

For release: Thursday AM's
February 27, 1969
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HUMPHREY OPPOSES DEPLOYMENT OF SENTINEL
ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM AND URGES ARMS
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Former Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey today announced his opposition to the deployment of the Sentinel anti-ballistic missile system and urged that negotiations with the Soviet Union on the reduction of offensive and defensive weapons begin in the near future.

The speech was Humphrey's first comprehensive discussion of arms control since the presidential campaign.

Participating in the University of Minnesota's International Week program, Humphrey stressed that deployment of the Sentinel ABM system would likely disrupt the present strategic nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union and force another round of arms building.

"Today both super-powers possess sufficient nuclear power for mutual deterrence," said Humphrey. "But tomorrow, if we allow the nuclear arms race to accelerate once again, we may find ourselves fearing for our lives and safety. We must not, in short, return to the fears and insecurity of the 1950's by introducing new uncertainties into the strategic arms balance between the United States and the Soviet Union."

Humphrey also challenged the view that arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union should be postponed until they can be linked to a more general settlement of outstanding political problems.

The urgency of our present problem -- to prevent a further round of the nuclear arms race before it is irreversibly launched -- cannot wait upon the solution of political disputes that have been many years in the making -- and will be many years, if not generations, in solving," said Humphrey.

"Indeed, an effective agreement to halt the nuclear arms race will make it far more likely that we and the Soviets will be able to go forward, with our allies, toward the solution of outstanding political problems."

Mr. Humphrey also noted the pressures to transform the so-called "thin" ABM system, directed against a potential nuclear threat by Red China, to a more elaborate and costly deployment directed against Soviet strategic nuclear forces.

"These are dollars vitally needed for meeting the problems of poverty, the decay in our cities, and the explosive time bombs of division and discord in America," said Humphrey.

He also praised the Nixon Administration for finally submitting the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to the U. S. Senate for ratification and urged its early approval.

Humphrey's speech on the International Week program was his initial appearance on the University of Minnesota campus where he will be teaching as a University professor.

The full text of Humphrey's speech follows:

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R E M A R K S

THE HONORABLE HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA

FEBRUARY 26, 1969

The security of a modern nation is to be found not only in its military power but in the sum total of its political, social, economic and military strength.

National security policy -- while requiring the expert and technological advice of those skilled in military science -- must ultimately be determined by the political leaders. George Clemenceau was right when he observed that war is too important to be left to the generals.

The 20th century has already seen two world wars and hundreds of regional and local conflicts that have taken millions of lives, consumed the resources of nations, and brought mankind to the brink of nuclear holocaust. In many ways, it could be called a century of destruction.

And yet, paradoxically, this same century has seen the liberation of millions of people from colonial rule, a steady rise in the standard of living for many millions, the development of international institutions to preserve peace and to promote social justice.

It has been a century of war and a century of the search for peace. It has been a century of destruction of life and the century of human rights. In this century we have entered the nuclear and space age with its potential for human progress and peaceful exploration of the universe or its potential for the destruction of the human race as we know it.

This is the background to our discussion of the issues of peace and war in the nuclear age. More specifically, we now face a crucial decision: Will we continue the search for ways to end the momentum of the nuclear arms race, or will we begin yet another round of arms building -- with all the danger and insecurity that decision would produce?

This is today's crucial political issue. Once we have moved to a new plateau of sophisticated weaponry, such as the Sentinel anti-ballistic missile defense system, it will become exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to restore the strategic balance on which true security ultimately rests.

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, and the unleashing of the terrible destructive power of atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we have tried to prevent the use of this indescribably destructive military power.

In these years we have provided for our defense -- and for the protection of all mankind from nuclear war -- through the philosophy of deterrence or, more precisely, a strategy of 'mutual assured destruction.' No man can contemplate a rational defense in a nuclear war that would leave millions of people dead. We must depend instead upon our ability to deter attack, to prevent a nuclear war from ever beginning.

This we have done thus far. We have provided ourselves with the ability to prevent any aggressor from attacking us with impunity. We have the ability to destroy any nation or nations that should choose to unleash a nuclear holocaust against us, or to threaten our vital interests or those of our allies -- just as we understand the fatal dangers to the United States if we should ever initiate a nuclear strike.

As a result, there has been no nuclear war, not even in the darkest days of our political conflict with the Soviet Union.

But relying upon a strategy of deterrence is not enough. We must also guard against the danger that nuclear weapons will be acquired by nations not directly involved in the equation of deterrence which restrains and controls the actions of the great powers.

Too often conflicts between small nations have grown into conflagrations involving many others. In the nuclear age, no one can rationally predict the consequences for the safety of all mankind of a single nuclear weapon exploded in some far-off, supposedly limited, conflict.

For this reason, we have labored for years to limit the spread of nuclear weapons -- to keep these terrible devices out of the hands of smaller, less responsible nations. And we have just achieved our first measure of success.

During the Johnson-Humphrey Administration, we concluded a nuclear non-proliferation treaty to take the first step towards preventing the world from becoming hostage to the mad act of some small country.

I long supported this effort. Indeed, I was the first member of the Johnson-Humphrey Administration to discuss publicly the desirability of such a treaty.

I support it now, as the non-proliferation treaty is finally submitted to the United States Senate for ratification by the Nixon Administration. I urge its early ratification, and I hope that we will take those further steps now required if the spread of nuclear weapons is to be halted.

But halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons among the nations of the world is not enough. We must also halt the nuclear arms race among the super powers.

Indeed, this is a step we must take if the non-proliferation treaty is to achieve its desired results. In the long run we cannot ask others to forego nuclear weapons if we -- and the Soviet Union -- fail to restrain ourselves in the needless accumulation of destructive nuclear power.

But there is another more fundamental reason for halting the strategic arms race with the Soviet Union. We are now on a strategic nuclear plateau -- where neither side can commit nuclear aggression without incurring unacceptable destruction in return. In these circumstances, there is a relative measure of nuclear security for the United States and the Soviet Union. Both nations can now turn their minds from the dread dangers of a surprise attack by the other side.

This easing of tensions arising from the nuclear arms race has been achieved only after long efforts and at great cost.

Today both super-powers possess sufficient nuclear power for mutual deterrence. But tomorrow, if we allow the nuclear arms race to accelerate once again, we may find ourselves fearing for our lives and safety. We must not, in short, return to the fears and insecurity of the 1950's by introducing new uncertainties into the strategic arms balance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

There is some evidence that the Soviet Union appreciates the dangers in a further escalation of the arms race. They have, for example, continued to confine their ABM activity to a rudimentary system around Moscow. On the other hand, they have continued to strengthen their offensive missile forces.

But the Soviets have also indicated a willingness to begin comprehensive talks on a limitation of both offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapons. I have long advocated this step -- and at the earliest possible opportunity.

I believe we can now join the Soviet Union in productive talks on controlling the strategic arms race.

To those who say you cannot successfully negotiate with the Soviet Union, I reply that we have successfully negotiated with them on many occasions. We have many precedents, beginning with the limited nuclear test ban treaty, negotiated by President Kennedy in 1963. We subsequently reached agreement to establish a hot-line between Moscow and Washington, and it was used to avert a confrontation during the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. At the United Nations we achieved a treaty to ban weapons of mass destruction from outer space.

We concluded a consular convention and a civil air transportation agreement with the Soviet Union.

I personally supported all of these measures and pioneered in advocating the test ban treaty and the space treaty. I understand the profound difficulties often encountered in such negotiations. Success is never guaranteed. Yet I think we have no alternative but to begin talks to end the nuclear arms race. We have to try.

To those who say you cannot rely on their word, I reply that it is not a question of relying on good faith alone. Any agreement to be acceptable must be subject to both inspection and enforcement. Modern technology has made this more easily accomplished than anyone would have dreamed possible, even five years ago. We are at a point in international relations where we can, through advanced techniques of science and technology, inspect and monitor agreements limiting strategic nuclear weapons and missiles.

To those who say we cannot risk losing the time that may be necessary for these negotiations to succeed, I reply that we now have the time to do this without jeopardizing our national security. Our offensive nuclear strength, based on our Polaris fleet, our Minuteman missiles and our manned long-range bombers, gives us the opportunity to explore in depth with the Soviet Union steps to preserve the existing strategic plateau and to avoid another round of weapons deployment that would destroy this plateau. We then can examine ways to reduce existing stockpiles of weapons by mutual action.

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It has been suggested in recent weeks that these talks should be postponed until they can be linked to more general settlement of outstanding political problems.

I cannot agree with this position. The urgency of our present problem -- to prevent a further round of the nuclear arms race before it is irreversibly launched -- cannot wait upon the solution of political disputes that have been many years in the making -- and will be many years, if not generations, in solving.

Nor are these broader agreements necessary for success in talks to limit the arms race. Indeed, we negotiated both the limited test ban treaty and the non-proliferation treaty during the Vietnam War when our relations with the Soviet Union and the other Communist states were severely strained.

There is only one caution. It must be clearly understood that our desire to negotiate an end to the strategic nuclear arms race in no way condones the aggression of the Soviet Union against Czechoslovakia, nor would it condone similar acts in the future. Nothing we do now can erase from our memories the brutal repression last August in Prague.

We are sometimes told that our allies in Western Europe would be concerned lest our approaches to the Soviet Union on arms control should delay the day when Czechoslovakia will again be free. I do not agree. I believe that our allies understand the grave issues involved in ending the arms race and, with adequate consultation and counsel on our part, will strongly support that move.

Indeed, an effective agreement to halt the nuclear arms race will make it far more likely that we and the Soviets will be able to go forward, with our allies, toward the solution of outstanding political problems.

But the fundamental requirement for this process of consultation is strategic stability. Anything we do to maintain that strategic stability -- to freeze the arms race at or near today's levels or to reverse it -- will improve our political relations. But anything we do to reverse it -- will improve our political relations. But anything we do to disrupt that strategic stability will lead us back again to the darkest days of the Cold War.

* * *

There is today an immediate danger to the stability of our strategic relations with the Soviet Union -- the impending decision by the administration and Defense Department to proceed with deployment of the Sentinel anti-ballistic missile system.

Let me be clear: I have always supported, and will continue to support, any effort to provide for the security of the United States. There can be -- there will be -- no compromise with our defense.

But is this anti-ballistic missile system a contribution to that defense? I believe it is not. And therefore, I firmly oppose deployment of the Sentinel ABM system at this time.

The Sentinel ABM system was originally designed to nullify an attack by China against the United States sometime during the 1970's, after China acquires the ability to launch a limited number of nuclear missiles against us. If Sentinel would do this, and would not erode our security in other ways, I would support its deployment -- even though it would only be needed to deal with the mad act of a Chinese leader whose own country would be destroyed in return.

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The Sentinel system will not do this. Even its advocates do not claim that the Sentinel will provide absolute immunity to a Chinese attack. There are serious questions with regard to its technical feasibility and reliability, particularly against a carefully planned and executed attack. It could never be tested without renouncing the atmospheric nuclear test ban treaty that we worked so long and hard to achieve.

But more significantly, deploying an anti-ballistic missile system against China -- however imperfect the system would be, and for however few years it would be partially effective -- could have serious repercussions on our relations with the Soviet Union.

Quite simply, we cannot afford to upset the strategic nuclear balance with the Soviet Union -- and Sentinel will do just that.

If we begin to deploy this system, we will inevitably raise doubts in the minds of the Russians about our intentions. We will force them to improve their own offensive missile forces, thereby postponing further a freeze in the arms race. We will add new uncertainties to a strategic balance that can remain stable only when each side is satisfied it knows the composition of this balance.

There are further dangers. Major weapons systems, once begun, have a tendency to expand. The Sentinel system would be no exception, especially since there is already strong pressure -- to transform it from the so-called "thin" system to a more elaborate and costly deployment directed against Soviet strategic nuclear forces.

But for every advance we achieve in anti-ballistic missiles, the Russians will be able, for much less effort, to recapture the same ability to wreak destruction on the United States through more sophisticated offensive weapons. The same argument applies in reverse, and would make a serious Soviet attempt to build anti-ballistic missile defenses equally futile. The offense can always be a step ahead of the defense -- our generals and scientists agree on this.

What we are now facing, therefore, is the prospect of embarking on a project that will provide us with only a marginal increase, at best, in our physical protection against China, yet will almost surely introduce grave uncertainties into our relations with the Soviet Union. And if history is at all instructive in this regard, it is likely that the defensive weapons system will be obsolete at approximately the same time its initial deployment is completed.

On balance, then, the risks of deployment far outweigh the risks of continuing to maintain this system at the research and development stage.

To postpone -- or to abandon -- deployment of the Sentinel system does not mean that we are leaving ourselves to the mercy of Soviet technological breakthroughs. We must continue with research and development of ABM technology -- and we are doing so. The issue is deployment -- not development.

Then there is the question of cost. The present limited Sentinel system will cost at least \$10 billion dollars. A full system, directed against the Soviet Union, would initially cost in the neighborhood of at least \$40 - \$60 billion dollars -- or more.

These are dollars vitally needed for meeting the problems of poverty, the decay in our cities, and the explosive time bombs of division and discord in America. We would purchase new nuclear weapons -- adding nothing to our real defense -- at the price of further postponing our efforts to improve our society at home.

It is now being argued that deployment of the Sentinel system will help us in our negotiations with the Soviet Union to control the nuclear arms race. We are supposed to trade it away for a comprehensive agreement on the more vital questions of limiting all offensive and defensive nuclear weapons.

I now question this view. If we have learned anything from our experience in two decades of deadly confrontation with the Soviets, it is that uncertainty in the strategic balance produces not agreement but fear and nuclear escalation which makes agreement more difficult.

With the bomber gap of the 1950's and the feared missile gap of the 1960's, there were grave complications in our ability to deal with the Soviet Union on political matters. With today's nuclear deterrence parity, we can be optimistic about chances for a strategic weapons treaty.

I repeat: we should halt deployment of the Sentinel system and begin, as expeditiously as possible, negotiations with the Soviet Union on the reduction of offensive and defensive strategic weapons.

There is one further -- one crucial -- point. For many years we have been concerned with the problem of preserving a strategic balance with the Soviet Union, of planning against the emergence of China as a nuclear power, and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But all too often we have looked at these problems in terms of weapons and hardware, instead of diplomacy and ideas.

There is one hard fact of life in this nuclear age: the determined aggressor, armed with nuclear weapons he may have built in secret, will be able to reap damage to any nation beyond our power to comprehend, even though the aggressor will likely be destroyed in the process.

The hope for the world to avoid this fate ultimately lies not in pursuit of more elaborate technology of destruction but in the pursuit of peace through the only means that can make peace real and lasting -- and these are primarily political means.

If we upset the existing strategic balance with the Soviet Union, we will harm the few prospects for meaningful political understanding and conciliation.

If we think of Mainland China only in terms of an irrational nuclear attack, we will stand to lose our chances in the coming years to encourage Peking to take an active peaceful part in the affairs of the world community.

And if we think of non-proliferation only in terms of nuclear weapons, and ignore the real conflicts and misunderstandings that may impel nations to acquire these weapons, we may find ourselves one day in a world made far more dangerous by the existence of many nuclear powers.

We must, in short, come to understand that real security is the compound of many elements -- and not just the military weapons systems developed by the professional defense establishment. In the pursuit of real national security, we must not chase after shadows and illusions which will cloud our vision of the more difficult, but ultimately no less necessary, political settlements.

As President John Kennedy said at American University in June, 1963: "Let us examine our attitude toward peace itself. Too many think it unreal. But that is a dangerous, defeatist belief. It leads to the conclusion that war is inevitable, that mankind is doomed, and that we are ripped by forces we cannot control.

We need not accept that view. Our problems are man-made; therefore, they can be solved by men. And man can be as big as he wants."

I say we can yet be masters of our destiny.

We can walk the difficult path it takes. But it will require courage, conviction and hard, rational thought.

I do not think that this is too high a price to pay for the survival of mankind. This is not too high a standard to require of men who hold in their hands the power of nuclear destruction. It is simply what we as creators and stewards of the most terrible power ever known to man owe to ourselves and to future generations.

I say we must pay this price. We must find this way to peace.

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aty, to make it clear that these unfortunate statements and what the President stated are not binding on any of us this body as a whole.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, join with the Senator from Arizona in pressing the same hope that he expressed. I do not know whether the reservation introduced by the Senator from North Carolina will or will not come to a vote. I hope it does.

Whether it does or does not come to a vote, I feel that in voting on the treaty, Senators are not in any way bound by assertions made by those who are not Members of Congress, whether by an appointed official in the United Nations, for example, or by an ex-President of the United States.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I agree with the Senator, and associate myself with his remarks. What concerns me is what country or countries feel that those words do have validity to them and had an influence on them in signing the treaty. That is the question in my mind.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. As I see it, we have no way of knowing; but perhaps some countries were influenced by them.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Virginia yield?

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I yield.

Mr. MURPHY. I raised this question, or a similar question, yesterday, but unfortunately all the available time had been used, so the question that I posed on this exact point was not answered.

If, as we are told, there are 80 signatories to the treaty, I am sure that a number of those signatories, just as perhaps many Members of this distinguished body, possibly could have had a misunderstanding of the conditions.

I know that my distinguished colleague and I have both wondered whether the language in the report guaranteed the immediate use of American troops and weapons, the immediate protection, the immediate going to war—if you will—by the United States, in the event any non-nuclear weapons nation signatory to the treaty was attacked by another nation using nuclear weapons. It was certainly my understanding, at the outset, that this was a condition. I have discussed this with many people, both retired military, and atomic energy experts; and, unfortunately, this seemed to be the consensus, that the statements made by the former Secretary of State, the former President, and the former Ambassador to the United Nations did guarantee military action by the United States of America.

Now, I wonder whether, if the 80 nations presently signatories had had the advantage of hearing the debate which has been carried on in the Senate, had they heard the questions and answers, the explanation of the position of the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and the explanation of General Wheeler that this was not a commitment, would they have been willing, under these circumstances, with this full knowledge, to sign the treaty, or if they might decide they signed under a misconception or a misunderstanding of the content of the treaty, of the intent of the treaty, or of our moral obli-

gation—if you will—would they still continue to be signatories to the treaty or would they make active the 30-day release notification and withdraw from the treaty.

I wonder whether my distinguished colleague would comment on that, because it has been disturbing me greatly.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. The Senator from Virginia would not know how to interpret the views of those 80 nations, nor would he have any way of knowing what motivated them to sign the treaty, nor how much the declaration on the part of our representative in the United Nations had in causing one or more of those nations to sign the treaty. Possibly one or more were misled.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, would the Senator from Virginia yield for an observation?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CRANSTON in the chair). Does the Senator from Virginia yield to the Senator from Arkansas?

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I might say that the first committee report, of last summer, was printed before most of the non-nuclear states ever said they would sign the treaty. So they had plenty of notice, or at least had available to them the attitude of the committee and the views of the committee. The first report of the committee last summer made it very clear that the United States is not committed by what happened up there. So, it is not right to say that they had no notice as to the attitude of the committee.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I thank the distinguished Senator from Arkansas.

I want to say that, so far as I am concerned, I think we have too many commitments all over the world.

We have mutual defense commitments to 44 nations.

I am not interested in advocating or supporting a proposal which could be, logically, properly, and accurately construed as committing us to additional wars.

We have had too many wars.

This Nation has been engaged in more major wars during the past 50 years than any other nation in history in a comparable length of time.

World War I was a major war. World War II was a major war. The Korean war was a major war; and the Vietnam war is a major war.

I say that we have made too many commitments already around the world.

This treaty does not, however, commit the United States to any future acts. It does not commit the United States to do anything except what it voluntarily is doing anyway; that is, not to give away to other countries nuclear devices for warmaking potential. We are not going to do that, anyway.

Thus, I cannot see that the treaty would be harmful to the United States.

By the same token, I am not sure that it will accomplish very much, but at least it presents, as I see it, a small hope, a small, first step toward trying to keep out of the hands of many nations who do not

have nuclear weapons, these terrible warmaking devices.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Virginia yield?

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I am happy to yield to the distinguished Senator from Texas.

Mr. TOWER. I should like to commend the distinguished Senator from Virginia for his remarks. Although I shall not vote for the treaty unless certain reservations are adopted, the Senator from Virginia has expressed his intention to vote for it. I just wish that more of the proponents and supporters of the treaty could be as frank and candid about it as the Senator from Virginia has been.

I am afraid that too many of those who passionately want to see the treaty ratified have conveyed the impression that it will terminate the prospect for a nuclear holocaust.

I think that we must realistically observe that that simply is not the case. I think the Senator from Virginia has been responsible in enunciating his support for the treaty and pointing out that we must not be lulled into a false sense of security or euphoria.

I further commend him for underscoring the fact that we must still maintain a degree of military superiority over those who have aggressive designs upon the rest of the world.

I thank the Senator from Virginia for his most instructive statement.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I am grateful to the distinguished Senator from Texas for his remarks.

Like the Senator from Texas, I think it is very important that the American people have an accurate understanding of just how much this treaty can do and how little it can do, and be governed accordingly.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Cook) may proceed, as in legislative session, for 10 minutes without the time being charged to either side.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE ABM SYSTEM

Mr. COOK. Mr. President, I am told that the administration has about eight options available to it in making a decision on the current anti-ballistic-missile controversy. Seven of these alternatives, some of which are variations of the proposed Sentinel system favored by the Johnson administration, would call for deployment of antiballistic missiles in the near future. Some of my colleagues have indicated that their major opposition stems from the outcry of citizens in Seattle, Chicago, Detroit, and Boston over the planned location of bases near those cities.

I would hope today to direct the emphasis of the ABM debate to the larger question, not where shall the installations be placed but, rather, whether they shall be deployed at all.

The outrage expressed by the people of these cities and the subsequent consideration of alternatives raises an all-

important question. What is the purpose of the ABM? Originally we were told the deployment around the cities was essential and that the Sentinel's purpose was damage limitation; that is, to reduce our losses by 40 or 50 million people in the event of nuclear exchange. The problem with this was pointed out by Senator MATHIAS on the floor last week when he asked, "Which people are you going to save?" By deploying in one place and not in another one makes a God-like decision as to who shall live and who shall perish. And besides, can there be any victory when millions die? In the years it would take to deploy the Sentinel, who can say what the offensive capacity of the enemy would become. Then, a fortiori, who can testify to the accuracy of the assumption that Sentinel would reduce casualties by 50 million?

Another justification for deployment of the Sentinel ABM system was that it would protect us against irrational behavior on the part of the Chinese. But as Jerome Wiesner points out:

We ought to regard the Sentinel as a bad joke perpetrated on us by Mr. McNamara and President Johnson in an election year. It seems to me that their very rationalization—that it was to defend us against the Chinese but we would stop building it if the Russians agreed not to build one—demonstrates that well enough.

One of the strongest arguments against deployment of any ABM system at this time centers around the question of effectiveness. A meaningful defense against nuclear attack must be almost perfect, as opposed to conventional warfare where, for example, one planeload of bombs will not do as much damage as many planes each loaded with the same destructive force.

The very real problem with today's quickly changing technology is that a defense system may well be obsolete before it is finished. It has been estimated that planning and deployment of such systems as we are talking about might take as long as 10 years. Certainly the Nike-Zeus and Nike X systems, if we had decided to deploy them, would now be obsolete. In fact, it is entirely possible that any defense system which depends on projectiles, rather than rays or beams, will be obsolete before completed.

Among the many technical difficulties which Sentinel is not likely to overcome, according to scientific testimony, are employment of penetration aids by an attacker, the possibility of blackout, and destructive fallout if the enemy chooses not to attack our points of defense and makes his missiles land and explode in sparsely populated areas. This latter plan of attack would minimize death from explosion but maximize the dangers of fallout throughout the country. There are a myriad of other possibilities. What all of this adds up to is that no defender is ever really going to know what to expect. The alternatives available to any planner of an offensive system are so many and varied as to give him every possibility of retaining the likelihood of success.

Skepticism about whether the Sentinel would work as designed is so widespread that even some of the contractors who

have orders to build certain parts for the system are asking that the ABM not be deployed at this time. A scientist for a company which presently has such contracts with the Department of Defense was in my office the other day and said he had been authorized by his employer to come to Capitol Hill and tell Members of Congress that he and the managers of his company were convinced that Sentinel, in its current state of development, would not work and should not be deployed. Delay in deployment of the system would cost this company hundreds of thousands of dollars but its technical people could not, in good faith, advocate such an expenditure of public money on a project which its scientists felt had little or no chance of performing as it was designed to function. I regret that I am not authorized to divulge the name of this contractor, but quite frankly, the reason I am not at liberty to do so, is because they fear reprisal in the form of lost contracts on other projects.

The theory behind defensive missile systems it seems, is twofold:

First. To limit damage—the deficiencies of this argument have already been explored—and

Second. To enhance our power to deliver a retaliatory blow. The problem with the second justification is that the Pentagon has been telling us for years that we have retaliatory power in abundance. Even if all our land-based power was knocked out, the 646 Polaris missiles to be fired from beneath the seas would totally destroy the enemy.

The opinions I have advanced were drawn from the best scientific minds available and these alone would tend to compel my opposition on the grounds that the system is unlikely to function properly. But there are still other strong reasons for opposing Sentinel, one of which is cost. Senator SYMINGTON on the floor last week pointed out that already \$15 billion of the taxpayers' money has been spent on missile systems placed in production, deployed, and then abandoned and that another \$4.2 billion was spent on additional missile systems which were discontinued in the research and development stage. He added that the total cost of unworkable or obsolete missiles probably is in excess of \$23 billion. Bearing in mind this record of expense and failure, we must ask what cost is anticipated for Sentinel, another missile system, which in all likelihood will also be abandoned or become obsolete before completion? The Johnson administration estimated that deployment of the "thin" Sentinel system designed to protect us against the Red Chinese would cost between \$5 and \$10 billion. Official cost estimates of a "thick" system designed to protect against Soviet attack range in the \$40 billion category. But these estimates are highly suspect. Senator SYMINGTON raised last week the question of how accurate predictions of missile expense by the Department of Defense had been. He pointed out that the 12 major systems developed during the 1950's exceeded their original estimated cost by 220 percent and that at this rate "thick" Sentinel would not cost \$40 billion but over \$160 billion.

Brookings Institute studies indicate that costs have exceeded estimates by from as much as 300 percent to 700 percent. My able colleague from Missouri added further that, based on these studies and recent Department of Defense requests it was conceivable that the "thin" system would cost \$40 billion and the "thick" \$400 billion—more than the national debt.

Now, no patriotic American opposes spending what is necessary for the defense of our country. And I am not opposed to continued appropriations for research and development of ABM systems, but I do oppose such astronomical expenditures for a defense system of questionable value, if not positive harm.

The last and most compelling argument against deployment of an ABM system at this time is the effect I believe such action would have on continued attempts to curb the nuclear arms race. Even if the sentinel worked perfectly, which almost no one is willing to concede, it would still have the major defect, in terms of international stability, of assuring an escalation in kind on the part of the Soviet Union. By passing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, we will be urging other nations not to enter the nuclear arms race. How can we then ignore our own admonition and deploy an ABM system which will almost certainly set off another arms race round between the United States and the Soviet Union. Such an action would not enhance our defense but only increase international tension. It is not insignificant that every one of the last four presidential scientific advisers is against deployment of the sentinel. Jerome Wiesner gave a better summation of my views than I could compose myself so I will quote him in conclusion:

This is not a matter that anybody can settle with numbers and calculations. It is a judgment. But judgments of this kind are at the heart of the decision to build or not to build an ABM system, not the statistics, the calculations about "cost-effectiveness" or how many people will be killed. These factors are important in the decision, of course. What is most important, however, is the total dynamics and the likely interaction of the policy makers on both sides. I come back to where I began and ask: Can we play this game, which certainly will not buy us a real defense, and at the same time achieve a rational world? My answer is "No."

I thank the Senator from Texas.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, my colleague, the distinguished junior Senator from Kentucky, (Mr. Cook), deserves commendation for his thoughtful, reasonable and incisive speech in opposition to the deployment, at this time, of the Sentinel anti-ballistic-missile system.

He has, I know, studied this complex issue thoroughly for several weeks and has made this decision on the merits giving chief consideration to the security of our country—which is the main consideration of all—whether favoring or opposing deployment. I know that he requested a discussion of this issue with other new members of the Senate, with Senate witnesses distinguished scientists who have testified in the current hearing before the Gore subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

State
Feb 22 - Mar 1

Yesterday
UCLA 00025
REMARKS

Pres moss
Dr Ziebarth
Mr Firestone
Jim Lombard.

Return to
campus
time of permit
it should be
Combat Pay

THE HONORABLE HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

San Harris
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA

President Nixon
out of country!
FEBRUARY 26, 1969

Discretionary Return
to campus

① Not Security - Not Development - Intern Congress

International
Employees
secret!

THE SECURITY OF A MODERN NATION IS TO BE FOUND
NOT ONLY IN ITS MILITARY POWER BUT IN THE SUM TOTAL OF
ITS POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY STRENGTH.

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY -- WHILE REQUIRING
THE EXPERT AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVICE OF THOSE SKILLED
IN MILITARY SCIENCE -- MUST ULTIMATELY BE DETERMINED
BY THE POLITICAL LEADERS. GEORGES CLEMENCEAU WAS RIGHT
WHEN HE OBSERVED THAT WAR IS TOO IMPORTANT TO BE LEFT TO
THE GENERALS.

The World War I French Prime Minister

THE 20TH CENTURY HAS ALREADY SEEN TWO WORLD WARS
AND ~~HUNDREDS~~ ^{many} OF REGIONAL AND LOCAL CONFLICTS THAT HAVE
TAKEN MILLIONS OF LIVES, CONSUMED THE RESOURCES OF NATIONS,
AND BROUGHT MANKIND TO THE BRINK OF NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST.

dangerously close

the 20th century

IN MANY WAYS, ~~IT~~ COULD BE CALLED A CENTURY OF DESTRUCTION.

AND YET, PARADOXICALLY, THIS SAME CENTURY HAS SEEN THE LIBERATION OF MILLIONS OF PEOPLE FROM COLONIAL RULE; A STEADY RISE IN THE STANDARD OF LIVING FOR MANY MILLIONS; THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS TO PRESERVE PEACE AND TO PROMOTE SOCIAL JUSTICE.

It has been a century of destruction a century of development.

IT HAS BEEN A CENTURY OF WAR AND A CENTURY OF THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. *It has been a century of* IT HAS BEEN A CENTURY OF DESTRUCTION *of life and the century of human rights.* ~~In this century,~~

~~We~~ HAVE ENTERED THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE AGE WITH ITS POTENTIAL FOR HUMAN PROGRESS AND PEACEFUL EXPLORATION OF THE UNIVERSE; OR ITS POTENTIAL FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF THE HUMAN RACE AS WE KNOW IT. *Tragic waste* *catastrophe and death.*

THIS IS THE BACKGROUND TO ~~OUR~~ *any* DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES OF PEACE AND WAR IN THE NUCLEAR AGE.

MORE SPECIFICALLY, WE NOW FACE A CRUCIAL DECISION: ~~WILL WE CONTINUE THE SEARCH FOR WAYS TO END THE MOMENTUM~~
~~OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE, OR WILL WE BEGIN YET ANOTHER~~
~~ROUND OF ARMS BUILDING WITH ALL THE DANGER AND~~
~~INSECURITY THAT DECISION WOULD PRODUCE?~~

THIS IS TODAY'S CRUCIAL POLITICAL ISSUE. ~~ONCE~~
 WE HAVE MOVED TO A NEW ~~PLATEAU~~ ^{family} OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY,
 SUCH AS THE SENTINEL ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM,
 IT WILL BECOME EXCEEDINGLY DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE,
 TO RESTORE THE STRATEGIC BALANCE ON WHICH ~~THE~~ ^{our} SECURITY
ULTIMATELY RESTS.

SINCE THE DAWN OF THE NUCLEAR AGE, AND THE
 UNLEASHING OF THE TERRIBLE DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF ATOMIC
BOMBS AT HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI, WE HAVE TRIED TO PREVENT
 THE USE OF THIS INDESCRIBABLY DESTRUCTIVE ^{atomic} MILITARY POWER.

IN THESE YEARS, WE HAVE PROVIDED FOR OUR DEFENSE --
 AND FOR THE PROTECTION OF ALL MANKIND FROM NUCLEAR WAR --
 THROUGH THE PHILOSOPHY OF DETERRENCE OR, MORE PRECISELY,
 A STRATEGY OF "MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION."

NO MAN CAN CONTEMPLATE A RATIONAL DEFENSE IN A NUCLEAR

WAR THAT WOULD LEAVE MILLIONS OF PEOPLE DEAD. WE MUST, *therefore,*

DEPEND INSTEAD UPON OUR ABILITY TO DETER ATTACK TO

PREVENT A NUCLEAR WAR FROM EVER BEGINNING.

THIS WE HAVE DONE THUS FAR. WE HAVE PROVIDED

OURSELVES WITH THE ABILITY TO PREVENT ANY AGGRESSOR FROM

ATTACKING US WITH IMPUNITY. WE HAVE THE ABILITY TO DESTROY

ANY NATION OR NATIONS THAT SHOULD CHOOSE TO UNLEASH A

NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST AGAINST US, OR TO THREATEN OUR VITAL

INTERESTS OR THOSE OF OUR ALLIES ~~— JUST AS~~ *and* WE UNDERSTAND

THE FATAL DANGERS TO THE UNITED STATES IF WE SHOULD EVER

INITIATE A NUCLEAR STRIKE.

AS A RESULT, THERE HAS BEEN NO NUCLEAR WAR, NOT

EVEN IN THE DARKEST DAYS OF OUR POLITICAL CONFLICT WITH

THE SOVIET UNION.

BUT RELYING UPON A STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE IS

NOT ENOUGH.

WE MUST ALSO GUARD AGAINST THE DANGER THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL BE ACQUIRED BY NATIONS NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE EQUATION OF DETERRENCE WHICH RESTRAINS AND CONTROLS THE ACTIONS OF THE GREAT POWERS.

TOO OFTEN CONFLICTS BETWEEN SMALL NATIONS HAVE GROWN INTO CONFLAGRATIONS INVOLVING MANY OTHERS. In the NUCLEAR AGE, NO ONE CAN RATIONALLY PREDICT THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SAFETY OF ALL MANKIND OF A SINGLE NUCLEAR WEAPON EXPLODED IN SOME FAR-OFF, SUPPOSEDLY LIMITED, CONFLICT.

FOR THIS REASON, WE HAVE LABORED FOR YEARS TO LIMIT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- TO KEEP THESE TERRIBLE DEVICES OUT OF THE HANDS OF SMALLER, LESS RESPONSIBLE NATIONS. AND WE HAVE JUST ACHIEVED OUR FIRST MEASURE OF SUCCESS.

w. the Soviet Union and others
DURING THE JOHNSON-HUMPHREY ADMINISTRATION, WE *negotiated* CONCLUDED A NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY ~~TO TAKE THE~~ *this is a*
FIRST STEP TOWARDS PREVENTING THE WORLD FROM BECOMING *irresponsible state*
HOSTAGE TO THE MAD ACT OF SOME SMALL COUNTRY.
Government or Militarist

I LONG SUPPORTED THIS EFFORT. INDEED, I WAS THE FIRST MEMBER OF THE JOHNSON-HUMPHREY ADMINISTRATION TO DISCUSS PUBLICLY THE DESIRABILITY OF SUCH A TREATY.

↳ I SUPPORT IT NOW, AS THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY IS FINALLY SUBMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES SENATE FOR RATIFICATION BY THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION. ↳ I URGE ITS EARLY RATIFICATION, AND I HOPE THAT WE WILL TAKE THOSE FURTHER STEPS NOW REQUIRED IF THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS TO BE HALTED.

* * *

↳ BUT HALTING THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AMONG THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD IS NOT ENOUGH. WE MUST ALSO HALT THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AMONG THE SUPER-POWERS.

↳ INDEED, THIS IS A STEP WE MUST TAKE IF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY IS TO ACHIEVE ITS DESIRED RESULTS. ~~IN THE LONG RUN, WE~~ CANNOT ASK OTHERS TO FOREGO NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF WE -- AND THE SOVIET UNION -- FAIL TO RESTRAIN OURSELVES IN THE NEEDLESS ACCUMULATION OF DESTRUCTIVE NUCLEAR POWER.

↳ BUT THERE IS ANOTHER MORE FUNDAMENTAL REASON FOR HALTING THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

↳ WE ARE NOW ON A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR PLATEAU -- WHERE NEITHER SIDE CAN COMMIT NUCLEAR AGGRESSION WITHOUT INCURRING

UNACCEPTABLE DESTRUCTION IN RETURN. ↳ IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE IS A RELATIVE MEASURE OF NUCLEAR SECURITY FOR THE

UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, ↳ BOTH NATIONS *have less*

reason to fear
TURN THEIR MINDS FROM THE DREAD DANGERS OF A SURPRISE ATTACK BY THE OTHER SIDE.

↳ THIS EASING OF TENSIONS ARISING FROM THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE HAS BEEN ACHIEVED ONLY AFTER LONG EFFORTS AND AT GREAT COST.

↳ TODAY BOTH SUPER-POWERS POSSESS SUFFICIENT NUCLEAR POWER FOR MUTUAL DETERRENCE. ↳ BUT TOMORROW, IF WE ALLOW THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE TO ACCELERATE ONCE AGAIN, WE MAY FIND OURSELVES FEARING FOR OUR LIVES AND SAFETY.

WE MUST NOT, IN SHORT, RETURN TO THE FEARS AND INSECURITY OF THE 1950's BY INTRODUCING NEW UNCERTAINTIES INTO THE STRATEGIC ARMS BALANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIET UNION APPRECIATES THE DANGERS IN A FURTHER ESCALATION OF THE ARMS RACE. THEY HAVE, FOR EXAMPLE, CONTINUED TO CONFINE THEIR ABM ACTIVITY TO A RUDIMENTARY SYSTEM AROUND MOSCOW.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY HAVE CONTINUED TO STRENGTHEN THEIR OFFENSIVE MISSILE FORCES. BUT THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO BEGIN COMPREHENSIVE TALKS ON A LIMITATION OF BOTH OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. I HAVE LONG ADVOCATED THIS STEP -- AND AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY.

I BELIEVE WE CAN NOW JOIN THE SOVIET UNION IN PRODUCTIVE TALKS ON CONTROLLING THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE.

↳ TO THOSE WHO SAY YOU CANNOT SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIET UNION, I REPLY THAT WE HAVE SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED WITH THEM ON MANY OCCASIONS. ↳ WE HAVE MANY PRECEDENTS, BEGINNING WITH THE LIMITED NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY, ^{+ of 1963} ~~NEGOTIATED BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN 1963.~~ WE SUBSEQUENTLY REACHED AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH A "HOT-LINE" BETWEEN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON, AND IT WAS USED TO AVERT A CONFRONTATION DURING THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR OF 1967.

↳ AT THE UNITED NATIONS WE ACHIEVED A TREATY TO BAN WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FROM OUTER SPACE.

↳ ^{four} WE CONCLUDED A CONSULAR CONVENTION AND A CIVIL AIR TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

↳ I PERSONALLY SUPPORTED ALL OF THESE MEASURES AND PIONEERED IN ADVOCATING THE TEST BAN TREATY AND THE SPACE

TREATY. ↳ I UNDERSTAND THE PROFOUND DIFFICULTIES OFTEN ENCOUNTERED IN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS. ↳ SUCCESS IS NEVER

GUARANTEED. ↳ YET, I THINK WE HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO ^{in an effort to halt a slowdown} ~~TO END~~ BEGIN TALKS TO END THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. WE HAVE TO

TRY.

↳ TO THOSE WHO SAY YOU CANNOT RELY ON THEIR WORD,
I REPLY THAT IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF RELYING ON GOOD
FAITH ALONE. ↳ ANY AGREEMENT TO BE ACCEPTABLE MUST BE
SUBJECT TO BOTH INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT. ↳ MODERN
TECHNOLOGY HAS MADE THIS MORE EASILY ACCOMPLISHED THAN
ANYONE WOULD HAVE DREAMED POSSIBLE, EVEN FIVE YEARS AGO.

↳ WE ARE AT A POINT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS WHERE WE
CAN, THROUGH ADVANCED TECHNIQUES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
INSPECT AND MONITOR AGREEMENTS LIMITING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND MISSILES.

↳ TO THOSE WHO SAY WE CANNOT RISK LOSING THE TIME
THAT MAY BE NECESSARY FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO SUCCEED,
I REPLY, THAT WE NOW HAVE THE TIME TO DO THIS WITHOUT
JEOPARDIZING OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. ↳ OUR OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR
STRENGTH, BASED ON OUR POLARIS FLEET, OUR MINUTEMAN MISSILES
AND OUR MANNED LONG-RANGE BOMBERS, GIVES US THE OPPORTUNITY
TO EXPLORE IN DEPTH WITH THE SOVIET UNION, STEPS TO PRESERVE
THE EXISTING STRATEGIC PLATEAU AND TO AVOID ANOTHER ROUND
OF WEAPONS DEPLOYMENT ~~THAT WOULD DESTROY THIS PLATEAU.~~

WE THEN CAN EXAMINE WAYS TO REDUCE EXISTING STOCKPILES OF WEAPONS BY MUTUAL ACTION.

IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED IN RECENT WEEKS THAT THESE TALKS SHOULD BE POSTPONED UNTIL THEY CAN BE LINKED TO MORE GENERAL SETTLEMENT OF OUTSTANDING POLITICAL PROBLEMS.

I CANNOT AGREE WITH THIS POSITION. THE URGENCY OF OUR PRESENT PROBLEM -- TO PREVENT A FURTHER ROUND OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE BEFORE IT IS IRREVERSIBLY LAUNCHED -- CANNOT WAIT UPON THE SOLUTION OF POLITICAL DISPUTES THAT HAVE BEEN MANY YEARS IN THE MAKING -- AND WILL BE MANY YEARS, IF NOT GENERATIONS, IN SOLVING.

NOR ARE THESE BROADER AGREEMENTS NECESSARY FOR SUCCESS IN TALKS TO LIMIT THE ARMS RACE. INDEED, WE NEGOTIATED BOTH THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY DURING THE VIETNAM WAR WHEN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OTHER COMMUNIST STATES WERE SEVERELY STRAINED.

THERE IS ONLY ONE CAUTION. IT MUST BE CLEARLY
 UNDERSTOOD THAT OUR DESIRE TO NEGOTIATE AN END TO THE
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN NO WAY CONDONES THE
AGGRESSION OF THE SOVIET UNION AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAKIA,
 NOR WOULD IT CONDONE SIMILAR ACTS IN THE FUTURE. NOTHING
 WE DO, NOW, CAN ERASE FROM OUR MEMORIES THE BRUTAL
REPRESSION LAST AUGUST IN PRAGUE.

WE ARE SOMETIMES TOLD THAT OUR ALLIES IN WESTERN
 EUROPE WOULD BE CONCERNED LEST OUR APPROACHES TO THE
 SOVIET UNION ON ARMS CONTROL SHOULD DELAY THE DAY WHEN
CZECHOSLOVAKIA WILL AGAIN BE FREE. I DO NOT AGREE. I
 BELIEVE THAT OUR ALLIES UNDERSTAND THE GRAVE ISSUES
 INVOLVED IN ENDING THE ARMS RACE AND, WITH ADEQUATE
CONSULTATION AND COUNSEL ON OUR PART, WILL STRONGLY
 SUPPORT THAT MOVE.

Key
 to
 W.
 Europe

INDEED, AN EFFECTIVE AGREEMENT TO HALT THE NUCLEAR
ARMS RACE WILL MAKE IT FAR MORE LIKELY THAT WE AND THE
 SOVIETS WILL BE ABLE TO GO FORWARD, WITH OUR ALLIES, TOWARD
THE SOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING POLITICAL PROBLEMS.

↳ BUT THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT FOR THIS PROCESS OF CONSULTATION IS STRATEGIC STABILITY. ↳ ANYTHING WE DO TO MAINTAIN THAT STRATEGIC STABILITY -- TO FREEZE THE ARMS RACE AT OR NEAR TODAY'S LEVELS OR TO REVERSE IT -- WILL IMPROVE OUR POLITICAL RELATIONS. ↳ BUT ANYTHING WE DO TO DISRUPT THAT STRATEGIC STABILITY WILL LEAD US BACK AGAIN TO THE DARKEST DAYS OF THE COLD WAR.

* * *

↳ THERE IS TODAY AN IMMEDIATE DANGER TO THE STABILITY OF OUR STRATEGIC RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION -- THE IMPENDING DECISION BY THE ADMINISTRATION AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENT TO PROCEED WITH DEPLOYMENT OF THE SENTINEL ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM.

↳ LET ME BE CLEAR: I HAVE ALWAYS SUPPORTED, AND WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT, ANY EFFORT TO PROVIDE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES. ↳ THERE CAN BE -- THERE WILL BE -- NO COMPROMISE WITH OUR DEFENSE.

↳ BUT IS THIS ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM A *significant* CONTRIBUTION TO THAT DEFENSE? I BELIEVE IT IS NOT, AND THEREFORE, I FIRMLY OPPOSE DEPLOYMENT OF THE SENTINEL ABM SYSTEM AT THIS TIME.

↳ THE SENTINEL ABM SYSTEM WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED TO NULLIFY AN ATTACK BY CHINA AGAINST THE UNITED STATES SOMETIME DURING THE 1970's, AFTER CHINA ACQUIRES THE ABILITY TO LAUNCH A LIMITED NUMBER OF NUCLEAR MISSILES AGAINST US. ↳ IF SENTINEL WOULD DO THIS, AND WOULD NOT ERODE OUR SECURITY IN OTHER WAYS, I WOULD SUPPORT ITS DEPLOYMENT -- EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD ONLY BE NEEDED TO DEAL WITH THE MAD ACT OF A CHINESE LEADER WHOSE OWN COUNTRY WOULD BE DESTROYED IN RETURN.

↳ THE SENTINEL SYSTEM WILL NOT DO THIS. EVEN ITS ADVOCATES DO NOT CLAIM THAT THE SENTINEL WILL PROVIDE ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY TO A CHINESE ATTACK. ↳ THERE ARE SERIOUS QUESTIONS WITH REGARD TO ITS TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY AND RELIABILITY, PARTICULARLY AGAINST A CAREFULLY PLANNED AND EXECUTED ATTACK.

It would be difficult if not impossible to
~~IT COULD NEVER~~ BE ADEQUATELY TESTED WITHOUT RENOUNCING

THE ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY THAT WE WORKED
SO LONG AND HARD TO ACHIEVE.

↳ BUT MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, DEPLOYING AN ANTI-BALLISTIC
MISSILE SYSTEM *allegedly* AGAINST CHINA -- HOWEVER IMPERFECT THE
SYSTEM WOULD BE, AND FOR HOWEVER FEW YEARS IT WOULD BE
PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE -- COULD HAVE SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS
ON OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

↳ QUITE SIMPLY, WE CANNOT AFFORD TO UPSET THE
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE WITH THE SOVIET UNION -- AND
SENTINEL WILL DO JUST THAT.

↳ IF WE BEGIN TO DEPLOY THIS SYSTEM, WE WILL
INEVITABLY RAISE DOUBTS IN THE MINDS OF THE RUSSIANS
ABOUT OUR INTENTIONS. ↳ WE WILL FORCE THEM TO IMPROVE
THEIR OWN OFFENSIVE MISSILE FORCES, THEREBY POSTPONING
FURTHER A FREEZE IN THE ARMS RACE. ↳ WE WILL ADD NEW
UNCERTAINTIES TO A STRATEGIC BALANCE THAT CAN REMAIN
STABLE ONLY WHEN EACH SIDE IS SATISFIED IT KNOWS THE
COMPOSITION OF THIS BALANCE.

and THERE ARE FURTHER DANGERS *L* MAJOR WEAPONS
SYSTEMS, ONCE BEGUN, HAVE A TENDENCY TO EXPAND. *L* THE
SENTINEL SYSTEM WOULD BE NO EXCEPTION, ESPECIALLY SINCE
THERE IS ALREADY STRONG PRESSURE -- TO TRANSFORM IT
FROM THE SO-CALLED "THIN" SYSTEM TO A MORE ELABORATE
AND COSTLY DEPLOYMENT DIRECTED AGAINST SOVIET STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR FORCES.

L BUT FOR EVERY ADVANCE WE ACHIEVE IN ANTI-BALLISTIC
MISSILES, THE RUSSIANS WILL BE ABLE, FOR MUCH LESS EFFORT,
TO RECAPTURE THE SAME ABILITY TO WREAK DESTRUCTION ON
THE UNITED STATES THROUGH MORE SOPHISTICATED OFFENSIVE
WEAPONS. *L* THE SAME ARGUMENT APPLIES IN REVERSE, AND WOULD
MAKE A SERIOUS SOVIET ATTEMPT TO BUILD ANTI-BALLISTIC
MISSILE DEFENSES EQUALLY FUTILE. *L* THE OFFENSE CAN ALWAYS
BE A STEP AHEAD OF THE DEFENSE -- OUR GENERALS AND
SCIENTISTS AGREE ON THIS.

L WHAT WE ARE NOW FACING, THEREFORE, IS THE PROSPECT OF EMBARKING ON A PROJECT THAT WILL PROVIDE US WITH ONLY A MARGINAL INCREASE, AT BEST, IN OUR PHYSICAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHINA. YET, WILL ALMOST SURELY INTRODUCE GRAVE UNCERTAINTIES INTO OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. AND, IF HISTORY IS AT ALL INSTRUCTIVE IN THIS REGARD, IT IS LIKELY THAT THE DEFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEM WILL BE OBSOLETE AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME ITS INITIAL DEPLOYMENT IS COMPLETED.

L ON BALANCE, THEN, THE RISKS OF DEPLOYMENT FAR OUTWEIGH THE RISKS OF CONTINUING TO MAINTAIN THIS SYSTEM AT THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT STAGE.

L TO POSTPONE -- OR TO ABANDON -- DEPLOYMENT OF THE SENTINEL SYSTEM DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE ARE LEAVING OURSELVES TO THE MERCY OF SOVIET TECHNOLOGICAL BREAKTHROUGHS. WE ^{cannot} MUST CONTINUE WITH RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF ABM TECHNOLOGY -- AND WE ARE DOING SO.

L THE ISSUE IS DEPLOYMENT -- NOT DEVELOPMENT.!

Obsolete

COST 000268

↳ THEN THERE IS THE QUESTION OF COST. ↳ THE PRESENT LIMITED SENTINEL SYSTEM WILL COST AT LEAST \$10 BILLION DOLLARS. ↳ A FULL SYSTEM, DIRECTED AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION, WOULD INITIALLY COST IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF AT LEAST \$40 - \$60 BILLION DOLLARS -- OR MORE.

↳ THESE ARE DOLLARS VITALLY NEEDED FOR MEETING THE PROBLEMS OF POVERTY, THE DECAY IN OUR CITIES, AND THE EXPLOSIVE TIME BOMBS OF DIVISION AND DISCORD IN AMERICA.

↳ WE WOULD PURCHASE NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS — ADDING NOTHING TO OUR REAL DEFENSE — AT THE PRICE OF FURTHER POSTPONING OUR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE OUR SOCIETY AT HOME.

↳ IT IS NOW BEING ARGUED THAT DEPLOYMENT OF THE SENTINEL SYSTEM WILL HELP US IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO CONTROL THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. ↳ WE ARE SUPPOSED TO TRADE IT AWAY FOR A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT ON THE MORE VITAL QUESTIONS OF LIMITING ALL OFFENSIVE AND STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-19-

I NOW QUESTION THIS VIEW. IF WE HAVE LEARNED
 ANYTHING FROM OUR EXPERIENCE IN TWO DECADES OF DEADLY
CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIETS, IT IS THAT UNCERTAINTY
 IN THE STRATEGIC BALANCE PRODUCES NOT AGREEMENT BUT
FEAR AND ESCALATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE, WHICH MAKES
 AGREEMENT MORE DIFFICULT.

WITH THE BOMBER GAP OF THE 1950's AND THE FEARED
 MISSILE GAP OF THE 1960's, THERE WERE GRAVE COMPLICATIONS
 IN OUR ABILITY TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON POLITICAL
 MATTERS. BUT WITH TODAY'S NUCLEAR DETERRENCE ^{parity} ~~FACTORY~~, *there is*
a reasonable ~~CAN BE OPTIMISTIC~~ ABOUT CHANCES FOR A STRATEGIC WEAPONS
 TREATY.

I REPEAT: WE SHOULD HALT DEPLOYMENT OF THE
 SENTINEL SYSTEM AND BEGIN, AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE,
 NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON THE REDUCTION OF *all*
 OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE STRATEGIC WEAPONS.

* * * * *

↳ THERE IS ONE FURTHER -- ONE CRUCIAL -- POINT.
FOR MANY YEARS WE HAVE BEEN CONCERNED WITH THE PROBLEM
OF PRESERVING A STRATEGIC BALANCE WITH THE SOVIET UNION,
OF PLANNING AGAINST THE EMERGENCE OF CHINA AS A NUCLEAR
POWER, AND OF PREVENTING THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS. ~~↳~~ BUT, ALL TOO OFTEN WE HAVE LOOKED AT THESE
PROBLEMS IN TERMS OF WEAPONS AND HARDWARE, INSTEAD OF
DIPLOMACY AND IDEAS.

THERE IS ONE HARD FACT OF LIFE IN THIS NUCLEAR
AGE: THE DETERMINED AGGRESSOR, ARMED WITH NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, ~~HE MAY HAVE BUILT IN SECRET~~, WILL BE ABLE TO
CAUSE DAMAGE TO ANY NATION BEYOND OUR POWER TO COMPREHEND,
EVEN THOUGH THE AGGRESSOR WILL LIKELY BE DESTROYED IN
THE PROCESS.

↳ THE HOPE FOR THE WORLD TO AVOID THIS FATE ULTIMATELY
LIES NOT IN THE PURSUIT OF MORE ELABORATE TECHNOLOGY OF
DESTRUCTION BUT IN THE PURSUIT OF PEACE THROUGH THE ONLY
MEANS THAT CAN MAKE PEACE REAL AND LASTING -- AND THESE
ARE PRIMARILY POLITICAL MEANS.

IF WE ~~UPSET~~ ^{is upset,} THE EXISTING STRATEGIC BALANCE WITH THE SOVIET UNION, ~~WE WILL HARM~~ THE PROSPECTS FOR MEANINGFUL POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING AND CONCILIATION ^{are reduced}

IF WE THINK OF MAINLAND CHINA ONLY IN TERMS OF AN IRRATIONAL NUCLEAR ATTACK, WE WILL STAND TO LOSE OUR CHANCES IN THE COMING YEARS TO ENCOURAGE PEKING TO TAKE AN ACTIVE PEACEFUL PART IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY.

AND IF WE THINK OF NON-PROLIFERATION ONLY IN TERMS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND IGNORE THE REAL CONFLICTS AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS THAT MAY IMPEL NATIONS TO ACQUIRE THESE WEAPONS, WE MAY FIND OURSELVES ONE DAY IN A WORLD MADE FAR MORE DANGEROUS BY THE EXISTENCE OF MANY NUCLEAR POWERS.

WE MUST, IN SHORT, COME TO UNDERSTAND THAT REAL SECURITY IS THE COMPOUND OF MANY ELEMENTS -- AND NOT JUST THE MILITARY WEAPONS SYSTEMS DEVELOPED BY THE PROFESSIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT.

IN THE PURSUIT OF REAL NATIONAL SECURITY, WE MUST NOT CHASE AFTER SHADOWS AND ILLUSIONS WHICH WILL CLOUD OUR VISION OF THE MORE DIFFICULT, BUT ULTIMATELY NO LESS NECESSARY, POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS.

AS PRESIDENT JOHN KENNEDY SAID AT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN JUNE, 1963: "LET US EXAMINE OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD PEACE ITSELF. TOO MANY THINK IT UNREAL. BUT, THAT IS A DANGEROUS, DEFEATIST BELIEF. IT LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT WAR IS INEVITABLE, THAT MANKIND IS DOOMED, AND THAT WE ARE GRIPPED BY FORCES WE CANNOT CONTROL.

"WE NEED NOT ACCEPT THAT VIEW. OUR PROBLEMS ARE MAN-MADE; THEREFORE, THEY CAN BE SOLVED BY MEN. AND MAN CAN BE AS BIG AS HE WANTS."

I SAY WE CAN YET BE MASTERS OF OUR DESTINY. WE CAN WALK THE DIFFICULT PATH IT TAKES, BUT IT WILL REQUIRE COURAGE, CONVICTION AND HARD, RATIONAL THOUGHT.

I DO NOT THINK THAT THIS IS TOO HIGH A PRICE TO
PAY FOR THE SURVIVAL OF MANKIND. ^{now is this} ~~THIS IS NOT~~ TOO HIGH
A STANDARD TO REQUIRE OF MEN WHO HOLD IN THEIR HANDS
THE POWER OF NUCLEAR DESTRUCTION. ~~IT IS SIMPLY~~ WHAT
WE AS CREATORS AND STEWARDS OF THE MOST TERRIBLE POWER
EVER KNOWN TO MAN OWE TO OURSELVES AND TO FUTURE
GENERATIONS.

I SAY WE MUST PAY THIS PRICE. WE MUST FIND THIS
WAY TO PEACE.

#

HHH inserts

U Min ABM speech

2-26-69

The defense of a modern nation is to be found not only in its military power but in the sum total of its political, social, economic and military strength. Defense policy, while requiring the expert and technological advice of those skilled in military science, must ultimately be determined by the political leaders. Georges Clemenceau was right when he observed that war is too important to be left to the generals. And peace is too important to be left to the arms race.

There is no greater challenge to the mind of man or to the moral purpose of contemporary society than abolishing force or the threat of force as a means of settling national disputes. War is not only dangerous but in fact in the nuclear age, is obsolete

The 20th century has been characterized by two world wars and a series of regional conflicts that have taken millions of lives, consumed the resources of nations. In many ways, it could be called a century of destruction. And yet, paradoxically, this same century has seen the liberation of millions of people from colonial rule, a rise in the standard of living for many millions, the development of international institutions

to preserve peace and to promote social justice. It has been a century of war and a century of the search for peace. It has been a century of destruction of life and yet the century of human rights. It has been a time of fantastic technological and scientific development where the decision as to whether this will be life-giving or life-taking is yet in the balance. ~~It has been~~ The 20th century has witnessed the development of nuclear power and the atomic bomb. We have entered into the space age with all of its possibilities by the peaceful exploration of the universe or a holocaust that could destroy us all.

This is the background in which we discuss the issue of peace and war. Or to put the question more specifically: we now face a crucial decision: will we continue the search for ways to end the mad momentum of the nuclear arms race, or will we begin yet another round of arms build-up.

This is the central political issue of today. Once we have moved into a level of sophisticated weaponry such as the ABM and all of its component parts, ~~&&~~ it will be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible

our present estimates, but more significantly, the question must be asked: would the deployment provide greater security or would it merely produce the illusion of security?

Insert

To those who say that you can not successfully negotiate with the Soviet Union nor can you rely on their word, I answer that we have negotiated and their word is good when the results of the negotiations are mutually beneficial. What is more important, however, is that we do not and will not rely on good faith alone. Any agreement must be subject to both inspection and enforcement. Modern technology has made this possible. At long last we are at a point in international relations where we can, through the means of science and technology, inspect and monitor agreements limiting nuclear weapons and missiles. This means that our security will not be jeopardized by violation and that agreements are enforceable.

We have many precedents...

Insert

Fortunately for ourselves and the world we have the time with safety to do this. Our offensive and defensive nuclear strength, based on our

with safety to enter into negotiations on the crucial question of deployment on an anti-ballistic missile system. We do have nuclear sufficiency now. We know it and the Soviet Union knows it.

Insert p 9

our outstanding political problems ...

The stock-piling of weapons does not lend itself to solution of political issues. The arms race feeds on itself, increases tensions, rising insecurity and uncertainty, relies on fear and threat of attack as its fuel. The fundamentally ...

I cannot agree with this position. The urgency of our present problem -- to prevent a further round of the nuclear arms race before it is irreversibly launched -- cannot wait upon the solution of political disputes that have been many years in the making -- and will be many years, if not generations, in solving.

Nor are these broader agreements necessary for success in talks to limit the arms race. Indeed, we negotiated both the limited test ban treaty and the non-proliferation treaty during the Vietnam War, the latter during the days when our involvement in the war most strained our relations with the Soviet Union and other Communist nations.

There is only one caution. As I have said in the past, our desire to negotiate an end to the strategic nuclear arms race in no way condones the aggression of the Soviet Union against Czechoslovakia, nor would it condone similar acts in the future. Nothing we do now can erase from our memories the brutal repression last August in Prague.

We are sometimes told that our allies in Western Europe would be

concerned lest our approaches to the Soviet Union on arms control should delay the day when Czechoslovakia will again be free. I do not agree. I believe that our allies understand the grave issues involved in ending the arms race and, with adequate consultation and counsel on our part, will strongly support that move.

An effective agreement to end the nuclear arms race will make it more likely that we and the Soviets will be able to go forward, with our allies, toward the solution of outstanding political problems.

But the fundamental requirement for that process of consultation ^{+ cooperation} is strategic stability_x. ^{-- which exists today.} Anything we do to maintain that strategic stability -- to freeze the arms race at or near today's levels -- will improve our political relations. But anything we do to disrupt that strategic stability will lead us back again to the darkest days of the Cold War.

* * *

There is another danger to the stability of our strategic relations with the Soviet Union -- the impending decision by the administration and Defense Department to proceed with deployment of the Sentinel anti-ballistic missile system.

Let me be clear: I have always supported, and will continue to support, any effort to provide for the security of the United States. There can be -- there will be -- no compromise with our defense.

But is this anti-ballistic missile system a contribution to that defense? I believe it is not.

The Sentinel ABM system was originally designed to counter an attack by China against the United States sometime during the 1970's, after China acquires the ability to launch a limited number of nuclear missiles against us. If Sentinel would do this, and would not erode our security in other ways, I would support its deployment -- even though it would only be needed to deal with the mad act of a Chinese leader whose own country would be destroyed in return.

But the Sentinel system will not do this. There are serious questions with regard to its technical feasibility, particularly against a carefully planned and executed attack. It could never be adequately tested without renouncing the atmospheric nuclear test ban treaty that we worked so long and hard to achieve.

Deploying an anti-ballistic missile system against China -- however imperfect the system would be, and for however few years it would be even partially effective -- would have grave effects on our relations with the Soviet Union.

Quite simply, we can afford to do nothing that risks upsetting the strategic balance with the Soviet Union -- and Sentinel is likely to do just that.

If we begin to construct this system, we will inevitably raise doubts in the minds of the Russians about our intentions. We will force them to improve their own offensive missile forces, thereby postponing

further a freeze in the arms race. And we will add new uncertainties to a strategic balance that can remain stable only when each side is completely sure of what balance consists.

There are further dangers. Major weapons systems, once begun, have a tendency to expand. Sentinel would be no exception, especially since there is already strong pressure -- misguided pressure -- to transform it into a defense against Soviet missiles.

I would support such a system if there were any chance that it would give us adequate protection against a nuclear attack. But it would do nothing of the kind. For every advance we achieve in anti-ballistic missiles, the Russians will be able, for much less effort, to recapture the same ability to wreak destruction on the United States through more sophisticated offensive weapons. The same argument applies in reverse, and would make a Soviet attempt to build anti-ballistic missile defenses equally futile.

What we are now facing, therefore, is the prospect of embarking on a project that will not provide us with greater protection, yet will introduce grave uncertainties into our relations with the Soviet Union. Indeed, the whole fabric of strategic stability we have so carefully constructed over the years would be called into question.

Then there is the question of cost. The present limited Sentinel system will cost at least \$10 billion. A full system, directed against the Soviet Union, would cost in the neighborhood of at least \$40 - \$60 billion.

These are dollars vitally needed for meeting the problems of poverty, the decay in our cities, and the explosive time bombs of division and discord in America. We would purchase new nuclear weapons -- adding nothing to our real defense -- at the price of postponing further our efforts to perfect our society at home.

It is now being argued that deployment of the Sentinel system will help us in our negotiations with the Soviet Union to control the

nuclear arms race. We are supposed to trade it away for a comprehensive agreement on the more vital questions of limiting all offensive and defensive weapons.

I question this view. If we have learned anything from our experience in two decades of deadly confrontation with the Soviets, it is that uncertainty in the strategic balance produces not conciliation but fear and nuclear escalation.

With the bomber gap of the 1950's and the missile gap of the 1960's, there were grave complications for our ability to deal with the Soviet Union on political matters.

But to postpone -- or to abandon -- deployment of the Sentinel system does not mean that we are leaving ourselves to the mercy of technological developments. We must continue with research and development against that day -- that unlikely day -- when a real defense should become necessary and possible. And we must continue to develop those

methods of intelligence reconnaissance that will enable us to know what other countries are doing in the field of nuclear weapons. But I repeat: we should now halt deployment of the Sentinel system and begin, as expeditiously as possible, negotiations with the Soviet Union on the reduction of offensive and defensive weapons.

But there is one further -- one crucial -- point. For many years we have been concerned with the problem of preserving a strategic balance with the Soviet Union -- of planning against the emergence of China as a nuclear power, and of preventing nuclear proliferation. But all too often we have looked at these problems in terms of weapons and hardware, instead of diplomacy and ideas.

There is one hard fact in this nuclear age: the determined aggressor, armed with the nuclear weapons that he may have built in secret, will be able to reap damage to any nation beyond our power to imagine.

The only hope for the world to survive accidental annihilation

lies not in the pursuit of more elaborate technology of destruction but in the pursuit of peace through the only means that can make peace real and lasting -- and these are largely political means.

If we upset the present strategic balance with the Soviet Union, we will harm the few prospects for political understanding.

If we think of China only in terms of an irrational nuclear attack, we will stand to lose the few hopes in coming years to encourage Peking to take an active peaceful part in the affairs of the world community of nations.

And if we think of non-proliferation only in terms of nuclear weapons, and ignore the real security problems and misunderstandings that may impel other nations to acquire these weapons, we may find ourselves one day in a world made far more dangerous than today by many nuclear powers.

We must, in short, come to understand that real security is the compound of many elements -- not just the military weapons system

provided by our professional defense establishment. And in the pursuit of real national security, we must not chase after shadows and illusions which will make us lose sight of the more difficult, but ultimately more important, political goals.

We can yet be masters of our destiny. We can walk the difficult path it takes. But it will require courage, conviction and hard, rational thought, I do not think that this is too high a price to pay for the survival of mankind. It is what we as creators and stewards of the most terrible power ever known to man owe to ourselves and to future generations. I say we must find this way to peace.

#

deterrence or, more precisely, a strategy of "mutual assured destruction."

No man can contemplate a rational defense in a nuclear war that would leave millions of people dead. We must depend upon our ability to deter attack, to prevent a nuclear war from ever beginning.

This we have done. We have provided ourselves with the ability to prevent any aggressor from attacking us with impunity; we have the ability to destroy any nation or nations that should choose to unleash a nuclear holocaust against ourselves, or to threaten our vital interests or those of our allies.

As a result, there has been no nuclear war, not even in the darkest days of our political conflict with the Soviet Union.

But relying upon deterrence is not enough. We must also guard against the danger that nuclear weapons will find their way into the hands of less cautious nations.

Too often conflicts between small nations have grown into conflagrations involving many others. In the nuclear age, no one can

Today I want to discuss a subject which is as difficult as it is important: the crucial national decision we must soon make between nuclear arms control and another escalation in the nuclear arms race. Now that the Soviet Union has nearly equalled us in strategic nuclear power, we must face the reality of possible nuclear annihilation. But we long ago anticipated the U.S.-Soviet mutual annihilation danger. Under the leadership of Secretary McNamara, who followed the basic policy of preceding Administrations, we have staked our nuclear security and survival upon the power of deterrence. By that we mean simply the possession of overwhelming strategic nuclear force so that any potential aggressor knows that the price of a nuclear attack may be its extinction as a nation.

To put it plainly: we stake our own survival upon the survival instinct of the other nuclear powers. We hope and pray that the leaders of all the nuclear powers will always hold highest the survival of their people and refrain under any circumstances from resorting to these dread weapons of national suicide. What we are trying to emphasize to all in our nuclear deterrence policy is that strategic nuclear missiles are really "non-weapons", whose sole and vital function is to assure that no nation will in fact resort to nuclear weapons. In a double sense nuclear weapons are quite unlike any other military power

ever before conceived. First, their power to annihilate entire nations puts them beyond any military might ever before created. Second, precisely because of that annihilative possibility they are weapons maintained not for use but rather to give assurance that nuclear war will not be unleashed by friend or foe.

If we have been right in pursuing national nuclear security through the deterrence of our strategic nuclear force, can we then feel secure from nuclear war? Certainly not. The history of mankind is a tragic tale of war between the great powers. Before we dismiss as unthinkable a nuclear exchange risking tens of millions of lives on either side, let us recall the war fought fifty years ago wherein thirteen million lives were lost for a cause which remains obscured from historical perception. And then there is Red China, which will be a nuclear superpower soon, and danger that small and belligerent nations will go nuclear -- Egypt and Israel, India and Pakistan, perhaps South Africa. Too often a conflict between small nations has grown into a conflagration involving all. In the nuclear age no one can say where a Hiroshima bomb dropped in Israel or Egypt would lead within minutes or hours.

No, there is no ultimate security in the present balance of nuclear terror. There is only the certainty that balance is

better than imbalance while we desperately seek arms control and nuclear disarmament agreements to put the genie back in the bottle. And in that regard we have had notable first success in recent years. In the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations we saw the birth and success of the atmospheric test ban treaty and the nuclear non-proliferation agreement. We have said in these first steps towards the ultimate security of nuclear arms control that the mad momentum of the nuclear arms race must be broken and we have set our course in a direction back from nuclear abyss.

But our successes have so far been limited: we have halted the spread of nuclear fallout and of nuclear weapons among the nations, but we have not yet agreed to halt the proliferation of new nuclear weapons among the existing nuclear powers. While we have had success in dissuading others from the nuclear path, the Soviet Union and the United States remain free to pursue endlessly escalating and expensive nuclear weapons programs. We are thus at a fateful crossroad. One course is to continue our efforts with the Russians toward a treaty to freeze weapons deployment at present levels. The other road is to renounce hopes for a strategic weapons treaty following the counsel of those who would plunge the United States into a variety of offensive and defensive nuclear programs. Thus we stand at the

crossroad where we can tread either the path of negotiated arms control or suffer a new weapons race with the Soviets. To make a rational choice we must examine both the chances of achieving a strategic weapons compact and the pros and cons of arms escalation, particularly concerning the controversial Sentinel-ABM. Let us then look briefly at the relative virtues of nuclear arms control and another nuclear arms race.

I believe that if we pursue with zeal and determination negotiation of a strategic weapons freeze with the Soviet Union we must and can succeed. Let those who doubt our ability to negotiate a strategic freeze with the Soviets recall our signal successes in recent years in achieving agreement with the Russians where we have tangible common interests. From Hot Line, the Consular Convention, and the Civil Air Transportation Agreement, to the more significant and difficult achievements of the atmospheric test ban and the non-proliferation treaty, we have examples of success in reaching binding treaty commitments with the Soviets. And if they found sufficient self-interest to enter into those treaties, how much stronger is their interest and ours in the achievement of a strategic weapons freeze. Proposals for new nuclear programs, such as ABM, would mean expenditures ranging from 40 to 80 billion dollars or more in the next few years. In December of 1967 House Republican Leader Ford put a 35 billion

dollar price tag on ABM, which has surely grown larger by current estimates. Surely comparable expenditure burdens for the Soviets are no less alarming, and give them a tangible interest in the achievement of a strategic weapons freeze. Nor must we merely speculate on that subject, since repeated public and private affirmations by Soviet leaders in recent weeks and months have made clear their earnest desire to negotiate a general halt in the strategic weapons race.

There are some, however, who have suggested that success in arms control negotiations with the Soviets must await the achievement of an overall political settlement of such tension issues as Central Europe and the Middle East. They are tragically and doubly mistaken. First of all, we have recently achieved treaties with the Soviets curbing nuclear testing and nuclear proliferation agreements made without any general political settlement. Indeed, Soviet agreement to the non-proliferation treaty came in the very midst of the divisive Vietnam conflict. To say we cannot achieve a strategic weapons freeze would disregard the teaching of most recent history. Moreover, the prospects for achieving a strategic freeze have been greatly enhanced by recent technological advances, for we now have detection methods which obviate need for on-site inspection of strategic weapons deployment and the attendant

difficulties of winning Soviet agreement.

Secondly, not only can we proceed without overall political settlements to achieve arms control progress with the Soviets, failure to do so would make political settlements the more difficult. For it is perfectly clear that if the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race is not contained by agreement when our two nations are in a relatively balanced power posture, the imbalance of another arms race cycle will make political settlements the more unlikely of achievement. Between hostile nations it has often been observed that settlement is possible only when they achieve a position of power parity. At that moment basic settlement appears preferable on either side to another burdensome escalation of effort to gain a tactical advantage. But if the nuclear genie is again unleashed in pursuit of the ephemeral nuclear "superiority", then another unstable period in Soviet-American relations will be upon us and political settlements the further off precisely because we have failed to achieve nuclear arms control.

Today the greatest international political reality is the power of nuclear annihilation. Those who counsel political settlements before nuclear settlements are putting the cart before the horse. Let us then with unrelenting effort engage the Soviets in prompt and meaningful strategic arms control negotiations.

While we progress in the strategic arms control negotiations with the Russians, should we proceed with the deployment of the Sentinel-ABM system? After much study and reflection, I have concluded that the answer must be in the negative, for the risks of Sentinel ABM far exceed any possible benefits we could now derive from undertaking this costly program.

What reason do the proponents of the Sentinel system give for its present deployment? Secretary McNamara's 1967 announcement of a deployment start was geared entirely to our expectation of an imminent Chinese breakthrough in strategic missile capability. Now, a year and a half later, the expected Chinese technical advance still has not occurred. There is no longer any serious contention that we must now commence deploying Sentinel against a potential Chinese capability which is surely many years off and has not even begun. This is no time to waste ten billion dollars for deploying a system which further research and development would improve for the day when it might actually be prudent to build a modest defense against^a/Chinese missile threat.

Another argument recently made for Sentinel deployment is that it would give us some protection against a Soviet missile strike. But as Secretary McNamara's eloquent San Francisco speech made clear, any effort to achieve even marginal protection from a

Soviet nuclear attack would be worse than futile. At best it would be costly waste of our resources, and at worst it will rekindle the nuclear arms race with a dangerous offense-defense spiral. Experts agree that the cost of missile defense systems has been reduced by recent research but that every dollar for missile defense can still be overcome on the other side by twenty cents of nuclear offense enhancement. Compared to the unbelievably complex technology of instant nuclear defense, the production of additional intercontinental missiles or warheads is simple and inexpensive. Deploying Sentinel would stimulate Soviet ABM activity and their development of further offensive systems to overcome our defense which in turn will precipitate further expensive and useless defense effort on our side. Surely Sentinel deployment against the Russians remains a worse than useless waste of our national resources.

With Sentinel coming too soon against the Chinese and far too late and ineffective against the Russians, what remains to be said in favor of deployment? A last gasp argument now being voiced is that we should build Sentinel so that we can trade it away in an arms control negotiations with the Soviets. Of all of the shifting and elusive arguments heard for ABM in recent months, this is surely the weakest reed. To say that we should undertake an ineffective

multi-billion dollar nuclear program so that we will have something additional to bargain with is to pretend that one can deal from strength without having it. If Sentinel deployment became a serious threat to the Russians, they would take countersteps to overcome it. But it is not such a threat, and we simply cannot convert into an asset at the bargaining table what everyone's balance sheet carries as a liability. In nuclear negotiation nothing we do can make more of Sentinel deployment than a pair of deuces.

Not only does Sentinel deployment lack any persuasive virtues, its vices are also manifest. First, it would foster a national illusion of nuclear safety when there is none that any ABM can provide. Second, it would make the achievement of a strategic weapons treaty more difficult, for it would kindle an unstable arms race climate least conducive to achieving agreement. Third, Sentinel has worrisome diplomatic repercussions, for our major allies view its deployment as a regressive step. They say to the United States, "Why do you leave us exposed while you seek missile defense for your own people?" We cannot answer their questions, because in fact we are not obtaining protection for our people, but a multi-billion dollar game of nuclear power politics. Finally, Sentinel means untold billions of dollars added to our

present tax burdens or taken from the desperate human need areas. Our crying human needs at home and abroad make unthinkable and immoral the waste of billions spent on a useless nuclear endeavor.

In sum, it is clear that Sentinel deployment has the gravest implications for our national interests: it would undermine prospects for a strategic weapons treaty, it would offend and alarm our major allies, and waste precious billions so desperately needed to alleviate human want and pressing domestic needs. When prospects for nuclear arms control, our relations with our allies, and our priority human needs are so deeply affected by a questionable nuclear program, it seems clear that we must invoke a procedure whereby the Sentinel deployment decision will reflect more than narrow military opinions. We cannot have profound issues of arms control, diplomacy, and national priorities left to decision by anonymous military strategists. We require a method whereby this vital decision affecting our national future will reflect bipartisan examination of the question from its every major aspect. We need a bipartisan commission representing Congressional leaders, Administration representatives, and non-Government experts to make a thorough review and recommendation to the President and the nation on this vital subject. If such a procedure requires six months or a year before the commission report can be made, it is no less

necessary. Indeed, while a commission examines and deliberates we may make progress with the Soviets in arms control negotiations, which could lead to reassessment of Sentinel even by its present staunch supporters.

Whatever means we employ to make this important national decision, what is vital is that we recognize just how crucial the decision really is. In our national history we have sometimes gone astray when decisions had to be made on a moment's notice, without public debate and general understanding of alternatives. On the other hand, where we have had time -- as we have time concerning Sentinel -- to make national decisions after due deliberation, history will accord us a high mark for good judgment. The superb human intelligence which can conceive a nuclear missile system is equally available for deciding whether to build it. The moment is at hand for a painstaking examination of the question whether as a nation we want to take the road of strategic weapons control or of escalation in the nuclear arms race. If we are not panicked into a hasty decision, I cannot doubt that wisdom will prevail, that we will not open a Pandora's Box of nightmare weapons, and that in our lifetime we may succeed in locking the nuclear genie safely into its bottle.

Tonight

~~Today~~ I want to discuss a subject ~~that is of the~~ most vital importance to the future of our nation: ~~the~~ the defense of America and our survival in the nuclear age. [We now face a crucial decision: will we continue the search for ways to ~~bring~~ end the mad momentum of the nuclear arms race, or will we begin yet another round of arms building that will only make us -- and all peoples in the world -- much less ~~safe~~ *secure from mass -- and mutual -- destruction?*

[Since the dawn of the nuclear age, and the unleashing of the terrible destructive power of atomic ~~or~~ bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we have tried to prevent the use of this military power whose consequences are ind^{able}scribable, and ~~whose~~ that could end life on earth as we know it.

~~For~~ [For years, we have provided for our ~~own~~ defence, and for the protection of all mankind from nuclear war through the philosophy of deterrence, *or, more precisely, a strategy of "mutual assured ~~destruction~~ destruction."* No man can contemplate a rationale defence in a nuclear war that would leave millions of people dead. We must depend upon our ability to deter attack, to prevent a nuclear war from ~~beginning~~ *ever beginning.*

This we have done. We have provided ~~ourselves~~ ourselves with the ability to prevent any aggressor from attacking us with impunity; *we have* with the ability to destroy any nation ^{or nations} that should chose to unleash ~~it~~ *it* ~~after attacking~~ *after attacking* a nuclear holocaust against ourselves, or to threaten ^{our} the vital ^{interests} interests of ourselves and our allies.

As a result, there has been no nuclear war, not even in the

darkest days of our political conflict with the Soviet Union.

But relying upon deterrence is not enough. We must also

~~guard~~ guard against the danger that nuclear weapons will find their way into the hands of ~~countries~~ ^{nations.} less cautious ~~the~~

~~with the emergence of China as a major nuclear power, and a potential~~ ~~by hostile~~ ~~the~~ ~~United States~~

Too

often conflicts between small nations have grown into conflagrations

^{many others.} involving ~~it~~. In the nuclear age, no one can ~~say~~ ^{nationally} predict the consequences

for the safety of all mankind of a single weapon exploded in some far

off ~~conflict~~, ^{supposedly limited, conflict.}

For this reason, we have labored for years to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. And we have ~~had~~ ^{just achieved} our first measure of success.

During the Johnson Administration, we concluded a ~~treaty~~ ^{nuclear} non-proliferation treaty to ~~keep the threat~~ take the first step towards

~~making~~ preventing the world from becoming a hostage to the mad act of some small country.

Indeed, I was the first member of the J-H Administration to discuss publicly the desirability of such a treaty. I long supported this effort, and I support it now, as the Non-Proliferation Treaty is finally submitted to the U.S. Senate for ratification. I urge its early ratification, and hope that we will ~~continue to~~ ^{are now} take those further steps that ~~will be~~ ^{will be} required if the spread of nuclear weapons is to be halted.

by the Nixon Administration

we will ~~continue to~~ take those further steps that ~~will be~~ required if the spread of nuclear weapons is to be halted.

* * * *

But halting the ~~spread~~ proliferation of nuclear weapons among the nations of the world is not enough. We must also ~~halt~~ halt the ~~spread~~

~~increase of~~ nuclear arms race among the superpowers, ~~themselves~~.

Indeed, this is a step we must take if the Non-Proliferation

Treaty is to succeed. ~~We~~ We cannot ask others to forego nuclear weapons if we -- and the Soviet Union -- ~~fail to restrain ourselves~~ -- *and senseless* -- in the needless accumulation of destructive ^{nuclear} power.

But there is a more important reason for halting the strategic arms race with the Soviet Union. We are now on a strategic plateau, ^{nuclear} where there is sure knowledge of our security, and where both ^{the United States} ~~our~~ ^{and the Soviet Union} ~~countries~~ ^{have} can turn ~~our~~ minds from the dread dangers of a surprise attack from the other side.

This easing of tensions has been achieved ~~not~~ only after long efforts and at great cost. ~~And we must not~~ ^{in short,} return again to the fears of the 1950s by introducing new uncertainties into the strategic arms balance. Today, both of us possess sufficient nuclear power for ^{mutual} deterrence, ~~and our peace of mind,~~ but tomorrow, if we allow the nuclear arms race to ^{accelerate once again,} ~~continue~~ we may find ourselves again fearing for ~~the~~ our lives and safety.

^{I believe} The Soviet Union ^{appreciates} ~~is well aware of~~ the dangers in a further escalation of the arms race. They have slowed the deployment of their anti-ballistic missile system, after we made clear to them the risks they were running, ^{and for many months they have been asking} ~~us~~ to begin ~~talks on~~ comprehensive talks on a limitation of both offensive and defensive ~~we~~ nuclear weapons. I have long advocated ^{this} ~~the~~ step, at the earliest possible ~~next~~ ^{long-term} opportunity -- for our own security.

^{productive} I believe ~~that~~ we can now join the Soviet Union in talks on controlling the arms race, ~~that will prove successful.~~ ~~And I believe~~ we should do it now. Recently, ~~there~~ ^{productive} there has been concern that

At the United Nations we achieved a treaty to ban weapons of mass destruction from outer space.

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~~we should~~

We have many precedents, beginning with the Limited Nuclear Test-

Ban treaty, negotiated by President Kennedy in 1963. ~~There was~~

~~reached~~

~~an~~ agreement to establish a Hot-Line between Moscow and Washington,

and it was used to avert a nuclear confrontation during the Arab-

Israeli War of 1967. ~~And we~~ concluded with the ~~S~~ Russians a Consular

Convention and a Civil Air Transportation Agreement. ~~I~~ I personally

~~strongly~~ supported all of these measures and ~~am~~ mindful of the

~~often encountered in such negotiations,~~

difficulties. Yet I think that talks to end the nuclear arms race, ~~we~~

~~when we~~ and the Russians have even more common interest to preserve

~~the future of mankind -- will be blessed with success.~~

It has been suggested in recent weeks that these talks should be postponed until they can be linked to more general ~~political~~

settlement of outstanding political problems. ~~I~~ I cannot agree. ~~If~~

~~only because~~ the urgency of our present problem -- to prevent a

further round of the nuclear arms race before it is irreversibly

launched -- cannot wait upon the solution of ~~political~~

~~-- and will be many years, if not generations, in solving,~~ disputes that have been many years in the making. ~~Nor~~ Nor are these

broader agreements necessary for success in talks to limit the

arms race. Indeed, we negotiated both the limited test-ban treaty

and the non-proliferation treaty during the Vietnam War, the latter

during the days when our involvement in the war most strained our

relations with the Soviet Union ~~and other Communist nations.~~

~~There~~

There is only one caution. As I have said in the past, our desire to negotiate an end to the strategic nuclear arms race in no way condones the aggression of the Soviet Union against Czechoslovakia, nor ~~does it~~ would it condone similar acts in the future. Nothing we do now can erase from our memories the brutal repression last August in Prague. We are sometimes told that our allies in Western Europe would be concerned lest our approaches to the Soviet Union on arms control should delay the day when Czechoslovakia will ~~gain~~ again be free. I do not agree. I believe that our allies understand the grave issues involved in ending the arms race and, with adequate consultation on our part, will and counsel ~~with us~~ /strongly support that move.

In addition, ~~an~~ ^{an} effective agreement to end the nuclear arms race will ~~actually~~ ^{actually} make it more likely that we and the ~~Russians~~ ^{Soviets} will be able to go forward, with our Allies, towards the solution of outstanding political problems. ^{But} The fundamental requirement for that process of consultation is strategic stability. Anything we do to maintain that strategic stability -- to freeze the arms race at or near today's levels -- will improve our political relations. But anything we do to ~~upset~~ ^{disrupt} that strategic stability will lead us back again to the darkest days of the Cold War.

^{There is} ~~Now I must address myself to yet~~ another danger to the stability of our strategic relations with the Soviet Union. ~~this is~~ ^{the} ~~impending~~ decision by the Administration and Defense Department to proceed with deployment of the Sentinel anti-ballistic missile system. ~~This move is being strongly contested in the United States Senate, led by~~

~~Senator Edward Kennedy. I say strongly support this courageous~~
~~move.~~

Let me be clear: I have ~~always~~ always supported, and will continue to support, any effort to provide for the security of the United States, ~~whatever the cost, whatever the effort involved,~~
-- and there will be
~~sacrifice.~~ There can be ^{no} compromise with our ~~defense~~ defense.

But is this anti-ballistic missile system a contribution to that defense? I believe it is not.

The Sentinel ^{ABM} system was originally designed to counter an attack by China against the United States sometime during the 1970s, after China acquires the ability to ~~launch a~~ *launch a limited number of* nuclear missiles against us. If Sentinel would do this, and would not erode our security in other ways, I ~~should~~ *would* certainly support its deployment, ~~even~~ *--* ~~But it does not~~ though it would ~~be~~ only be needed to deal with the mad act of a Chinese leader ~~whose~~ *whose* ~~own~~ *would be* own country, ~~destroyed~~ in return.

But Sentinel will not do this. ~~To begin with,~~ *To begin with,* there are serious questions with regard to its technical feasibility, particularly against a carefully planned and executed attack. ~~And it~~ *And it* could never be adequately tested, ~~without~~ *without* ~~renouncing~~ *renouncing* the ^{atmospheric} nuclear test-ban treaty that we worked so long and hard to achieve.

~~I say that~~ ~~But~~ Deploying an anti-ballistic missile system against China -- however imperfect the ~~system~~ system would be, and

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for however few years it would be even partially effective -- would ~~not~~ have ~~great~~ ^{grave} ~~grave~~ effects on our relations with the Soviet Union. ~~Indeed~~

Quite simply, we can ^{afford to} do nothing that ~~will risk~~ ^{risks} upsetting the strategic balance with the Soviet Union -- and Sentinel, ^{is likely to} ~~whenever it is designed~~ to counter ~~will~~ do just that. [If we begin to ~~construct~~ ^{construct} this system,

we will inevitably raise doubts in the minds of the Russians about our intentions. ~~We~~ will force them to improve their own offensive missile forces, thereby ^{further a freeze in} ~~postponing an end to~~ the arms race, and we will add new uncertainties into a strategic balance that can ~~be~~ ^{remain} stable only when each side is completely sure ^{of} ~~that~~ what ~~the~~ balance ~~is~~ ^{consists}.

[There are ^{further} ~~more~~ dangers. It is well established that major weapons systems, once begun, have a tendency to expand. Sentinel would be no exception, especially ^{since} there is already strong pressure -- misguided pressure -- to ~~convert~~ ^{transform} it into a defense against ~~Russian~~ ^{Soviet} missiles.

Again, let me say that I would support such a system if there were any chance that it would give us adequate protection against a nuclear attack. But it would do nothing of the kind. For every advance we ^{achieve} ~~make~~ in anti-ballistic missiles, the Russians will be able, ~~to~~ ~~do~~ ~~so~~ ~~quickly~~ ~~and~~ ~~effectively~~ for ^{much} ~~less~~ effort, to ^{recapture the} ~~regain the~~ same ability to ~~wreak~~ ^{wreak} destruction on the United States ^{through more sophisticated offensive weapons.} The same argument applies in reverse, and would make a ~~Russian~~ ^{Soviet} attempt to build ^{anti-ballistic} missile defenses equally futile.

~~There is ~~nothing~~ ~~we~~ ~~can~~ ~~do~~ ~~to~~ ~~prevent~~ ~~the~~ ~~Soviet~~ ~~Union~~ ~~from~~ ~~overwhelming~~ ~~any~~ ~~missile~~ ~~defense~~ ~~system~~ ~~we~~ ~~could~~ ~~construct~~; that is a hard fact of the nuclear age, and explains why we must continue~~

~~to rely on deterrence, ~~to provide~~ ~~xxx~~ not defence, for our protection~~

~~And the Soviet Union must do likewise.~~

What we are ^{now} facing ~~is~~, therefore, is the prospect of embarking on a project that will ^{not} provide us with ^{greater} ~~the best~~ protection, yet will introduce ~~some~~ grave uncertainties into our relations with the

Soviet Union, ^{Indeed,} ~~as to call into question~~ the whole fabric of strategic stability we have so carefully constructed over the years ^{would be called into}

^{Then there is the question of cost.}
~~And this project, besides being dangerous, will be expensive.~~ ^{question.}

The present limited Sentinel system will cost at least \$10 billion; ^A full system, ~~designed~~ directed against the Soviet Union, would cost in the neighborhood of ^{at least \$40-60} ~~\$100~~ billion. ^L These are dollars

~~that~~ vitally needed for meeting the problems of poverty, the decay in our cities, and the explosive time bombs of division and ^{in America} discord. We would purchase new nuclear weapons, adding nothing

to our real defence, at the price of ~~a foregoing efforts~~ postponing ^{our} ~~efforts to defend~~ ^{perfect} our society at home, against internal ~~threats~~

~~to us and to the world~~

~~Threats of~~

Robert Hunter

We must not sacrifice our own future, by pursuing the illusion of a defense that will not defend.

It is now being argued that deployment of the Sentinel system will help us in our negotiations with the SU to control the nuclear arms race. We are supposed to trade it away for a comprehensive agreement on the more vital questions of limiting all offensive and defensive weapons.

I ^{question} ~~strongly dispute~~ this view. If we have learned anything from our experience in two decades of deadly confrontation with the ~~Russians~~ ^{Soviets}, it is that uncertainty in the strategic balance produces ~~not conciliation but fear~~ ^{and nuclear escalation.} With ~~the~~ the bomber gap of the 1950's and the missile gap of the 1960's, there were grave complications for our ability to deal with the Soviet Union on political matters. ~~We cannot run that risk again, gaining nothing and with the strong possibility that we will prejudice the success of these vital talks on arms control.~~

But to postpone -- or to abandon -- deployment of the Sentinel system does not mean that we are leaving ourselves to the mercy of

technological developments. We must continue with research and development ^H

against that day -- that unlikely day -- when a real defense should

necessary and

become possible. And we must continue to develop those methods of ^{intelligent}

~~reconnaissance~~ reconnaissance that will ~~always~~ enable us to know what other countries

are doing in the field of nuclear weapons. But I ~~say we should~~ ^{repeat: we should}

~~endorse the present halt to Sentinel~~ ^{now} the deployment of Sentinel, ^{the} system ^{and begin, as expeditiously as possible, negotiations with the} ^{Soviet Union on the reduction of} ^{offensive and defensive} ~~weapons.~~

~~At the present time the deployment of Sentinel would be the gravest threat to our chances to end the nuclear arms race. It would create the illusion -- the deadly illusion -- that we have bought a defense, when indeed we have not; it will complicate the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons around the world, by destroying the good faith we have created in our sincere efforts to halt the nuc arms race: and it will rob us of money we need for the more pressing and deserving tasks of creati g within our nation new and just opportunity for all citizens.~~

^{- one crucial -}
But there is one further [^] point. For many years we have been

concerned with the problem of preserving a strategic balance with the

the Soviet Union, of planning against the emergence of China as a nuclear power, and of preventing nuclear proliferation. But all too often we have looked at these problems in terms of weapons and hardware, instead of diplomacy and ideas. There is one hard fact in this nuclear age: that the determined aggressor, armed with the nuclear weapons that he may have built in secret, will be able to reap damage to any nation beyond our power to imagine.

The only hope for the world ~~surviving~~ ^{surviving} accidental annihilation lies not in the pursuit of more elaborate technology of destruction but in the pursuit of peace through the only means that can make peace real and lasting -- and these are largely political means. If we upset the present strategic balance with the SU, we will harm the few prospects for political understanding. If we think of China only in terms of an irrational nuclear attack, we will stand to lose the few hopes in coming years to encourage Peking to take an active peaceful part in the affairs of the world community of nations, and if we think of nonproliferation only in terms of nuclear weapons, and ignore the real security problems and misunderstandings

that may impel other nations to acquire these weapons, we may find ourselves one day in a world made far more dangerous by many nuclear

powers than today. We must pursue our own sure defense but we must not chase after shadows and illusions that will make us lose sight of the more difficult, important political goals. Real security, the only firm support for peace, is not the professional responsibility of the military -- it is the total achievement of mankind.

We have the capacity and the ingenuity to turn our efforts to the pursuit of peace. These decisions are too important to be left to the automatic workings of our defense establishment, or to the entrenched political pressures that have long influenced the making of our strategic policy.

I call today for new approaches to the problems of strategic decisionmaking; for a new and thorough review that looks beyond the grave questions raised by the Sentinel program and for new efforts to reconcile our desire to end the nuclear arms race -- and to secure the

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We must, in short, come to understand that real security is the compound of many elements--not just the military weapons system provided by our professional defense establishment. And in the pursuit of real national security, we must not chase after shadows and illusions which will make us loose sight of the more difficult, but ultimately more important, political goals.

~~world from a nuc holocaust with our attitudes toward weapons systems~~

~~national integrity and cultural diversity~~. (^{yet} We can be masters of

our destiny. We can walk the difficult path it takes. But it will

require courage, conviction and hard rational thought. I do not think

that this is too high a price to ~~pay~~ pay for the survival of mankind.

It is what we as creators and stewards of the most terrible power

ever known to man owe to ourselves and to future generations. I say

but must

~~let us do it~~ find this way to peace.

Robert Hunter

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The only hope for the world surviving accidental annihilation lies not in the pursuit of more elaborate technology of destruction but in the pursuit of peace through the only means that can make peace real and lasting -- and these are largely political means. If we upset the present strategic balance with the SU we will harm the few prospects for political understanding; if we think of China only in terms of an irrational nuclear attack we will stand to lose the few hopes in coming years to encourage Peking to take an active peaceful part in the affairs of the world community of nations; and if we think of nonproliferation only in terms of nuclear weapons, and ignore

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