

REMARKS OF SENATOR HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL FOR ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Washington, D.C.

February 5, 1976

Tonight I wish to discuss a controversial foreign policy topic which currently is before the Congress. It is an issue with which I currently am involved through my work on the Foreign Relations Committee.

It is a complex problem with no easy solutions.

I speak of arms transfers and current efforts to rewrite the statute by which the United States granted and sold more than \$11 billion in 1975 in arms-and defense-related services.

As in the case of general economic assistance, the Congress has become involved in the arms transfer area as a result of our basic concern that these transfers do not appear to be taking place within the framework of coherent Administration policy. We have taken the initiative because we could no longer sit back and watch important decisions being made on an ad hoc basis.

The transfer of arms from the United States to foreign nations has been an important component of American foreign policy since early in this century. A brief historical overview demonstrates the longevity of this issue.

-- Two years before the U.S. entered the First World War the Lusitania was sunk carrying arms destined for Britain's war effort.

--During the 1920's and 1930's the issue of arms transfers as they relate to foreign policy was hotly debated. A special Senate Committee chaired by Senator Nye of North Dakota was formed in 1934 to investigate the matter.

Its purpose was to examine the extent to which the U.S. was drawn into wars as a result of the munitions makers. Senator Nye's work largely was unsuccessful and many believe it fed the fires of rampant isolationism which was sweeping the country.

-- After the end of World War II the United States began a program of granting arms to numerous countries as a means to halt the spread of Communism. This was a central ingredient of U.S. foreign policy for nearly two decades.

By the early 1960's many of our aid recipients in Europe and Asia could afford to purchase their weapons. The grant program declined in the 1960's, with the notable exception of Southeast Asia, as a result of the lessening of cold war tensions.

-- The decline of our grant program coincided with the sudden flow of oil revenues to Arab oil producers and the withdrawal of the British from the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.

These oil-rich nations were able and eager to purchase American and European weapons. By the early 1970's and the formulation of the Nixon Doctrine, our posture in the Persian Gulf was to rely principally on Iran and Saudi Arabia for stability in the region. This meant embarking on a vast program of selling technologically advanced weapons and building a local military infrastructure.

Here are some interesting statistics to supplement this brief overview.

-- In the last 30 years the U.S. has given away or sold \$110 billion in military equipment and supplies to foreign countries.

-- Last fiscal year, the U.S. government sold \$9.5 billion in military equipment, supplies or services to 71 nations. Slightly over \$600 million in military material was supplied through commercial channels and \$584 million was given away in military grants by our government.

We now have reached the point in a rapidly changing, multi-polar world when we must re-examine American arms transfer policy.

This complex task must be undertaken because we and other industrialized nations no longer can sell vast quantities of arms based on rationales rooted in the 1960's or even in the early 1970's.

We must look ahead five and ten years to the consequences for world peace and stability of policies formulated yesterday and today.

I do not deny that economic and political benefits can flow from the sale of weapons.

Jobs are created. Weapons for our own forces are cheaper. Our balance of payments position is aided. And our overall commercial posture in foreign countries benefits.

Politically, arms often provide leverage and influence. Important military and intelligence bases often are secured through the sale or grant of weapons.

But we must weigh these advantages -- many of which are short term -- against the long term effect of unrestricted arms transfers on our national interests and goals.

-- Arms transfers to regions where conflict is likely stimulate arms races and can increase sharply the prospects for war. We see such a phenomenon in the Middle East. The Persian Gulf itself has yet to reach such a threshold, although some experts believe this inevitable.

-- Through the sale of arms and by providing support -- including American servicemen -- we become identified with particular regimes. Most important, we become embroiled in the day-to-day affairs of other governments and their military commands.

Such a relationship creates animosity over time and draws us deeper and deeper into the internal affairs of foreign nations. We are beginning to see this syndrome at work in Iran.

-- Our sale and grant of weapons to regimes which may engage in gross violations of human rights is of increasing concern. Our moral standing in the world is harmed by such practices.

-- The transfer of American arms can have an adverse effect on our own readiness as stocks of weapons are drawn down and our flexibility is reduced. If U.S. personnel are sent abroad in connection with the sales, we may compound our manpower problems.

-- If one of the countries heavily dependent on American arms becomes involved in a regional conflict or if that country experiences a breakdown of internal order, our options may become awkward and unpleasant: We can continue to supply spare parts or maintenance services to that nation and risk involvement; or we can refuse to cooperate.

If we take the latter course, we may incur the wrath of that government and undermine our reputation with other purchasers as a reliable supplier.

This is why the choice of arms recipients must be made with extreme care.

-- The transfer of advanced conventional weapons technology narrows the lead time nations need to develop nuclear weapons.

Many of the nations which are developing nuclear power for energy also are being provided what we call "dual capable" weapons such as ground to ground missiles. The marriage of nuclear fuel to advanced non-nuclear technology may lead to the further spread of nuclear weapons.

-- Finally, the arms we transfer for legitimate reasons may be retransferred illegally to other nations at a time of war. I frankly am concerned that Arab countries peripheral to past conflicts with Israel may participate with our weapons in a future war against the Jewish state.

It is fair to say that the U.S. government sells vast quantities of arms to foreign governments with little foresight, minimal consultation with Congress, and very little scrutiny within the Executive branch.

The American people have become justifiably concerned with a highly secretive national policy which seems to disregard our long-term security interests in a stable, more democratic world.

The answer to this concern is not to halt abruptly all American arms sales. This would have a serious adverse impact on our economy and our foreign policy. I advocate, instead, two courses of action.

First, the Congress must exercise effective oversight of arms transfers through enactment of legislation which now is pending. The bill which I had the privilege to author -- the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 -- is designed to achieve five basic objectives.

1. To shift the focus of U.S. arms sales policy from that of selling arms to controlling arms sales and exports;
2. To provide the Congress with additional information about, and expanded and strengthened control over, arms transfers;
3. To provide the public with more information about government arms sales actions;
4. To reduce significantly the number of military grant assistance programs and U.S. military missions abroad over the next year and a half and to require a specific authorization for any grant programs or missions after that; and
5. To reduce the cost of military assistance grants.

A major feature of the bill is to bring American arms exports issues out into the open. A basic fault of past policy, which has led to the present state of public concern, is that too much of the sales program in the past has been carried out in secrecy.

This bill requires that all government-to-government contracts be available for public inspection and that data in quarterly and other reports be unclassified to the maximum extent possible, consistent with U.S. security and the protection of the competitive position of U.S. industry.

I believe that more effective control over arms transfers by the Congress will force the Executive branch to formulate more responsible arms transfer policies.

I must emphasize that this nation needs an overall arms transfer policy with careful delineations about individual countries and regions. A well understood policy framework cannot be developed by the Congress through legislation. This responsibility belongs primarily to the Executive branch. But it should be undertaken with the cooperation of the Congress.

Moreover, Congress cannot manage these programs, and this legislation is not designed as a substitute for a soundly managed arms transfer program.

The second course of action is more difficult to achieve.

I believe that the United States should embark on a major initiative to achieve multilateral constraints in the transfer of arms.

I do not believe that this issue has ever been given serious consideration by our policy makers. But it must be now.

In order to be taken seriously, our proposals must be concrete and somewhat limited in scope.

One possible option to be explored is a joint Soviet-American moratorium on the transfer of all surface-to-surface missiles to countries outside of Europe. This would mean no more Scuds, Frogs, Lances and no Pershing missiles to the Persian Gulf or the Middle East.

If this could be achieved, it would be an important first step toward further, more extensive agreements which could include other Western and Eastern suppliers. If commercial rivalry is the main roadblock to unilateral constraints, then a multi-lateral approach should be utilized.

I conclude with an appeal for greater discussion of the arms transfer issue within government and by the public. If this is not done, the sale of arms by the United States and other nations will continue at increasing levels and in an indiscriminate manner.

American sales for 1976 are expected to jump to the \$14 billion level. The national security justification for such a volume of sales seems to lag considerably behind the economic benefits and short run political advantages which fuel the arms trade.

The policy drift in this critical area is alarming. The next President of the United States needs to address this issue and provide badly needed leadership and policy direction. The high level attention which has been given almost exclusively to the control of the strategic arms race through the SALT process must be shifted to the arena of conventional arms transfers.

As the nightmare of nuclear holocaust seems to grow more remote, we are confronted with the future prospect of regional wars of ferocious intensity and devastating destruction fought with the latest American weapons.

Surely, we can work to avoid such an outcome.

Surely, America can stand for something more in the world than its export of military technology.

We must realistically confront what the future holds. And we must do it now.

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REMARKS OF SENATOR HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

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TONIGHT I WISH TO DISCUSS A CONTROVERSIAL FOREIGN POLICY TOPIC WHICH CURRENTLY IS BEFORE THE CONGRESS. IT IS AN ISSUE WITH WHICH I CURRENTLY AM INVOLVED THROUGH MY WORK ON THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE.

IT IS A COMPLEX PROBLEM WITH NO EASY SOLUTIONS.

↳ I SPEAK OF ARMS TRANSFERS AND CURRENT EFFORTS TO REWRITE THE STATUTE BY WHICH THE UNITED STATES GRANTED AND SOLD MORE THAN \$11 BILLION IN 1975 IN ARMS AND DEFENSE-RELATED SERVICES.

↳ AS IN THE CASE OF GENERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, THE CONGRESS HAS BECOME INVOLVED IN THE ARMS TRANSFER AREA AS A RESULT OF A VERY BASIC CONCERN: IT APPEARS THAT THESE TRANSFERS ARE TAKING PLACE IN A POLICY VACUUM. ↳ WE HAVE TAKEN THE INITIATIVE BECAUSE WE COULD NO LONGER SIT BACK AND WATCH IMPORTANT DECISIONS BEING MADE ON AN AD HOC BASIS.

THE TRANSFER OF ARMS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO FOREIGN NATIONS HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE EARLY IN THIS CENTURY. A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW DEMONSTRATES THE LONGEVITY OF THIS ISSUE.

↳ -- TWO YEARS BEFORE THE U.S. ENTERED THE FIRST WORLD WAR THE LUSITANIA WAS SUNK CARRYING ARMS DESTINED FOR BRITAIN'S WAR EFFORT.

↳ -- DURING THE 1920'S AND 1930'S THE ISSUE OF ARMS TRANSFERS AS THEY RELATE TO FOREIGN POLICY WAS HOTLY DEBATED. A SPECIAL SENATE COMMITTEE CHAIRED BY SENATOR NYE OF NORTH DAKOTA WAS FORMED IN 1934 TO INVESTIGATE THE MATTER.

↳ ITS PURPOSE WAS TO EXAMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE U.S. WAS DRAWN INTO WARS AS A RESULT OF THE MUNITIONS MAKERS. ↳ SENATOR NYE'S WORK LARGELY WAS UNSUCCESSFUL AND MANY BELIEVE IT FED THE FIRES OF RAMPANT ISOLATIONISM WHICH WAS SWEEPING THE COUNTRY.

L-- AFTER THE END OF WORLD WAR II THE UNITED STATES BEGAN

A PROGRAM OF GRANTING ARMS TO NUMEROUS COUNTRIES AS A MEANS TO

HALT THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM. THIS WAS A CENTRAL INGREDIENT OF

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR NEARLY TWO DECADES.

L BY THE EARLY 1960's MANY OF OUR AID RECIPIENTS IN EUROPE

AND ASIA COULD AFFORD TO PURCHASE THEIR WEAPONS. THE GRANT PROGRAM

DECLINED IN THE 1960's, WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTION OF SOUTHEAST

ASIA, AS A RESULT OF THE LESSENING OF COLD WAR TENSIONS.

L-- THE DECLINE OF OUR GRANT PROGRAM COINCIDED WITH THE

~~ES~~ SUDDEN FLOW OF OIL REVENUES TO ARAB OIL PRODUCERS AND THE

WITHDRAWAL OF THE BRITISH FROM THE PERSIAN GULF AND INDIAN OCEAN.

L THESE OIL-RICH NATIONS WERE ABLE AND EAGER TO PURCHASE AMERICAN

AND EUROPEAN WEAPONS. BY THE EARLY 1970's AND THE FORMULATION

OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE, OUR POSTURE IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAS TO RELY

PRINCIPALLY ON IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA FOR STABILITY IN THE REGION.

↳ THIS MEANT EMBARKING ON A VAST PROGRAM OF SELLING TECHNOLOGICALLY  
ADVANCED WEAPONS AND BUILDING A LOCAL MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE.

↳ HERE ARE SOME INTERESTING STATISTICS TO SUPPLEMENT THIS  
BRIEF OVERVIEW.

↳ -- IN THE LAST 30 YEARS THE U.S. HAS GIVEN AWAY OR SOLD  
\$110 BILLION IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES TO FOREIGN  
COUNTRIES.

↳ -- LAST FISCAL YEAR, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SOLD \$9.5 BILLION  
*This yr about 11 Billion*  
IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT, SUPPLIES OR SERVICES TO 71 NATIONS.

↳ \$600 MILLION IN MILITARY MATERIAL WAS SUPPLIED  
THROUGH COMMERCIAL CHANNELS AND \$584 MILLION WAS GIVEN AWAY IN  
MILITARY GRANTS BY OUR GOVERNMENT.

L WE NOW HAVE REACHED THE POINT IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING,  
MULTI-POLAR WORLD WHEN WE MUST RE-EXAMINE AMERICAN ARMS  
TRANSFER POLICY.

L THIS COMPLEX TASK MUST BE UNDERTAKEN BECAUSE WE AND OTHER  
INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS NO LONGER CAN SELL VAST QUANTITIES OF ARMS  
BASED ON RATIONALES ROOTED IN THE 1960'S OR EVEN IN THE EARLY 1970'S.

WE MUST LOOK AHEAD FIVE AND TEN YEARS TO THE CONSEQUENCES  
FOR WORLD PEACE AND STABILITY OF POLICIES FORMULATED YESTERDAY  
AND TODAY.

L I DO NOT DENY THAT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BENEFITS CAN  
FLOW FROM THE SALE OF WEAPONS.

L JOBS ARE CREATED. WEAPONS FOR OUR OWN FORCES ARE CHEAPER.  
OUR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS POSITION MAY BE AIDED. AND OUR  
OVERALL COMMERCIAL POSTURE IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES BENEFITS.

L POLITICALLY, ARMS CAN PROVIDE LEVERAGE AND INFLUENCE.  
IMPORTANT MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE BASES OFTEN ARE SECURED  
THROUGH THE SALE OR GRANT OF WEAPONS.

L BUT WE MUST WEIGH THESE ADVANTAGES--MANY OF WHICH ARE  
SHORT TERM--AGAINST THE LONG TERM EFFECT OF UNRESTRICTED ARMS  
TRANSFERS ON OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS AND GOALS.

L --ARMS TRANSFERS TO REGIONS WHERE CONFLICT IS LIKELY  
STIMULATE ARMS RACES AND CAN INCREASE SHARPLY THE PROSPECTS  
FOR WAR. WE SEE SUCH A PHENOMENON IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE  
PERSIAN GULF ITSELF HAS YET TO REACH SUCH A THRESHOLD,  
ALTHOUGH SOME EXPERTS BELIEVE THIS INEVITABLE.

L --THROUGH THE SALE OF ARMS AND BY PROVIDING SUPPORT--IN-  
CLUDING AMERICAN SERVICEMEN--WE BECOME IDENTIFIED WITH PARTICULAR  
REGIMES. L MOST IMPORTANT, WE BECOME EMBROILED IN THE DAY-TO-DAY  
AFFAIRS OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR MILITARY COMMANDS.

SUCH A RELATIONSHIP CREATES ANIMOSITY OVER TIME AND DRAWS US DEEPER AND DEEPER INTO THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF FOREIGN NATIONS. WE ARE BEGINNING TO SEE THIS SYNDROME AT WORK IN IRAN.

-- OUR SALE AND GRANT OF WEAPONS TO REGIMES WHICH MAY ENGAGE IN GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IS OF INCREASING CONCERN. OUR MORAL STANDING IN THE WORLD IS HARMED BY SUCH PRACTICES.

-- THE TRANSFER OF AMERICAN ARMS CAN HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON OUR OWN READINESS AS STOCKS OF WEAPONS ARE DRAWN DOWN AND OUR FLEXIBILITY IS REDUCED. IF U.S. PERSONNEL ARE SENT ABROAD IN CONNECTION WITH THE SALES, WE MAY COMPOUND OUR MANPOWER PROBLEMS.

-- IF ONE OF THE COUNTRIES HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON AMERICAN ARMS BECOMES INVOLVED IN A REGIONAL CONFLICT OR IF THAT COUNTRY EXPERIENCES A BREAKDOWN OF INTERNAL ORDER, OUR OPTIONS MAY BECOME AWKWARD AND UNPLEASANT;

WE CAN CONTINUE TO SUPPLY SPARE PARTS OR MAINTENANCE SERVICES TO THAT NATION AND RISK INVOLVEMENT; OR WE CAN REFUSE TO COOPERATE,

IF WE TAKE THE LATTER COURSE, WE MAY INCUR THE WRATH OF THAT GOVERNMENT AND UNDERMINE OUR REPUTATION WITH OTHER PURCHASERS AS A RELIABLE SUPPLIER,

THIS IS WHY THE CHOICE OF ARMS RECIPIENTS MUST BE MADE WITH EXTREME CARE,

-- THE TRANSFER OF ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY NARROWS THE LEAD TIME NATIONS NEED TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS,

MANY OF THE NATIONS WHICH ARE DEVELOPING NUCLEAR POWER FOR ENERGY ALSO ARE BEING PROVIDED WHAT WE CALL "DUAL CAPABLE" WEAPONS SUCH AS GROUND TO GROUND MISSILES. THE MARRIAGE OF NUCLEAR FUEL TO ADVANCED NON-NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY MAY LEAD TO THE FURTHER SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,

-- FINALLY, THE ARMS WE TRANSFER FOR LEGITIMATE REASONS  
MAY BE RETRANSFERRED ILLEGALLY TO OTHER NATIONS AT A TIME OF  
WAR. I FRANKLY AM CONCERNED THAT ARAB COUNTRIES <sup>THAT WERE</sup> PERIPHERAL  
TO PAST CONFLICTS WITH ISRAEL MAY PARTICIPATE WITH OUR WEAPONS  
IN A FUTURE WAR AGAINST THE JEWISH STATE.

IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SELLS VAST  
QUANTITIES OF ARMS TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS WITH LITTLE FORESIGHT,  
MINIMAL CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS, AND VERY LITTLE SCRUTINY  
WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE BECOME JUSTIFIABLY CONCERNED WITH  
A HIGHLY SECRETIVE NATIONAL POLICY WHICH SEEMS TO DISREGARD OUR  
LONG-TERM SECURITY INTERESTS IN A STABLE, MORE DEMOCRATIC WORLD.

THE ANSWER TO THIS CONCERN IS NOT TO HALT ABRUPTLY ALL AMERICAN ARMS SALES. THIS WOULD HAVE A SERIOUS ADVERSE IMPACT ON OUR ECONOMY AND OUR FOREIGN POLICY. I ADVOCATE, INSTEAD, TWO COURSES OF ACTION.

FIRST, THE CONGRESS MUST EXERCISE EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT OF ARMS TRANSFERS THROUGH ENACTMENT OF LEGISLATION WHICH NOW IS PENDING. THE BILL WHICH I HAD THE PRIVILEGE TO AUTHOR -- THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT OF 1976 -- IS DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE FIVE BASIC OBJECTIVES.

1. To SHIFT THE FOCUS OF U.S. ARMS SALES POLICY FROM THAT OF SELLING ARMS TO CONTROLLING ARMS SALES AND EXPORTS;

2. To PROVIDE THE CONGRESS WITH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT, AND EXPANDED AND STRENGTHENED CONTROL OVER, ARMS TRANSFERS;

3. To PROVIDE THE PUBLIC WITH MORE INFORMATION ABOUT  
GOVERNMENT ARMS SALES ACTIONS;

4. To REDUCE SIGNIFICANTLY THE NUMBER OF MILITARY GRANT  
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND U.S. MILITARY MISSIONS ABROAD OVER  
THE NEXT YEAR AND A HALF AND TO REQUIRE A SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION  
FOR ANY GRANT PROGRAMS OR MISSIONS AFTER THAT; AND

5. To REDUCE THE COST OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE GRANTS.

A MAJOR FEATURE OF THE BILL IS TO BRING AMERICAN ARMS  
EXPORTS ISSUES OUT INTO THE OPEN. A BASIC FAULT OF PAST  
POLICY, WHICH HAS LED TO THE PRESENT STATE OF PUBLIC CONCERN,  
IS THAT TOO MUCH OF THE SALES PROGRAM IN THE PAST HAS BEEN  
CARRIED OUT IN SECRECY.

THIS BILL REQUIRES THAT ALL GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS BE AVAILABLE FOR PUBLIC INSPECTION AND THAT DATA IN QUARTERLY AND OTHER REPORTS BE UNCLASSIFIED TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE, CONSISTENT WITH U.S. SECURITY AND THE PROTECTION OF THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF U.S. INDUSTRY.

I BELIEVE THAT MORE EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER ARMS TRANSFERS BY THE CONGRESS WILL FORCE THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO FORMULATE MORE RESPONSIBLE ARMS TRANSFER POLICIES.

I MUST EMPHASIZE THAT THIS NATION NEEDS AN OVERALL ARMS TRANSFER POLICY WITH CAREFUL DELINEATIONS ABOUT INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES AND REGIONS. A WELL UNDERSTOOD POLICY FRAMEWORK CANNOT BE DEVELOPED BY THE CONGRESS THROUGH LEGISLATION. THIS RESPONSIBILITY BELONGS PRIMARILY TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, BUT IT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN WITH THE COOPERATION OF THE CONGRESS.

MOREOVER, CONGRESS CANNOT MANAGE THESE PROGRAMS, AND THIS LEGISLATION IS NOT DESIGNED AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR A SOUNDLY MANAGED ARMS TRANSFER PROGRAM.

THE SECOND COURSE OF ACTION IS MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE.

I BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD EMBARK ON A MAJOR INITIATIVE TO ACHIEVE MULTILATERAL CONSTRAINTS IN THE TRANSFER OF ARMS.

I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS ISSUE HAS EVER BEEN GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION BY OUR POLICY MAKERS. BUT IT MUST BE NOW.

IN ORDER TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY, OUR PROPOSALS MUST BE CONCRETE AND SOMEWHAT LIMITED IN SCOPE.

ONE POSSIBLE OPTION TO BE EXPLORED IS A JOINT SOVIET-AMERICAN MORATORIUM ON THE TRANSFER OF ALL SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES TO COUNTRIES OUTSIDE OF EUROPE.

THIS WOULD MEAN NO MORE SCUDS, FROGS, LANCES AND NO PERSHING MISSILES TO THE PERSIAN GULF OR THE MIDDLE EAST.

IF THIS COULD BE ACHIEVED, IT WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP TOWARD FURTHER, MORE EXTENSIVE AGREEMENTS WHICH COULD INCLUDE OTHER WESTERN AND EASTERN SUPPLIERS. IF COMMERCIAL RIVALRY IS THE MAIN ROADBLOCK TO UNILATERAL CONSTRAINTS, THEN A MULTI-LATERAL APPROACH SHOULD BE UTILIZED.

I CONCLUDE WITH AN APPEAL FOR GREATER DISCUSSION OF THE ARMS TRANSFER ISSUE WITHIN GOVERNMENT AND BY THE PUBLIC. IF THIS IS NOT DONE, THE SALE OF ARMS BY THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER NATIONS WILL CONTINUE AT INCREASING LEVELS AND IN AN INDISCRIMINATE MANNER.

AMERICAN SALES FOR 1976 ARE EXPECTED TO JUMP TO THE \$14 BILLION LEVEL. THE NATIONAL SECURITY JUSTIFICATION FOR SUCH A VOLUME OF SALES SEEMS TO LAG CONSIDERABLY BEHIND THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS AND SHORT RUN POLITICAL ADVANTAGES WHICH FUEL THE ARMS TRADE.

THE POLICY DRIFT IN THIS CRITICAL AREA IS ALARMING. THE NEXT PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES NEEDS TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE AND PROVIDE BADLY NEEDED LEADERSHIP AND POLICY DIRECTION. THE HIGH LEVEL ATTENTION WHICH HAS BEEN GIVEN ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY TO THE CONTROL OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE THROUGH THE SALT PROCESS MUST BE SHIFTED TO THE ARENA OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS.

AS THE NIGHTMARE OF NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST SEEMS TO GROW MORE  
REMOTE, WE ARE CONFRONTED WITH THE FUTURE PROSPECT OF REGIONAL  
WARS OF FEROCIOUS INTENSITY AND DEVASTATING DESTRUCTION FOUGHT  
WITH THE LATEST AMERICAN WEAPONS.

SURELY, WE CAN WORK TO AVOID SUCH AN OUTCOME.

SURELY, AMERICA CAN STAND FOR SOMETHING MORE IN THE  
WORLD THAN ITS EXPORT OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY.

WE MUST REALISTICALLY CONFRONT WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS.

AND WE MUST DO IT NOW.

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