

International Symposium

REMARKS OF THE

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A STRATEGY FOR PEACE

✓ Dr. Sifer  
 ✓ Dr. Tarter  
 ✓ Robert White  
 ✓ Dr. Hauptman

↳ In the final three decades of the 20th Century, three challenges confront the Society of Man.

They are --

Peace

Population and

Ecology.

↳ The survival of our species will be determined by how we confront each of these challenges.

↳ By the year 2000 the current world population of 3.5 billion will double to 7 billion. ✓  
 ↳ Unchecked it will keep on doubling every 30 years. ✓  
 ↳ Population pressures serve ~~only~~ to compound our inability to cope with the problems of environment and the opportunity for peace.

↳ Similarly, unless we come to grips with environmental pollution, we will jeopardize the quality of life that increased technology and wealth can provide.

↳ The same realism and depth of analysis that we shall and must apply to the crises of population and our environment must be applied to the challenge of peace.

No problem is more pressing.

None is more fundamental to our survival.

No other is more elusive.

↳ Yet, unless we meet this -- the primary challenge of our time -- all other discussions -- indeed all other problems -- will be moot,

↳ At the core of the problem is our relationship with the Soviet Union. ↳ As it has been aptly put -- we are like scorpions in a bottle able to sting each other only at the price of death!

↳ Clearly then the first element in a <sup>new</sup> strategy of peace must be to define and enlarge the areas of enlightened self-interest between ourselves and our potential adversaries -- first and foremost the Soviet Union and, secondarily, Communist China.

↳ As between ourselves and the Soviet Union, the issue of paramount concern must be the arms race - particularly the strategic nuclear arms race.

↳ Each escalation results only in counter escalation.

↳ Each escalation is a drain on resources that both governments would need to deploy elsewhere,

↳ Each escalation serves to compound further the state of terror in which we have lived since the birth of the nuclear age.

*Therefore,* We must lift the emotional state of seige that has dominated international relations for the past quarter century.

↳ The opportunity for that breakthrough will come on April 16, 1970, in Vienna, Austria, when the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between ourselves and the Soviet Union convene,

↳ To signify our good faith in entering into these critical negotiations, the United States should declare an immediate moratorium on further MIRV (Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles) testing and the further deployment of offensive and defensive missile systems.

In imposing this restraint upon ourselves, we should call upon the Soviet Union to do the same.

↳ There are clear precedents for such actions.

We have taken similar calculated risks for peace in the past.

↳ In the course of the extended negotiations for the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty -- ~~I am proud of my part in its accomplishment~~ -- President Eisenhower, in 1958, offered to withhold further American testing for a period of one year from the beginning of negotiations, if the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union would follow suit.

↳ In spite of subsequent Soviet testing, both the United States and the Soviet Union did not conduct tests for a period of almost three years. Soviet testing resumed in 1961 only after the French had conducted a number of tests.

↳ Atmospheric tests were conducted by both sides in 1963. However, when nuclear test ban negotiations were scheduled in Moscow, President Kennedy announced:

"The United States does not propose to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere so long as other states do not do so. . .Such a declaration is not a substitute for a formal binding treaty, but I hope it will help us to achieve one."

↳ This second moratorium on testing continued until it was supplanted by the Test Ban Treaty.

↳ The moratorium I recommend on the testing and deployment of nuclear missiles would be wholly consistent with the brave example set by both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy in helping us to achieve the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

↳ We have less than two months to make a decision that will determine the future of mankind.

~~In April the SALT negotiators re-convene in Vienna.~~

↳ If the Soviet team is unwilling to negotiate further development of SS9s and a halt in their MRV testing -- or if the American team is not prepared to negotiate a moratorium on MIRV testing, and to discuss the President's proposed ABM expansion: then it is unlikely indeed that man will again be in a position to limit the strategic arms race.

↳ The MIRV will become an anachronism beside the Advanced Ballistic Re-Entry System of the late 70's (we have already spent over half a billion dollars on the ABRES) and new systems like the Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy (SCAD) and the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) will make present weapons look like kindergarten toys.

↳ In any technology there is a built-in momentum -- it is as human to seek a better guidance system as to build a better mousetrap.

Growth for the sake of growth, like change for the sake of change, has an internal dynamic of its own.

↳ But we are not yet past the point where civilized discussion and rational agreement are possible.

We have made progress. In the past nine years, we have seen:

- . . . total disarmament in Antarctica;
- . . . a nuclear test ban undersea, in the atmosphere and in outer space;
- . . . an atomic quarantine for Latin America;
- . . . a nuclear non-proliferation treaty to curb the spread of weapons and technology;
  - - Outer Space has been ruled out for nuclear weapons.
  - - Work has started on securing a second environment - the seabed - from encroachment by weapons of mass destruction.

We have solved the problem of mutual distrust by developing elaborate and effective detection, inspection and surveillance systems.

So we are not approaching the SALT talks as neophytes.

We know that agreement is essential in the nuclear age; we have learned that agreement is possible in the nuclear age.

We recognize that there is an element of risk involved -- there is an element of risk in any undertaking. But mankind -- like the turtle -- will never make progress if he is afraid to stick his neck out.

When we measure the risk involved in arms control against the risk of continued escalation, reason dictates that we take the risk for peace. At worst, it is a limited risk!

Any agreement we make will be subject to inspection and enforcement. Advanced techniques in science and technology have made nuclear monitoring virtually foolproof for both the major powers.

But without a moratorium on MIRV and MRV testing, all our carefully developed detection and inspection systems will be obsolete.

~~Yes we could still count the missile silos. But the count would be meaningless unless we could get inside the silo -- indeed, inside the nose cone itself, and count the number of war heads in each missile.~~

Not even the most dedicated arms control expert hopes for that kind of inspection agreement!!

Thus MIRV -- and future generations of multiple warhead systems -- will end the hope of meaningful arms control by making effective monitoring virtually impossible.

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I have no illusions about the difficulties inherent in the SALT negotiations.

Bilateral arms control with the Soviet Union has always been difficult. It will continue to be difficult.

But given the nightmare future the United States and the Soviet Union -- and the rest of the earth -- will face if the arms race continues, we have a profound obligation to try.

\* \* \* \* \*

We have paid a heavy toll in Vietnam in life and material resources. We must acknowledge not only the division among our own people, but recognize with equal candor that it has eroded our credentials in the Councils of Peace. Those are facts, not moral judgments.

As we seek expeditiously to resolve that conflict and to disengage -- as I believe we must -- we can act with courage to demonstrate our good faith upon entering the most fateful international negotiations in our history -- the arms limitations talks.

A moratorium on MIRV testing and deployment, will contribute substantially to the chances of success of those talks, just as the moratorium on nuclear testing facilitated the conclusion of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Middle East \* \* \* \* \*

The Middle East is another arena where we and the Russians must define an area of self-interest.

As a matter of primary importance, the United States should undertake efforts to bring about face-to-face negotiations between the parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict including efforts under the auspices of the United Nations. I further recommend that the United States ask the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France to join in an international appeal for a complete cease-fire, thereby reaffirming their commitment to support the United Nations Cease-fire Resolution.



If current events continue to drift and tensions increase, the Middle East can become the most likely area of the world to spark nuclear confrontation.

The Soviet Union has been playing a risky game in the Middle East -- risky for them -- risky for us -- and risky for all mankind.

We can only dissuade the Soviets from their dangerous course if we choose the path of patient *and persistent* work for peace.

We can meet the challenge of economic development. . .to help the Middle Eastern nations develop jointly their great wealth of resources. . . for the use of all mankind.

We can work to make the Mediterranean -- not a sea of conflict -- but a sea of friendship.

We can act -- pursuing our mutual commitment to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons -- to keep such weapons out of the region.

We can try to prevent the recurrence of local wars through the United Nations and other means; and we can seek to resolve the causes of these wars.

These avenues are our best -- and only -- choice.

The search for peace depends on our convincing the Soviets to turn their efforts in the Middle East to peaceful development. . . economic development. Our interests in the stability of the region are parallel. Its volatility. . .and the danger that we could be brought into nuclear confrontation by a Middle East war. . .demand that we work together to preserve the peace.

L I would urge a conference of the principal weapon suppliers to the region -- the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom and ourselves -- not to propound an ultimate solution for the parties to conflict -- but rather to establish a Regional Development Authority. All countries interested in the Mediterranean and Middle East should be invited to participate. Resources now going into weaponry should be diverted to a capital fund for development.

As Pope Paul has said, "Development is the new name for peace."

Neither the security of Israel nor that of any Arab state would be jeopardized by this approach.

~~But~~ L The United States should make every effort to reduce the flow of arms into the area and press for Middle East Arms limitation arrangements.

However, pending such an arrangement, the United States must remain prepared to correct or prevent an arms imbalance which might either threaten Israel's existence or contribute to a resumption of major hostilities.

L Although Israel must not be made insecure by any failure on our part -- there is a painful lesson to be learned -- arms beget arms!

L We cannot hope for peace. . . permanent peace. . . unless there are comprehensive agreements among the major suppliers of arms to the area -- and by the recipient countries themselves. This arms race must not go unchecked -- for the sake of the people of the region. . . for the sake of all of us.

We cannot expect sudden success. . .an overnight end to conflict, but we can hope that quiet counsel. . .patient effort. . .will lead these countries along the path of peace.

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↳ The Nuclear Age calls for a New Diplomacy --

--We should schedule regular annual working meetings at the highest level between United States and Soviet Leaders. ↳ The Nato Alliance must become an international instrument for peaceful engagement through persistent diplomacy of negotiation and conference with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries.

--We can and should <sup>open</sup> the channels of trade between ourselves, eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

--We can and should encourage and support the recent efforts of Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany in his initiatives with East Germany, border settlements with Poland, and trade expansion with all countries of Eastern Europe.

--NATO and Warsaw Pact countries should explore together the possibility of a European Mutual Security Pact leading to mutual reductions in military forces.

Regular and continuing contacts to explore these and similar proposals would lie at the core of the New Diplomacy -- informal meetings -- free of the high expectations that surround irregular summit meetings.

For over twenty years our policy has been to *contain and* isolate mainland China. To isolate that land is both difficult and dangerous.

The resumption of American-Chinese discussions in Warsaw is a hopeful development. We must exert greater initiatives in the relaxation of trade and travel restrictions between China and the United States. Cultural exchange can also serve to broaden the contacts between our peoples.

These initiatives -- and always in full consultation with our Allies -- can lead to the eventual diplomatic recognition of mainland China and China's admission to the United Nations.

Neither of these steps constitutes our moral approval of that government or of any of its policies anymore than similar recognition can be regarded as approval of the government or policies of the Soviet Union. However, both of those steps will provide an increased opportunity for contact and accommodation.

Widening the contacts between our two peoples is to everyone's interest. Chinese Communist missiles will not be stopped by barriers of non-recognition and isolation. Given the great military strength provided by our nuclear shield, we can best avoid the insanity of possible nuclear exchange with Communist China by beginning the long hard work of negotiations now.

It is in our interest to do this.

It is in the interest of the Chinese as well.

Delay only will make the job of finding the basis for accommodation more difficult.

The Sino-Soviet dispute is real. With its limited resources, the Chinese cannot accept the contingency of major confrontations with both the Soviet Union and ourselves.

Clearly, we should not take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Such folly would only serve to prohibit accommodation with either the Soviet Union or China. However, we can maintain a flexible and open attitude toward both to increase the chances for understanding.

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↳ While control of the arms race must be negotiated principally between ourselves and the Soviet Union, there are significant unilateral steps that we can take to reduce international tension.

↳ Our military strength is unsurpassed. However, that very security provides us with the basis to examine our own military expenditures. This must be the next element in our strategy for peace.

↳ A new generation, at home and abroad, rejects the old premises of war and diplomacy. They want to see greater emphasis placed on human and personal values -- having enough to eat.....being able to learn.....living free of fear.

It is for us to help them realize their hopes for a world free of the tyrannies of war and oppression and inequality.

↳ In the United States this focus and new sense of urgency concerning pressing domestic problems demands an open reassessment of our priorities.

↳ Without that careful reassessment, there can be no assurance that peace in Vietnam will automatically provide the resources needed to do the job at home.

↳ It is not just military budgets that must be examined.

↳ We must also examine the assumptions on which those budgets are predicated.

↳ The most fundamental decisions determining the size of military budgets are rarely subject to outside review and debate in the public arena.

Those fundamental decisions include -

- What are the nation's commitments around the world?
- Against what sort of contingencies or threats do we build our peace time forces to meet those commitments?
- What force levels are needed to meet those contingencies?
- And, with what weapons systems should those forces be equipped?

An in depth analysis of each of these questions would raise the following issues --

-- Must our military forces be maintained to simultaneously fight a major war in Europe, another in Asia and a brushfire conflict in the Western Hemisphere?

-- Do we need a Navy equipped to fight a long full-scale non-nuclear war with the Soviet Union?

-- Do we need to maintain 15 attack carrier task forces?

↳ These are only three among the many assumptions on which our military budget is predicated -- each of them at a cost of many billions of dollars each year.

↳ For peace in the world and progress at home, we need to bring these questions into the arena of public debate.

There is no one more concerned or dedicated to the preservation of our national security than *myself*. No strategy for peace is acceptable which would jeopardize that security.

Clearly the sufficiency of our military strength must be maintained. However, we do have a reasonable right to question what is in fact sufficient, and to be assured that what is being spent for military hardware is predicated on realistic and sensible contingencies.

Sizeable reductions in military spending predicated on realistic planning for our national security will free resources for application to domestic needs.

It will also demonstrate to the Soviet Union our determination to pull back from the abyss of terror.

Hopefully, it will encourage the Russians to do the same.

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A third element in our strategy for peace must be to improve and deal realistically with the institutions for peace.

The International Court of Justice is for the first time since its inception without a single case pending on its docket.

In some measure, that is true because the United States, under the Connally Reservation, has refused to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Other nations have imposed comparable reservations.

Similarly, 24 years ago at San Francisco we did not protest the establishment of the Great Power right to exercise a veto in the Security Council of the United Nations.

These are hard realities about ourselves as they affect the international instruments of peace. If those instruments are to be at all effective in the quest for peace, we must squarely recognize those realities. Harder yet to accept is the fact that those realities may not be amenable to constructive change in the foreseeable future. We are going to have to learn to work with the international institutions for peace in spite of the limitations that we have imposed on them.

Certainly, it would be much easier and far more satisfying for me sanctimoniously to propose "Charter Reform" -- the elimination of the Security Council Veto -- a new system of weighted voting in the General Assembly.

As worthy as such reforms may be, it is unlikely that they shall be achieved or even seriously considered presently.

However, the recognition of these hard realities does not mean that we should not seek to make the United Nations a more effective instrument for peace within the confines of its limitations. Whatever its imperfections as an instrument for peace may be -- it is the instrument we have to work with.

If unilateral American peacekeeping is not acceptable it does not mean that there can be no peacekeeping. It must be peacekeeping by the United Nations or by regional agencies.

The basis of any world peacekeeping system must be a commitment to non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. But this policy will only work if it is respected by all states -- large and small -- and if there is an effective instrument in the United Nations to serve the interests, not of individual states, but of peace itself.

A policy of mutual non-interference is not just an ideal -- it is the only way to preserve peace in this world. But it will work only if the pledges of non-interference are backed up by the United Nations forces which can patrol borders and supervise free elections.

Such practical results have been achieved by the United Nations in Cyprus, the Congo and Kashmir. Even in the Middle East some stability was maintained by the presence of the United Nations force until the United Arab Republic demanded its withdrawal.

However, the peacekeeping capacity of the United Nations can be enlarged only if its members -- particularly those who have only limited international power -- earmark and train units of their armed forces for international peacekeeping assignments.

To aid in such efforts, we should

- use our military assistance program to help less developed countries prepare units of their armed forces for UN and regional peacekeeping assignments.
- launch a new effort to resolve the UN's financial crisis.
- call for the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping fund, with an initial twenty million dollars, to help the United Nations launch emergency operations without delay. If we want peace -- we, and all nations, must be prepared to pay for it.

If our realities indicate that the United Nations cannot be a fully effective fire department, we can see that it is equipped as a significant instrument of fire prevention.

Here in the United States, we have learned the value of fact finders and mediators to mobilize opinion behind a reasonable settlement of disputes. The United Nations should establish a permanent panel of highly-skilled fact finders and mediators to apply themselves to disputes that threaten world peace.

The designing of instruments to help to end conflict and to provide for the mediation of crises will be of little use if we do not strike at the causes of future conflicts before they arise.

*Pope John*

*"Where there is constant war, there is no Peace."*

Therefore, the fourth element in our strategy for peace must be a global effort at economic development.

The time has come for a new approach to world development. We have learned that national burdens can be lifted -- if international burdens can be shared.

*Dexter Filkins*  
"Partners in Development"

We need not merely a new level of effort, but a greater emphasis on multilateral cooperation.

The multilateral agencies which are to be the instruments of a new philosophy of aid must broaden their capacity to assist the developing countries in effective long-range planning. Considerations of the pressures of population as well as the challenge of living with our environment must be part of the total aid-planning picture.

And, we must be willing to help nations to develop while avoiding the temptation to insist not only that virtue be done, but that our particular version of virtue be implemented in our particular way.

We will not be alone in this effort. New efforts should be made in the coming years to enlist the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the global war on poverty. Development should mean cooperation -- not competition -- because the peace it provides is in our common interest.

Realistic negotiations with our adversaries, open and critical evaluations of our military expenditures, a realistic dedication to improve the international institutions of peace and a relentless determination to come to grips with pervasive human misery in the less developed countries are the basic elements in the strategy of peace I propose.

We are in the business of international responsibility to stay. Setbacks and disappointments, division and disagreement must not lead to disillusionment. Let us look to the possibilities unmet. It is a challenge that will tax our will, our resources and our endurance.

It will be the work of many years.

It is our destiny.

In the final analysis, it is our only alternative.

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