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~~Friday PM's~~
~~February 13, 1970~~
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REMARKS
THE HONORABLE HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION
OF MINNESOTA

MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA

FEBRUARY 13, 1970

Gentlemen: I hope to frighten you.

I am not a fearmonger -- I hope my long public record makes it unnecessary to note that fact -- nor am I easily frightened.

But I am frightened today.

It has been said that life may be extinct on other planets because their scientists were more advanced than ours.

This is bitter wisdom, my friends.

It is a quarter century since we unleashed the first atomic bomb in Hiroshima.

It is less than two decades since we developed the hydrogen bomb.

It is just over a decade that we have had the ICBM.

Today, in 1970, we have a national arsenal of some 4,500 strategic nuclear warheads -- almost all with more than 50 times the explosive power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima 25 years ago. We have close to twice that number of small tactical nuclear weapons in Europe alone.

Despite this quantitative build-up -- which, for the past decade ~~we~~ has given us a generally accepted superiority to the Soviets -- we have maintained a precarious nuclear equilibrium for the past ten years.

It was an equilibrium based on our common understanding that, survive or perish, we would do it together so long as both nations possessed the nuclear might to destroy the other.

Today this equilibrium is threatened. It is threatened by the build-up of the heavy Soviet SS9's, with their multiple warhead potential; it is threatened by our MIRV and ABM -- the former because it creates the illusion of destruction with impunity, and the latter because it creates the illusion of a secure defense.

Every action has an equal and opposite reaction: we know this as a law of physics and we are forced to recognize it as a law of practical international relations. So long as we expand the ABM, the Russians will continue to add to their stockpile of SS9's, SS11's and SS13's.

So long as we continue testing the multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle -- MIRV -- the "space bus" that can multiply every warhead we now have by ten -- the Russians will continue to test and develop their own multiple re-entry vehicle.

By next June our MIRV tests will be complete. By next October our first nuclear submarine will be ready for deployment with 16 Poseidon missiles -- each with ten MIRVED warheads.

MIRVED -- that's a new addition to the American vocabulary, gentlemen, and I suggest that we grasp its full implication quickly.

For, if we do not, with the Soviets, agree to end further MIRV and MRV testing, the United States will begin MIRV deployment next January and, by 1976 will have close to 10,000 MIRVED missiles. The Soviet timetable cannot be far behind.

The cost -- in resources -- to both nations will be devastating. The threat to mankind cannot be measured.

We will be well over the threshold of the next stage of nuclear terror -- and our scientists will be hard on the heels of their vanished colleagues from outer space.

Though the art of diplomacy has made few strides in recent years, the art of weaponry has galloped far beyond what we could foresee with the limited vision of a decade ago.

In March, 1960, John F. Kennedy -- still a senator -- warned the nation that "We are meeting the Russians at the summit this spring ... But we have prepared no plan for our conferees .. We have no idea what our stand will be."

Now, a full ten years later, I regret beyond measure that these statements are as valid today as they were when John Kennedy first spoke them.

Again, we are about to meet the Soviets at the Summit. Again, our negotiators have no concrete plan. Again, we do not know what our stand will be.

But there is a frightening difference: we have made a quantum jump in terror with the MIRV and its inevitable successors in sophisticated weapon systems.

There is no question that the most frightening aspect of American foreign policy today is the absence of a clear program for arms control.

As a nation, we talk a good deal about peace. No other subject has such a firm hold on the national conscience. All Presidents in contemporary history, regardless of party, have repeatedly emphasized their commitment to peace. Soviet leaders too, have adopted peace as part of their regular rhetoric.

And yet our two nations continue the headlong technological plunge toward destruction. And the world continues to rush pell mell from one violent confrontation to another.

While Viet Nam is cooling, the Near East is heating up. While Pakastanis recover, Biafrans starve.

The two major powers cannot enforce peace on the rest of the world -- indeed, we cannot always impose peace upon ourselves.

But we can do a great deal to ensure that the survival of mankind is not threatened by these confrontations.

Overkill has become the catchword of the nuclear age. It is too simple today to note that we already have enough megatonnage in our nuclear stockpiles to blow up each man, woman and child in the world 200 times over.

Today we talk in terms of delivery systems -- of who can get there first with enough destructive power to make a retaliatory strike impossible.

Talk of first and second strike capability, of "hard" targets (enemy installations) and "soft" targets (enemy cities and people) has absorbed the Pentagon's technicians and wordsmiths for the last several years.

I am afraid that our preoccupation with the weapon trees has obscured our view of the arms control forest.

While the annihilation technicians perfect the state of their art, the political leaders remain mired in the archaic vocabulary and protocol appropriate to an earlier era.

We cannot march into the 1970's equating the nuclear arsenal to the obsolete weaponry of the past.

We cannot send our conferees to the SALT negotiations armed only with propaganda initiatives that we know in advance will be rejected. They must be given authority and the high level policy support -- to do some real bargaining.

Make no mistake: I do not suggest that we approach the issues of arms control with a bleeding heart. Neither anger nor anguish are sufficient for today's tough problems.

But who, I ask, are the true realists: those who today seek a pragmatic plateau in the technological race toward destruction -- a plateau that may disappear tomorrow -- or those who seek to continue the quantitative and qualitative improvements in the nuclear arsenal???

At this pivotal point in history, we are confronted with a hard choice:

1. We can agree with the Soviets to leave MIRV an "unfinished technology" -- a weapons system that the military of both nations would be reluctant to use because it is not yet adequately tested, or

2. We can keep MIRV out of the SALT discussions, complete the tests -- and escalate the arms race beyond foreseeable avenues of control.

Today we have reasonable parity -- we have more warheads than the Soviets -- but the Soviet SS9 is more powerful than any U.S. missile. Today, neither nation is sure enough of its MIRV technology to proceed with development. *development*

Thus we have an "acceptable" -- but ephemeral -- impasse.

It may be gone -- it will be gone -- tomorrow.

We have less than two months to make a decision that will determine the future of mankind.

In April the SALT negotiators re-convene in Vienna.

If the Soviet team is unwilling to negotiate further development of SS9's and a halt in their MRV testing; *development*

if the American team is not prepared to negotiate a moratorium on MIRV testing, and to discuss the President's proposed ABM expansion: then it is unlikely indeed that man will again be in a position to limit the strategic arms race.

The MIRV will become an anachronism beside the Advanced Ballistic Re-Entry System of the late 70's (we have already spent over half a billion dollars on the ABRES) and new systems like the Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy (SCAD) and the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) will make present weapons look like kindergarten toys.

In any technology there is a built-in momentum -- it is as human to seek a better guidance system as to build a better mousetrap.

Growth for the sake of growth, like change for the sake of change, has an internal dynamic of its own.

But we are not yet past the point where civilized discussion and rational agreement are possible.

We have made progress. In the past nine years, we have seen: total disarmament in Antarctica; a nuclear test ban undersea, in the atmosphere and in outer space; an atomic quarantine for Latin America; a nuclear non-proliferation treaty to curb the spread of weapons and technology.

Other efforts are underway in the Middle East and in Europe.

We have solved the problem of mutual distrust by developing elaborate and effective detection, inspection and surveillance systems.

So we are not approaching the SALT talks as neophytes.

We know that agreement is essential in the nuclear age; we have learned that agreement is possible in the nuclear age.

We recognize that there is an element of risk involved -- there is an element of risk in any undertaking. But mankind -- like the turtle -- will never make progress if he is afraid to stick his neck out.

When we measure the risk involved in arms control against the risk of continued escalation, reason dictates that we take the risk for peace. At worst, it is a limited risk.

Any agreement we make will be subject to inspection and enforcement. Advanced techniques in science and technology have made nuclear monitoring virtually foolproof for both the major powers.

But without a moratorium on MIRV and MRV testing, all our carefully developed detection and inspection systems will be obsolete.

We could still count the missile silos. But the count would be meaningless unless we could get inside the silo -- indeed, inside the nose cone, itself, and count the number of war heads in each missile.

Not even the most dedicated arms control expert hopes for that kind of inspection agreement!!!

Thus MIRV -- and future generations of multiple warhead systems -- will end the hope of meaningful arms control by making effective monitoring virtually impossible.

I have no illusions about the difficulties inherent in the SALT negotiations.

Bilateral arms control with the Soviet Union has always been difficult. It will continue to be difficult.

But given the nightmare future the United States and the Soviet Union -- and the rest of the earth -- will face if the arms race continues, we have a profound obligation to try.

On behalf of our own and future generations, let us at this moment in history summon the extra measure of courage, wisdom and vision that can bring victory home from Vienna.

And let history record that America was not the country that denied the people of this planet a chance for survival.

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Tom Vahlen

REMARKS

BY

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION

OF MINNESOTA

11 Economic Development

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└ It is just over a decade that we have had the ICBM.

└ Today, in 1970, we have a national arsenal of some 4,500 strategic nuclear warheads - almost all with more than 50 times the explosive power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima 25 years ago.

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└ Overkill has become the catchword of the nuclear age. └ It is too simple today to note that we already have enough megatonnage in our nuclear stockpiles to blow up each man, woman and child in the world 200 times over.

└ Today we talk in terms of delivery systems - of who can get there first with enough destructive power to make a retaliatory strike impossible. - '1st Strike'

L Talk of first and second strike capability, of "hard" targets (enemy installations) and "soft" targets (enemy cities and people) has absorbed the Pentagon's technicians and wordsmiths for the last several years.

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clear vision is essential - but so is a hard head

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Outer Space has been ruled out for Nuclear weapons - and we now have a treaty banning the nuclear weapons ^{installations} for the ^{outer} space work has started on securing a second environment the seabed - from encroachment by weapons of mass destruction

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