

**Foreign Policy Breakfasts/National Security**

Foreign Policy Breakfasts, 1/80-6/80.

## OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

Memo No. 651-80


WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

January 24, 1980

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Denis Clift 

SUBJECT:

Foreign Policy Breakfast, Friday, January 25, 1980, 7:30 a.m.

Vance Address to Council on Foreign Relations - During this Friday's breakfast you should tell Secretary Vance that it would be extremely helpful if he could schedule an address to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations before March 18, 1980. Jim Johnson underlines the importance of Vance agreeing to do so.

Hostages in Iran - Based on the results of Thursday's meeting, you, Zbig and Cy Vance will probably wish to give the President at least an interim report on this issue.

Middle East/Linowitz Mission - Sol Linowitz will have just departed for the Middle East by the time of your breakfast. It is my understanding that the President convened a meeting on short notice earlier this week involving Linowitz, Vance and Brzezinski, to discuss Linowitz' mission. In response to the President's request, Linowitz and State have produced the attached spread sheet reviewing the Egyptian and Israeli positions on the provisions of draft arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

As you know, there is a growing feeling in State and at the White House that we must show some movement on the Palestinian issue if we are to bring the moderate Arabs along with us on broader strategy interests in the region. This comes at a time when Begin and the Israeli government are digging in more firmly than ever opposing any real movement in the West Bank talks. It also comes at a time when both Begin and Sadat have stated that a summit with President Carter will be in order before the Camp David May, 1980 deadline. I have been led to believe the President is highly skeptical about such a summit. At the same time, I personally believe that such a summit will come to pass given the interests of his two partners in the Camp David process and the importance of keeping Camp David alive.

I think it is important that Vance review for you and the other breakfast participants the instructions Linowitz is carrying on his current mission, and that Vance lay out for you his thinking

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT  
REVIEW ON JANUARY 24, 2000

DECLASSIFIED

per 7/27/06 NSC 1hr  
NCLTC-06-070  
BY: BAE NARA, DATE 8/25/06

on the Palestinian issue. It is my belief that you personally may be in a position to play an influential role, initially through Eppie, with the Israelis if the President settles, or has already settled, on a strategy to deal with the West Bank within the context of the Camp David Accords in the next few months.

Pakistan/Christopher Mission - State should be asked to review its plans for Christopher's presentation to Zia, as well as any responses we have received or expect to receive from the allies as a result of the political directors' talks in Europe.

Moscow Olympics - Following the receipt of intelligence reports on the importance of the FRG's position on the Olympics, and the influence that the FRG will have on other countries, we received another intelligence item indicating that Chancellor Schmidt has informed his SPD coalition partners that he has no intention of agreeing to a boycott. I believe the President on Thursday, January 24, sent the Chancellor a handwritten letter on the subject of the Olympics. It seems to me that the United States must move vigorously on this issue, with a fresh round of telegrams to capitals underscoring Congressional support for the President's actions, reviewing the growing numbers of countries favoring postponement, change of venue of our boycott and renewing again in the most persuasive possible terms the need for other countries to agree with us. At your lunch with Hedemann on Thursday he noted that at least one influential member of the Norwegian Olympic Committee has spoken out in favor of not going. Now is the time to capitalize on those who are wavering. You may wish to ask Vance to review State's plans on this issue.

NEGOTIATIONS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A  
SELF GOVERNING AUTHORITY IN THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP  
AS A TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT

## THE AGREED BASIS:

1. Assertion of the basic principles as agreed, such as the principles of the UN Charter, UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, the Camp David Framework and the Joint Letter.  
A. The parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict.
- B. Respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.
- C. The right of every state to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of (war) force.
- D. Egypt, Israel, Jordan (If she so wishes) and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The solution from the negotiations must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.
- E. The need to move towards a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.
- F. The need to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond on the basis of full reciprocity. Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations.
- G. A withdrawal of Israeli forces and a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces and specific security locations.

PROPOSAL FOR FULL AUTONOMY FOR THE ARAB INHABITANTS OF  
JUDEA, SAMARIA AND THE GAZA DISTRICT

## THE AGREED BASIS:

1. Assertion of the basic principles as agreed, such as the principles of the UN Charter, UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, the Camp David Framework and the Joint Letter.  
(Israel noted that comprehensive peace is included in all the above documents and that further repetition is unnecessary and might call into question in peoples minds the commitment of the parties.)  
A. Respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area.
- B. The right of every state to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.  
(Israel felt that the Palestinian problem was only one of the factors in the Arab-Israeli dispute and it should not be singled out. Israelis have also noted that representatives of the Palestinians would not have equal status with states like Israel and Jordan in the negotiations.)
- C. The need to move towards a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation.
- D. The need to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond.  
(Israel rejected the concept of reciprocity in the area of security.)
- E. A withdrawal of Israeli forces and a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces and specific security location

SANITIZED

per 7/27/06 NSC Mr  
NLJC-06-070  
BY BAH NAPA, DATE 8/25/06

H. Agreed reciprocal security arrangements.

THE OBJECTIVE:

1. Ultimate: The achievement of a just, comprehensive and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations. The Palestinian problem being the core of the Middle East conflict should be solved in all its aspects according to the aforementioned agreed basis. The Palestinian people have the right to determine their own future without external interference.

2. Transitional: The establishment of a transitional arrangement for the West Bank and Gaza not exceeding five years whereby a freely elected self governing authority will replace the Israeli Military Government and its civilian administration.

PURPOSE OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD:

1. To ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority to the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.


2. To provide the proper conditions for the Palestinian people to participate in all negotiations leading to the solution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects.

3. As soon as possible but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place concerning the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects including:

- A) The determination of the final status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
- B) The recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

F. The need to lay down arrangements for assuring internal and external security.

Israel rejected Egypt's statement of "The Objectives" noting that the objectives of the negotiation are specified in the Camp David Framework and are therefore included by reference under the agreed language in 1 above.



Israel could not accept the Egyptian stress on the Transitional period since this was not the only subject discussed at Camp David and particularly since Camp David made provision for Israel's security during the transitional period "and beyond". Partial and selective quotations from Camp David would distort the meaning of the document. Israel rejected this topic.

4. Negotiations on these related topics should start as soon as possible with the participation of the representatives of the Palestinian people.

THE TRANSITION PERIOD:

1. It is a transitional arrangement for the West Bank and the Gaza strip.
2. It should not exceed five years.
3. It begins when the self-governing authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is established and inaugurated.
4. The transitional arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government in the territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.
5. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations.
6. During that period negotiations will take place with the participation of the representatives of the Palestinian people to solve the Palestinian problem in all its aspects including the problems of the displaced persons in the 1967 and the refugees of 1948 taking into account all the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

FIFTH: THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY:

1. It replaces the Israeli Military Government and its civilian administration.
2. It is established in for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as an integral whole.
3. It should be freely elected. To this end the Israeli Government shall take the necessary steps toward;  
-- The release of all Palestinian political prisoners prior to the election.

The Israelis rejected this topic in its entirety for the reasons stated above. It might be noted that although the Camp David framework should prevail the Begin plan, even as it was revised after Camp David, does not in any way refer to the autonomy as a "transitional arrangement." The Begin plan does also provide(s): "These principles will be subject to review after a five year period."

Israel has refused to discuss unilateral steps such as these in the context of the negotiations.

- Guaranteeing the freedom of political expression in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
- Non-detention of Palestinians without trial.
- Transfer of the Headquarters of the Military Government outside the West Bank and Gaza.
- Facilitate the return of displaced Palestinians who left the West Bank and Gaza Strip after June 5, 1967 in order to participate in the elections of the self-governing authority.

The above shall be subject to international supervision.

4. Elections shall be held under agreed international supervision.

5. The Palestinians who had a legal residence in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on the 4th of June 1967 are eligible to participate in the elections of the self-governing authority.

6. The Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem shall participate in the elections.

7. The Authority will be composed of a Legislative Assembly of 80-100 members and the Council, to be elected from among the membership of the Legislative Assembly. The Council will be composed of 10-15 members. The Egyptians have told us they probably would agree to and SGA of 40-60 elected members.

Israel has rejected international supervision except as agreed in London and stipulated in the Annex on Election Modalities.

Israel has rejected this blanket definition of eligible voters.

Israel rejects participation of East Jerusalem Palestinian residents.

Israel rejects the concept of a Legislative Assembly and calls for an elected 11 man Administrative Council consisting of a Chairman and 10 division heads. The Israelis at the working group level have indicated that they probably could accept 30 elected members.

SIXTH: THE POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY:

1. Legislative: (Legislative Assembly)
  - A. To legislate and enact laws and regulations
  - B. To levy taxes and decide fiscal regulations  
....etc.
  - C. The supervision of - inter alia - the following:
    - 1) The administration of all public services.

POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL

1. Legislative (under the Begin plan)
  - A. A committee will be established of representatives of Israel, Jordan and the Administrative Council to examine existing legislation in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, and to determine which legislation will continue in force, which will be abolished, and what will be the competence of the Administrative Council to promulgate regulations. The rulings of the Committee will be adopted by unanimous decision (Begin Plan 1977).
2. Administrative
  - A. Empowered to issue regulations (Is. model 1/80)
  - B. Determine budget and method of financing budget.  
(Taxation specifically mentioned in July terms of ref)

(Administration of Public Services)

POWERS TO BE TRANSFERRED FULLY (From the 1980 Israeli Model):

1. Internal administration including:
  - 1) Civil Service, official publications, archives.
  - 2) Internal audit, statistics.
2. Transportation and Communications  
Limited to:
  - 1) Engineering services
  - 2) Post offices

3. Local Affairs

Limited to:

- 1) Supervision of local authorities including
  - a) Budget approval
  - b) Supervision of local authorities activities
  - c) Tax collection, property taxes
  - d) Approval of municipal by-laws
- 2) Ecology
- 3) Supervision of bathing places
- 4) Firefighting services
- 5) Supervision of building industry
- 6) Licensing of buildings

COORDINATED POWERS: Israel retains a direct role in policy formulation including a veto, and perhaps a role in implementation in some cases.

- 1) Postal Bank Services
- 2) Telephone installation
- 3) Telegraph
- 4) Telex
- 5) Maintenance and Supervision of Communications equipment
- 6) Meteorological services
- 7) Protection against sea pollution
- 8) Traffic and Road forecasting
- 9) Master plans for transportation

- 10) Transportation statistice
- 11) Driver training and driving schools
- 12) Supervision of production and sale of spare parts
- 13) Approval of public transportation routes and public works
- 14) Planning, implementation, and supervision of road works
- 15) Demarcation of roads, waterlines, sewage

POWERS TO BE SHARED: Israel retains a direct role in policy formulation, including a veto, and would have a role in implementing policy.

- 1) Regional and district planning

POWERS TO BE RETAINED BY ISRAEL:

- 1) Natural resources
- 2) Printing of Stamps and Currency
- 3) Radio and Television
- 4) Information
- 5) Aerospace Supervision
- 6) Supervision of territorial seas
- 7) Main international communication exchanges
- 8) International telex
- 9) International mail

2. The Maintenance of public order and the overall authority over the internal police force.

(Public order and internal police)

POWERS TO BE COORDINATED

- 1) Regulation of traffic
- 2) Regulation of licensing of buses and taxicabs
- 3) Drivers licenses
- 4) Vehicle licenses
- 5) Traffic safety
- 6) Films and public performance censorship
- 7) Textbook supervision to prevent incitement
- 8) Licensing of weapons
- 9) Local police and prisoners

POWERS TO BE SHARED

- 1) Emergency situations

POWERS TO BE RETAINED

- 1) Defense
- 2) Internal security

3. The movement of persons and goods to and from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

(Movement of persons and goods)

POWERS TO BE COORDINATED

- 1) Citrus marketing
- 2) Agricultural Imports and Exports
- 3) Tourism

4. Issuance of the identification documents for the inhabitants.

5. The administration of justice.

- 4) Railway maintenance
- 5) Coordination with Israel Railways
- 6) Licensing and marking of vessels
- 7) Administration and development of Gaza harbor
- 8) Licensing of seamen

POWERS TO BE RETAINED

- 1) Israeli inhabitants  
(Identification documents)

POWERS TO BE SHARED:

- 1) Population registry  
(Administration of Justice)

POWERS TO BE TRANSFERRED FULLY

Limited to:

- 1) Companies and partnerships registration
- 2) Public notaries
- 3) Trademarks, patents and designs registration
- 4) Legal aid
- 5) Pledges registration
- 6) Administration of local courts
- 7) Executive offices
- 8) Administration of minors and mentally incapacitated assets

- 9) Supervision of executors and custodians appointed by the local courts
- 10) Licensing of petition writers
- 11) Assessors' Council
- 12) Accountants' Council
- 13) Law Council
- 14) Attorney General and District Attornies

6. Freedom of worship and freedom of access to and from places of worship.

(Religious affairs)

POWERS TO BE TRANSFERRED FULLY

Limited to:

- 1) Religious services
- 2) Kadis, Shari'i Courts and other religious courts
- 3) Wakf
- 4) Supervision of Mosques
- 5) Muslim religious observances
- 6) Muslim cemeteries

7) Supervision of Muslim properties  
(Curiously, the Israeli description does not include any provisions for Christian religious affairs.)

POWERS TO BE SHARED

- 1) Holy places

7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

No Israeli equivalent

8. Ensuring the freedom of political expression and the freedom to form political parties.

No Israeli equivalent

D. To hold title to the public domain and government property as well as to the water and power resources.

(Public Domain, Water and Energy)

POWERS TO BE COORDINATED

- 1) Supervision of all surveying
- 2) Licensing of surveyors
- 3) Boundary marking in cases of dispute or trespassing
- 4) Topographical mapmaking
- 5) Approval of plans for land registration and corrections in the field

POWERS TO BE SHARED

- 1) Land registry
- 2) Settlement
- 3) Water
- 4) Absentee property

POWERS TO BE RETAINED

- 1) Israeli settlements
- 2) State lands
- 3) Energy

E. To notify the policies of:

- 1) Education, culture

(Education and Culture)

POWERS TO BE TRANSFERRED FULLY:

Limited to:

- 1) Curriculum
- 2) Pedagogy
- 3) Teachers training
- 4) Vocational training
- 5) Kindergarten
- 6) Elementary schools
- 7) Preparatory schools
- 8) Secondary schools
- 9) Higher Education Institutions
- 10) Regional Offices
- 11) Sports
- 12) Librarians
- 13) Museums
- 14) Theatres
- 15) Culture, youth and sports activities

POWERS TO BE SHARED

- 1) Archaeology

2) Economy

POWERS TO BE COORDINATED AND SHARED (as yet to be agreed by a joint subcommittee of the Working Group)

- 1) Finance
- 2) Industry and commerce

POWERS TO BE SHARED:

- 1) Economy

POWERS TO BE RETAINED:

- 1) Supervision of Israeli banking and insurance Institutions in the territories
- 2) Representation of the local banking system abroad

3) Health

(Health)

POWERS TO BE TRANSFERRED FULLY

Limited to:

- 1) Supervision of hospitals
- 2) Supervision of clinics and public health bureaus
- 3) Supervision and opening of pharmacies
- 4) Sanitary licensing of businesses and buildings and supervision of workshops and Industry
- 5) Mother and child care
- 6) Schoolchildren care
- 7) Dental care
- 8) Family health
- 9) Licensing of Doctors and Pharmacists

- 10) Sewage disposal
- 11) Supervision of meat and food
- 12) Training and advanced training of medical and paramedical personnel
- 13) Medical publications

POWERS TO BE COORDINATED

- 1) Supply of medicines
- 2) Dangerous drugs
- 3) Epidemic prevention
- 4) Innoculations
- 5) Quarantine

(Agriculture)

POWERS TO BE TRANSFERRED FULLY

Limited to:

- 1) Natural resources and parks
- 2) Fisheries
- 3) Orchards, fieldcrops and vegetables
- 4) Instruction
- 5) Agricultural Inspection
- 6) Research and development
- 7) Livestock
- 8) Planning

4) Agriculture

POWERS TO BE COORDINATED

- 1) Plant protection
- 2) Veterinary Quarantine
- 3) Veterinary Institutions

(Labor and welfare)

5) Labor and welfare

POWERS TO BE TRANSFERRED FULLY

Limited to:

- 1) Refugee rehabilitation
- 2) Family and community services
- 3) Child and youth services
- 4) Hostels
- 5) Welfare training
- 6) Welfare planning
- 7) Welfare bureaus and regional rehabilitation institutions
- 8) Labor training
- 9) Supervision of work and labor relations
- 10) Registration of Corporate Societies
- 11) Mechanical equipment licensing
- 12) Work safety
- 13) Regional labor exchanges

POWERS TO BE COORDINATED

- 1) Labor manpower planning
- 2)

The Israelis object to any implication that the Self-Governing Authority would have any legislative powers whatever.

2. EXECUTIVE:

The Council of the Governing Authority will carry out the actual administration of all the items referred to above. It will submit proposals to the legislative assembly. The Council will be responsible before the legislative assembly. The internal police force shall be under the direct authority of the Council who will appoint its Commander-in-Chief and approve all officer-level appointments if the constitution of the force will be the responsibility of the Council.

3. POLITICAL:

A.) The Authority shall participate in all the stages of negotiations - during the transitional period - aiming at the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects.

B.) The Authority shall have the duty to ascertain the views of the Palestinian people on all matters related to the resolution of the Palestinian problem.

The Israelis have objected to this topic noting that the Authority is not an equal participant in the final status negotiations and that this subject is not germane to the current negotiations.

SEVENTH: SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS:

1. Ultimate: The parties can, under the terms of peace treaties and on the basis of reciprocity agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring and for other arrangements that they agree are useful.

The Israelis have objected to considering ultimate security arrangements in these negotiations.

2. Provisional Arrangements:

A.) The arrangement would give due consideration to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved

The Israelis have rejected any concept of reciprocity.

on the basis of reciprocity.

B.) There will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations along the pre-June 5, 1967 borders.

C.) A strong local police force will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It will be constituted by the Self-Governing Authority composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The police will maintain continuing liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli and Egyptian officers (as well as with Jordanian officers if Jordan so wishes.)

#### DEFINITIONS AND BASICS:

1. The term West Bank and Gaza Strip applies to all territories occupied by Israel in June 1967 and are delineated in accordance with the relevant 1949 armistice agreements.

2. The West Bank and Gaza Strip shall be regarded as one territory and integral whole. Territorial and aerial connections between them will be secured through negotiations between the self-governing authority and the Israeli Government

3. All changes in the geographic character, the demographic composition and the legal status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip or any part thereof including in particular the establishment of settlements are null and void. They would jeopardize the attainment of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people as provided for in the Camp David Framework.

The Begin plan is most specific: "The IDF will withdraw and redeploy in specific zones within the autonomy area."

Police is a coordinated function and internal security is the sole responsibility of the Israelis according to their presentation, as in the maintenance of prisons for those guilty of security offenses.

Israel rejects any territorial definitions of the autonomy area and, in any event, would specifically exclude Jerusalem or any part thereof.

Begin, in his plan, indicated that:

Residents of Israel and residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be assured freedom of movement and freedom of economic activity in Israel, Judea and Samaria and the Gaza district.

Unacceptable to Israel. The Begin plan for its part says:

- A.) Residents of Israel will be entitled to acquire land and settle in the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. Arabs, residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district who, in accordance with the free option granted them, will become Israeli citizens, will be entitled to acquire land and settle in Israel.
- B.) The land needed for the army and for Jewish settlements will be under Israeli control. Non-cultivated State lands will be in Israeli hands. Private land will not be expropriated except for explicit public purposes, such as the laying of railway lines or the

paving of roads, as well as purely military requirements. Full and rapid monetary compensation will be given for expropriations.

4. The Israeli settlers who were removed to the West Bank or the Gaza Strip shall not have the right to participate in the elections of the Self-Governing Authority or in the institutions thereof.

5. The participation of Egypt, and of Jordan if she so wishes, in the different stages of negotiations aimed at the resolution aspects is based on their responsibilities vis a vis the Gaza Strip and the West Bank respectively in accordance with the relevant armistice agreements concluded between each of them and Israel. The determination of the Palestinian position in the negotiations is a Palestinian decision that should be taken solely by the Palestinian people or their legitimate representatives. This is done in application of their legitimate rights and just requirements.

6. As appropriate, Egypt maintains the rights to include in her delegation to the different stages of negotiations Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip or other Palestinians.

7. East Jerusalem shall be the seat of the Self-Governing Authority.

Israel has not called for Israeli settlers' participation in the SGA, but has specifically withdrawn them from SGA authority.

The Camp David Framework would apply, but the Begin plan does provide for Jordanian participation in legislative, election and refugee committees and in negotiations with Israel over West Bank inhabitants voting in Jordan's parliament. There is no place for Egypt in the original Begin plan.

The Camp David Framework would apply. It provides for other Palestinians as agreed.

The Begin plan establishes Bethlehem as the seat of the SGA. In addition, the Begin plan provides:

"With regard to the administration of the holy places of the three religions in Jerusalem, a special proposal will be drawn up and submitted that will include the guarantee of freedom of access to members of all the faiths to the shrines holy to them."

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
THRU: DR. BRZEZINSKI  
FROM: Bernie Rogers, SACEUR *BWR*  
SUBJECT: Greek Reintegration into the NATO Military Structure

1. Key Players

- Gen Davos - Recently retired as Greek Chief, National Defense General Staff (NDGS); now Deputy Minister of Defense (perhaps retaining responsibility for reintegration)
- Gen Gratsios - new Greek Chief, (NDGS)
- Gen Evren - Chief of the Turkish General Staff
- SACEUR

2. Review of recent events

- a. Davos and SACEUR met early Nov 79: last Haig proposal (as modified) unacceptable; Greeks state they will only accept status quo ante
- b. Evren and SACEUR met late Nov 79
  - (1) last Haig proposal (as modified) unacceptable
  - (2) status quo ante for Greeks out of the question
  - (3) SACEUR presented new "non-paper" outlining his best military solution for reintegration; Turks agreed to provide reaction.
- c. Evren and SACEUR met during December ministerials:
  - (1) for first time progress made in area of air space control
  - (2) Evren sent team of experts to SHAPE in mid-December to discuss "non-paper"
  - (3) Final Turkish reply on "non-paper" was due to SACEUR on 15 January (not yet received).

3. Future game plan

- a. Greeks have advised State and SACEUR that, for internal political reasons, reintegration must be achieved not later than end March '80.
- b. Evren's deputy, Gen Saltik, to provide Turks' response to "non-paper" to SACEUR at SHAPE on 6 Feb.
- c. SACEUR will then modify (as appropriate) his best-solution "non-paper," present it as a firm proposal to Davos or Gratsios, and get Greek reaction.
- d. Another round of discussions with Evren and Davos/Gratsios may be necessary if positions are quite close.
- e. Following c (and d if appropriate) SACEUR will report to SYG Luns results of discussions and ask that he direct the NATO Military Committee to review SACEUR's "best military solution" proposal, the results of his discussions with Turks and Greeks, and recommend to DPC whether or not Greece should be reintegrated using SACEUR's proposal as the basis. This time, Turkey may not ~~be~~.
- f. SACEUR Target: complete above by 29 Feb '80.

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d. Assistance for SACEUR's efforts

Through appropriate channels (US and Allies) advise both Greeks and Turks that:

- a. it is vital to Alliance to get Greece reintegrated as soon as possible
- b. too much time has already elapsed in seeking reintegration and time is running out
- c. SACEUR is writing final chapter of his efforts under SYG mandate; how it will read will depend upon sincerity of Greeks and Turks regarding reintegration
- d. other military and political problems can be faced (and better) once Greece reintegrated.



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S 8002117

**SECRET**

January 30, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Greek Reintegration

In your memorandum of January 24, you reported that the President had noted that the subject of Greek reintegration into the NATO military structure was worthy of direct talks with Greek leaders.

The Greek Ambassador at his request called on the Secretary January 25 to deliver orally a confidential personal message from Prime Minister Karamanlis. The message was that Greek reintegration must be decided by the end of March because a fluid political situation will exist in Greece in the May-June period when a new president must be elected by the Parliament. The implication appeared to be that, if satisfactory arrangements for reintegration had not been developed by that time, Greece would withdraw its reintegration request but remain in the political wing of the Alliance. In the same message and for the same reason, Karamanlis asked that we resume negotiations for our military bases in Greece.

The reference to the presidential election indicates that Karamanlis has decided to seek that office and suggests that he needs movement on these two issues to support his candidacy.

In his response to Tzounis, the Secretary reiterated the importance we attach to reintegration and urged the GOG to continue to work with SACEUR to develop mutually satisfactory arrangements for reintegration.

On January 26, Under Secretary Designate Nimetz met with General Rogers, who was in Washington, and briefed him on the conversation with the Greek Ambassador. General Rogers is now aware of the need for prompt movement. He will talk to the Turks this week and to the Greek side soon thereafter. He anticipates submitting a report on his efforts to Secretary General Luns in the next few weeks.

**SECRET**

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
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NLS-06-070  
BY BRC NARA DATE 8/25/06

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General Rogers knows that we are prepared to support his efforts in any way possible. He has not requested help at this time. In the meantime, we will be instructing Ambassador McCloskey to inform senior Greek officials of the conversation with General Rogers and of the importance we attach to reintegration in view of the current international situation. He will also indicate our willingness to resume base negotiations. Nimetz concurrently will pass the same message to the Greek Ambassador.

(The message from Karamanlis is extremely sensitive, as is Nimetz's conversation with Rogers, who is acting in his SACEUR capacity under a NATO mandate from the Secretary General with regard to reintegration.)



Peter Tarnoff  
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Jan. 31, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BERNIE ARONSON BA

SUBJECT:

Follow-Up With CDM -Kampleman Appointment

Landon asked me to head up a small WH group to maintain liaison with the CDM and to follow-up on today's meeting.

I think we should begin with Max Kampleman.

I understand from Max that prior to the Scranton appointment you discussed the Chairmanship of the U.S. delegation to the Madrid Conference with Max. He still would be interested in a position on the delegation of either Co or Deputy Chairman with Ambassadorial rank.

Matt Nimitz is very agreeable to the creation of such an appointment and feels Max would be a good choice. He suggested that the WH raise this directly with either Christopher or Vance and mention his support for the idea.

Would you consider taking the lead on this with the Secretary or the UnderSecretary.

Appointment of Max to the Helsinki delegation would be both a substantive and symbolic statement of commitment on the human rights issue and would be extremely well-received, as you know, not only among the CDM wing of the Party, but in the Jewish and human rights communities.

cc Jim Johnson

January 31, 1980

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift *DC*

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast, Friday, February 1, 1980,  
7:30 a.m.

Iran

Secretary Vance's evening report to the President of January 30 has provided the most recent update on strategy and tactics relating to release of the hostages.

The question of sanctions must be addressed, and I am sure that Vance will raise the subject. A great deal of subtlety is required in how we play this issue if it is to continue to contribute to our objective of 1) early release of all hostages and 2) retention of such allied country support as we now have. In fact, we have basically achieved such punitive effect as we can at this point, even though our regulations formally implementing sanctions have not been issued. I believe we should continue to take the position that we are "tightening the screws" and expect others to do so as well, and that we are continuing to work on further steps relating to the sanctions (without actually implementing them).

Afghanistan/USSR

I am sure the President will wish to address the question of the lukewarm reaction we continue to receive from our allies on sanctions against the USSR because of its invasion of Afghanistan. It is my understanding from State that we have received a very lukewarm response to their proposal for an early meeting of the seven foreign ministers. At the same time, the question of allied support or lack thereof is growing on Capitol Hill and on the political trails.

As has been noted, European public opinion is ahead of European governments on this issue. Art Hartman has cabled, wisely I believe, from Paris that we should be careful not to clumsily interfere in the evolving attitude of the French, an attitude further influenced by Sakharov's banishment. It seems to me

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*NLTC 06-070*  
*BY BAE NARA, DATE 8/25/06*

that it is important for the U.S. Government to ensure that we continue to make available to the world the fullest possible information on the magnitude of the Soviet invasion, occupation and control of Afghanistan, the nature of the forces and weapons, the indications not only of chemical warfare but also of incendiary warfare, the growing indications of atrocities.

Middle East

It is my understanding that Secretary Vance has been working on a new formulation for U.S. policy on contacts with the PLO, a formulation that would continue to require that the PLO recognize Israel's right to exist but, at the same time, would attempt to handle Resolution 242 differently.

Yemen - The most recent review of developments in the Yemens is at Tab A. Frank Carlucci has completed his visit. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A copy of Frank Carlucci's report is held by David. He will give it to you personally.

Grain Embargo - Argentina and Brazil - The Goodpaster mission has been completed. Both General Videla and President Figueiredo received Goodpaster cordially. Argentina is the key concern, and the picture is not particularly promising. The Argentinians dangled the possibility of either informal directives to their trade or a direct understanding with Soviet purchasing authorities not to increase their grain sales to the USSR above normally anticipated sales.

However, they are talking about direct sales, with no penalty for third country sales. They have also put us on notice that they will be selling at least 3 million tons of corn instead of the 2 million we had expected, 2 million tons of sorghum versus no sales we had expected, and sales of sunflower and soy beans -- no additional wheat. The Soviet grain buyer is in Argentina at present and we are awaiting a report from our Embassy.

Brazil is in a somewhat different category as it is only in a position to supply soy beans to the USSR. Goodpaster was advised that the Brazilians have no desire to change their traditional market. However, this whole issue remains to be tested: 1) the Soviets are not a major purchaser of soy beans and 2) they have not yet approached the Brazilians on soy bean purchases.

Greek Reintegration into NATO - You asked on Thursday if you should schedule a briefing on the Greek reintegration issue. I would recommend that you ask Vance for a review of the current

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status at tomorrow's breakfast and that we then wait a few more days before bringing specialists in -- for the following reasons. As you know from the papers at Tab B, SACEUR General Bernie Rogers has been charged with re-doubling his efforts to complete successful negotiations. Rogers, because of his international role, has kept the details of his negotiating proposals very tightly held. It is my understanding that he has reviewed them only with Vance in person. Accordingly, there are no specialists short of SACEUR or the Secretary of State (with Zbig out of the country) who could get into the details of the Rogers proposals. At the breakfast, I recommend that you note that Rogers has informed the President that he is shooting to have negotiations completed by February 29. I think it would be helpful, given Karamanlis' end of March deadline, to have a discussion on the SACEUR timetable, should it be accelerated to permit work in the political channel if Rogers fails in the SAC channel.

CSCE Madrid Conference - Bernie Aronson's memorandum on Max Kampleman's interest in a role in the CSCE conference is at Tab C.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

February 7, 1980

*African Basis**Canada*

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift *DC*

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast, Friday, February 8, 1980, 7:30 a.m.

USSR/Afghanistan/Actions with Allies

On Thursday afternoon State was still working on proposed letters from the President to Thatcher, Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing outlining the actions he hopes each of the allies will take as 1) sanctions against the USSR and 2) assistance to Pakistan. The current thinking is that Secretary Vance will go to Bonn for a bilateral meeting with Foreign Minister Genscher on February 20, and that he and Genscher will be joined in Bonn by the foreign ministers of Great Britain, France and Italy. Canada and Japan are not being included in this round for various reasons (among them, Canada's February elections). Looking further down the road another meeting of the foreign ministers of the seven is contemplated for May, prior to the Venice summit.

The President has continued to indicate that he wants follow-up action in the UN on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. I would anticipate he will ask Vance about this during the breakfast, bearing in mind the fact that Waldheim was requested to investigate and report back to the General Assembly by January 15.

Olympics

Vance will address the Olympic Committee at Lake Placid on Saturday. You will open the winter games on Wednesday, February 13. I will continue to work with State, to ensure that you are fully abreast of Olympic political developments in connection with your visit to Lake Placid.

Iran - Hostages

The hostage release scenario continues to unfold with various pieces of it, e.g. the French lawyers' mission seeping into the media. Hal Saunders is scheduled to meet with the lawyers in Paris over the weekend. It is my understanding that Bani-Sadr has been given authority by Khomeini to resolve and end the hostage crisis in a dignified way. The crucial phase of the

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scenario will be orchestrating an order from Khomeini at the right moment to have the hostages moved from the compound to a prison or a hospital.

#### Greek Reintegration into NATO, and Cyprus Negotiations

Following up on last week's breakfast, Secretary Vance has asked General Rogers to speed up his timetable in the Greek reintegration talks.

On February 5 Vance met with Cypriot Foreign Minister Rolandis who proposed a new approach to the Cyprus problem -- i.e., Turkish Cypriots agree to resettlement of Varosha in return for significant economic assistance from Greek Cypriots and third parties. Given the history of this dispute, I personally cannot imagine the Turkish Cypriots agreeing to a formula that would have them in effect lose face by agreeing to accept economic assistance from the Greek Cypriots. Vance may wish to comment on this during the breakfast.

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For Feb. 22, 1980

## OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

Memo No. 710-80

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

February 21, 1980

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift *DC*

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast, Friday, February 22, 1980, 7:30 a.m.

Afghanistan/U.S. Actions Against USSR

Thursday's SCC meeting focused on the phosphate issue and further U.S. actions relating to the Olympics. On phosphates (paper at Tab A) the majority view was to recommend to the President a variation on Option 1 -- total embargo -- which would link the embargo to Soviet behavior and which would have the President lift the phosphates embargo at the same time that he lifts the grain embargo. Aaron indicated his belief that you would favor this option.

On the Olympics (Cutler paper at Tab B) it was agreed that U.S. firms should not be encouraged to sell products to the Olympics, in keeping with our athletic boycott. There was almost an even split among participants as to whether the President should make a voluntary appeal to firms or issue regulations formally blocking sales on such highly symbolic items as Levi blue jeans (Coke is a different problem, with most of the syrup already purchased and in the USSR). There was considerable debate on whether the President would appear petty and vindictive if he were to move in this field, but the majority felt that such action was important to be consistent with the athletic boycott.

On the related subject of alternate games, Cutler noted the complex international politics. Zbig asked Cutler and State to do an options paper on this subject noting that we must get our policy established if we, in fact, decide to favor alternate games and have any hope of actually setting them up.

Tito

Official and media sources continue to report Tito holding his own with Thursday's press containing speculation from Yugoslav medical sources that he may survive for quite some time.

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## Saudi Arabia/King Khalid

At the same time, there are indications that King Khalid is gravely ill. As you know from my note to David Aaron a few days ago, I have asked the NSC and State to focus on contingency planning should the King die. This issue concerns me not only because of Saudi Arabia's growing importance and the currently unstable situation in the Persian Gulf region but also because the United States was represented at the Vice Presidential level at the last funeral of a Saudi King -- Rockefeller attended Faisal's funeral in 1975. This has to be factored into U.S. planning in terms of the Saudi perception of our representation should Khalid die.

## Iran

It is my understanding that White Papers are being drafted at both the classified and unclassified levels reviewing the history of the Iranian hostage crisis. I do not believe, however, that at this point the President has this drafting as well coordinated as he might wish to -- i.e., State is doing its draft, but this has not been run through the NSC/White House process. In my opinion, the President will wish to have the initiative in terms of the best possible White Paper for release at a time of his choosing, given the fact that this subject will become a hot national issue following the hoped-for return of the hostages.

As you have seen in recent intelligence, Bani-Sadr says there are only 49 hostages in the compound. It is my understanding that one of our political officers, Michael Metrisko, has not, in fact, been accounted for since November 4.

The President's statement on the UN commission is at Tab C for your reference.

## Central America - El Salvador

I have the feeling, given the state of affairs in El Salvador, that the focus of U.S. foreign policy attention may switch much more to Central America and the Administration's handling of the multiple crises there, following the return of the hostages. I do not think the President has what he needs in terms of a good public policy available for articulation at this point. If you agree, you may wish to suggest that State and the NSC prepare for intensified attention on this front (see news item at Tab D).

## Greece

I have asked State to ask Warren Christopher to be prepared to speak to both the Greek reintegration negotiations and the prospects for forward movement on Cyprus. (I have noted to Tarnoff that this is a subject of intense interest to Greek Americans in Illinois.)

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February 20, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: SCC PRINCIPALS

SUBJECT: Phosphates (U)

Issue for Decision. Should the US impose an embargo on phosphate exports to the USSR? (C)

Background. On February 5, we announced that exports of phosphates to the USSR would be subject to validated license requirements and suspended action on all applications pending completion of an interagency review. That review is now complete, and an interagency paper describing the issues and options was distributed to SCC principals on February 20. This memo summarizes the main points in that and other papers and list three options for SCC consideration, which include the two options in the interagency paper that have agency support.

1. Economic Impact. The impact of an embargo on the Soviet and US economies would not be substantial, according to the interagency group.

This group concluded that an embargo would affect the 1980 Soviet crop only marginally and reduce yields in 1981 and beyond by 2-4 million metric tons (mmt), or 2-3% of the Soviet grain crop. CEA believes that the interagency paper understates the costs to the Soviet Union and suggests that Soviet grain might fall 2-10 mmt. (The CEA paper has been distributed separately.) CEA also asserts that the Soviets may have more difficulty than the interagency group suggests in replacing Occidental's Super Phosphoric Acid with dry fertilizer. An embargo would disrupt the Soviet liquid fertilizer program and require new investments of approximately \$40 million over a 1-2 year period. (C)

The interagency group concluded that the probable cost to the US economy from an embargo would be marginal. Decreases in domestic phosphate prices would probably offset the increases in ammonia prices that would result if the Soviets retaliated by cutting off ammonia shipments to the US. But Occidental Petroleum's production and marketing adjustment costs could run \$40 million. The USG would also risk Soviet default on an EXIMBANK loan of \$179 million and a potential loss of \$100-\$170 million spent in building tankers for Occidental. The interagency group also estimated potential export losses of \$4 billion over the next 5-10 years because of minimal US involvement in large scale projects and industrial cooperation arrangements. (C)

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2. Other Considerations. An embargo would, in effect, abrogate Occidental's 20-year, \$20 billion barter deal, the most visible example of long-term US-Soviet trade. It would reduce US-Soviet non-agricultural trade to an insignificant level and discourage resumption of such trade even if the political climate improves. (C)

Yet failure to take action against phosphates might be seen by both the American public and the Soviets as a return to "business as usual" despite strong statements to the contrary in the State of the Union message and elsewhere. We would be leaving untouched a deal which would likely account for about 50% of our projected manufactured good exports to the USSR over the next few years. The farm community and its supporters in the Congress would point to the inequity of a decision to suspend grain exports while permitting shipment of fertilizers intended to stimulate Soviet grain production. (C)

#### Options.

1. Total Embargo. Under this option, we would require validated export licenses but would deny applications unilaterally.

2. Continue Trade. We would maintain the requirement for export licenses but approve applications at this time. We would curtail trade, however, in the event of future Soviet misbehavior (e.g., an invasion of Pakistan). (C)

3. Partial Embargo. We would limit phosphate exports to a certain percentage of planned shipments (e.g., 500,000 tons in 1980, which is equal to the 1979 level but only 50% of planned shipments for 1980). We would thus establish some rough symmetry with our partial embargo on grain exports. A full phosphate embargo would be applied if the Soviets took further adverse action.

The pros and cons of options 1 and 2 have been described above. The main advantage of option 3 is that it would convey a political signal to the Soviets without abrogating the barter agreement, thus minimizing the economic cost to Occidental and avoiding potential losses by EXIM and the Maritime Administration. The main disadvantage is that this compromise would have only minimal adverse impact on the Soviet economy and thus would probably not satisfy those who favor a total ban on phosphate exports. (C)

February 20, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR SCC

FROM: LLOYD CUTLER

SUBJECT: Olympics Issues

There are two Olympics issues which need to be resolved in the next few days.

I. Olympic-related Exports. There are several types of exports which are planned in connection with the Olympics.

- A. High Technology Communications and Computer Equipment. The export of these items is suspended.
- B. Sports-related Items. American firms or foreign subs are scheduled to export pole-vault landing equipment, a swimming pool, a tartan track, and drug-testing equipment. None of these items is under license.
- C. Miscellaneous Items. American firms or foreign subs are scheduled to export blue jeans, chewing gum, coca-cola syrup, and similar items for use in connection with the Olympics. None of these items is under license.

The argument is made that as part of our campaign against the Moscow Olympics, we should bar export of these items. If athletes can't go to Moscow, the argument runs, American commercial products should not go either. The argument against barring exports is that (1) it may seem petty and ridiculous to bar chewing gum, etc., and (2) many of the exports are by foreign subs which we cannot effectively reach.

Should we bar these exports by American firms and, if so, should we seek to reach foreign subs?

II. U.S. Army Support To USOC. The U.S. Army has undertaken to assist the USOC in training U.S. athletes in West Berlin just prior to the Moscow Games. The Army would provide three gyms, a swimming pool, a track and field facility, two soccer fields, a yatching facility, and a rifle and pistol range to American athletes. In addition, the Army would provide ground transportation from the commercial hotels where the athletes would be staying to these facilities. Finally, the Army was planning to provide a 10 or 11-man support team. The personnel costs incurred by the Army were expected to be in the neighborhood of \$46,000.

Should we now notify U.S. Army Europe and the USOC that, since American athletes are not going to Moscow, the planned cooperation is terminated?

/agreed

Secretary General Waldheim has announced the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry to go to Iran to hear Iran's grievances and to allow an early solution of the crisis between Iran and the United States. He has stated that the Commission will speak with each of our people.

Both the United States and Iran have concurred in the establishment of the Commission as proposed by the Secretary General in mutually acceptable official responses to him.

In concurring, the United States has taken note of the Secretary General's statement that the Commission will undertake a fact-finding mission. It will not be a tribunal. The United States understands that the Commission will hear the grievances of both sides and will report to the Secretary General. The American people are deeply aggrieved that Iran, after guaranteeing the protection of our people, has taken them hostage and held them in intolerable conditions for 108 days. The United States has no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran, but it does insist on the prompt return of the 53 Americans now illegally held in Tehran.

The United States has also made clear its position that the meeting of the Commission with our people must be consistent with international law and that the hostages must under no circumstances be subjected to interrogation. It is vital, however, for the Commission to determine that they are all present, and to assess their condition.

We hope that the Commission will, as the Secretary General has said, achieve an early resolution of the crisis between our two countries which requires the release of the hostages.

# # #

SECOND SECRET SESSION IN 149 YEARS, AND ONCE AGAIN THE SUBJECT IS CONCERN THAT CUBA MAY BE WORKING TO SEE THAT MARXIST FORCES GAIN CONTROL IN NICARAGUA.

REP. ROBERT E. BAUMAN, R-MD., SAID HE WOULD ASK FOR THE SECRET SESSION TODAY TO DISCLOSE CIA INFORMATION HE SAID "IS AT VARIANCE WITH WHAT THE PUBLIC HAS BEEN TOLD."

BAUMAN AND A GROUP OF OTHER REPUBLICANS SAID THEY WANT THE HOUSE TO HEAR THE INFORMATION BEFORE VOTING ON PRESIDENT CARTER'S REQUEST FOR \$75 MILLION IN U.S. AID FOR NICARAGUA.

BUT REP. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, D-WIS., CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, SAID AFTER A CIA BRIEFING WEDNESDAY THAT THE INTELLIGENCE DATA SHOULD GIVE THE HOUSE NO REASON TO VOTE AGAINST THE AID.

"I DON'T THINK THERE IS ANY NEED FOR IT (THE SECRET SESSION), BUT THEY DO AND IF THEY WANT IT, I WON'T FIGHT IT," ZABLOCKI SAID.

BAUMAN SAID THE REPUBLICANS WILL SHOW THE HOUSE FOUR CIA DOCUMENTS AND A TRANSCRIPT OF A THREE-HOUR CIA BRIEFING ON NICARAGUA TO ZABLOCKI'S COMMITTEE LAST DECEMBER.

HE SAID THE INTELLIGENCE "DEALS WITH THE INFLUENCE OF THE CUBANS AND THEIR PRESENCE IN THE COUNTRY, THE EXTENT OF COMMUNIST DOMINANCE AND THE TRAINING OF TERRORISTS ACTIVE IN COUNTRIES BORDERING NICARAGUA."

HE SAID HE COULD NOT ELABORATE WITHOUT DISCLOSING SECRET INFORMATION.

DEPUTY CIA DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI BRIEFED INTERESTED HOUSE MEMBERS ON THE INFORMATION AND REPORTEDLY TOOK NO POSITION FOR OR AGAINST ITS BEING DISCLOSED TO THE HOUSE IN SECRET SESSION.

CARTER ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD CONGRESS THE NEW SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT IN NICARAGUA IS STILL NEUTRAL AND THE \$75 MILLION U.S. AID MIGHT INFLUENCE IT AGAINST TURNING MARXIST.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE VIRON P. VAKY TESTIFIED THAT THERE IS "A STRONG FLUX FROM THE CUBAN AND MARXIST SIDE TO MOVE THE COUNTRY TOWARD MARXIST RULE."

IF THE UNITED STATES DOES NOTHING TO COUNTER THAT FLUX, HE SAID, "WE MAY VERY WELL SEE THIS DEVELOPMENT TURN OUT ADVERSELY."

THE SENATE APPROVED THE \$74 MILLION AID LAST MONTH OVER PROTESTS IT WOULD "AID MARXISTS AND LEFTISTS."

VAKY SAID THE \$75 MILLION WOULD BE USED TO RESTORE NICARAGUA'S COMMERCE AND SAID 60 PERCENT OF IT WOULD GO TO PRIVATE BUSINESS WHICH IS NOT INCLINED TO SUPPORT MARXISM.

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