

PRESS CONFERENCE NO. 4

of the
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

12:00 Noon
March 14, 1969
Friday

In The East Room
At The White House
Washington, D. C.

THE PRESIDENT: Ladies and gentlemen, today I am announcing a decision which I believe is vital for the security and defense of the United States, and also in the interest of peace throughout the world.

Last year a program, the SENTINEL antiballistic missile program, was adopted. That program, as all listeners on television and radio and readers of newspapers know, has been the subject of very strong debate and controversy over the past few months.

After long study of all of the options available, I have concluded that the SENTINEL program previously adopted should be substantially modified. The new program that I have recommended this morning to the leaders, and that I announce today, is one that perhaps best can be described as a safeguard program.

It is a safeguard against any attack by the Chinese Communists that we can foresee over the next 10 years.

It is a safeguard of our deterrent system, which is increasingly vulnerable due to the advances that have been made by the Soviet Union since the year 1967 when the SENTINEL program was first laid out.

It is a safeguard also against any irrational or accidental attack that might occur of less than massive magnitude which might be launched from the Soviet Union.

The program also does not do some things which should be clearly understood. It does not provide defense for our cities, and for that reason the sites have been moved away from our major cities. I have made the decision with regard to this particular point because I found that there is no way, even if we were to expand the limited SENTINEL system which was planned for some of our cities to a so-called heavy or thick system -- there is no way that we can adequately defend our cities without an unacceptable loss of life.

The only way that I have concluded that we can save lives, which is the primary purpose of our defense system, is to prevent war, and that is why the emphasis of this system is on protecting our deterrent, which is the best preventive for war.

MORE

The system differs from the previous SENTINEL system in another major respect. The SENTINEL system called for a fixed deployment schedule. I believe that because of a number of reasons, we should have a phase system. That is why, on an annual basis, the new safeguard system will be reviewed, and the review may bring about changes in the system based on our evaluation of three major points.

First, what our intelligence shows us with regard to the magnitude of the threat, whether from the Soviet Union or from the Chinese; and, second, in terms of what our evaluation is of any talks that we are having by that time, or may be having, with regard to arms control; and, finally, because we believe that since this is a new system, we should constantly examine what progress has been made in the development of the technique to see if changes in the system should be made.

I should admit at this point that this decision has not been an easy one. None of the great decisions made by a President are easy. But it is one that I have made after considering all of the options, and I would indicate before going to your questions two major options that I have overruled.

One is moving to a massive city defense. I have already indicated why I do not believe that is, first, feasible, and there is another reason: Moving to a massive city defense system, even starting with a thin system and then going to a heavy system, tends to be more provocative in terms of making credible a first-strike capability against the Soviet Union. I want no provocation which might deter arms talks.

The other alternative, at the other extreme, was to do nothing, or to delay for six or twelve months, which would be the equivalent, really, of doing nothing, or, for example, going the road only of research and development.

I have examined those options. I have ruled them out because I have concluded that the first deployment of this system, which will not occur until 1973, that that first deployment is essential by that date if we are to meet the threat that our present intelligence indicates will exist by 1973.

In other words, we must begin now. If we delay a year, for example, it means that that first deployment will be delayed until 1975. That might be too late.

It is the responsibility of the President of the United States, above all other responsibilities, to think first of the security of the United States. I believe that this system is the best step that we can take to provide for that security.

There are, of course, other possibilities that have been strongly urged by some of the leaders this morning -- for example that we could increase our offensive capability, our submarine force, or even our MINUTEMAN force or our bomber force. That I would consider to be, however, the wrong road

because it would be provocative to the Soviet Union and might escalate an arms race.

This system is truly a safeguard system, a defensive system only. It safeguards our deterrent and under those circumstances can, in no way, in my opinion, delay the progress which I hope will continue to be made toward arms talks, which will limit arms, not only this kind of system, but particularly offensive systems.

We will now go to your questions.

Mr. Smith?

QUESTION: Mr. President, the war in Vietnam has been intensifying recently, and if there has been any notable progress in Paris it has not been detectable publicly. Is your patience growing a little thin with these continued attacks, particularly such as came out of the DMZ today?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Smith, you may recall that on March 4 when I received a similar question, at an earlier stage of the attacks, I issued what was interpreted widely as a warning. It will be my policy as President to issue a warning only once, and I will not repeat it now. Anything in the future that is done will be done. There will be no additional warning.

As far as the Paris talks are concerned, I have noted the speculation in the press with regard to whether we will have, or should have, or are, for example, approving private talks going forward. I will not discuss that subject. I trust there will be private talks.

I think that is where this war will be settled -- in private rather than in public. This is in the best interest of both sides, but public discussion of what I think is significant progress which is being made along the lines of private talks, I will not indulge in.

Mr. Cormier?

MORE

QUESTION: Mr. President, will you make your own State of the Union address, and what will your legislative program encompass?

THE PRESIDENT: I do not plan a State of the Union address in the traditional manner. I will, within approximately a month, however, state a general domestic program. By that time the program will be at the point that I think it should be completely summarized and set forth, not only for the Nation, as to what we have done, but particularly to the Congress as to what we expect for the balance. I would not want to anticipate now what will be in that program.

QUESTION: Mr. President, there has been a great deal of criticism in Congress against deployment of any type of antiballistic defense system. What kind of reception do you think your proposal this morning will receive there?

THE PRESIDENT: It will be a very spirited debate, and it will be a very close vote. Debates in the field of national defense are often spirited and the votes are often close. Many of my friends in Congress who were there before I was there remarked that the vote on extending the draft in 1941 won by only one vote.

This might be that close. I think, however, that after the Members of the House and the Senate consider this program, which is a minimum program, and which particularly provides options to change in other directions if we find the threat is changed, or that the art has changed, our evaluation of the technique has changed, I think that we have a good chance of getting approval. We will, of course, express our views, and we hope that we will get support from the country.

QUESTION: Mr. President, I understand that your first construction or deployment of antimissile systems would be around two MINUTEMAN retaliatory operations. Do you think that deploying around these two provides enough deterrent that would be effective?

THE PRESIDENT: Let me explain the difference between deploying around two MINUTEMAN bases and deploying around, say, 10 cities.

Where you are looking toward a city defense, it needs to be a perfect or near perfect system to be credible because, as I examine the possibility of even a thick defense of cities, I have found that even the most optimistic projections, considering the highest development of the art, would mean that we would still lose 30 million to 40 million lives. That would be less than half of what we would otherwise lose. But we would still lose 30 million to 40 million.

When you are talking about protecting your deterrent, it need not be perfect. It is necessary only to protect enough of the deterrent that the retaliatory second strike will be of such magnitude that the enemy would think twice before launching a first strike.

MORE

It has been my conclusion that by protecting two MINUTEMAN sites, we will preserve that deterrent as a credible deterrent, and that that will be decisive and could be decisive insofar as the enemy considering the possibility of a first strike.

QUESTION: Mr. President, there have been charges from Capitol Hill that you have stepped up the war in Vietnam. Have you?

THE PRESIDENT: I have not stepped up the war in Vietnam. I actually have examined not only the charges, but also examined the record. I discussed it at great length yesterday with Secretary Laird.

What has happened is this: For the past six months, the forces on the other side have been planning for an offensive, and for the past six months they not only have planned for an offensive, but they have been able, as a result of that planning, to have mounted a rather substantial offensive.

Under those circumstances, we had no other choice but to try to blunt the offensive. Had General Abrams not responded in this way, we would have suffered far more casualties than we have suffered, and we have suffered more than, of course, any of us would have liked to have seen.

The answer is that any escalation of the war in Vietnam has been the responsibility of the enemy. If the enemy de-escalates its attacks, ours will go down. We are not trying to step it up. We are trying to do everything that we can in the conduct of our war in Vietnam to see that we can go forward toward peace in Paris.

That is why my response has been measured, deliberate and, some think, too cautious. But it will continue to be that way, because I am thinking of those peace talks every time I think of a military option in Vietnam.

MORE

QUESTION: Mr. President, your safeguard ABM system, I understand, would cost about \$1 billion less in the coming fiscal year than the plan which President Johnson sent up. Would this give you the opportunity to reduce the surcharge or will the continued high level of taxation be needed for the economy?

THE PRESIDENT: That question will be answered when we see the entire budget. Secretary Laird will testify on the defense budget on Wednesday.

Incidentally, my understanding at this time, and I have seen the preliminary figures, is that the defense budget that Secretary Laird will present will be approximately \$2-1/2 billion less than that submitted by the previous Administration.

Whether after considering the defense budget and all of the other budgets that have been submitted, we then can move in the direction of either reducing the surcharge or move in the direction of some of our very difficult problems with regard to our cities, the problem of hunger and others -- these are the options that I will have to consider at a later time.

QUESTION: Mr. President, last week you said that in the matter of Vietnam you would not tolerate heavier casualties and a continuation of the violation of the understanding without making an appropriate response.

Is what we are doing now in Vietnam in a military way that response of which you were speaking?

THE PRESIDENT: This is a very close decision on our part, one that I not only discussed with Secretary Laird yesterday, but that we will discuss more fully in the Security Council tomorrow.

I took no comfort out of the stories that I saw in the papers this morning to the effect that our casualties for the immediate past week went from 400 down to 300. That still is too high. What our response should be must be measured in terms of the effect on the negotiations in Paris. I will only respond as I did earlier to Mr. Smith's question. We issued a warning. I will not wam again. If we conclude that the level of casualties is higher than we should tolerate, action will take place.

QUESTION: Mr. President, do you have reason to believe that the Russians will interpret your ABM decision today as not being an escalating move in the arms race?

THE PRESIDENT: As a matter of fact, Mr. Kaplow, I have reason to believe, based on the past record, that they would interpret it just the other way around.

First, when they deployed their own ABM system, and, as you know, they have 67 missile ABM sites deployed around Moscow, they rejected the idea that it escalated the arms race on the ground that it was defensive solely in character, and, second, when the United States last year went

forward on the SENTINEL system, four days later the Soviet Union initiated the opportunity to have arms limitation talks.

I think the Soviet Union recognizes very clearly the difference between a defensive posture and an offensive posture.

I would also point this out, an interesting thing about Soviet military and diplomatic history: They have always thought in defensive terms, and if you read not only their political leaders, but their military leaders, the emphasis is on defense.

I think that since this system now, as a result of moving the city defense out of it, and the possibility of that city defense growing into a thick defense, I think this makes it so clearly defensive in character that the Soviet Union cannot interpret this as escalating the arms race.

QUESTION: Mr. President, last week at your press conference you mentioned negotiations with the Russians at the highest level being in the wind. Could you tell us if since then we have moved any closer to such a summit meeting?

THE PRESIDENT: I should distinguished between negotiations at what you call the highest level, and what I said was the highest level, and talks. Talks with the Soviet Union are going on at a number of levels at this time, on a number of subjects.

However, those talks have not yet reached the point where I have concluded, or where I believe they have concluded, that a discussion at the summit level would be useful. Whenever those talks, preliminary talks, do reach that point, I anticipate that a summit meeting would take place.

I do not think one will take place in the near future, but I think encouraging progress is being made toward the time when a summit talk may take place.

QUESTION: Mr. President, there have been several reports from your staff members that Kennedy and Johnson hold-over people who made policy have sown themselves into civil service status and this may mean some problem for you people in personnel. I wonder if this means that you will transfer a lot of these people or abolish jobs?

THE PRESIDENT: I have heard a lot from some of my Republican friends on Capitol Hill on this point, as well as from, of course, Republican leaders in the Nation. It seems that this is a rather common practice, when one Administration goes out and the other one comes in. We will do what we think will best serve the interest of effective Government, and if the individual who has been frozen in can do the job, we are going to keep him.

However, we are moving some out, but we wouldn't do it through subterfuge. We will try to do it quite directly.

QUESTION: Mr. President, in your recent European trip, did you find any willingness on the part of our allies to increase their military and financial contribution to the alliance?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that matter was discussed with all of our allies, and particularly will be a subject for discussion when we have the 20th Anniversary meeting of NATO here in April.

I think it might be potentially embarrassing to allies to suggest that we are urging them, any one specifically, to do one thing or another in this field. I think it is best for me to leave it in these terms:

Our allies do recognize the necessity to maintain NATO's conventional forces. They do recognize that they must carry their share or that the United States, and particularly our Congress, representing our people, will have much less incentive to carry our share. I believe they will do their share, but I think we are going to do the best through quiet conversation rather than public declaration.

Yes, sir?

QUESTION: In any talks with the Soviet Union, would you be willing to consider abandoning the ABM program altogether if the Soviets showed a similar willingness or, indeed, if they showed a readiness to place limitations on offensive weapons?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Scali, I am prepared, in the event that we go into arms talks, to consider both offensive and defensive weapons. As you know, the arms talks, that at least preliminarily have been discussed, do not involve limitations or reduction. They involve only freezing where we are.

Your question goes to abandoning. On that particular point, I think it would take two, naturally, to make the agreement. Let's look at the Soviet Union's position with its defensive deployment of ABM's. Previously, that deployment was aimed only toward the United States. Today their radars, from our intelligence, are also directed toward Communist China.

I would imagine that the Soviet Union would be just as reluctant as we would be to leave their country naked against a potential Chinese Communist threat. So the abandoning of the entire system, particularly as long as the Chinese threat is there, I think neither country would look upon with much favor.

QUESTION: Mr. President, do you think these developments of the Soviet Union and the United States are compatible with the aims of the NPT?

THE PRESIDENT: I considered that problem, and I believe that they are compatible with the NPT. We discussed that in the leaders' meeting this morning and I pointed out that as we consider this kind of defensive system, which enables the United States of America to make its deterrent

capability credible, that that will have an enormous effect in reducing the pressure on other countries who might want to acquire nuclear weapons.

That is the key point. If a country doesn't feel that the major country that has a nuclear capability has a credible deterrent, then they would move in that direction.

One other point I wish to make, and make an announcement with regard to the NPT: that I was delighted to see the Senate's confirmation or consent to the treaty, and this announcement -- I hope President Johnson is looking. I haven't talked to him on the phone. I am going to invite President Johnson, if his schedule permits, to attend the ceremony when we will have the ratification of the treaty, because he started it in his Administration and I think he should participate when we ratify it.

Mr. Lisagor?

QUESTION: Mr. President, I wonder if I could turn to the campus disorders and unrest. They are continuing and we haven't had an opportunity to ask you your views of them. But particularly, would you favor the cutting off of Federal loans to the offenders?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Lisagor, I have asked the Attorney General and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to examine this problem, particularly in view of a Congressional report that 122 of the 540 who had been arrested at San Francisco State were direct recipients of Federal funds.

I will have a statement on that that I will be making either Monday or Tuesday, in detail. I would prefer not to go into it now.

Mr. Semple?

QUESTION: To follow up Mr. Bailey's question on Vietnam earlier, is there any evidence that your measured response to the enemy attacks in South Vietnam has produced or yielded any results in Paris or in the attitudes of the North Vietnamese leaders in Hanoi?

THE PRESIDENT: Our measured response has not had the effect of discouraging the progress, and it is very limited progress, toward talks in Paris. That is the negative side in answering your question.

As to whether or not a different response would either discourage those talks or might have the effect of even encouraging them is the decision that we now have to make.

MORE

QUESTION: Mr. President, on Vietnam, in connection with Secretary Laird's visit, we have heard for sometime predictions that American troop levels could be cut as the South Vietnamese capabilities improve, and again last week, while he was in Vietnam, we were getting similar reports from Saigon despite the high level of the fighting that is going on now.

Do you see any prospect for withdrawing American troops in any numbers soon?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Bailey, in view of the current offensive on the part of the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, there is no prospect for a reduction of American forces in the foreseeable future.

When we are able to reduce forces as a result of a combination of circumstances -- the ability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves in areas where we now are defending them; the progress of the talks in Paris; or the level of enemy activity -- when that occurs, I will make an announcement. But at this time there is no foreseeable prospect.

Mr. Theis?

QUESTION: What effect, if any, will your safeguard program have on the shelter program? Can you tell us anything about your long-range plans?

THE PRESIDENT: Congressman Holifield in the meeting this morning strongly urged that the Administration look over the shelter program and he made the point that he thought it had fallen somewhat into disarray due to lack of attention over the past few years.

I have directed that General Lincoln, the head of the Office of Emergency Preparedness -- I had directed him previously to conduct such a survey. We are going to look at the shelter program to see what we can do there in order to minimize American casualties.

QUESTION: Mr. President, if I recall correctly, at the last press conference when you were discussing the meeting with General de Gaulle, and the Middle East situation, you said you were encouraged by what he told you, because he was moving closer to our position.

I wonder if you can tell us what our position is in the Middle East, and if it has changed significantly in the last year?

THE PRESIDENT: We have had bilateral talks not only with the French, but also with the Soviet Union, and with the British, preparatory to the possibility of four-power talks. I would not like to leave the impression that we are completely together at this point.

We are closer together than we were, but we still have a lot of yardage to cover. And until we make further progress in developing a common position, I would prefer not to lay out what our position is.

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I don't think that would be helpful in bringing them to the position that we think is the right position.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 12:30 P.M. EST)

Issue must be seen in the background of national priorities - works of war works of peace

March 1969

(X)

Sad & sorrow - what an opportunity - one in a lifetime - to put aside another step up in the arms race - Time for a book initiative - RISK for peace - Always risks

MEMORANDUM

FOR: H.H.H.
FROM: John G. Stewart (via Susan)
SUBJECT: Reactions to Nixon's ABM decision

No easy decision

Does this decision

(1)

In what ways does President Nixon's decision improve our national security? This is the basic question which must be asked. - or is this another spiral in the arms race

Deployment not development

(2)

I earlier stated that deployment not development was the issue and I stand by this statement. In other words, is our nation any more secure through the President's decision to deploy than it would have been had he decided to proceed with development, postponing for the moment the deployment decision?

(3)

There are several reasons to doubt an increase in national security:

a. reliability of the ABM system -- it cannot be tested in advance; it might leave second strike forces vulnerable at the moment of attack;

(Harder getting sites) American models / Stalin / 19-52 / Dan

b. second strike forces can be protected in other

Spine

(4)

ways which don't involve the psychological effect of ABM deployment

Vastly complicates arms race between U.S. + Soviet Union
no longer just defense against chance; now to be considered as a protection for our deterrent capability against

and which have far greater reliability and are less costly.

See Silard's memo.

c. at this point one can't predict the effect
this will have on the arms control negotiations with the Soviet
Union since our ABM system is of much greater sophistication
than Soviet Moscow's system.

4. The argument about it being solely defensive is misleading since a broader deployment of the ABM system, even around the second strike force, could be interpreted by the Soviets as making a U.S. first strike more likely, especially if these judgments are made in a time of national crisis. In other words, one gains very little, if any, increase in the safeguarding of second strike forces and one necessarily generates uncertainty with the Soviets as to our ultimate purpose in beginning ABM deployment.

Note: ~~There is a clear distinction~~

~~between the two systems.~~

Memo to HHH

From John S.

Re: NET discussion on the ABM

Henry Owen is ready to run through the material this afternoon if you so desire. Susan Davis can reach him at Brookings.

I would stress heavily the point about having to make decisions and judgments about priorities in federal governmental spending. Henry wrote an excellent piece on this issue (see attachment). Indeed, the issue of spending priorities should be one you emphasize in every talk on ABM and in all other speeches where it is even remotely appropriate.

See also the excellent letter to the editor of the Post from Townsend Hoopes, former under secretary of the Air Force. He hits particularly well the point about using the Sentinel to defend against Chinese missiles and how, therefore, the system will ultimately be seen as an anti-Soviet system.

Also attached is another piece by Tom Wicker and the N.Y. Times story about Soviet reaction to ABM issue.

To recapitulate the three points we agreed upon for Issues and Answers:

1. We should not become prematurely wedded to ABM system with the Soviets without first attempting to negotiate/a mutual freeze of strategic offensive and defensive ~~XXXXXX~~ nuclear weapons.

2. The existing strategic balance between the Soviets and the U.S. make it a particularly opportune time to begin such negotiations . . . also our existing weapons systems give us time

2/

to conduct these negotiations without jeopardizing our national security. (Also note: MIRV represents an equally serious threat to strategic balance as ABM system, (as spelled out very clearly in Townsend Heepes's letter) and therefore negotiations must include both strategic offensive and defensive weapons.

3. The MIRV and ABM question is only one part of a larger question for the country: How will we order ~~in~~ our priorities in the expenditure of federal revenues? Will we turn away from works of war to works of peace?

Central Issue - Is Another Contribution to our
Net Security - or just another spiral
in Arms Race -

March 14, 1969

Central issue has to be seen in the background
of National Priorities -
Work of War
" of Peace

MEMORANDUM

FOR: HHH
FROM: Bill Connell (via Marsha)
RE: Points to make on the ABM decision

1. It is a substantial modification of the original proposal --
a system essentially designed to protect the Minuteman silos,
as against a system designed to give protection to city
populations.

2. It clearly is an escalation. The indicated response to
the deployment will be a Soviet increase in its ICBMs targeted
against the protected silos. If our defense is calculated to
stop an attack of 5 missiles, for example, then the indicated
Soviet step-up will be to put 10 missiles on the target. We did
the same thing in the case of the deployment of the early Soviet
ABMs. We went to the multiple warhead development, designed
to saturate the Soviet defenses.

3. Since even the most ambitious ABM system cannot
protect our cities (President Nixon says that at the very least
a massive attack would get through the defenses and cause
30 to 40 million deaths), how can we expect the Minutemen to
be successfully protected?

Risk for Peace?
Safeguard

What an opportunity - to Push aside another step
in the Arms Race
needed bold initiative

4. Our strategic security rests on our ability to convince the potential attacker that we can get off a devastating reply of our own -- and in our case is based on the sea-deployed missiles plus the ability of a number of Minutemen to be launched before the enemy strike actually explodes. Would this ABM system materially increase our second strike capability -- would it increase it to any significant degree?

5. Will this decision impede or delay negotiations on arms control? I think so. Because the Soviet Union will consider it an escalation, and will want to take steps to redress the balance as they see it before entering negotiations.

6. The central issue is: Does this decision affect the strategic balance as between the U.S. and the USSR? I believe it does require a Soviet response which will tend to trigger in turn another U.S. response. The task of statesmen is to intervene in this seemingly endless round of escalations and to seek agreement that will provide a stable situation.

7. The argument that the revised ABM system is in part an effort to protect against a Chinese Communist attack raises the question of whether a system designed to protect the Minuteman silos against Soviet attack will be even marginally effective against a Chinese Communist attack against the American population.

1. Safeguard Program

- (1) against China
- (2) Safeguard Against our deterrent system
- (3) " " " any accidental Attack

Does not Promote Defense facilities
Sites moved away from cities
no way we can adequately defend
our cities -

only way for safety, to to save
lives - protect deterrent system
namely our missile sites.

Phase system - annual Reviews

(1) maintain intelligence & how
as threat

(2) evaluation of TALKONAC.

(3) Anti New System, constantly
examine any changes

No Massive City Defense then to think
the same provisions

No Delay. No just R+D
(First deployment to 1973)

Safeguard against China - next 10 years -
what makes you think it will work.

⊕ Pragmatism of Policy - not Hardware

⊗ US have time with Safety

Issues

Deployment, not Development

offense always ahead of defense

Best defense is commercial -

Sand + AT&T

↳ Does this decrease add to Nat Security

↳ it is an increase
Probability of negotiations

✓ - Priorities

Not to defend our cities.
no way adequately defend our cities without
unacceptable loss of life

March 14, 1969

MEMORANDUM

FOR: HHH

FROM: Norm Holmes

will be annual review

John Silard of the Council for a Livable World makes the following points with regard to President Nixon's ABM press conference:

1. Vastly complicates the arms race between the U. S.

and the Soviet Union. It represents a qualitative shift from the MacNamara argument that the ABM system was purely defensive vis à vis the Chinese. MacNamara warned against considering ABM vis à vis the Soviets. Nixon, however, has made it explicit that it is to be considered as a protection for our deterrent capability against the Soviets.

No longer
Just defense
against
China -
implication
Strait.

2. Our strike capacity is so advanced that the present deployment of an ABM system to protect our deterrent capacity is premature.

3. On a purely cost effective basis it would make more sense to

a) harden existing sites,

b) increase our mobile strike capacity, and

c) increase the number of our offensive weapons.

- Blair P. Seiden

4. The Sentinel system is still not the right system for a
missile defense system. More research is needed.

As concerns the issue of the Chinese, Silard suggests that

1. It is irrational to assume that the Chinese would be willing to commit national suicide by attacking the U.S.

2. ABM expenditure represents, at best, only a short term plus. The Chinese are not expected to have any strike capacity until 1973. Their strike capacity in two years after its deployment would be more sophisticated than our ABM system.

3. We do not know how effective the ABM system would be. There is no way of testing it short of war. The Chinese are equally aware of this. Therefore the system does not even serve our purpose in the strategic 'poker game' with the Chinese.

President
R+D

2 cities

~~How do this increase~~
our NatSec

Does it mean Escutator

Does it impede
talks

Second strike force
can be hardened
dispersed

If China to launch a few missiles
would be decimated.
#

The following are the principal points which might be made against the use of Sentinel to protect our Minuteman sites (sometimes referred to as "hard point" defense):

1. Any defense system we can build can be matched step by step by the Soviets, and will be matched step by step. Therefore, as Secretary McNamara emphasized in San Francisco, there is no virtue in commencing any defense-offense races with the Soviets but only the expense and danger of escalation in the mad momentum of the arms race.

2. While deploying Sentinel for Minuteman defense may be somewhat less exacerbating than for population defense, it will nevertheless bring uncertainties and destabilization in place of the present strategic weapons plateau, and thus will make negotiation of a strategic weapons treaty the more difficult. (It will also make the weapons limits provisions of the treaty itself more difficult to formulate and police, since an ABM system wherever it is located can fairly quickly be converted from hard point defense to population defense).

3. We are many years from the point where technical improvements in targeting and additions in the total strategic forces on either side could possibly imperil the certainty of the United States or the Soviet Union that it has an assured second strike

capability which the other side cannot nullify by a preemptive first strike. Since an ABM system to defend Minuteman sites is only significant to protect our second strike capability, we are a long way from the point in time where it might be necessary or prudent to provide a defense system for our strategic forces. Haste makes waste.

4. If Sentinel is indeed to be employed for Minuteman defense rather than population defense, on a cost-effect basis three other options must be examined which may give less expensive and/or better results for the same purpose:

- (i) more Minuteman sites,
- (ii) more hardening of the existing Minuteman force,
- (iii) more reliance on Polaris strength.

5. Sentinel is not designed for Minuteman protection but for population protection. Since we have plenty of time if we make a shift in purpose, why not return to the research stage so that we could have an ABM system best suited for Minuteman defense?

Nixon Takes Middle Ground in First Difficult Decision

By MAX FRANKEL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 14—As expected, President Nixon dealt with what he called his first "great," meaning difficult, decision by occupying a broad middle ground and leaving himself flexible for the future. He approved deployment of a missile defense system, but held it for the time being to minimum proportions and a modest pace. The debate that will flow from his proposal, like the debate that preceded it, will revolve around two main questions:

First, is the system militarily necessary and therefore a justifiable expense? Mr. Nixon said yes.

Second, will his decision stimulate a further increase in Soviet offensive forces and, therefore, yet another costly round in the arms race? Mr. Nixon said it should not.

The "experts" in these matters have only conflicting opinions to offer the President and all who would judge his proposal. Mr. Nixon, like President Johnson before him, took a middle course but chose to err on the side of acquiring too much hardware rather than too little.

More Modest Program

He selected an even more modest program than his predecessor—at least to begin with—for the technical and diplomatic reasons that he gave and perhaps also for political reasons that he did not give.

What he proposed was about as much as he could reasonably expect Congress to approve in the current climate here. It leaves him poised between those who would expand to a bigger system as soon as possible and those who would use the four years before it goes into operation to kill it altogether.

Yet the objectives that Mr. Nixon proposes to serve are remarkably similar to those outlined 18 months ago by a reluctant Robert S. McNamara for the Johnson Administration's ABM system, with only slight changes of emphasis. The former Defense Secretary, too, foresaw three benefits: The former Defense Secretary, too, foresaw three benefits: To protect the nation's offensive missiles against a Soviet strike to guard against the potential Chinese nuclear threat in the next decade, and to guard against a few missiles that might be launched accidentally.

Move Away From Cities

Mr. Nixon said he had rejected a "thick" missile defense of the cities as both ineffective and provocative. Mr. McNamara not only rejected it but vowed to resist the "mad momentum" toward such expansion that a "thin" system was bound to generate.

The changes introduced by Mr. Nixon were said by him to have further reduced the provocation to the Russians. They will also permit him to move the ABM installations away from major cities, where uneasy residents have stimulated parochial but heated political opposition to the program.

An understanding of this missile debate requires an understanding of at least two concepts of nuclear strategy.

One is "first-strike capability," by which the experts mean the ability to strike a first blow of such magnitude that the victim is unable to retaliate. Neither the Soviet

Union nor the United States is judged to be anywhere near such capability now and neither claims to be seeking it.

Capability is Conceded

And there is "second-strike capability," by which the experts mean the ability of a victim of attack, no matter how devastating, to retaliate with enough force to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage on the aggressor. Both big powers concede this capability to each other and rely upon it to deter each other from attack.

The two concepts are dynamically related because every new generation of offensive weapons implies a threat to the existing second-strike capabilities. They are also related because each side's efforts to improve second-strike capability have time and again propelled the other toward expansion of its nuclear arsenal.

Mr. Nixon was obviously sensitive to this dynamic. In dealing with the question of military necessity, he offered three arguments:

First, the Russians, having greatly augmented their offensive forces in recent years, may yet be tempted to think some day that they can attain a first-strike capability and knock out the American retaliatory missiles in their protected underground hideaways. A missile defense for those sites should deter the Russians from that ambition.

McNamara Contradicted

Second, the Russians are experimenting with their own missile defense system, gaining "operational" experience that the United States must also have to judge their capacities and intentions.

Third, a modest defense, even if it proves useless in a massive attack, promises both big powers some protection against the Chinese and against accident. The system therefore might one day be incorporated into an arms agreement between them and certainly should not prevent talks about an agreement.

In this presentation, Mr. Nixon, in effect, contradicted one of Mr. McNamara's arguments, namely, that American bomber and submarine forces, together with the underground missiles, were sufficient retaliatory strength against any foreseeable Soviet offensive force.

Mr. Nixon made no mention of the fact that both Soviet and American offensive missiles are now being augmented and improved through the use of multiple warheads. Such warheads could enable the offense to overwhelm any existing defense.

And he did not deal with a recent argument of some of his

critics, that the ABM system would increase rather than reduce the risk of accident by yielding fire control to machines and middle-echelon officers.

In moving on to argue that he was reducing the provocation to Soviet military planners, Mr. Nixon made two basic points:

First, by giving up even the pretense of defending American cities against major attack, the

United States emphasizes its interest in a second-strike rather than first-strike capacity. The cities remain hostage to any Soviet fear that Washington would trigger a nuclear exchange. The Johnson program carried a greater implication of gradual expansion to protect the cities.

Second, the pace of ABM deployment will be slower than the Russians' own, subject to constant review and change,

and subject to total freeze if arms talks bear fruit.


Mr. Nixon did not, however, agree at this time to move into talks to limit the arms race, as some thought he would. Among other reasons, he may wish to be farther along in both offensive and defense weapons development. Also, he has said he will wait for more signs of progress in political talks, such as those on the Middle East.

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
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
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Transcript of the President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Affairs

Following is a transcript of President Nixon's news conference in Washington yesterday, as recorded by The New York Times:

OPENING STATEMENT

Ladies and gentlemen, today I am announcing the decision which I believe is vital for the security and defense of the United States and also in the interests of peace throughout the world.

Last year a program, the Sentinel antiballistic missile program, was adopted and that program, as all listeners on television and radio and readers of newspapers know, has been the subject of very strong debate and controversy over the past few months. After a long study of all of the options available I have concluded that the Sentinel program previously adopted should be substantially modified.

The new program that I have recommended this morning to the leaders and that I announce today is one that perhaps best can be described as a safeguard program. It is a safeguard against any attack by the Chinese Communists that we can foresee over the next 10 years.

It is a safeguard of our deterrent system, which is increasingly vulnerable due to the advances that have been made by the Soviet Union since the year 1967, when the Sentinel program was first laid out.

It is a safeguard, also, against any irrational or accidental attack that might occur, of less than massive magnitude, which might be launched from the Soviet Union.

The program also does not do some things, which should be clearly understood. It does not provide defense for our cities and, for that reason, the sites have been moved away from our major cities.

'No Way' to Defend Cities

I have made the decision with regard to this particular point because I found that there is no way, even if we were to expand the limited Sentinel system which was planned for some of our cities, to a so-called heavy or thick system, there is no way that we can adequately defend our cities without an unacceptable loss of life.

The only way that I have concluded that we can save lives—which is the primary purpose of our defense system—is to prevent war. And that is why the emphasis of this system is on protecting our deterrent, which is the best preventive for war.

The system differs from the previous Sentinel system in another major respect. The Sentinel system called for a fixed deployment schedule. I believe that because of a number of reasons that we should have a phase system. That is why, on an annual basis, the new safeguard system will be reviewed. And the review may bring about the changes in the system based on our evaluation of three major points.

First, what our intelligence shows us with regard to the magnitude of the threat, whether from the Soviet Union or from the Chinese.

And, second, in terms of what our evaluation is of any talks that we are



Associated Press

CHOOSES ONE: President Nixon indicating which of a number of reporters is to put next question at White House

ticularly such as came out of the DMZ today?

A. Mr. Smith you may recall that on March 4 when I received a similar question at an earlier stage of the attacks, I issued what was interpreted widely as a warning. It will be my policy as President to issue a warning only once, and I will not repeat it now.

Anything that in the future is done will be done. There will be no additional warning. As far as the Paris talks are concerned, I have noted the speculation in the press with regard to whether we will have or should have or are, for example, approving private talks going forward. I will not discuss that subject.

I trust there will be private talks. I think that's where this war will be settled, in private, rather than in public, and this is in the best interests of both sides. But public discussion of what I think is significant progress which is being made along the lines of private talks I will not indulge in.

2. State of Union Talk

Q. Will you make your own State of the Union address and what will your legislative program encompass?

A. I do not plan a State of the Union Address in the traditional manner. I will within approximately a month, how-

Vietnam, I have—actually have examined not only the charges but also examined the record. And I discussed it at great length yesterday with Secretary Laird.

What has happened is this. For the past six months the forces on the other side had been planning for an offensive. And, for the past six months, they not only had planned for an offensive but they have been able, as a result of that planning, to have mounted a rather substantial offensive.

Under those circumstances we had no other choice but to try to blunt that offensive. Had General Abrams not responded in this way, we would have suffered far more casualties than we have suffered—and we have suffered more than, of course, any of us would have liked to have seen.

The answer is that any escalation of the war in Vietnam has been the responsibility of the enemy. If the enemy de-escalates its attacks, ours will go down. We are not trying to step it up, we are trying to do everything that we can in the conduct of our war in Vietnam, to see that we can go forward toward peace in Paris.

That is why my response has been measured, deliberate and—some think—too cautious. But it will continue to be measured, deliberate and—some think—too cautious. But it will continue to be

of—is what we're doing in Vietnam now in a military way that response of which you were speaking?

A. This is a very close decision on our part, one that I not only discussed with Secretary Laird yesterday but that we will discuss more fully in the Security Council tomorrow. I took no comfort out of the stories that I saw in the papers this morning to the effect that our casualties for this, the immediate past week, went from 400 down to 300. That's still much too high.

What our response should be must be measured in terms of the effect on the negotiations in Paris. I will only respond as I did earlier to Mr. Smith's question. We have issued a warning. I will not warn again. And if we conclude that the level of casualties is higher than we should tolerate, action will take place.

8. Reaction in Moscow

Q. Do you have reason to believe that the Russians will interpret your ABM decision today as not being an escalatory move in the arms race?

A. As a matter of fact, Mr. Kaplow, I have reason to believe, based on the past record, that they would interpret it just the other way around.

First, when they deployed their own

level, and talks. Talks with the Soviet Union are going on at a number of levels at this time. On a number of subjects.

However, those talks have not yet reached the point where I have concluded—or where I believe they have concluded—that a discussion at the summit level would be useful.

Whenever those talks—preliminary talks—do reach that point, I anticipate that a summit meeting would take place. I do not think one will take place in the near future, but I think encouraging progress is being made toward the time when a summit talk may take place.

10. Personnel Problems

Q. Sir, there have been several reports from your staff members that Kennedy and Johnson holdover people who made policy have sewn themselves into civil service status and thus may mean some problem for you people in personnel. I wonder if this means that you are going to transfer a lot of these people or abolish the jobs?

A. Well I've heard a lot from some of my Republican friends on Capitol Hill on this point as well as from, of course, Republican leaders in the nation. We—it seems this is a rather common practice when one Administration goes out and the other comes in.

We will do what we think will best serve the interest of effective government and if the individual who's been frozen in can do the job we're going to keep him. However, we're moving some out but we won't do it through subterfuge. We'll try to do it quite directly.

11. Assistance From Allies

Q. Mr. President, on your recent European trip did you find any willingness on the part of our allies to increase their military and financial contributions to the alliance?

A. Well, that matter was discussed with all of our allies. And, particularly, will be a subject for discussion when we have the 20th anniversary meeting of NATO here in April. I do not . . . I think it might be potentially embarrassing to allies to suggest that we're urging them—anyone specifically—to do one thing or another in this field.

I think it's best for me to leave it in these terms. Our allies do recognize the necessity to maintain NATO's conventional forces. They do recognize that they must carry their share or that the United States—and particularly our Congress, representing our people—will be—have much less incentive to carry our share. I believe they will do their share. But I think we're going to do it best through quiet conversation rather than public declaration.

12. ABM as Bargaining Issue

Q. Mr. President, in any talks with the Soviet Union, would you be willing to consider abandoning the ABM program altogether is the Soviets showed a similar willingness, or, indeed, if they showed a readiness to place limitations on offensive weapons?

A. Well, Mr. Scali, I am prepared in the event that we go into arms talks to consider both offensive and defensive weapons. As you know, the arms talks that have at least preliminarily been discussed do not involve limitation or reduction; they involve only freezing

A Good Memory Shown by Nixon

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 14—President Nixon demonstrated once again today that he is a very quick student.

Mr. Nixon delivered the longest opening statement of his four news conferences at the White House, entirely without notes or a lectern and on a most complicated subject—the Sentinel antimissile program.

Before the conference began, a printed, 1,500-word "Statement of the President" about his decision was distributed to reporters. Then Mr. Nixon took the floor to tell the same story extemporaneously in about 900 words in about nine minutes.

In a comparison of the printed statement with the transcript of the President's remarks, the two emerge as strikingly similar in structure, sequence and substance.

Mr. Nixon's spoken statement by no means seemed memorized, but the President appeared to have absorbed his subject thoroughly in previous briefings and to have kept an outline—almost a "crib sheet"—firmly in mind.

doesn't feel that the major country that has a nuclear capability has a credible deterrent then they would move in that direction.

One other point: I wish to make an announcement with regard to N.P.T.—that I was delighted to see the Senate's confirmation or consent to the treaty and this announcement—I hope President Johnson is looking.

I haven't talked to him on the phone. I'm going to invite President Johnson, if his schedule permits, to attend the ceremony when we will have the ratification of the treaty because he started it in his Administration and I think he should participate when we ratify it.

14. Aid to College Protesters

Q. Mr. President. I wonder if I can turn you to the campus disorders and unrest. They're continuing and we haven't had an opportunity to ask you your views of them. But particularly would you favor the cutting off of Federal loans to the offenders?

A. Mr. Lisagor, I've asked the Attorney General and the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to examine this problem particularly in view of a Congressional report that 122 of 540 that had been arrested at San Francisco State were direct recipients of Federal funds. I will have a statement on that that I will be making either Monday or Tuesday in detail. I prefer not to go into it now.

15. Paris Peace Talks

Q. To follow up Mr. Day's question on Vietnam earlier, is there any evidence that your measured response to the enemy attacks in South Vietnam has produced or yielded any results in Paris or in the attitudes of the North Vietnamese leaders in Hanoi?

A. Our measured response has not had the effect of discouraging the progress—and it is very limited progress—toward talks in Paris. That is the nega-

First, what our intelligence shows us with regard to the magnitude of the threat, whether from the Soviet Union or from the Chinese.

And, second, in terms of what our evaluation is of any talks that we are having by that time or may be having with regard to arms control.

And, finally, because we believe that since this is a new system, we should constantly examine what progress has been made in the development of the technique to see if changes in the system should be made.

I should admit at this point that this decision has not been an easy one. None of the grave decisions made by a President are easy. But it is one that I have made after considering all of the options and I would indicate before going to your questions two major options that I have overruled.

One is moving to a massive city defense. I've already indicated why I do not believe that is, first, feasible, and there is another reason. Moving to a massive city defense system, even starting with a thin system and then going to a heavy system, tends to be more provocative in terms of making credible a first strike capability against the Soviet Union. I want no provocation which might deter arms talks.

'Doing Nothing' Option

The other alternative to the other extreme was to do nothing or to delay for six months or 12 months, which would be the equivalent, really, of doing nothing, or for example, going the road only of research and development.

I have examined those options. I have ruled them out because I have concluded that the first deployment of this system which will not occur until 1973, that that first deployment is essential by that date if we are to meet the threat that our present intelligence indicates will exist by 1973.

In other words, we must begin now. If we delay a year, for example, it means that that first deployment will be delayed until 1975. That might be too late.

It is the responsibility of the President of the United States above all other responsibilities to think first of the security of the United States. I believe that this system is the best step that we can take to provide for that security.

There are, of course, other possibilities that have been strongly urged by some of the leaders this morning. For example, that we could increase our offensive capabilities, our submarine force, or even our Minuteman force, or our bomber force.

That I would consider to be, however, the wrong road because it would be provocative to the Soviet Union and might escalate an arms race. This system is truly a safeguard system, a defensive system only. Its safeguards are deterrent and under those circumstances, can in no way, in my opinion, delay the progress which I hope will continue to be made toward arms talks which will limit arms not only this kind of system, but particularly offensive systems.

We'll now go to your questions.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

1. Enemy Attacks in Vietnam

Q. Mr. President, the war in Vietnam has been intensifying recently and if there has been any notable progress in Paris it has not been detectable publicly. Is your patience growing a little thin with these continued attacks, par-

Q. Will you make your own State of the Union address and what will your legislative program encompass?

A. I do not plan a State of the Union Address in the traditional manner. I will within approximately a month, however, state a general domestic program. By that time the program will be at the point that I think it should be completely summarized and set forth not only for the nation as to what we have done but particularly to the Congress as to what we expect for the balance. I would not like to anticipate now what will be in that program.

3. Reaction to ABM Plan

Q. There's been a great deal of criticism in Congress against the deployment of any type of antiballistic missile defense system. What kind of reception do you think that your proposal this morning will receive there?

A. It will be a very spirited debate and it will be a very close vote. Debates in the field of national defense are often spirited and the votes are often close. Many of my friends in Congress who were there before I was there remarked that the vote on extending the draft in 1941 won by only one vote. This might be that close.

I think, however, that after the members of the House and the Senate consider this program, which is a minimum program, but which—and which—particularly provides options for change in other directions, if we find the threat has changed or that the art has changed—our evaluation of the technique has changed—I think that we have a good chance of getting approval. We will, of course, express our views and we hope that we will get support in the country.

4. Effectiveness of ABM Plan

Q. Mr. President, I understand that your first construction or deployment of antimissile systems would be around two Minuteman retaliatory operations. Do you think that deploying around these two provides enough deterrent that would be effective?

A. Let me explain the difference between deploying around two Minuteman bases and deploying around, say, 10 cities. Where you are looking toward a city defense, it needs to be a perfect or near-perfect system to be credible, because, if, as I examine the possibility of even a thick defense of cities, I found that even the most optimistic projections considering the highest development of the art, would mean that we would still lose 30 to 40 million lives.

That would be less than half of what we would otherwise lose, but we would still lose 30 to 40. Now, when you are talking about protecting your deterrent, it need not be perfect.

It is necessary only to protect enough of the deterrent that the retaliatory second strike will be of such magnitude that the enemy would think twice before launching a first strike, and I, it has been my conclusion that by protecting two Minuteman sites we will preserve that deterrent as a credible deterrent and that that will be decisive and could be decisive in so far as the enemy considering the possibility of a first strike.

5. The Face of the War

Q. Mr. President, there have been charges from Capitol Hill that you have stepped up the war in Vietnam. Have you?

A. I have not stepped up the war in

we are trying to do everything that we can in the conduct of our war in Vietnam, to see that we can go forward toward peace in Paris.

That is why my response has been measured, deliberate and—some think—too cautious. But it will continue to be that way because I am thinking of those peace talks every time I think of our military option in Vietnam.

6. Prospects on Taxes

Q. Mr. President, your safeguard ABM system, I understand, would cost about \$1-billion less in the coming fiscal year than the plan which President Johnson sent up. Will this give you the opportunity to reduce the surcharge, or will the continued high level of taxation be needed for the economy.

A. That question will be answered when we see the entire budget. Secretary Laird will testify on the defense budget on Wednesday, and incidentally, my understanding at this time and I've seen the preliminary figures is that the defense budget for, that Secretary Laird will present, will be approximately \$2.5-billion less than that submitted by the previous Administration.

Now whether, after considering the defense budget and all the other budgets that have been submitted, we then can move in the direction of either reducing the surcharge or move in the direction of some of our very difficult problems, with regard to our cities, the problem of hunger and others, these are the options that I will have to consider at a later time.

7. Response to Foe's Attacks

Q. Last week you said that, on the matter of Vietnam, you would not tolerate heavier casualties in the continuation of the violation of the understanding without making an appropriate response

Sentinel Decision Likely to Hurt Nixon in Senate

Continued From Page 1, Col. 7

was said to have been careful not to present the matter in terms of a vote of confidence in his Administration.

Senator J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said that the President "went out of his way to be conciliatory."

Just before the two-hour meeting ended, according to Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen of Illinois, the Republican leader, the President said:

"I want to assure you that I know there are differences of opinion. But these in no way will interrupt our friendly relations. We are all working for the same boss—the national security of the United States. Feel free always to come and talk with me, to consult with me."

To some Congressional leaders, Mr. Nixon gave the impression that he was not overly enthusiastic about his decision and had accepted a compromise rather than undercut Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird.

To the Sentinel opponents, the President offered the assurance that he was "going down the road" toward stra-

President's 'Safeguard' Is Not an Official Name

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 14—President Nixon at his news conference today referred to the Sentinel missile system as the "Safeguard system," but Pentagon officials said the name had not officially been changed.

After Mr. Nixon used the term, officials changed the name from Sentinel to Safeguard on a chart used after the news conference by the Deputy Defense Secretary, Davvid M. Packard.

The name Safeguard, according to Daniel Z. Henkin, acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, was coined by Mr. Nixon himself.

tegic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union.

Conciliatory Approach

This conciliatory approach, combined with the suggestion that the Senate "had a responsibility to exercise its own judgment in this matter,"

the Russians will interpret your ABM decision today as not being an escalating move in the arms race?

A. As a matter of fact, Mr. Kaplow, I have reason to believe, based on the past record, that they would interpret it just the other way around.

First, when they deployed their own ABM system, and as you know, they have 67 missiles—ABM sites—deployed around Moscow, they rejected the idea that it escalated the arms race on the ground that it was defensive solely in character.

And second, when the United States last year went forward on the Sentinel system four days later the Soviet Union initiated the opportunity to have arms limitation talks.

I think the Soviet Union recognizes very clearly the difference between a defensive posture and an offensive posture. I would also point this out—an interesting thing about Soviet military and diplomatic history: They have always thought in defensive terms and if you read their—not only their political leaders but their military leaders—the emphasis is on defense.

I think that since this system now—as a result of moving the city defense out of it and the possibility of that city defense growing into a thick defense—I think this makes it so clearly defensive in character that the Soviet Union cannot interpret this as escalating the arms race.

9. Summit Meeting Plans

Q. Mr. President, last week at your press conference you mentioned negotiations with the Russians at the highest level being in the wings. Could you tell us if since then we've moved any closer to such a summit meeting?

A. I should distinguish between negotiations at what you'd call the highest level, and what I said was the highest

helped explain the reluctance of Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana, the Democratic leader, to take on the new Administration.

In a Senate speech a week ago, Senator Mansfield said that a decision favoring the Sentinel would set the pattern of national policy for the next decade and determine whether the nation was going to place old militaristic policies over the problems of "internal security."

But today in an interview in his office, he said that it would not be clear whether the pattern had been set until the Senate voted.

The Administration will probably have no difficulty in winning House approval of the modified Sentinel system. Speaker John W. McCormack of Massachusetts called the President's proposal "a necessary, precautionary measure for the defense of our country in case of a future attack."

The fight, however, was far from over in the Senate.

One Democrat said: "We sought to give our advice and he rejected it. Now he has to get our consent."

President Nixon acknowledged at his news conference that he might have trouble get-

on offensive weapons?

A. Well, Mr. Scali, I am prepared in the event that we go into arms talks to consider both offensive and defensive weapons. As you know, the arms talks that have at least preliminarily been discussed do not involve limitation or reduction; they involve only freezing where we are.

Now your subject, your question goes to abandoning. And on that particular point I think it would take two, naturally, to make the agreement. Let's look at the Soviet Union's position with its defensive deployment of ABM's.

Previously, that deployment was aimed only toward the United States. Today their radars, from our intelligence, are also directed toward Communist China. I would imagine that the Soviet Union would be just as reluctant as we would be to leave their country naked against a potential Chinese Communist threat.

So the abandoning of the entire system, particularly as long as the Chinese threat is there, I think neither country would look upon with much favor.

13. Nonproliferation Treaty

Q. Mr. President, would you think that the deployment of the ABM by both the Soviet Union and the United States are compatible with the N.P.T., the nonproliferation treaty?

A. I considered that problem and I believe that they are compatible with the N.P.T. We discussed that in the leaders' meeting this morning and I pointed out that as we consider this—this kind of defensive system which enables the United States of America to make its deterrent capability credible, that that will have an enormous effect in reducing the pressure on other countries who might want to acquire nuclear weapons.

That's the key point. If a country

ting Senate consent and said he expected "a very close vote." [Question 3, Page 16.]

"I think that we have a good chance of getting approval," he said.

The Sentinel opposition, which appeared to have mustered a majority in the Senate, was thrown on the defensive. By moving Sentinel sites away from cities and giving the system an anti-Soviet justification, the Administration probably picked up wavering votes, such as that of Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, the assistant Republican leader. Senator Mansfield told reporters that "as of right now there is not a majority" against a modified Sentinel system. But he emphasized "right now."

Draft Resister Gets 4 Years

BALTIMORE, March 14 (AP)—Harry L. Lack 30, a leader in draft-resistance movements, was sentenced to four years in Federal prison yesterday for failing to report for Army induction in September, 1967. Chief Judge Reszel C. Thomsen refused to grant bail pending appeal after learning of the 26-year-old Lack's activities in counseling draft resisters about leaving the country for Canada.

enemy attacks in South Vietnam has produced or yielded any results in Paris or in the attitudes of the North Vietnamese leaders in Hanoi?

A. Our measured response has not had the effect of discouraging the progress—and it is very limited progress—toward talks in Paris. That is the negative side in answering your question.

As to whether or not a different response would either discourage those talks or might have the effect of even encouraging them is the decision that we now have to make.

16. U.S. Troop Reduction

Q. Again on Vietnam—in connection with Secretary Laird's visit, we've heard for some time predictions that American troop levels could be cut as the South Vietnamese capabilities improved. And, again last week while he was in Vietnam, we were given similar reports from Saigon, despite the high level of the fighting that's going on now. Do you see any prospect for withdrawing American troops in any numbers soon?

A. Mr. Bailey, in view of the current offensive on the part of the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong, there is no prospect for a reduction of American forces in the foreseeable future.

When we are able to reduce forces as the result of a combination of circumstances—the ability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves in areas where we now are defending them, the progress of the talks in Paris, or the level of enemy activity—when that occurs I will make an announcement. But at this time there is no foreseeable prospect in that field.

17. Shelter Program

Q. Mr. President, what effect, if any, will your safeguard program have on the shelter program. Can you tell us anything about your long-range plans in this direction?

A. Congressman Holifield, in the meeting this morning, strongly urged that the Administration look over the shelter program and he made the point that he thought it had fallen somewhat into disarray, due to lack of attention over the past few years.

I have directed that General Lincoln, the head of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, I directed him previously to conduct such a survey—we're going to look at the shelter program to see what we can do there in order to minimize American casualties.

18. Middle East Stand

Q. Mr. President, if I recall correctly at the last press conference when you were discussing the meeting with General de Gaulle and the Middle East situation, you said you were encouraged by what he told you because he was moving closer to our position. I wonder if you can tell us what our position is in the Middle East and if it has changed significantly in the last year.

A. We have had bilateral talks, not only with the French but also with the Soviet Union, and with the British, preparatory to the possibility of four-power talks. I would not like to leave the impression that we are completely together at this point.

We are closer together than we were but we still have a lot of yardage to cover. And until we make further progress in developing a common position, I would prefer not to lay out what our position is. I don't think that would be helpful in bringing them to the position that we think is the right position.

Thank you Mr. President.

Text of President Nixon's Announcement on Revised Proposals for Sentinel Antiballistic Missile Program

WASHINGTON, March 14 [AP]—Following is the text of President Nixon's announcement concerning the antiballistic missile, issued in advance of his news conference:

Immediately after assuming office, I requested the Secretary of Defense to review the program initiated by the last Administration to deploy the Sentinel ballistic missile defense system.

The Department of Defense presented a full statement of the alternatives at the last two meetings of the National Security Council.

These alternatives were reviewed there in the light of the security requirements of the United States, and of their probable impact on East-West relations, with particular reference to the prospects for strategic arms negotiations.

After carefully considering the alternatives, I have reached the following conclusions:

1. The concept on which the Sentinel program of the previous Administration was based should be substantially modified.
2. The safety of our country requires that we should proceed now with the development and construction of the new system in a carefully phased program.
3. This program will be reviewed annually from the point of view of (a) technical developments, (b) the threat, (c) the diplomatic context including any talks on arms limitation. The modified system has

been designed so that its defensive intent is unmistakable. It will be implemented not according to some fixed, theoretical schedule, but in a manner clearly related to our periodic analysis of the threat.

The first deployment covers two missile sites; the first of these will not be completed before 1973. Any further delay would set this date back by at least two additional years.

The program for fiscal year 1970 is the minimum necessary to maintain the security of our nation.

This measured deployment is designed to fulfill three objectives:

1. Protection of our land-based retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviet Union.
2. Defense of the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which Communist China is likely to be able to mount within the decade.
3. Protection against the possibility of accidental attacks from any source.

Three Other Options

In the review leading up to this decision, we considered three possible options in addition to this program:

☐ A deployment which would attempt to defend U.S. cities against an attempt by the Soviet Union.

☐ A continuation of the Sentinel program approved by the previous Administration.

☐ An indefinite postponement of deployment while continuing research and development.

I rejected these options for the following reasons:

2 Although every instinct motivates me to provide the American people with complete protection against a major nuclear attack, it is not new within our power to do so.

The heaviest defense system we considered, one designed to protect our major cities, still could not prevent a catastrophic level of U. S. fatalities from a deliberate all-out Soviet attack. And it might look to an opponent like the prelude to an offensive strategy threatening the Soviet deterrent.

The Sentinell system approved by the previous Administration provided more capabilities for the defense of cities than the program I am recommending, but it did not provide protection against some threats to our retaliatory forces which have developed subsequently.

Also, the Sentinel system had the disadvantage that it could be misinterpreted as the first step toward the construction of a heavy system.

Giving up all construction of missile defense poses too many risks. Research and development does not supply the answer to many technical issues that only operational experience can provide.

The Soviet Union has engaged in a build-up of its strategic forces larger than was envisaged in 1967 when the decision to deeply Sentinel was made. The following is illustrative of recent Soviet activity:

1. The Soviets have already

deployed an ABM system which protects to some degree a wide area centered around Moscow. We will not have a comparable capability for over four years.

We believe the Soviet Union is continuing their ABM development, directed either toward improving this initial system, or more likely, making substantially better second-generation ABM components.

2. The Soviet Union is continuing the deployment of very large missiles with warheads capable of destroying reinforced Minuteman forces.
3. The Soviet Union has also been substantially increasing the size of their submarine-launched ballistic missile force.
4. The Soviets appear to be developing a semi-orbital nuclear weapon system.

In addition to these developments, the Chinese threat against our population, as well as the danger of an accidental attack, cannot be ignored.

By approving this system, it is possible to reduce U. S. fatalities to a minimal level in the event of a Chinese nuclear attack in the 1970's, or in an accidental attack from any source. No President with the responsibility for the lives and security for the American people could fail to provide this protection.

The gravest responsibility which I bear as President of the United States is for the security of the nation. Our nuclear forces defend not

only ourselves but our allies as well.

The imperative that our nuclear deterrent remain secure beyond any possible doubt requires that the U.S. must take steps now to insure that our strategic retaliatory forces will not become vulnerable to a Soviet attack.

Modern technology provides several choices in seeking to insure the survival of our retaliatory forces.

First, we could increase the number of sea and land-based missiles and bombers. I have ruled out this course because it provides only marginal improvement of our deterrent, while it could be misinterpreted by the Soviets as an attempt to threaten their deterrent. It would therefore stimulate an arms race.

A second option is to harden further our ballistic missile forces by putting them in more strongly reinforced underground silos. But our studies show that hardening by itself is not adequate protection against foreseeable advances in the accuracy of Soviet offensive forces.

The third option was to begin a measured construction on an active defense of our retaliatory forces.

I have chosen the third option.

The system will use components previously developed for the Sentinel system. However, the deployment will be changed to reflect the new concept.

We will provide for local defense of selected Minuteman missile sites and an area

defense designed to protect our bomber bases and our command and control authorities.

In addition, this new system will provide a defense of the continental United States against an accidental attack and will provide substantial protection against the kind of attack which the Chinese Communists may be capable of launching throughout the 1970's.

This deployment will not require us to place missile and radar sites close to our major cities.

The present estimate is that the total cost of installing this system will be \$6-\$7-billion.

However, because of the deliberate pace of the deployment, budgetary requests for the coming year can be substantially less—by about one half—than those asked for by the previous Administration for the Sentinel system.

In making this decision, I have been mindful of my pledge to make every effort to move from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation.

Actions Based on Threat

The program I am recommending is based on a careful assessment of the developing Soviet and Chinese threats. I have directed the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board—a non-partisan group of distinguished private citizens—to make a yearly assessment of the threat which will supplement our regular intelligence assessment.

Each phase of the deployment will be reviewed to insure that we are doing as much as necessary but no more than that required by the threat existing at that time.

Moreover, we will take maximum advantage of the information gathered from the initial deployment in designing the later phases of the program.

Since our deployment is to be closely related to the threat, it is subject to modification as the threat changes, either through negotiations or through unilateral actions by the Soviet Union or Communist China.

The program is not provocative. The Soviet retaliatory capability is not affected by our decision. The capability for surprise attack against our strategic forces is reduced.

In other words, our program provides an incentive for a responsible Soviet weapons policy and for the avoidance of spiraling U.S. and Soviet strategic arms budgets.

I have taken cognizance of the view that beginning construction of a U.S. ballistic missile defense would complicate an agreement on strategic arms with the Soviet Union.

I do not believe that the evidence of the recent past bears out this contention. The Soviet interest in strategic talks was not deterred by the decision of the previous Administration to deploy the

Sentinel ABM system — in fact, it was formally announced shortly afterwards.

I believe that the modifications we have made in the previous program will give the Soviet Union even less reason to view our defense effort as an obstacle to talks.

Moreover, I wish to emphasize that in any arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union, the United States will be fully prepared to discuss limitation on defensive as well as offensive weapons systems.

The question of ABM involves a complex combination of many factors:

☐ Numerous, highly technical, often conflicting judgments.

☐ The costs.

☐ The relationship to prospects for reaching an agreement on limiting nuclear arms.

☐ The moral implications the deployment of a ballistic missile defense system has for many Americans.

☐ The impact of the decision on the security of the United States in this perilous age of nuclear arms.

I have weighed all these factors. I am deeply sympathetic to the concerns of private citizens and members of Congress that we do only that which is necessary for national security.

This is why I am recommending a minimum program essential for our security. It is my duty as President to make certain that we do no less.

Weather: Partly cloudy and seasonable today, tonight and tomorrow. Temp. range: today 45-43; Friday 45-35. Full U.S. report on Page 58.

NEW YORK, SATURDAY, MARCH 15, 1969—

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10 CENTS

NIXON FOR LIMITED MISSILE PLAN TO PROTECT U.S. NUCLEAR BASES; FACES MAJOR TEST IN CONGRESS

BUDGET TO BE CUT

Billion Reduction Arms Includes Antinuclear Saving

WIN L. DALE Jr.

Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, March 14—President Nixon made the surprise announcement today that his administration's defense budget would be cut by about \$2.5-billion from the one proposed by the House of Representatives.

It was known later that the President announced the news at a news conference, the appropriate time for the announcement, not the new fiscal year beginning July 1. Because of the budget cut involved, the administration will save \$2.5-billion.

The budget cut was announced at a news conference.



The New York Times (by Mike Lien)

DEFENSE STRESSED

President Hopes Move Will Not Result in Bigger Arms Race

News conference transcript is printed on Page 16.

By ROBERT B. SEMPLE Jr.
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 14—In the first major decision of his Administration, President Nixon asked Congress today to approve a modified Sentinel antiballistic missile system.

Facing a crowded and expectant news conference in the East Room of the White House and a nationwide television audience, the President announced that after "long study of all of the options" he had decided to proceed with a redesigned missile defense system. [Opening statement, page 16.]

Mr. Nixon said he hoped the revised system would protect the country's nuclear deterrent without simultaneously escalating the arms race or impeding arms control talks with the Soviet Union.

The announcement ended several weeks of rising suspense in the capital—weeks of intense private deliberations within the high councils of the Administration and fierce public debate, dominated by opponents of the system, on Capitol Hill.

'A Safeguard System'

The President's decision is almost certain to provoke further controversy, particularly among those who believe that any deployment of an antimissile system will provoke a new round in the arms race.

But Mr. Nixon gave a preview this morning of the argument his representatives will be using when they journey to Capitol Hill next week to begin pressing the fight for funds for the system.

"The system is truly a safeguard system, a defensive system only," he declared. "It safeguards our deterrent and under those circumstances can in no way, in my opinion, delay the progress which I hope will continue to be made toward arms talks. . . ."

The defense system described today was advertised by Mr. Nixon and his principal aides as different in scope, cost, and purpose from the Sentinel system recommended by President Johnson and approved by Congress last year.

That system, for which Mr. Johnson requested \$1.7-billion in new appropriations for the 1970 fiscal year, would have consisted of 15 to 20 antimissile sites near large population sites all over the country.

Missile Base Protection

The defense system recommended by Mr. Nixon would



New York Times

March 15, 1969

The President's plan calls for antiballistic missiles first at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, and Grand Forks Air Force Base, N. D., with the 10 other sites to be set up later. Perimeter radar, at six cities, would alert radar linked to Spartan and Sprint missiles.

ROOM
U.S.

Nixon Chances of Getting Senate Approval in Doubt

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 14—President Nixon's decision to proceed with a modified antimissile defense system appeared today to have strained but not broken his amicable relations with the Democratic-controlled Congress.

The President obviously made inroads in the sizable Senate opposition to the Sentinel missile program, but Senate Democratic leaders were far from certain that he could win Senate approval of the modified system.

Before the President's decision, the opposition estimated that it could muster 54 votes in the Senate. The group has lost some votes, at least for the present, but as the President acknowledged at a news conference, the Senate vote is likely to be "very close." [Question 3, Page 16.]

The first reaction to the President's decision among the bipartisan Sentinel critics was more one of disappointment than of anger.

Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, Democrat of Minnesota, said, "This is the President's first serious mistake."

Senator George S. McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota, described it as "the first major blunder of his Administration."

Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, said that the President had "missed a number of important opportunities to advance our common cause of peace in the world and our goal of improving the quality of life of all Americans."

In general, however, the reaction was more conciliatory than contentious. Democrats appeared reluctant to make the issue a partisan one and Republicans seemed loath to break with their new Administration.

Whether the President had alienated the bipartisan coalition upon which he must depend for support was uncertain. Both sides seemed determined not to let the issue rupture relations between the White House and Congress, particularly the Senate.

At a meeting with Congressional leaders before announcing his decision, the President

Continued on Page 16, Column 3

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AHAN Times

March 14—

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Missile Base Protection

The defense system recommended by Mr. Nixon would consist, initially, of two sites designed to protect two Minuteman missile wings at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana and Grand Forks Air Force base in North Dakota.

The President will ask Congress for an appropriation of \$800-million to \$900-million to continue research into the antimissile program generally, acquire land for other sites, and begin work on the first two sites. They would not become operational until 1973.

Eventually, Mr. Nixon said, the system would encompass 12 sites—all near, and designed to

Continued on Page 17, Column 1

Eban, in Capital, Voices Concern Over Nixon's Mideast Approach

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 14— Foreign Minister Abba Eban of Israel emphasized today the "complexity and peril" of big-power guarantees for a Middle East settlement.

Mr. Eban's comments on President Nixon's approach, in speech to the National Press Club, are said to have echoed private remarks to President Nixon and other top members of the Administration. Mr. Eban also sought in his speech to encourage a profusion of American initiatives in Middle Eastern diplomacy.

Mr. Eban's remarks were the most clear-cut to date of Israel's position at the general appeal of the Nixon Administration. He has favored participation by the United States, Britain and France in the early stages of Middle East negotia-

Rogers and evidently Mr. Nixon himself have sought to reassure Mr. Eban that the United States would not attempt to impose any settlement unfavorable to Israel.

The Foreign Minister met for 45 minutes with President Nixon, but the White House refused to disclose details of their discussion.

At his news conference today, Mr. Nixon sought to pull back from his earlier remarks on March 4 suggesting that the American position and the French position on the Middle East had moved close together.

"I would not like to leave the impression that we are completely together at this point," Mr. Nixon said. "We are closer together than we were, but we still have a lot of yardage to cover." [Question 18, Page 16.]

It was at his March 4 news

Continued on Page 10, Column 1

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Military Spending Faces Ambush

Richard Nixon's compromise of the ABM dispute is more apt to be the beginning than the end of his problem of keeping national sentiment in balance on the allocation of resources to armaments.

It is fair to say that it probably took more political courage to deploy the ABM than to defer it because popular doubts on the defensive weapon have crystallized with a swiftness which recalls the "feast or famine" pendulum of past public attitudes toward the military.

The ABM is simply the most salient of a number of costly military undertakings on which expert opinions differ. The rising concern with national priorities will focus quickly on other projects which shadow the post-Vietnam budget: new strategic bomber (\$10 billion); manned orbiting laboratory (\$2.9 billion); new generation of Minuteman missiles (\$12 billion).

★

The list is infinite—this year alone the military wanted to spend some \$25 billion more than the \$78 billion which President Johnson approved. The big question is whether a passionate tug-of-war over defense spending will permit the crucial decisions to be made in a dispassionate spirit.

Politics is a distorting ingredient in these judgments. Last week Sen. William Proxmire, D-Wis., delivered a thoughtful attack on defense spending in which he called for the elimination of waste through "zero-based budgeting" by the

Pentagon. This would mean a Herculean scrutiny of every agency and program in the huge establishment.

Only one department, Agriculture, has even attempted zero-budgeting. The 1963 experiment produced a mountain of paper and some intriguing disclosures of projects whose validity had faded. But when the Budget Bureau set out to eliminate the invalid programs, it found that each had fierce protectors in Congress. A staunch protector of one, the subsidization of milk sales to children in unimpoverished school districts, has been Proxmire.

★

Similarly the Congressional review of Pentagon projects is warped by the biased character of the reviewing committees. They are stacked with members and staffs deeply committed to the military viewpoint. For example eight of the 15 votes against ratifying the NPT treaty were cast by senators on the Armed Services Committee. There is no congressional effort to balance defense expenditures against domestic needs or the national economy.

This was one reason why Robert McNamara, whose breadth and doggedness were unique in Pentagon history, privately advocated the creation of a citizen panel which might include politicians, scientists, and wise civilians without direct government ties. It would examine intricate issues of defense in a broader context of national

priorities and advise the President.

The idea has gained fresh impetus from some like James R. Killian, who opposed the ABM. An administration committed to softening the Cold War has a special need for detached analysis in the pursuit of balance between those who talk of winning the Cold War and those who deny that it is any longer relevant.

The pieces of the puzzle are too intricate to be held in place by the pendulum pressures. As James Forrestal once observed, "If you tell congressmen too much, they panic. If you don't tell them enough, they go fishing." The defense budget in 1939 was 1.4 percent of GNP. Before the war broke two years later, it was 13 percent. The pendulum had swung.

★

This is plainly not a time for wide swings. The pace of Soviet military technology has presented recurring and unpleasant surprises. Their first nuclear weapon emerged three years ahead of Washington's expectations and their recent catch-up in missile strength is fresh evidence of a determination to maintain parity or better.

The virtue of McNamara's concept of a panel is that it will deepen the public's confidence in the quality of the decisions which are being made on defense expenditures. It will modify the pendulum pressures while the negotiators struggle for disarmament agreements.

Washington: President Nixon's Priorities

By JAMES RESTON

WASHINGTON, March 15 — The control of military arms is undoubtedly the most important political question in the world today, for the arms race devours the money and influences all other questions of poverty, race, jobs and housing, both here and abroad.

This was why there was such intense interest in what President Nixon would do about putting \$6- or \$7-billion into an antiballistic-missile system. Would he see and face the presiding issue of world politics, or evade it? The answer is fairly clear; he evaded it.

The Political Angle

He dealt with it politically and nationally, and within this frame, he was not only effective but brilliant. He did not reverse the Johnson Administration's decision to build an antiballistic-missile system, but modified it. He moved it out of the cities, where every missile site would have been a center of student demonstrations, to military bases in Montana and North Dakota, where students and demonstrations are less visible and less popular.

In short, he confused and disarmed his critics with a mystifying clarification of his

policy, but he didn't really deal with the major issue of disarmament. Like President Johnson, he dealt with the politics of the problem, but not with the problem. For students of domestic politics, public relations, and bedside manners, President Nixon's press conference on the ABM was a fascinating performance, but it was a tactic and not a policy, and it reduced the great issue of world arms control down to a national political controversy over the President's techniques.

The Washington Game

Washington is an intensely personal and political city. At the beginning of a new Administration, it is more interested in the character and personality of the new President than in his policies. It watches him under pressure to see whether he will be bold enough to take a different course—to deal with the realities instead of the politics of life—or merely modify the old courses with a different style; and on the ABM issue, Mr. Nixon obviously followed the traditional political pattern.

This has worried watchful people in the capital. They are confused about what to do about the ABM, and can see the argument for and against

Mr. Nixon's compromise, but they are asking some fundamental questions.

If the President decides to go along with the powers at the Pentagon and Congress who want a controversial ABM system, despite its cost, what will he do about the much more difficult question of making peace in Vietnam against the opposition of these same forces on Capitol Hill and at the Pentagon?

The White House Argument

The argument of President Nixon's aides about this is very interesting. They say that the really major question for President Nixon is not the antiballistic missile but Vietnam. They say they are sorry that the ABM had to be Mr. Nixon's first big decision, for on the ABM he seems to be compromising, whereas on Vietnam, they insist, he will really be bold and will force a change of policy by the end of the year, which will stop the killing and end the war one way or the other.

This may be true. The public posture of amiability and compromise with everybody, which President Nixon has dramatized, may actually be a cover for a policy which will deal

with the really big questions of arms control, peace in Vietnam, and a new policy and new priorities for the American cities. But very few people here see this as the future of the Nixon Administration at the present time.

The ABM decision has convinced most observers here that President Nixon is going to see the world in domestic political terms, that he is going to rely on good manners, good public relations, and good luck to bring about fundamental changes at home and abroad; but the most thoughtful people here have their doubts.

Personality and Policy

They are not particularly concerned about Mr. Nixon's decision to go ahead in the country with the ABM, but they are concerned about him. For the really big questions in the world—arms control, ending the war, race and poverty—are radical and even desperate problems, requiring bold and radical policies, and they are worried because Mr. Nixon's first big decision indicated, not a bold or a philosophic approach to his problems, but a narrow, political, tactical, and public relations view of the world.

McGovern Loses Key Doves

By MARY McGRORY
Star Staff Writer

George S. McGovern of South Dakota stood up in the presence of eight of his colleagues on the Senate floor and made a vigorous speech protesting President Nixon's conduct of the war.

Two of the leading doves, Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and Whip Edward M. Kennedy, sat following his remarks on their printed texts. When McGovern had finished, they did not observe the ritual amenities of praising the speech.

McGovern found their silence "deafening."

Mansfield and Kennedy had registered their disapproval of the speech before it was given—not the content but the timing.

Kennedy observed that he did not think that the middle of an enemy offensive was the moment to attack the commander-in-chief.

Origin Disputed

The origin of the offensive is a matter of dispute between the President and McGovern.

The former chief negotiator in Paris, Averell Harriman, who over the weekend urged McGovern to give the President more time, has said publicly that he thinks the Viet Cong attacks are a "reaction" to our intensified ground offensive.

McGovern claims that the North Vietnamese had responded to the bombing halt by withdrawing 22 full regiments from South Vietnam.

"Is this Viet Cong drive a response to our own offensives over the last five months—a response determined more by our own aggressive combat operations than by any design of Hanoi's?"

'Secret Talks' Cited

The President gave his version in his press conference last Friday: "The answer is that any escalation of the war in Vietnam has been the re-



SEN. GEORGE McGOVERN

sponsibility of the enemy. If the enemy de-escalates its attacks, ours will go down."

The only hope the President held out for any resolution of who should make the first move or break into the cycle was in his mention of "secret talks."

They cannot be discussed, of course, and his public position is strikingly like that of Lyndon Johnson, who also said that no man can predict when the first troops would come home.

The peace community was alarmed by the President's decision on the anti-ballistic missile. His capitulation on that comparatively abstract matter, which pleased only the military, has given rise to the suspicion that on Vietnam, he will follow the counsel of the military commanders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, all of whom contend that he must keep the pressure on.

Sen. McGovern said that the lesson of 1968 was that "our citizens regret and deplore our involvement in this cruel and futile venture."

For Nixon, the lesson seems to be that he must not act like Lyndon Johnson. He understands that he must not call his critics "nervous Nellies" or show his scars or dart around the country like Batman. But his critics think he has nonetheless missed the big point in that he appears to be pursuing the policies of Johnson, although his staff assures everyone that "he knows he must end the war."

Honeymoon Ends

The honeymoon is over. He said so himself at the Gridiron dinner. Over the weekend, too, Herbert G. Klein, his bland and amiable communications director, who has never said anything mean about anyone, attacked Sen. McGovern for his "disgraceful" handling of the hunger situation.

The charge was so bizarre, and politics is so instantly "as usual" again, that people began to wonder if Klein was trying to discredit McGovern as a critic of the war in advance of his speech.

The larger question, of course, is whether Nixon will pay any more attention to Senate critics of the war than Johnson did.

He can see for himself that the Democrats are still a

vided over Vietnam as they were last August when they tore each other to pieces over the matter, and, amid turmoil that defeated them, voted to endorse the policies of Lyndon Johnson.

Humphrey Committed

The titular leader of the Democrats, Hubert Humphrey, is committed to the Johnson policies—at least has given no indication of a major break. His running mate, Sen. Edmund S. Muskie of Maine, has said nothing. Neither has the chairman of the Democratic National Committee, Sen. Fred R. Harris.

Some Democrats think the only hope is—at a proper moment, yet to be determined—to mount a concerted, organized opposition to the war to make withdrawal of American troops party policy.

They say they will make the determination when the storm of the present offensive is over. Some think in the meantime Nixon may have dug himself into the Johnson position. They have no idea what his true position is, because as McGovern said, in his spurned speech, he has not yet revealed the "bold plan for peace" he promised during his campaign.

ABM—Administration's Biggest Mistake?

By JAMES RESTON

There are really two crises over the ABM. One is over what the initials mean: do they stand for an essential Anti-Ballistic Missile, or for the Administration's Biggest Mistake? It depends on who is talking. But the second, and maybe even more important crisis, is not so much over what to do about the ABM, but how to decide what to do.

Very few people in this country, or even in the world, have the scientific and technical competence to pass judgment on whether this missile would be effective in knocking down multiple-entry warheads with their decoys and other radar scramblers; or even whether deploying such a system, whatever its cost, would add to or subtract from the security of the Republic.

Decision Puzzle

In this situation, about all the rest of us can demand is not a specific decision but a sense of confidence in the process of decision, and this sense of confidence is precisely what is lacking.

President Nixon will make a "decision" on this five- or fifty-billion-dollar ABM question, but he won't decide it, for it is so

tangled in subjective questions of politics, Government contracts, cost-effectiveness disputes and arguments on the need for spending the money elsewhere, that his "decision" will leave the controversy unresolved no matter what he says.

Accordingly, there is considerable merit in the proposal made to the Congress this week by Dr. James R. Killian Jr., the former president of M.I.T., a multiple intellectual trust located in Cambridge, Mass. The defense of the nation, Dr. Killian suggested, is too serious and complicated to be left to soldiers and politicians alone.

Outside Judgments

He was more polite than that, as usual, but he argued for the creation of an independent commission of qualified men who could make a "comprehensive study in depth of our weapons technology and of the factors which bear upon the decisions the nation must make regarding on-going strategic forces and policies."

Dr. Killian recalled that such a commission had been established during the Eisenhower Administration and proved to be useful to both the President and the Congress. He did not

argue that its findings should carry more weight than studies conducted within the Government, but he noted that the competition between the services for roles and missions, and the subjective interests of military and industrial minds, often led to suspicion of narrow and selfish decisions, which an outside group of experts might avoid.

The Committed Chairman

He might have added that there are now powerful men in the armed services committees of the Congress whose disinterestedness in voting funds for missiles and other expensive explosives is not unbounded. What he did say was that even the Congress could use some special help from outside the Government from time to time in reaching decisions on the great strategic questions of the day.

The comments out of Capitol Hill on the ABM question this week illustrate the point. Chairman L. Mendel Rivers of the House Armed Services Committee said he was for deploying the ABM's. "I want protection, and like everybody else, I want the latest in technology," he said.

Representative Gerald Ford

of Michigan, the House Republican leader, made an equally profound remark. "If you have to gamble and err," he said, "it is better to gamble and err on the side of strength and not weakness."

The Big Question

This is the kind of thing that passes all too often for analysis in the Congress, and it sounds fine only until you begin to think about it. For the argument over the ABM is not whether we want "protection" but whether the ABM will provide it; not whether we want strength or weakness, but which of the two we will get from deploying these missiles.

Dr. Killian's proposal could help us out of this dilemma, or at least give us a little more time to decide how to decide. The ABM is being debated as one defensive weapons system without much relation to the other critical aspects of a strategic plan as a whole. For the moment, it has got lost in politics and opinions and past commitments, and is not likely to be accepted either at home or abroad until there is a great deal more trust in the way evidence is gathered and decisions are taken.

CROSBY S. NOYES

On my Desk

Selfies

Chief ABM Task: To Score Bargaining Point

One fervently hopes that President Nixon's forthcoming statement on plans for a defensive missile system will put an end to the controversy that has been raging over the problem for so many months. For this debate has produced some of the weirdest logic from eminent political and military sources heard in a long time.

No one can quarrel very much with the idea of spending a few billion dollars on a defensive missile system that might offer some degree of protection against a nuclear attack from Communist China over the next few years. But unfortunately there is a great deal more than this involved in the minds of many people when it comes to the deployment of the Sentinel ABM system in the United States.

In fact, the Chinese nuclear threat argument for Sentinel was something of an after-

thought. The real impetus for building an ABM system was — and still is — the discovery that the Soviet Union had begun deploying missile defenses near Moscow.

So far as many supporters of the Sentinel system are concerned, its real importance lies in its relevance to the nuclear balance between the United States and Russia. And it is in this area of the debate that the logic of the argument becomes most confused.

Almost everyone starts from the premise that the existing nuclear stalemate between Russia and the United States should not be upset — or at least that it should not be upset in favor of the Soviet Union. There is fairly general agreement that the major deterrent to a nuclear war is the disagreeable fact that each country can destroy the other, regardless of which side strikes first.

The development of defensive missile systems obviously does have relevance to maintaining this balance.

If the Russians should succeed, for example, in building a defensive system they believed capable of protecting them effectively against a full-scale nuclear attack, there is no doubt that the danger of a nuclear war would be increased enormously. Even if they were mistaken about the effectiveness of their defenses, the risk of a confrontation would be very great.

The real question is, therefore, how to convince the Russians that they have not built and cannot build a defensive system, having such protective capability.

As Defense Secretary Robert McNamara argued at the outset, the way to do this — and the only way — is to maintain our offensive nuclear

striking power at such a level that no defensive system would be credible. It was his belief — and also that of many military experts — that in nuclear war the offense always will have a decisive advantage over any defensive system that could be devised.

The worst possible way of convincing the Russians that their defenses will not protect them would be to set about building a massive system of our own. To have any credibility at all, competition with the Russians in such a "thick" defensive system would be virtually unlimited. The cost has been estimated at anywhere from \$40 billion to \$400 billion.

The real irony, however, is that the result of such a competition might also greatly increase the danger of nuclear war.

If both we and the Russians became convinced that we had effective nuclear defenses — that is to say, defenses that would reduce the devastation of a nuclear exchange to "acceptable" limits — much of the deterrent value of the present nuclear balance would be gone. In this situation, the danger of a confrontation again would be far greater than it is today.

In spite of these quite evident facts, there is still strong support for an all-out competition with the Russians in nuclear defenses, including most of the military brass and some powerful figures in Congress.

Fortunately, neither President Nixon nor Defense Secretary Melvin Laird seems to share their views. From the evidence so far, their major interest in the Sentinel project is largely in its value as a bargaining-point in negotiating an agreement with the Russians on limiting nuclear defenses, if not abandoning them entirely. It is likely that this hope will be reflected in what Nixon has to say on the matter next week.

Letters to The Editor

The ABM and Nuclear Talks With Russia

The world stands at a watershed in the nuclear arms race, and ABM has become a pivotal element of the broader question whether that race can be curtailed or will go on spiraling upward. The principal reference point for considering ABM should be the U.S.-Soviet talks on nuclear limitation, for only in that context can ABM be intelligently evaluated.

The singular opportunity now presented for prompt talks lies in the confluence of several decisive facts: (1) each side possesses a strong and secure second-strike capability; (2) working majorities in the two governments acknowledge the practical impossibility for either side to evade the implications of the other's second-strike capability; (3) each side can unilaterally verify the strength of the other side (land-based missile silos and submarine-based launching tubes can be counted from afar, and their sum is equal to the total number of warheads). But the latter two of these prevailing conditions could prove highly perishable if the opportunity for talks is not seized. The Soviet group favorable to talks could be overborne by unique delay or by acts indicating that the U.S. was bent on pursuing the mirage of "clear-cut superiority." Gravest dangers lie, however, in the future certainty that, failing agreement soon, both sides will introduce the offensive MIRV missile. If the two governments allow the situation to drift agreement-less into the MIRV era, they will have failed mankind. For in the MIRV era, no agreement could be stable, because the parties would lack confidence in their ability to verify the strength of the opposition (a counted silo might contain one warhead, or three or ten).

U.S.-Soviet talks leading to agreement on nuclear limitations should accordingly be our urgent first priority, and in approaching the matter we must recognize a factor of absolutely central importance—that the essence of any stable U.S.-Soviet agreement to limit nuclear arms in the near future will be the certainty and visibility of assured destruction power on both sides. The requisite condition of mutual deterrence exists today, and the task of negotiators on both sides is to build constructively on it. At the heart of the matter is the need to recognize that any move by one side to build a serious ABM system in an effort to evade or remove the other side's assured destruction capability would be destabilizing; any such move would quickly impair the chances of reaching agreement, or quickly emasculate whatever agreement had been reached. This central reality argues that an ABM decision should be held in abeyance, and that our ABM policy should be in fact determined by the course of U.S.-Soviet talks. If we could negotiate a dismantling of the small Soviet ABM around Moscow, we would be able to dispense with a system of our own (leaving aside preparatory research and development); if, on the other hand, the Soviets insisted on standing fast on their small sys-

tem, we would then have the basis for a sensible decision.

There would be no military danger in a deferred decision, because there is no valid military requirement for ABM. The anti-Chinese rationale employed in the Sentinel announcement of 1967 represented one of those regrettable low points to which logic must inevitably sink when required, on short notice, to reconcile a politically pressured presidential decision to act, with a desire of the Secretary of Defense to avoid stimulating a further increase in Soviet offensive missiles and to hold open the option for talks. The rationale asks us to believe that, while we have deterred Russia's very powerful nuclear missile force for many years without an ABM, we now need such a system to deter Chinese attack—even though Chinese nuclear power is roughly a tenth of Soviet power and a thirtieth part of our own. This asks too much of our credulity. The Chinese fill the air with fierce polemics, but their operational policy is extremely cautious. And they understand the destructive power of nuclear weapons—i.e., that, while a Chinese attack might inflict damage upon the United States, it would produce a riposte that would tear China asunder.

A "thin" ABM is accordingly unnecessary against China, and we have deterred a powerful Soviet capability for 20 years without one. But the notion is now being advanced that the Sentinel system can "complicate" Soviet attack plans. We should examine this line of argument with the greatest care, for any ABM system which was sufficient to cast doubt on the Soviet second-strike capability would lead to a Soviet response that took the form of greater offensive power—either a numerical expansion or a qualitative improvement. And if that occurred, we would once again have triggered the dynamic of the nuclear arms race, and would be forced by its inner logic to a similar expansion of our own nuclear forces. Presumably, this is what the Administration wishes to avoid.

ABM cannot solve any of our military problems, but it can both complicate the military equation and aggravate tensions in ways that will make a stable U.S.-Soviet agreement perhaps impossible to achieve. Secretary Laird seems to believe that the fact of an ongoing ABM development will be a measurable U.S. advantage as we enter talks. This seems highly debatable. What seems not debatable is that such a decision, taken in the absence of any relevant U.S.-Soviet context, would provide momentum and encouragement to those specially interested groups who have by no means given up the idea of a full-scale ABM.

TOWNSEND HOOPES.

McLean.

The writer is a former Under Secretary of the Air Force (1967-1969).

In The Nation: A Decision That Makes Itself

By TOM WICKER

WASHINGTON, March 10—Mr. Nixon's interesting custom of setting dates upon which he will deliver major policy pronouncements has this capital positively quivering in anticipation or dread of his promised decision on the antiballistic missile system. In fact, the case against ABM deployment is so overwhelming that it is hard to see how the President could decide for it.

Even the technical feasibility of the system is in doubt, particularly if deployment is to be justified by placing Sprint missiles to protect ICBM sites; and the Defense Department's research director, Dr. John S. Foster, warned two years ago that the whole Nike-X system—now known as Sentinel—would soon be obsolete.

The rationale first advanced by the Johnson Administration, that Sentinel some day would protect the nation against a Chinese missile attack, has been discredited by no less a hawk than Senator Richard Russell, a pillar of the armed forces establishment in Congress. "The Chinese are not completely crazy," he has said. "They are not going to attack us with four or five missiles when they know we have the capability of virtually destroying their entire country."

Now the ABM defenders have virtually abandoned the Chi-

nese rationale and talk of deploying Sentinel to protect ICBM sites from new Soviet multiple-warhead weapons. But Senator Cooper of Kentucky has pointed out that no one has produced evidence that the state of Russian weaponry makes it imperative for the United States to deploy such defenses; and two authorities, Dr. Hans Bethe and Dr. J. P. Ruina, told a Congressional hearing last week that they knew of no such evidence.

The cost estimate attached to Sentinel—about \$5 billion—is conservative at best and Senator Stuart Symington has effectively demonstrated that defense hardware costs always mushroom beyond Pentagon estimates. Moreover, the out-of-pocket cost to taxpayers is the least of it, while the worst is that these same dollars could be and should be used for all those domestic social needs so long starved for funds by the devouring demands of the military.

Insuring Military Embrace

Politically, for the President to opt for Sentinel against these social needs, or even to insist, Johnson-like, that we can have missiles and social programs, would throw his Administration into the arms of the military-industrial complex and its servants in Congress, insuring for another four years

the pre-eminence of generals and militarists; because a decision would repudiate the most progressive forces in Congress, now gathered in bipartisan opposition to the ABM system, and further alienate all those voters who already question Mr. Nixon's concern for the poor and the black, and doubt his interest in the quality of American life.

Step to Complete System

The deployment of any ABM system, moreover, however "thin," ineffective or near obsolescence, will be regarded by its victorious proponents as a "building block" in a vastly more expensive ABM defense against Soviet missiles. "It is the first step," Senator Russell said of sentinel, "toward the deployment of the complete system that I think is required."

But the estimated \$40-billion cost of the "complete system" that Russell and others really want to develop from Sentinel deployment is not much better than an arbitrary guess; and former Defense Secretary McNamara has pointed out persuasively that even the "complete system" would be penetrable by the sophisticated Soviet weaponry its deployment would force them to build.

Above all, a decision to deploy an ABM system now might well trigger what McNamara called an "action-reaction phe-

nomenon that fuels an arms race." The Soviets might and probably would step up their offensive or defensive missile armaments, or both, in response; they might recoil from the nuclear arms control talks Mr. Nixon has said he desires; and military hardliners in Moscow might well picture themselves a vindicated and find their influence enhanced for years to come.

If these arguments, all of which are being made to Mr. Nixon not only by Democratic liberals but by such Republicans as Cooper, Javits, Percy, Brooke and Hatfield (even Everett Dirksen and John Stennis, the Armed Forces Committee chairman, have expressed reservations), should persuade the President, he even has at hand a sound political explanation just waiting to be made.

He could say that the proposed ABM system needs more study and further development, which it does. He could add that this need dovetailed with his desire as a peacemaker to defer deployment at least until he had determined whether the Soviets would negotiate in good faith on arms control. And he could play on the disenchantment on Congress and the public by pointing out that deploying the Sentinel was Lyndon Johnson's idea, anyway. After all, this is a new Administration, isn't it?

Memo to HHH

From Jehn S.

Re: NET discussion on ABM

As of 10:15 a.m. the NET producers are having problems finding a Republican willing to defend the ABM. Karl Mundt is still the most likely participant. I figure it really doesn't much matter who they get.

As for the scientists, George Kistiakewsky of Harvard will be with you opposing the system. WET is attempting to do a remote pick-up of Edward Teller from California to advocate deployment. But you ought not to get in any scientific arguments. . . . let Kistiakewsky fight with Teller.

Dick McKutcheon will moderate the discussion.

You should be at Channel 26 by 9:00 p.m. for make-up. The show goes on the air at 9:30 and runs to 11:00 p.m.

Myths Surround Budget Priorities

By Henry Owen

THE CURRENT ABM debate highlights a larger issue: How to set budgetary priorities between defense and domestic needs. Gladstone was not far wrong when he said that "budgets are not mere matters of arithmetic, but in a thousand ways go to the root of prosperity of individuals and relation of classes, and the strength of kingdoms."

Budgetary priorities cannot be greatly changed while the war in Vietnam goes on. But as the fighting phases down, the issue will have to be faced: Pressures will mount for commitments to new domestic and defense programs and to tax cuts (beyond the expected surcharge repeal). The Administration's response to these pressures will probably do more to shape the country's future than most of the events that now dominate the headlines. That response should be based on a wide-ranging national debate about budgetary priorities. The time for that debate is now, before the commitments are made.

If the debate is to do more than "leave the surrounding darkness unobscured," it should be based on understanding of the facts. This involves dispelling several powerful myths.

MYTH NUMBER ONE is that the United States will be rich enough, after Vietnam, to do whatever it wants.

This may be true for the long run; but for the years immediately after the war it will be wide of the mark. The January report of the Council of Economic Advisers totals up

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plausible and likely post-Vietnam domestic and defense demands for fiscal year 1972. They come to several times the expected post-Vietnam budgetary saving. Hard choices will have to be made.

Myth Number Two is that this budgetary problem will go away if an arms agreement can be reached with the Soviet Union.

An agreement on offensive and defensive missiles is of the greatest importance. In its absence, new technology could boost the cost of strategic nuclear programs very rapidly. But the great bulk of our non-Vietnam defense expenditure goes for conventional naval, air, and ground forces—not for strategic arms. And the level of these conventional forces is geared, in good part, to areas of the third world, notably Asia—where the Soviet Union is *not* the main threat.

Thus, post-Vietnam defense expenditures will hinge, in considerable degree, on questions which will not be settled by U.S.-Soviet agreement: What local threats should con-

cern us in Asia—and elsewhere in the third world? How likely are they to materialize? Can countries of the area play a greater role in meeting these threats? What should be the U.S. role?

Unless answers to these questions permit some reduction in general purpose forces, the post-Vietnam defense budget will continue to grow very substantially each year.

Myth Number Three is that we can have all this and domestic heaven too, because rising prosperity will substitute for costly new programs in meeting needs at home—notably those of the urban and rural poor.

The plain fact is that prosperity, although a powerful solvent of poverty to date, will likely operate less effectively in the future. For one thing, the rate of growth may have to be slowed to avoid inflation. For another, the 22 million people still trapped in poverty are so handicapped by poor health, education, and environment that they cannot readily profit from the opportunities which prosperity creates. Their children may be able to do better, if there is a substantial expansion in child health, education, welfare, and other antipoverty programs in the meantime. But annual funding for many of these programs is now far below authorized levels.

MYTH NUMBER FOUR is that increased expenditures for these remedial programs could be financed by a reduction in other "nonessential" domestic programs. People have been trying for decades to find going domestic programs which the Congress will pronounce nonessential; the fact that they haven't succeeded tells us a good deal. Programs that some groups consider nonessential—e.g., rivers and harbors, and farm subsidies—are not seen in that light by powerful domestic constituencies; in the real world, these programs just aren't going to be cut.

Thus, on both the foreign and domestic fronts, there is no easy way out. Hard choices will have to be made: between private and public spending, and between domestic and defense needs.

The Executive branch, in the past has not had to gear its organization and procedures to the need for evaluating radically different long-term budgetary strategies—and particularly for judging gross choices between defense and domestic needs. But now painful choices, which will affect the future of the entire Nation, must be made.

A first step might be to set up a small high level planning staff in the Bureau of the Budget, to analyze the risks and costs of different long-term budgetary strategies for consideration by the President. Its annual reports on these alternatives could be made public, as are those of the Council of Economic Advisers, to assist public discussion and understanding.

A second step might be to set up a national commission of distinguished Americans to review these long-term post-Vietnam budgetary alternatives and to make recommendations on two key long-range issues: the balance between private and public spending, and between defense and domestic programs.

No doubt, there are other ways of meeting the need. But that need is clear: To focus the attention and understanding of the country on long-term budgetary choices, before they are made by a series of *ad hoc* decisions on immediate problems.

New York Times
Thursday, March 13, 1969

Moscow Suggests Sentinel Could Hamper Arms Talk

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, March 12—The Soviet Government newspaper Izvestia suggested tonight that deployment of an American antimissile system might set back the chances for successful United States-Soviet talks on arms control.

Breaking its silence on the debate in Washington over deployment of the Sentinel missile defense, Izvestia said that the current balance of forces between the United States and Russia "offers a possibility to conclude agreements on the freezing and reduction of nuclear armaments."

"It is well known," its leading commentator, Vikenty Matveyev, said, "that the Soviet Union suggests the beginning of talks on the restriction and reduction of both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons."

But Izvestia said, in an apparent reference to the Sentinel debate, "Steps that may be taken in the field of disarmament must not place any state or group of states in an unfavorable position in respect to other states."

The Izvestia article was given prominence here and seemed to be an effort by the Soviet Government to add its voice to those trying to persuade President Nixon to cancel or postpone plans for starting to deploy the Sentinel system.

The article seemed to hint that installation of antimissile

Continued on Page 27, Column 1

missiles might cause the Russians to have second thoughts about holding arms talks. But senior Western diplomats pointed out that Moscow already had a small-scale system of its own and agreed to holding talks with the United States last year after President Johnson and Congress approved going ahead with the Sentinel deployment.

Izvestia said there was a split in the United States between those who were "sobri-minded" and those who were "adventurists." It praised former Defense Secretaries Robert S. McNamara and Clark M. Clifford for advocating, after they left office, a prompt start of talks with the Soviet Union on disarmament. Actually, both men were on record for such talks while in office.

Laird Considered Target

"Words, of course, are insufficient," Izvestia said. "Other words are being heard from high places in the United States. Their authors propose 'not to rush' into such talks and call for creating a 'position of strength.'"

Izvestia said that those voices wanted to step up the arms race and advocate the deployment of the Sentinel system in the absence of an agreement with the Russians.

Observers believe that much of the criticism was aimed at Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, who has advocated a start to deployment, but he was not mentioned by name.

Much of the article was devoted to deploring the high costs of new arms.

"Every day emphasizes with new force the acuteness of the disarmament problem," it said, "because every day huge sums that are so needed for peaceful, civilian needs are spent on military production."



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