

NEWS FROM

UNITED DEMOCRATS FOR HUMPHREY

1100 17th STREET, N.W. ■ WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

TELEPHONE 202 / 393-6420

Release for Wednesday AMs
July 31, 1968

For Further Information:
Ev Munsey, ext. 208
U-202

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY IN TELEVISED TALKS ADVOCATES MARSHALL PLAN FOR THE CITIES AND PROGRAMS FOR CIVIL ORDER AND JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 30 -- Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey outlined his proposals for a Marshall Plan for the cities and for inter-related programs for civil order and civil justice in his second and third brief televised talks to the people.

The Vice President's talk on the Marshall Plan was broadcast on CBS at 9:25 p.m., EDT, and his statement on civil order and civil justice on NBC at 10:55 p.m., EDT.

Vice President Humphrey pointed out that America will not solve its problems "by wishing or by simply talking of how bad things are. The next President of the United States must lead this country with specific programs for change, but without violence."

The texts of the Vice President's remarks follow:

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1. MARSHALL PLAN -- At this very moment, millions of people in this country are dead. They're walking but they're dead, because they've lost their reason to live. Many of them are in rural America. Many are on Indian reservations, but most of them are in our cities, just around the corner from the America we know.

They are frustrated, bitter, unemployed, living in conditions that you and I would not and could not accept. But we can save their lives. We can help people reclaim themselves and become self-respecting, productive citizens. I've seen it happen. I've seen it happen as Mayor of Minneapolis. We trained people to work and we cut our relief rolls by almost ninety per cent.

I've seen it happen as Vice President, too. Through our poverty programs, through youth education, housing and job training programs. But those programs are just a beginning. We must see this job through or we won't be able to live with ourselves.

Now, many of you remember the cities of Western Europe right after World War II. They were bombed and devastated. The people were homeless, jobless and hungry and beaten. That's a pretty good description of a ghetto, but we brought help to those cities under the Marshall Plan, and the people rebuilt their own cities and gave a whole continent a new lease on life.

Now, I ask you, if the Marshall Plan worked in Europe, why can't it work in America. The answer is, it can. That's why I have proposed a Marshall Plan for our American cities.

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The Marshall Plan worked because of its concentration on a clear and feasible purpose. It depended on a great moral commitment on planning, and on the money to back up that commitment.

How much will it cost? Well, a good deal, but to do less will cost much more in crime and delinquency, welfare and lost tax dollars. To help pay for this effort, I propose the creation of a national urban development bank, financed in part publicly and through private subscription of funds.

Such a bank would have enough borrowing and lending authority to do the job. If we are to improve our cities within the traditions of American enterprise, most of the money and much of the initiative must come from free enterprise. And in the Marshall Plan for our cities, we must see to it that the worst problems get the first attention.

In most of our cities today, public services are the poorest where the needs are the greatest. Schools are the weakest, garbage collection is the slowest, and housing is the poorest. Now, we can change all of that. Not by violence and by hating, but through the hard work, of people who believe in America and in the American city.

We can and we must do it, because we want peace in this country, because we can't afford to waste money and human life, and most of all because it is right.

I propose no miracles, and I make no promises that cannot be kept. It's easy to point out what's wrong with this country. Any candidate can do that, but that doesn't mean this is a sick society, and it doesn't mean that we've lost our way.

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I think that we are a restless nation, searching for better ways. The next President of the United States must be prepared to propose those ways. The Marshall Plan for the cities is one of them, and between now and election day, I'll be talking with you about some others. Together, we will make them work.

2. CIVIL ORDER AND CIVIL JUSTICE -- The American right to life is in jeopardy. Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King are dead. So are the victims of too many riots and too much crime. The right to life was the idea that formed this nation. The right to a protected life and the right to a better life, a life of meaning and value, and these -- all of these -- are in jeopardy.

They suffer from physical violence, and from violence to human dignity in the filth of our slums and the despair of unemployment and poverty.

I propose, therefore, two programs for the future: a program for civil order and a program for civil justice, and they go together as one.

Now, I put these items at the top of the program for civil order. First, the riots must stop. We must have the rule of law, due process of law, and the full protection of the law in every American neighborhood, and we must have it now.

Second, we need gun control laws that will effectively stop the criminal use of firearms, and we need them now.

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Third, we must stop the dangerous drug traffic. There must be stiffer penalties for the illegal sale of drugs, better treatment and rehabilitation for addicts, more research on the effects of drugs, and now.

Fourth, we must organize councils of civil peace in our states and our communities. These would include members of all racial, religious and economic groups. These councils could provide a community relations service to foresee and prevent violence. They could gain community cooperation and hear the voices of these who too often go unheard.

And we must strengthen and modernize our police forces, improve our law enforcement agencies, and back up the forces of law and order, and we must be willing to pay the bill.

Fifth, we must take a hard look at the effects of television on our children. What happens when they see casual violence and death every day. Now, I do not propose censorship. I propose that you judge what is best for your children, and, that those responsible for TV programming act responsibly.

Now, let me talk to you about my program for civil justice. First, we must conquer hunger in this country. Some children starve while others overeat. We can and we must provide food for those who need it.

Second, we must help everyone who can work to find work. No one really wants a welfare check or a handout. People want the self-respect of an honest job. Job training for everyone who needs it and jobs for them to do. Those who cannot work are entitled to enough income to live a decent life.

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Third, we must provide full education from pre-school right on through college or advanced training for every American child.

Education to the limit of every child's capacity, whether his family can pay for it or not.

If we carry out these two programs, we will have made a new and great contribution to our America. Not just another bill of civil rights legislated, but a history making record of civil results achieved. Results that tell every American he is free and safe and able to stand on his own feet.

I want one America, not two, and so do you. To achieve it, we must have both civil order and civil justice. We must pursue them at one and the same time. We won't get them by wishing or by simply talking of how bad things are. The next President of the United States must lead this country with specific programs for change, but without violence.

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A COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF
NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION'S

NET Journal

"Hubert Humphrey on Government and the Presidency"

From: National Educational Television, 10 Columbus Circle,
New York, New York 10019. Phone: (212) 262-5576.

NOTE: This transcript is to be used for news and review purposes
only.

In this exclusive interview with NET Washington correspondent Paul Niven, Vice President Humphrey discusses his conception of the presidency, the course of his campaign, the division within the Democratic Party, and his philosophy of government, based on his experiences as mayor, senator, and vice president.

The program is the third in NET's series of hour-long conversations with the candidates. It was taped in Los Angeles on July 28, 1968, in the studios of KCET.

For Release: AFTER 9:00 P.M. EDT, MONDAY, JULY 29, 1968.

Broadcast Times: In Los Angeles, KCET/Channel 28, Monday, July 29,
at 9:30 P.M.
In New York, WNDT/Channel 13, Monday, July 29,
at 9:00 P.M.
In Washington, D.C., WETA/Channel 26, Monday,
July 29, at 9:00 P.M.

Producer: Jim Karayn

Director: Robin Clark

Associate Producer: Elvera Ruby

CONTACT: Jim Karayn, Bureau Chief
NET Washington Bureau
1619 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
Telephone: 483-6367

MR. NIVEN:

Good evening. Hubert Horatio Humphrey runs for president in 1968 with a number of advantages. He is ~~an~~ ^{the} heir apparent to a retiring Democratic President; he is the natural candidate of the country's majority party. He is the favorite of the party organization, most labor leaders, and of most minority leaders. He offers more than a quarter-century of experience, as political science teacher, mayor of Minneapolis, senator, majority whip of the Senate, and vice president. His name is identified with a vast amount of legislation, ranging from civil rights to the Peace Corps to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. And in an unusual political year marked by many unforeseen events, Mr. Humphrey is not without problems. The hero of one generation of liberals, he has demonstrated less appeal to a new generation which has new values. His party has been torn asunder by the Administration's Vietnam policy, which he supported and which most Democratic voters seem to have rejected in the State Primaries. The outlook for the election is clouded further by urban unrest, and the resulting preoccupation with law and order which cut across traditional political lines. For the next sixty minutes, we'll be talking with the vice president about the issues, his party, his campaign and the presidency.

(NET PRESENTS HUBERT HUMPHREY, ON GOVERNMENT AND
THE PRESIDENCY.)

The Interviewer is Paul Niven)

MR. NIVEN: Mr. Vice President, you said in New York last week that the main job of the next President would be to pull the country together again. On the one hand, we seem to have the kind of militant anti-Vietnam people who are demonstrating against you, the kind of militant Negroes who heckled you last night, and at the other end of the spectrum there are the people who want the status quo and simplify everything with law and order, and in between ~~probably~~ *apparently* a lot of people who just want politics and politicians to go away. Isn't it going to be a tremendous task, sir, to reconcile these elements in our society?

MR. HUMPHREY: There isn't any doubt but what it's a real challenge and it is a great task, but the fact that it's a difficult task makes the opportunity all the more important and all the more meaningful to me. I happen to believe that the next president of the United States will have a great opportunity to pull this country together. He must be, as I have felt and as I have said, an educator, he must take his case to the people, he must appeal to the basic goodness of the American people, their desire to make this a better country. I believe there is a great silent majority here in America that wants to do what's right, that doesn't hold ill-will against others, that wishes to have progress, social, economic progress, but they want it

peacefully, they want it without disorder or without violence. I believe that the job of that next president is to see that this comes about, to see that it materializes.

MR. NIVEN: Dr. Gallup reports that most people whom his people interview do not worry too much about poverty, are not concerned about the ghettos. Do you think they really are?

MR. HUMPHREY: Well, whether they are or not, it is important that they be brought to understand that these problems are here. I think it is true that many times in our history, people have not been fully aware of the challenge and of the difficulty and the problem that might exist, until it almost got out of hand. But the privilege and the duty of a leader of a country is to try to point to those problems before they do get out of hand, and to try to bring to the attention of the great majority of the people the necessity in their own self-interest as well as in the interests of others to deal with these problems. I know there is a feeling abroad that this country is not really yet ready to move on some of the social and economic conditions that you may see or that I may see in our travels and visits. But I am convinced that the country can be aroused to move and I think that we have to take the preventive action. We have to alert the public before it's too late.

MR. N. Mr. Vice President, haven't most of the roll calls in the House of Representatives in the last two years indicated that the Congress at least is not willing to move?

MR. H. I don't believe I would make that statement. I believe that the roll calls indicate that there is less excitement or less anxiety over some of these matters than I think there ought to be. But we have moved on matters of considerable importance. On the model cities program, for example. On the whole question of what we call the safe streets and the law and order bill, in which you implement the local police forces and you provide for additional training. While we didn't get very much on rent supplement, we at least made the breakthrough, and the Congress has been very much aware of the importance of upgrading our educational system. By and large they've done quite well in that area. Now, this is an election year, and there's a tendency on the part of any Congress in an election year to try to bind up its business, get it over with and get back to the hustings. But I'm convinced that the next president of the United States will have a chance after this campaign, which can be an educational experience, to focus attention anew upon these needs and these problems.

MR. N. Isn't it true that any administration, in order to sell a program to a Congress, has to use slogans which inevitably raise popular expectations too high? You mention model cities. Isn't it true that so far only about ten million dollars

has been disbursed to 75 cities?

MR. H.

I think it's been far too slow, the process, and you're right. And this is something that we've got to get at. There's been even a slowness in the applications coming in from the cities and the communities themselves. But the fact that it's been slow doesn't mean that we need not expedite it or emphasize it. This is a new program. The funding of it is within the last eight months. And I'm convinced that you'll start to see now a large number of applications coming on in with a good deal of emphasis behind it. Plus the fact -- again I've come back to what is a campaign about? Surely it's to get elected and you concentrate on personalities. But really you arouse during a campaign the interests of the people and their long term needs, as well as their short term needs. That's what I intend to do. I intend to use this campaign period, Paul, as a way to talk with the people, to let them know what my concerns are and to share to the best of my ability as to what their concerns are. A campaign in a sense is a dialogue, and those of us who have been privileged to travel about this country and to see its many wonderful assets as well as its liabilities, we have the responsibility to speak of both, to speak with confidence in our ability to do the job that needs to be done, and also to speak with candor as to the nature of the job that is before us, or the nature of the problems.

MR. N. In an interview last October, you said one of the signs of the times as to the improvement in things is that people who never before spoke up, never showed any spark or spirit are now speaking up. Aren't these the kind of people who bothered you when you appeared here Saturday night?

MR. H. No, I don't think so. I think there are two kinds of people, so to speak, that are speaking up. There's those that are speaking up out of great concern over their plight. They sense that there's a better day ahead. There is a ray of hope. Or as we put it sometimes, they look down the tunnel and they can see some light, the light of hope. That's what we call the rising expectations, and I believe there's a number of people today that for the first time in their lives feel that there is a chance to break out of the ghetto, so to speak, to break out of the prisons of illiteracy, and of poverty and of deprivation. And I'm all for those people speaking up. I think they must. I think they arouse our conscience, and they touch our spirit, and they motivate us to move into action. Then there's another group. It's very very small. Very, very small. But highly articulate, and at times violent. But particularly articulate. That are the sort of 'aginners'. Now for example the group that caused some disturbance, and it was a very small group in terms of the total audience of Saturday night in Los Angeles.

Those were people that wanted to ban the draft. That was their claim to fame. They were the ban the draft militants. And there were at a maximum 25 in an audience anywhere from 750 to a thousand. Now they were very noisy. They booed and they shouted. Frankly any message I'd had to give to that audience, it was already said. It was primarily a voter registration audience. It is true that it disrupted the program, but that isn't going to deter me one bit from carrying my message. I think we have to face up to heckling. I think we have to face up to the people that are going to violate the rules of fair play. I think the American people will resent those that violate those rules. But you know something? I got a front page story, on my message. I doubt that I would have gotten a front page story on my message had there not have been some of that commotion. Now, I'm not advocating the commotion, but.....

MR. N. I was going to say, are you gonna ask these people to pursue you around the country? You gonna pay their way to get you on the front page?

MR. H. Well, Paul, it sounds rather cynical to say this, but sometimes the best copy that I've received in terms of the message that I've tried to deliver, after you get through paragraph 1, about the picketers or the hecklers or whoever they may be, is after you've had a little disturbance. I must say, though, that these disturbances -- if you'll permit me to move from myself

now to others -- can have a very negative effect. Take for example -- I am convinced that Mr. Wallace, Governor Wallace, is gaining a great deal of popularity, and surely of notoriety, because of those who try to break up his meetings. Those who come in and try to break it up, break up the meeting because they disagree with his point of view, because they think he's a bad person and they don't like what he's saying. They actually help him.

MR. N. The way your hecklers helped you, as you say.

MR. H. I think so.

MR. N. Well, there are always people around who want to exacerbate problems rather than solve them. You dealt with them 25 years ago in Minnesota.

MR. H. Yes sir.

MR. N. But aren't there also--- it seems to me, seeing these hate-filled faces at airports--- there are a lot of quite innocent people who perhaps have been misguided but who really distrust the system, who have lost faith in the political process. Isn't it going to be an enormous task to bring them back, to reconcile them to a political process?

MR. H.

We have to gain their confidence. Let me differentiate again. There are a few hate-filled faces. I feel sorry for them. I really do. Because hate is the worst toxin of all. It's the worst poison that you can possibly have in any system, or in any situation. But there's a great deal of difference between those who are maybe temporarily disillusioned, who feel that the system has not been fair with them, and that little minority of haters. Now, it's my job, and the job of other political leaders in this country, to make this system responsive to the needs of the people, to make it possible for people to have faith and trust in us, and we, the political candidates. But more importantly, in this system. And how do we do it? By the involvement. By the involvement of the deprived and of those that are the needy. By bringing them into the decision-making processes. By encouraging them into community action, and by being willing to listen to them. I've found out that sometimes after some of the so-called militants have worked you over for a little while, and have had a chance to just spill out, so to speak, all their frustrations and their bitterness, that they settle back and you can have a sensible, reasonable talk, and you can come to some understandings.

MR. N.

But, sir, Senator McCarthy, when he launched his campaigns, gave as part of his reason the fact that he wanted to bring these protestors back out of the street into the political process. Will they not now feel that you, whom they regard as the

official organizational candidate, wins the nomination despite the results of the primaries which they felt went their way? Won't they be more disenchanted than ever with the political process?

MR. H. Well, first of all, I'm not exactly what you would call an Establishment man. I've been in the Establishment, it is true, but I've tried to change it and I have changed the Establishment and I still think it needs a lot of changing. I'm sort of in it and out of it. In the one sense I work within the system; on the other side I try to adjust and change that system for what I believe is the better of this country. I know that Senator McCarthy did say that he was seeking to channel the energies, particularly of young people, into the constructive political process, and I think he has. I think in a large measure he's been helpful and effective in this manner. But he has a fringe that hang on, as any group does, or any candidate does, that in a sense abuses his purpose, that erodes and corrodes his purpose. Now that fringe that really are not wanting to even be a part of the system even if they could change it to their own design. That fringe is not going to cooperate ultimately with Senator McCarthy or with myself. They are not going to be happy. I believe, however, that the vast majority, the very large majority of the people that today support Senator McCarthy, if they feel that I have a sensitivity to the needs of this country, that I am deeply committed to the cause of peace and a peaceful world. And I am deeply

committed to the cause of a more just and humane society, and the re-direction of our political and social institutions to human welfare and human needs. I think that I can get them. I believe that they will come back. In fact, I think they will be a very powerful force for good.

MR. N. Isn't a large group of them by now in such an emotional state that they will not forgive you unless you denounce the administration of which you've been a part?

MR. H. Let's wait and see what happens, what the Republicans do. You know, most people have to choose between two realistic alternatives. At this stage, you know, you can always dream that the perfect candidate is going to come on the scene. The hero is going to walk out and save the day. Then all at once you find out that it comes down to two mortals. Not a choice between God and the Devil, but the choice between two mortals, or three mortals, within the political system. And I'm of the opinion that when that choice comes, that we'll be able to gain our fair share of the support of people who are very idealistic. I'm an idealist...

MR. N. You're saying, ^{who} sir, that these people/may think now that they dislike Hubert Humphrey are going to be saying in October, 'Well, we may have disliked Hubert Humphrey but we dislike Richard Nixon much more?'

MR. H. You said that.

MR. N. Well, I asked for your comment.

MR. H. I would say that I shall be able to enlist a large number of these people in my cause because my cause is essentially their cause. No man in this country wants peace any more than I do, or has worked any harder to get it. And if I can continue to be a bit immodest, all of my life I have worked toward--to be of some help and benefit to the needy, to help people walk upright, in self respect and human dignity. This is my life. I haven't been in politics to gain power or to gain wealth. I've been in politics because I believe in social service, because I believe in the concept of service to humanity and to people. And to the people, at home and abroad. I believe that I can still exemplify those characteristics and thereby once again motivate young people in particular to become active participants in the political process.

MR. N. You've been quoted, I think most recently in a LOOK Magazine article, as expressing some puzzlement as to why young people don't recognize your record of accomplishment, and have so little sympathy for you. May I ask, sir, whether you as a youth, as a young, burning Liberal, ever felt that disenchanted with the previous generation of Liberals.

MR. H. Well, I think every generation of young people feels a bit disenchanted with the older generation. I think it's a little more sharply drawn now. I really do, in all candor and fairness. But let me make it quite clear, I'm really not

too puzzled as to why young people are--- some of the young people are not familiar with my record and therefore more appreciative of my good works and my good intentions. After all, some of the older people are not very familiar with it. I think we have to keep in mind that people frequently do not remember what you did or who you are or what you stand for. Therefore you need to constantly refresh the memory, not just by words, but by deeds.

MR. N. The central issue, of course, in this alienation, is Vietnam. To go way back before the situation which you and President Johnson came into in 1965, 1964. If you had been in the policy position-- policy-making position, 14 or 15 years ago, and you saw that if we committed ourselves in Vietnam, as we did, what was going to happen. If you'd had the advantage of foresight, would you have gone in?

MR. H. Oh, that's one of those iffy questions, Paul. I tell you, I'm sure that the Administration in 1954, 55, and 56, and later on President Kennedy's administration, in light of the evidence that they had, did what they thought was really right, and I frankly tell you that at that time I felt that what we were doing was basically right, in light of the information that I had. Now, had you been able to foresee way down the line, the unbelievable commitment that was involved here and the length and the duration of this war, it surely would have given any one pause for some very sober reflection as to whether or not it was worth the sacrifice that we were called upon to make.

But you don't have that kind of foresight. Nobody has that kind of foresight.

MR. N. I think most of the country was with the Administration of President Eisenhower, President Kennedy and President Johnson up to a certain point.

MR. H. That's right.

MR. N. But surely there comes a point when what you lose is greater than what you gain. Didn't we somewhere along the line come to that point where every time we escalated we blithely assumed for some reason -- and this is the country, not the Administration -- that they wouldn't escalate, on the other side. And every time they did, and we got in deeper and deeper.

MR. H. You know, that word 'escalate' is one I'd like to discuss with you for a moment. We did not actually escalate. What we did was try to meet the challenge of the north and the recruitment and the pace of the enemy, of the Viet Cong. In other words, we were sort of always tracking them, rather than getting out in front. Our bombing, for example, was a result of the fact that the escalation of the war had taken place to a point where there wasn't much left to do except to try to save the situation by the beginning of the bombing attacks on North Vietnam. Now, when we put troops into South Vietnam, the only alternative we had was either to

put forces in there or let all of South Vietnam be the victim of aggression and the action of North Vietnam and the Viet Cong. So you see the whole subject of escalation is whether or not we were going to try to have a reasonable matching of forces that had already been put into the field by the enemy.

MR. N. Didn't our military people tell the civilian leaders at every given stage that all we have to do is this much more and we'll win? Without giving due consideration to the likelihood that the enemy would escalate another step in return?

MR. H. I suppose if you could go back through all the records, you would find that there were times that the military leaders thought that with additional increment, this would be enough to stop the enemy and hopefully to bring that enemy to the conference table for a prompt political or a negotiated settlement. People just don't have these qualities of prophecy and vision that we wish that they would have, and I think there was a great lack of understanding of the nature of this war. The fact that the military of South Vietnam had been trained primarily for conventional warfare when you were fighting really a Guerrilla war. That even the equipment of the ArVN, the Army of South Vietnam, was equipment designed for a different kind of a war. We just didn't, as a Western power, did not understand the nature of this kind of a conflict. This is really the first Guerrilla war along the formula of **GIAP** that we've ever had to fight or in which we'd been involved. It was very different from the war in Korea, where in Korea

there were large masses of forces moved even though it was a war in an Asian area, here was a war that had the elements of a civil war in it on the one hand, down with the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, and of course the open elements of an aggression from the North with the mainline units from North Vietnam, with a good deal of control, both military and political from the north out of Hanoi, but with a degree of control and autonomy on the part of the Viet Cong in the South. It's a political war, as well as a military conflict, and I doubt that in the beginning, we really understood that we were engaged essentially in a political war, in psychological warfare, in propaganda warfare; We tried to fight this war, primarily, as other wars had been fought. Now we've learned a great deal, we've learned a great deal, and this is why I think the pattern has changed as far as the military is concerned for the better on the side of the Allies.

MR. N.

Haven't we overlearned, in a sense? Ambassador Reischauer said, six months or a year ago, that one of the great dangers is Vietnam, that if we were now called upon to respond to another challenge elsewhere in Asia, or elsewhere in the world, the chances that the American people would be in favor of going in are less, nor greater, because of our disenchanting experience in Vietnam.

MR. H. I think that's true. I, by the way, happen to think that Ambassador Reischauer is one of the most astute observers of the Asian scene that America has, and we would be well advised to take his counsel very very seriously. Once again, let me say you don't always have to agree with every point that a man makes, but Ambassador Reischauer has not only been a student of Asian life and Asian culture and Asian politics, but having been our Ambassador in Japan, where he could really view from almost a sanctuary, from a position of security and safety, what was going on in South-east Asia, he came back, I believe, with a great fund of knowledge as to both what we'd accomplished and the mistakes that we'd made. And I intend to draw on that brilliant mind for advice and counsel.

MR. N. On the peace-*making* effort to which you're committed, doesn't a Democratic president have an unfair disadvantage in that if he reaches any kind of an accommodation with Communists anywhere, his opposition is much more likely to cry 'Appeasement, Munich, Surrender' than the opponents of a Republican president?

MR. H. Yes, I think the opposition would do that, Paul. I think you could expect at least some of the opposition, the hard-line Republican opposition---

MR. N. Not all, by any means...

MR. H. No, there are differences within the Republican party. But I believe that cry would have less response from the public than in former days. I happen to believe that the American people, like many of their leaders, have learned a great deal during these last 20-some years. The American people know that the Communist forces are yet a competitive force, and in some areas they become actually enemies. They know that the Communist ideology is a powerful political movement, but they also know quite intuitively and I think now from experience, and from observation, that we have to get along in this world. They know that this is a very dangerous world. And I think sometimes that the American people are a good deal more even intelligent than some of their tutors or/some of their explainers or their editorialists. They know that the peace of the world ultimately depends on the capacity and the ability of the Soviet Union and the United States to have at least a working relationship, and hopefully a healthy understanding.

MR. N. Does that mean that you have no fear of the people who will cry 'Communist' and 'Appeaser' as you seek to build bridges?

MR. H. I have no fear of them. No, as a matter of fact, I really believe that this is an asset. I believe that the American people are now at a point where they know that in the Nuclear Age, where there is massive destructive power in the hands of the Soviet Union and the United States, and growing destructive power in the hands of the Communist regime in China, that it is absolutely imperative that the leaders of the United States try to find without appeasement, without running or retreating, a working relationship with the Soviet Union. Otherwise, we'll continue to mount this arms race to accelerate it and it gets to a point where any little mistake can be a total nuclear holocaust. Now we can't afford that. There's a great deal of difference today, Paul, between our relationships with the Soviet Union than there was at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. At the time of the Cuban missile crisis, we had massive, massive nuclear power over and beyond what the Soviet Union had. That gap has, believe me, been very much closed, and we are now talking to the Soviet Union that has made tremendous efforts to close that gap.....

MR. N. Are you saying that the Soviets have gained, relatively, to our military position during the last eight years of Democratic Administration?

MR. H.

I think that the Soviet Union has put in such massive amounts of efforts in their intercontinental ballistic missile system and their nuclear sub system, that there isn't any doubt today that they have a larger capacity of nuclear power than they had some five or six years ago. I don't think anybody denies that. This is open knowledge. But let me say that we both have enough power to destroy each other, so when you get at it, what you're really talking about is the capacity for total destruction. We have all the capacities needed to obliterate the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union has the capacity to obliterate the United States. Now those are the facts of life. Even if you develop an anti-ballistic missile system, if you send ten missiles charging in on a great city in this country and you could knock out nine, that one that still carries than one megaton would lay that city low and destroy its people. We've never been able to develop a totally complete and totally effective defense system. This is why the negotiations that are contemplated and that are now in the preliminary stages on both defensive and offensive weapons are so vital. We simply have to find some way to bring this dangerous thing called nuclear power under some kind of rational control, and not only control, but to start to cut it back, because we're getting to a point where any kind of decision that would be , well, that could trigger passion and go beyond reason could be catastrophic.

Mr. NIVEN: Forgive me, sir, there may be merit in what you say but if I were a propagandist for the Republican National Committee, I would seize upon what you said a moment ago and say Vice President Humphrey said today that the Soviet Union militarily had gained relatively to us during the Kennedy and Johnson Administration . . .

HUMPHREY: And then the Vice President would say that even though there may have been some gain that we are still ahead of them. And yet, when you say that you're ahead -- what do you say? You simply say that we, after a nuclear exchange, we'd maybe have some weapons left that we didn't use and they wouldn't have any but there wouldn't be any people. Now what kind of sense does that make? Now the fact of the matter is that we know that in great nuclear exchanges that millions, ~~hundreds~~ ^{hundred} millions and millions of people, could be literally exterminated in the first few hours. Now that kind of knowledge should compel people to understand that the great issue before the world today is how ~~x~~ do you maintain the peace in this dangerous nuclear space age. Surely we have more power than the Soviets do. I don't think there's any ~~x~~ doubt about it. I think we have more nuclear power. I think we have more power in many areas, but that doesn't mean that you are safe and secure. That is the balance of ~~terror~~ ^{terror}. What I am saying is that the Soviet Union has

poured vast amounts of resources to build this missile system, to build its system of submarines -- I know that the Soviet Union has a larger number of active submarines than we have. We know that they have built their fleet, that they are now in the Mediterranean. We know that we have a great fleet, that we have a tremendous Air Force, we know that we have vast numbers of inter-continental ballistic missiles. We know that those missiles are highly sophisticated -- what else do we know? We know that if anyone -- either nation -- triggers that power, that it is all over. Now that is the important thing to know. Therefore, we have simply got to talk to our people about not just one-upmanship -- who is stronger than the other -- but how do we bring these two great superpowers into a responsible relationship so that the peace of the world is preserved. We are talking about humanity now. We are not talking about just Vietnam. We are not talking about some problem in the Carribean. We're talking about the totality of the world. We are talking about the fact that there are two superpowers in this world today that have the capacity of total annihilation of the other, and not only of the other, but of the annihilation of all of its neighbors. Now with that kind of awesome power, I think it is the duty of a candidate for President to be thinking in the highest

terms of law and order, of peace in this world, and not to be merely scratching around on the edges. And that is why I say the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, recently signed, is a major step, and maybe the most significant step in the building of peace since World War II. That's why I believe that these negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on the missile system, offensive and the defensive, are so vital. That's why I believe that the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, that I participated in, was so important to the cause of peace. Now we have simply got to build that kind of peace, Paul. That's what I am saying.

NIVEN: You've increasingly spoken in recent weeks of building bridges to the difficult people who run Red China or perhaps their successors. How does this square with your membership in the Committee of One Million, which was an anti-Chinese, anti-recognition outfit. Have you changed? Or has the situation changed?

HUMPHREY: Both. I think we have to recognize. You cannot ignore 800 million people who are on the mainland of China. That does not mean we accept their ideology . . .

NIVEN Some ~~people~~ ^{people} said that in 1948 when Britain recognized. . .

HUMPHREY: That's right. I've been Vice President of the United States. I've been close to the security of this nation, participated as a member of the National Security Council. I've traveled to Asia three or four times since I've been Vice President.

I think it is imperative that we begin the process of building as we call it for back of a better phrase, building better bridges to the people of mainland China. And one of the best ways to do it is through journalists, through the media, through doctors, through literary and cultural people, through tourism and through trade -- and trade -- particularly in those non-strategic items. I've never been able to ~~quite~~ quite understand in this day and age when people are supposed to be sane and intelligent that we could ignore the opportunities ^{for trade} for example, in soft goods, such as wheat, or our agricultural commodities with mainland China. Here we are with Canada doing business with them all the time. Our trusted and beloved neighbor, and ^a Canada that is vital to our defenses, tied in to our whole defense structure, just as much as any state in this union is tied in to the defense of the United States, and we have closed our mind to it, not only closed our mind to it -- closed our ports, closed our commerce to any kind of trade with mainland China. Now I'm not talking about trade in electronics, I'm not talking about computers, I'm not talking about weapon systems -- I'm simply saying that we are living in a world that is ~~w~~ smaller and smaller every day, and yet there are more and more people on it everyday. I would like to see that world somewhat more manageable ~~in~~ in terms of the hope of peace.

NIVEN I would like to move on to some questions about the campaign and the presidency itself. We will resume in just a moment.

Announcer: You are listening to Hubert Humphrey on Government and the Presidency. The Interviewer is Paul Niven.

END OF REEL ONE

NEVIN: Mr. Vice President, about a month ago you told the editors of the New York Times, "I would like to feel that when I went to Chicago, there would be enough delegates in ~~the hand~~ ^{hand} so that we would have some degree of security so that I could be a serene and pleasant man while I am there." Do you know have that surfeit of delegates and that degree of serenity?

HUMPHREY: I am feeling more serene each week. I believe the delegate situation is coming along very well. I had almost forgotten that I said that. I think it was said somewhat in jest and good humor but I believe that we are progressing very well and it ~~looks~~ ^{looks} to me know like we will have the delegate on the first ballot to gain the nomination. That will depend -- I must qualify that -- on how some of the favorite son candidates do and whether or not they are willing to give me the benefit of their delegate strength on the first ballot or whether we will have to go on to a second.

NIVEN: Is it possible that a credentials fight in any of the ~~seven~~ ^{Southern} delegations would loose you -- if you have to take a stand -- would loose you ^{either Southern} white votes ~~of the~~ delegates or Negro support.

HUMPHREY: No, I don't think so because where there will be a severe credentials fight I think people pretty well know what my position is such as in the instance of Mississippi where I have already expressed my concern over what happened there.

- NIVEN: Your civil rights record is there for all to see and it goes back a very long way. On the other hand you still have this problem as the leader of the Democratic Party -- You went into Georgia, you ~~embraced~~ ^{embraced} Lester Maddox . . .
- HUMPHREY: What . . .
- NIVEN: Didn't you put your arm around him?
- HUMPHREY: I walked along side of the distinguished governor of the state -- after all he is the governor, he was elected as the governor of the state . . .
- NIVEN: You said that the Democratic Party was a big family or that it had a big umbrella and that you were happy to be in the presence of a good Democrat.
- HUMPHREY: That's what he told me he was. He told me he was a good Democrat. I don't push aside people who want to be good Democrats but a good Democrat requires that you have some adherence to that platform and I want to make it quite clear -- my job as Vice President of the United States is when I go to a state where there is a governor -- no matter whether he is a Republican ^{conservative} or a Democratic conservative governor -- that I must treat him with respect and I did so -- when I went to the state of Georgia, I was invited by the governor to the governor's mansion and I treated the governor with respect. He was elected by the people of that ~~State~~ ^{State}. Surely, I do not agree with many of the governor's views but he wanted to talk with me on that day, Paul, about how we could improve the poverty program in that state -- how we could get more training for the hard core unemployed and in particular the Negro youth

so that they could have jobs. I thought my visit there therefore was worthwhile.

NIVEN: But isn't it one thing for the Vice President of the United States to treat the government with respect and another thing for a Democrat to hail someone as a fellow Democrat. Doesn't this make it difficult to obtain support at the other end of the spectrum of the party?

HUMPHREY: Not if people take a look at my record and what my views are and what my stands are. After all, I think I have a record in the field of civil rights that is about as good as any public figure has in the United States and it isn't an old record -- it is a continuing one right up to the time of open housing when I was there helping to see that that legislation came into being and helping work out the arrangements in the Senate to break the Southern filibuster -- the Southern Republican filibuster, I might add -- I think that the record is pretty clear. If I never have to defend myself on any other basis in my civil rights record, I believe that I will be in pretty good shape.

NIVEN: As Mr. Nixon has noted it from time to time with some envy, the Democratic party is greater at binding up its wounds after a convention and forgetting all the ugly things that have been said -- I remember in 1960 you and Mr. Kennedy were at each other's throats early in the year -- Mrs. Roosevelt was skeptical of Mr. Kennedy all year -- Mr. Truman was saying really terrible things about him just before the convention. Then as soon as the convention was over, there was a great love feast and

everybody joined in and worked together. Isn't it going to be more difficult this time. Aren't the divisions in the party more severe, more fundamental and more emotionally held than any that you can remember.

HUMPHREY:

There are very strong emotions now. But I do honestly believe that most of the Democrats after this convention will work together. I doubt that the emotions are much deeper than they were in 1948. In 1948 we even had emotions where large numbers of Democrats weren't even for Mr. Truman, and then you had the Wallace group that went off with what was called the Peace Movement at that time. Then you had Strom Thurmond who went off with the Dixiecrats.

NIVEN:

Let's take both of those in turn, sir. Henry Wallace, I think as you have said that he indicated to you later in his life, was taken over by some pretty bad people then. I know that you don't -- that Senator McCarthy is not the captive of the same people of a new generation. Mr. Wallace had a much more popular support, much more widespread support than Mr. Thurmond ever had. Aren't both divisions much more severe this year?

HUMPHREY:

Yes, I think they are. I think they are that. I think there is a greater emotional tension here. But I also believe, as we say when the chips are down, and after that convention had concluded its business on platform, on credentials, on rules, on nomination -- Paul, you just have to

take my observation of it -- I really believe that the vast majority of those -- vast majority of those Democrats will once again unite.

NIVEN: Governor Wallace is now way up in the high upper teens and twenty per cents in the polls. Do you think that after the conventions or when the people get in the polling booth, they are going to take the choice between the two men, one who is going to be President, and forget their emotional empathy for Governor Wallace.

HUMPHREY: I think that Governor Wallace will draw a smaller percentage of the vote than the polls now indicate, ^o since you get to that polling box.

NIVEN: Much smaller?

HUMPHREY: I just say considerably smaller. I don't want to get into percentages, but most American~~s~~ voters, when they go into that ballot box, want to vote for the man they think is going to be President. They may have somebody off over here that they -- well, they sort of like his ideas, but they are afraid that he can't make it, and they come in and vote ^{for} ~~in~~ one of the two major political party candidates. That is the history of American elections. Now it may change this time, but a man can only guide, can only base his judgment on the future on some of the experiences of the past, and the experiences of the past indicate what I have said.

NIVEN: Another thing I'd like to draw on -- your impressions of past elections in ~~that~~ ^{another} respect, in 1952 Governor Stevenson acknowledged the phrase in a letter from a correspondent, ^{Someone who} wrote something to him, said something about the "mess in Washington". And Mr. Stevenson picked up the phrase to use it in his reply, and Mr. Truman who was President was very angry. In 1960 as Mr. Nixon began to talk about moving on from the Eisenhower Administration's record and Mr. Rockefeller was pressing him to do so, Mr. Nixon had a man assigned to see that Mr. Eisenhower didn't get antagonized, and it was pretty delicate. Aren't you in the same situation this year?

HUMPHREY: Yes, I think that any Vice President is always in this situation where as he speaks and as he enunciates his attitudes, his programs, his policies that he may somehow or another, irritate the present Administration or cause some embarrassment to the President. I'm in a very fortunate situation, however, in the sense that President Johnson has not told me one time that I shouldn't say this or ~~S~~ouldn't say that. I think it is pretty clear that he has said to me to "speak your mind, Hubert, you speak what you believe you have to say, what you believe is right and what you want to see this country do." He hasn't become angry with me and I have spoken ^{out} very ~~openly~~ ^{openly}. For example, when I talked about my plan for the cities, you may recall

that I spoke of the Marshall Plan for the cities using that symbol of the Marshall Plan, and it caused some difficulty amongst some of the Administration's spokesmen. I have now spoken of it openly and it hasn't caused any further difficulties.

NIVEN: There is a difference, you see, between saying -- I will do this, if elected President. -- than saying -- What we ~~have~~ been doing is wrong. -- If you do that. . . Mr. Johnson -- we're all human. Mr. Johnson presumably has done the best he can with the country. He ~~thinks~~^{thinks} he has done right. If you start saying that the Administration is wrong here and inadequate there, isn't he naturally going to feel that you're wrong and isn't it going to interfere with your relationship?

HUMPHREY: But I'm not going to condemn the Administration. I happen to think that what we have done -- and I say we -- because I've been a part of it, is basically good. I think we could have done more if we had had more sources, had we known more at the time, but I believe by and large that what we have done in the fields on the domestic side, in education, in health, in consumer protection, in pollution control, in law enforcement, in civil rights, in housing, in urban affairs -- all of these things have been basically constructive and I'm very proud of them. I'm very proud of the fact that we have increased our investment in education by over 300% in the last four years. I think

this is remarkable achievement. I am not condemning the President. I am simply saying that we must build on this. Where we have learned some things, found out that some things work well, let's move ahead, Let us not stand still. Let's go on and do a better job and build on it.

NIVEN: The results of the Democratic primaries across the country, whatever constructions can be placed on them, do seem to show ~~that~~ fairly conclusively that large numbers of Democrats are dissatisfied. Can you get those people back without losing the President?

HUMPHREY: Well, now, let's just look at those Democratic primaries. There was one primary in which the President was involved where he had not yet ^{up} to that time said he would not seek the nomination or accept it, and that was in New Hampshire. And I think that it is almost a news flash now but the President gained 48-49% of the vote and his opposition only 42%. . .

NIVEN: In Indiana, didn't those who wanted to endorse the record of this administration know that voting for Governor Brannigan was the way to do it?

HUMPHREY: No sir. No sir. Because the President's name was not on that ballot. And not only that but the President had openly announced that he was not a candidate and when the President makes that kind of a statement, believe me, the

people understand it, and understand it well. I think it is a great misconception that has been given to the people that where the President's name did not appear but ^{where} somebody said he was for him, this was the way you tested the President's strength. The way you test a man's strength is when his name is on the ballot. Now you're not going to get me to have my strength tested by putting Paul Niven's name on the ballot, even though I think you might do very well and you could test your strength by putting your name on the ballot. The only time when I have run for office, when I won or was defeated, was when my name was on the ballot. Now when I went into West Virginia and Wisconsin, my name was on the ballot, and by the way, I got more votes in defeat in Wisconsin than some of the primary winners have been getting in victory in this 1968. Yet I was tagged as having been defeated.

NIVEN:

I know that you enjoy the cartoons of Herblock in the Washington Post because he is more likely to make mischief ^{among} ~~with~~ the Republicans than Democrats -- I wonder if you remember one during the 1960 campaign. ^{when he} ~~it~~ showed Mr. Nixon physically ^{deploring} ~~impugning~~ ^{deploring President} Mr. Eisenhower on the platform. Mr. Nixon said, "Little closer, General, not too close". That's right. Isn't that the problem of any candidate of the in-party in establishing a relationship with the out-going President?

HUMPHREY: Yes. Indeed. I think you are always under a great deal of pressure. Some people are saying to you like they say to me -- ^{Mr.} Humphrey when are you going to be your own man. Of course, I consider that rather childish to ask the question, but I have to face up to it. It means, what he's really saying is, "When are you going to speak your mind?" I've been speaking it all of my life. ~~cause~~ that is what has gotten me into a good deal of trouble. I intend to continue to speak it even if it does cause me some difficulties. Then you have to be constantly aware of the fact that there are those ^{that} ~~who~~ would like to see you either repudiate your association with the Administration, and there is another group who wants you to be very close in. *So it is always difficult.*

NIVEN: Are you confident that you can get through the fall campaign? ⁱ If nominated? Promising to build on the Administration's record. Perhaps, even implying that things aren't as good as they could be. . . without antagonizing the President.

HUMPHREY: Yes sir. Because I think the President is a broad minded man. I think he wants the Democratic Party to win. I think he knows as well as I know that there ^{are} ~~is~~ always limits to any one Administration and its accomplishment and achievements. You know, President Johnson did not have to renounce or repudiate the achievements of John Kennedy in order to get an administration in his own ~~right~~ right. As a matter of fact, the legislation that has been passed since 1964 ⁻⁶⁵ is nothing short of phenomenal.

There have been tremendous achievements. And I think that only history can objectively judge this administration, and I believe that history will judge it well. I remember when Mr. Truman was President, he didn't have many supporters, and they didn't judge him well, but you go down the street today, Paul, and you ask ten people to name you two or three Presidents that they think are really good Presidents, I venture anything that one of them will be President Truman, because it took some time and when history starts to put the light of objectivity, of objective analysis, upon the record, then you start to get the truth. Right now, it's all clouded and fuzzed up with the smog of contesting points of view, *and it takes a little while.*

HUMPHREY: Looking beyond the campaign, sir, if elected, will you try to be a consensus President?

NIVEN: I suppose *but* I would best term myself an advocate President. I believe -- I call it what, a phrase like this, an *open* ~~urban~~ Presidency-- what do I mean by that? An active President. A person that tries to maybe lead the country further than the indications are that it wants to go. As I indicated a little earlier in our discussion, I believe that a President, the office of the President offers a great opportunity for the mobilization ~~of~~ of the resources, ~~of~~ both physical and spiritual, of the American people. I think the President must be a leader. I think he ~~has to~~ *must* be an educator. I

think he also has to be a student to understand -- to listen to what the people have to say. In a sense sometimes he has to be a ~~father~~ follower -- a follower in the sense that he must perceive these great social forces that are at work and follow them and try to direct them into constructive channels. No -- I will be an active president.

NIVEN:

Suppose we are in the spring of 1972 -- 1970 and the Congress gives you half of what you think you need for some important program. Would you accept it or would you veto the measure and say call them back into special session in the fall and make an election issue out of it before the ~~election~~. *Congressional elections.*

HUMPHREY:

I have had some experience ⁱⁿ ~~with~~ this as the Majority Whip of the United States Senate. I was on the one hand the advocate frequently -- a very articulate advocate -- that called upon this Congress -- I think it was the 88th Congress -- to go much further than it did. But as the Majority Whip I brought it along as far as it would go. Now that is what I call being a pragmatic liberal. I would encourage the Congress to proceed -- to ~~make~~ carry out my program -- to do what I wanted it to do. But I would recognize that sometimes it is not possible. And that you try to get as much as you can and you come back another day. Now, if they violate fundamental principles of a program and have merely ^{the} ~~a~~ shell of what you asked for but the substance is not there, then I would have to take another ^{hard} look at it and most likely would not find it acceptable.

NIVEN: You have watched several presidents now, Mr. Humphrey. Do you think in ~~general~~ general that the President can occasionally appeal over the heads of the Congress to the people or is ^{this} ~~this~~ a fairly difficult and dangerous thing to do.

HUMPHREY: If he doesn't overdo it I think he can do it affectively. I think that if you try to do it too often you loose the impact of your appeal. I think that you have to pick and choose very very carefully. More importantly, Paul, I think that it is very important for the President to keep the people informed. I am not sure that you can do that just in press conferences because then you are somewhat at the mercy of the man that asks the question because then you have to be responsive to that question. I believe that you need to take the people into your confidence.

NIVEN: Was Roosevelt perhaps more successful with this ~~than~~ than anyone since?

HUMPHREY: Yes. His fireside chat which was an innovation at the time I believe was ~~was~~ very very successful. But he used it sparingly as you may recall. I believe with the television now -- with the media of the picture, plus radio plus the ~~the~~ daily press and all the news services that you have that you have a splended opportunity to selectively call upon the people for greatness -- call upon them to do big things, to make sacrifices ~~that~~ if need be or to direct their energies towards ^a ~~a~~ big goal.

~~For a long time, that is, with the increasing advantage~~

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NIVEN: I don't think a disservice to avoid Senator Kennedy or Mayor Lindsay to say that Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Lindsay combined didn't begin to do as much for the cause of civil rights in the United States as you have done in the last 25 years. But isn't it also fair to say that Mr. Kennedy or Mr. Lindsay can walk into a room full of Negro militants and achieve a rapport or at least cool them in a way that you or Governor Rockefeller or any other of the leaders can't achieve for some reason.

HUMPHREY: Well, the late Senator Kennedy did have a very charismatic personality -- there is no doubt about that. He was in the center of action. He was a live active senator. When I was a senator and I was on that floor day after day contesting with the

-- even if it was a friendly administration -- adding on little extra dimension that gives you a different kind of personality. You are out in front. You are not explaining or justifying or you are not just trying to find out how to hold people together. There is a great advantage may I say in not having too much responsibility.

NIVEN: You are skeptical then I take it of the theory of magic in politics.

HUMPHREY: No, I think it is a factor. I really believe that it is a very significant factor. But I must say that in the crunch as we put it -- when you get right down to basic what is most important is integrity. Do people trust you or don't they. What do they think of you as a man. Can they place their confidence in you. There are many people that I know. If not many at least several that I know that have television personalities but I am not at all sure that the American people want to put their faith and trust in them.. Dwight Eisenhower did not have a television personality but he had the trust -- that was his magic -- he had the trust of the American people and the most precious ingredient -- the most precious asset that a man in public life today is does he have the trust of the people. If you have the trust of the people they will walk that extra mile with you and you can be brilliant and scintillating but if they don't trust you you are not going to have the people over the long run.

NIVEN: But in the case of General Eisenhower, didn't the people take the reputation of the hero and see a man of great charm and

just want to turn their cares over to him?

HUMPHREY:

Yes, but he just exuded this kind of personality of trust and confidence and they -- listen, we Democrats tried to defeat him and you could have all the record on him that you wanted in terms of legislative record. But the fact is that my mother trusted him. Let me tell you, I often times get more political sense from my mother than I did from some of my . . . more sophisticated advice than from my more sophisticated advisors. But Mother thought that President Eisenhower was a good man and when I have people come to me and say Mr. Humphrey I think you are a good man, I know that I am not going to lose that vote. I know that that person is with me. That word means something.

NIVEN:

Did your mother try to get you to vote Republican?

HUMPHREY:

Well, as Dad use to say about ~~Mother's~~ ^{Mother} she is a wonderful woman and a dear mother and a good wife but she is politically unreliable. Dad was a strong Democrat. Mother sort of had more conservative instincts on occasion and I never was quite nor was my Dad just how Mom voted. I know she voted for Roosevelt but she scolded me several times when I would get too partisan. I can recall -- I won't take your time now but I think you remember a story I told you. I made a rather partisan speech one time during the Eisenhower Administration and my mother when I came home called me aside and said "Your Father would have been ashamed of you. You shouldn't talk like that. President Eisenhower is a good man." And I got my verbal spanking from my mother and I was a man in my fifties.

NIVEN: Many of us have the same problem. Governor Rockefeller said recently "New leadership can ^{he} capture control of events, master them rather than ~~lat~~ them master us." Mr. James Reston has said just the opposite recently -- that for all the oratory of the candidates, events control leaders -- even control ~~President~~ ^{General} De Gaulle and candidates are more affraid than any thing else ~~ix~~ of their own staff propaganda that they can solve all of the problems -- that leaders really respond to problems ~~that~~ ^{the latter} are controlled by events, ~~at~~ than the other way around.

What is your view.

HUMPHREY: I don't think that it is an either-or. I must say that events have a tremendous impact. For example if this war could oome to a conclusion between now and the month of September, that would be an event of monumental significance and I think ~~tht~~ it might have some impact on this election. More important, it would have an impact on the world which would be a very good impact. Events do affect elections. There isn't any doubt about it. Even something like in the Truman period the event of falling farm prices affected an election. There is no doubt about that. But a candidate -- a president in particular can make history. That is the joy -- that is the excitement of it -- that is also the responsibility of the presidency. You make history. You make events. And I believe that is ~~that~~ the test of greatness -- not that events make you but that you help chan^Nel the forces that make possible the events that make possible a change in the lives of the people and the nation.

NIVEN: Someone else has said recently that we may never have another eight-year president -- conditions being what they are -- the reasons for the divisions -- people being what they are -- and maybe no president will ever succeed again in keeping the country together for more than four years. ~~XXXX~~ Would you buy that?

HUMPHREY: No, I would not. I am a student of American history, Paul -- this is part of my life. This country has had many divisions in the past that are even more severe than this one. My goodness, in the beginning of this republic there were divisions ~~that were worse.~~ There were secessionists in the New England states and Thomas Jefferson ^{had} ~~two~~ two terms and James Madison had two terms and Andrew Jackson had two terms and James Monroe had two terms -- there was only one one-term president and that was John Quincy Adams during that time. Martin Van Buren had two terms. This country was divided in the period of Abraham Lincoln -- there were still two terms. This country has had many divisions. Listen this country has had the N~~n~~othings and you couldn't get much worse than that. And they tried to divide this country on every conceivable issue.

NIVEN: Do you see a revival of this N~~n~~othing movement?

HUMPHREY: There are some and they are going to end up just about the same way they did then -- with nothing. The N~~n~~othings ended up with nothing. And they contributed nothing.

~~NIVEN: You use the word joy a few moments ago. For awhile Senator Kennedy was making fun of you for your politics of joy and he claimed that you stopped saying it. Do you think that joy has been driven out of public life and out of politics?~~

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NIVEN: Mr. Vice President, our time is up. Thank you for these words.

END OF REEL TWO.



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