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"THE NEXT ERA IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY"

STATEMENT BY VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

FRIDAY, JULY 12, 1968

(Originally prepared for delivery at the Commonwealth Club
in San Francisco, California on Friday, July 12, 1968)

Humphrey

VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT HUMPHREY

COMMONWEALTH CLUB

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

July 11, 1968

I want to talk with you today about the next era in American foreign policy.

For I believe we -- and indeed the rest of the world -- are truly at a turning point.

Twenty years ago, the United States was virtually the only source of power in the non-Communist world.

We faced an aggressive and highly centralized Communist bloc.

We feared its designs on the developing world. Western Europe and Japan tottered on the brink of chaos.

America's policies were geared to these problems. Large successes were achieved. Now, partly because of these successes, we face new conditions:

-- The cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union is waning.

-- The Communist countries no longer pose a monolithic threat.

-- There is a prospect of further accelerating mutual efforts toward disarmament.

-- The new nations are moving into a period when they increasingly look toward self-development, and the concrete works of national independence.

-- Western Europe and Japan can stand on their own two feet, and they want to do just that.

-- A new generation is emerging in the United

States and other industrial countries which rejects the old premises of war and diplomacy and which wants, rightly I believe, to see more emphasis placed on human and personal values -- like having enough to eat...being able to learn...living free of fear.

These conditions demand new priorities, new policies and a new sense of purpose in our engagement in the world.

They demand a shift from policies of confrontation and containment to policies of reconciliation and peaceful engagement.

The most important area of reconciliation -- and the top priority for American foreign policy in the next decade -- is that of East-West relations. This particularly includes relations among the United States and the Soviet Union, Western Europe and Eastern Europe.

Adherence to this priority will minimize the possibility of direct conflict.

It will minimize the possibility that conflict among the developing nations may involve the major powers.

Finally, it will permit a re-allocation of the world's resources away from massive military budgets to constructive, human development.

I favor the following actions in pursuit of reconciliation:

- 1) Early United States-Soviet agreement to freeze and to reduce offensive and defensive strategic armaments. And, following that, initiatives toward mutual reduction of general armaments and defense expenditures by all nations.

2) Reciprocal reductions of American and Soviet, and allied forces in the heart of Europe.

3) Accelerated technological and economic interchange among developed countries of all ideologies, and in turn among these nations and the developing countries.

4) United States-Soviet action to avoid wasteful competition in space -- including coordination of United States and Soviet post-lunar manned space exploration.

These are goals we cannot achieve alone.

I offer them with full awareness of John Kennedy's warning against the illusion that there can be "an American solution to every world problem."

But we can take concrete initiatives toward achieving them.

* * *

The task of reconciliation can obviously proceed much more quickly once a peace is achieved in Vietnam. It must be a lasting and stable peace -- one which will not lead to new crises that can drag us back into the era of confrontation.

I have been asked where I stand on the Vietnam war.

I want to end that war.

I want to end it the only way it can be ended -- by a political settlement.

I want a political settlement which will permit the people of South Vietnam -- all the people of South Vietnam -- to shape their own future. And I want to see a cease-fire at the earliest possible moment.

Right now, however, the most effective peace effort we can make is to back our negotiating team in Paris, headed by Ambassador Averell Harriman and Cyrus Vance.

They are wise and experienced diplomats.

They are trying hard to secure peace.

We must not make their job more difficult by misleading Hanoi into the belief that our negotiators may not be speaking for America.

Looking ahead, how can we avoid future Vietnams?

Parts of the developing world -- not only in Asia, but Africa and Latin America -- will be turbulent for some time to come. Our policy objective should be to prevent this turbulence from breeding wider conflicts.

To this end, we should do three things:

First: Try to define clearly, in our own minds, what our national interest is, and what it is not, in each of these developing areas.

That interest surely does not run to maintaining the status quo wherever it is challenged.

We are not the world's policemen. How peoples wish to govern themselves, and how they wish to change their governments -- that's their business. Our interest runs only to avoiding the kinds of violence which can transcend national frontiers and threaten the wider peace.

Second: We also have to recognize that, whatever our own intentions, others may be prepared to violate frontiers and foster local turmoil for their own ends. We must therefore be prepared to fulfill specific and clearly-defined mutual-defense commitments approved by the President and the Congress of the United States.

By making this willingness clear, we can help to deter direct major aggression and help reduce the incidence of externally-sponsored insurgency.

We should firmly insist, however, that any threatened country to which we are committed -- or a potentially threatened country -- actively develop programs of economic, political and social development, including land reform, which will win the support of the people.

Third: If we are to avoid big-power confrontation over small-power conflicts, the world must look primarily to regional organizations to prevent indirect aggression and local disputes from disrupting the broader peace.

These organizations can help to conciliate disputes among their members; over the longer-run, they may be able increasingly to meet peacekeeping needs.

We should try to enhance the United Nations' peace-keeping capability:

-- by supporting creation of a UN Staff College and a UN Training Center for Peacekeeping;

-- by using US aid to encourage more earmarking by the smaller powers of national military units of peacekeeping;

-- by joining other countries in studying the use of independent sources of revenue for financing UN peacekeeping.

As we strengthen the ability of the UN and of regional groupings to meet peacekeeping needs in developing areas, we can provide an effective alternative to great power military involvement -- and thus help to ensure against future Vietnams.

* * *

We can talk neither about reconciliation nor about increasing the stability and progress of the developing world without taking full account of mainland China.

Although the prospect for cooperative programs with China in the next decade are not good, we should make it clear that we are prepared to replace conflict with cooperation whenever the Chinese are.

We must expect rebuffs, rejection, and insult ... and still continue to seek more normalized relations with the mainland.

To widen our contacts with the seven hundred and fifty million people who live in mainland China we should:

- 1) lift restrictions on trade in non-strategic goods,
- 2) encourage interchange of scholars, journalists and artists;

3) make it clear that should China make its decision to become a responsible, participating member of the community of nations, we will welcome it. And we should, now, encourage it.

The need for reconciliation and an end to the arms race derives not just from the danger of war, but from the fact that the world urgently requires a major reallocation of resources to the work of providing better lives for people -- both here in America and in the world.

Pope Paul said "development is the new name for peace."

Unless and until the needy...hungry...ill-clothed ... ill-housed...undereducated majority of mankind has some substantial hope for the future, something worth protecting -- peace will be sullen and precarious at best.

We all know the case for foreign aid:

It is right and decent.

It contributes to peace and security.

It is not a significant cold drain because virtually all of it is spent in this country for goods and services.

A little bit can be the catalyst that puts much larger resources to work in the recipient nation.

We can afford it.

The United States has made a good start. We have helped put Taiwan, Western Europe, South Korea, Iran, Greece and Turkey on their feet--and others of our aid recipients are on the way.

Other nations are now aid donors--at least five of them give a greater share of their Gross National Product than we do.

But neither the developed nor the developing nations have been doing enough, well enough, to get the results that a lasting peace demands.

It is time to start fresh...together...and this time with the clear purpose before us of doing what is necessary to see that there is visible progress for the people of the developing world.

The urgent business of national development can no longer be left to a thin patchwork of bilateral contributions and occasional consortia. It is the great international challenge of our times, and one that can be met only on the basis of the fullest international cooperation.

Our neighbors in the Western hemisphere are already engaged in a major cooperative effort, together with the United States, to accelerate the development of this area which is of vital interest to us.

As I see it, America's role in a new international development effort demands the following:

First: A steady increase rather than a steady decrease in the amount of aid we make available.

Second: Leadership toward family planning in the developing nations on a scale many times larger than now being considered.

Third: New emphasis in our development programs to food production and the building of rural economies.

Fourth: World-wide commodity agreements which stabilize prices enough so that raw-materials-producing nations may have at least an even chance of earning their own way.

Fifth: Leadership toward international agreements and guarantees which will sharply increase the flow of private investment to the developing countries.

Sixth: A new emphasis on multilateralism in aid programs, with maintenance of only limited bilateral aid programs, and greater reliance on the World Bank, the United Nations, and African, Asian and Latin American institutions for investment and development.

Seventh: Active encouragement of economic and political regionalism so that other nations may enjoy the benefits of large units of people, resources and markets such as the United States and European Community now possess.

Eighth: New priority to modernization of an international monetary system which must be able to provide

the capital needed to finance the developing as well as the developed.

Ninth: The steady removal of barriers to trade among the prosperous nations, and the establishment of a global preference system for the goods of the underdeveloped.

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A more stable peace...reconciliation...redirection on international effort from the wasteful arts of war to the humane work of development -- I believe those are the only realistic policy goals for America in the months and years ahead if we mean to enhance the security of the American people.

They reflect the values of ordinary men and women -- not the habits of mind we associate with traditional diplomacy.

Let me emphasize, however, that our success in achieving such goals can be no greater than our success in dealing with the hard questions of the present:

--How to convince the Soviet Union it shares a common interest in building a community of developed nations, and avoiding conflict in developing areas when some Soviet ideologists declare the reverse;

--How to promote the kind of economic growth in the poorer nations which will involve and benefit the common man, even while these nations resist--and rightly--any suggestion of external intervention in their internal affairs;

--Above all, how to involve the private citizen, and particularly young people, more and more in the business of making foreign policy?

I don't have all the answers, I doubt anyone has.

I do know that a significant departure in American foreign policy will require that the new President will continue to be guided by the advice and consent of the United States Congress and of the American people.

Although it is an obligation of the President to propose, our tradition assumes a high degree of participation by the people and the Congress--especially the Senate--in the making of critical national policy decisions.

Involvement by the Congress, and by the people, will continue to be a necessity if national decisions are to be truly reflective of the national will.

For foreign policy is the people's business in 1968 just as politics is their business.

We understand especially today that a new foreign policy for a new decade stands little chance of success unless it can inspire the new generation of Americans who wear the nation's uniforms, renew the nation's political processes, and in the long run determine the success or failure of American society at home and abroad.

I have attempted to outline here a policy to serve the people -- not merely nations or ideologies.

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REMARKS

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COMMONWEALTH CLUB

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The Vice President did not go to San Francisco because of a bad case of flu.

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COMMONWEALTH CLUB - ~~DRAFT~~

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America's policies were geared to these problems. Large successes were achieved. Now, partly because of these successes, we face new conditions:

-- The cold war between the U.S. and the USSR is waning.

Soviet Union

-- The Communist countries no longer pose the threat of a

monolithic threat.

-- There is a prospect of further accelerating mutual efforts toward disarmament.

-- The countries of Africa, Asia and the Middle East have made *it* clear that they do not care to be tied to either of the super powers. *T*hey want to shape their own *future.* ~~destiny.~~

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~~It can be pursued~~

It can be pursued without our neglecting our special responsibility to our own Hemisphere.

I favor the following actions in pursuit of reconciliation among the developed nations:

1) Early U.S.-Soviet agreement to freeze and to reduce offensive

and defensive strategic armaments. ~~is an encouragement of~~
~~the present Soviet agreement to our~~
~~offer of disarmament.~~ **And, following that, initiatives**
~~repeated requests for control talks is encouraging~~ and a tribute to the
toward mutual reduction of general armaments and
~~skill and wisdom with which President Johnson has long pursued this goal.~~
defense expenditures by all nations.
American

2) Reciprocal reductions of ~~U.S.~~ **American** and Soviet, and allied forces in

the heart of Europe. ~~Peaceful engagement should replace containment as~~
~~the object of our policy in Europe.~~

3) Accelerated technological and economic interchange ~~between the~~

among developed countries of all ideologies, and in turn
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among these nations and the developing countries.

4) U.S.-Soviet action to avoid wasteful competition in space ~~and~~ **including**

~~thus to reduce the costs of the space race.~~ **Coordination of U.S. and Soviet**
~~the new applies~~
post-lunar manned space exploration, ~~would serve this purpose.~~

Oceans

5. Joining with the USSR and other countries, in exploiting new technology for the benefit of all mankind. Modifying weather, avoiding pollution, and exploiting the resources of the ocean -- all these demand new techniques and new institutions for international cooperation.

These are goals we cannot achieve alone. *If offer them will* ~~Indeed they take~~

full ^{awards} ~~account~~ of John Kennedy's warring against the illusion that there can be "an American solution to every world problem." *But we can* take concrete initiatives toward achieving them.

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hard to secure peace. ^{We must not} let's not make their job more difficult by ^{misleading} ~~letting~~

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Hanoi that ~~they don't speak~~ for America.

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Looking ahead, ~~we say that we want "no more Vietnams."~~ How

~~can they best be avoided?~~
we avoid future Vietnam?

Parts of the developing world -- not only in Asia, ^{but} Africa and Latin America -- will be turbulent for some time to come. Our policy objective should be to prevent this turbulence from breeding wider conflicts.

To this end, we should do three things:

First: Try to define clearly, in our own minds, what ^{our} ~~the~~ US national interest is, and what it is not, in each of these developing areas.

That interest surely does not run to maintaining the status quo wherever it is challenged.

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Revolutions and insurgencies are going to happen. And sometimes they will be the necessary road to progress. Let's dust off our own heritage and recognize that fact.

[Handwritten signature]

We are not the world's policemen. How peoples wish to govern themselves, and how they wish to change their governments --

that's their business. Our interest runs only to avoiding the kinds of

violence which ~~might~~ transcend national frontiers and threaten the wider ~~space~~.

Second: We also have to recognize, ~~however~~ that, whatever our own intentions, others may be prepared to violate frontiers and foster local

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Third: If we are to avoid big power confrontation over small power conflicts, the world must look primarily to the regional organizations of developing countries and to the United Nations- Nations to prevent indirect aggression and local disputes from disrupting the broader peace.

We should seek to strengthen such regional organizations as the Organization of American States, the Organization for African Unity, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the Asian and Pacific Council. These organizations can help to conciliate disputes among their members; over the longer-run, they may be able increasingly to meet peacekeeping needs.

We should also try to enhance the United Nations' peace-keeping capability.

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That interest surely does not run to maintaining the status quo wherever it is challenged.

We are not the world's policemen. How peoples wish to govern themselves, and how they wish to change their governments -- that's their business. Our interest runs only to avoiding the kinds of violence which can transcend national frontiers and threaten the wider peace.

Second: We also have to recognize that, whatever our own intentions, others may be prepared to violate frontiers and foster local turmoil for their own ends. We must therefore be prepared to fulfill specific and clearly- defined mutual-defense commitments approved by the President and the Congress of the United States.

By making this willingness clear, we can help to deter direct major aggression and help reduce the incidence of externally-sponsored insurgency.

We should firmly insist, however, that any threatened country to which we are committed -- or a potentially threatened country -- actively develop programs of economic, political and social development, including land reform, which will win the support of the people.

Third: If we are to avoid big-power confrontation over small-power conflicts, the world must look primarily to the regional organizations of (development ^{ING} countries) and ~~to the United Nations~~ to prevent indirect aggression and local disputes from disrupting the broader peace.

We should seek to strengthen such regional organizations as the Organization of American States, the Organization for African Unity, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the Asian and Pacific Council.

YEP memo

These conditions demand new priorities, new policies -- and a new sense of purpose in our engagement in the world. They demand a shift from policies of confrontation and containment to policies of reconciliation and peaceful engagement.

The most important area of reconciliation - and the top priority for American foreign policy in the 1970's is that of East-West relations. This includes the relations among the U.S. and the Soviet Union, together with their allies in Western and Eastern Europe.

~~Impact of the instability that may arise among the developing nations of the world. Adherence to this priority will not only aid the preserving of peace in the world, but will permit a reallocation of the world's~~

resources away from massive military budgets to constructive development tasks.

manage the possibility of conflict among the developing nations
make it more favorable

~~*These relations can take many forms. Will have special importance for world peace. The Russians*~~

final 7/9/68
v. 30 p. 17
3.

These conditions demand new priorities, new policies -- and a new sense of purpose in our engagement in the world. They demand a shift from policies of confrontation and containment to policies of reconciliation and peaceful engagement.

The most important area of reconciliation -- and the top priority for American foreign policy in the next decade -- is that of East-West relations. This includes the relations among the United States and the

Adherence to this priority Soviet Union, Western Europe and Eastern Europe. ~~It~~ will minimize the possibility of direct conflict. It will minimize the possibility that conflict among the developing nations may involve the major powers. Finally, it will permit a reallocation of the world's resources away from massive military budgets to constructive development tasks.

It can
~~must~~ be pursued ~~by~~ by the United States without neglecting its special responsibilities to its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere.

These conditions demand new priorities, new policies -- and a new sense of purpose in our engagement in the world. They demand a shift from policies of confrontation and containment to policies of reconciliation and peaceful engagement.

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T. Hughes 5/9/10

p. 2 N.H. has been against the old premises
of war & diplomacy
should not associate himself with
old premises.

3- north - south
Does it come through. - reads like
D. Ball - Atlantic
could not stand half north -
half south

5. - conflicts with what happened
reflects on bona fide of last election.

P. 7 - same paragraph in proposal,

p. 8 - collective security idea implies that
these countries cannot carry
responsibility.

p. 9. (T.H. on ZB - we only intervene when
regional balance being upset)

p. 11 - p. 15 - what is US prepared to do
positively.

P 13 - good pt. no 4
Army has other plans.

P 13 - both -

P 17 - batton - good

19 - public - private - ^{5.} private ?

P 22 - Paragraph - contrasts with ^{community of nations} developed nations - early part.

22 - does rely on consent mean one won't
go ahead if there are objections.

sets up contest between Humphy, Congress
& ^{and} belong at the end of ^{the} ^{program}

~~Don't imply possibility of Congress
not going~~

Now can concentrate

John

Here is my suggested redraft,
including some points not
covered in our phone talk.

loo

Mr Rilly

7/8/68

COMMONWEALTH CLUB - DRAFT

I want to talk with you today about the next era in American foreign policy.

For I believe ^{that} we -- and indeed the rest of the world -- are truly at a turning point.

Twenty years ago, the United States was virtually the only source of power in the non-communist world. We faced an aggressive and highly centralized communist bloc. We feared its designs on the developing world. Western Europe and Japan tottered on the brink of chaos.

America's policies were geared to these problems. Large successes were achieved. Now, partly because of these successes, we face new conditions:

-- The cold war between the U.S. and the USSR is waning.

-- The Communist countries no longer pose the threat of a monolithic bloc.

-- There is a prospect of further accelerating mutual efforts toward disarmament.

-- The countries of Africa, Asia and the Middle East have made clear that they do not care to be tied to either of the super powers; they want to shape their own destiny.

-- Western Europe and Japan can stand on their own two feet, and they want to do just that.

-- A new generation is emerging in the U.S. and other industrial countries which rejects the old premises of war and diplomacy and which wants, rightly I believe, to see more emphasis placed on human and personal values -- like having enough to eat . . . being able to learn . . . living free of fear.

These conditions demand new priorities, new policies and a new sense of purpose in our engagement in the world.

The business of achieving a stable peace in the 1970's will largely depend, as I see it, first, on preserving and extending peace ^{throughout the world,} and, second, on dealing with the root causes of conflict ^{- poverty + suffering} in the southern half of the world.

These ~~over-all~~ goals cannot be achieved by the US, alone. But the US can take concrete actions toward achieving them - measures which take full account of John Kennedy's warning against the illusion that there can be "an American solution to every world problem."

Let me turn, first, to the goal of building peace - among the developed nations and in the southern hemisphere.

In all of the developed nations there must be a reordering of national priorities - so that a lesser proportion of a nation's wealth and energy can be spent for armaments and a greater proportion can be devoted to the good works of peace.

We must pursue concrete actions to further this aim:

Action #1: I favor early US-Soviet agreement ⁵⁻⁴
to freeze & to reduce offensive & defensive strategic armaments.
The recent Soviet agreement to our repeated requests for
control talks is encouraging - and a tribute to the skill
and wisdom with which President Johnson has long pursued
this goal.

Action #2: I favor US-Soviet action to avoid wasteful
competition in space and thus to reduce the costs of the
space race. Coordination of US and Soviet post-lunar
manned space exploration would serve this purpose.

Action #3: I favor reciprocal reductions of US and
Soviet and allied forces

5

13.

in the heart of Europe. Peaceful engagement should replace containment as the object of our policy in Europe.

Action #4: I favor an eventual orderly scale-down of U.S. global conventional forces to pre-Vietnam levels. When the fighting in Vietnam abates, this should be feasible -- especially as new means of meeting peacekeeping needs emerge in developing areas.

Action #5: I recommend accelerated technological and economic interchange between the United States and the Soviet Union, and Western and Eastern Europe.

Action #6: The U.S. should join with the USSR and other countries, in exploiting new technology for the benefit of all mankind. Modifying weather, avoiding pollution, and preserving the resources of the ocean -- all these demand new techniques and new institutions for international cooperation.

I have spoken of peace among the developed nations.

Even more pressing is the need to establish a stable peace in Vietnam.

I have been asked where I stand on the Vietnam war.

Well, I'll tell you where I stand: I want to end that war.

I want to end it the only way it can be ended - by a political settlement.

1

5.

I want a political settlement which will permit the people of South Vietnam -- all the people of South Vietnam -- to shape their own future.

The way for them to do this is through a genuinely free election -- an election in which all can vote and in which no one is barred from office; an election in which there are concrete assurances against fraud and intimidation.

I am prepared to accept the verdict of such an election -- whatever it is. If the people of South Vietnam want a coalition government, let the majority say so. If they don't want it, that is up to the majority. Meanwhile, I continue to urge a cease-fire, ^{and at} *some de-escalation in the fighting in South Vietnam* very least that neither side take advantage of the talks to escalate its military efforts.

8

6.

Right now the most effective peace efforts we can make are:

- 1) To back our negotiating team at Paris, headed by Averell Harriman and Cyrus Vance. They are wise and experienced diplomats; they're trying hard to secure peace; let's not make their job more difficult by telling Hanoi that they don't speak for America.

- 2) To try to end the fighting and to avoid escalation in the meantime.

- 3) To encourage the South Vietnamese to take over more of the burden of the fighting; ~~to assist them in this effort, I would program a schedule for a gradual reduction of American troops.~~

- 4) To seek a political settlement based on free elections and the withdrawal of all external forces of South Vietnam.

Looking ahead, we say that we want "no more Vietnams." How

can they best be avoided?

We will continue to honor our mutual security commitments there.

We do not mean that we will withdraw from Asia. We do mean

that alternatives to U.S. military intervention will increasingly be

^{sought} considered as the better course of action in the 1970's. In considering

the U.S. role, I would offer the following guidelines: 1) a more precise

definition of U.S. national interest; 2) self-help; 3) regional ^{+ multilateral} responsibility;

4) ~~multilateralism~~; and 5) residual U.S. responsibility.

First, we must try to define clearly, in our own minds, what

the U.S. national interest is, and what it is not, in areas such as Asia.

That interest surely does not run to maintaining the status

quo, wherever it is challenged.

It is time Americans faced the fact that revolutions are

going to happen -- and sometimes will be the

necessary road to progress. Let's dust off our own heritage and recognize that fact.

We are not the world's policemen. How peoples wish to govern themselves, and how they wish to change their governments -- that's their business. Our interest runs only to avoiding the kinds of violence which transcend national frontiers and threaten wider peace.

~~Second, according to the principle of self-help, a country being threatened must assume ^{a large} ~~the primary~~ responsibility for its own security. It should be responsible -- with rare exceptions -- for the entire burden of providing ground forces, ^{to deal with internal insurgency.} In case of externally supported insurgency, the local government should be expected to take primary responsibility for plans, programs, and combat military operations. It should also bear responsibility in providing programs of economic and political development to build cohesive support for the government.~~

Even in meeting these wider threats, we should seek to strengthen the capacity of regional organizations

11

9.

Third, the principle of regional responsibility suggests that neighboring nations should cooperate to deal with the causes of instability in the immediate area. The organization of the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) represent two encouraging steps.

If an insurgency does arise, and outside military forces are required, they could be provided -- with rare exceptions -- by the neighbors of the country being attacked.

With clandestine aggression a continuing threat in Asia, and with the prospect of British withdrawal from Singapore and Malaya, many nations appreciate today the need for a regional peacekeeping capacity. If the proposal of the leaders of Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand that ASEAN eventually take on certain defense functions is acted upon, this could be the beginning of an effective regional peacekeeping force in Southeast Asia.

Here ^A an enlarged peacekeeping capacity for the United Nations ^{will} ~~would~~ also be important. We should try to enhance this capacity by:

- 1) Supporting creation of a UN Staff College and a UN Training Center for Peacekeeping;
- 2) Using U.S. aid to encourage more earmarking by the smaller powers of national military units for peacekeeping;
- 3) Joining other countries in studying the use of independent sources of revenue for financing UN peacekeeping.

~~This brings me to the fourth principle mentioned -- that of multilateralism. A number of countries in Asia will continue to require outside capital and technical assistance if economic development is to proceed, and if they are to be able to assume primary responsibility for their own defense.~~

comment: Covered later in section on aid.

~~In taking these new measures -- in addition to those now under~~

~~way -- to extend the area of East-West collaboration and reconciliation,~~

9 In all of this,

we cannot overlook the role which China must play in future decades. Although

the prospect for cooperative programs with China in the next decade are

not good, we should make it clear that we are prepared to replace ^{conflict with} cooperation.

with conflict whenever the Chinese are.

To widen our contacts with the seven hundred fifty million people

who live in mainland China we should:

1) lift restrictions on trade in non-strategic goods;

2) encourage interchange of scholars, journalists and artists;

3) ^{thus to} make it clear that ^{the United States does not stand in} ~~should the nations of the world decide that~~

~~the way of Chinese intercourse with this country or the~~
~~China has met the standards for inclusion as a participating member of the~~

community of nations; ^{we look forward to the day when Peking} ~~we will not pose any bar to such participation.~~

~~will no longer wish to isolate itself.~~

This leads me to the second of the two purposes that I described at the start of this speech: dealing with the underlying cause of conflict in the southern hemisphere: poverty, and suffering, and disease.

~~The need to reverse the arms race derives not just from the danger of war, but from the fact that the world urgently requires a major reallocation of resources to the work of providing better lives for people -- both at home in America and in the world.~~

Pope Paul said "development is the new name for peace." Unless, and until the needy ... hungry ... ill-clothed ... ill-housed ... under-educated majority of mankind has some substantial hope for the future, something worth protecting -- there will be no peace.

We all know the case for foreign aid:

It is right and decent.

It contributes to peace and security.

It is not a significant gold drain because virtually all of it is spent in this country for goods and services.

A little bit can be the catalyst that puts much larger resources to work in the recipient nation.

We can afford it.

The United States made a good start, ~~with the Marshall Plan.~~

We have helped put Taiwan, South Korea, Iran, Greece and Turkey

on their feet and others of our aid recipients are on the way.

^{developed}
Other nations are now aid donors -- at least five of them give

a greater share of their gross national product than we do.

Even some former aid recipients, such as Taiwan, have become donors.

But we have simply not been doing enough, well enough, to

get the results that a lasting peace demands. And I am talking now not

just about the United States, but about all the developed nations between

San Francisco and Tokyo -- looking East.

It is time to start fresh ... together ... and this time with the

clear purpose before us of doing what is necessary to see that there

is visible progress for the peoples of the developing world.

The goal of the developed nations should be to make available as much assistance as the self-help efforts of the developing nations will permit them to put to good use. Much of that assistance will be in money -- which really means machinery, fertilizer and other industrial products. Some of it will be in commodities like food.

And some -- perhaps the hardest to come by -- will have to be in trade concessions which will allow the developing nations gradually to take their place as full participants in the world economy.

The urgent business of national development can no longer be left to a thin patchwork of bilateral contributions and occasional consortia. It is the great international challenge of our times, and one that can be met only on the basis of the fullest international cooperation.

I propose that the United States join other nations in meeting this challenge.

- 18 -

I propose that we seek an international agreement to this end -- perhaps building on the Dutch proposal for a World Development Charter which would specify both the aid obligations of developed countries and the self-help obligations of developing countries. [Is it too bold to think of a World Development Conference -- to be held in San Francisco on the 25th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations -- to explore this and other possibilities.]

~~Meanwhile, the United States must rededicate itself to its clear responsibilities in foreign aid.~~ In specific terms, I favor:

First: that we channel our aid increasingly through multi-lateral instruments. We should aim at doubling the proportion of our aid -- moving through the World Bank family and through regional banks in Asia, Africa and Latin America. These multi-lateral agencies should be open to participation by the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries.

Second: we should encourage increased private investment in developing countries. I favor creation of a public corporation which would experiment with a wide variety of techniques to this end, both abroad and at home: extended risk guarantees, joint ventures, tax credits, and many more.

Third: we should ensure that the technical aid we provide developing countries reflects the wide variety of talents at hand in our pluralistic society. I would like to explore channeling an increasing share of this technical aid through a mixed public-private institute, which would work closely with our great universities and private research institutes.

Fourth: We should seek to mobilize the enthusiasm of our young people for good works, abroad as at home. I have proposed a new system of national service, which would offer overseas outlets far beyond those now available in the Peace Corps.

In all of these endeavors, we should seek partnership with Western Europe and Japan. Our association with them must be at the heart of any community of developed nations.

That partnership must be adjusted to changing realities - and to the reviving Western European and Japanese strength and pride. We should seek new means of translating the concept of a partnership of equals into reality - a partnership in which both the burdens and responsibilities will be more fully shared.

A more stable peace ... reconciliation ... redirection of international efforts from the wasteful arts of war to the humane work of development -- I believe those are the only realistic policy goals for America in the months and years ahead if we mean to enhance the security of the American people.

They are goals which will let us build the future rather than trying to protect the past.

They reflect the values of ordinary men and women -- not the habits of mind we associate with traditional diplomacy.

They are goals for young people -- of all ages -- people with the confidence and imagination to welcome change and challenge.

Let me emphasize, however, that no single nation can simply declare a new era in international relations. Our success in achieving our future goals can be no greater than our success in dealing with the hard realities of the present.

The goals I have suggested raise some difficult questions:

-- How to convince the Soviets that they share a common interest in building a community of developed nations, and avoiding conflict in developing areas;

-- How to promote the kind of economic growth in the poorer nations which will involve and benefit the common man, even while these nations resist -- and rightly -- any suggestion of external intervention in their internal affairs;

-- How to find new techniques for increasing cooperation among the community of developed countries of East and West -- even while the political processes which shape their governments remain rooted in the workings of national societies;

-- Above all, how to involve the private citizen, and particularly young people, more and more in the business of making foreign policy?

I don't have all the answers -- I doubt anyone has -- to these questions.

in
I do know that/implementing such a foreign policy, the new President must be guided by the advice and consent of the United States Congress and by the reaction of the American people. Our preoccupation with dissent during the past few years has obscured

another venerable and valued American tradition -- that of consent. Our tradition assumes a high degree of participation by the people and the Congress -- especially the Senate -- in the making of critical national policy decisions.

The failure to consult invariably leads to a lack of public involvement -- and eventually to a lack of public support. As we move to redefine our foreign policy in the next decade, the next President must bear in mind that to gain legitimacy, policies must command the respect and support of public opinion, must never outdistance public opinion too much.

We understand better today than yesterday that a new foreign policy for a new decade stands little chance of success unless it makes sense to the new generation of Americans who fight the nation's wars, renew the nation's political processes, and in the

long-run determines the success or failure of American society at home and abroad. I have attempted to present here a policy which will command the assent of all Americans, young and old.

#

DRAFT
Commonwealth Club

I want to talk with you today about the next era in American foreign policy.

For I believe we -- and indeed the rest of the world -- are truly at a turning point.

Twenty years ago, the United States was virtually the only source of power in the ^{non-Communist} ~~free~~ world. We faced what seemed ~~an~~ an aggressive and highly centralized Communist bloc. We feared its designs on the developing world. Western Europe and Japan tottered on the brink of chaos.

America's policies were geared to these problems. Large successes were achieved. Now, partly because of these successes, we face new conditions:

-- The cold war between the US and the USSR is waning.

-- The Communist ^{countries} bloc no longer poses ^{the} a ~~monolithic~~ threat, ^{of a} ~~monolithic~~ bloc.

-- There is ~~some~~ prospect of further accelerating mutual efforts

toward disarmament.

? ~~The~~ Developing countries, ^{of Africa, Asia and the Middle East} have made clear that they do not ^{care} ~~mean~~ to be tied to either ^{of the super powers} ~~the West or the Communists~~; they want to shape their own destiny.

-- Western Europe and Japan can stand on their own two feet, and they want to do just that.

-- A new generation is emerging in the US and other industrial countries which rejects the old premises of war and diplomacy and which wants, rightly I believe, to see more emphasis placed on human and personal values -- like having enough to eat ... being able to learn ... living free of fear. This is perhaps the most important fact of all.

1-22

3) An appreciable improvement in the standard of living ~~is~~ among the people of most developing countries,

4) A more even distribution of the burdens and responsibilities involved in pursuing these goals.

With the cooperation of the US and the Soviet Union, plus Europe and Japan, ~~these problems~~ appreciable progress can be made. During the next decade cooperation, the anarchy and violence seen in the 1960's will ~~spread~~ continue to spread.

It means that we must rethink our foreign policy from the ground up --
in human terms.

I have been trying to do just this. I have been talking to scholars,
in and out of government; I will be talking to others. I do not have all the
answers; anyone who tells you that he has is either a fool or a charlatan.

But I have reached some conclusions, which I would like to share with
you today.

In the face of these changes it will not be sufficient merely to continue policies of the past. The Central fact of ↑ American foreign policy should henceforth, I believe, be directed in the 1970's is to help the world in a very practical way to four key goals: main aim the peace. [Smart - 3.]

Reduction
First: Elimination of the threat of direct confrontation among the

great powers which has blighted our personal security for nearly three
decades, and a steady reduction of the risk of great power military involve-
ment in developing areas.



-- Second: Far greater East-West reconciliation and cooperation, so that needed resources and energies can be redirected from armaments to more useful tasks.

-- Third: Steady and visible improvement in the lives of the people in every developing country.

-- Fourth: Mutual sharing of the costs and responsibilities involved in pursuing these goals by all nations according to their ability to contribute.

A few years ago, these goals would have been unthinkably visionary.

Today, I believe they are realistic. Indeed, I consider them minimum objectives if we expect to know true peace in our lifetimes.

This over-all goal - and these specific aims

~~These are not goals we can~~ ^{not be d} achieve alone. Indeed they take full

account of John Kennedy's warning against the illusion that there can be

"an American solution to every world problem." But we can take concrete

actions toward achieving them.

4a.

One of the foremost obstacles to
 our efforts to move ahead
~~in collaboration with~~ to extend
 the area of cooperation with the
 Soviet Union is the continuation
 of the war in Vietnam.

We must help to
~~An important first step is to~~ establish a stable peace in Vietnam ~~↙~~
~~one which will not spawn new crises that can drag us backwards into the~~
~~era of confrontation we are now trying to escape.~~

I have been asked where I stand on the Vietnam war.

Well, I'll tell you where I stand: I want to end that war.

I want to end it the only way it can be ended -- by a political settlement.

I want a political settlement which will permit the people of South Vietnam -- all the people of South Vietnam -- to shape their own future.

~~(John R. any problem here for negotiators?)~~

The way for them to do this is through a genuinely free election -- an election in which all can vote and in which no one is barred from office; an election in which there are concrete assurances against fraud and intimidation.

One man, one vote: That should be the basic principle.

I am prepared to accept the verdict of such an election --

whatever it is. If the people of South Vietnam want a coalition government,

let the majority say so. If they don't want it, that is up to the majority.

Meanwhile, I continue to urge a cease-fire, and at very least that neither side take advantage of the talks to escalate its military efforts.

Right now the most effective peace effort we can make is to back our negotiating team at Paris, headed by Averell Harriman and Cyrus Vance. They are wise and experienced diplomats; they're trying hard to secure peace; let's not make their job more difficult by telling Hanoi that they

don't speak for America.

← Insert - to A. / we say

Looking ahead, ~~it is easy to state~~ that we want "no more Vietnams."

~~Can they best be avoided?~~

How ~~shall we avoid them?~~

6a
insert.

Recommend as
I will concentrate on getting peace:

— by trying to end to fighting,
and by avoiding escalation in
the meantime;

— by encouraging the South Vietnamese
to take over more of the fighting, ~~and~~ ^{to assist them}
in this effort, I would ~~like to~~ ^{propose} a
schedule for a gradual ^{program} ~~with~~ ^{reductions}
of American troops.

— by seeking a political settlement
based on free elections and the
withdrawal of all external forces
of South Vietnam.

[7a insert]

Parts of the developing world -- in Asia, Africa and Latin America -- will suffer occasional turmoil for some time to come. Our policy objective should be to prevent this turmoil from breeding wider conflicts.

I would offer the following guidelines to

To this end, we should do three things:

We must
First: Try to define clearly, in our own minds, what the US

national interest is, and what it is not, in these developing areas, *such as Asia.*

That interest surely does not run to maintaining the status quo, wherever it is challenged.

It is time Americans faced the fact, *that* I think, that two decades of precarious confrontation with Communism *gets-* and the threat of nuclear annihilation has made us supersensitive about not letting the boat be rocked. I think we are a little high *ok* on the water now, and we -- all of us, including the Russians as they contemplate events in Eastern Europe these days -- can tolerate a lot more change. *Revolutions are going to happen.*

7a (2)

Revolutions are going to happen. And sometimes ~~they~~ will be the necessary road to progress. Let's dust off our own heritage and recognize that fact.

We are not the world's policemen. How peoples wish to govern themselves, and how they wish to change their governments -- that's their business. Our interest runs only to avoiding the kinds of violence which transcend national frontiers and threaten wider peace.

Second: We also have to recognize that whatever our own intentions, others may be prepared to violate frontiers and foster and take advantage of local turmoil. We must therefore be prepared to fulfill the specific and limited commitments against aggression which have been approved by the President and the Congress of the United States. By making this willingness clear, we can help to deter direct major aggression and help reduce the incidents of externally-sponsored insurgency.

We do not mean that we will withdraw from Asia. We do mean that alternatives to U.S. military intervention will increasingly be

considered as the better course of action in the 1970's. In considering

the U.S. role, I would be guided by four principles: *offer the following guidelines* 1) self-help; *1) a well precise definition of US national interest*

2) regional responsibility; 3) multilateralism; and 4) residual U.S.

responsibility.

Second Insert 7a

According to the principle of self-help, a country being threatened must assume the primary responsibility for its own security. It should

be responsible -- with rare exceptions -- for the entire burden of providing ground forces. ~~In case of an insurgency, the local government should~~

~~play the dominant role.~~ In case of externally supported insurgency, the

local government should be expected to take primary responsibility for

plans, programs, and combat military operations. *It should* Finally, the local

also bear responsibility ~~government must assume leadership~~ in providing programs of economic

and political development to build cohesive support for the government,

~~to make it immune from the threat of insurgent groups supported from the~~

~~outside.~~

third,

The principle of regional responsibility suggests that neighboring

nations should cooperate to deal with the causes of instability in the

immediate area. The organization of the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC)

and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) represent two

encouraging steps. ~~To the extent that these regional associations are~~

~~effective, the threat of insurgency is diminished.~~

If an insurgency does arise, governments of the area could

provide technical assistance. If the threat arises in a border area,

nations can work together to meet the threat. ~~If~~ ^{and} outside military forces

are required, they could be provided -- with rare exceptions -- by the

neighbors of the country being attacked.

With clandestine aggression a continuing threat in Asia, and with the prospect of British withdrawal from Singapore and Malaya, many nations ^{appreciate today the} need for a regional peacekeeping capacity. If the proposal of the leaders of Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand that ASEAN eventually take on certain defense functions is acted upon, this could be the beginning of an effective regional peacekeeping force in Southeast Asia. An ASEAN joint defense force could represent a powerful deterrent against the outbreak of new guerrilla violence. If the Asia nations proceed with this initiative -- and only they can decide this -- they can count on a sympathetic response in the U.S.

This brings me to the ^{fourth} ~~third~~ principle mentioned -- that of

multilateralism. A number of countries in Asia will continue to require outside capital and technical assistance if economic development is to proceed, and if they are to be able to assume primary responsibility for their own defense.

9a

Here an enlarged Peacekeeping
Capacity for the United Nations
would also be important.

We should try to enhance the
capacity by:

test: 1-2-3 p 7-8 - done by

But our own assistance can best be effective if channeled through multilateral institutions such as the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank. Indonesia offers an example of how the "slippery slope" from bilateral assistance to military involvement can be avoided and the benefits of multilateralism attained. Here the U.S. resisted both the temptation to intervene at the time of the revolution of 1965, and the temptation to embrace an anti-communist regime which had deposed an increasingly communist-oriented government. Here we have cooperated with other developed nations in providing large-scale assistance through a multilateral framework. Here we have contributed to security and development -- without becoming embroiled in local political struggles. Such a mode of cooperation offers one of the best chances for the U.S. to play a constructive role in Asia in the 1970's.

7-14-66
The ~~fourth~~ principle suggested -- that of residual U.S.

responsibility -- means that the U.S. cannot and will not do the things

that the nations of Asia can do for themselves. It means that our physical presence in the area should be reduced, and that we should adopt what might be termed a "low posture" in pursuing our policy in Asia. This means neither permanent bases in South Vietnam nor sizeable military

build-ups elsewhere. We shall of course, in accordance with the international agreements just signed, provide nuclear guarantees which will make it unnecessary for the nations of the area to develop their own nuclear capability. We shall honor our treaty commitments to all countries. We shall supply limited military assistance to some, including Korea and Taiwan. We shall continue to provide substantial economic assistance on a selective basis, though increasingly through multilateral channels.

Asia's future in the next decade will depend in great part on the actions of four great nations: Japan, India, Indonesia and China. Our relations with them -- and more important -- their relations with each other -- will be critical in deciding the peace and stability of the area.

This is the course that I intend to follow, to preserve for

America the peace that she will -- God willing -- gain in Vietnam

*Having indicated how we might avoid
future Vietnam type involvements, let us move
beyond this present obstacle to peace to consider*

~~But peace, alone, is not enough. And I think our times permit~~

*The steps we should take to further cooperation,
more -- a move toward true reconciliation.*

between the US the Soviet Union, Europe and Japan.

~~In all of these nations there must be
I want to see a reordering of our national priorities -- so that~~

~~a lesser proportion of ^{a nation's} our wealth and energy can be spent for armaments~~

~~and a greater proportion can be devoted to the good works of peace --~~

~~including the tasks of building a better America, right here at home.~~

~~That means we must do more than talk about the need for~~

~~We ^{must} ~~have already begun to~~ ~~the~~ ~~center~~~~
~~reconciliation; we must take concrete actions,~~ *to further*

this aim!

Action #1: I favor early US-Soviet agreement to freeze and to reduce offensive and defensive strategic armaments. The recent Soviet agreement to our repeated requests for control talks is encouraging -- and a tribute to the skill and wisdom with which President Johnson has long pursued this goal.

Action #2: I favor US-Soviet action to avoid wasteful competition in space and thus to reduce the costs of the space race. Coordination of US and Soviet post-lunar manned space exploration would serve this purpose.

Action #3: I favor reciprocal reductions of US and Soviet forces in the heart of Europe. Peaceful engagement should replace containment as the object of our policy in Europe.

Action #4: I favor an eventual orderly scale-down of US global conventional forces to pre-Vietnam levels. When the fighting in Vietnam abates, this should be feasible -- especially as new means of meeting peacekeeping needs emerge in developing areas.

Action #5: I favor steps to remove restrictions on American trade with the People's Republic of China in non-strategic goods.

Action #6: I favor private and informal discussions with representatives of the Peoples Republic of China on a wide range of disarmament issues, especially nuclear and arms control issues, provided that these discussions would be in no way detrimental to the progress of Soviet-American discussions.

~~Action No. 5~~ *accelerated and*
Reconciliation also requires technological cooperation, economic
interchange between the United States and the
~~cooperation, and greater exchanges of people by all nations.~~

Soviet Union, and Western & Eastern Europe,

Action No. 6.

- p 10 - Owen draft

In taking these new measures, in addition to those now underway - to extend the area of East-West collaboration and reconciliation, we cannot overlook the ~~contingent~~ ^{general} which China must play in future decades. Although the prospect for cooperative programs with China ~~is~~ in the next decade are not good, we should make it clear that we are prepared to replace cooperation with conflict whenever the Chinese are.

To widen our contacts with the seven hundred fifty million people who live in mainland China we should:

- 1) lift restrictions on ~~our~~ trade in non-strategic goods
- 2) encourage interchange of scholars, journalists and artists
- 3) make it clear that should the nations ^{of} the world decide that China (over)

has met the standards for
inclusion as a participating member
of the community of nations;
we will not pose any
bar to such participation.

*collaboration and
to ~~Attene~~ ^{reconciliation}
This is the path that I intend to travel, so that this great*

should
country's priorities ~~can~~ be reordered and its resources redirected

a path

away from building engines of destruction and toward the needs of

peace.

If we have succeeded in ^{advancing} ~~progress~~ ^{the} on the road of cooperation among the ^{community of} ~~developed~~ ^{developing} nations, we will ^{be} ~~be~~ ^{the} ~~problems~~ ^{confront} ^{the} ~~problems~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{development} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~Southern~~ ^{half} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~globe.~~ ^{globe.}

Pope Paul said "development is the new name for peace."

Unless, and until the needy ... hungry ... ill-clothed ...

ill-housed ... undereducated majority of mankind has some substantial

hope for the future, something worth protecting -- there will be no

peace.

The great challenge in the new era of American foreign policy I am discussing will be not only ways to lay down our swords, but ways to beat them into plowshares in a very real sense. The urgent need



This need

X derives not just from the dangers it imposes, but from the fact that the world urgently requires a major reallocation of resources to the work of providing better lives for people -- both at home in America and in the world.

We all know the case for foreign aid:

It is right and decent.

It contributes to peace and security.

It is not a significant gold drain because virtually all of it is spent in this country for goods and services.

A little bit can be the catalyst that puts much larger resources to work in the recipient nation.

We can afford it.

Unfortunately, however, the developed nations have grievously neglected their responsibilities to assist the developing countries -- and their opportunities to make an inexpensive contribution to world peace.

The United States made a good start with the Marshall Plan.

We have helped put Taiwan, South Korea, Iran, Greece and Turkey on their feet and others of our aid recipients are on the way.

Other nations are now aid donors -- at least five of them give a great share of ^{ex} their gross national product than we do.

But by and large we developed nations have been trying to get away with a decent minimum of stop-gap assistance rather than extending as much as we can to get a very urgent job done. As I speak to you today, it is possible that the United States Congress may authorize no aid at all for next year (?) -- at a time when Americans are dying in a war borne of nothing so much as economic backwardness. ?

The aid practices and procedures of the 1950's and 1960's are simply no longer adequate. It is time to start fresh -- this time with the clear purpose before us of doing what is necessary to see that there is visible progress for the peoples of the developing world.

And I am talking now not just about the United States, but about all the developed nations between San Francisco and Tokyo -- looking East.

Our goal should be to make available as much assistance as the self-help efforts of the developing nations will permit them to put to good use. Much of that assistance will be in money -- which really means machinery, fertilizer and other industrial products. Some of it will be in commodities like food.

And some -- perhaps the hardest to come by -- will have to be in trade concessions (?) which will allow the developing nations gradually to take their place as full participants in the world economy.

The urgent business of national development can no longer be left to a thin patchwork of bilateral contributions and occasional consortia. It is the great international challenge of our times, and one that can be met only on the basis of the fullest international cooperation.

I propose that we seek an international agreement to this end -- perhaps building on the Dutch proposal for a World Development Charter which would specify both the aid obligations of developed countries and the self-help obligations of developing countries. Is it too bold to think of a World Development Conference -- to be held in San Francisco on the 25th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations -- to explore this and other possibilities.

Meanwhile, the United States must rededicate itself to its clear responsibilities in foreign aid. In specific terms, I favor:

First: that we channel our aid increasingly through multi-lateral instruments. We should aim at doubling the proportion of our aid -- moving through the World Bank family and through new regional banks in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

*multilateral agencies
open to participation
Soviet Union and
European countries*

*These
should be
by the
Eastern*

Second: we should encourage increased private investment in developing countries. I favor creation of a public corporation which would experiment with a wide variety of techniques to this end, both abroad and at home: extended risk guarantees, joint ventures, tax credits, and many more.

Third: we should ensure that the technical aid we provide developing countries reflects the wide variety of talents at hand in our pluralistic society. I would like to explore channeling an increasing share of this technical aid through a mixed public-private institute, which would work closely with our great universities and private research institutes.

Development is the great task for rich nations in the decade ahead. It is a task in which America once pioneered. It is a task, I believe, which can in the years ahead help rediscover the idealism and sense of purpose which has guided our nation in its greatest moments.

A more stable peace ... reconciliation ... redirection of international efforts from the wasteful arts of war to the humane work of development -- I believe those are the only realistic policy goals for America in the months and years ahead if we mean to enhance the security of the American people.

They are goals which will let us build the future rather than trying to protect the past.

They reflect the values of ordinary men and women -- not the habits of mind we associate with ~~striped pants and uniforms~~. *traditional diplomacy*

They are goals for young people -- of all ages -- people with the confidence and imagination to welcome change and challenge.

Let me emphasize, however, that no single nation can simply declare a new era in international relations. Our success in achieving our future goals can be no greater than our success in dealing with the hard realities of the present.

The goals I have suggested raise some difficult questions:

convinced
-- How to ~~show~~ the Soviets that they share a common interest ^{with} ~~with~~
building a community of developed nations, and
us in avoiding conflict in developing areas, and in strengthening alterna-
~~tives to great power involvement there -- even while powerful elements~~
~~in Soviet ideology impel them to seek expanded influence in these areas;~~

-- How to promote the kind of economic growth in the poorer nations
which will involve and benefit the common man, even while these nations
resist -- and rightly -- any suggestion of external intervention in their
internal affairs?

Community of
-- How to find new techniques for increasing cooperation among the
East and
developed countries of ~~the~~ West -- even while the political processes which
~~control~~ shape their governments remain rooted in the workings of national
societies?

-- Above all, how to involve the private citizen, and particularly young people, more and more in business of making foreign policy, [?] -- and thus to ensure that democratic control over this policy is maintained, in an age of growing technical complexity?

I don't have all the answers -- I doubt anyone has -- to these questions.

Prolonged, patient and persistent effort will be required to find the answers and make them work.

The answers will not come from the kind of arrogant assertions of American power with which some have charged us in the past.

And neither will they come from the arrogant aloofness and moral certitude which seem to lie at the root of some of the foreign policy declarations we hear today.

I do know that in implementing ^{23.}

~~I have set no time schedule for the measures proposed. This in~~
Such a foreign policy, the new President must
~~the end -- as far as the United States is concerned --~~ will be guided by

the advice and consent of the U.S. Congress and by the reaction of the

American people. Our preoccupation with dissent during the past few

years has obscured another venerable and valued American tradition -- that

of consent. Our tradition assumes a high degree of participation by the

people and the Congress -- especially the Senate -- in the making of

critical national policy decisions. [#] The failure to consult invariably

leads to a lack of public involvement -- and eventually to a lack of public

support. As we move to redefine our basic ^{foreign} policy toward ~~the~~ in the next

decade, the next President must bear in mind that to gain legitimacy,

policies must command the respect and support of public opinion, must

never outdistance public opinion too much.

~~do~~ We understand better today than yesterday that a new ^{foreign} policy

~~in Asia~~ for a new decade stands little chance of success unless it makes sense to the new generation of Americans who fight the nation's wars, renew the nation's political processes, and in the long-run determine the success or failure of American society at home and abroad. I have attempted to present here a policy which will command the assent of all Americans, young and old.

* * * * *

file 'Commonwealth' / H. Owen draft /
JER - 17/1/68.

Regional peace - happy
p4 Inter American Force - ?

UK peace happy - strong theme of

p6 New era in int. relations - cooperation
replacing competition.

Good:

p7- Catalog of areas of US

Smart: Competition
also: China
E Europe

Helping the poor
at home ?? -

abroad - as well as
out-moded phrase -
way of thinking - well for
handouts - also - New Deal.

p 9-11

Multilaterally and - pro-entente - checks -
World Development Conference

partnership - US - Europe - Japan. - OECD

all conclusions - specific programs -
~~and~~ no rationale at Conceptual Framework

Should have some of the programmatic
recommendations for post-convention
period.



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