

R E M A R K S

THE HONORABLE HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

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AMERICA IN THE WORLD

The war in Vietnam has now marked its quarter-century and American involvement is rapidly approaching a full decade. It has cost us more than 40,000 American lives, more than \$100 billion of American wealth, and more division and discord at home than we can bear much longer.

We entered the war a confident nation concerned with our ability to foster peace and security in many parts of the world; we are leaving it a nation uncertain of ourselves, uncertain of the future, uncertain of our place in the world. This coming out of war is a difficult time; Alexis de Tocqueville called it 'the most important time in the life of a country'.

What have we learned? What lessons have we bought in blood in Southeast Asia? What will we think and do now that differs from our posture of a decade ago?

These are not simple questions, and they do not have simple answers. But we do know that the Vietnam war has caused something to happen in America. It has changed our country and our people. It has compelled us to re-examine our role in the world; to see in historical perspective what we have done; and to ask what our responsibilities for peace and security are today.

Twenty-five years ago, we were nearing the end of a bitter and costly world war. We looked forward hopefully to a new world at peace.

We had a dream of Allied amity and cooperation, and of strong moral limits on the use of power -- limits to be observed by all nations.

That dream soon faded. We found that only America had the means and the will to save much of the world either from a new tyranny imposed by military force, or from the ravages of economic collapse and a widespread poverty of the human spirit.

We resolved not to repeat our mistake of the 1920's. We accepted the role of international responsibility. We refused to turn our backs on Europe and other parts of the world that desperately needed our aid. We were determined to hold off the return of isolation, and we worked diligently to build structures of collective security that would bring order out of near chaos. This massive effort -- one which we had no choice but to initiate -- took us suddenly into a new and often confusing era in our history. We abandoned almost overnight the most basic tenet of our foreign policy: to "beware of

entangling alliances."

Our new involvement -- including our repudiation of isolationism -- was underscored by our leadership in creating the United Nations, in forging the NATO Alliance, and in vast investments in foreign aid.

Today our network of commitments stretches around the world, and involves alliances with 43 different nations. In less than three decades -- an instant of time in man's history -- we grew from provincial state to super-power, with the greatest physical and economic power the world has ever known.

There was no precedent for this development. No other nation has been required to do -- and learn -- so much in so little time. And I believe that we met the demands placed upon us with a surprising degree of sophistication and success. We used our power and generously shared our resources to bring political stability and economic recovery to nations ravaged by World War II. We provided a shield of protection behind which other peoples and nations could once again stand strong and renewed. We met the fierce force of aggression in Korea. We sought to bring stability to the Middle East. We extended our power and resources bit by bit into Southeast Asia until we were engulfed in a strange and cruel war that defied all norms of conventional warfare.

That war in Vietnam has brought with it such disillusionment and discord that many Americans of every political persuasion now question anew all United States overseas involvements. But we must not let our experience in Vietnam obscure the fact that for twenty-five years we helped preserve the world from a major war and, in particular, from a nuclear holocaust.

What costly lessons have we learned from the sorrow of Vietnam? We have learned above all that we must now carefully assess all of our national interests, free from an ideology of involvement and tested by hard, uncompromising analysis. Underlying all the rhetoric about Vietnam is the belief that we are overcommitted and that there are limits to the use of military power and these limits need to be defined. We must not become deeply involved where we have little at stake, or where our own security can be protected by other means than armed intervention. We must exercise that thoughtful discretion which is the better part of valor.

This is one lesson of Vietnam -- the signal lesson -- but it is more. It also reflects a new sense in America that we must turn our minds and talents, and direct our resources, to pressing needs at home.

The traditional line dividing domestic from foreign affairs has become as indistinct as a line drawn through water. This means that our place in the world, and the nature of our own society, have become indivisible. Our structure of common defense and security could prove to be only a hard outer shell that could collapse on an empty center unless we bring new strength to areas of our internal life that are threatened on every side.

However, there are growing fears that the new questioning of our involvement in the world will lead us to another period of isolation that we will abandon our current role of international involvement and return to isolation and Fortress America. Our Allies in Europe are especially concerned; and their fears are fostered by misguided efforts in the United States to regard all of our separate commitments in the world as indivisible -- seeing in our disengagement from Vietnam the threat that we will abandon Europe as well.

Nothing could be more absurd. Today it is impossible for us to isolate ourselves physically from the rest of the world. The facts of communications, transport, trade, and the travels of our people have ruled that out, not just for now but for all time.

Yet there is a danger of a new moral isolation, brought about in part by our failure to see that recovery and prosperity as found in Europe, does not mean that the job is done. Nor must we permit our weariness with war and responsibility to trap us into believing that we can now separate ourselves from a deep and lasting involvement in the rest of the world. On the contrary, we are now fully committed to playing a major role in the future of mankind.

We can -- and we must -- readjust the scale and nature of our involvements, and manage these changes intelligently. But we must be careful not to act in haste, nor to explore a short-sighted and ultimately futile moral disengagement from the world. There are equal dangers -- of over-involvement and blind abstention. We must carefully steer a course between the two.

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In recent years, we have seen the development of a central paradox: That while we and the Soviet Union have become more powerful in strictly military terms, our ability to use this power has become more limited. We must not underestimate the latent power and effects of nuclear weapons. They are still of central importance in relations among the major nations of the world. But now, at a time of mutual deterrence, their mystique is dwindling and other expressions of power are emerging in competition with them.

We are living in a new age of pluralism:

-- the bonds of alliances are weakening, both in the West and in the Communist world;

-- Sino-Soviet rivalry has become a threat to peace, and firm evidence that the Communist monolith is no more.

-- the game of world politics now has a host of new players in the developing world; and

-- individual countries are making new diplomatic approaches and arrangements with little reference to the super-powers that once were virtually the sole custodians of security. Even Soviet military occupation of Czechoslovakia has failed to quash hopeful developments in Eastern Europe.

In today's world, power is proving to be persuasive only to the extent that it is appropriate to local circumstances and the interests of local powers. We are discovering a new definition of power that goes beyond military might.

The plain fact is that, in the world of today, there is a much greater play of other power forces -- economic, political and psychological. And there is the emergence of new problems, such as the growing division between rich nations and poor, that have little relation to military might.

Almost everywhere, there is a return to the power of ideas and ideals, not just within a younger generation that reacts against the ceaseless combat of its elders, but emerging in every generation and every place where the writ of nuclear power no longer runs.

Effective action in the world now often means the application of wealth, talent, and ideals -- not just by the super-powers, but by many nations.

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In these changed circumstances, how can we develop a new role for the United States in the 1970's? What can our country do in the world that we help to build peace, stability and ordered change? To a great extent, the answer to these questions will depend on our ability to develop new methods and approaches that are rooted less in our military power and more in what we have to offer other nations in ideas, resources, and experience.

But first and foremost, we must help preserve life itself from the threat of nuclear war. This is no simple or preordained process; we cannot take for granted our survival in the nuclear age.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union now have far more nuclear power than needed to deter one another. Each of us could destroy the world with a million Hiroshimas; and neither of us can benefit from added nuclear strength, which may even decrease the security of everyone.

For twenty years, we have lived with the doctrines of deterrence, not because we welcomed the prospect of a cataclysmic nuclear war following the first use of these terrible weapons, but because we had no other choice. In the last few years, we managed to add a small measure of stability to this mad balance of nuclear armaments: a mutual deterrence that has made each of us as much a custodian of the other's basic security as we are of our own. This mutual deterrence is based on healthy distrust, but it is secured by the evidence of reconnaissance satellites and other means of unilateral inspection.

This was a novel development -- unprecedented -- but it was and is necessary for either Russia or the United States -- indeed, for anyone in the world -- to survive the nuclear age.

Today, we are rapidly entering a period of new super-weapons in which we will no longer be sure of deterring the Russians and -- as strange as it may seem to us -- they will have similar doubts about their ability to deter us.

This April in Vienna, we will resume direct negotiations with the Soviet Union to try to prevent this new phase of the arms race. But we must not jeopardize these talks now by a pell-mell rush to prepare the very weapons that are the subject of discussion. We must not sow seeds of distrust that will bring forth deadly fruit.

Instead, we must stop deploying the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile System and insist that the Soviet Union stop deploying their giant SS-9 missiles. But we must lead.

We must also stop testing the Multiple, Independently-Targetable, Re-entry Vehicle -- the most frightening weapon ever developed. MIRV is no simple qualitative improvement in destructive power: it is a quantum jump, and calls into question all of our basic assumptions about deterrence and survival.

Without a moratorium on the testing of MIRV's, by both sides, all of our carefully developed detection and inspection systems will become obsolete.

We could still count the missile silos -- as we do now. But the count would be meaningless unless we could get inside the silo -- indeed, inside the nose cone itself, and count the number of warheads on each missile.

Not even the most dedicated arms control expert hopes for that kind of inspection agreement.

Thus the completion of the test program for MIRV -- when the weapons could be built and deployed in secrecy -- will destroy any real chance to find a safe and secure end to the arms race, by making effective monitoring virtually impossible.

We have only a few short months to act, before it will be too late to stop the next spiral in the deadly race of nuclear arms.

We have valuable precedents to support decisive action now. In 1958, President Eisenhower offered to halt American testing of nuclear weapons for a period of one year from the beginning of negotiations on a formal treaty, if the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union would follow suit. This mutual moratorium was preserved for nearly three years.

In 1963, President Kennedy again ordered a halt to testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, and proposed to maintain the ban so long as the Russians did likewise. They responded, and the result was the historic Test-Ban Treaty -- a proposal I had long urged.

Today, I call upon President Nixon to halt deployment of ABM and testing of MIRV. Like President Kennedy, he holds in his hands the keys to arms control -- or to an uncertain world of mutual terror.

We would run no serious risks; and we could always continue our programs if the Russians failed to respond.

I believe that such a moratorium can succeed; and all mankind -- all future generations -- would forever be in our debt.

But even if we do succeed -- even if we do stop the dangerous and destabilizing weapons now being prepared by both sides, there will be other terrifying weapons in the future.

This prospect increases the importance of the SALT talks. Whether or not we succeed in stopping the MIRV, the ABM and the SS-9 before it is too late, we must work patiently with the Soviet Union to achieve one common goal: continued survival in a world where nuclear technology itself is our greatest enemy.

From now on, we must both base much of our security on greater political understanding, or we will have no security at all.

I do not argue that we can trust the Russians in all of our relations with them. We cannot: they are still not prepared to consider agreements with us or with our allies in many areas of the world in which competition and conflicts of interest could still have deadly consequences. But unless we transform Soviet-American relations in the critical area of nuclear weapons, we may not live to debate other question of serious but lesser importance.

This will require a new diplomacy, managed with skill and patience, and extending far beyond the SALT talks. We must recognize that there is no easy exit from the many dilemmas facing us; we must take full account of the interests of our allies, in Europe and elsewhere; and we must seek ways to turn all aspects of our relationship with the Soviet Union from the sterile byways of military confrontation into the more hopeful paths of political accommodation.

We could usefully begin regular annual working meetings at the highest level between American and Russian leaders. And we should expand trade relations, cultural contacts, and the search for peaceful engagement.

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Our relations with the Soviet Union are of central importance. But other developments in the 1970's demand our attention; other factors will influence what the United States can usefully do in the world.

Most important among these is the emergence of China as a major power in Asia. Today, Chinese power is still more psychological than factual, although it is growing. It would be a fatal error if we let ignorance and unreasoning fear in the face of future Chinese military power close the door to political understandings with Peking.

* * * * *

We must do all we can to end the isolation of China, helping to bring her into the community of nations, free from paranoia and committed to respecting the legitimate rights of her neighbors. An isolated China is a danger to all the world; a China that is involved with the outside world will still pose problems, and perhaps even threats of a serious nature, but at least there will be some hope that accomodation will replace antagonism.

The resumption of American-Chinese discussions in Warsaw is a hopeful development. We must exert greater initiatives in the relaxation of trade and travel restrictions between China and the United States. Cultural exchanges can also serve to broaden the contacts between our peoples..

These are modest beginnings; and they will not be enough. But we must also realize that the legacy of embittered Chinese-American relations will not be overcome in a year, or perhaps even in a decade. We can do much to come to terms with China, and come to terms with ourselves regarding China. Yet it may well take years before these efforts produce a visible change in our relations, before China will respond to our efforts. Our initiatives -- always taken in full consultation with our allies -- can lead to the eventual diplomatic recognition of China and her admission to the United Nations. This is also a part of the new diplomacy.

The primary responsibility for security and development in Asia rests with the Asian nations themselves. They must take the lead. It is they who best understand themselves -- their past and their hopes for the future. We should be prepared to cooperate -- to be a helpful partner, not a dominating force. We do have an interest in Asia -- but we are not an Asian power. We are a Pacific power.

Chief among these Asian nations is Japan, with whom we have strong ties. These ties must be continued and expanded as the best hope of promoting development and stability in Asia without holding the ring ourselves.

Japan is uniquely situated. She is the most powerful Asian country -- not in military might or in nuclear weapons, but in economic strength, a thorough knowledge of the continent and its diverse cultures, widespread trading partnerships, and an inventive approach to new problems. These qualities enhance Japan's ability to play a leading role in helping Asia to enter an era of political, social and economic development.

We should continue, particularly during this period of transition, to be directly concerned with Asian affairs. We seek an early end to the Vietnam war; but we cannot ignore the real problems that will continue in Southeast Asia once we are gone from Vietnam. Without becoming an Asian power, deeply enmeshed in the politics and problems of that continent, we can and should support hopeful efforts by local peoples to work out their own destiny.

In September, 1968, at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, I gave my views on Southeast Asia in my speech entitled "The New Strategy for Peace." I said then that whatever role we play in Southeast Asia should carefully follow three guidelines: self-help; regional and multilateral assistance; and selective American involvement:

--first, local countries must manifest a willingness to help themselves, both to provide security and to undertake economic and social development; and they must have the courage to organize their own affairs in ways that will provide them with a stable basis for governing:

--second, primary responsibility for helping individual nations provide for their security and economic development should rest with the nations in the area and with multilateral and regional organizations and;

--third, American help should be selective and carefully measured. Our efforts must be justified by our own interests and responsibilities; and they should be concentrated on economic

development through multilateral means. We are no longer the only source of help against threats to the security of Southeast Asia, or against poverty. Hopeful developments there will be lasting only if they spring from efforts by local countries, and if they command broad popular support.

Our experience in Southeast Asia points to a central dilemma in foreign policy: the difficulty of reconciling stability with change. Today, we recognize that the stability of Soviet-American relations is necessary for the survival of the world. But we also recognize that unless there can be change in the world -- economic, social and political change within countries and in international society -- then stability, itself, will prove fruitless and self-defeating.

We must find new ways to promote change within a framework of order, or the future of the world will be tyrannized by either anarchy or repression.

We can begin by supporting efforts within Europe to move away from twenty years of confrontation, to a new European Commonwealth of nations embracing the entire Continent.

The United States no longer has the dominating voice in European politics; nor do we wish it. But we are a European power, deeply involved in providing security and confidence, without which there would be no hope of change.

There is a movement in the United States, today, to reduce our commitment to NATO before we work out firm understandings with all nations in Europe -- East and West -- on the future of the Continent.

Would this be wise? We will not achieve mutual and balanced force reductions if we act first and alone; we will not convince the Soviet Union to accept rules of civilized behavior in Eastern Europe if we lose interest in European affairs; we will not reassure our allies that we are concerned with the future of Europe if we are insensitive to their anxieties and needs.

We must show that our partnership with Europe really means something, and support efforts to resolve the division of the Continent. As a part of the new diplomacy:

--we should encourage our Allies' in their proposal for a European Security Conference, and realize that this conference can be part of the political process that can help achieve what we want -- troop reductions throughout Europe.

--we should have more sensitivity and understanding when our allies express concern that we may deal over their heads in the SALT talks;

--we should make consultation, particularly on force levels, a real on-going effort -- with regular meetings at the highest level -- not a vehicle for showmanship and American lecturing to our European allies;

--we should encourage bi-lateral political contacts between our allies and the nations of the Warsaw Pact, including West German efforts to improve relations with the East;

--we should work for expanded trade and cultural relations between East and West;

--and we should help to make the NATO alliance an international instrument for peaceful engagement, not a rigid institution committed to the past. With our allies, we can help to liquidate the legacy of military confrontation. But this will require a new American awareness of Europe's needs, problems, and hopes.

Elsewhere in the world, the dilemma of change versus order will be even more difficult to resolve, yet more pressing, as population growth, poverty, and unrest disrupt whole continents.

There are more than a billion people in the world today in countries where the average annual income per person is less than 100 dollars. Hundreds of millions live on less than fifty dollars a year.

Evidence has shown us that poverty and deprivation, coupled with the beginning of education and hope, create a revolution of rising expectations.

And people all over the world are "in touch." The transistor radio and communications satellite will make this even more so in the immediate future.

The man in Korea, or Guatemala, or Zambia knows what modern society can mean to his family. He knows what you and I have. He knows about our wealth. He knows about the vast resources at our command, and at the command of other fortunate nations.

This knowledge helps to widen even further the growing gap between the have and have not peoples of the earth. Inequality is polarizing the world between north and south, rich and poor, white and non-white. This is a recipe for strife, both between the world's divided halves, and throughout the developing world.

As an American I take pride in the well-being and relative affluence we have been able to create for an increasing number of our citizens. But I also feel shame at the hunger, poverty, and deprivation which surrounds this prosperous island of the Western world.

Today, our material contribution to the developing world is far below the scant 1% of GNP proposed for development aid by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Our foreign aid has dropped to a post-war low. We have fallen behind many of our European Allies, and other countries that recognize, as did Pope Paul, that "Development is the new name for peace."

By ignoring this fact, we are taking a tremendous risk. We are trying to have the best of all possible worlds -- rightly giving up unilateral American peacekeeping, but at the same time turning our backs on the economic needs of development.

This will not work; it will only be self-defeating. Let us face the problem squarely: either we will take a strong lead in the development of the poorer half of the world, or one day its great social and economic problems will engulf us all as surely as would a nuclear war. We must choose our weapons to secure the peace: ideas and resources today, or guns and troops tomorrow.

We Americans, as part of our responsibility to mankind, must commit ourselves anew to economic and social development, including control of the growth of population.

Our commitment should be to nation-building -- and not to buying favors in the developed world. Our interest is in having nations that are independent and secure -- and thereby free to pursue their own development within the community of nations.

But to do this effectively, we must channel the bulk of our aid through multilateral institutions. This will place heavy demands upon the United Nations and other organizations, like the World Bank and regional efforts for development in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. At present, we pay too little attention to these institutions, often regarding them as poor relations to more powerful initiatives we take on our own in foreign affairs. Yet for many nations, and in many parts of the world, only institutions like the UN can provide the help that is needed, free from complications of super-power relations or national self-interest.

This applies to peacekeeping as well. If American peacekeeping

is to be curtailed, that does not mean that there can be no peacekeeping. It must be done by the United Nations or by regional agencies. Only this can help to prevent the drift of disordered change into open conflict, and to stem the tide of human suffering.

The basis of any system of peacekeeping must be a commitment to non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. But this policy will only work if it is respected by all states -- large and small -- and only if there is an effective instrument in the United Nations to serve the interests, not of individual states, but of peace itself.

This means that pledges to recognize the sovereignty and internal politics of other nations must be backed up by United Nations forces which can patrol borders and supervise free elections. This will require the commitment of many nations; the United States must be prominent among them.

Finally, for us to understand our future role in the world, we need to change many of our basic ideas about the world, and learn about other nations, other peoples, other cultures, as we have never done before.

In the past quarter-century, we have had a foreign policy for the whole world, with a half-world understanding. We know much about Europe; we know far less about Asia; and we are almost totally ignorant about the developing areas of the world. Indeed, would we have become involved in Vietnam, if we had known more about it? Would we, today, be unsure what to do in Laos, if we knew more about that troubled country?

For many years, the message of the American Revolution was a beacon of hope for all mankind. Then, what we had to say was welcomed by champions of freedom around the world. But today our ideals are not alone; they must compete in a free market-place with a host of others.

For too long, our isolation from the rest of the world allowed us to think that we were the center of it; that other people would adapt to our ways of looking at international politics; that what we had to say was so important that we didn't have to listen to others.

Too often, our schools are so intent on teaching the myths of American destiny that they ignore the billions of other people who find us as foreign as we find them.

Too often, our newspapers and television only report events in other lands that directly affect us, or translate events into American terms even at the price of gross distortion. We have become voyeurs of the world with our superior technology of communications, filtering what we see through the prism of our own experience; we see, but we often fail to understand both difference and diversity.

We are part of the English-speaking world, and value the role of this language in communications and the spread of ideas. But our failure to emphasize the importance for Americans to learn other languages has done much to isolate us from a true knowledge of other peoples, and has led us to expect everyone to understand our mother tongue.

We know little even about our two closest neighbors, Canada and Mexico, and few of us understand French or Spanish, even though these languages are spoken by many of our own people and by those on our very own borders.

Like other great nations before us, we have too often suffered from the myopia of power, imputing to others attitudes about the world that they do not share, and often, in our zeal, imposing our cultural ideas where they are not wanted. We see others mimicking our material advances -- from the automobile to indoor plumbing -- but fail to realize that superiority on the assembly line may not mean superiority in way of life.

This is called the "American challenge" -- a challenge to resist unwanted influences coming from this country. But I say that this is really a challenge to us. We must break with the tradition that leads great nations to practice cultural imperialism. We must show that we

can be involved in the world, without trying to dominate it. Is this possible? I believe it is.

This is a challenge to know ourselves -- what is best in our tradition and what would benefit from an infusion of the ideas and experience of others. And it is a challenge to listen intently; to still the cry of our own desires long enough to hear what others may have to tell us.

This is a challenge to our schools, our universities, and the media, to help us with the new education in world citizenship that we need so urgently. Only with a better public understanding of the world and its problems can we build a broad-based involvement of our people in the foreign policy of America -- involvement that is necessary if our foreign policy is to serve our nation's needs.

And it is a challenge to all of us to abandon that element of self-righteousness that has stigmatized much of our foreign policy -- the tendency to substitute moralisms for morality; and legalisms for the rule of law. We need to gain a new perspective on the world and the history of our involvement in it, seeing ourselves neither as saviours uniquely endowed with good, nor as villains possessed by evil.

We have had a unique experience; we still have much to offer to others; but we will benefit no one -- least of all ourselves -- if we corrupt our view of the world and all of our foreign policy dilemmas into a simple, misleading and often dangerous choice between right and wrong. We can no longer see all the world as divided between friends and enemies.

This challenge to our understanding of the world and of ourselves does not mean that we must shy away from making available to others what we do have to offer, both in resources and in experience. It is one thing to give freely of what we have; it is quite another to demand that our ways prevail.

This can be our contribution to the search for ways to promote stability, ordered change, development, and peace, without recourse to fire and sword. It may win us few friends; but it should also make us fewer enemies.

* * * *

We are in a new age of revolution -- in political relations, technology, education, and rising expectations. We have come to regard these revolutions as commonplace, as the destiny of mankind, in coming years. Yet at the same time, we have too often attempted to contain the effects of revolution, by increasing the commitment of American power, often without much thought about our basic interests in security.

As we have become more involved in the world, we have permitted an increasing division between the ideals of our society and the facts of our power. We have not always understood that the aspirations of other peoples often follow a tradition that we ourselves began.

We cannot permit this to happen again. We must find ways of being involved in the world that will protect our security, without stifling the legitimate desires of people who strive for their freedom and personal fulfillment.

We must seek peace, without prohibiting change.

We must be patient, not expecting a new world at peace to emerge in a day, a year, or perhaps even in this decade.

And we must inspire a new generation of Americans with the hope that our ideals can once again be the cornerstone of our involvement in the world, not ignoring the continuing facts of power, but not letting them destroy the human dimension of our policy. We must place greater emphasis on human and personal values--having enough to eat, being able to learn, living free of fear.

I believe we can do it. I believe we can make our ideals powerful again.

REMARKS

President Lederle
President Plimpton
of Amherst.

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FEBRUARY 24, 1970

AMERICA IN THE WORLD

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all-American
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
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Southeast Asia until we were engulfed in a strange and cruel war that defied all norms of conventional warfare.

↳ That war in Vietnam has brought with it such disillusionment and discord that many Americans ~~of every political persuasion~~ now question anew all United States overseas involvements. ^{language} But we must not let our experience in Vietnam obscure the fact that for 25 years we helped preserve the world from a major war and, in particular, from a nuclear holocaust.

↳ What costly lessons have we learned from the sorrow of Vietnam? We have learned above all that we must now carefully assess all of our national interests, free from an ideology of involvement and tested by hard, uncompromising analysis.

↳ Underlying all the rhetoric about Vietnam is the belief that we are overly committed and that there are limits to the use of military power. These limits need to be defined. We must not

become deeply involved where we have little at stake, or where
our own security can be protected by ~~other~~ ^{other} means, than armed
intervention. We must exercise that thoughtful discretion

which is the better part of valor. We must reexamine
old policies, commitments, ~~and~~ in the
light of new circumstances, new
demands, ~~and we must not~~
and new realities. - and
then dare to ~~release our selves~~ escape
from the Prison of ~~our~~ what
has been into the open
scene of what should be.

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^{the}
This is ~~a~~ lesson of Vietnam -- the signal lesson --
but it is more. It also reflects a new sense in America
that we must turn our minds and talents, and direct
our resources, to pressing needs at home.

↳ The traditional line dividing domestic from foreign
affairs has become as indistinct as a line drawn through
water. ~~This means that~~ our place in the world, and the
nature of our own society, have become indivisible. Our
structure of common defense and security could prove to
be only a hard outer shell that could collapse on an empty
center unless we bring new strength to areas of our internal
life that are threatened on every side.

However, there are growing fears that the new questioning of our involvement in the world will lead us to another period of isolation; that we will abandon our current role of international involvement and return to isolation and Fortress America.

Our Allies in Europe are especially concerned; and their fears are fostered by misguided efforts in the United States to regard all of our separate commitments in the world as indivisible -- seeing in our disengagement from Vietnam the threat that we will abandon Europe, as well.

Nothing could be more absurd. Today it is impossible for us to isolate ourselves ~~physically~~ from the rest of the world. The facts of communications, transport, trade, and the travel of our people have ruled that out, ~~not just for now but for all time.~~

Yet there is a danger of a new moral isolation,
 brought about in ~~part by our failure to see that recovery~~
 and prosperity, as found in Europe, ~~does not mean that~~
 the job is done. ~~Nor must we permit our weariness~~

~~war and responsibility to trap us into believing that we can~~

~~Or moral isolation derived~~
~~from a weariness of the burdens of war and~~

~~responsibility with all to little guidance~~
~~committed to playing a major role in the future of mankind.~~

We can -- and we must -- readjust the scale and
 nature of our involvements, and manage these changes

intelligently. But we must be careful not to act in haste,

nor to explore a short-sighted and ultimately futile moral

disengagement from the world. There are equal dangers --

of over-involvement and blind abstention. We must

carefully steer a course between the two. ~~We are committed~~
~~to playing a major role in the future~~
~~of mankind. There is no escape,~~

But

In recent years, we have seen the development of a central paradox: ~~that~~ while we and the Soviet Union have become more powerful in strictly military terms, our ability

to use this power has become more limited. *(Not saying this)*

do I

underestimate the latent power and effects of nuclear

weapons. *(They are still of central importance in relations*

among the major nations of the world) But now, at a time

of mutual deterrence, their mystique is dwindling and

other expressions of power are emerging in competition with them.

(We are living in a new age of pluralism:

--- the bonds of alliances are weakening, both in the West and in the Communist world;

--- Sino-Soviet rivalry has become a threat to peace, and firm evidence that the Communist monolith is no more;

--- the game of world politics now has a host of new
players in the developing world; and

--- individual countries are making new diplomatic
approaches and arrangements with little reference to the
super-powers that once were virtually the sole custodians
of security. ~~Even Soviet military occupation of~~
~~Czechoslovakia has failed to quash hopeful developments in~~
~~Eastern Europe.~~

L In today's world, power is proving to be persuasive
only to the extent that it is appropriate to local circumstances
and the interests of local powers. ~~We are discovering a new~~ *There is a new*
definition of power that goes beyond military might.

L The plain fact is that, in the world of today, there is
a much greater play of other power forces -- economic, political
and psychological. And there is the emergence of new
problems, such as the growing division between rich nations
and poor, that have little relation to military might.

L Almost everywhere, there is a return to the power of ideas and ideals, not just within a younger generation that reacts against the ceaseless combat of its elders, but emerging in every generation and every place where the writ of nuclear power no longer runs.

~~L Effective action in the world now often means the application of wealth, talent, and ideals -- not just by the super powers, but by many nations.~~

L In these changed circumstances, how ~~do~~ we develop
a new role for the United States in the 1970's? What can
~~our country do in the world that will help to build peace,~~
~~stability and ordered change?~~ *we do contribute to peace,*
development, To a great extent, the
answer to these questions will depend on our ability to
develop new methods and approaches that are rooted less
in our military power and more in what we have to offer
other nations in ideas, resources, and experience.

/ ~~But~~ first and foremost, we must help preserve life
itself from the threat of nuclear war, This is no simple or
preordained process; we cannot take for granted our survival
in the nuclear age.

L Both the United States and the Soviet Union now have
far more nuclear power than needed to deter one another.
~~Each of us could destroy the world with a million Hiroshimas,~~

~~and~~ neither of us can benefit from added nuclear strength,
which may even decrease the security of everyone,

For twenty years, we have lived with the doctrines of
deterrence, ~~not because we welcomed the prospect of a~~
relying on a precarious
balance of Terror as the guarantee of Peace.
~~cataclysmic nuclear following the first use of these terrible~~

~~weapons, but because we had no other choice.~~ In the last

few years, we managed to add a small measure of stability

to this mad balance of nuclear armaments: a mutual

deterrence that has made each of us as much a custodian of

the other's basic security as we are of our own. This mutual

deterrence is based on healthy distrust, but it is secured

by the evidence of reconnaissance satellites and other means

of unilateral inspection.

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~~This was a novel development -- unprecedented --~~
~~but it was and is necessary for either Russia or the United~~
~~States -- indeed, for anyone in the world -- to survive the~~
~~nuclear age.~~

L Today, we are rapidly entering a period of new
super-weapons in which we will no longer be sure of
detering the Russians and -- as strange as it may seem
to us -- they will have similar doubts about their ability to
deter us.

L This April in Vienna, we will resume direct negotiations
with the Soviet Union to try to prevent this new phase of the
arms race. L But we must not jeopardize these talks now by a
pell-mell rush to prepare the very weapons that are the subject
of negotiations. We must not sow seeds of distrust that will
bring forth deadly fruit.

↓ suggest we
Instead, ~~we~~ must stop deploying the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile System and insist that the Soviet Union stop deploying their giant SS-9 missiles. *↓* But we must lead,
↓ We must also stop testing the Multiple, Independently-Targetable, Re-entry Vehicle -- the most frightening weapon ever developed. *↓* MIRV is no simple qualitative improvement in destructive power: it is a quantum jump, and calls into question all of our basic assumptions about deterrence and survival.
↓ Without a moratorium on the testing ^{*↓ deploying*} of MIRV's, by both sides, all of our carefully developed detection and inspection systems will become obsolete.

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↳ We could still count the missile silos -- as we do now.

But the count would be meaningless unless we could get inside the silo -- indeed, inside the nose cone itself, and count the number of warheads on each missile.

↳ Not even the most dedicated arms control expert hopes for that kind of inspection agreement.

↳ Thus the completion of the test program for MIRV -- when the weapons could be built and deployed in secrecy -- will destroy any real chance to find a safe and secure end to the arms race by making effective monitoring virtually impossible.

We have only a few short months to act, before it will be too late to stop the next spiral in the deadly race of nuclear arms.

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We have valuable precedents to support decisive action now. In 1958, President Eisenhower offered to halt American testing of nuclear weapons for a period of one year from the beginning of negotiations on a formal treaty, if the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union would follow suit. This mutual moratorium was preserved for nearly three years.

In 1963, President Kennedy again ordered a halt to testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, and proposed to maintain the ban so long as the Russians did likewise. They responded, and the result was the historic Test-Ban Treaty -- a proposal I had long urged.

Today, I call upon President Nixon to halt deployment of ABM and testing of MIRV. Like President Kennedy, he holds in his hands the keys to arms control -- or to an uncertain world of mutual terror.

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We would run no serious risks; and we could always continue our programs if the Russians failed to respond.

I believe that such a moratorium can succeed; and all mankind -- all future generations -- would forever be in our debt.

~~But even if we do succeed -- even if we do stop the dangerous and destabilizing weapons now being prepared by both sides, there will be other terrifying weapons in the future.~~

~~This prospect increases the importance of the SALT talks.~~ Whether or not we succeed in stopping the MIRV, the ABM and the SS-9 before it is too late, we must work patiently with the Soviet Union to achieve one common goal: continued survival in a world where nuclear technology itself is our greatest enemy.

~~The Cold War which has all to often frozen the lines of~~
 The cold war must be supplanted by peaceful engagement.

L From now on, we must base much of our security on

greater political understanding, or we will have no security

at all.

~~The Iron Curtain must give way to open windows of negotiation and peaceful engagement.~~

L I do not argue that we can trust the Russians in all of our relations with them. L We cannot. They are still not prepared to consider agreements with us or with our allies in many areas of the world in which competition and conflicts of interest could still have deadly consequences. But unless we transform Soviet-American relations in the critical area of nuclear weapons, we may not live to debate other questions of serious but lesser importance.

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⌞ This will require a new diplomacy, managed with skill,
and patience, and extending far beyond the SALT talks. ⌞ We
must recognize that there is no easy exit from the many dilemmas
facing us. We must take full account of the interests of our
allies, in Europe and elsewhere; And we must seek ways to
turn all aspects of our relationship with the Soviet Union
from the sterile byways of military confrontation into the
more hopeful paths of political accommodation.

⌞ We could usefully begin ^{with} regular annual working meetings
at the highest level between American and Russian leaders.
And we should expand trade relations, cultural contacts, and the
search for peaceful coexistence.

*new areas of agreement
cooperation in science, technology,
and development*

Yes, Our relations with the Soviet Union are of paramount importance. But other developments in the 1970's demand our attention; ~~other factors will influence what the United States can usefully do in the world.~~

↳ Most important among these is the emergence of China as a major power in Asia. Today, Chinese power is still more psychological than factual, although it is growing.

↳ It would be a fatal error if we let ignorance and unreasoning fear in the face of future Chinese military power close the door to political understandings with Peking. ~~A cold~~

~~War with China~~

China

↳ We must do all we can to end the isolation of China, helping to bring her into the community of nations, free from paranoia and committed to respecting the legitimate rights of her neighbors. ↳ An isolated China is a danger to all the world; a China that is involved with the outside world will still pose problems, and perhaps even threats of a serious nature, but at least there will be some hope that accomodation will replace antagonism.

↳ The resumption of American-Chinese discussions in Warsaw is a hopeful development. ↳ We must exert greater initiatives in the relaxation of trade and travel restrictions between China and the United States. ↳ Cultural exchanges can also serve to broaden the contacts between our peoples.

These are modest beginnings; and they will not be enough. But we must also realize that the legacy of embittered Chinese-American relations will not be overcome in a year, or perhaps even in a decade. We can do much to come to terms with China, and come to terms with ourselves regarding China. Yet it may well take years before these efforts produce a visible change in our relations, before China will respond to our efforts. Our initiatives -- always taken in full consultation with our allies -- ^{can, however,} ~~can~~ lead to the eventual diplomatic recognition of China and her admission to the United Nations. This is also a part of the new diplomacy.

But, —

↳ The primary responsibility for security and development in Asia rests with the Asian nations themselves. ↳ They must take the lead, ↳ It is they who best understand themselves -- their past and their hopes for the future, ↳ We should be prepared to cooperate -- to be a helpful partner, not a dominating force. ↳ We do have an interest in Asia -- but we are not an Asian power, ↳ We are a Pacific power.

↳ Chief among these Asian nations is Japan, with whom we have strong ties. These ties must be continued, and expanded, as the best hope of promoting development and stability in Asia without holding the ring ourselves.

Japan is uniquely situated. She is the most powerful Asian country -- not in military might or in nuclear weapons, but in ^{her} economic strength, ^{her} a thorough knowledge of the continent and its diverse cultures, widespread trading partnerships, and an inventive approach to new problems. These qualities enhance Japan's ability to play a leading role in helping Asia to enter an era of political, social and economic development.

We should continue, particularly during this period of transition, to be directly concerned with Asian affairs. We seek an early end to the Vietnam war; but we cannot ignore the real problems that will continue in Southeast Asia once we are gone from Vietnam. Without becoming an Asian power, deeply enmeshed in the politics and problems of that continent, we can and should support hopeful efforts by local peoples to work out their own destiny.

In September, 1968, at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, I gave my views on Southeast Asia in my speech entitled "The New Strategy for Peace." I said then that whatever role we play in Southeast Asia should carefully follow three guidelines: self-help, regional and multilateral assistance, and selective American involvement.

-- first, local countries must manifest a willingness to help themselves, both to provide security and to undertake economic and social development; and they must have the courage to organize their own affairs in ways that will provide them with a stable basis for governing;

-- second, primary responsibility for helping individual nations provide for their security and economic development should rest with the nations in the area and with multilateral and regional organizations and;

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-- third, American help should be selective and carefully measured. Our efforts must be justified by our own interests and responsibilities; and they should be concentrated on economic development through multilateral means. / We are no longer the only source of help against threats to the security of Southeast Asia, or against poverty. / Hopeful developments there will be lasting only if they spring from efforts by local countries, and if they command broad popular support.,

Our experience in Southeast Asia points to a central dilemma in foreign policy: the difficulty of reconciling stability with change. Today, we recognize that the stability of Soviet-American relations is necessary for the survival of the world. But we also recognize that unless there can be change in the world -- economic, social and political change within countries and in international society -- then stability, itself, will prove fruitless and self-defeating.

We must find new ways to promote change within a framework of order, or the future of the world will be tyrannized by either anarchy or repression.

We can begin by supporting efforts within Europe to move away from twenty years of confrontation, to a new European Commonwealth of nations embracing the entire Continent.

Europe

└ The United States no longer has the dominating voice in European politics; nor do we wish it. But we are a European power, deeply involved in providing security and confidence, without which there would be no hope of change.

└ There is a movement in the United States, today, to reduce our commitment to NATO before we work out firm understandings with all nations in Europe -- East and West -- on the future of the Continent.

Would this be wise? We will not achieve mutual and balance force reductions if we act first and alone; we will not convince the Soviet Union to accept rules of civilized behavior in Eastern Europe if we lose interest in European affairs; we will not reassure our allies that we are concerned with the future of Europe if we are insensitive to their anxieties and needs.

L We must show that our partnership with Europe really means something, and support efforts to resolve the division of the Continent. *therefore I suggest,* As a part of the new diplomacy:

---we should encourage our Allies in their proposal for a European Security Conference, and realize that this conference can be part of the political process that can help achieve what we want -- troop reductions throughout Europe;

---we should have more sensitivity and understanding when our allies express concern that we may deal over their heads in the SALT talks;

---we should make consultation, particularly on force levels, a real on-going effort -- with regular meetings at the highest level -- not a vehicle for showmanship and American lecturing to our European allies;

--- we should encourage bilateral political contacts between our allies and the nations of the Warsaw Pact, including West German efforts to improve relations with the East;

--- we should work for expanded trade and cultural relations between East and West;

--- and we should help to make the NATO alliance an international instrument for *a new diplomacy,* not a rigid institution committed to the past. With our allies, we can help to liquidate the legacy of military confrontation. ~~But this will require a new American awareness of Europe's needs, problems, and hopes.~~

Elsewhere in the world, the dilemma of change versus order will be even more difficult to resolve, yet more pressing, as population growth, poverty, and unrest disrupt whole continents.

There are more than a billion people in the world today in countries where the average annual income per person is less than 100 dollars. Hundreds of millions live on less than fifty dollars a year.

↳ Evidence has shown us that poverty and deprivation, coupled with the beginning of education and hope, create a revolution of rising expectations.

↳ And people all over the world are "in touch." ↳ The transistor radio and communications satellite will make this even more so in the immediate future.

The man in Korea, or Guatemala, or Zambia knows what modern society can mean to his family. He knows what you and I have. He knows about our wealth. He knows about the vast resources at our command, and at the command of other fortunate nations.

This knowledge helps to widen even further the growing gap between the have and have not peoples of the earth.

[Inequality is polarizing the world between north and south, rich and poor, white and non-white. This is a ~~recipe for~~ *prescription for* ~~and war~~ strife, both between the world's divided halves, and throughout the developing world.]

[As an American, I take pride in the well-being and relative affluence we have been able to create for an increasing number of our citizens. But I also feel shame at the hunger, poverty, and deprivation which surrounds this prosperous island of the Western world.]

yet,

Today, our material contribution to the developing world is far below the scant 1% of GNP proposed for development aid by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

Our foreign aid has dropped to a post-war low. We have fallen behind many of our European Allies, and other countries that recognize, as did Pope Paul, that "Development is the new name for peace."

By ignoring this fact, we are taking a tremendous risk. We are trying to have the best of all possible worlds --- rightly giving up unilateral American peacekeeping, but at the same time turning our backs on the economic needs of development.

This will not work; it will only be self-defeating. Let us face the problem squarely: either we will take a strong lead in the development of the poorer half of the world, or one day its great social and economic problems will engulf us all as surely

as would a nuclear war. We must choose our weapons to secure the peace: ideas and resources today, or guns and troops tomorrow!

↳ We Americans, as part of our responsibility to mankind, must commit ourselves anew to economic and social development, including control of the growth of population.

↳ Our commitment should be to nation-building -- and not to buying favors in the developed world. ↳ Our interest is in having nations that are independent and secure -- and ~~the~~ free to pursue their own development within the community of nations.

↳ But to do this effectively, we must channel the bulk of our aid through multilateral institutions. ~~This will place heavy demands upon~~ the United Nations and other organizations,

like the World Bank and regional efforts for development in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. At present, we pay too little attention to these institutions, often regarding them as poor relations to more powerful initiatives we take on our own in foreign affairs. Yet for many nations, and in many parts of the world, only ~~institutions like the UN~~ ^{international agencies} can provide the help that is needed, free from complications of super-power relations or national self-interest.

This applies to peacekeeping as well, If American peacekeeping is to be curtailed, that does not mean that there can be no peacekeeping. It must be done by the United Nations or by regional agencies. Only this can help to prevent the drift of disordered change into open conflict, and to stem the tide of human suffering.

The basis of any system of peacekeeping must be a commitment to non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. But this policy will only work if it is respected by all states -- large and small -- and only if there

is an effective instrument in the United Nations to serve the interests, not of individual states, but of peace itself.

This means that pledges to recognize the sovereignty and internal politics of other nations must be backed up by United Nations forces which can patrol borders and supervise free elections. This will require the commitment of many nations; the United States must be prominent among them.

Finally, for us to understand our future role in the world, we need to change many of our basic ideas about the world, and learn about other nations, other peoples, other cultures, as we have never done before.

In the past quarter-century, we have had a foreign policy for the whole world, with a half-world understanding. We

know much about Europe; we know far less about Asia; and we are almost totally ignorant about the developing areas of the world. ~~Indeed, would we have become involved in~~

~~Vietnam, if we had known more about it? Would we, today, be unsure what to do in Laos, if we knew more about that troubled country?~~

~~For many years, the message of the American Revolution was a beacon of hope for all mankind. Then, what we had to say was welcomed by champions of freedom around the world. But today our ideals are not alone; they must compete in a free market-place with a host of others.~~

For too long, our isolation from the rest of the world allowed us to think that we were the center of it; that other people would adapt to our ways of looking at international politics; that what we had to say was so important that we didn't have to listen to others.

Too often, our schools are so intent on teaching the myths of American destiny that they ignore the billions of other people who find us as foreign as we find them.

↳ Too often, our newspapers and television only report events in other lands that directly affect us, or translate events into American terms even at the price of gross distortion. We have become ^{viewers}~~voyeurs~~ of the world with our superior technology of communications, filtering what we see through the prism of our own experience; we see, but we often fail to understand both difference and diversity.

We are part of the English-speaking world, and value the role of this language in communications and the spread of ideas. But our failure to emphasize the importance for Americans to learn other languages has done much to

isolate us from a true knowledge of other peoples, and has led us to expect everyone to understand our mother tongue.

↳ We know little ~~even~~ about our two closest neighbors, Canada and Mexico, and few of us understand French or Spanish, even though these languages are spoken by many of our own people and by those on our very borders.

↳ Like other great nations before us, we have too often suffered from the myopia of power, imputing to others attitudes about the world that they do not share, and often, in our zeal, imposing our cultural ideas where they are not wanted. ↳ We see others mimicking our material advances -- from the automobile to indoor plumbing -- but fail to realize that superiority on the assembly line may not mean superiority in way of life.

This is called the "American challenge" -- a challenge to resist unwanted influences coming from this country.

└ But ~~say that~~ this is really a challenge to us. └ We must break with the tradition that leads great nations to practice cultural imperialism. └ We must show that we can be involved in the world, without trying to dominate it. └ Is this possible? I believe it is.

└ This is a challenge to know ourselves -- what is best in our tradition and what would benefit from an infusion of ideas and experience of others. And it is a challenge to listen intently; to still the cry of our own desires long enough to hear what others may have to tell us.

└ This is a challenge to our schools, our universities, and the media, to help us with the new education in world

citizenship that we need so urgently. Only with a better public understanding of the world and its problems can we build a broad-based involvement of our people in the foreign policy of America -- involvement that is necessary if our foreign policy is to serve our nation's needs.

And it is a challenge to all of us to abandon that element of self-righteousness that has stigmatized much of our foreign policy -- the tendency to substitute moralisms for morality; and legalisms for the rule of law. We need to gain a new perspective ~~on the world and the history of our involvement~~ ~~in it~~, seeing ourselves ~~neither~~ as saviours uniquely endowed with good, nor as villains possessed by evil.

We have had a unique experience; we still have much to offer to others; but we will benefit no one -- least of all ourselves -- if we corrupt our view of the world and all of our

foreign policy dilemmas into a simple, misleading and often dangerous choice between right and wrong. We can no longer see all the world as divided between friends and enemies.

↳ This challenge to our understanding of the world and of ourselves does not mean that we must shy away from making available to others what we do have to offer, both in resources and in experience. It is one thing to give freely of what we have; it is quite another to demand that our ways prevail!

This can be our contribution to the search for ways to promote stability, ordered change, development, and peace, without recourse to fire and sword. It may win us few friends; but it should also make us fewer enemies.

We are in a new age of revolution -- in political relations, technology, education, and rising expectations. We have come to regard these revolutions as commonplace, as the destiny of mankind in coming years. Yet at the same time, we have too often attempted to contain the effects of revolution, by increasing the commitment of American power, often without much thought about our basic interests in security.

As we have become more involved in the world, we have permitted an increasing division between the ideas of our society and the facts of our power. We have not always understood that the aspirations of other peoples often follow a tradition that we ourselves began.

We cannot permit this to happen again. We must find ways of being involved in the world that will protect our

security, without stifling the legitimate desires of people who strive for their freedom and personal fulfillment.

We must seek peace, without prohibiting change.

We must be patient, not expecting a new world at peace to emerge in a day, a year, or perhaps even in this decade.

And we must inspire a new generation of Americans with the hope that our ideals can once again be the cornerstone of our involvement in the world, not ignoring the continuing facts of power, but not letting them destroy the human dimension of our policy. We must place greater emphasis on human and personal values -- having enough to eat, being able to learn, living free of fear.

I believe we can do it. I believe we can make our ideals powerful again.

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