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"Detente and East-West Relations"

An Address
by
Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey

Detente and East-West Relations

Text of an Address by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey

ANY DISCUSSION of detente brings to mind the English adage, "The king is dead, long live the king." Now somebody is going to say, what do you mean by that? I simply mean that we've taken a much more realistic attitude about detente, that some of the great expectations that were the phenomena of the 1960s and 1970s are passing into history, and we're beginning to look at detente in a much more realistic fashion. But I think it should be said that the ice has been broken in U.S.-Soviet relations. Whatever your point of view may be about detente, it does at least symbolize that we are in a process of communication. The two superpowers are now focusing on specific issues in their relations, and devoid of theatrics and dramatics, the Soviet-American dialogue must henceforth be based on an ongoing political process as well as on solid accomplishments. I try to define detente not as an accomplishment as such, but rather the creation of a political environment in which it is possible to work toward solutions that may relieve some of the tensions which exist between our two great systems. If you look at it as a process rather than a fact of achievement, I think you're in a much better position.

It is the issues at the heart of the East-West relations that I would like to address. By focusing on concrete problems, we avoid the windy generalities about East-West relations which obscure rather than clarify reality. In focusing on these problems, we need to keep in mind two central facts, as I see them:

First, businesslike, well-organized Soviet-U.S. efforts to resolve problems of common concern must continue. I say "must continue" because the process of continuation of these relationships will reduce the risk of war. It will contribute to sensible reductions in the vast and costly arsenals which both nations now possess. It may help to promote stability at a time of growing international violence and anarchy, and it hopefully will cause both superpowers to recognize their obligations and responsibilities to the rest of humanity.

It also is important to realize that these efforts will not soon radically (and I emphasize the words "soon" and "radically") change the international situation. I think this becomes more clear if we note that the benefits which were supposed to flow so quickly from improved Soviet-American relations have not materialized.

Detente has not brought an end to Soviet support of "liberation movements" in the Third World, as we know, or the established Communist parties in the industrialized nations. I don't think we should have expected that to happen. It has not meant a bonanza for Americans or the American business community.

It has not caused a liberalization, to any substantial degree, of Soviet suppression of internal dissidence. (I would put in a caveat here that I do think that the Soviet Union is more concerned about world public opinion than it used to be. It has gained a stature of power and respect—or at least acceptance—in the world to the point where, in dealing with its own internal dissidence, it is somewhat more concerned about outside opinion.)

It has not produced a reduction of Soviet defense expenditures. And so-called detente has not meant that we cease to regard each other as strong competitors and political adversaries.

Failure to realize these expectations is at the heart of much of the current frustration and disenchantment with detente and Soviet-American relations in the United States and Europe. But quite frankly, the expected benefits from detente, like the expected benefits from the United Nations, were oversold. We like to do that here. Our journalism contributes to it. Our whole sense of media, of advertising and public relations, always oversells practically everything that's on the market, either in ideas or goods.

Taking these things together, the need for continuing U.S.-Soviet cooperation in problems of common concern and the unlikelihood that these efforts soon will produce radical change in the Soviet system should provide the basis for a more mature relationship with the Soviets.

It should be a relationship that will embrace both competition and cooperation as instruments of peaceful change; a relationship shed of any illusion that a conservative Communist nation is going to abandon completely its ideology, goals, and tactics because its main adversary expects it to do so.

To say this, however, is not to say that a constructive Soviet-American relationship means that we must be morally indifferent to the denial of human rights within the Soviet Union. Such an attitude was sadly evident when the President refused to see Mr. Solzhenitsyn.

I recognize the substantial limitations of fundamentally altering Soviet internal policies by our actions or our relationship. But that doesn't mean that we should not persist in our proper goals, the democratic ideals and relationships which we believe lend themselves to peaceful cooperation.

In other words, this is no excuse for turning our backs on those who express outrage at Soviet policies of suppression and denial of human rights. I don't know whether we can really change them a great deal but I don't believe that we ought to hush up. I believe that we have a responsibility to our own set of values, and those values ought to be constantly placed before the world community.

To this end I believe it is imperative that we insist on scrupulous fulfillment of the Helsinki Agreement through careful monitoring of the manner in which the Soviets treat their dissidents and how the question of freedom of movement is administered. I am not so naive as to believe that we're really going to make them toe the mark. But I think they ought to be reminded. More people in this world want freedom of movement than to be locked up; and more people want free exchange of ideas than to be denied expression of creative thought. We ought to be on the side of freedom constantly—not necessarily belligerently—but firmly and intensely.

Normalizing relations with the Soviets should not mean that we acquiesce through our silence to Soviet internal policies or practices. We had a period of acquiescence in this world in the time of Hitler. People did acquiesce, in Germany and elsewhere, who knew that Hitler's policies were wrong. There was too much acquiescence in America both to Japanese imperialism and German Nazism with people saying it wasn't any of our business. The fact is that *freedom* is our business. The fact is that democratic ideals are our business. And whenever we sell them out by silence or by negotiation, we do it at our peril.

Now it's one thing to say that we cannot alter these policies and practices. It is another thing to say that Soviet-American relations—at any cost—should be an end in themselves to preserve the status quo. I am not one who underestimates the tremendous importance of Soviet-American relations. I think the peace of the world depends on it, at least in the foreseeable future. Nor have I ever been known as a Soviet baiter. To the contrary, I recognize the accomplishments of their society in material things. I recognize many of the great contributions that have been made by their science and technology and many other areas. In fact the Russian people, over the centuries, have made great contributions to the culture of the world.

But if we must abandon the long-term goal of peaceful change within and without the Communist system as the price of U.S.-Soviet relationships, I suggest to you it can never endure.

The inflated rhetoric of summit diplomacy should, therefore, now cease. I am not opposed to summit diplomacy: to the contrary, I think it is a part of the diplomatic scene and will continue to be so. But I think summit diplomacy has to be well organized. It has to be put in a proper framework. It ought to be something that we know is going to happen, and it should be prepared for without extravaganzas or spectaculars. The

time has come for American politicians to speak far more realistically of what can and what cannot be gained in East-West relations—and that goes on both sides. We should stop frightening ourselves with horrendous tales of Soviet aggression and Soviet penetration on the one hand, and recognize on the other that we're in for competition. I don't mind the competition myself. As a matter of fact, I think it keeps us alive and on our toes.

Let me now move from the general to the particular. Let's talk about specific areas in the current scene of U.S.-Soviet dealings. There are three priority areas that I believe are at the core of a more realistic Soviet-American relationship. The first, obviously, is to continue the SALT talk process and obtain (hopefully) in the near future, a new, meaningful, and acceptable agreement. I understand the difficulties. I don't think we ought to expect miracles or quick solutions. I want to say explicitly that my remarks here are not meant in any way to prejudge the tentative proposals which Secretary Kissinger discussed in Moscow. I was one that urged the Secretary to continue the discussions in Moscow. I believe he ought to walk the extra mile no matter how difficult it is to obtain better understandings with people and, hopefully, agreements.

I have only read news reports of the Secretary's discussion with the Soviet leadership.

The reduction of the Vladivostok ceilings, as I have read them, is an encouraging sign of progress. I am less certain about the proposals on the cruise missile issue because of the lack of information in the press accounts. What I am about to say is my own personal view of the way we should handle some of the very difficult issues facing us in the upcoming and continuing negotiations.

I stress the word "meaningful" when discussing SALT. In the SALT negotiations, we are now past the point where we must sign a document with the Soviets just to demonstrate our fidelity to the concept of more normalized relations. We want a document that *means* something, that *does* something—but we don't need one just to encourage ourselves to continue the process. Because once you sign documents that lend themselves to violation, you do not serve the cause of peace, or the cause of reduction of misunderstanding, or of tensions.

The qualitative content of the agreement—not the agreement itself—is the real measure of progress in the field of arms limitation. What is the pivotal element in a new SALT II agreement that would cover strategic weaponry and cruise missiles? Unless testing and deployment of strategic or intercontinental-range cruise missiles can be avoided, and I underscore strategic and intercontinental, it will be difficult to secure a substantial arms control agreement. The strategic cruise missile is an arms control nightmare. Its verification problems would be immense because of its characteristics and the fact that there would likely be great numbers deployed. There is just no way that you can know how many

cruise missiles a B-52 or a submarine can carry. The only way to avoid this problem, therefore, is to forbid its testing and deployment. A ban on testing of strategic or intercontinental cruise-range missiles might be verifiable. If further studies indicate this is the case, concluding an agreement on such a ban should be a high priority of negotiations. And while the negotiations are underway, we should not prejudice their outcome by proceeding with the development and testing of strategic-range cruise missiles ourselves.

Now I differentiate between the strategic and the limited distance missile. I am convinced that America is strong enough by any measure, militarily, economically, politically, and socially to forego the addition of a costly new system of air and sea-launched strategic cruise missiles to its nuclear arsenal. I recognize that if the other side does it, all bets are off. But I'm talking about whether we take the lead and clearly we have the lead, at least in the technology.

America's lead in cruise missile technology is, of course, only temporary. If the ceilings on strategic arms established in Vladivostok should be raised to include the strategic cruise missile, a new SALT agreement will be of limited value, since its provisions with respect to cruise missile deployment could not be adequately verified. I know of no one today that thinks that you could properly verify cruise missiles. I predict that if an agreement should be negotiated, which included the cruise missile, it would have a very difficult time getting through the Senate. If we take the arms control process seriously, and believe that it is in our national interest, we must strive to avoid the testing and deployment of those weapons systems that cannot be measured with certainty. The only way that we dare negotiate these agreements is if we can be reasonably secure in verification. Trust does not really exist. We have to have an alternative to trust, which is the technology of verification. I do not believe for a minute that Secretary Kissinger or President Ford can afford to jeopardize the SALT process by allowing the testing and deployment of strategic-range cruise missiles to occur.

SALT is at the top of our arms control agenda. There are, however, several other critical items which merit attention. First, the task of reducing tension and confrontation in Europe must continue with renewed vigor at the MBFR (Mutual Balanced Force Reduction) negotiations. The Soviets have shown very little inclination to come around to any understanding here.

Secondly, the cooperation that we have elicited from the Soviets and others in the field of nuclear nonproliferation should continue and we ought to press for it and expand it. I am happy to say the Soviets have been very cooperative in this area. The threshold of the Test Ban Treaty recently negotiated should be renegotiated at a lower, and meaningful level. The ultimate goal should be a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

Finally, we should initiate discussions with the Soviets on conven-

tional arms limitations building on our expertise and cooperation in the nuclear field. I feel that there really is no advanced security in the arms race. It's a constant game of who gets ahead and who catches up. It's catch up, get up, spend more, lifting the threshold of danger. And I am sure that Soviet negotiators are not going to negotiate away what they think is their security, and I hope and I believe none of our negotiators are going to negotiate away what is our security. When we are talking arms control, we are talking life and death. We are also talking about whether or not we can keep away from going bankrupt, because defense expenditures are rising at a horrendous pace. There is pressure in this country to get them to rise even faster.

Now the second area for U.S.-Soviet negotiation is what appears on the face to be more simple—it's economic. I would like to discuss just one issue here, and that's food.

Though Soviet grain purchases are the single most important variable in the world wheat market, their unwillingness to accept and cooperate in the establishment of adequate food and fiber information, which reveals supply and future needs, is disruptive and injurious to our bilateral economic relationship and to world food security. We simply have to insist they join in.

The Soviets have literally smashed our markets time after time. They come in with these huge purchases which disrupt the commodity market, which are of little or no benefit to the farm producer, which throw the commodity futures into a turmoil, and we have let them get by with it for years. Why haven't we asked them to do as the Japanese or other grain customers do? The Japanese and others take food supplies on a regular, week-by-week basis, not putting pressure on our transport system, upon our shipping system, not putting pressure on our markets, and have a reasonable understanding as to what is going to transpire over a crop year.

Fortunately, the recent negotiations conducted by Mr. Bell of the Department of Agriculture and Mr. Robinson of State have lent themselves to a better situation. There is already, however, some concern that the recent U.S.-Soviet grain agreement leads the Soviets to believe they can ignore their responsibilities as a significant element in the international food system. In other words, "they're taken care of." International norms in many fields are there for the Soviets to see. Western trading partners must be more insistent in their demands that these norms be obeyed.

Consultations about an international system of grain reserves are taking place in the wake of the Rome Food Conference. Success in this endeavor, which is important, will be impeded if the Soviets do not join or cooperate. If they refuse to join in building up their reserves—and I say *acknowledged* reserves for I happen to think they have a secret strategic reserve, but I'm talking about reserves that are available for the

world community and for themselves—if they refuse to join, and must therefore go into the world market every time their production falls below domestic need and demand, the world grain market will be subject to endemic instability. Instability in these markets is disaster for American agriculture, because we are the reserve producers. We have got our economic life at stake. The largest business in America is not General Motors, or U.S. Steel, or computers. They are like a peanut stand. The real business of America is agriculture. That's one thing Washington doesn't understand. It's incredible, but there isn't a single agency of this government except one, the Department of Agriculture, that is even interested in agriculture, except in an emergency. The Federal Reserve Board ignores it. The State Department ignores it, except when it gets to be critical in terms of some world crisis. The Commerce Department ignores it. The White House ignores it. It is as if it didn't exist. It is the number one thing we have. Everything else we have, we have competitors for. And many of them outcompete us. But when it comes to agriculture, we say, "Well, we've got those old farmers out there. They'll still do it."

I want to tell you if I had my way, the American farmers would make you say uncle a few times until they got some attention. I think it's important that we emphasize this, but I don't think my message gets through and I will be very frank with you. I have been to all these sophisticated seminars now for over 20 years in Washington. I have never yet heard a conference on agriculture that they didn't complain about the farmer. And he is our most reliable producer. He saved us most of the time before and he is still saving the nation. He is the only thing we really have going for us except the sale of weapons. He is the big exporter. And yet he is given little or no consideration in economic policymaking of America domestically or internationally, except when it suddenly appears there is a crisis.

If we can get agreement of like-minded countries to create a system of building up their food reserves, it should be made manifestly clear to the Soviet Union that non-participating countries will enjoy a lower priority than others with respect to exports and reserves of participating countries in time of global food shortage. They either cooperate, join in, or take a second class status on the availability of supplies. I think that has got to be clear. If the Soviet Union expects to reap the advantages of an interdependent, international economic system, it will have to accept the responsibilities that go with those benefits. And as a United States Senator, I am going to look after U.S. interests. U.S. interests are not being protected by the kind of willy-nilly, ad hoc, in-and-out relationships that the Soviet Union preserves today in the international field of food and fiber. So I want the message to them to be clear. I believe in selling the Russians anything they can't shoot back, if they can pay cash. Anything. I believe in trade. I don't believe in trying to be mean about it

or antagonistic. I believe that they are a good customer. I want them as a good customer for years and years and years to come. And I want us to be a reliable exporter and reliable producer. But we have got to have ground rules. And if they are not going to abide by the rules, they are not going to get the benefit in times of crisis. That is the way we have got to play the game.

Now it's important that American policymakers should not underestimate the critical importance of food worldwide, and particularly in our international relations and in our relations with the Soviet Union. Shed of any illusions that grain exports will overnight produce political miracles, I have every reason to believe that the Soviet behavior could be moderated by their continued dependence on America for food commodities. There is no way that they can produce enough for themselves, unless God Almighty changes the climate, because 85 to 90 percent of all the productive land of the Soviet Union is north of the latitude of Minneapolis, Minnesota. And we know that north of that, corn, soy beans and wheat are always in difficulty. It would be like trying to produce enough food for all of the Soviet Union in Canada. It cannot be done.

Now they can make their estimates of 215 million metric tons: that estimate is sort of like the President's budget—a lot of guesses that don't add up to a single thing in fact.

Last year we got an estimate of $8 billion for offshore oil leases. We got one billion. Anybody that fails that much in school has flunked. But these estimates, all these Soviet estimates, don't mean a thing. What you need to do is take a look at the traditional pattern of production as related to the estimates. The minute you start to do that, you begin to understand the facts.

A third area that I wish to discuss is the formulation or formation of a more enduring political relationship where cooperation moderates competition. There are no easy ways, no secret formulas. Tough and businesslike negotiations are the best route to progress in East-West relations. This means, for example, trying to persuade the Soviet Union to join with the United States in exercising a moderating, rather than an inflammatory, influence in the Middle East. There may have been some reasonable success already. I have some reason to believe that one of the reasons the Soviets didn't blast the Sinai Agreement was because they needed food. But the very time that the Sinai Agreement was before the Congress, they were also in the market for American food and, as you know, there was some doubt as to whether there were going to be deliveries. We both have the same responsibility to moderate conditions in the Middle East. This kind of successful negotiation involving a specific threat to peace is much more important to improving relations than general declarations or political atmospherics.

These three specific areas—arms control, economic policy, and political negotiations—should be the focus of East-West relations in the period

ahead. Success in each of them is important. But there doesn't need to be linkage. We need a limitation on armaments. We need a system of international grain reserves and world grain information—food information. We need progress, step by step, towards peace in the Middle East. It will be difficult enough to make progress in each of these areas individually. If we limit them and make progress in one dependent on progress in all, the task will be impossible. And if we make one-sided concessions in one of these areas, in an effort to persuade the Soviets to change their stance in another, we will only expose ourselves to being considered a novice at the whole thing—just unwilling to recognize the facts of life.

We should signal clearly to the Soviet leaders that they can achieve solid benefits by cooperation in each of these areas. A strategic arms race, an unstable world food market, tension and conflict in the Middle East and elsewhere—none of these are in their interest or ours. They can work with us to avoid these dangers. But we must also make it clear to them that progress can be achieved only if they, no less than we, are prepared to make concessions. Agreements must be based on a solid mutuality of interests.

In about a month, the 25th Party Congress will occur in Moscow. During this meeting important decisions will be made about the Soviet Union's economic policies and its foreign policy. Looking ahead it is clear that the Soviets are on the threshold of a generational turnover among the party leadership and hierarchy. I believe there are hardly any of the original revolutionaries left, if any. There is a whole new generation. By actions and statements which make clear to the Soviets the principles we believe should govern East-West relationship, we may have a unique opportunity now to influence the development of a Soviet foreign policy of restraint and responsibility and the emergence of a less repressive domestic society. This can be achieved not by being soft or making foolish concessions or compromising in any way our national interests.

Firmness, not belligerancy, but firmness is in order. But we must couple this attitude with encouragement of the forces of moderation in the Soviet society against the ideologues, the supernationalists, and the military. To achieve this, the American political leaders should focus on the three areas that I have described, seeking concrete progress on the basis of the principles that I tried to outline. I believe that these will serve the interests of both countries.

All of this will be hard to do in an election year, unless both political parties approach this issue in a responsible and realistic manner. I want to see the Soviet-American relationship discussed and debated in the coming Presidential election. But I want the candidates to use restraint, and to recognize their responsibility to the world community as well as to our own electorate. If they do not, and if demagoguery is substituted for sensible discussion, great harm could be done to the cause of influencing

the evolution of a less aggressive Soviet foreign policy. If inflammatory rhetoric or exaggerated promises become the coinage of a Presidential campaign in discussing Soviet-American relations, we only aid and abet those Soviets who want to return to the cold war for their own purposes. And let me tell you they have cold war warriors too. It isn't just here in the United States. I urge candidates in both parties to take the high road of reasoned statesmanship, speaking honestly, openly, to East-West issues that must now be tackled. In this way, progress in our relations with the Soviet Union can continue even while we go about the process of choosing America's new leadership.

If we seek world peace, there are no alternatives to a constructive Soviet-American relationship. That's what I started with, that's what I end with. If we wish to have America turn its attention and energies to urgent domestic problems and pressing world responsibilities, the process, the slow, tedious, and at times agonizing, process of normalizing relations with the Soviet Union must continue, expecting no miracles, but working for some advancement.

REMARKS OF SENATOR HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

DETENTE AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS

THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
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Any discussion of detente brings to mind the English adage: "The King is dead. Long live the King."

Detente, with all of its symbolism and great expectations, was a phenomenon of the late 1960's and early '70's. It now is passing into history. But the ice has been broken in U.S.-Soviet relations. The two super powers now are focusing on specific issues in their relations. Devoid of theatrics and dramatics, the Soviet-American dialogue must be based on an on-going political process as well as on solid accomplishments.

It is the issues at the heart of the East-West relationship which I want to address today. By focusing on concrete problems, we avoid windy generalities about East-West relations which obscure rather than clarify reality. In focusing on these problems, we need to keep two central facts in mind.

First, businesslike U.S.-Soviet efforts to resolve problems of common concern must continue. I say "must continue" because the process will reduce risks of war.

It will contribute to sensible reductions in the vast and costly arsenals which both nations possess.

It may help to promote stability at a time of growing international violence and anarchy.

And it hopefully will cause both superpowers to recognize their obligations and responsibilities to the rest of humanity.

But it also is important to realize that these efforts will not soon radically change the international situation. This becomes more clear if we note that the benefits which were to flow quickly from improved Soviet-American relations have not materialized.

Detente has not brought an end to Soviet support of liberation movements in the Third World or the established Communist parties in industrialized nations.

It has not meant a bonanza for the American business community.

It has not caused a liberalization to any degree of Soviet suppression of internal dissidents.

It has not produced a reduction of Soviet defense expenditures.

And it has not meant that we cease to regard each other as strong competitors and political adversaries.

Failure to realize these expectations is at the heart of much of the current frustration and disenchantment with Soviet-American relations in the United States and in Europe. But, quite frankly, the expected benefits from detente were oversold. These basic conditions have not changed and will not soon change.

These things taken together -- the need for continuing U.S.-Soviet cooperation in problems of common concern and the unlikelihood that these efforts soon will produce radical change in the Soviet system -- should provide the basis for a more mature relationship with the Soviets.

It should be a relationship that will embrace both competition and cooperation as instruments for peaceful change; a relationship shed of any illusion that a conservative Communist nation is going to abandon completely its ideology, goals and tactics because its main adversary expects it to do so.

To say this, however, is not to say that a constructive Soviet-American relationship means that we must be morally indifferent to the denial of human rights within the Soviet Union. Such an attitude was sadly evident when the President refused to see Mr. Solzhenitsyn.

I recognize the substantial limitations of fundamentally altering Soviet internal policies quickly by means of our relationship. But this is no excuse for turning our backs on those who express outrage at Soviet policies of suppression and denial of Human Rights.

To this end, I believe it imperative that we insist on scrupulous fulfillment of the Helsinki agreement through careful monitoring of the manner in which the Soviets treat its dissidents and how the question of freedom of movement is administered.

Normalized relations with the Soviets should not mean that we acquiesce through our silence to Soviet internal policies and practices.

It is one thing to say that we cannot soon alter these policies and practices. It is another to say that Soviet-American relations should be an end in themselves to preserve the status quo. If we must abandon the long-term goal of peaceful change within and without the Communist system as the price of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, it can never endure.

The inflated rhetoric of summit diplomacy should, therefore, now cease. The time has come for American politicians to speak far more realistically of what can and cannot be gained in East-West relations.

Let us now move from the general to the particular. Let's talk about the specific areas of the U.S.-Soviet dealings.

There are three priority areas which are at the core of a more realistic Soviet-American relationship.

The first is to continue the SALT process and obtain in the near future a <u>meaningful</u> and <u>acceptable</u> agreement.

I want to say quite explicitly that my remarks today are not meant to prejudge the tentative proposals which Secretary Kissinger discussed in Moscow.

I have only read news reports of the Secretary's discussions with the Soviet leadership. I have not received a Department of State briefing concerning the specifics. The reduction of the Vladivostok ceilings is an encouraging sign of progress.

I am less certain about the proposals on the cruise missile issue because of the lack of information in the press accounts.

What I am about to say is my own personal view of the way we should handle some of the very difficult issues facing us in the negotiations.

I stress the word "meaningful" when discussing SALT because we are now past the point where we must sign a document with the Soviets to demonstrate our fidelity to the concept of more normalized relations. The qualitative content of the agreement -- not the agreement itself -- is the real measure of progress in the field of arms limitations.

What is the pivotal element in a meaningful SALT II agreement?

Unless testing and deployment of strategic or intercontinental range cruise missiles can be avoided, it will be difficult to secure a substantial arms control agreement.

The strategic cruise missile is an arms control nightmare. Its verification problems would be immense because of its characteristics and the fact that there would likely be great numbers deployed. The only way to avoid this problem is to prevent its testing. A ban on testing of strategic range missiles might be verifiable.

If further studies indicate that this is the case, concluding agreement on such a ban should be a high priority of negotiations. And while the negotiations are underway, we should not prejudice their outcome by proceeding with the development and testing of strategic range cruise missiles ourselves.

I am convinced that America is strong enough by any measure -- militarily, economically, politically, socially -- to forego the addition of a costly new system of air and sea-launched strategic cruise missiles to its nuclear arsenal.

Let us not fool ourselves. America's lead in cruise missile technology is only temporary.

If the ceilings on strategic arms established at Vladivostok should be raised to include the strategic cruise missile, a new SALT agreement will be of limited value, since its provisions with respect to cruise missile deployment could not be adequately verified. And I predict such an agreement could have a very difficult time in the Senate.

If we take the arms control process seriously and believe that it is in our national interest, we must strive to avoid the testing and deployment of those weapons systems that cannot be measured with certainty. If this is not done, future negotiation to obtain reductions will be far more difficult to achieve.

I don't believe Secretary Kissinger or President Ford can afford to jeopardize the SALT process by allowing the testing and deployment of strategic range cruise missiles to occur.

SALT is at the top of our arms control agenda. However, there are several other critical items which merit attention:

-- The task of reducing tension and confrontation in Europe must continue with renewed vigor at the MBFR negotiation.

-- The cooperation we have elicited from the Soviets in the field of nonproliferation should continue and be expanded in view of the dangers from the spread of nuclear weapons.

-- The threshold for the Test Ban Treaty recently negotiated should be renegotiated at a lower, meaningful level. The ultimate goal here should be a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

-- Finally, we should initiate discussions with the Soviets on conventional arms limitations building on our expertise and cooperation in the nuclear field.

The second area for U.S.-Soviet negotiation is economic. The key issue here is food.

Though the Soviets' grain purchases are the single most important variable in the world wheat market, their unwillingness to accept and cooperate in the establishment of an adequate food and fiber information system which reveals supply and future needs is disruptive and injurious to our bilateral economic relationship. This has been eased somewhat by the agreement that provides for long term U.S. exports on a systematic basis.

There already is some concern that the recent U.S.-Soviet grain agreement leads the Soviets to believe they can ignore their many responsibilities as a significant element in the international food system. International norms in many fields are there for the Soviets to see. Western trading partners must be more insistent in their demands that these norms be obeyed.

Let me be more specific.

Consultations about an international system of grain reserves are taking place in the wake of the Rome World Food Conference. Success in this endeavor will be impeded if the Soviets do not cooperate. If they refuse to join in building up reserves, and must therefore go into the world market every time their producion falls below domestic need and demand, the world grain market will be subject to endemic instability.

If we can get agreement of like-minded countries to create a system for building up these reserves, it should be made clear to the Soviet Union that non-participating countries will enjoy lower priority than others with respect to exports and reserves of participating countries in time of global food shortage.

If the Soviet Union expects to reap the advantages of an interdependent international economic system, it will have to accept the responsibilities that go with those benefits.

It is important that American policymakers should not underestimate the critical importance of food in the Soviet-American relationship. Shed of any illusions that grain exports will overnight produce political miracles, I have every reason to believe that Soviet behavior will be moderated by their continued dependence on America for food commodities.

A third area that I wish to discuss is the formation of a more enduring political relationship where cooperation moderates competition.

There are no easy methods or secret formulas to achieve this goal. Tough and business like negotiations are the best route to progress in East-West relations. This means, for example, trying to persuade the Soviet Union to join with the United States in exercising a moderating, rather than an inflammatory, influence in the Middle East.

This kind of successful negotiation involving a specific threat to peace is more important to improved relations than general declaration or atmospherics.

These three specific areas -- arms control, economic policy and political negotiations -- will be the focus of East-West relations in the period ahead. Success in each of them is important.

We need a limitation on armaments.

We need a system of international grain reserves.

We need progress toward peace in the Middle East.

It will be difficult enough to make progress in each of these areas individually. If we limit them and make progress in one dependent on progress on all, the task may be impossible. And if we make one-sided concessions in one of these areas in an effort to persuade the Soviets to change their stance in another, we will only expose our naivete.

We should signal clearly to the Soviet leaders that they can achieve solid benefits by cooperation in each of these areas. A strategic arms race, an unstable world food market, tension and conflict in the Middle East and elsewhere -- none of these are in their interest.

They can work with us to avoid these dangers. But we must also make clear to them that progress can only be achieved if they, no less than we, are prepared to make concessions. Agreements must be based on a solid mutuality of interests.

In about a month the 25th Party Congress will occur. During this meeting important decisions will be made concerning the future direction of Soviet foreign policy. Looking further ahead, it is clear that the Soviets are on the threshold of a generational turnover among the Party leadership and hierarchy.

By actions and statements which make clear to the Soviets the principles that we believe should govern the East-West relationship, we may have a unique opportunity to influence the development of a Soviet foreign policy of restraint and responsibility and the emergence of a less repressive domestic society. This can be achieved not by being soft or compromising in any way our national interests.

Firmness is in order. But we must couple this attitude with encouragement of the forces of moderation in Soviet society against the ideologues, nationalists and the military.

To achieve this, American political leaders should focus on the three areas that I have described -- seeking concrete progress, on the basis of the principles that I have outlined, that will serve the interests of both countries.

All this will be hard to do in an election year unless both political parties approach this issue in a realistic and responsible manner.

I want to see the Soviet-American relationship discussed and debated in the coming Presidential election.

But I want the candidates to use restraint.

If they do not, and if demagoguery is substituted for sensible discussion, great harm could be done to the cause of influencing the evolution of a less aggressive Soviet foreign policy.

If inflammatory rhetoric or exaggerated promises become the coinage of a Presidential campaign in discussing Soviet-American relations, we only aid and abet those Soviets who want a return to the Cold War for their own purposes.

I urge candidates in both parties to take the high road of reasoned statesmanship, speaking honestly to the East-West issues that must now be tackled. In this way progress in our relations with the Soviet Union can continue even while we go about the process of choosing America's new leadership.

If we seek world peace, there are no alternatives to a constructive Soviet-American relationship. If we wish to have America turn its attention and energies to urgent domestic problems and pressing world responsibilities, the process of normalizing relations with the Soviet Union must continue.

# # # # # #

REMARKS OF SENATOR HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

DETENTE AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS

THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

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ANY DISCUSSION OF DETENTE BRINGS TO MIND THE ENGLISH ADAGE: "THE KING IS DEAD. LONG LIVE THE KING."

DETENTE, WITH ALL OF ITS SYMBOLISM AND GREAT EXPECTATIONS, WAS A PHENOMENON OF THE LATE 1960'S AND EARLY '70'S. ~~IT NOW~~ The great expectations, ~~IS~~ are PASSING INTO HISTORY. BUT THE ICE HAS BEEN BROKEN IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. THE TWO SUPER POWERS NOW ARE FOCUSING ON SPECIFIC ISSUES IN THEIR RELATIONS. DEVOID OF THEATRICS AND DRAMATICS, THE SOVIET-AMERICAN DIALOGUE MUST BE BASED ON AN ON-GOING POLITICAL PROCESS AS WELL AS ON SOLID ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

IT IS THE ISSUES AT THE HEART OF THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP WHICH I WANT TO ADDRESS TODAY. BY FOCUSING ON CONCRETE PROBLEMS, WE AVOID WINDY GENERALITIES ABOUT EAST-WEST RELATIONS WHICH OBSCURE RATHER THAN CLARIFY REALITY. IN FOCUSING ON THESE PROBLEMS, WE NEED TO KEEP TWO CENTRAL FACTS IN MIND.

FIRST, BUSINESSLIKE U.S.-SOVIET EFFORTS TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS OF COMMON CONCERN MUST CONTINUE.

I SAY "MUST CONTINUE" BECAUSE THE PROCESS WILL REDUCE RISKS OF WAR.

IT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO SENSIBLE REDUCTIONS IN THE VAST AND COSTLY ARSENALS WHICH BOTH NATIONS POSSESS.

IT MAY HELP TO PROMOTE STABILITY AT A TIME OF GROWING INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE AND ANARCHY.

AND IT HOPEFULLY WILL CAUSE BOTH SUPERPOWERS TO RECOGNIZE THEIR OBLIGATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE REST OF HUMANITY.

BUT IT ALSO IS IMPORTANT TO REALIZE THAT THESE EFFORTS WILL NOT SOON RADICALLY CHANGE THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

THIS BECOMES MORE CLEAR IF WE NOTE THAT THE BENEFITS WHICH WERE TO FLOW QUICKLY FROM IMPROVED SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS HAVE NOT MATERIALIZED.

DETENTE HAS NOT BROUGHT AN END TO SOVIET SUPPORT OF LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD OR THE ESTABLISHED COMMUNIST PARTIES IN INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS.

IT HAS NOT MEANT A BONANZA FOR THE AMERICAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY.

IT HAS NOT CAUSED A LIBERALIZATION TO ANY DEGREE OF SOVIET SUPPRESSION OF INTERNAL DISSIDENTS.

IT HAS NOT PRODUCED A REDUCTION OF SOVIET DEFENSE EXPENDITURES.

AND IT HAS NOT MEANT THAT WE CEASE TO REGARD EACH OTHER AS STRONG COMPETITORS AND POLITICAL ADVERSARIES.

FAILURE TO REALIZE THESE EXPECTATIONS IS AT THE HEART OF MUCH OF THE CURRENT FRUSTRATION AND DISENCHANTMENT WITH so-called Detente - SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN EUROPE. BUT, QUITE FRANKLY, THE EXPECTED BENEFITS FROM DETENTE WERE OVERSOLD. THESE BASIC CONDITIONS HAVE NOT CHANGED AND WILL NOT SOON CHANGE.

THESE THINGS TAKEN TOGETHER -- THE NEED FOR CONTINUING U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION IN PROBLEMS OF COMMON CONCERN AND THE UNLIKELIHOOD THAT THESE EFFORTS SOON WILL PRODUCE RADICAL CHANGE IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM -- SHOULD PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A MORE MATURE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIETS.

IT SHOULD BE A RELATIONSHIP THAT WILL EMBRACE BOTH COMPETITION AND COOPERATION AS INSTRUMENTS FOR PEACEFUL CHANGE; A RELATIONSHIP SHED OF ANY ILLUSION THAT A CONSERVATIVE COMMUNIST NATION IS GOING TO ABANDON COMPLETELY ITS IDEOLOGY, GOALS AND TACTICS BECAUSE ITS MAIN ADVERSARY EXPECTS IT TO DO SO.

TO SAY THIS, HOWEVER, IS NOT TO SAY THAT A CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP MEANS THAT WE MUST BE MORALLY INDIFFERENT TO THE DENIAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION. SUCH AN ATTITUDE WAS SADLY EVIDENT WHEN THE PRESIDENT REFUSED TO SEE MR. SOLZHENITSYN.

I RECOGNIZE THE SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATIONS OF FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERING SOVIET INTERNAL POLICIES QUICKLY BY MEANS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.

BUT THIS IS NO EXCUSE FOR TURNING OUR BACKS ON THOSE WHO EXPRESS OUTRAGE AT SOVIET POLICIES OF SUPPRESSION AND DENIAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

TO THIS END, I BELIEVE IT IMPERATIVE THAT WE INSIST ON SCRUPULOUS FULFILLMENT OF THE HELSINKI AGREEMENT THROUGH CAREFUL MONITORING OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE SOVIETS TREAT THEIR DISSIDENTS AND HOW THE QUESTION OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IS ADMINISTERED.

NORMALIZED RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS SHOULD NOT MEAN THAT WE ACQUIESCE THROUGH OUR SILENCE TO SOVIET INTERNAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES.

IT IS ONE THING TO SAY THAT WE CANNOT SOON ALTER THESE POLICIES AND PRACTICES. IT IS ANOTHER TO SAY THAT SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS SHOULD BE AN END IN THEMSELVES TO PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO.

IF WE MUST ABANDON THE LONG-TERM GOAL OF PEACEFUL CHANGE WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM AS THE PRICE OF THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP, IT CAN NEVER ENDURE.

THE INFLATED RHETORIC OF SUMMIT DIPLOMACY SHOULD, THEREFORE, NOW CEASE. THE TIME HAS COME FOR AMERICAN POLITICIANS TO SPEAK FAR MORE REALISTICALLY OF WHAT CAN AND CANNOT BE GAINED IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

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LET ~~US~~ WE NOW MOVE FROM THE GENERAL TO THE PARTICULAR. LET'S TALK ABOUT THE SPECIFIC AREAS OF THE U.S.-SOVIET DEALINGS.

THERE ARE THREE PRIORITY AREAS WHICH ARE AT THE CORE OF A MORE REALISTIC SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP.

THE FIRST IS TO CONTINUE THE SALT PROCESS AND OBTAIN IN THE NEAR FUTURE A MEANINGFUL AND ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT.

I WANT TO SAY QUITE EXPLICITLY THAT MY REMARKS TODAY ARE NOT MEANT TO PREJUDGE THE TENTATIVE PROPOSALS WHICH SECRETARY KISSINGER DISCUSSED IN MOSCOW.

I HAVE ONLY READ NEWS REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY'S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. I HAVE NOT RECEIVED A DEPARTMENT OF STATE BRIEFING CONCERNING THE SPECIFICS. THE REDUCTION OF THE VLADIVOSTOK CEILINGS IS AN ENCOURAGING SIGN OF PROGRESS.

I AM LESS CERTAIN ABOUT THE PROPOSALS ON THE CRUISE MISSILE ISSUE BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF INFORMATION IN THE PRESS ACCOUNTS.

WHAT I AM ABOUT TO SAY IS MY OWN PERSONAL VIEW OF THE WAY WE SHOULD HANDLE SOME OF THE VERY DIFFICULT ISSUES FACING US IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

I STRESS THE WORD "MEANINGFUL" WHEN DISCUSSING SALT BECAUSE WE ARE NOW PAST THE POINT WHERE WE MUST SIGN A DOCUMENT WITH THE SOVIETS TO DEMONSTRATE OUR FIDELITY TO THE CONCEPT OF MORE NORMALIZED RELATIONS. THE QUALITATIVE CONTENT OF THE AGREEMENT -- NOT THE AGREEMENT ITSELF -- IS THE REAL MEASURE OF PROGRESS IN THE FIELD OF ARMS LIMITATIONS. SO -

WHAT IS THE PIVOTAL ELEMENT IN A MEANINGFUL SALT II AGREEMENT?

UNLESS TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC OR INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE CRUISE MISSILES CAN BE AVOIDED, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO SECURE A SUBSTANTIAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT.

THE STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILE IS AN ARMS CONTROL NIGHTMARE.

ITS VERIFICATION PROBLEMS WOULD BE IMMENSE BECAUSE OF ITS CHARACTERISTICS AND THE FACT THAT THERE WOULD LIKELY BE GREAT NUMBERS DEPLOYED.

THE ONLY WAY TO AVOID THIS PROBLEM IS TO PREVENT ITS TESTING.

A BAN ON TESTING OF STRATEGIC RANGE MISSILES MIGHT BE VERIFIABLE.

IF FURTHER STUDIES INDICATE THAT THIS IS THE CASE, CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT ON SUCH A BAN SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF NEGOTIATIONS.

AND WHILE THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDERWAY, WE SHOULD NOT PREJUDICE THEIR OUTCOME BY PROCEEDING WITH THE DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF STRATEGIC RANGE CRUISE MISSILES OURSELVES.

I AM CONVINCED THAT AMERICA IS STRONG ENOUGH BY ANY MEASURE -- MILITARILY, ECONOMICALLY, POLITICALLY, SOCIALLY -- TO FORGO THE ADDITION OF A COSTLY NEW SYSTEM OF AIR- AND SEA-LAUNCHED STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES TO ITS NUCLEAR ARSENAL.

LET US NOT FOOL OURSELVES. AMERICA'S LEAD IN CRUISE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY IS ONLY TEMPORARY.

IF THE CEILINGS ON STRATEGIC ARMS ESTABLISHED AT VLADIVOSTOK SHOULD BE RAISED TO INCLUDE THE STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILE, A NEW SALT AGREEMENT WILL BE OF LIMITED VALUE, SINCE ITS PROVISIONS WITH RESPECT TO CRUISE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT COULD NOT BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIED. AND I PREDICT SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE A VERY DIFFICULT TIME IN THE SENATE.

IF WE TAKE THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS SERIOUSLY AND BELIEVE THAT IT IS IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST, WE MUST STRIVE TO AVOID THE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF THOSE WEAPONS SYSTEMS THAT CANNOT BE MEASURED WITH CERTAINTY. IF THIS IS NOT DONE, FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS TO OBTAIN REDUCTIONS WILL BE FAR MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE.

I DON'T BELIEVE SECRETARY KISSINGER OR PRESIDENT FORD CAN AFFORD TO JEOPARDIZE THE SALT PROCESS BY ALLOWING THE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC RANGE CRUISE MISSILES TO OCCUR.

SALT IS AT THE TOP OF OUR ARMS CONTROL AGENDA. HOWEVER THERE ARE SEVERAL OTHER CRITICAL ITEMS WHICH MERIT ATTENTION:

-- THE TASK OF REDUCING TENSION AND CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE MUST CONTINUE WITH RENEWED VIGOR AT THE MBFR NEGOTIATION.

-- THE COOPERATION WE HAVE ELICITED FROM THE SOVIETS AND OTHERS IN THE FIELD OF NONPROLIFERATION SHOULD CONTINUE AND BE EXPANDED IN VIEW OF THE DANGERS FROM THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- THE THRESHOLD FOR THE TEST BAN TREATY RECENTLY NEGOTIATED SHOULD BE RENEGOTIATED AT A LOWER, MEANINGFUL LEVEL. THE ULTIMATE GOAL HERE SHOULD BE A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN.

-- FINALLY, WE SHOULD INITIATE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS LIMITATIONS, BUILDING ON OUR EXPERTISE AND COOPERATION IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD.

THE SECOND AREA FOR U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATION IS ECONOMIC. THE KEY ISSUE HERE IS FOOD.

THOUGH THE SOVIETS' GRAIN PURCHASES ARE THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT VARIABLE IN THE WORLD WHEAT MARKET, THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT AND COOPERATE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ADEQUATE FOOD AND FIBER INFORMATION SYSTEM WHICH REVEALS SUPPLY AND FUTURE NEEDS IS DISRUPTIVE AND INJURIOUS TO OUR BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP.

THIS HAS BEEN EASED SOMEWHAT BY THE AGREEMENT THAT PROVIDES FOR LONG TERM U.S. EXPORTS ON A SYSTEMATIC BASIS.

THERE ALREADY IS SOME CONCERN THAT THE RECENT U.S.-SOVIET GRAIN AGREEMENT LEADS THE SOVIETS TO BELIEVE THEY CAN IGNORE THEIR MANY RESPONSIBILITIES AS A SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL FOOD SYSTEM.

INTERNATIONAL NORMS IN MANY FIELDS ARE THERE FOR THE SOVIETS TO SEE. WESTERN TRADING PARTNERS MUST BE MORE INSISTENT IN THEIR DEMANDS THAT THESE NORMS BE OBEYED.

LET ME BE MORE SPECIFIC.

CONSULTATIONS ABOUT AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF GRAIN RESERVES ARE TAKING PLACE IN THE WAKE OF THE ROME WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE. SUCCESS IN THIS ENDEAVOR WILL BE IMPEDED IF THE SOVIETS DO NOT COOPERATE. IF THEY REFUSE TO JOIN IN BUILDING UP RESERVES, AND MUST THEREFORE GO INTO THE WORLD MARKET EVERY TIME THEIR PRODUCTION FALLS BELOW DOMESTIC NEED AND DEMAND, THE WORLD GRAIN MARKET WILL BE SUBJECT TO ENDEMIC INSTABILITY.

IF WE CAN GET AGREEMENT OF LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES TO CREATE A SYSTEM FOR BUILDING UP THESE RESERVES, IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT NON-PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES WILL ENJOY LOWER PRIORITY THAN OTHERS WITH RESPECT TO EXPORTS AND RESERVES OF PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES IN TIME OF GLOBAL FOOD SHORTAGE.

IF THE SOVIET UNION EXPECTS TO REAP THE ADVANTAGES OF AN INTERDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM, IT WILL HAVE TO ACCEPT THE RESPONSIBILITIES THAT GO WITH THOSE BENEFITS.

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT AMERICAN POLICYMAKERS SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF FOOD IN THE SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP. SHED OF ANY ILLUSIONS THAT GRAIN EXPORTS WILL OVERNIGHT PRODUCE POLITICAL MIRACLES, I HAVE EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT SOVIET BEHAVIOR could BE MODERATED BY THEIR CONTINUED DEPENDENCE ON AMERICA FOR FOOD COMMODITIES.

A THIRD AREA THAT I WISH TO DISCUSS IS THE FORMATION OF A MORE ENDURING POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP WHERE COOPERATION MODERATES COMPETITION.

THERE ARE NO EASY METHODS OR SECRET FORMULAS TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL. TOUGH AND BUSINESS LIKE NEGOTIATIONS ARE THE BEST ROUTE TO PROGRESS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THIS MEANS, FOR EXAMPLE, TRYING TO PERSUADE THE SOVIET UNION TO JOIN WITH THE UNITED STATES IN EXERCISING A MODERATING, RATHER THAN AN INFLAMMATORY, INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. (arms control)

THIS KIND OF SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION INVOLVING A SPECIFIC THREAT TO PEACE IS MORE IMPORTANT TO IMPROVED RELATIONS THAN GENERAL DECLARATION OR ATMOSPHERICS.

THESE THREE SPECIFIC AREAS -- ARMS CONTROL, ECONOMIC POLICY AND POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS -- WILL BE THE FOCUS OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN THE PERIOD AHEAD. SUCCESS IN EACH OF THEM IS IMPORTANT.

WE NEED A LIMITATION ON ARMAMENTS.

WE NEED A SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL GRAIN RESERVES.

WE NEED PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

IT WILL BE DIFFICULT ENOUGH TO MAKE PROGRESS IN EACH OF THESE AREAS INDIVIDUALLY. IF WE LIMIT THEM AND MAKE PROGRESS IN ONE DEPENDENT ON PROGRESS ON ALL, THE TASK MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE.

AND IF WE MAKE ONE-SIDED CONCESSIONS IN ONE OF THESE AREAS IN AN EFFORT TO PERSUADE THE SOVIETS TO CHANGE THEIR STANCE IN ANOTHER, WE WILL ONLY EXPOSE OUR NAIVETE.

WE SHOULD SIGNAL CLEARLY TO THE SOVIET LEADERS THAT THEY CAN ACHIEVE SOLID BENEFITS BY COOPERATION IN EACH OF THESE AREAS, A STRATEGIC ARMS RACE, AN UNSTABLE WORLD FOOD MARKET, TENSION AND CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ELSEWHERE -- NONE OF THESE ARE IN THEIR INTEREST.

THEY CAN WORK WITH US TO AVOID THESE DANGERS. BUT WE MUST ALSO MAKE CLEAR TO THEM THAT PROGRESS CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED IF THEY, NO LESS THAN WE, ARE PREPARED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS. AGREEMENTS MUST BE BASED ON A SOLID MUTUALITY OF INTERESTS.

IN ABOUT A MONTH THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS WILL OCCUR. DURING THIS MEETING IMPORTANT DECISIONS WILL BE MADE CONCERNING THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY.

LOOKING FURTHER AHEAD, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS ARE ON THE THRESHOLD OF A GENERATIONAL TURNOVER AMONG THE PARTY LEADERSHIP AND HIERARCHY.

BY ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS WHICH MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THE PRINCIPLES THAT WE BELIEVE SHOULD GOVERN THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP, WE MAY HAVE A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OF RESTRAINT AND RESPONSIBILITY AND THE EMERGENCE OF A LESS REPRESSIVE DOMESTIC SOCIETY. THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED NOT BY BEING SOFT OR COMPROMISING IN ANY WAY OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS.

FIRMNESS IS IN ORDER. BUT WE MUST COUPLE THIS ATTITUDE WITH ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE FORCES OF MODERATION IN SOVIET SOCIETY AGAINST THE IDEOLOGUES, NATIONALISTS AND THE MILITARY.

TO ACHIEVE THIS, AMERICAN POLITICAL LEADERS SHOULD FOCUS ON THE THREE AREAS THAT I HAVE DESCRIBED -- SEEKING CONCRETE PROGRESS, ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES THAT I HAVE OUTLINED, THAT WILL SERVE THE INTERESTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES.

ALL THIS WILL BE HARD TO DO IN AN ELECTION YEAR UNLESS BOTH POLITICAL PARTIES APPROACH THIS ISSUE IN A REALISTIC AND RESPONSIBLE MANNER.

I WANT TO SEE THE SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP DISCUSSED AND DEBATED IN THE COMING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

BUT I WANT THE CANDIDATES TO USE RESTRAINT.

IF THEY DO NOT, AND IF DEMAGOGUERY IS SUBSTITUTED FOR SENSIBLE DISCUSSION, GREAT HARM COULD BE DONE TO THE CAUSE OF INFLUENCING THE EVOLUTION OF A LESS AGGRESSIVE SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY.

IF INFLAMMATORY RHETORIC OR EXAGGERATED PROMISES BECOME THE COINAGE OF A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN IN DISCUSSING SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, WE ONLY AID AND ABET THOSE SOVIETS WHO WANT A RETURN TO THE COLD WAR FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES.

I URGE CANDIDATES IN BOTH PARTIES TO TAKE THE HIGH ROAD OF REASONED STATESMANSHIP, SPEAKING HONESTLY TO THE EAST-WEST ISSUES THAT MUST NOW BE TACKLED. IN THIS WAY PROGRESS IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION CAN CONTINUE EVEN WHILE WE GO ABOUT THE PROCESS OF CHOOSING AMERICA'S NEW LEADERSHIP.

IF WE SEEK WORLD PEACE, THERE ARE NO ALTERNATIVES TO A CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP. IF WE WISH TO HAVE AMERICA TURN ITS ATTENTION AND ENERGIES TO URGENT DOMESTIC PROBLEMS AND PRESSING WORLD RESPONSIBILITIES, THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION MUST CONTINUE.

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Draft of As Delivered Text, given by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, The Center for Strategic and International Studies' Quadrangular Conference III, January 27. Edited by M. Jon Vondracek

Any discussion of detente brings to mind the English adage, "The king is dead, long live the king." Now somebody is going to say, what do you mean by that? I simply mean that we've taken a much more realistic attitude about detente, that some of the great expectations that were the phenomena of the 1960's and 1970's are passing into history, and we're beginning to look at detente in a much more realistic fashion. But I think it should be said that the ice has been broken in U.S.-Soviet relations. Whatever your point of view may be about detente, it does at least symbolize that we are in a process of communication. The two superpowers are now focusing on specific issues in their relations, and devoid of theatrics and dramatics, the Soviet-American dialogue must henceforth be based on an ongoing political process as well as on solid accomplishments. I try to define detente not as an accomplishment as such, but rather the creation of a political environment in which it is possible to work toward solutions that may relieve some of the tensions which exist between our two great systems. If you look at it as a process rather than a fact of achievement, I think you're in a much better position.

It is the issues at the heart of the East-West relations that I would like to address. By focusing on concrete problems, we avoid the windy generalities about East-West relations which obscure rather than clarify reality. In focusing on these problems, we

need to keep in mind two central facts, as I see them:

First, businesslike, well-organized Soviet-U.S. efforts to resolve problems of common concern must continue. I say "must continue" because the process of continuation of these relationships will reduce the risk of war. It will contribute to sensible reductions in the vast and costly arsenals which both nations now possess. It may help to promote stability at a time of growing international violence and anarchy, and it hopefully will cause both superpowers to recognize their obligations and responsibilities to the rest of humanity.

It also is important to realize that these efforts will not soon radically (and I emphasize the words "soon" and "radically") change the international situation. I think this becomes more clear if we note that the benefits which were supposed to flow so quickly from improved Soviet-American relations have not materialized.

Detente has not brought an end to Soviet support of "liberation movements" in the Third World, as we know, or the established Communist parties in the industrialized nations. I don't think we should have expected that to happen. It has not meant a bonanza for Americans or the American business community.

It has not caused a liberalization, to any substantial degree, of Soviet suppression of internal dissidence. (I would put in a caveat here that I do think that the Soviet Union is more concerned about world public opinion than it used to be. It has gained a

stature of power and respect-- or at least acceptance--in the world to the point where, in dealing with its own internal dissidence, it is somewhat more concerned about outside opinion.)

It has not produced a reduction of Soviet defense expenditures. And so-called detente has not meant that we cease to regard each other as strong competitors and political adversaries.

Failure to realize these expectations is at the heart of much of the current frustration and disenchantment with detente and Soviet-American relations in the United States and Europe. But quite frankly, the expected benefits from detente, like the expected benefits from the United Nations, were oversold. We like to do that here. Our journalism contributes to it. Our whole sense of media, of advertising and public relations, always oversell practically everything that's on the market, either in ideas or goods.

Taking these things together, the need for continuing U.S.-Soviet cooperation in problems of common concern and the unlikelihood that these efforts soon will produce radical change in the Soviet system should provide the basis for a more mature relationship with the Soviets.

It should be a relationship that will embrace both competition and cooperation as instruments of peaceful change; a relationship shed of any illusion that a conservative Communist nation is going to abandon completely its ideology, goals, and tactics because its main adversary expects it to do so.

To say this, however, is not to say that a constructive Soviet-American relationship means that we must be morally indifferent to the denial of human rights within the Soviet Union. Such an attitude was sadly evident when the President refused to see Mr. Solzhenitsyn.

I recognize the substantial limitations of fundamentally altering Soviet internal policies by our actions or our relationship. But that doesn't mean that we should not persist in our proper goals, the democratic ideals and relationships which we believe lend themselves to peaceful cooperation. In other words, this is no excuse for turning our backs on those who express outrage at Soviet policies of suppression and denial of human rights. I don't know whether we can really change them a great deal but I don't believe that we ought to hush up. I believe that we have a responsibility to our own set of values, and those values ought to be constantly placed before the world community.

To this end I believe it is imperative that we insist on scrupulous fulfillment of the Helsinki Agreement through careful monitoring of the manner in which the Soviets treat their dissidents and how the question of freedom of movement is administered. I am not so naive as to believe that we're really going to make them toe the mark. But I think they ought to be reminded. More people in this world want freedom than oppression; more people want freedom of movement than to be locked up; and more people want free exchange of ideas than to be denied expression of creative thought. We ought to be on the side of freedom constantly -- not necessarily

belligerently -- but firmly and intensely.

Normalizing relations with the Soviets should not mean that we acquiesce through our silence to Soviet internal policies or practices. We had a period of acquiescence in this world in the time of Hitler. People did acquiesce, in Germany and elsewhere, who knew that Hitler's policies were wrong. There was too much acquiescence in America both to Japanese imperialism and German Nazism with people saying it wasn't any of our business. The fact is that freedom is our business. The fact is that democratic ideals are our business. And whenever we sell them out by silence or by negotiation, we do it at our peril.

Now it's one thing to say that we cannot alter these policies and practices. It is another thing to say that Soviet-American relations -- at any cost -- should be an end in themselves to preserve the status quo. I am not one who underestimates the tremendous importance of Soviet-American relations. I think the peace of the world depends on it, at least in the foreseeable future. Nor have I ever been known as a Soviet baiter. To the contrary, I recognize the accomplishments of their society in material things. I recognize many of the great contributions that have been made by their science and technology and many other areas. In fact the Russian people, over the centuries, have made great contributions to the culture of the world.

But if we must abandon the long-term goal of peaceful change within and without the Communist system as the price of U.S.-Soviet

relationships, I suggest to you it can never endure.

The inflated rhetoric of summit diplomacy should, therefore, now cease. I am not opposed to summit diplomacy: to the contrary, I think is is a part of the diplomatic scene and will continue to be so. But I think summit diplomacy has to be well organized. It has to be put in a proper framework. It ought to be something that we know is going to happen, and it should be prepared for without extravaganzas or spectaculars. The time has come for American politicians to speak far more realistically of what can and what cannot be gained in East-West relations -- and that goes on both sides. We should stop frightening ourselves with horrendous tales of Soviet aggression and Soviet penetration on the one hand, and recognize on the other that we're in for competition. I don't mind the competition myself. As a matter of fact, I think it keeps us alive and on our toes.

Let me now move from the general to the particular. Let's talk about specific areas in the current scene of U.S.-Soviet dealings. There are three priority areas that I believe are at the core of a more realistic Soviet-American realtionship. The first, obviously, is to continue the SALT talk process and obtain (hopefully) in the near future, a new, meaningful, and acceptable agreement. I understand the difficulties. I don't think we ought to expect miracles or quick solutions. I want to say explicitly that my remarks here are not meant in any way to prejudge the tentative proposals which Secretary Kissinger discussed in Moscow. I was one that urged the Secretary to continue the discussions in Moscow. I believe he ought to walk the extra mile no matter how

difficult it is to obtain better understandings with people and, hopefully, agreements.

I have only read news reports of the Secretary's discussion with the Soviet leadership.

The reduction of the Vladivostok ceilings, as I have read them, is an encouraging sign of progress. I am less certain about the proposals on the cruise missile issue because of the lack of information in the press accounts. What I am about to say is my own personal view of the way we should handle some of the very difficult issues facing us in the upcoming and continuing negotiations.

I stress the word "meaningful" when discussing SALT. In the SALT negotiations, we are now past the point where we must sign a document with the Soviets just to demonstrate our fidelity to the concept of more normalized relations. We want a document that means something, that does something -- but we don't need one just to encourage ourselves to continue the process. Because once you sign documents that lend themselves to violation, you do not serve the cause of peace, or the cause of reduction of misunderstanding, or of tensions.

The qualitative content of the agreement -- not the agreement itself -- is the real measure of progress in the field of arms limitation. What is the pivotal element in a new SALT II agreement that would cover strategic weaponry and cruise missiles? Unless testing and deployment of strategic or intercontinental range cruise missiles can be aborted, and I underscore strategic and intercontinental, it will be difficult to secure a substantial arms control agreement. The strategic cruise missile is an arms control

nightmare. Its verification problems would be immense because of its characteristics and the fact that there would likely be great numbers deployed. There is just no way that you can know how many cruise missiles a B-52 or a submarine can carry. The only way to avoid this problem, therefore, is to forbid its testing and deployment. A ban on testing of strategic or intercontinental cruise-range missiles might be verifiable. If further studies indicate this is the case, concluding an agreement on such a ban should be a high priority of negotiations. And while the negotiations are underway, we should not prejudice their outcome by proceeding with the development and testing of strategic-range cruise missiles ourselves.

Now I differentiate between the strategic and the limited distance missile. I am convinced that America is strong enough by any measure, militarily, economically, politically, and socially to forego the addition of a costly new system of air and sea launched strategic cruise missiles to its nuclear arsenal. I recognize that if the other side does it, all bets are off. But I'm talking about whether we take the lead and clearly we have the lead, at least in the technology.

America's lead in cruise missile technology is, of course, only temporary. If the ceilings on strategic arms established in Vladivostok should be raised to include the strategic cruise missile, a new SALT agreement will be of limited value, since its provisions with respect to cruise missile deployment could not be adequately verified. I know of no one today that thinks that you could properly verify cruise missiles. I predict that if an agreement should be negotiated, which included the cruise missile, it would have a

very difficult time getting through the Senate. If we take the arms control process seriously, and believe that it is in our national interest, we must strive to avoid the testing and deployment of those weapons systems that cannot be measured with certainty. The only way that we dare negotiate these agreements is if we can be reasonably secure in verification. Trust does not really exist. We have to have an alternative to trust, which is the technology of verification. I do not believe for a minute that Secretary Kissinger or President Ford can afford to jeopardize the SALT process by allowing the testing and deployment of strategic-range cruise missiles to occur.

SALT is at the top of our arms control agenda. There are, however, several other critical items which merit attention. First, the task of reducing tension and confrontation in Europe must continue with renewed vigor at the MBFR (Mutual Balanced Force Reduction) negotiations. The Soviets have shown very little inclination to come around to any understanding here.

Secondly, the cooperation that we have elicited from the Soviets and others in the field of nuclear nonproliferation should continue and we ought to press for it and expand it. I am happy to say the Soviets have been very cooperative in this area. The threshold of the Test Ban Treaty recently negotiated should be renegotiated at a lower, and meaningful level. The ultimate goal should be a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

Finally, we should initiate discussions with the Soviets on conventional arms limitations building on our expertise and cooperation in the nuclear field. I feel that there really is no advanced

security in the arms race. It's a constant game of who gets ahead and who catches up. It's catch up, get up, spend more, lifting the threshold of danger. And I am sure that Soviet negotiators are not going to negotiate away what they think is their security, and I hope and I believe none of our negotiators are going to negotiate away what is our security. When we are talking arms control, we are talking life and death. We are also talking about whether or not we can keep away from going bankrupt, because defense expenditures are rising at a horrendous pace. There is pressure in this country to get them to rise even faster.

Now the second area for U.S.-Soviet negotiation is what appears on the face to be more simple -- it's economic. I would like to discuss just one issue here, and that's food.

Though Soviet grain purchases are the single most important variable in the world wheat market, their unwillingness to accept and cooperate in the establishment of adequate food and fiber information, which reveals supply and future needs, is disruptive and injurious to our bilateral economic relationship and to world food security. We simply have to insist they join in.

The Soviets have literally smashed our markets time after time. They come in with these huge purchases which disrupt the commodity market, which are of little or no benefit to the farm producer, which throw the commodity futures into a turmoil, and we have let them get by with it for years. Why haven't we asked them to do as the Japanese or other grain customers do? The Japanese and others

take food supplies on a regular, week-by-week basis, not putting pressure on our transport system, upon our shipping system, not putting pressure on our markets, and have a reasonable understanding as to what is going to transpire over a crop year.

Fortunately, the recent negotiations conducted by Mr. Bell of the Department of Agriculture and Mr. Robinson of State have lent themselves to a better situation. There is already, however, some concern that the recent U.S.-Soviet grain agreement leads the Soviets to believe they can ignore their responsibilities as a significant element in the international food system. In other words "they're taken care of." International norms in many fields are there for the Soviets to see. Western trading partners must be more insistent in their demands that these norms be obeyed.

Consultations about an international system of grain reserves are taking place in the wake of the Rome Food Conference. Success in this endeavor, which is important, will be impeded if the Soviets do not join or cooperate. If they refuse to join in building up their reserves -- and I say <u>acknowledged</u> reserves for I happen to think they have a secret strategic reserve, but I'm talking about reserves that are available for the world community and for themselves -- if they refuse to join, and must therefore go into the world market every time their production falls below domestic need and demand, the world grain market will be subject to endemic instability. Instability in these markets is disaster for American agriculture, because we are the reserve producers. We have got our economic life at stake. The largest business in America is not

General Motors, or U.S. Steel or computers. They are like a peanut stand. The real business of America is agriculture. That's one thing Washington doesn't understand. It's incredible, but there isn't a single agency of this government except one, the Department of Agriculture, that is even interested in agriculture, except in an emergency. The Federal Reserve Board ignores it. The State Department ignores it, except when it gets to be critical in terms of some world crisis. The Commerce Department ignores it. The White House ignores it. It is as if it didn't exist. It is the number one thing we have. Everything else we have, we have competitors for. And many of them outcompete us. But when it comes to agriculture, we say, "Well, we've got those old farmers out there. They'll still do it."

I want to tell you if I had my way, the American farmers would make you say uncle a few times until they got some attention. I think it's important that we emphasize this, but I don't think my message gets through and I will be very frank with you. I have been to all these sophisticated seminars now for over 20 years in Washington. I have never yet heard a conference on agriculture that they didn't complain about the farmer. And he is our most reliable producer. He saved us most of the time before and he is still saving the nation. He is the only thing we really have going for us except the sale of weapons. He is the big exporter. And yet he is given little or no consideration in economic policy making of America domestically or internationally, except when it suddenly appears there is a crisis.

If we can get agreement of like-minded countries to create a system of building up their food reserves, it should be made manifestly clear to the Soviet Union that non-participating countries will enjoy a lower priority than others with respect to exports and reserves of participating countries in time of global food shortage. They either cooperate, join in or take a second class status on the availability of supplies. I think that has got to be clear. If the Soviet Union expects to reap the advantages of an interdependent, international economic system, it will have to accept the responsibilities that go with those benefits. And as a United States Senator, I am going to look after U.S. interests. U.S. interests are not being protected by the kind of willy nilly, ad hoc, in-and-out relationships that the Soviet Union preserves today in the international field of food and fiber. So I want the message to them to be clear. I believe in selling the Russians anything they can't shoot back, if they can pay cash. Anything. I believe in trade. I don't believe in trying to be mean about it or antagonistic. I believe that they are a good customer. I want them as a good customer for years and years and years to come. And I want us to be a reliable exporter and reliable producer. But we have got to have ground rules. And if they are not going to abide by the rules, they are not going to get the benefit in times of crisis. That is the way we have got to play the game.

Now it's important that American policy makers should not underestimate the critical importance of food worldwide, and particularly in our international relations and in our relations with the Soviet

Union. Shed of any illusions that grain exports will overnight produce political miracles, I have every reason to believe that the Soviet behavior could be moderated by their continued dependence on America for food commodities. There is no way that they can produce enough for themselves, unless God Almighty changes the climate, because 85 to 90 per cent of all the productive land of the Soviet Union is north of the latitude of Minneapolis, Minnesota. And we know that north of that, corn, soy beans, and wheat are always in difficulty. It would be like trying to produce enough food for all of the Soviet Union in Canada. It cannot be done.

Now they can make their estimates of 215 million metric tons: that estimate is sort of like the President's budget -- a lot of guesses that don't add up to a single thing in fact.

Last year we got an estimate of $8 billion for offshore oil leases. We got one billion. Anybody that fails that much in school has flunked. But these estimates, all these Soviet estimates, don't mean a thing. What you need to do is take a look at the traditional pattern of production as related to the estimates. The minute you start to do that, you begin to understand the facts.

A third area that I wish to discuss is the formulation or formation of a more enduring political relationship where cooperation moderates competition. There are no easy ways, no secret formulas. Tough and businesslike negotiations are the best route to progress in East-West relations. This means, for example, trying to persuade the Soviet Union to join with the United States in exercising a moderating, rather than an inflammatory, influence in the Middle East.

There may have been some reasonable success already. I have some reason to believe that one of the reasons the Soviets didn't blast the Sinai Agreement was because they needed food. But the very time that the Sinai Agreement was before the Congress, they were also in the market for American food and, as you know, there was some doubt as to whether there were going to be deliveries. We both have the same responsibility to moderate conditions in the Middle East. This kind of successful negotiation involving a specific threat to peace is much more important to improving relations than general declarations or political atmospherics.

These three specific areas -- arms control, economic policy, and political negotiations -- should be the focus of East-West relations in the period ahead. Success in each of them is important. But there doesn't need to be linkage. We need a limitation on armaments. We need a system of international grain reserves and world grain information -- food information. We need progress, step by step, towards peace in the Middle East. It will be difficult enough to make progress in each of these areas individually. If we limit them and make progress in one dependent on progress in all, the task will be impossible. And if we make the one-sided concessions in one of these areas, in an effort to persuade the Soviets to change their stance in another, we will only expose ourselves to being considered a novice at the whole thing -- just unwilling to recognize the facts of life.

We should signal clearly to the Soviet leaders that they can achieve solid benefits by cooperation in each of these areas. A strategic arms race, an unstable world food market, tension and

conflict in the Middle East and elsewhere -- none of these are in their interest or ours. They can work with us to avoid these dangers. But we must also make it clear to them that progress can be achieved only if they, no less than we, are prepared to make concessions. Agreements must be based on a solid mutuality of interests.

In about a month, the 25th Party Congress will occur in Moscow. During this meeting important decisions will be made about the Soviet Union's economic policies and its foreign policy. Looking ahead it is clear that the Soviets are on the threshold of a generational turnover among the party leadership and hierarchy. I believe there are hardly any of the original revolutionaries left, if any. There is a whole new generation. By actions and statements which make clear to the Soviets the principles we believe should govern East-West relationship, we may have a unique opportunity now to influence the development of a Soviet foreign policy of restraint and responsibility and the emergence of a less repressive domestic society. This can be achieved not by being soft or making foolish concessions or compromising in any way our national interests.

Firmness, not belligerancy, but firmness is in order. But we must couple this attitude with encouragement of the forces of moderation in the Soviet society against the ideologues, the super-nationalists, and the military. To achieve this, the American political leaders should focus on the three areas that I have described, seeking concrete progress on the basis of the principles that I tried to outline. I believe that these will serve the interests of both countries.

All of this will be hard to do in an election year, unless both political parties approach this issue in a responsible and realistic manner. I want to see the Soviet-American relationship discussed and debated in the coming Presidential election. But I want the candidates to use restraint, and to recognize their responsibility to the world community as well as to our own electorate. If they do not, and if demagoguery is substituted for sensible discussion, great harm could be done to the cause of influencing the evolution of a less aggressive Soviet foreign policy. If inflammatory rhetoric or exaggerated promises become the coinage of a Presidential campaign in discussing Soviet-American relations, we only aid and abet those Soviets who want to return to the cold war for their own purposes. And let me tell you they have cold war warriors too. It isn't just here in the United States. I urge candidates in both parties to take the high road of reasoned statesmanship, speaking honestly, openly to East-West issues that must now be tackled. In this way, progress in our relations with the Soviet Union can continue even while we go about the process of choosing America's new leadership.

If we seek world peace, there are no alternatives to a constructive Soviet-American relationship. That's what I started with, that's what I end with. If we wish to have America turn its attention and energies to urgent domestic problems and pressing world responsibilities, the process, the slow, tedious, and at times agonizing, process of normalizing relations with the Soviet Union must continue, expecting no miracles, but working for some advancement.

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