

*Major
File*

*- President Harry Boyer
Exec. P. Mike Johnson
Sect. Harry Block*

REMARKS

THE HONORABLE HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

10TH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, AFL - CIO

Pete Flaherty

PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

*my co-chairman
with George
Leader!*

JUNE 5, 1969

It is a special pleasure for me to participate in the
10th Constitutional Convention of the Pennsylvania AFL - CIO.

I've come to appreciate more than you realize the
capacity of people to do the hard and difficult work of
winning elections.

And so I've come to say "Thank you" to the Union
members of the great Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for
the tremendous performance you turned in last November.

↳ If I recall correctly, even up to Election Day the
major forecasters conceded Pennsylvania to the Republican
opposition. But a few of us knew better!

↳ We knew of the unprecedented effort which you had mounted in September and October -- and we were confident that this work would bring its own rewards when the ballots were counted. !

↳ And so it did. Not only did we win the Presidential contest in Pennsylvania, but Democrats swept to victory across the ticket -- even winning control of the state House of Representatives -- one of the three states in the country which can make that statement.

↳ In all of this, there is surely an important lesson -- one that hopefully will not be lost on this 10th Constitutional Convention. To win elections in this era requires money and skill -- and both in considerable amounts. But winning also requires one additional factor: a fundamental belief and personal commitment in the rightness of one's cause and the importance of that cause prevailing on election day. 

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↳ That combination can't be beaten and you proved it last November -- all the pollsters notwithstanding.

↳ So let your great success of 1968 become a model for 1970, 1972 and beyond. There is no wiser investment you could possibly make.

* * *

↳ One of the great issues of the Presidential campaign -- as well as being one of the great issues in our country for the past decade -- concerned our Nation's policies in Southeast Asia.

↳ As I said, in accepting my party's nomination for President, and as I repeated later in my televised address to the Nation from Salt Lake City, 'The necessity for peace in Vietnam is the first reality that confronts this Nation.'

It is no less true today.

↳ I went on to say in my Salt Lake City speech that the key decisions over this complex issue must, in the end, be the President's alone. ↳ This -- also -- is equally true with a new President in the White House.

↳ The policies of the past few years -- policies supported by four Presidents of two political parties -- have brought us to a critical moment when the long-sought peace may be within our grasp.

↳ In these circumstances it is incumbent upon each of us to do nothing that would damage this chance to stop the fighting in South Vietnam and to carry forward the terribly difficult work of achieving a viable political settlement in this war-ravaged land.

\ From this perspective then and recognizing fully the obligations we all bear to contribute positively to the ending of the conflict, I want to share with you my thoughts on the strategy this country might well adopt at this juncture.

* * *

\ In the final analysis, our great sacrifices of human life and resources have been made with only one object in view: the opportunity for all the people of South Vietnam to chart their own future through democratic procedures and principles.

\ Peace ultimately depends on reaching a settlement acceptable to ~~the~~ the people of South Vietnam. The United States has no more right than Hanoi to impose a settlement on South Vietnam or to negotiate unilaterally the future of the 16 million South Vietnamese people.

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↙ But, by the same token, the United States very much
 has the right -- indeed, we have the obligation -- to advocate
 as vigorously as we can in Paris and elsewhere, our ideas
 for achieving a durable political settlement. ↙ President Nixon
 did precisely this in his recent speech on Vietnam. And I
 assume he will continue such advocacy in the forthcoming
 talks with President Thieu on ~~Midway~~^{Midway} Island this Sunday.

↙ In particular, we must stress the importance of bringing
dissident South Vietnamese in the National Liberation Front
 and the Viet Cong into the legitimate political processes of
 South Vietnam, provided they are willing to accept democratic

procedures. I am encouraged by what appears to be
 a political buildup in South Vietnam
 by both the South Vietnamese government
 and the NLF. There is ample evidence that the
 S. Vietnamese are broadening the base of
 their government - creating political parties
 and tying them into a democratic coalition
 of democratic forces preparing for the day
 when the struggle in the battlefield will
 be moved to the Pol. Arena. Likewise

The NLF with the aid of N. Vietnam
is strengthening its Political Cadre in the
South.

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For some time now the negotiations in Paris have been stalled over the fundamental issue of how this is to be accomplished; that is, finding a way to create procedures for political competition among individuals and groups which have for many years considered each other to be outlaws and subversives.

Obviously, this is an exceedingly difficult problem -- one which demands the greatest patience and skill on all sides.

The National Liberation Front, supported by the North Vietnamese, has insisted upon the imposition of an interim coalition government prior to the conduct of elections. The government of the Republic of South Vietnam has rejected this proposal, citing, with considerable justification, their position as the constitutionally-elected representatives of the South Vietnamese people.

At this juncture, however, we surely must realize that finding some escape from this impasse lies at the heart of our achieving the cessation of hostilities for which we so fervently yearn. By now we have learned that neither side can win a decisive military victory. The conflict can only be ended by a negotiated political settlement.

Moreover, since the Paris talks began in May, 1968, more than one-third of all American deaths have occurred.

The casualties to North and South Vietnamese military units, the Viet Cong and civilians have been extremely heavy. The time for bold and decisive initiative has clearly arrived, so that these tragic human losses -- on all sides -- can be ended.

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↳ Our strategy, therefore, should be geared to these two overriding objectives: First, to find a solution to the impasse over the procedures for achieving and then implementing a political settlement in South Vietnam; and second, to stop as quickly as possible the high casualties that continue to be inflicted by both sides.

↳ It is with these dual objectives in view that I commend to our government and the American people the ceasefire and free election strategy developed by the National Committee for a Political Settlement in Vietnam.

* * *

↳ What are the principal elements of this strategy?

First, we should propose an immediate standstill ceasefire by all sides in Vietnam to take effect as soon as agreement is reached on a schedule for mutual troop withdrawals. Further attempts by either side to improve their bargaining position by military pressure are simply illusory.

The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, in particular, have suffered grievous manpower losses in the past year.

Indeed, it is estimated that at least 75% of the Viet Cong have gone through battle casualties and defections.

Since we stopped bombing the North, there is evidence that the North Vietnamese are less interested in the war.

Morale has sagged badly. The death rate from battle is high.

There is reason to believe that the North Vietnamese people are asking why their forces remain in South Vietnam when no one is attacking the North.

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Soviet and Mainland Chinese interest in Hanoi is at a low point. The Soviet Union is principally worried about China and China is worried about the Soviet Union. Large Soviet forces have been moved to the Russian-Chinese frontier; likewise, Chinese forces have been deployed into the frontier areas. Ho Chi Minh and his problems are assuming much lower priority in the activities of both countries.

Finally, the government in South Vietnam has weathered two Tet offensives -- one in the winter of 1968 and the other in 1969. ^{seven and a half} million South Vietnamese are under arms in the regular, regional and district forces. Any government that can trust ^{seven} million men under arms is not critically weak or in danger of being overthrown.

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↳ In other words, to a greater degree than has been true in recent years, the conditions appear ripe for serious consideration by both sides of an immediate ceasefire. ↳ And even though it is a guerrilla war, I believe both sides have sufficient communication and discipline among their forces to achieve adherence to a ceasefire order if, and this is crucial, both sides see it in their interest to observe the ceasefire.

↳ Second, as the key to unlocking the present political stalemate in Paris, we should propose that free elections, open to all political groups in South Vietnam, be held at the earliest possible date after the ceasefire, and that these elections be supervised by a representative Electoral Commission composed of the major political factions within South Vietnam, plus international representatives.

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↳ The Electoral Commission would have jurisdiction over *only* ~~on~~ the administration of the elections, leaving the normal day-to-day duties of running the country to the present government. Throughout the pre and post-election period, phased withdrawals of foreign troops could go forward toward the goal of having all such troops out of the country when the newly-elected government took office.

↳ Third, we should propose the establishment of an International Peacekeeping Corps to oversee the ceasefire, the withdrawal of all outside military forces, and the elections.

↳ The Corps would establish listening posts in province capitals and district towns to receive reports of any violations and make recommendations for their solution by majority rule, rather than the unanimity which has weakened the present International Control Commission. It would be essential, moreover, that the Corps be sufficiently large to cover the several hundred listening posts required for effective monitoring.

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Following the election, the International Peacekeeping Corps would remain on duty until it had established iron-clad assurances of protection of minorities against reprisals and to prevent the killing or imprisonment of political opponents by those who won the election.

Once elected, the new South Vietnamese government would, hopefully, devote substantial and immediate attention to inaugurating the long overdue and oft-postponed sweeping land-reform program. The South Vietnamese people must have a visible and personal stake in the success of their new government, land reform is the most direct and significant way to begin building these loyalties.

The United States, working through the United Nations or other international agencies, could then contribute, along with other nations, to the economic reconstruction of South Vietnam, and, hopefully, of North Vietnam as well. Highest priority should be given to immediate refugee relief and medical aid to the victims of the war on both sides.

In his May 14 address on Vietnam, President Nixon stressed ~~this government's willingness~~ ^{the need} "...to consider other approaches consistent with our principles." I believe this strategy based on an immediate ceasefire, monitored by an International Peacekeeping Corps, and free elections supervised by a representative Electoral Commission falls squarely within the basic principles set forth by the President.

These proposals are made in the spirit of constructive suggestions, not negative criticism. I have no doubt that President Nixon desires peace in Vietnam as much as any other American. President Lyndon Johnson worked ceaselessly for peace

and sacrificed his political life for it. By so doing he ~~created~~ brought about the Paris negotiations, first between N.V. & the U.S. then broadened the structure by convincing S. Vietnam¹⁶ - The NLF to join the Paris Talks. It was he who ordered the halt to bombing of the North

L I hope very much that such a strategy could be advanced by this country at the earliest possible moment.

L Perhaps it will be rejected -- like so many of our past initiatives have been turned aside in the past. L But I believe nevertheless that within this strategy can be found the core of the approach that ultimately can stop the killing in Vietnam and move the struggle to the political arena.

L Moreover, such a proposal, if advanced by the United States would generate considerable pressure on Hanoi, Saigon and the National Liberation Front to get on with the business of working out a fair political settlement, even if the final terms are considerably different from the ones I have set

forth this morning. ~~There is no doubt in my mind but that the South Vietnamese are strengthening their political structure preparing for the transfer of the struggle in Vietnam from the battlefield to the pol. arena. Like us, the N. Vietnamese have been strengthening their Pol. Cadre in the South~~

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The search for peace is not for the timid or the weak; it must come from a Nation of high purpose -- firm without being belligerent, resolute without being bellicose, strong without being arrogant.

↳ Offered by the United States, in this spirit, such a strategy as I have discussed today would, in my opinion, be a bold and decisive step forward toward the settlement of this tragic conflict.

#



PENNSYLVANIA AFL-CIO

101 Pine Street • Harrisburg, Penna. 17101

Telephone 238-9351

May 26, 1969

*John
Attached is
sup-explanatory*

*Probably the
Demo for P. H. Humphrey
Pete Flaherty*

*Will be accompanying NHT
to the convention, and
should be given
co-chairman attention - he was a
in Pennsylvania last
year*

Mr. William J. Connell
1510 H Street, N.W., Suite 700
Washington, D. C. 20005

Dear Bill:

The enclosed is a copy of a letter which I have today written to John Stewart as per your suggestion. I am hopeful that you will indicate to Mr. Stewart your own views on my suggestions, preferably in support of them.

I gather from your remarks to me over the phone today that you will be accompanying Mr. Humphrey. I look forward to seeing you in Philadelphia on Thursday, June 5th.

With every good wish, I am,

Sincerely yours,

Michael Johnson
Executive Vice President

MJ:ckp
Encl.
opeiu-14
afl-cio



PENNSYLVANIA AFL-CIO

101 Pine Street • Harrisburg, Penna. 17101

Telephone 238-9351



May 26, 1969

Mr. John Stewart
c/o Hubert H. Humphrey
Federal Office Building 7, Rm. 6202
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Stewart:

I have today talked with Mr. William J. Connell who has suggested that I write to you relative to remarks to be made by Mr. Humphrey on Thursday, June 5, 1969, before the Tenth Constitutional Convention of the Pennsylvania AFL-CIO at the Sheraton Hotel in Philadelphia.

Before suggesting any specific references, I would like to acquaint you with the fact that the Pennsylvania AFL-CIO, in participating in last year's campaign throughout the state, was forced into a very large expenditure which was in the main made possible by loans from affiliated unions. In order to liquidate these obligations (which are very substantial), it is necessary for us to seek an increase in the per capita membership affiliation dues. This is necessary for a second reason. Having found the secret to possible success, namely adequate supplies of literature, adequate manpower and adequate supervision, this same type of effort will have to be continued in 1970 and in all subsequent major election years.

Consequently, we would appreciate a reference by Mr. Humphrey to the fact that he understands and appreciates how Pennsylvania labor went overboard in 1968 both in terms of literature, communication with a million and one-half members, manpower, materials, etc.

But it should be remembered that in Pennsylvania as all over the country, the Republican forces had unlimited resources available to them. This will certainly be the case in future election years, and if labor is to protect itself and elect candidates for Governor, U. S. Senate, U. S. Congress, the State Legislature and other important offices, labor will have to be prepared to make the same kind of commitment. If it fails to do so, we can look forward only to victory by the opposing forces.

It might be helpful if Mr. Humphrey could refer to the fact that even right up to Election Day, the major forecasters, including the important newspapers such as "The New York Times, "The Washington Post, etc., all conceded Pennsylvania to Mr. Nixon. The Humphrey victory in Pennsylvania was an in depth victory including state fiscal offices, State Superior Court Judge, retention of incumbent Democrats in Congress and most notably the winning by the Democrats of control of the State House of Representatives from the Republicans, one of three states in the country to achieve this feat in 1968.

Mr. John Stewart

May 26, 1969
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Our only loss was of Joe Clark, a development which ran counter to the state-wide trend.

This only could have been accomplished by unyielding dedication and application and he (Mr. Humphrey) knows at first hand the part played by labor in this unusual state-wide victory.

On another matter, since it is possible that Peter Flaharty, the successful Democratic primary candidate for Mayor of Pittsburgh will be accompanying Mr. Humphrey to the Convention in Philadelphia, I think it would be appropriate for Mr. Humphrey to make a kindly reference to Pete, recalling how closely he worked with labor in Pittsburgh as head of the Citizens organization and how important it is for the City of Pittsburgh to elect a young man like Flaharty this November.

I trust that Mr. Humphrey will be able to give us a friendly lift in his address to our Convention without making any reference to the possibility that we may have to go for an increase in affiliation dues.

If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to call me in Harrisburg before Thursday since we depart for our pre-convention meetings at that time.

Sincerely yours,

Michael Johnson
Executive Vice President

MJ:ckp
opeiu-14
afl-cio

Remarks
The Honorable W.H.H.
10th Constitutional Convention, AFL-CIO
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
June 5, 1969

It is a special pleasure for me to participate in the 10th Constitutional Convention of the Pennsylvania AFL-CIO.

I've come to appreciate more than you realize the capacity of ~~the~~ people to ~~do~~ do the hard and difficult work of winning elections.

And so I've come to say 'thank you' to the union members of the great Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for the tremendous ~~the~~ you performance you turned in last November.

If I recall correctly, even ~~at~~ ^{upto} Election Day the major forecasters conceded Pennsylvania to the Republican opposition. But a few of us knew better.

We knew of the unprecedented effort which you ~~made~~ ^{had} mounted in September and October -- ~~an effort~~ ~~at~~ ~~it~~ and we were confident that this work would ~~be~~ bring its own rewards when the ballots were counted.

(2)

And so it did. Not only did we win the Presidential Contest in Pennsylvania, but Democrats swept to victory across the ticket -- even winning control of the State House of Representatives -- one of the three states ~~the~~ in the Country which can make that statement.

In all of this there is surely an important lesson -- one that hopefully will not be lost on this 10th Constitutional Convention. To win elections in this era requires money and skill -- ~~and~~ and both in considerable amounts. But winning also requires one additional factor: a fundamental belief and personal commitment ~~that one's cause is just and that~~ in the rightness of one's cause and ^{the} importance of that cause prevailing on election day.

That combination can't be beaten and you proved it last November -- all the polls notwithstanding.

So let your great success of 1968 become a model for 1970, ~~in~~ 1972 and beyond. There is no wiser investment you could possibly make.

* * *

One of the great issues of the Presidential Campaign -- as it has been one of the great issues in our country for the past decade -- Concerned our nation's policies in South East Asia.

As I said in ~~my~~ ^{televised} address to the nation from Salt Lake City on September 31, the necessity for peace in Vietnam

(accepting my ~~party~~ party nomination for President, and ^{as I} repeated later in my televised address to the nation from Salt Lake City, "the necessity for peace in Vietnam is the first reality that confront this nation."

I went on to say that the key decisions on this tragic issue must, in the end, be the President's alone. ~~That was true~~ This is no less true today with a new President in the White House. ~~than it was then.~~

The policies of the past few years, ~~controversial~~ ^{as they have been} policies supported by three Presidents of two political ~~the~~ parties -- have now brought us to a ~~critical~~ critical moment when peace may be within our grasp.

(4)

In these circumstances it is incumbent upon us to do nothing that would damage this ^{last} chance to bring the fighting ^{in South Vietnam} to an end and to ^{carry forward} the critical task of permitting ~~at that~~ Terribly difficult work of achieving a ~~political~~ viable political settlement in this war-ravaged land. For, in the final analysis, our great sacrifices of human life and resources have been made with only one object in view: the opportunity for all the people of South ~~the~~ Vietnam to chart their own future through free and open elections.

^{ultimately} We depend on a settlement acceptable to all the people of South Vietnam. We have no more right than Hanoi to impose a settlement on South Vietnam or to negotiate ^{unilaterally} the future of the 16 million South Vietnamese people.

But, by the same token, we very much do have the right ~~to~~ -- indeed, we have the obligation -- to advocate as vigorously as we can ^{in Paris and elsewhere,} our ideas for achieving a durable political settlement. President Nixon did precisely this in his ~~recent~~ recent speech on Vietnam. And I assume he will ~~continue~~ continue this advocacy in the forthcoming talks with President Thieu on Midway Island ^{on} Sunday.

(5)

In some time now the negotiations in Paris have ~~been~~ been stalled over the ~~question~~ ^{issue} of ~~who would~~ ^{agreeing upon} the procedure for conducting free and open elections ^{in South Vietnam} based on the principle of one man - one vote. The National Liberation Front, supported by the North Vietnamese, ~~has~~ ^{has} insisted upon the ~~total~~ ^{total} imposition of an interim coalition ^{prior to the conduct of elections} government. The ~~South Vietnamese~~ ^{government of the} Republic of South Vietnam has rejected this proposal, citing, with considerable justification, their position as the Constitutionally-elected representatives of the South Vietnamese people.

At this juncture, however, ^{must} ~~by this time~~ we surely ~~must~~ ^{must} realize ^{that finding} ~~that~~ some escape from this impasse ~~is essential~~ lies at the heart of our achieving the cessation of hostilities for which we so fervently yearn.

Since the Paris talks began in May 1968, more than one-third of all American deaths have occurred. The time for bold and decisive initiative has clearly arrived so that these tragic human losses -- on all sides -- can be ended.

Our ^{strategy} ~~strategy~~, therefore, should be geared to these two overriding objectives: First, to find ~~an acceptable~~ a

(6)

solution to the impasse over the procedures for implementing a political settlement in South Vietnam, and, second, to ~~bring to an end~~ stop as quickly as possible the ~~loss of human life - Americans, South & North Vietnamese soldiers and civilians.~~ high casualties that continue to be inflicted by both sides.

It is ~~in~~ with these dual objectives in view that I commend ~~the~~ to our government and the American people the ~~the~~ cease fire and free elections strategy developed by the National Committee for a Political Settlement in Vietnam.

What are the principle elements of this strategy?

First, we should propose an immediate standstill cease-fire by all sides in Vietnam. By now we have learned - - just as Hanoi and the ~~the~~ Viet Cong have learned - - that neither side can win a decisive military victory. Further attempts by either side to improve their bargaining position by military pressure are simply illusory.

(7)

The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, in particular, have suffered grievous manpower losses in the past year. Indeed, it is estimated that at least 75% of the V.C. have gone through battle casualties and defections. [In other words, the conditions ~~are~~ ^{are} ~~should~~ appear ~~to be~~ ripe ~~for~~ ^{or more} ~~both sides~~ serious consideration by both sides of an immediate cease fire than at any time in recent years. ^{And} Even though it is a guerrilla war, ^{I believe} both sides have sufficient communication and discipline among their forces to achieve adherence to a cease-fire order.

Second, we should propose establishment of an International Peacekeeping Corps to oversee the cease-fire, withdrawal of all out-side military forces, and the political settlement.

Third, as the key to unblocking the present political stalemate in Paris, we should propose ~~that~~ ^{only to all political groups in South Vietnam,} free elections, be supervised by a representative electoral Commission held at the earliest possible date after the cease-fire and that these elections be supervised by a representative electoral Commission composed of ^{the} major political factions within South Vietnam.

(8)

~~In this~~
Throughout the pre and post-election period, phased
withdrawal of foreign troops could go forward toward the
goal of ~~having all~~ ~~of the country~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~when~~ ~~the~~ ~~government~~ ~~took~~ ~~office~~
having all such troops out ^{newly elected} ~~of the country~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~when~~ ~~the~~ ~~government~~ ~~took~~ ~~office~~

Vietnam, plus international representatives.

~~The normal day to day duties of running the~~

The electoral Commission would have
jurisdiction over only the administration of the
elections, leaving the normal day-to-day
duties of running the ^{country} ~~government~~ to the present
government.

Following the elections, the
International Peacekeeping Corps would
remain on duty ^{it had established} under iron-clad assurances
of protection ~~of~~ of minorities against
reprisals ~~of~~ and to ~~prevent~~ prevent the
killing or imprisonment of political opponents
by those who won the election.

Southern Vietnamese

Once elected, the new government would,
hopefully, devote substantial ~~at~~ and immediate
attention ^{to} ~~to~~ the long-overdue and oft-postponed
~~business~~ ~~of~~ a sweeping land-reform program.
The Southern Vietnamese people must have a visible and
personal stake in the success of their new government;
land reform is the ~~most~~ most direct and
significant way to begin building their loyalty.

The United States, working through the United Nations
or other international agencies, could ~~to~~ then contribute,
along with other nations, to the economic reconstruction

(9) and, hopefully, of North Vietnam, as well.

of ~~this~~ South Vietnam. Highest priority should be given to immediate refugee relief and medical aid to the victims of the war on both sides.

In his 3 May 14 address on Vietnam, President Nixon stressed this government's willingness "to consider other approaches, consistent with our principles." I believe this strategy, based on an immediate cease-fire and free elections supervised by a representative electoral commission falls squarely within the basic principles set forth by the President. And I hope very much that such a strategy could be advanced by this Country at the earliest possible moment.

Perhaps it will be rejected -- like so many of our past initiatives have been turned aside in the past. But I believe nevertheless that within this strategy can be found the ~~seeds of~~ core of the approach that ultimately can stop the killing in Vietnam and move the struggle to the ~~battle box~~ political arena.

~~that~~ If it is rejected and the struggle goes on, at least ^{this Country} ~~the~~ ~~struggle~~ have continued

(10)

~~its~~ ~~efforts to find a solution.~~ ~~And I believe,~~
moreover, ^{moreover,} that such a proposal, ^{and} would
generate considerable pressure on Hanoi, Saigon
and the N.L.F. to get on with the business of
~~the~~ working out a fair political settlement, ^{even}
if the final terms are considerably different
from the ones I have set forth this morning.

For all these reasons, I felt it necessary
to speak out on this subject this

~~And that is both a settlement~~

~~and such a political settlement will,~~

The search for peace is not for the
timid or the weak; it must come from a nation
of high purpose -- firm without being belligerent,
absolute without being bellicose, strong without
being arrogant.

~~Offered by the United States~~

~~My motto~~ In this spirit, ~~we should~~
~~move forward~~ such a strategy as I have
discussed today would, in my opinion,
be a bold and decisive step forward toward
the ~~status~~ settlement of this tragic conflict.



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