.

2 So now let us speak of the peace and secur-
3 ity in Europe, which is, of course, in the end result the
4 peace and security of the United States, NATO, the most
5 enduring and successful defense alliance in history, I
6 believe continues to be a necessity, for western Europe
7 and ourselves. But NATO for two decades has contained
8 aggressive power and deterred war. It is truly an instru-
9 ment of peace.

10 But over the long run a policy of contain-
11 ment along becomes obsolete. The time of change has come.
12 And largely due, my fellow Americans, to the success of
13 our own policies. We are, in fact, in a new period and
14 we must recognize it. The time, therefore, has come for
15 the NATO alliance itself to look to a new dynamic vision
16 of a peaceful engagement rather than sheer containment.

17 I was privileged to visit the NATO Council
18 last year on behalf of your government. And I spoke then
19 for such a policy. And since that time the NATO Ministers
20 have actively explored the ways and the means of making a
21 policy of peaceful engagement workable, of transforming
22 our alliance from a defensive military organization to an
23 active, vitally political, social and economic tool which
24 may, through peaceful engagement, hasten the replacement
25 of the Iron Curtain that now divides Europe with an open

1 door that permits Europe to become whole once again.

2 The need is not to abandon NATO or to abandon its func-
3 tions of defense. The need is to modernize it like you
4 do your own industry, to transform and redirect it towards
5 the new priorities of a new era.

6 Now, just a word about the problem of those
7 millions of men and billions of dollars that are still be-
8 ing devoted to a rudimentary balance of security forces in
9 Europe. Security forces which today are costly, security
10 forces which today draw heavily upon the resources of every
11 country.

12 First of all, we cannot abandon a security
13 system which has worked without having something better
14 to replace it. And I think there is nothing to recommend a
15 one-sided retreat by ourselves and our allies, from our
16 responsibility to our own safety. No unilateral action.
17 Because such action, I believe, would destabilize a peril-
18 ous equilibrium. It would derail a developing detant.
19 It would resurrect old fears, and it would intensify lin-
20 gering insecurities. All of which would only add to the
21 confusion, tension, problem and the danger.

22 The diplomacy of the next decade, and I be-
23 lieve that you must hear these words from those of us that
24 seek your trust or those of us at least that speak to you
25 about our designs or our ambitions -- the diplomacy of the

1 next decade must recognize that dramatic pages are taking
2 place all over this world, not just in America. Not
3 merely violence in our streets, gentlemen, but in other
4 streets. Not merely student revolt here in protest, but
5 in other countries, east and west, north and south, Asia,
6 Africa, Latin America, Europe, America. New and differ-
7 ing demands by people all over the world, in the U.S. and
8 U.S.S.R., in France and Czechoslovakia, in Britain and
9 Poland, in Canada and Germany, will inevitably require in
10 the years ahead a most careful reexamination by all govern-
11 ments and all leaders of the priorities of both domestic
12 and international policies. A new day is here. And we
13 cannot close it out.

14 And we would be literally blind and danger-
15 ously blind to reality if we did not recognize that people
16 everywhere are insisting upon a greater allocation of their
17 respective national resources to building of freer and more
18 modern societies. And I say to those of us that live by
19 this great inspiration of freedom that this inspiration of
20 freedom is not in retreat, it has been on the march. The
21 totalitarian society is not spreading, rather it finds it-
22 self being adjusted, reformed, redesigned and if anything
23 retreating. For everyone, for every people in every na-
24 tion, the cost of defense and the security forces of de-
25 fense, whether made for in Moscow or in Washington, are

1 staggering. And they are rising. The defense budgets of
2 the next decade will blow your hat off, so to speak. Not
3 only for ourselves, but for others.

4 Therefore, it's my view that the time is
5 coming when all nations and governments involved in this
6 precarious balance of forces must take stock of these new
7 circumstances. Even a nation as wealthy as ours, and we-
8 re mightly welathy in terms of the total world gross na-
9 tional product, even this wealthy nation must constantly
10 review its priorities. There are limits and a prudent
11 and wise people will try to find those.

12 Therefore, it's my view that the task of
13 statesmanship in this last third of the 20th Century, in
14 the 1970s and hence, is to find some way, not alone but
15 in concert, to deescalate the arms race and to move in
16 common agreement towards a systematic scaling down of the
17 mutually oppressive burden and cost of our vast military
18 complex. I repeat: This must be done in concert with
19 allies and in negotiations with adversaries. I do not be-
20 lieve there is security in precipitous unilateral with-
21 drawal, precipitous unilateral disarmament. But I do be-
22 lieve that there is the possibility of a better world and
23 a better day and security by action in concert with part-
24 ners and in negotiation with adversaries. And I believe
25 that this must be done on American initiative since we are,

1 whether we like it or not, the political leader of the
2 west. And therefore there is a great deal now to commend
3 and recommend, a mutual reduction of the armed forces and
4 armaments facing each other in Europe. We must also do
5 our utmost to communicate to the leaders of the Soviet
6 Union that we seek such mutual reduction of forces and
7 armaments as a tangible means of reducing tension. In
8 short, adding to their security as well as ours.

9 Now, I know this seems far out, long-ranged.
10 But I do not see this as an impossibility. I see it as an
11 urgent necessity. And I believe that every wise and pru-
12 dent man of economics, of industry, of commerce, of poli-
13 tics can see it no other way. I know from some personal
14 experience that we have been and are able to deal with the
15 Soviet Union. We did in the case of the nuclear test ban
16 treaty. I was there for its signing. And if I may say
17 was a pioneer in its advocacy. The treaty banning nuclear
18 weapons from outer space and now the nuclear non-prolifer-
19 ation treaty before the United Nations. It is possible to
20 negotiate. Difficult as it is and difficult as it will be.

21 I believe, too, that there is the opportunity
22 for what has been called bridge-building, for lack of a
23 better phrase, to the East from and through increased or
24 increasingly accepted commercial, cultural and educational
25 means. Contact has been increasing and American members of

1 the business community are the first to participate in
2 this contact. And it is in this area where I think we
3 should be doing something now, and you should be backing
4 it. Something now that is immediate and tangible. We
5 should give to the President the discretionary authority
6 to remove restrictions, to trade and investment between
7 the United States and Eastern Europe. I think that by so
8 doing we would open up new markets and that we would re-
9 lease constructive, creative new means of building better
10 understanding.

11 The truth is, my fellow Americans, that some-
12 body else is in those markets. They are not being denied.
13 The only one that's being denied is the American economy.
14 And if that's good business, and if it's good politics,
15 then I guess I'm a poor judge of both. (Applause)

16 Now, some of the eastern European countries
17 are already members of organizations that affect your well-
18 being. For example, members of GAP, the world trading for-
19 um. Others are interested as well in the work of O.E.C.D.,
20 the organization of the Developed nations which is concerned
21 with economic and aid policy. We belong to these organiza-
22 tions as a government. You do not belong as an individual
23 participant because of our restrictive policies which deny
24 you that chance. Your government deals with them, yet we
25 say that our people cannot. I put a little more faith in

1 the people. I happen to believe that the best contacts
2 may be made outside of the realm of diplomacy and inside
3 the realm of commerce. (Applause)

4 All of this might eventually be followed
5 by membership in other multilateral organizations, from
6 the International Monetary Fund to the World Bank, invol-
7 ving both east and west. And if these forward steps can
8 be taken at a government level, as I've said, I have no
9 doubt that at a private level, businessman to businessman,
10 scientist to scientist, citizen to citizen, the whole pro-
11 cess of peaceful engagement of a free people competing
12 in a relatively closed society, would accelerate rapidly
13 the change that's taking place in Eastern Europe. I could
14 never understand what we're afraid of. Never could I
15 understand why we were unwilling to turn loose in this
16 country the greatest power that we have, the power of our
17 industry and our commerce and our trade and our economic
18 community.

19 I am not one of those public officials that
20 believes that government diplomacy alone can ever fulfill
21 the needs of this Republic. The partnership of government
22 and business is essential. (Applause)

23 And finally, gentlemen, this brings me to
24 the greatest of all tasks which goes far beyond our parochial
25 or our private concerns. It brings me to the task which

1 faces not only the Atlantic community and partnership,
2 but all who profess to be members in the family of man.
3 Pope John VVIII, that great peasant priest, said it so
4 well in his encyclical matar at Majestra. And these
5 words are the words of a prophet, as well as a statesman.

6 He said: "Given the growing interdependence
7 among the peoples of the earth, it is not possible to pre-
8 serve lasting peace if glaring economic and social inequal-
9 ity among them persists." This same great spiritual leader
10 said, "Where there is constant want, there is no peace."
11 Who has a greater stake in a world of law and order and
12 peace than the men that I'm looking at here tonight.
13 Which nation has a greater stake in a world of law and res-
14 pect for law, in a world of steady social progress than the
15 American nation. And therefore our interest in eliminating
16 these conditions which are not conducive to peace is para;
17 mount. And we above all who share this European heritage,
18 whose nations today are relatively rich and fortunate, at
19 least compared to others, bear a special obligation to
20 those who live in glaring economic and social inequality.

21 I speak, of course, of our obligation to
22 those nations which have not yet to reap the benefits of
23 the technological and social revolution. Our obligation
24 to help the so-called third world. This is not soft-headed
25 or soft-hearted nonsense as some people have termed it. But

1 it is a constructive, sound investment in the stability
2 and the peace of vast areas. And stability and peace is
3 your environment for your product, for your investment,
4 for this country. Nobody, no people has a greater stake
5 in these conditions. But it is more importantly, what I
6 speak of, a moral obligation, the very obligation that
7 Pope John spoke of.

8 Yes, we have a moral obligation. Why?
9 Because of who we are, of where we come from, of the
10 teachings, spiritual and political, that our entire civil-
11 ization represents. We have a moral obligation. To help
12 all men lift themselves to the state of human freedom and
13 dignity which is our own objective. Not an obligation to
14 do it for them, but an obligation to help them do it for
15 themselves. Not merely social security, but social oppor-
16 tunity, Not a welfare state, but a state of genuine oppor-
17 tunity, at home and abroad.

18 And just as the fortunate nations have this
19 responsibility to the less fortunate, so do we my friends
20 have the same responsibility to the less fortunate within
21 our own borders. This is not mere sentiment; it is an
22 imperative. Political, economic and moral. Only in this
23 past quarter century have nations on a scale that really
24 means something, begun to accept this concept of responsi-
25 bility. And I count it a major victory for America that our

1 commitments to that concept of service, that concept of
2 responsibility, commitments at home as well as abroad,
3 have led others to follow. It is but another way of
4 telling us that we cannot turn back.

5 There is but one world, and there is no
6 escape from it. Unless it is the escape of destruction.
7 This, then, is the task that we the people have who live
8 along the Atlantic -- to end the civil wars that have
9 torn the European continent for generations. To make
10 that continent once again, if we can, one continent, to
11 reduce the causes of tensions and conflict which divide
12 men and engage men together in the works of peace. To
13 work for the day, as a noble spirit, Adlai Stevenson,
14 expressed it, when men have learned to live as members
15 of the same family, to respect each other's differences,
16 to heal each other's wounds, to promote each other's pro-
17 gress, and to benefit from each other's knowledge. That
18 is the meaning of interdependence. And that is the only
19 philosophy, gentlemen, that offers any hope for a world
20 that is plunging ahead at a breakneck pace towards what?
21 Well, what we as intelligent people will it. Because
22 there is no direction to humanity unless God and man to-
23 gether direct it. And I call upon the leaders of industry
24 in America to do for this country what you have done for
25 our industry. To make it a country of excellence, excellence

1 in spirit, excellence in purpose, and excellence in per-
2 formance. Because really the business of America now is
3 America. And what it stands for. And it stands for one
4 thing above all in these days: It stands for hope, for
5 people who feel hopeless. It stands for strength, for
6 people who are weak. It stands for a better day for
7 those who live in the darkness of the night of despair.
8 And I have a feeling that if we join together in common
9 cause, there is no force on this earth that can prevent
10 this nation of ours being judged by history and historians
11 as a great nation, inhabited by a great people who believe
12 in doing what some people called the impossible.

13 Thank you very much. (Applause)

14 (SESSION ADJOURNED)

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7:30 P.M.

5/15/68

8:30 P.M.

REMARKS
VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT H. HUMPHREY
AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK
MAY 23, 1968

As leaders of an industry whose scope is global, you are acutely

that interdependence has become a
aware of ~~one constant characteristic of the world: it changes.~~ You know

physical fact of our lives,

that the answers to the questions of the last score of years, whether in

business or in technology, are relevant chiefly as history, because the

questions are no longer the same. The same situation exists in the relations

of the United States with the rest of the world. If the ends of foreign

policy -- our national interest -- do not alter, certainly the questions

about the means are changing. And so we need new answers to questions

about the role of the U.S. in an ever-changing world.

The world is moving in a hundred different directions at often

break-neck speed. I don't have to tell you that we can't stop the world

and demand to get off. ~~We live in an intimacy~~ *exponentially increasing* with other peoples the

world over ~~which~~ is as inescapable as is the intimacy with which we live

with our problems here at home. If at times it is ~~a~~ very uncomfortable,

~~intimacy~~, we must not forget that it was brought about ~~largely~~ by great

revolutions in science, technology and communications. We can't escape

it short of denying science, technology and communications their great

promise for the benefit of mankind.

The world of the 1970's will
~~No. Serious solutions to the problems of foreign policy in the 1970's~~

therefore not permit.
~~lie between what some people call "the new isolationism" and the abdication~~

of the responsibilities of power -- ~~and a kind of guilt-feeling for all the~~

→ was with the regret
~~world's evil -- the assumption of a unilateral obligation to impose a cure~~

for every ill. Between these ~~self-defeating~~ extremes lies all serious

discussion of our national interest ~~and~~ our national purpose ~~in~~ the world.

Tonight

~~Today~~ I want to talk about ~~just~~ one aspect of foreign policy -- our

relations with Europe. Because of the war in Vietnam, some people have

has suggested
~~taken refuge in a World War II frame of mind and decided that the primary~~

focus of American foreign policy today must be in Asia, with Europe a poor

second. ^{then} Such notions of priority were inevitable in World War II when men and material had to be allocated to war fronts thousands of miles apart.

~~But~~ ^{in the} Those ~~who have had~~ day-to-day responsibility for conducting foreign

policy ^{view} in recent years have never been able to ~~look at~~ the problem this

way. The United States is a power in Asia; it is a power in Europe. Neither area has an over-riding priority. The art of conducting foreign policy involves learning how to use our power discreetly and effectively in various parts of the world.

What, then, of our relations with Europe today? ~~What are the real~~

~~possibilities and limitations in the exercise of our influence there?~~

Some will say not much. After all, very few European governments have chosen to support actively our commitments in Vietnam. Some European governments have voiced a lack of confidence in the strength of the dollar, largely because of the war in Vietnam. It is something new for the United

States to go it virtually alone in a major commitment overseas without the support of our traditional European allies and even in the face of active opposition from some.

But does this mean that our relations with Europe have become unimportant or that our influence counts for nothing there? Not at all. It simply means that we are talking to a very different Europe than existed in the 1940's and the 1950's, and even the early 1960's. *Although today's Europe* ~~in fact both the~~ *is a different continent than the 1950's,* peace of the world and our national interest require attention to Europe second to none. In the future as in the past, the relationship must be one of active cooperation, not merely mutual affinity of a passive character.

A year ago at Fulton, Missouri, I stated that it was within our power in the next decade -- that of Europe and America -- to "shift from the narrow context of coexistence to the broader vision of peaceful engagement" -- in our relations with the countries of Eastern Europe.

Tonight I would like to pursue this subject and to consider:

-- First, the movement toward West European unity;

-- Second, both the continuing and new requirements of European security;

-- Third, the efforts to end the division of Europe and make it whole again;

-- Fourth, the tensions engendered by the electronic and technological revolution; and

-- Finally, the role of Europe beyond Europe.

First, let me speak of the movement toward West European unity.

Today the nations of Western Europe stand independent, powerful, prosperous,

assured. If the mood which prompted Krushchev to brandish a Soviet missile over the Parthenon has passed, the capacity of his successors to enforce such a threat under changing conditions is appreciably greater. ~~Therefore~~ ~~with~~ the great achievement of Atlantic cooperation -- the North Atlantic Treaty Organization -- continues to be needed for the ~~absolute~~ security of Europe as a whole. ^{is} The U.S. commitment to NATO ~~will be~~ both necessary and firm.

Until European security is perceived in similar terms in Moscow and Washington, London and Warsaw, Brussels and Budapest, ready force structures will be needed to support peace through mutual deterrence. NATO ^{has been and} will continue to be the most efficient and reliable means for the countries of the Atlantic Alliance to focus their military resources for the preservation of peace until mutual fear subsides. ~~And~~ ^{Because} the U.S. component is essential to the Alliance's present strength, it cannot be diminished simply because it is expensive.

American and Soviet

Yet the reciprocal reduction of military forces in Europe would

contribute both to the long-term security and ~~to the long-term~~ solvency of Europe as well as the United States. Mutual reduction could accelerate the effort of Europeans to surpass the negative goal of containment and promote the positive search for economic and political integration on a continental scale. But the withdrawal must be reciprocal, not unilateral. Budget-balancing as a guide to security strategy remains as dubious in this ~~and future~~ decades as it was in the last. Unilateral withdrawal of troops from either half of Europe would only de-stabilize an existing equilibrium, derail a developing detente, resurrect old fears and intensify lingering insecurities. To those who seek to strengthen Europe's security by ending its division, unilateral withdrawal of forces has little to recommend it. But let me express my strong personal conviction that a mutual reduction of forces with those of the Warsaw Pact nations deserves our support. If our NATO allies agree, we should give this proposal high priority.

If a broader European security community is a possibility for the next decade, there are steps which we can take immediately to help draw the two halves of Europe together and to extend the area of cooperation with the Soviet Union.

For the peace of mankind, the United States and the Soviet Union have given highest priority to avoiding a nuclear confrontation, and to slowing down the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Both President Kennedy and President Johnson have sought every opportunity to reach agreements with the Soviet Union: to negotiate a Test Ban Treaty, a treaty banning nuclear weapons from outer space, and now the treaty to ban the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But the fate of Europe cannot be decided by the United States and the Soviet Union. This is why the United States has always sought the closest consultations with her European allies -- as recently in the case of the non-proliferation treaty -- before final decisions were

But
~~Most importantly~~ if this gap is not overcome, development could
propel us into a situation in which the U.S. would increasingly become
the only worldwide technological super-power. Such a situation would *only*
strengthen those who seek to confine the

perspective of Europe to a regional ~~one~~, rather than a worldwide one. This would not only inhibit progress in U.S.-European relations, but deprive the world of the contribution to peace and progress which Europe is uniquely equipped to provide.

What I would hope to see

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~~What is needed in the international field -- is some equivalent~~

forum which would bring together, under non-governmental auspices, men of wisdom and experience from the universities and foundations, science and industry, politics and the professions -- who could systematically assess the implications of this second industrial revolution for the world of the 1970's. An East-West Institute could perform this function. Its

recommendations would invariably become an important guide to governmental decision-making.

Moreover, as the European nations move into the second industrial revolution, we must begin to explore with Europe the ways in which we might jointly relate to the other two major industrial powers of the world -- the Soviet Union and Japan. In turn the four of us must examine the ways to relate to the vast developing areas of the world ^{for} whose future all four of us have ^a heavy responsibility.

For ultimately a policy such as I have outlined here -- of encouraging the development of a secure Europe, economically strong, politically unified, and in harmonious relationship with the U.S.A. and the USSR -- that policy cannot be pursued in isolation from our concern with the whole world's welfare as an integrated human community.

Thus, fifth and finally, I would like to consider the role Europe might play beyond Europe. The millions in the industrially advanced nations of the northern hemisphere will find cold comfort in their growing abundance if they do not assist the billions of fellow human beings south of them to meet the problems of hunger, overpopulation, illiteracy, and disease.

That is, both those who have attained ^{which} and those ^{or} who are in the process of

attaining a second revolution have a tremendous responsibility to help all others attain ^{the} a first revolution. The challenge to assist developing countries is not a matter of short-run expediency. The obligation of nations that are

*Reminds - George H. H. King
American Iron and Steel Institute J.R.
New York, N.Y. editing
May 23, 1968 5/18/68*

As leaders of an industry whose reach is global, you are acutely aware that interdependence has become a physical fact in the lives of nations--and thus in our business and professional and personal lives as well.

There are There are discomforts in this. Life is immeasurably more complex and more demanding in an inter-dependent world. ~~To~~ *my view* It also is a more challenging and infinitely more fascinating world.

There is no mystery about the well-springs of the current tide toward inter-dependence among nations. It is fed by the discoveries of science and the achievements of technology--in power, in transport, in communication, *and* in electronics, in *other* burgeoning areas of research and development. And there is nothing that political leaders could do to reverse that tide (even if they wanted to): what has been discovered cannot be de-discovered; what has been learned cannot be unlearned; what has been created will not be cast away. ~~And thank God there is no way to prevent a free mind from~~

We do not appear to any Post Americans.
We have no desire to play the role
of global guardian. But neither national
interest nor world peace and stability will permit
us to "retreat to 'farther America'."

We know from experience
that the "illusion of American
omnipotence", in D. W.
Brogan's phrase, is
an illusion.

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the pursuit of free inquiry!

So the fruits of science and technology and their political
by-products are with us whether we like it or not. And it behooves
us to like it for the simple reason that we are acquiring the means
to do a lot of good here on earth for the condition of man--if we have
the intelligence to perceive it and the will to do something about it.

~~Yet~~ we cannot escape the fact that with our present leadership
in science and technology--and with the economic and financial and
military implications of that leadership--goes national power. And
with national power goes responsibility for custodianship of power
which we can neither abdicate--nor use to prescribe cures for all
the world's ills. ~~So~~ any serious discussion of our foreign policy

will focus on the inevitable but limited use of our great but not
unlimited power.

share with you my views

Tonight I want to ~~talk~~ about one important aspect of our foreign
policy--our relations with Europe. Because of the war in Vietnam,

some have suggested--and others have feared--that the primary focus of American foreign policy today must be in Asia, with Europe tucked away somewhere in the back of the national consciousness.

But those with day-to-day responsibility for conducting foreign policy have never been able to view the problem this way. It is a fact of life that the United States is a Pacific power, *as well as an Atlantic Power,* We can be prudent; we can be measured; we can be restrained--and we should be.

But we cannot escape the ~~modern~~ *fact* that the art of conducting our foreign policy involves *both abstinence from the use of power* ~~and~~ *and* learning how to make our great power a constructive force for peace, stability, and progress in various parts of the world--~~and~~ *and* at the same time.

The key to this process we ~~understand instinctively~~ *is to* discover ~~and invent and contrive ways to share elements of our power~~ *and the responsibilities of* ~~with others~~ *with others* in constructive enterprise--enterprise based upon perceived common interest, ~~and conducted under mutually satisfactory~~ *formulas.* This, of course, is easier to say than to do.

(5) For two decades we have known constructive enterprise with ^{Western} Europe. From the Marshall Plan ~~and~~ ^{through} to NATO and the OECD, America and Western Europe have successfully cooperated in trans-atlantic ventures. Today an independent, prosperous and powerful Western Europe has progressed far in subsuming the ancient rivalries of Europe into the framework of common institutions.

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We have heard much of a larger Atlantic partnership--between North America, and a ^{strong} united Europe, ~~so strong~~ it can look us in the ~~eye as an equal in all respects~~. Of this we can only say that how

Europe organizes itself is up to the Europeans. What they decide will have more to do with our future relations than what we decide.

But we have never attempted to hide from our European friends what our hopes are for them. ^{We have never wanted} To put it negatively, if we had wanted the nations of western Europe to be weak, we would not have helped to strengthen them; if we had wanted to dominate them, we would have tried to divide them--not to unite them.
~~a weak, divided Europe.~~

~~To put it more positively.~~ We have hoped that the commercial and economic community taking shape in the new western Europe ^{some day} ^{some kind of} institutions would ~~prove to~~ be the foundation for an ultimate political unity. We have hoped that this would be an open and dynamic community with the welcome mat out for qualified applicants for membership. We

have hoped that this would be an outward-looking community, playing ^{a large role in world affairs.}

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6.

and capable of achieving a new role for Europe in the affairs of the world. This is due to the successful efforts of great Europeans -- Monnet, Adenauer, Spaak, de Gasperi, Schuman -- to subsume the ancient rivalries of Europe into the framework of common institutions. The European Communities provide the framework for the growing prosperity and unity within Western Europe. It may soon include other applicants -- so that ⁱⁿ the next decade ~~develops~~ ^{may} it ~~will~~ become a more inclusive framework, ~~than is now the case~~.

The way in which ^{Western} Europe organizes itself in the future is a matter ^{the world role of Europe and} for Europeans to decide. Their decisions will shape ^{the} the future of U.S.-European relations as much as, if not more than, decisions made in the United States. ^{We continue to believe} ~~indeed, these~~ ^{that} relations will be on a sounder footing ⁱⁿ ~~in~~

~~defense as in other fields~~ to the ~~very~~ degree that we can move toward a ^{to} partnership of equals. But as the new United States Ambassador ^{to} the United Nations, George Ball, has remarked in his recent book The Discipline

of Power, "Until Europe knows the reality of roughly equivalent power, Europeans will never risk the full acceptance of a partnership relation."

For Western Europe, political unity has become essential if Germany is to be reunited within a larger Europe, and the Iron Curtain is to be further dismantled. Yet it remains difficult to envisage a unified Germany without some change in the structure of Europe. The stability and security which could result from a united Europe is in the long-term interests of the Soviet Union as well as Europe and America. Such a politically united Europe cannot be an appendage of American power, a pampered American protectorate. ~~It~~ ^{but} must be a truly equal and independent partner, a Europe continental in scope and equal to the responsibilities of a great power. ~~Western Europe today is strong and offers an economically flourishing base for a larger, politically-~~ ~~united Europe of the future.~~

~~I would like~~ ^{Second let us consider} ~~if I may now~~ ^{to} ~~secondly~~ ^{to} ~~move on to consideration~~ of both the continuing

and new requirements of European security. Europe's security is not automatically

But how does all this apply to our relations with Europe today? We have known constructive enterprise with Europe; it has been based on common interest; it has been conducted under mutually satisfactory formulas. The Marshall Plan is only the most dramatically successful of such trans-Atlantic adventures in cooperation.

If many aspects of the European landscape have changed since 1945, much has changed. Some have not. Some remain with us today.

Yet in a fundamental way much has not changed: Europe is still divided; Germany is still a nation cut asunder; there has been no peace settlement of the Second World War which ended nearly a quarter of a century ago.

And so when we approach our relations with Europe, we must talk first of the peace of Europe--of the security of Europe--~~of the~~

and
~~security of the whole Atlantic area~~ and of the United States itself. *of the mood which prompted Khrushchev to brandish a Soviet missile over the Parthenon has passed, the capacity of*

To this end we--the Europeans and the Americans--signed the Treaty of Washington and formed the North Atlantic Council and

his successors to enforce such a threat under changing conditions is appreciably greater.

~~established a mutual defense organization under a Supreme Commander~~
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
~~nearly twenty years ago. Since then, NATO has turned out to be the~~

~~most ambitious, most enduring and most successful defense alliance~~
the
continues to be necessary for the
~~in history. This, too, has been a great adventure in cooperative trans-~~
security of Western Europe - as well as our
~~Atlantic enterprise. own~~ *Our* ~~Commitment to~~
NATO remains firm.

~~I suppose that if you asked a large number of people what the~~

For the past two decades, NATO has
~~purpose of NATO has been, the most consistent response would be to~~
been the instrument for implementing a
deterred and ed
policy of containment. This policy has
~~post-war world. And that would be part of the story but not the~~

~~whole story. Containment, in my view, was a necessary and almost~~

~~inescapable doctrine for the United States during the days of the~~

~~late Marshall Staling and it will be a cold day before somebody~~

Through this
~~persuades me that the policy of containment is unrelated to the fact~~

~~that Europe has known peace for more than two decades.~~

But containment necessarily is a static and negative concept.

~~A defensive alliance for the purpose of containment implies~~

~~In a defensive alliance based on containment, the member nations look inward~~
~~exclusivity; it suggests a closed group of nations looking inward to~~

~~to their own interests.~~

~~And over the long run, of course, a policy of~~

containment becomes obsolete--either because it fails or because it

succeeds. If it fails, there is war. If it succeeds for long enough,

the forces of change will be doing their work and new opportunities

will evolve, ~~however gradually~~, to search for the basis of a more

positive and more dynamic system of security--a more open and more

outward-looking style of relations among states. ~~And this was the~~

~~years we know that~~

~~most that ever could be asked of the doctrine of containment--that~~

~~succeeded.~~

by deterring war it would keep the peace and thus buy enough time

for enough change to occur so a better doctrine could, in due course,

become relevant and thus attainable.

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A year ago at Fulton, Missouri, I said that I thought it

of "peaceful engagement" should replace "containment" as a guide to relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

was within our power in the next decade--that of Europe and America

together--to shift from the narrow confines of coexistence with the

and the Soviet Union countries of eastern Europe to the ~~broader and~~ more hopeful vision

of peaceful engagement with them. And I still think so.

the next decade, ~~I believe that a policy~~ *As we approach*

~~Let me be clear first about several things. There are not~~ *I know*

~~many great watersheds in history; there are not many sharp turning~~

~~points or sea changes~~ *in history* at which, suddenly, everything is different from

But what it was yesterday. Complex patterns of political relationships do

~~indeed~~ *mark* ripen--and it is the ~~height~~ of statesmanship to sense when that

moment has arrived, ~~but~~ *only* they are likely to mature slowly, to respond

fitfully to the most careful cultivation. ~~Meanwhile, we can never see~~

~~very far ahead--especially when events will not be all, or nearly all,~~

~~of our own making.~~ *And* tradition lingers; old attitudes are not easily


discarded; ideology dies hard.

But we cannot miss the ^{unmistakable} signs
of ~~deeper~~ change in some of the nations
of Eastern Europe. (12.)

made. And now the Soviet Union is once again reminded that its hegemony
in Eastern Europe is waning.

More and more the countries of Eastern Europe are following their
own national interests -- which are not always identical with those of the
Soviet Union. More and more the younger generation seeks to cast off the
ideological shackles of the past -- and to participate in the establishment
of democracy at home and the achievement of a unified Europe. More and
more there is a dialogue about the place of individual freedom in modern
technical society, about labor's right to strike, about the role of opposition
parties. More and more the nations of Eastern and Western Europe are
cautiously drawing together.

It would be a mistake on our part to seek to influence directly the
changes now underway in Eastern Europe.



~~18~~ (13)

~~But we cannot miss the signs of recent change in some of the~~
~~nations of eastern Europe.~~ We would do well to note that they are

not of a pattern--that some stem from economic discontent, some

from the resurgence of nationalism, some from remembrance of lost

freedoms. Yet there is change, there is ferment; ^{with them come} ~~and~~ so new

opportunities ^{for the US and Western Europe} ~~are evolving~~ to seek a more generous, a more rewarding,

a more humane relationship with ~~them~~ ^{Eastern Europe.}

^{It would be a mistake to seek to influence directly the changes now underway in Eastern Europe.}
We do not wish to ~~sabotage or~~ poison relationships between
nations associated in the Warsaw Pact. We do not seek to drive
wedges between them--but to add bridges between them and us. ~~And~~

^{be developed}
whatever new forms and kinds of relationships ~~that we may work out~~

in the years ahead, surely we shall want to lessen the old tensions--

and if possible lower the level of the military stand-off that has

existed for some years now.

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5/20/68 (2)

REMARKS
VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT H. HUMPHREY
AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK
MAY 23, 1968

As leaders of an industry whose reach is global, you are acutely aware that interdependence has become a physical fact in the lives of nations -- and thus in our business, professional and personal lives as well.

~~In an interdependent world, life is immeasurably more complex. It is also more challenging and fascinating.~~

There is no mystery about ^{the sources of this} ~~the current tide toward interdependence~~ among nations. It is fed by the discoveries of science and the achievements of technology -- in power, transport, communications, electronics.

~~There is~~ ^{will} nothing that political leaders can do ^{the} to reverse ~~the~~ tide. ~~even if they wanted to.~~ ^W What has been discovered cannot be un-discovered; what has been learned cannot be unlearned; what has been created will not be cast away.

We in the United States cannot escape the fact that with our leadership in science and technology -- and with the economic, financial and military implications of that leadership -- goes national power. And with national power goes responsibility for its custodianship.

We cannot escape the fact that the art of conducting our foreign policy involves both abstinence from the use of power ^{as well as} ~~and learning how~~ ^{making its} ~~to make our~~ use ~~of it~~ a constructive force for peace, stability, and progress in various parts of the world -- and at the same time.

The key to this process is to discover and contrive ways to share the responsibilities of power with others in constructive enterprise -- enterprise based upon perceived common interests.

Tonight I want to ^{share} ~~share~~ with you my views about one of the fundamental aspects of our foreign policy, our relations with Europe. ^{Because} ~~Because~~ of the war in Vietnam, some have suggested -- and others have feared -- that

the primary focus of U.S. foreign policy today must be in Asia, with Europe tucked away somewhere in the back of the national consciousness.

But those with day-to-day responsibility for conducting foreign policy have never been able to view the problem this way. It is a fact of life that the United States is a Pacific power; but it is also an Atlantic power.

Sharing the responsibilities of power across the Atlantic in the next decade ~~requires not~~ ^(does not necessarily imply) a smaller role for the United States, but ^{it certainly requires} a larger role for Europe. ~~An outward-looking Europe -- a Europe facing not only the North Atlantic but also the world at large -- can once again become a leading architect of human destiny.~~

For two decades we have known constructive cooperation with Western Europe. From the Marshall Plan to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,

America and Western Europe have successfully cooperated in trans-Atlantic

At the meantime, an increasingly
ventures. ~~Today~~ an independent, prosperous and powerful Western Europe

has ~~progressed~~ *gone* far in subsuming its ancient rivalries into the framework

of common institutions.

in How Europe organizes itself is, of course, up to the Europeans.

But we have never attempted to hide from our European friends what our

hopes are. We have never wanted a weak, divided Europe. *At* We have

hoped that the commercial and economic community taking shape in ~~the~~

new Western Europe institutions would someday be the foundation for some

kind of political unity. We have hoped that this *community* would be *growing and* ~~an advanced~~

open to all
dynamic ~~community with the welcome mat out for~~ qualified applicants for

membership. We have hoped that this would be an outward-looking

Europe, *facing not only the North Atlantic but also the world*
~~community, playing a large role in world affairs~~

at large — a Europe once again a leading architect of
human destiny.

Our relations with such a developing Europe

~~As for relations between a united Europe and North America, we~~

~~continue to believe that they will be on a sounder footing to the degree~~ *not to the extent that it*

~~that we can move toward a partnership of equals.~~ *It comes becomes* ~~But as the new United~~ *This means a*

~~States Ambassador to the United Nations, George Ball, has remarked in~~

~~partnership until, in George Ball's words, "Until Europe knows the reality~~

~~of roughly equivalent power, Europeans will never risk the full acceptance~~ *the reality of roughly equivalent power.* ~~of roughly equivalent power, Europeans will never risk the full acceptance~~

~~of a partnership relationship.~~

~~Initiation~~

~~If many aspects of the European landscape of the late '40's and~~

41 ~~The achievement of this reality is still ahead of us.~~ *The achievement of this reality is still ahead of us.* ~~the early '50's have long since vanished, some remain with us today~~

~~Europe is still divided; Germany has yet to be united; there is still no~~ *and unification remains essential to the peace and stability of Europe;*

~~peace settlement of the Second World War which ended nearly a quarter of~~

~~a century ago.~~

And so when we approach our relations with Europe, we must *still*

talk first of the peace of Europe -- of the security of Europe -- and of the

United States as well. If the mood which prompted Khrushchev to brandish a Soviet missile over the Parthenon has passed, the capacity of his successors to enforce such a threat ~~under changing conditions~~ is appreciably greater.

NATO, the most enduring and successful defense alliance in history, continues to be necessary for the security of Western Europe -- as well as our own. Our commitment to NATO remains firm.

For the past two decades, NATO has been the instrument for implementing a policy of containment. This policy has contained the outward thrust of the Soviet Union and has deterred war. Containment was a necessary and almost inescapable doctrine for the United States during the days of the late Marshal Stalin.

But over the long run, the negative policy of containment becomes obsolete -- either because it fails or because it succeeds. If it fails,

there is war. If it succeeds for long enough, the forces of change will bring about opportunities for a more positive system of security ~~---a more open and more outward-looking style of relations among states.~~

After twenty years we know that the doctrine of containment has succeeded, and the doctrine of coexistence is not enough. It is time for something new.

A year ago at Fulton, Missouri, I said that I thought it was within the power of Europe and America to shift from the narrow confines of coexistence with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to the more dynamic vision of peaceful engagement. ⁹¹ As we approach the next decade, I believe that a policy of peaceful engagement should become our guide to relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

I know there are not many sharp turning points in history at which, suddenly, everything is different from what it was yesterday. But we cannot

miss the unmistakable signs of change in some of the nations of Eastern

Europe. Increasingly they are following their own national interests --

which are not always identical with those of the Soviet Union. More and

more the younger generation seeks to cast off the ideological shackles of

the past -- and to participate in the establishment of democracy at home.

The dialogue grows about the place of individual freedom in modern technical society, about labor's right to strike, about the role of opposition parties.

And steadily, cautiously, the nations of Eastern and Western Europe are drawing together.

These changes stem from a variety of causes -- from economic discontent, from the resurgence of nationalism, from remembrance of lost freedoms. But there is change. And with it comes opportunities for the U.S. and Western Europe to find the more generous, more rewarding, more humane relationship with Eastern Europe that we have always wanted.

As for the new relationships that are developing among the nations of Eastern Europe itself, we can only hope they will not inhibit the lessening of ~~on~~ ^{with the West} tensions and the easing of the present military stand-off.

For all practical purposes there is a balance of forces in Europe today, a balance representing a rudimentary kind of security system. We must not throw away a security system which has worked for two decades unless and until there is a better system to replace it. It would be foolish to buy time for fundamental change to take place and then precipitously cancel the whole investment at the first fitful signs of change. ⁴ There is nothing to recommend a one-sided retreat from the barriers that have held so well. This would only de-stabilize an existing equilibrium, derail a developing detente, resurrect old fears and intensify lingering insecurities.

But there is a great deal to recommend a ^{mutual} ~~balanced~~ and balanced reduction of the armed forces facing each other in Europe. The time has

come

~~arranged~~ to negotiate the first steps in a mutual reduction of the current

level of East-West forces and armament in Europe ^{of} ~~not~~ because we must

correct our balance of payments or because we need troops elsewhere,

but because we earnestly seek to further promote peaceful engagement

in Europe. ⁹ I hope our NATO allies will ^{support this approach} ~~see this in the same light~~ -- for

if we are to move in this direction we must be in agreement about the

objective and the general line of approach.

~~There is reason to hope that~~ The leaders of the Soviet Union might

~~be persuaded~~ ^{that we share a mutual} ~~of~~ ^{interest} ~~we share~~ in a mutual reduction of forces, ~~that~~

~~there is indeed common ground for agreement.~~ For it is the perception of

~~mutual interest that~~ ⁹ common ground which is the starting point for agreement. ^{do} It was in the

case of the test ban treaty, and in the treaty to ban weapons of mass

destruction in outer space, and in the case of the draft treaty to limit the

spread of nuclear weapons which is now before the United Nations General

Assembly. ⁹ We hope the Soviet Union will find ~~it~~ such mutual interest in our ~~offer~~ offer to discuss control of both offensive and defensive weapons systems.

If a mutual thinning out of forces could begin soon, conditions might become favorable for an enlarged framework of European security.

Such a new framework should include both Western and Eastern Europe, as well as the United States and the Soviet Union. ⁹ Although this is a task of many years' duration, it offers hope that the wars which have afflicted and divided the industrially advanced nations for the past 150 years can someday come to an end.

To these steps in the security field must be added initiatives in the commercial, cultural and education fields ⁹ which offer opportunities ~~for~~

~~to~~ ^{to} further peaceful engagement ~~into~~ Eastern Europe.

~~what we~~ In the United States ~~could~~ ~~what we~~ must do ~~to~~

^{give}
~~remove as soon as possible any and all legal restrictions on the President's~~

discretionary authority ^{to allow} ~~which may limit~~ trade, investment, tourism, and

cultural exchange between the United States and Eastern Europe. ⁹ While ~~the~~ ^{existing}

^{legal} ~~these~~ ^(~~mandatory~~) restrictions were valid in ^{to} ~~decades~~ past, ~~today and tomorrow~~ they ~~now~~

serve only to prevent Americans from joining with Europeans in our common

dialogue about how to live in ^a modern technical society. ^{in this dialogue, the OECD} ~~Here the OECD~~

~~has useful relations~~

Insert A from p. 18

In our efforts to promote reconciliation between ~~both halves of~~

~~Europe~~, between the U.S. and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, we

should not rely exclusively upon ~~our~~ governments. Private trade and invest-

ment and joint ventures are ^{important} ~~leading~~ channels for exchanging ~~if~~ new technology

and techniques, including the techniques of modern management.

The subject of technology has been a source of concern in the past
several years. The "technology gap" between the United States and the

~~Insert from p. 18~~

nations of Western Europe or the "American Challenge," to use the phrase of Jean-Jacques Servan-Screiber's (popular and perceptive book), cannot be ignored by those who care ~~deeply~~ about the future of U.S.-European relations.

Insert from Ball - Pt 8

~~It is now widely recognized that the "technology gap" is not rooted in an American design to scientifically or technologically deprive its friends. Europeans now perceive that the gap did not begin and end with technology as such. They see that the gap goes to the scale of the economy -- to the size of individual corporations -- to the science policies of governments and the research budgets of firms -- to the educational system and the social structure and on to attitudes of men in management toward markets and prices and product improvement and many other things.~~

~~It is now realized, too, that the trans-Atlantic technological gap is not the only one. It appears that there is also a technological gap between~~

Western Europe and Eastern Europe; between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Choices about future emphases -- about research and development budgets, educational innovations, the benefits of competition and consolidation, the potential growth of continental sources of talent and capital -- these are clearly decisions for Europeans to make.

But we must find some way to encourage a continuous exchange of technological and organizational experience between Western Europe and the United States -- which will achieve an equilibrium that can be maintained -- and someday expanded to include Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

It would be a worthwhile adventure in cooperative enterprise if an East-West Institute were established under non-governmental auspices in which experts from nations on both sides -- men from science and

industry, universities and laboratories, politics and the professions -- systematically assessed the implications of the technology gap for the world of the 1970's.

I have talked mostly of our relations -- with Western Europe -- and with Eastern Europe and with the Soviet Union -- because these bear upon peace, upon our security, upon our vital national interests.

Finally I would like to consider the role which Europe might play beyond Europe -- the role which Europe can play in bringing progress and stability to the developing nations of the world. There is ^{a crucial} ~~not only a moral~~ obligation for the developed countries. ~~But~~ As Pope John XXIII stated in the encyclical Mater et Magistra, "... given the growing interdependence among the peoples of the earth, it is not possible to preserve lasting peace if glaring economic and social inequality among them persist."

Insert B from Ball

Any realistic appraisal indicates that both Europe and America should be supplying ~~at least~~ ^{of 10-15%} twice as much in external assistance to the developing world as is now the case. Instead of accelerating the ~~trend~~ ^{to} dumping surplus military hardware on countries which already possess military forces too large for their security needs, ^{their economic capacities,} and which further endangers ~~precarious economies,~~ Europe and America should be concerting to ^{help} provide the southern half of the world with ^{its human needs} the type of assistance it requires. Our hope is that assistance can be increasingly channeled through multilateral agencies.)

Insert from Ball - pt 16

But we must understand Europe's reluctance to provide additional financial assistance for projects which she has not chosen, according to priorities which she does not share. ^{And} ~~If eventually~~ an outward-looking Europe ^{contribute to} ~~would assume~~ ^{development from Europe,} a political role in Africa and Latin America, and Asia, this ~~would be a development to be welcomed, not an intruder to be feared.~~

*John
for
do
this
wishes clearly*

The experience of the past decade suggests that the economic progress sought in the developing world, the social justice which people aspire to, can be securely achieved only where political institutions are strong and resilient. Economic and social development can help significantly to provide the basis for progress and stability, but it will not guarantee it. The past and prospective inadequacy of economic and social progress argues strongly for more conscious action to develop political systems that can enable rapidly-changing societies to contain and manage explosive tensions within them.

inspiration

Among the developing countries which seek assistance in the political development field, some may find the European political experience more relevant than our own. ~~In this area non-governmental assistance is usually preferable.~~ ~~It is usually~~ ~~inspired~~ *parties* The two major post-war political parties of Western Europe, ~~the Christian Democratic and the Social Democratic~~, have demonstrated a commitment to economic and social progress and a program capable of

integrating all groups into society. For certain ^{developing} countries, ~~the~~ contribution
of these ~~parties and other non-governmental institutions~~ ^{and other movements} can be of
greater significance than conventional ^{government} economic assistance programs.

In conclusion, we have learned to respect West Europeans for being
good Europeans, after many years of praising them for being good Atlantic
partners. We understand that the economic and political future of Europe
is for Europeans, not Americans, to decide. But along with this appreciation
goes an awareness of a common need ^{for a more effective set of} ~~to create an even larger~~ economic and
~~relationships between~~ ^{and} political ~~integration of~~ North and South, developed and developing regions.

The task for the present European generation is to continue, and
for the next generation to complete, the process of making Europe whole
~~again~~; of moving beyond containment to peaceful engagement; so that men
of the European family never again wage war against each other as hostile
neighbors; never again coexist in frigid isolation separated by an Iron

Curtain. Together -- Europe and America must strive for the glorious if distant day, as a great man -- Adlai Stevenson -- once said, "When men have learned to live as members of the same human family, to respect each other's differences, to heal each other's wounds, to promote each other's progress, and to benefit from each other's knowledge."

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REMARKS
VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT H. HUMPHREY
AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK
MAY 23, 1968

As leaders of an industry whose reach is global, you are acutely aware that interdependence has become a physical fact in the lives of nations -- and thus in our business, professional and personal lives as well.

In an interdependent world, life is immeasurably more complex. It is also more challenging and fascinating.

Nothing that political leaders can do will reverse this tide. What has been discovered cannot be un-discovered; what has been learned cannot be unlearned; what has been created will not be cast away.

We in the United States cannot escape the fact that with our leadership in science and technology -- and with the economic, financial

and military implications of that leadership -- goes national power. And with national power goes responsibility for its custodianship.

We cannot escape the fact that the art of conducting our foreign policy involves both abstinence from the use of power as well as making its use a constructive force for peace, stability, and progress in various parts of the world -- and at the same time.

The key to this process is to discover and contrive ways to share the responsibilities of power with others in constructive enterprise -- enterprise based upon perceived common interests.

Tonight I want to share with you my views about one of the fundamental aspects of our foreign policy, our relations with Europe. Because of the war in Vietnam, some have suggested -- and others have feared -- that

the primary focus of U.S. foreign policy today must be in Asia, with Europe tucked away somewhere in the back of the national consciousness.

But those with day-to-day responsibility for conducting foreign policy have never been able to view the problem this way. It is a fact of life that the United States is a Pacific power, but it is also an Atlantic power.

Sharing the responsibilities of power across the Atlantic in the next decade requires not a smaller role for the United States, but a larger role for Europe. An outward-looking Europe -- a Europe facing not only the North Atlantic but also the world at large -- can once again become a leading architect of human destiny.

For two decades we have known constructive cooperation with Western Europe. From the Marshall Plan to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,

America and Western Europe have successfully cooperated in trans-Atlantic ventures. Today an independent, prosperous and powerful Western Europe has progressed far in subsuming its ancient rivalries into the framework of common institutions.

How Europe organizes itself is, of course, up to the Europeans.

But we have never attempted to hide from our European friends what our hopes are. We have never wanted a weak, divided Europe. We have hoped that as Europe and America have benefitted greatly from trade between the vastly enlarged economic community, the benefits for both will continue.

There have been some dislocations on both sides, but the experience has shown that it is better for both if close consultation occurs rather than closing ourselves off through artificial barriers.

We have hoped that the commercial and economic community taking shape in the new Western Europe institutions would someday be

the foundation for some kind of political unity. We have hoped that this would be a growing and dynamic community, open to all qualified applicants for membership. We have hoped that this would be an outward-looking Europe -- a Europe once again^a leading architect of human destiny.

Our relationship with a developing Europe will be sounder to the degree that we can move toward a partnership of equals. And Europe will not risk such a partnership until, in the words of Ambassador George Ball, it "knows the reality of roughly equivalent power. "

The achievement of this reality is still ahead of us. Europe is still divided; Germany has yet to be united; a reunification remains essential to the peace and stability of Europe; there is still no peace settlement of the Second World War which ended nearly a quarter of a century ago.

And so when we approach our relations with Europe, we must talk first of the peace of Europe -- of the security of Europe -- and of the

United States as well. If the mood which prompted Khrushchev to brandish a Soviet missile over the Parthenon has passed, the capacity of his successors to enforce such a threat is appreciably greater.

NATO, the most enduring and successful defense alliance in history, continues to be necessary for the security of Western Europe -- as well as our own. Our commitment to NATO remains firm, and we view the North Atlantic Council as a forum of growing importance for consideration of issues which divide East and West.

For the past two decades, NATO has been the instrument for implementing a policy of containment. This policy has contained the outward thrust of the Soviet Union and has deterred war. Containment was a necessary and almost inescapable doctrine for the United States during the days of the late Marshal Stalin.

But over the long run, the negative policy of containment becomes obsolete -- either because it fails or because it succeeds. If it fails, there is war. If it succeeds for long enough, the forces of change will bring about opportunities for a more positive system of security.

After twenty years we know that the doctrine of containment has succeeded, and the doctrine of coexistence is not enough. It is time for something new.

A year ago at Fulton, Missouri, I said that I thought it was within the power of Europe and America to shift from the narrow confines of coexistence with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to the more dynamic vision of peaceful engagement. As we approach the next decade, I believe that a policy of peaceful engagement should become our guide to relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

I know there are not many sharp turning points in history at which, suddenly, everything is different from what it was yesterday. But we cannot

miss the unmistakable signs of change in some of the nations of Eastern Europe. Increasingly they are following their own national interests -- which are not always identical with those of the Soviet Union. More and more the younger generation seeks to cast off the ideological shackles of the past -- and to participate in the establishment of democracy at home.

The dialogue grows about the place of individual freedom in modern technical society, about labor's right to strike, about the role of opposition parties. And steadily, cautiously, the nations of Eastern and Western Europe are drawing together.

These changes stem from a variety of causes -- from economic discontent, from the resurgence of nationalism, from remembrance of lost freedoms. But there is change. And with it comes opportunities for the U.S. and Western Europe to find the more generous, more rewarding, more humane relationship with Eastern Europe that we have always wanted.

As for the new relationships that are developing among the nations of Eastern Europe itself, we can only hope they will not inhibit the lessening of tensions with the West and the easing of the present military stand-off.

For all practical purposes there is a balance of forces in Europe today, a balance representing a rudimentary kind of security system. We must not throw away a security system which has worked for two decades unless and until there is a better system to replace it. It would be foolish to buy time for fundamental change to take place and then precipitously cancel the whole investment at the first fitful signs of change. There is nothing to recommend a one-sided retreat from the barriers that have held so well. This would only de-stabilize an existing equilibrium, derail a developing detente, resurrect old fears and intensify lingering insecurities.

But there is a great deal to recommend a mutual reduction of the armed forces facing each other in Europe. The time has come to negotiate the first steps in a mutual reduction of the current level of East-West forces

and armament in Europe. We should make this effort not because we must correct our balance of payments or because we need troops elsewhere, but because we earnestly seek to further promote peaceful engagement in Europe. I hope our NATO allies will agree -- for if we are to move in this direction we must be in agreement about the objective.

The leaders of the Soviet Union might be persuaded that we share a mutual interest in a mutual reduction of forces. For it is the perception of mutual interest that is the starting point for agreement.

It was so in the case of the test ban treaty, and in the treaty to ban weapons of mass destruction in outer space, and in the case of the draft treaty to limit the spread of nuclear weapons which is now before the United Nations General Assembly. We hope the Soviet Union will find a mutual interest in our offer to discuss control of offensive and defensive weapons systems.

If a mutual thinning out of forces could begin soon, conditions might become favorable for an enlarged framework of European security. Such a new framework should include both Western and Eastern Europe, as well as the United States and the Soviet Union. Although this is a task of many years' duration, it offers hope that the wars which have afflicted and divided the industrially advanced nations for the past 150 years can someday come to an end.

To these steps in the security field must be added initiatives in the commercial, cultural and education fields, which offer opportunities to further peaceful engagement in Eastern Europe.

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We in the United States must give the President discretionary authority to allow trade, investment, tourism and cultural exchange between the United States and Eastern Europe. While existing legal restrictions were valid in the past, they now serve only to prevent Americans from

joining with Europeans in our common dialogue about how to live in modern technical society.

We should welcome and encourage the interest East European countries have shown in joining the OECD. Such a development could eventually be followed by membership in the World Bank and its related organizations.

In our efforts to promote reconciliation between Western Europe and the U.S. and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, we should not rely exclusively upon governments. Private trade and investment and joint ventures are important channels for exchanging new technology and techniques, including the techniques of modern management.

The subject of technology has been a source of concern in the past several years. The "technology gap" or the "American challenge" -- to use the phrase of Jean-Jacques Servan-Screiber's popular and perceptive

book, reflects in large degree the structural differences between the United States and Europe. With a great continent to develop, we Americans have built many of our industries on a giant scale and today our corporations are expanding their activities throughout the world, utilizing the world's finite store of resources at a new level of efficiency, and thus contributing to the welfare of everyone. At the same time, because of the great resources they can command, they are able to finance and sustain prodigious efforts of research and development.

This is less true of Europe. Europe suffers from an older structure of enterprises organized primarily to serve small national markets. While, in the past decade, Europeans have made great progress in moving toward economic integration, this has not yet found full reflection in the organization of enterprise on the scale demanded by modern requirements.

Choices about future emphases -- about research and development budgets, educational innovations, the benefits of competition and

consolidation, the potential growth of continental sources of talent and capital -- these are clearly decisions for Europeans to make.

We should do everything possible to encourage them. Thus it is important that we maintain a continuous exchange of technological and organizational experience between Europe and the United States -- a flow which someday, we can hope, might include Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Finally I would like to consider the role which Europe might play beyond Europe -- the role which Europe can play in bringing progress and stability to the developing nations of the world. There is not only a moral obligation for the developed countries. But as Pope John XXIII stated in the encyclical Mater et Magistra, ". . . given the growing interdependence among the peoples of the earth, it is not possible to preserve lasting peace if glaring economic and social inequality among them persist."

We must be quite clear about the role that Europe and America and the other industrially advanced nations of the Northern Hemisphere should play with regard to the poorer nations, which lie primarily in the Southern Hemisphere. Those of us who live in areas that have reaped the benefits of a first industrial revolution, and are in the process of benefitting from a second, cannot shirk our responsibilities to help other nations for whom industrialization is still more a hope than an experience.

The need to assist developing countries is not a matter of short-range expediency -- not something we must justify in terms of immediate returns in order not to be thought soft-headed -- and we do ourselves an injustice when we talk as though it were.

Any realistic appraisal indicates that both Europe and America should be supplying ~~the same amount~~ *considerably more* in external assistance of all kinds to the developing world as is now the case. Instead of accelerating the

dumping of surplus military hardware on countries which already possess military forces too large for their security needs, and their economic capacities, Europe and America should be concerting to help provide the southern half of the world with the type of assistance it requires.

This does not mean, of course, that Europe should be expected merely to pick up the check for the residual cost of American development projects. European peoples in their relations with the less developed countries have their own order of priorities, and that is for them to decide. Nor should we seek to limit their efforts to help other nations by any preconceived or doctrinaire views as to special areas of influence or responsibility.

The experience of the past decade suggests that the economic progress sought in the developing world, the social justice which people aspire to can be securely achieved only where political institutions are

strong and resilient. Economic and social development can help significantly to provide the basis for progress and stability, but it will not guarantee it.

The past and prospective inadequacy of economic and social progress argues strongly for more conscious action to develop political systems that can enable rapidly-changing societies to contain and manage explosive tensions within them.

Among the developing countries which seek inspirations in the political development field, some may find the European political experience more relevant than our own. The two major post-war political parties of Western Europe have demonstrated a commitment to economic and social progress and a program capable of integrating all groups into society. For certain developing countries, the contribution of these parties and of other non-governmental institutions -- can be of greater significance than conventional government economic assistance programs.

In conclusion, we have learned to respect West Europeans for being good Europeans, after many years of praising them for being good Atlantic partners. We understand that the economic and political future of Europe is for Europeans, not Americans, to decide. But along with this appreciation goes an awareness of a common need to create a more effective set of economic and political relationships between North and South, and developed and developing regions.

The task for the present European generation is to continue, and for the next generation to complete, the process of making Europe whole; of moving beyond containment to peaceful engagement; -- so that men of the European family never again wage war against each other as hostile neighbors; never again coexist in frigid isolation separated by an Iron Curtain. Together -- Europe and America must strive for the glorious if distant day, as a great man -- Adlai Stevenson -- once said, "When men have learned to live as members of the same human family, to respect each other's differences, to heal each other's wounds, to promote each other's progress, and to benefit from each other's knowledge."

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REMARKS

VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT HUMPHREY

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE

NEW YORK

MAY 23, 1968

Tonight I wish to share with you my thoughts about a fundamental aspect of our foreign policy---our relationship with the continent of Europe.

Because of the war in Vietnam, it has been suggested---and, ^{by some,} ~~others~~ have feared---that American foreign policy has taken a permanent Asian detour, with Europe ~~tacked away somewhere in the~~ to the exclusion of ~~other priorities,~~ to the particular ~~detriment~~ detriment of our long-standing ~~relationship~~ and more familiar relationship with Europe.

As one who has participated in policy formulation during this period, I respond by saying this: Yes, America has awakened to Asia. There has been clear and present trouble there.

America has awakened, or is awakening, at the same time to Latin America and to Africa.

But this has not, ~~and should not,~~ meant---nor should it mean in the

future---that America can afford to attach anything but the highest importance to its relationship ~~with~~ across the Atlantic.

America has learned painfully that it is a Pacific power. But America is, and must remain, an Atlantic power.

For, in the calculation of problems and possibilities in this world, this is clear: It is still Europe and America which together have both the means and capacity to most directly and effectively influence---for the better---the world's future.

(A) from p 4 ***

One year ago I went, as the President's representative, to Western Europe with this basic message: *about the future:* We welcome your new strength, prosperity and unity. Despite its occasional pain to ourselves, we welcome your new spirit of independence and of "Europeanism." Let us now, working together in a spirit of greater equality, raise our sights beyond the Atlantic to the opportunities which lie at hand in the wider human society.

I was encouraged by the ^{Western European} response to that message. Yet I also came home with the knowledge that both Atlantic partners were in for a period of adjustment.

---Adjustment by us, as the habitual senior partner^s, to the idea that Western Europe was finally approaching the capacity for becoming an equal partner, and must be treated accordingly;

|---Adjustment by Western Europe, as the longtime junior partner, to the realization that equal partnership brought with it not only the opportunity for ~~self-betterment but~~ new status and growth, but also the responsibility ^{challenges} ~~for~~ to meet wider ~~responsibilities~~ reaching far beyond the Atlantic basin.

Both of us have made some of that adjustment. But neither nearly enough.

If our Atlantic Partnership is to grow and prosper, ~~we shall have to maintain our interest and commitment~~ continue our commitment to it. it will inevitably mean not a smaller role for us, but a larger role for Western Europe. And that is as it should be.

An outward-looking Western Europe---facing not only the Atlantic but the world at large---can once again become a leading architect of human destiny.

And, as that happens, we can take not alarm but pride in the fact that---a little more than 20 years later---a Western Europe that was torn by hate and war has risen to play a large and ~~peaceful~~ ~~role~~ role beside us on the world stage. ~~Equality for our European partners? Yes: We should.~~

~~I will not recite tonight the record of~~
~~We have not yet reached it, but I believe we should welcome the~~
~~time when it comes---but I believe we shall~~

So I believe it is that time---as my friend George Ball put it, when Western Europe "knows the reality of roughly equivalent power,"--- that we should look and plan toward.

* * * * *

in detail
I will not recite tonight ^{in detail} all the joint achievements of these past two decades---the story of Western Europe coming again to its feet... of its movement toward economic and political unity...of our joint resistance to Communist pressures from the East...of our working together to bring new trade and economic growth to the world...of our steadfast adherence, during times of trouble, to ~~the~~ democratic institutions and the rights of man.

Rather, let us look to the future.

The shape and organization of that equal Europe is, of course, up to Europeans.

~~I can think of none~~
We should, and must, not offer a "Made in America" blueprint to Europeans---as we should not in other places---~~offer it~~ about the hows and whys of their to tell them how they should order their affairs.

Yes, our hopes have never been disguised.

They have been---as my previous remarks have inferred---that technological the ~~common~~ common scientific, economic and commercial institutions of the ~~the~~ European Community might provide the foundation for ~~common~~ political institutions as well.

They have been that those present and possible future institutions might be open to all who would adhere to them, including Great Britain.

But they have not been hopes, however,---and must not be in the future---put forward across the Atlantic as a take-it-or-leave-it, "Made in USA" blueprint for Europeans to follow.

If ~~our~~ ^{those} hopes are even partially realized, and I believe they will be, it will be largely because we did not ~~force our own particular~~ press forward such specific blueprints.

It will be because, as I indicated earlier, we treated our partners
~~###~~ as ~~mature~~ adults able to make their own decisions in their own time
and ~~why~~.

* * *

~~I have looked ahead to the time when the Atlantic Partnership might
come to full maturity.~~

~~What, then,~~

Until now, my remarks have dealt almost exclusively with our
relationship with Western Europe---that part of Europe which, to most
Americans, is Europe.

But there is a wider Europe-----a Europe where the forces of human
emancipation are ~~compelling us~~ ^{now} to straining a diminishing Iron Curtain....
~~###~~ a Europe which compels us ^{now} to give our full attention.

That Europe is still divided.

divided,
Germany remains ~~united~~, despite the fact that ^{German} reunification is central
to the long-term peace and stability of the world.

~~Almost 25 years later,~~

Twenty-three years later, there is no peace settlement of ~~the~~
World War II.
~~Second~~

~~And men and resources from West and East are still~~

Millions of
Hundreds of ~~thousands~~ of men, and ~~men~~ billions in resources, are
still being invested, East and West, in longstanding aftermath of that
war and of the immediate post-war period.

So let us speak now of peace and security in that Europe---and of
which is, of course, in the end result the peace and security of the United
how we in the Atlantic
States.

Let us speak of ~~the~~ European peace and security without illusion,
but with the approach of hard-headed optimists who know it remains the
work of many years.

For, if things seem easier in the East...if the Chairman of the
Soviet Council of Ministers no longer ~~threatens~~ threatens missiles
over the Parthenon, we nonetheless must know that his successors have far
more power today than ever before to carry out such a threat, should they choose
to do so.

NATO---the most enduring and successful defense alliance in history---continues to be an absolute necessity for the security of Western Europe and ourselves.

NATO, for two decades, has contained aggressive power and deterred war.

But, over the long run, ~~no matter how previously successful~~ a policy of ~~containment~~ ^{tain} alone becomes ~~obsolete~~ obsolete---either because it fails or because it succeeds.

If it fails, there is war. If it succeeds for long enough, the forces of change will bring new chances for a new, more-positive system of mutual security.

Those forces of change have come.

→ (B) from p. 9

The time has come---as I said not long ago at Fulton, Missouri---for the NATO Alliance to look to ^{that new} ~~the more~~ dynamic vision of peaceful engagement, ~~with the nations of East~~ ^{the} ~~East~~.

When I visited the NATO Council last year I called ^{on behalf of our government,} for such a policy. Since that time, NATO ministers have actively explored the ways and means of making it work---of transforming our Alliance from a defensive, military

organization to an active, vital political ^{social} and economic tool which may ^{— through peaceful engagement —} hasten the replacement of the Iron Curtain with an Open Door.

The task is not to abandon NATO, or to abandon its function of defense. It is to modernize, transform and redirect it toward the new priorities which ~~have~~ we face in a new era.

There are few sharp turning points in history at which, suddenly, everything is different than it was yesterday (Hiroshima ~~and~~ is perhaps the only modern example).

B But we must recognize that, in large part ~~due~~ to the success of our policies, the ^{so-called} ~~post-war~~ period is almost over. ~~and~~ We are in a new period. It ^{can} ~~will~~ be a period in Europe---if we maintain cohesion and solidarity in the West---in which we can break through to peaceful engagement with the East.

For if
we see what is happening now in Eastern Europe---dialogue and action
having to do with individual freedom in a technological society...about
labor's right to strike...about the role, yes, of opposition parties--
we see that steadily,

~~As for the longstanding~~

Now, as to the problem of those millions of men and billions of
dollars still being devoted to a rudimentary balance of security forces
in Europe.

We certainly cannot abandon a security system which ~~has~~ has worked
without having something better to replace it.

It would be foolish indeed to buy time, as we have, for fundamental
change to take place and then to precipitously cancel the whole investment
at the first signs of that change.

There is nothing to recommend a one-sided retreat ~~from~~ ^{---by ourselves or our allies---} our responsibility
to our own safety. Such action ^{would} destabilize a perilous equilibrium, derail
a developing detente, ~~and~~ resurrect old fears, and intensify lingering
insecurities.

But there is a great deal to recommend a mutual reduction of the
and armaments
armed forces facing each other in Europe.

~~the first steps in~~
~~The time is here to begin negotiation toward a mutual~~

We should make this effort not because we want to correct our
balance of payments, or send American troops elsewhere, but because we
believe it can genuinely contribute to peaceful engagement, and to the
eventual healing of old wounds and divisions on the European continent.

~~As we have in the past,~~ I believe we must renew initiative with
our NATO partners toward a common position on such mutual reductions.

At the same time, we must do our utmost to communicate to the leaders
of the Soviet Union that we seek ^{such} ~~###~~ reduction ^{of forces and armaments} ~~not as a political ploy~~

~~or means of~~ ^{tangible} as a genuine means of reduction of tension — ^{in short, as}
^{adding to their security as well as ours.}

I do not see this as an impossibility.

As one who has devoted a good share of his public life to arms
control and ~~disarmament~~ I know from experience what we were able to do
with the Soviet Union in the case of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty...in the
case of the treaty banning nuclear weapons from outer space...in the case of
the nuclear non-proliferation treaty now before the United Nations

I would hope the Soviet Union might find ~~in~~ mutual self-interest in such a proposal (just as I hope it will in our pending offer to discuss the whole matter of offensive and defensive weapons ~~systems~~ ~~systems~~, before a whole new spiral of the arms race plunges ahead).

~~When~~

I repeat: A mutual thinning out of men and armaments in Europe would be no American-Soviet deal. It would involve, to mutual benefit, ~~all~~ the nations of Eastern and Western Europe.

And this step might, in time, lead to other steps which might ^{one day} finally bring Europe together again, whole and healthy.

* * * *

There is, too, the opportunity for what has been called "bridge-building" ~~increasingly-accepted~~ to the East through commercial, cultural, and educational means.

has been Contact ~~is~~ increasing. And, where it ^{has} ~~taken~~ place, I believe it has been overwhelming to the good.

The old notion that East-West contact might somehow contaminate our freedom has long since been disproved.

And members of the ^{American} ~~business~~ community have been among the first to disprove it.

It is in this area that we can do something tangible and immediate right now at home.

I believe we must give the President the discretionary authority to permit trade, investment, tourism and cultural exchange between the United States and Eastern Europe as he sees best.

There are legal restrictions now impeding this which, if they were valid in the past, now serve only to prevent Americans from helping to build new bridges East.

Some of the Eastern European countries are already members of GATT---
forum -
the world trading ~~organization~~. Others are interested as well in joining
the OECD---the organization ~~###~~ of the developed nations which *is concerned with* ~~coordinates~~
economic and aid policy. This might eventually be followed by
membership in the World Bank and its related organizations.

And if these forward steps can be taken at a government level,
I have no doubt that at a private level---businessmen to businessman;
scientist# to scientist; citizen to citizen---the whole process of
bring peaceful and democratic change to Eastern Europe can be accelerated.

I also believe that the now-famous "technology gap"---which is in fact first cousin to the "brain drain"### and is now being described by Western Europeans as the "American Challenge"---should in fact be seen by us not just as an American-Western European problem, but as a ~~Western-Eastern European problem~~, and, finally, as a ~~developed nation-developing nation problem~~. further means of increasing peaceful engagement with the East.

By the technology gap or American Challenge, I mean of course the whole broad ~~advantage~~ we Americans have over the rest of the ~~human and material~~ world in ~~available~~ resources...scale of industrial organization...level of research and development...and capacity for scientific and technological expansion.

We, and our Western European partners, have awakened to the problem this gap brings to the ~~nation~~, or business organization, trying to compete with ~~Americans~~.

Until now, it has been seen by Western Europeans as one of direct economic concern to them. They are, both in Europe and in ^{much of} the world, ~~our~~ ^{economic} principal competitors. Needless to say, they have no desire to be swallowed up by us---nor would we wish it.

But if we can turn this problem around....if we could enter into a joint enterprise with the nations of both Western and Eastern Europe ---- and ~~other~~ members of OECD, such as Japan---to reduce the technology gap all over the world, I believe it could be a very practical, peaceful means of reducing world tension.

~~The exact nature of this enterprise would be something which nations, governments, and economic interests all over the world, would have to explore for many months before settling out its~~ within them,

There are already various means at hand for such an enterprise---
~~for instance, the United Nations~~ ^{OECD.} What remains is for the commitment to be made.

I, for one, would welcome the time when ~~Soviet... American...~~ European.... Japanese and, yes, mainland Chinese managers, technicians, researchers, ^{of many countries} agriculturists, and workers might stand side-by-side in

~~coordinated,~~
a massive, non-political effort in the under- and undeveloped nations of
the world to bring the ~~the~~ benefits of this technological age to
people who still ~~stand~~ live on the dusty roads of previous centuries.

And I believe that such an effort, once offered or undertaken,
should be open for participation to all nations---including those of
Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and even mainland China---who would
wish to enter.

For with the flow of technological experience, from nation-to-nation
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the true and ultimate challenge of these times.

* * * *

And this, finally, brings me to the largest of all tasks which
faces not only the Atlantic Partnership, but all who profess to ~~live by~~
~~ethical~~ ~~moral~~ code. *membership in the family of man.*

Pope John 23rd said it well in his encyclical Mater et Magistra:

"...given the growing interdependence among the peoples of the
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We, above all, of ~~the Atlantic Part~~ who share the European
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obligation to those who ~~lack~~ live in ^{glaring} economic and social ⁱⁿ equality.

I speak, of course, of ~~the~~ ^{our} obligation to those nations which
have yet to reap the benefits of a first---far less a second---technological
and social revolution.

Our obligation to help the so-called "developing" countries *"third world"*
is, of course, in our self-interest. It is not soft-headed, or even just
soft-hearted, but an investment in the stability and peace of vast areas
~~of the world.~~

But it is, more importantly, a moral obligation---the very obligation
Pope John spoke of.

We have a moral obligation, ~~###~~---because of who we are...~~what we~~
of where we came from...the teachings our entire civilization represents---
to help all men lift themselves to the state of human freedom and dignity
which is our own objective.

And as our fortunate nations have this responsibility to the less fortunate nations of this earth, so do we have this responsibility to less fortunate people within our own ~~borders~~. *borders.*

Only in this past quarter-century have nations, on a ~~broad scale~~ *that means something*, begun to truly accept this concept.

I count it a major victory for America that our own commitments, *to that concept* since World World II---commitments at home as well as in the world---have *follow* led others to ~~take such initiative~~. ~~###~~ We cannot turn back now.

This, then, is the task of *we* the peoples who live along the Atlantic: To end the "civil wars" that have torn the European continent for generations... to make ~~that~~ ~~###~~ continent again one continent...to reduce the causes of tension and conflict ~~which~~ *men* divide men and to engage ~~them~~ ~~###~~ together in the works of peace....to work ~~and live~~ *men* for the day, as Adlai Stevenson expressed it, "when men have learned to live as members of the ~~same~~ ~~###~~ human family, to respect each other's differences, to heal each other's wounds, to promote each other's progress, and to benefit from each other's knowledge."

REMARKS

VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT HUMPHREY

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE

NEW YORK, NEW YORK

MAY 23, 1968

Tonight I wish to share with you my thoughts about a fundamental aspect of our foreign policy -- our relationship with the continent of Europe.

Because of the war in Vietnam, it has been suggested -- and, by some, feared -- that American foreign policy has taken a permanent Asian detour, to the particular detriment of our long-standing and more familiar relationship with Europe.

*Draft
insertion
steel.* (3)

As one who has participated in policy formulation during this period, I respond by saying this: Yes, America has awakened to Asia. There has been clear and present trouble there.

America has awakened, or is awakening, at the same time to Latin America and to Africa.

But this has not meant -- nor should it mean in the future -- that America can afford to attach anything but the highest importance to its relationship across the Atlantic.

America has learned painfully that it is a Pacific power. But America is, and must remain, an Atlantic power.

For, in the calculation of problems and possibilities, in this world, this is clear: It is still Europe and America which together have both the means and capacity to most directly and effectively influence -- for the better -- the

world's future

world's future

I will not recite tonight in detail all the joint achievements of these past two decades -- the story of Western Europe coming again to its feet ... of its movement toward economic and political unity ... of our joint resistance to Communist pressures from the East ... of our working together to bring new trade and economic growth to the world ... of our steadfast adherence, during times of trouble, to democratic institutions and the rights of man.

Rather, let us look to the future.

One year ago I went, as the President's representative, to Western Europe with this basic message about the future:

We welcome your new strength, prosperity and unity.

Despite its occasional pain to ourselves, we welcome your new spirit of independence and of "Europeanism."

Let us now, working together in a spirit of greater equality, raise our sights beyond the Atlantic to the opportunities which lie at hand in the wider human society.

I was encouraged by the Western European response to that message. Yet I also came home with the knowledge that both Atlantic partners were in for a period of adjustment.

-- Adjustment by us, as the habitual senior partner, to the idea that Western Europe was finally approaching the capacity for becoming an equal partner and must be treated accordingly;

-- Adjustment by Western Europe, as the longtime junior partner, to the realization that equal partnership brought with it not only the opportunity for new status and growth, but also the responsibility to meet wider challenges reaching far beyond the Atlantic basin.

Both of us have made some of that adjustment. But neither nearly enough.

If our Atlantic Partnership is to grow and prosper, it will inevitably mean not a smaller role for us, but a larger role for Western Europe. And that is as it should be.

An outward-looking Western Europe -- facing not only the Atlantic but the world at large -- can once again become a leading architect of human destiny.

And, as that happens, we can take not alarm but pride in the fact that -- a little more than 20 years later -- a Western Europe that was torn by hate and war has risen to play a large and peaceful role beside us on the world stage.

So I believe it is ^{toward} that time -- as ^{Ambassador} ~~my friend~~ George Ball put it, when Western Europe "knows the reality of roughly equivalent power" -- that we should look and plan toward.

* * *

The shape and organization of that equal Europe is, of course, up to Europeans.

Our hopes have never been disguised.

They have been -- as my previous remarks ^{implied} ~~inferred~~ -- that the common scientific, technological, economic and commercial institutions of the European Community might provide the foundation for common political institutions as well.

They have been that those present and possible future institutions might be open to all who would adhere to them, including Great Britain.

They have not been hopes, however -- and must not be in the future -- put forward across the Atlantic as a take-it-or-leave-it, "Made in USA" blueprint for Europeans to follow.

If those hopes are even partially realized, and I believe they will be, it will be largely because we did not press forward such specific blueprints.

It will be because, as I indicated earlier, we treated our partners as adults able to make their own decisions in their own time and way.

* * *

Until now, my remarks have dealt almost exclusively with our relationship with Western Europe -- that part of Europe which, to most Americans, is Europe.

But there is a wider Europe -- a Europe where the forces of human emancipation are straining a diminishing Iron Curtain ... a Europe which compels ~~us~~ now to ~~give~~ our full attention.

That Europe is still divided.

Germany remains divided, despite the fact that German reunification is central to the long-term peace and stability of the world.

Twenty-three years later, there is no peace settlement of World War II.

Millions of men, and billions of ^{dollars} ~~resources,~~ are still being invested, East and West, in longstanding aftermath of that war and of the immediate post-war period.

So let us speak now of peace and security in that Europe -- which is, of course, in the end result the peace and security of the United States.

Let us speak of European peace and security without illusion, but with the approach of hard-headed optimists who know it remains the work of many years.

For, ~~the~~ things seem easier in the East ... if the Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers no longer threatens missiles over the Parthenon, we nonetheless must know that his successors have far more power today than ever before to carry out such a threat, should they choose to do so.

NATO -- the most enduring and successful defense alliance in history -- continues to be an absolute necessity for Western Europe and ourselves.

NATO, for two decades, has contained aggressive power and deterred war.

But, over the long run, a policy of containment alone becomes obsolete -- either because it fails or

because it succeeds. ~~It~~ becomes frozen in its pattern of success.

If it fails, there is war. If it ~~succeeds for~~ ^{pattern of success} becomes inhibiting, it will constrain long enough, the forces of change will bring new ^{and the}

chances for a new, more-positive system of mutual security.

~~The time~~ ^{has} ~~these forces of change have come.~~

There are few sharp turning points in history at which, suddenly, everything is different from what ^a then it was yesterday (Hiroshima is ~~perhaps the~~ ^{only} modern example).

~~But we~~ ^{largely} must recognize that, in large part due to the success of our policies, the so-called post-war period is almost over. We are in a new period. It can be a period in Europe -- if we maintain cohesion and solidarity in the West -- in which we can break through to peaceful engagement with the East.

The time has come ~~as I said not long ago at Fulton, Missouri --~~ for the NATO Alliance to look to that new, dynamic vision of peaceful engagement.

When I visited the NATO Council last year I called, on behalf of our government, for such a policy. Since that time, NATO ministers have actively explored the ways and means of making it work -- of transforming our Alliance from a defensive, military organization to an active, vital political, social and economic tool which may -- through peaceful engagement -- hasten the replacement of the Iron Curtain with an Open Door.

imperative need
The ~~task~~ is not to abandon NATO, or to abandon its functions of defense. It is to modernize, transform and redirect it toward the new priorities ^{of} ~~which we~~ ~~face in~~ a new era.

Now, to the problem of those millions of men and billions of dollars still being devoted to a rudimentary balance of security forces in Europe.

We ~~certainly~~ cannot abandon a security system which has worked without having something better replace it.

It would be foolish indeed to buy time, as we have, for fundamental change to take place and then to precipitously cancel the whole investment at the first signs of that change.

There is nothing to recommend a one-sided retreat -- by ourselves or our allies -- from our responsibility to our own safety. Such action would destabilize a perilous equilibrium, de-rail a developing detente, resurrect old fears, and intensify lingering insecurities.

But there is a great deal to recommend
a mutual reduction of the armed forces and
armaments facing each other in Europe.

We should make this effort not because we
want to correct our balance of payments, or send
American troops elsewhere, but because we believe
it can genuinely contribute to peaceful engagement and
to the eventual healing of old wounds and divisions
on the European continent.

~~I believe we must renew initiative with our~~ *do this in cooperation with,*
~~NATO partners toward a common position on such~~
~~mutual reductions.~~ *and with the support of our NATO allies.*

~~At the same time,~~ *also* ~~we must~~ *do* our utmost to
communicate to the leaders of the Soviet Union that
we seek such reduction of forces and armaments as a
tangible means of reduction of tension -- in short,
adding to their security as well as ours.

I do not see this as an impossibility.

~~As one who has devoted a good share of~~
~~his public life to arms control,~~ ^{close personal} I know from experience
what we were able to do with the Soviet Union in
the case of the nuclear test ban treaty ... in the
case of the treaty banning nuclear weapons from
outer space ... in the case of the nuclear
non-proliferation treaty now before the United Nations.

I would hope the Soviet Union ^{— and the other countries of} might find ^{Eastern}
^{Europe}
mutual self-interest in such a proposal (just as I
hope it will in our pending offer to discuss the whole
matter of offensive and defensive weapons systems,
before a whole new spiral of the arms race ^{begins} plunges
~~ahead.~~

I repeat: A mutual thinning out of men and
armaments in Europe would be no American-Soviet deal.
It would involve, to ^{common} ~~mutual~~ benefit, the nations of
Eastern and Western Europe.

And this step, might, in time, lead to other steps which ^{could} ~~might~~ one day bring Europe together again, whole and healthy.

* * *

There is, too, the opportunity for what has been called "bridge-building" to the East through increasingly-accepted commercial, cultural, and educational means.

Contact has been increasing. And, where it has taken place, I believe it has been overwhelmingly to the good.

The old notion that East-West contact might somehow contaminate our freedom has long since been disproved.

And members of the American business community have been among the first to disprove it.

It is in this area that we can do something tangible and immediate right now at home.

I believe we must give the President the discretionary authority to permit trade, investment, tourism and cultural exchange between the United States and Eastern Europe as he sees best.

There are legal restrictions now impeding this which, if they were valid in the past, now serve only to prevent Americans from helping to build new bridges East.

Some of the Eastern European countries are already members of GATT -- the world trading forum.

Others are interested as well in ^{the work of} ~~joining~~ the OECD -- the organization of the developed nations which is

concerned with economic and aid policy. This might eventually be followed by membership in ^{other} ~~the World~~

^{multilateral} ~~Bank and its related~~ organizations ^{involving both East and West.}

And if these forward steps can be taken at a government level, I have no doubt that at a private level -- businessman to businessman; scientist to scientist; citizen to citizen -- the whole process of bringing peaceful and democratic change to Eastern Europe can be accelerated.

* * *

I also believe that the now-famous "technology gap" -- which is in fact first cousin to the "brain drain" and is now being described by Western Europeans as the "American Challenge" -- should in fact be seen by us not just as an American-Western European problem, but as a further means of increasing peaceful engagement with the East.

By the technology gap or American Challenge, I mean of course the whole broad advantage we Americans have over the rest of the world in available human and material resources ... scale of industrial organization ... level of research and development ... and capacity for scientific and technological expansion.

We, and our Western European partners, have awakened to the problem this gap brings to the nation, or business organization, trying to compete with us.

Until now, it has been seen by Western Europeans as one of direct economic concern to them. They are, both in Europe and in much of the world, our principal economic competitors. Needless to say, they have no desire to be swallowed up by us -- nor would we wish it.

But if we can turn this problem around ... if we could enter into a joint enterprise with the nations of both Western and Eastern Europe -- and members of OECD, such as Japan -- to reduce the technology gap all over the world, I believe it could be a very practical, peaceful means of reducing world tension.

There are already various means at hand for such an enterprise -- for instance, the United Nations or OECD. What remains is for the commitment to be made.

I, for one, would welcome the time when managers, technicians, researchers, agriculturists, and workers of many countries might stand side-by-side in a massive, coordinated, non-political effort in the

under- and undeveloped nations of the world to bring the benefits of the technological age to people who still live on the dusty roads of previous centuries.

And I believe that such an effort, once offered or undertaken, should be open for participation to all nations -- including those of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and even mainland China -- who would wish to enter.

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p.6

~~And at this point may I add that I know your particular industry~~
has a special and particular interest in seeing that our future relationship
with this European partner is one based on fair play, ~~true economic~~
~~competition, and closest consultation,~~ and a respect for the problems
and interests of each ^{partner} ~~other~~ --- as a good working partnership should be based.

That must surely be our goal.



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