

For March 14, 1980

## OFFICE OF THE VICEPRESIDENT


WASHINGTON

Memo No. 763-80

~~SECRET~~

March 13, 1980

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast, Friday, March 14, 1980,  
7:30 a.m.

Iran and Afghanistan, and allied cooperation or lack thereof, will be the centerpiece of discussion. These issues are covered below, together with additional points I believe you should raise.

Tito Funeral

President Tito continues to hang on. However, given the fact that his end could come at any moment, we need policy level consideration of the pros and cons of a meeting between you (with or without Vance) and the head of the Soviet delegation while you are in Belgrade. My current information is that Brezhnev's Supreme Soviet Deputy Vasiliy Kuznetsov will head the Soviet delegation, accompanied by Gromyko. This will provide the first opportunity for a policy level US-USSR meeting since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. If properly prepared for, I believe the pros outweigh the cons in having a meeting in which we are able to state basic US positions and so report to the media following the meeting. The President should be asked to focus on this as part of the contingency planning, and if he believes we should be prepared for such a meeting, Vance and Zbig should be tasked as a high priority with coming up with a good agenda for such talks and good papers for such talks.

Zimbabwe

Prime Minister Mugabe and the new Zimbabwe government are moving ahead with the British toward formal independence of Zimbabwe some time in April. I have been advised that State is moving ahead with the nomination of a career FSO, Deputy Assistant Secretary Keeley, one of Dick Moose's deputies, to be our first Ambassador to Zimbabwe -- having a career man in that difficult post makes good sense to me.

I think the President should be asking now for recommendations on the U.S. delegation to the Zimbabwe independence ceremonies. As you may recall, some time ago before the Iranian crisis, I

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REVIEW ON MARCH 13, 2000

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told you that it might make sense for you to take a powerful delegation to Africa given the favorable impact both nationally and internationally. However, with the President's presence now required in Washington and with your time so heavily devoted to campaigning, I do not see how you can take such an assignment. I do see this as an opportunity for the President to include a number of important Americans on an important delegation, and I think that this requires attention now by his domestic advisors and political advisors. (More than one voice has suggested that Tip O'Neill might be a good head of delegation.)

#### Greek Reintegration

As a result of last Friday's breakfast, Vance dispatched George Vest to Brussels for further talks on possible Greek reintegration formulas that would prove to be a satisfactory compromise. You should ask the Secretary of State for an update, given the fact that Karamanlis' timetable has not changed.

#### The People's Republic of China

You are scheduled to meet with PRC Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin on March 19. This will be the first policy level US-PRC meeting since Harold Brown's visit. Needless to say, we have papers in preparation. However, I recommend that you mention the fact of your meeting at the breakfast asking Vance and Zbig to make sure that we take full advantage of the meeting and that we have the best possible position on any and all tough questions.

#### Middle East/UN Resolution

Secretary Vance can be expected to give the President an update both on the congressional inquiry and on follow-up to the charges levied by Mayor Koch naming Vance, Brzezinski, McHenry, Young and Saunders as the anti-Israeli "Gang of Five." The House Foreign Affairs Committee took testimony from Warren Christopher on Wednesday, and will meet again with Secretary Vance in executive session next week. Christopher has reported that the basic concern of the Committee has been to establish whether or not Administration actions on the UN resolution involved a change in policy toward Israel.

There is every evidence -- e.g., reports from members of the Jewish American community following contacts by the Israeli Embassy -- that the Embassy has been mounting a very aggressive campaign in the wake of the UN resolution, and that this campaign has included charges which may well have contributed to Mayor Koch's pronouncement. It is my understanding that Vance personally has called Ambassador Evron on this subject.

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## Iran

At Thursday's SCC meeting, Secretary Vance made available the paper at Tab A reviewing U.S. diplomatic options. It was agreed that the paper would be discussed next Tuesday, after the Administration had had a chance to assess the first round of Parliamentary elections this weekend.

It was agreed to consider Justice's Option Paper (Tab B) concerning vesting of Iranian government-owned property at next Tuesday's meeting.

Vance will report on his talks in New York this past Wednesday with Waldheim and the UN commission members.

The breakfast will also provide the occasion for an update on possible sale of helicopter parts by Italy to Iran. As you know from the message traffic, Ambassador Gardner got word that Italy had approved such sales. This has not yet been formally established. It would, if true, run contrary to the assurance given Vance by Prime Minister Cossiga.

The telegram at Tab C provides the Danish Ambassador's assessment as of March 12 of the situation we face in Iran. As you would expect, it focuses primarily on the power struggle taking place within Iran and the increased difficulties this poses for the United States in our efforts to secure the release of our hostages.

## USSR/Afghanistan

It is my understanding that the President is increasingly exercised over the weak support or lack of support from our allies on Afghanistan. At the same time, the President is faced with an increasingly difficult situation in the grain embargo. Thursday's SCC -- a major exercise including Vance, Christopher, Brown, Klutznick, Bergland, Civiletti, Zbig, Henry Owen, Cutler, Donovan and Stan Turner -- addressed a number of tough issues that will be raised during the breakfast:

1. Revised standards for licenses - Commerce has completed its review of U.S. licensing practices toward the USSR. It was agreed that Commerce by late Thursday afternoon would circulate the proposed announcement to be made on revised U.S. standards for licenses -- with a view to ensuring that the language reinforces the tough position the President is taking, rather than suggesting that he is falling off his effort to teach the Soviets a lesson.

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2. COCOM - Zbig summarized the frustration the President feels over Helmut Schmidt's exploitation of our current position with Schmidt saying the FRG will support the U.S. if the U.S. moves in COCOM. State advised that we are prepared to move in COCOM early next week. It was agreed that we will bring the German Ambassador in to present him with our position and plans for COCOM next week and that we will then press Schmidt hard to support us firmly when we move in COCOM (We do not want to give the Germans the option of waiting for the anticipated French veto. We want them to have to speak out firmly and in favor of the U.S. position fast.)
3. Grain Embargo - The grain embargo has a number of leaks, as you know from the press guidance prepared for you earlier this week. Bergland was tasked with providing a report to the President on Agriculture's best estimate of the situation. It was agreed that major U.S. grain companies would be called into the White House for a Dutch Uncle session. State pointed out during the SCC that we are faced with the fact that we are exporting a vast amount of grain this year and that this is making it easier for other countries to buy from the U.S. and then to ship their own grain to the USSR.
4. Olympics - Lloyd Cutler took the lead in arguing for invocation of the President's National Emergency Powers Act to give the Administration the authority it requires to have NBC stop sending television payments to the USSR for the Moscow Olympics. Cutler says the fact that NBC is still dealing with the Soviets is causing people in the U.S. and around the world to doubt the President's word and to feel that in the end NBC and the U.S. will be in Moscow. There was considerable discussion about the psychological impact of invoking NEPA to stop a TV payment. Vance argued that we should consult with key leaders on the Hill to see if we can push through a quick bill to obtain the authority we need. It was agreed that such consultation should take place.

#### Secretary of State Sweepstakes

In the event that you have not seen it, I am attaching at Tab D the latest wire story on this subject. Bob Strauss' name is one of the most recent to have been tossed into the pot.

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Venezuela

Your visit to Venezuela and your cordial reception for Minister Calderon last week have paid dividends, with President Herrera praising improvements in US-Venezuelan relations in his State of the Union speech on Wednesday, March 12 (Tab E).

Steel Trigger Prices

John Farmer has given you the paper at Tab F.



IRAN

Possible Options for Changes in Diplomatic Relations with Iran

The following is a range of possible options (in decreasing order of severity), with pros and cons, for changes in diplomatic relations with Iran. The choice of any particular option should logically be directly related to the degree of success expected of efforts to negotiate a resolution of the hostage crisis. Thus, the greater degree of success expected of negotiations, the more limited a change should be chosen.

Option 6. Close the Embassy and the Consulates and expel all Iranian diplomats. Permit Iranians to arrange for third country to represent them.

Pro: Would generate U.S. public support.

Would flag for the Iranians the increasingly serious nature of developments.

Would generate some pressure on the regime in Iran from Iranians with relatives in the U.S. and others who would see this as a potentially damaging or dangerous effect of the continued holding of the hostages.

Would reduce Iranian capabilities to carry out propaganda efforts in the U.S.

Con:

-- Could bring forth some counter-reaction in Iran on part of hardliners, possibly an escalation by putting some of the hostages on trial to prove that U.S. Embassy is not a regular embassy like Iranian Embassy in Washington, but a "nest of spies."

[Would eliminate one channel for the Iranians to convey changes in U.S. public mood to the leadership in Iran. (This has not been a useful channel, however, in recent months.)]

-- Would create considerable difficulties for Iranians in the U.S., at least temporarily, in obtaining travel documentation and papers needed for transfer of funds, especially for students. Could put many students on local relief.

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BAC NARA DATE 8/25/06

-- A total break in diplomatic relations probably would make it more difficult to restore relations in the future.

-- Would remove from the Iranian arsenal a potentially useful face-saver in the final resolution of the crisis.

Option 5. Close the Embassy and the Consulates, but allow Iranians to maintain an Interests Section in the Embassy of a third country.

Pro:

-- Would generate U.S. public support, but somewhat less than Option 6.

-- Would flag for the Iranians the increasingly serious nature of developments, but somewhat less dramatically than Option 6.

-- Would generate some pressure, but less than Option 6, on the regime in Iran from Iranians with relatives in the U.S. and others who would see this as a potentially damaging or dangerous effect of the continued holding of the hostages.

-- Would reduce Iranian capabilities to carry out propaganda efforts.

Con:

-- Could bring forth some counter-reaction in Iran on part of hardliners, but probably not to the point of putting some hostages on trial.

-- Would create some difficulties for Iranians in the U.S., at least temporarily, while the reorganization took place, in obtaining travel documentation and papers needed for transfer of funds, especially for students, but these would be minimal if we allowed time for an orderly transfer to an Interests Section. [Could put some students on local relief.]

-- Would make it somewhat less difficult to restore relations in the future than the total break envisaged in Option 6.

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Option 4. Further reduce the staff of the Embassy to only the current Consular Officers and their support staff, and restrict their activities to consular matters. The only sanction we would have to enforce this would be PNGing offenders.

Pro:

-- The same as 6 or 5 above, but with diminished effect.

-- Would generate some pressure, but much less than Options 6 or 5, on the regime in Iran from Iranians with relatives in the U.S. and others who would see this as a potentially damaging or dangerous effect of the continued holding of the hostages.

-- Would reduce Iranian capabilities to carry out propaganda efforts in the U.S.

Con:

-- Could bring forth some counter-reaction in Iran on part of hardliners, but probably not of a serious nature.

Option 3. Restrict travel of Iranian diplomats to the Embassy or Consulate and their home (which would be difficult to monitor) and/or stop Embassy distribution of propaganda publications; and/or stop public appearances of Iranian diplomats. The only sanction we would have to enforce this would be PNGing offenders.

Pro:

-- Would generate some U.S. public support because it would be "newsworthy" as placing greater restrictions on Iranian diplomats than on those of Communist countries.

-- Would flag for the Iranians that more severe measures might be taken if there is no forward movement on hostage issue.

-- Would generate some pressure on the regime in Iran (from Iranians with relatives in the U.S. and others who would see this as a possibly damaging effect of the continued holding of the hostages).

-- Would reduce Iranian capabilities to carry out propaganda efforts in the U.S.

Con:

-- Could bring forth some counter-reaction in Iran on part of harliners, possibly directed against American media representatives.

Option 2. Close one or more of the four Iranian Consulates in New York, Chicago, Houston, and San Francisco.

Pro:

-- Would generate some limited U.S. public support, but would probably be seen as little more than a slap on the wrist.

-- Would warn the Iranians that we could take more serious measures concerning their diplomatic representation.

-- Would generate some pressure on the regime in Iran from Iranians with relatives in the U.S.

-- Would marginally reduce Iranian capabilities to carry out propaganda efforts in the U.S.

Con:

-- Could bring forth some limited counter-reaction in Iran on part of hardliners, in terms that it was an example of harassment of Iranians in the U.S.

-- Would create considerable difficulties for Iranians in the U.S., at least temporarily, in obtaining travel documentation and papers needed for transfer of funds, especially for students. Could put many students temporarily on local relief.

Option 1. Reduce the number of Iranian diplomats at Embassy and/or Consulates either by decreasing numbers allowed or by declaring some persona non grata.

Pro:

-- Would probably generate some very limited U.S. public support, especially if the Iranian diplomats were thrown out in 48 hours.

-- Could reduce Iranian capabilities to carry out propaganda efforts, depending on size of reductions or who was PNGed.

-- Would give Iranians a limited signal of possible further action, and show our dissatisfaction with the activities of some Iranian diplomats.

Con:

-- Could possibly bring forth some low-level counter-reaction in Iran on part of hardliners.

-- Could create some difficulties for Iranians in the U.S., at least temporarily, in obtaining travel documentation and papers needed for transfer of funds, especially for students, depending on number of people PNGed. Could put some students on local relief.

12 MAR 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Re: Options Concerning Vesting of Iranian  
Government-owned Property

This memorandum outlines issues surrounding possible actions to be taken concerning Iranian Government-owned property, in aid of discussion at the SCC meeting on March 13, 1980. It is intended to provide general information only, and does not analyze the complexities that would surround any of these actions.

I. Without new legislation:

A. Census of Claims. The President could direct the Department of Treasury to conduct a census of private claims presently asserted against Iran, to identify the nature and amounts of claims. This would send the signal that we are contemplating vesting Iranian assets to satisfy those claims.

B. Assumption of Custody. Based on the broad terms of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, it is arguable that the Government could take custody of all Iranian government-owned assets, without taking title to the assets. (This would require a new executive order.) However, this action probably would not cause any greater prejudice to the Iranians than the present freeze.

II. With new legislation:

A. Seizure of Assets without Claims Program. Congress by statute could authorize the vesting (seizure) of all Iranian government-owned assets. This would vest title to those assets in the U.S. Government. (At present, the IEEPA does not permit vesting of subject property. Under present law, foreign-owned property can be vested only under the authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act, which requires a declaration of

war by Congress.) If Congress enacts a general statute authorizing vesting, the President could be given discretion as to the type or amount of property that would be vested (e.g., bank accounts, credits, personal property, real estate).

B. Seizure of Assets with Claims Program. Congress could authorize vesting coupled with a claims program. The legislation should specify whether claimants who have already filed suit and sought to attach Iranian assets will be given priority or whether they will participate equally with all other claimants.

C. Claims Determination without Seizure of Assets. Congress could be asked to enact a law authorizing the formal determination and adjudication of claims by American citizens against Iran (as was done in the 1960's with claims against Cuba and the PRC). Congress could, furthermore, include the determination of U.S. Government claims in such a program.

### III. Foreign Effect

Legislation authorizing the vesting of Iranian property would, under principles of international law, not be enforceable against property located abroad. Iranian dollar deposits in U.S. Branch banks abroad could be reached only if foreign courts were to hold that such dollar deposits in U.S. Branch banks are in reality located at the home office of the banks in the United States. That issue is being litigated in English and French courts now with respect to the Presidential freeze order.

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EXDIS  
EO 12065: RDS-1 3/12/1200 (GRIBBLE, MARION L) OR - P  
TAGS: PINS PORS IR OA  
SUBJ: DANISH INFORMATION ON US HOSTAGES IN IRAN  
REF: COPENHAGEN 1680

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. REFTEL PROVIDED HIGHLIGHTS OF A MARCH 10 REPORT FROM DANISH TEHRAN AMBASSADOR TROELS MUNK CONCERNING "AGGRAVATION OF THE HOSTAGE CRISIS". THE EMBASSY'S UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF AMBASSADOR MUNK'S ENTIRE CABLE FOLLOWS.

3. BEGIN TEXT.

1. THE EVENTS DURING RECENT DAYS HAVE CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THAT THE DETENTION OF HOSTAGES IN ITS PRESENT PHASE IS NOT DIRECTED PRIMARILY AGAINST THE US, BUT HAS BECOME AN INSTRUMENT IN THE DOMESTIC IRANIAN POWER STRUGGLE IN WHICH THE CHALLENGING SIDE IS COMPOSED OF FORCES THAT ALSO UTILIZE THE "STUDENTS" AND ARE IDENTIFIED AS GROUPS OF PROGRESSIVE POSTURE TO THE LEFT-- MUJAHEDDIN KHALK, CERTAIN FEDAYEHEENS AND ESPECIALLY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS LIKE TUDEH.

THIS TRIAL OF STRENGTH HAS ON THE SURFACE BEEN ESSENTIALLY RELATED TO PRESIDENT SANI SADR HIMSELF AND THEREBY ALSO TO A HIGH DEGREE TO HIS NEW SUPPORTER, GHOTBZADEH. BUT IT ALSO HAS AN EFFECT ON THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL'S INFLUENCE AND A WIDER CIRCLE IN THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. AND IF THE CRISIS IS INTENSIFIED AND CONTINUED, IT IS NOT UNLIKELY THAT THE TRIAL OF STRENGTH WILL IMPLY THE RESIGNATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. MAYBE EVEN LEAD TO ISOLATION OF SANI SADR IN THE COMING PARLIAMENT AND TO THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCE THAT THE PRESIDENT, WHO HAS BEEN ELECTED ON THE BASIS OF ABOUT 75 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL POLL, WILL BE FORCED TO CONTEMPLATE HIS OWN RESIGNATION OR WILL HAVE HIS OATH TO

\* \* \* \* \* WWSR COMMENT \* \* \* \* \*

REV --SICK-- VP  
EDB:BLOOM,KIM,HUNT,SICK,STEBBINS

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7/27/86 NSC Htr  
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BY BAE NARA, DATE 8/25/06

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THE PARLIAMENT POSTPONED--AND MAYBE THEREBY WILL FACE A SERIOUS POSTPONEMENT OF THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT AND OF THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS.

2. THE LAST-MENTIONED POSSIBILITY IS PERHAPS PART OF THE MOST PESSIMISTIC PROGNOSIS. BUT EVEN THOSE WHO ARE MOST CONFIDENT NOW HAVE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE CONDITIONS AND FUTURE OF THE HOSTAGES SEEM TO BE AN INSTRUMENT OR A PLAYTHING IN A DANGEROUS GAME ABOUT THE FUTURE POWER IN IRAN, THAT THE WALDHEIM COMMISSION IN THIS CONNECTION SEEMS TO HAVE LOST AN ESSENTIAL PART OF ITS ORIGINAL IMPORTANCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE US AND IRAN, AND THAT IT APPEARS DIFFICULT TO SEE BY WHICH STEPS THE US IN THE PRESENT SITUATION MIGHT INITIATE ANY CHANGE IN THIS PICTURE TO PROMOTE A POSTIVE SOLUTION IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

3. THE PICTURE, WHICH CHANGES VIRTUALLY FROM HOUR TO HOUR, WILL BE KNOWN TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCIES. IT BEGAN WITH THE ATTEMPT WHICH WAS MADE BY THE STUDENTS LAST MARCH 5-6 TO OUTHANEUVER THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL IN A SORT OF GAME OF POKER. THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL'S DARING COUNTERMOVE WAS TO ACCEPT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE GUARDING (OF THE HOSTAGES). THE STUDENTS THEN REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE GHOTBZADEH AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE COUNCIL IN CONNECTION WITH A TAKEOVER AND PLACEMENT OF THE HOSTAGES IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THE STUDENTS MAINTAINED THAT IT WAS NOT ENOUGH THAT THE IMAM HAD ALLOWED THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL A FREE REIN. A DIRECT ORDER FROM THE IMAM WOULD BE NECESSARY. AND THE FINAL PHASE--IN WHICH IMPOSSIBLE CONDITIONS WERE LAID DOWN (A NOTICE OF EIGHT HOURS AND A RADIO MESSAGE TO THE PUBLIC, CF AMTEL 232 OF TODAY) -- MERELY POINTS IN A NEGATIVE DIRECTION.

4. THE UNDERSIGNED YESTERDAY HAD AN OCCASION TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION CONFIDENTIALLY WITH TWO OF THE FRENCH LAWYERS AND THE ARGENTINE LAWYER WHO--IN ADDITION TO ASSISTANCE TO THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT'S PREPARATIONS FOR AN ATTEMPT TO USE LEGAL MEANS TO OBTAIN EXTRADITION OF THE SHAH AND DEBLOCK THE RESTITUTION OF THE SHAH FAMILY'S CAPITAL AND PROPERTY ABROAD--ALSO SERVES AS THE GOVERNMENT'S DAILY ADVISOR IN CONNECTION WITH THE WALDHEIM COMMISSION AND THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE HOSTAGES.

THEIR UNANIMOUS VIEWS WERE TO THE EFFECT THAT IT SEEMS DIFFICULT TO STOP THE SUCCESS HITHERTO OF THE STUDENTS IN BLAMING THE GOVERNMENT AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AS "DEVIATIONISTS" IN RELATION TO "THE LINE OF THE IMAM", PORTRAYING BANI SADR ESPECIALLY, BUT ALSO THE COUNCIL, AS IMPOTENT, AND IN MOBILIZING LEFT-WING FORCES AND OTHER GROUPS THAT HAVE BEEN FRUSTRATED AND DISAPPOINTED AT THE COURSE OF THE REVOLUTION. IF THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD MEET THE CONDITIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN LAID DOWN BY THE STUDENTS AS TO TRANSFER (OR EXTRADITION) OF THE HOSTAGES--AND THIS IS NOT LIKELY--MORE DEMANDS WOULD CERTAINLY BE MADE, THE LAWYERS

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THE ONLY POSITIVE POSSIBILITY APPEARED TO BE A SUDDEN VOI TE-  
FACE ON THE PART OF THE STUDENTS WHO MIGHT (THOUGH THIS SEEMS  
NOT VERY LIKELY) ANNOUNCE--IN A NEW BID FOR HUMILIATION OF THE  
GOVERNMENT--THAT THE UN COMMISSION NOW AFTER ALL CAN VISIT THE  
HOSTAGES IN THE COMPOUND, BUT ON THE TERMS WHICH HAVE BEEN LAID  
DOWN BY THE STUDENTS.

IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION ABOUT THE NUMBER OF HOSTAGES, ONE OF  
THE LAWYERS SAID: THERE HAVE ONLY BEEN ABOUT 30 IN THE COMPOUND  
PREVIOUSLY, BUT ALL OF THEM HAVE DURING THE PAST 48 HOURS BEEN  
GATHERED IN THE EMBASSY COMPOUND.

ANOTHER POSSIBILITY IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT MAY USE FORCE.  
GHOTBZADEH SAID IN A STATEMENT A COUPLE OF DAYS AGO THAT SUCH  
A SOLUTION HAD BEEN CONTEMPLATED DURING THE DAYS PRIOR TO THE--  
APPARENT--JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

HOWEVER, ABOVE ALL IS OF COURSE STILL THE HOPE THAT KHOMEINI  
WILL DECIDE TO UNTIE THE KNOT BY GIVING AN ORDER. THE DEVELOPMENT  
SO FAR, HOWEVER, HAS NOT INCLUDED SPECIAL INDICATIONS IN SUPPORT  
OF SUCH A HOPE, IT SHOULD BE ADMITTED. THE WAYS OF THE IMAM ARE  
STILL PAST UNDERSTANDING. HIS EARS, WHICH ARE VERY SENSITIVE TO  
WHAT IS EXPECTED BY THE POPULAR MOOD, MAY STILL NOT BE CONVINCED  
THAT THE POPULATION IS IN THE PROCESS OF BECOMING FED UP WITH THE  
STUDENTS AND THEIR WIREPULLERS.

5. THE LAWYERS DID NOT DARE TO SAY WITH CERTAINTY HOW LONG THE  
WALDHEIM COMMISSION WILL STAY IN TEMERAN. THEY DID NOT COMPLETELY  
OUT THAT THE DEPARTURE MAY BE POSTPONED FOR AN ADDITIONAL  
NUMBER OF DAYS. THE COMMISSION HAD DISPLAYED "UNEXPECTED FLEXI-  
BILITY". FOR EXAMPLE, HAD THE COMMISSION ON ITS ARRIVAL REFUSED  
TO START WORKING UNTIL PROMISES AND A SCHEDULE HAD BEEN FIXED FOR  
VISITS TO THE HOSTAGES AND THEIR RELEASE LATER ON. ONE COULD  
RIGHTLY USE THE PHRASE THAT THE COMMISSION--BY ITS YIELDING IN  
THIS RESPECT--HAS "CONTRIBUTED" TO THE PRESENT UNFORTUNATE  
SITUATION. THIS IMPRESSION OF "COMPLICITY" RESTED HEAVILY ON  
SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION, IT WAS SAID.

BANI SAQR FOUND IT ONLY POSSIBLE AT PRESENT TO PLAY FOR TIME.  
ALL THE INVOLVED PARTIES WERE FULLY AWARE OF THE EXTREMELY  
LARGE RISK OF SERIOUS AMERICAN REACTIONS WHICH THIS AFFAIR MUST BE  
EXPECTED TO RELEASE IN THE NEAR FUTURE, ACCORDING TO THE LAWYERS  
(OF WHOM AT LEAST THE ARGENTINE ONE HAS SOME CURRENT CONTACT  
WITH WASHINGTON).

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DW  
CHRISTOPHER

WASHINGTON (AP) -- PRESIDENT CARTER IS BEING ADVISED TO PICK SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS R. VANCE'S DEPUTY TO REPLACE VANCE IN A SECOND CARTER ADMINISTRATION, THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN POLICY ASSISTANT SAID WEDNESDAY.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, CARTER'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, SAID HE FAVORED DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN M. CHRISTOPHER FOR THE JOB, AND THAT CARTER, WHO BRZEZINSKI SAID LIKES CHRISTOPHER, IS RECEPTIVE TO THE IDEA.

VANCE HAS SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT SERVE IN A SECOND ADMINISTRATION, IF CARTER IS RE-ELECTED.

BRZEZINSKI HIMSELF HAS BEEN RUMORED AS A POSSIBLE CHOICE TO SUCCEED VANCE, BUT HE REAFFIRMED THAT HE WAS NOT INTERESTED.

TALKING WITH A GROUP OF REPORTERS AT LUNCH, THE WHITE HOUSE AIDE SAID "WHO THE HELL WANTS THAT JOB."

BRZEZINSKI COMPLAINED ABOUT THE SECRETARY'S DUTIES IN DEALING WITH THE GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY AND CONGRESS.

HE SAID HE PREFERRED TO REMAIN IN THE WHITE HOUSE -- HIS CORNER OFFICE IS ABOUT 100 FEET FROM CARTER'S OFFICE -- BECAUSE OF THE VARIETY OF THE WORK AND THE ACCESS TO THE PRESIDENT.

BRZEZINSKI ALSO SAID THAT CARTER, LIKE RICHARD M. NIXON AND JOHN F. KENNEDY, IS IN EFFECT HIS OWN SECRETARY OF STATE. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT REDUCES THE ROLE OF THE HEAD OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND BOOSTS THAT OF HIS FOREIGN POLICY ASSISTANT.

CHRISTOPHER IS A LOS ANGELES LAWYER WHO WORKED AS THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL IN LYNDON JOHNSON'S DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FROM JULY 1967 TO JANUARY 1969.

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS HAVE INDICATED THAT AT THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT HE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR DRAWING UP PLANS FOR WIDESPREAD SURVEILLANCE OF CITIZENS IN THE 1960S.

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(VENEZUELA)

CARACAS (UPI) - VENEZUELA, A FOUNDING OPEC MEMBER, WILL CONTINUE TO BE A SECURE SOURCE OF OIL FOR THE UNITED STATES, PRESIDENT LUIS HERRERA CAMPINS SAID YESTERDAY IN HIS STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE.

"THE REALITY IS THAT WE ARE THE MOST SECURE SOURCE OF OIL FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THAT COUNTRY IS AN IMMENSE SOURCE OF MANUFACTURING AND AGRICULTURE PRODUCTS FOR VENEZUELA," HERRERA TOLD CONGRESS.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES CONTINUED TO BE CORDIAL DURING HIS FIRST YEAR IN OFFICE AND WERE IMPROVED AFTER A VISIT LAST YEAR FROM VICE PRESIDENT WALTER MONDALE AND FIRST LADY ROSLYNN CARTER, HERRERA SAID.

VENEZUELA PRODUCED AN AVERAGE OF 2.35 MILLION BARRELS OF OIL PER DAY IN 1979 AND HAS PROVEN RESERVES OF 18 BILLION BARRELS. IT ALSO HAS ONE OF THE LARGEST RESERVOIRS OF UNTAPPED OIL IN THE FORM OF THE ORINOCO HEAVY OIL BELT, WITH PERHAPS AS MUCH AS 2 TO 3 TRILLION BARRELS OF THICK, TAR-LIKE OIL.

VENEZUELA AND THE UNITED STATES SIGNED AN AGREEMENT LAST WEEK TO SHARE TECHNOLOGY IN PROJECTS AIMED AT DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES AND RECOVERING HEAVY OIL.

THIS SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRY WILL BECOME A NET HEAVY OIL PRODUCER IN THE FUTURE, AND IT WILL USE ITS LIGHT AND MEDIUM CRUDE OILS AS A LEVER TO OPEN THE MARKET TO ITS HEAVY CRUDES, HERRERA SAID.

AT THE SAME TIME HERRERA STRESSED CORDIALITY WITH THE U.S., HE ALSO ADOPTED A "GET-TOUGH" POLICY THE MARKET FOR VENEZUELAN OIL.

"WE ARE NOT GOING TO ALLOW OUR OIL TO BE MANIPULATED TO DISTORT THE WORLD OIL MARKET," HE SAID, CONFIRMING HIS GOVERNMENT'S PLANS TO DEMAND CERTIFICATES OF DESTINATION TO GUARANTEE THAT VENEZUELAN OIL DOES NOT GO ON THE SPOT MARKET.

UPI 03-13 03:23 PES



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

March 13, 1980

MEMORANDUM TO THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN FARMER  
SUBJECT: STEEL TRIGGER PRICES

At tomorrow's Foreign Policy breakfast, steel trigger prices will be discussed. U.S. Steel is now threatening to file their lawsuits on Monday, March 17.

Attached are memoranda from Secretary Klutznick and Ambassador Askew which are being held. Bill Miller is doing a separate memo, and there may be another meeting with the President over the weekend.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SECRETARY PHILIP M. KLUTZNICK  
AMBASSADOR REUBIN O'D. ASKEW

SUBJECT: What to do with the TPM

You asked us to report to you on our consultations with Commissioner Davignon, whom Roy Jenkins sent over following his letter to you of last Friday. You also said that inflationary considerations would weigh heavily in your decision on the TPM.

In the discussions with Davignon, we emphasized, in particular, your strong feeling of responsibility for enforcement of the anti-dumping laws. He, in turn, stressed that he understood completely the need to correct dumping where it occurred. If he were given a period of time to assess the dumping margins contained in the U.S. Steel cases, he was willing to try to correct dumping where the margins and volume involved were large; he could not, of course, make any definitive comment absent a closer analysis of the cases.

Davignon stressed that keeping TPM in place for a time (90 days) would permit him to make the analysis necessary and take appropriate action. He would also be able to resist pressures (which he argued would spring from immediate suspension of the TPM) for counter measures against such U.S. exports as soy and textiles. He would be able to do this because he could point to the limited nature of the filings. If, on the other hand the TPM were suspended, it would result in U.S. Steel filing its other suits along with other companies, and would be perceived in Europe as a wholesale attack by the U.S. on European steel exports and the ability to resist such pressures and maintain a reasonable dialogue with the U.S. would be almost impossible. It would also damage our efforts to secure European cooperation in Iran and Afghanistan.

For the above reasons we believe that maintaining the TPM in order to give time to the Europeans to correct whatever dumping exists would be both consistent with your responsibilities under the law and avoid trade difficulties which



would harm the two largest sectors of American exports -- agriculture and high technology products. Because the filings cover only 15 percent of U.S. imports, holding the TPM would not be a violation of your commitment to suspend the TPM if large scale dumping cases against the EC and Japan were filed.

We further believe, and our analysis and discussions subsequent to our meeting with you confirm this, that retaining the TPM is likely to be less inflationary than dropping it. This conclusion is based on the following judgement:

- If we drop TPM, U.S. Steel may file its additional cases and other firms are likely to follow suit, so that as much as 70 percent (\$5 billion) of our imports will be covered by anti-dumping suits rather than only 15 percent (from Germany and France).
- We may get some price cutting and increase in imports when the TPM is suspended as foreign exporters try to get into the U.S. in anticipation of anti-dumping action. But starting in June and July, as more cases are filed, imports will begin to dry up. This will happen even before an injury determination by the ITC. This sequence of events will mean that less steel is likely to come to the American market than if the TPM were retained while the present two cases are being processed.
- The large scale filings, enormous uncertainty about the outcome and the consequent chilling of imports will mean less foreign competition in the domestic steel market. This, in turn, will allow steel producers to increase prices (which is why they are filing the cases in the first place). This is unlikely to discourage the union during the wage negotiations and may, in fact, have the opposite effect.

We very much appreciate Charlie Schultze's concern about a negotiated settlement being inflationary. We would therefore propose, in order to put this concern to rest, a negotiating scenario, the objective of which would be:

- To produce less inflation than would likely result from the anti-dumping process.
- To avoid restrictions that would impede needed adjustment in the U.S. and the EC.

During the coming weeks, assuming the TPM were retained, the U.S. Government would develop a prompt analysis of the dumping margins against individual products shipped by France and Germany together with a preliminary assessment of what would be necessary to correct the dumping in those product areas.

- The EC and the U.S. would engage in consultations which would focus on this analysis.
- The EC could, on the basis of its analysis, consider ways of correcting the dumping.

If this process were proceeding satisfactorily, the TPM would be retained. If other cases were filed, the TPM would be suspended. If the U.S. felt that the process were not proceeding satisfactorily, it would give the EC prior notice before any decision to suspend the TPM were made.

If we cannot persuade U.S. Steel to withdraw its two cases in the context of this kind of process, we would simply let the cases proceed along their legal course while using the threat of a suspension of TPM to deter others from filing cases and to persuade U.S. Steel not to file additional cases. If the additional cases are filed by U.S. Steel and other companies file significant cases, we would suspend TPM.

We strongly believe that retaining the TPM is likely to be less inflationary than removing the TPM with all that flows from that and is unquestionably in our trade and foreign policy interests.

March 12, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Publication of Steel Trigger Prices

I have given much thought to the discussions we have had with you on the steel issue. I continue to believe strongly that if maintaining TPM, at least temporarily, will limit the number of steel antidumping petitions filed, TPM should be maintained, at least on a tentative basis.

- o If antidumping petitions are filed against only two countries, the amount of trade impaired will be held to a minimum, there will be opportunity for substitution of steel from other foreign sources, and as a consequence the inflationary impact will be minimized. On the basis of our consultations with Commissioner Davignon (whom Roy Jenkins sent over, following his letter to you) Reubin Askew and I believe we can work out an approach with the Europeans which corrects whatever dumping is occurring in the U.S. market.

- o On the other hand, if the TPM is suspended and, as a result, the steel industry files sweeping complaints, the very strict nature of our antidumping laws will cause steel imports to dry up in a short time. This will have a direct and significant inflationary impact. It will put enormous strain on our political relations with Europe and our ability to manage an open international trading system. And, as Commissioner Davignon made clear during his visit this week, it is likely to open the way for protectionist measures in Europe which would reduce our \$3 billion in annual soybean exports to Europe and impair our healthy exports of textiles.

I recognize that the issues are complex and that your advisers do not unanimously agree with me on the implications of the course I advocate.— The complexity of the issues, the highly-charged nature of the present environment, and the need for measured action on your part combine to suggest that it is in our best interest to defer what may well be the single most important trade decision of your Presidency.



The action I propose to take in regard to trigger prices would defer the need for immediate decision on the future of the TPM in the event only two antidumping cases are filed.

Trigger prices for the second quarter of 1980 should have been released a month ago. The second quarter begins April 1. In announcing the TPM program, the Administration said it would give between 45-60 days advance notice of quarterly trigger prices. We delayed announcement because of the industry's threat to file antidumping petitions. But steel imports are now being impaired by the absence of any announcement of the trigger price that will apply to shipments coming in after April 1. Orders for Japanese steel have, for example, virtually halted.


I propose that I announce second quarter trigger prices -- to continue at first quarter levels -- before the end of the week. My announcement should precede any filing of dumping petitions. If petitions are then filed, we have 20 days under the law to determine whether they provide a sufficient basis for initiating investigations. Only upon such a determination are the petitions "accepted".

These 20 days could be used to our benefit. The economic, trade and political implications of any decision on TPM could be carefully assessed. This time would also provide us a better opportunity to consult not only with the Europeans but also with the Japanese before we radically change the rules of the game under which they have, at our request, been operating during the past two years.

The decision to defer would not, of course, commit us one way or the other on maintaining TPM. The final decision to suspend or maintain TPM, under this proposal, would then be made in light of a full analysis of the petitions and the implications of suspending/maintaining TPM. It could be made at the end of the 20 days or at any later time in the investigation, when we will know more about the seriousness of the cases and their impact on the market.

It is of the utmost importance to our foreign trade relations, and to the steel industries in the U.S. and abroad, that some action be taken by the end of this week. Unless you indicate some other course of action is more appropriate, I propose to act as suggested above. --This action would not change anything, and would leave all the options open for you to take such future action as you consider appropriate.

Mr. Askew concurs with the above comments and proposed course of action.

  
Secretary of Commerce

For April 11, 1980

Memo No. 829-80

April 10, 1980

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift *DC*

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast, Friday, April 11, 1980,  
7:30 a.m.

Olympics

With your trip to Colorado and the US Olympic Committee's vote in mind, Warren Christopher will be prepared to give an update on the positions of other nations regarding a boycott of the Moscow Olympics. You have seen the report from Ottawa stating that Trudeau can be expected to speak out against Canadian participation on April 18, and that this in turn reflects the Canadian view that a growing number of nations -- a figure of 75 was suggested -- will join the boycott once the FRG announces its decision not to go to Moscow.

Iran

The lukewarm allied reaction to our call for further action against Iran will be a key point of discussion at the breakfast. The President as you know is determined to put real pressure on the allies to be more supportive; they see this as counter-productive.

NATO Summit

In this regard, key allies have turned down the President's proposal for a NATO summit prior to the Venice economic summit in the third week of June. The President has indicated that he will want to devote a large portion of the summit to political issues, and I believe Prime Minister Trudeau has indicated his concurrence.

Vienna State Treaty

On April 9, the State Department announced that Secretary Vance would go to Vienna this May to join with the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom at ceremonies marking the 25th Anniversary of the Vienna State Treaty.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT  
REVIEW ON APRIL 10, 2000

DECLASSIFIED  
per 7/19/06 NSC 1hr  
NTE-06-070  
BY BDL NARA, DATE 8/25/06



Vance, I believe, will have just had a meeting with Dobrynin the day before this foreign policy breakfast. The issue of a Vance-Gromyko meeting in Vienna can be expected as part of that agenda. The President has earlier indicated that he did not want the United States to ask the Soviet Union for such a meeting, but that we would agree to such a meeting if the USSR were to propose it.

I believe it would be useful for Vance and Gromyko to meet. It seems to me that diplomats can devise a formula whereby no one has to ask for a meeting. It can simply be announced that by mutual agreement the foreign ministers of the four countries will have bilateral consultations as part of their Vienna program.

#### Sadat Visit

You may wish to mention the major pitch that Sadat made for U.S. assistance to Somalia. He was very direct on this stating that Somalia and Oman are the only countries in the region still supporting. You may wish to ask Christopher to comment on the current problems we face with Somalia, given Siad's use of force in Ethiopia.

#### Begin Visit

In the cable at Tab A Embassy Tel Aviv reports our Charge's April 9 call on Prime Minister Begin. The Charge concludes (page 3): "Begin was most courteous but quite firm. For me it was an instructive insight into his mindset as he prepares for his visit: meticulous attention to form, style and procedure as well as substance. It also highlights an important Begin tactical defense mechanism -- the argument for full consultation with his cabinet and detailed cabinet clearance for any concession which might be asked of him." This observation by the Charge was reinforced by Begin's appearance on Good Morning America, April 10, in which he underlined Israel's meticulous adherence to implementation of Camp David and the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, and in which he said words to the effect that "it is all laid out in Camp David, every step, and I will be bringing the document with me." This is as clear a signal as possible of how he plans to conduct his talks next week.

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NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 4/10/2000 (BROWN, WILLIAM A) DR-M

TAGS: PEPR, US, IS

SUBJECT: AUTONOMY TALKS -- CALL ON BEGIN

REF: A) STATE 93465, B) BROWN/KORN TELCON 4/9/80

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. I CALLED ON BEGIN AT 1720 LOCAL WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, JUST BEFORE HE RECEIVED CODEL MCHUGH AND JUST AFTER A LENGTHY CABINET SESSION ON THE UPCOMING WASHINGTON TALKS. WITH HIM WERE KADISHAI AND AVNER.

3. AS INSTRUCTED, I SOUGHT TO CONVEY TO HIM THE SINCERE DESIRE OF HIS U.S. AND EGYPTIAN PARTNERS TO ENSURE THAT THEY WERE CONTINUING TO WORK IN FULL HARMONY WITH HIM. IT WAS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT I WAS SEEKING HIS CLEARANCE OF THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH (PARA FOUR OF REFTEL) FROM THE DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT OF PRESIDENTS CARTER AND SADAT AND WHICH DEALS WITH INTENSIFIED AUTONOMY TALKS BEGINNING THE WEEK OF APRIL 27. IN THIS CONNECTION I ADDED THAT I HAD BEEN TOLD THAT AMBASSADOR LINOWITZ

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DECLASSIFIED

per 7/27/06 NSC H.  
NLJL-06-070  
BY: CTS NARA, DATE 8/25/06



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THOUGHT HE HAD AN UNDERSTANDING WITH MINISTER BURG ON THIS ISSUE.

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4. BEGIN'S IMMEDIATE REACTION WAS THAT THE PROPOSED FINAL SENTENCE WAS "UNNATURAL." IT GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT PRESIDENTS CARTER AND SADAT HAD CONSULTED WITH HIM ON THE TIMING AND PLACE OF FOLLOW-UP AUTONOMY TALKS WHICH, IN FACT, THEY HAD NOT. AVNER INTERJECTED TO SUGGEST TO BEGIN THAT MY PRESENTATION WAS IN FACT DESIGNED TO ACCOMPLISH THAT CONSULTATION. BEGIN REPEATED THAT THE SENTENCE STILL SOUNDED "UNNATURAL" TO HIM BUT HE WOULD QUICKLY CONSULT WITH BURG AND OTHERS AFTER OUR MEETING WITH CODEL MCHUGH.

5. AT 1900 LOCAL, ONCE THE CODEL HAD DEPARTED, BEGIN REPAIRED TO HIS OFFICE AND CALLED ME IN AT 1915. HE SAID THAT HAVING CONFERRED TELEPHONICALLY WITH BURG AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR HE WISHED ME TO CONVEY THE FOLLOWING:

--AT THE LENGTHY CABINET SESSION THAT DAY THE SUBJECT OF FOLLOW-UP TALKS BEGINNING THE WEEK OF APRIL 27 HAD NOT BEEN DEBATED BECAUSE IT HAD NOT BEEN BROUGHT UP.

--HE COULD NOT GIVE HIS AGREEMENT AT THIS TIME TO THE INCLUSION OF THE PROPOSED SENTENCE ON THE FOLLOW-UP TALKS BECAUSE HE DID NOT HAVE CABINET AUTHORITY TO DO SO. IF HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES READ THE NEXT DAY A COMMUNIQUE WITH SUCH A SENTENCE "THEIR MOUTHS WOULD DROP OPEN" BECAUSE A COMMITMENT HAD BEEN GIVEN WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT.

--HE WAS PREPARED TO RAISE THIS ISSUE IN THE NEXT CABINET

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SESSION SUNDAY, APRIL 13, AND TO CONVEY THE CABINET  
DECISION TO PRESIDENT CARTER ON HIS ARRIVAL IN WASHINGTON  
"MONDAY OR TUESDAY."

6. COMMENT: BEGIN WAS MOST COURTEOUS BUT QUITE FIRM.  
FOR ME IT WAS AN INSTRUCTIVE INSIGHT INTO HIS MINDSET  
AS HE PREPARES FOR HIS VISIT: METICULOUS ATTENTION TO  
FORM, STYLE AND PROCEDURE AS WELL AS SUBSTANCE. IT ALSO  
HIGHLIGHTS AN IMPORTANT BEGIN TACTICAL DEFENSE MECHANISM--  
THE ARGUMENT FOR FULL CONSULTATION WITH HIS CABINET AND  
DETAILED CABINET CLEARANCE FOR ANY CONCESSION WHICH  
MIGHT BE ASKED OF HIM. BROWN

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