

Foreign Policy Breakfasts/National Security

Foreign Policy Breakfasts, 1/80-6/80.

Folder 2

For April 18, 1980

April 17, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift *DC*

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast, Friday, April 18, 1980, 7:30 a.m.

Middle East

In addition to his moves on the Israeli political front, Ezer Weizman continues to grapple as Minister of Defense with the situation in southern Lebanon, and Israeli forces remain there. With this the case, pressure for Security Council action on Lebanon continues. Vance may well bring copies of the draft Security Council Resolution with him to the breakfast -- very sensitive to the need for a careful review of every provision.

US-USSR Meeting

The Administration is still grappling with the decision of whether Secretary Vance should or should not meet with Foreign Minister Gromyko during the Austrian State Treaty Anniversary meeting in mid May. My recommendation continues to be that the President approve a meeting, and that we avoid the question of who asked the meeting by simply having our Austrian hosts and other allies note that bilateral consultations are anticipated between each of the foreign ministers attending the Anniversary. (If we cannot meet with the Soviets in diplomatic channels, to me it indicates a certain bankruptcy. If we solve the "who requested the meeting" issue, Vance can deliver a good message to Gromyko behind closed doors, and he can then take a press line that best advances US interests following his meeting.) A telegram from the British (Tab A) reflects the current uncertainty over the bilateral schedule in Vienna.

Iran

Much as your strong message to the US Olympic Committee inspired a favorable vote last Saturday, so the President's continuing action against Iran should help to inspire action in fact by the allies. In my opinion the President's public line in the

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REVIEW ON APRIL 17, 2000

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per 7/27/06 NLS H
NLS-06-070
BY BAE NARA, DATE 7/25/06

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April 17 press conference was good. I think he should match this public line with personal contact and private communications with the allied leaders that politely keeps the pressure on, while at the same time emphasizes the spirit of cooperation and friendship in which these actions against Iran are being taken. There is a delicate balance here. The Europeans have the jitters, but they are starting to move.

Olympics

The US Olympic Committee's vote has resulted in progress on the boycott front. Vance and Cutler may wish to report on the latest international developments. There may be a message from Prime Minister Nordli responding to your message to him on the Olympics by the time of the breakfast. Lloyd Cutler may also wish to report on developments relating to alternative games.

Greek Reintegration

George Vest has done a good status report on Greek reintegration (Tab B). It is my understanding that Karamanlis has taken the decision to run for the Presidency, and that he is quite satisfied with Greek posture on the reintegration issue for the time being, with much less pressure on the US to produce results.

Politics in the People's Republic of China

Vice Premier Teng continues to shape the Chinese political scene along his preferred lines, with the announcement just having been made that his protege Vice Premier Zhao will take over the day-to-day Head of Government responsibilities in the PRC. Under Teng's scenario, he will gradually move up into a DeGaulle-like position where he can exercise power or not as he chooses. Hua will not be purged, just quietly eased further out of the limelight as these changes continue to take place.

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E.O. 120651 ROS-1 4/17/10 (STREATOR, EDWARD J.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, UK, UR, OVIP (VANCE, CYRUS)
SUBJECT: (S) BRITISH INQUIRY RE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH
GROMYKO IN VIENNA

(RE-ENTIRE TEXT) FCO EE/SOVIET DEPARTMENT HEAD WHO IS
BEGINNING PREPARATIONS FOR CARRINGTON'S PARTICIPATION IN
AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY ANNIVERSARY MEETING IN MID-MAY HAS
ASKED FOR AN AUTHORITATIVE INDICATION OF WHETHER IT IS
NOW INTENDED THAT THE SECRETARY MEET PRIVATELY WITH
GROMYKO IN VIENNA. AT ISSUE IS THE FCO'S RECOMMENDATION
TO CARRINGTON CONCERNING A UK-SOVIET BILATERAL WITH
GROMYKO. THE ASSUMPTION IS THAT FRANCOIS-PONCET WILL WANT
A PRIVATE MEETING WITH GROMYKO AS A FOLLOW-ON TO GROMYKO'S
PARIS VISIT LATER THIS MONTH, AND US PLANS WILL BE A MAJOR
CONSIDERATION IN DETERMINING CARRINGTON'S SCHEDULE.
BREWSTER
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BY BAE NARA, DATE 8/25/06

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/D
Dr. Bremer
FYI

16 APR 1980

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM

TO: Under Secretary Nimetz
FROM: EUR - George S. Vest *RG*
SUBJECT: Status Report on Greek Reintegration

While Greek reintegration has moved no closer to accomplishment since the March 20 Mini Policy Meeting you chaired, mercifully neither has it taken a turn for the worse. In fact we seem to be in a rare period of calm while the Greeks and General Rogers ponder their next moves.

NATO/SACEUR Efforts Continue:

After the White House meeting we asked Ambassador Bennett to advise SACEUR Rogers and SYG Luns that we were considering a new approach in the event the NATO military string played itself out. Bennett also sought Rogers' concurrence in an early US diplomatic approach to calm the Greeks and reassure them of our interest in their reintegration. Rogers asked us to hold our fire until he had talked to the Turks one more time. We did so.

On March 25 Rogers met with Deputy Turkish Chief of Staff Saltik and received an answer which caused Rogers to ask for more time to prepare a further approach to both the Greeks and Turks. We have just heard from Rogers that he plans to try some adjustments soon on the Turks which build on openings provided by their latest response. He then plans to make another run on the Greeks after his trip to Washington this week. In response to queries, especially those based on inaccurate press reports from Athens, the SHAPE staff is saying that Rogers has not made his final report to Luns; and that his

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discussions with the parties continue. As ever, SHAPE continues neither to confirm nor deny third party comments and not to respond to queries about the details of the SACEUR dialogue.

US/FRG views.

On instructions, Ambassador Bennett also briefed Luns and some key Allied PermReps about the small informal version of the open-ended group of the DPC, with some form of simultaneous participation by the Greeks and Turks, which we decided offered the best chance for keeping the process alive should SACEUR'S effort reach its end. There was wide understanding for this approach with the partial exception of the British PermRep--a congenital activist--who floated the idea of giving the problem to a high level political mediator. He then conducted consultations in London where he sparked an FCO policy review of Greek reintegration. The British then approached us in Washington to offer a low key unveiling of a range of ideas from "letting the problem stew", to full blown mediation. We explained the thinking behind our OEG idea. We then asked the German Embassy to come in for a briefing. We told our FRG Embassy contact in very general terms that the British had some ideas they would be trying out in Bonn. We also explained our OEG idea. In addition we made clear that nothing should be done hastily since Rogers still felt he has a chance, and we would not want to undercut his efforts. In the meantime we have learned that Rogers is not pleased with the UK permrep's actions and wishes his efforts could be put into neutral.

Greek Politics, diminishing threats, and Codel Biden:

The Greeks have had any number of opportunities recently to urge an active US role if that was their wish. The most recent occurred during the Easter recess visit of Codel Biden/Baker to both Greece and Turkey. In their meetings with high level Greek officials--including Karamanlis and Averoff--we were struck by the low key way in which the Greeks addressed Reintegration and US bases. There were no threats and no deadlines. It is our conclusion that Karamanlis feels he is now well positioned on this issue. It appears unlikely he will make or seek any initiatives until after he has taken care of the Presidential succession problem and digested its results.

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CONCLUSION/NEXT STEPS:

We still have some time, and we owe it to General Rogers to let him continue his "final" approaches to the two parties. During this period of relative calm, we should be in continuing touch with key allies as we prepare either to help support the Rogers effort or to move the issue into the OEG channel.

cc: NSC - Robert Blackwill
DOD/ISA - James V. Siena

Draft: EUR/RPM:RFHopper ^{RFH}

Clear: EUR/SE:EDillery ^{ED}
EUR/RPM:SJLedogar ^{SJ}
EUR:REwing ^{RE}

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For April 25, 1980

Memo No. 868-80

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

April 24, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift *DC*

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast, Friday, April 25, 1980,
7:30 a.m.

Tito Funeral

Tito continues his valiant struggle; however, his condition deteriorated markedly during the course of this week and the Yugoslavs consider the end very near. I have asked Vance's Executive Assistant, Peter Tarnoff, and Assistant Secretary George Vest to give thought to any possible additional stops you might make following the Belgrade services and the tentatively planned stop-over in London on the way. Vest has advised that State would not recommend Romania but that Portugal might be a candidate on the way out. Secretary Vance may wish to comment on this during the breakfast. I have had indications from State that Vance may feel at this point that he should not accompany you (as you know, he goes to Austria for ceremonies marking the Austrian Treaty in mid May).

Cuban Refugees

State and other agencies have been grappling with the move by the Cuban community in Florida to bring boat loads of Cuban refugees into the United States illegally. It would be useful to have a status report on this issue.*

Soviet Jewry -- Solidarity Sunday

As you know, there will be a major rally in New York City this Sunday sponsored by the Greater New York Conference on Soviet Jewry. In the first three years of the Administration, the President has sent a message and an Administration representative to these rallies. While it is my understanding that State is drafting a proposed message for this coming Sunday, I do not believe that this has been sorted out. You may wish to ask Vance for a status report. It would be a mistake if the

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President were not to send a message to this year's event, read by an Administration representative. A telephone call to Al Moses has confirmed that this has not yet been sorted out. Al concurs in my view that there should be a message read by an Administration representative.

Olympics Boycott

With the German, Canadian and Japanese announcements, the boycott movement has gained great strength. Following the IOC's meeting in Switzerland this week, Lord Killanin told reporters that he thought all NATO countries would vote to boycott. Cutler and Vance will probably wish to give an update and to report on the issue of alternative games. It would also be helpful to have an update on the status of the Puerto Rican Olympic Committee's moves. That committee, as you know, has voted to send athletes!

Iran

Since the last breakfast, the EC has voted to impose sanctions by May 17 "if by that time there has not been any decisive progress leading to the release of the hostages." On Thursday, Foreign Minister Gotzhabadeh boldly pronounced that a U.S. blockade would cause Iran, in turn, to block the shipment of all Middle East oil, not just Iranian. Also, during the week, the Soviets have postured themselves with an offer of overland routes for Iran should the U.S. impose a blockade, and Soviets have spread the word through diplomatic channels that they would not stand by with their hands folded if the U.S. were to impose the blockade -- that they would have to take equal action. I believe that you and other principal advisors to the President have been addressing Iranian options this week; this discussion should continue at the breakfast.

Lebanon Resolution

The wire stories reporting the U.S. abstention on the Lebanon resolution read quite well, and it is our understanding that the U.S. representative's statement was favorably received by Israeli diplomats. You may wish to note that you will be with Ezer Weitzman over the weekend and that you will press him to keep Haddad on a close leash.

Next Steps in Autonomy Talks

On Thursday afternoon, April 24, at the same time that you were meeting with the President, Zbig and the other Middle East

principals held a Situation Room meeting to review Sol Linowitz' instructions and our strategy and tactics in the Autonomy Talks and beyond. The papers for that meeting are in the accompanying briefing book. You should ask Secretary Vance and Zbig for a report on the meeting. (Papers at Tab B)

*Cuban Refugee Q and A

Given the volatility of the Cuban refugee issue, and misunderstanding about U.S. policy -- in part because of State's very terse legalistic Q's and A's, I have drafted the Q and A at Tab A for your reference in connection with the trip to Michigan Friday which puts what we are doing into a more positive context. I have shown this to Dick Moe, and Gail Harrison has a copy. You may wish to mention this at the breakfast.

NOTE: For your reference, I have attached State's Q's and A's behind my own.

CUBAN REFUGEES

Q: Mr. Vice President, when thousands of Cubans are crying out for help, why does your Administration threaten to arrest the decent people who are rescuing these Cubans by boat and bringing them to the United States -- I thought this was supposed to be the land of the free and the home of the brave?

A: President Jimmy Carter - I believe more than any President in the history of our nation -- has dedicated himself and has dedicated the United States to assisting refugees around the world -- and we are dedicated to assisting those who are seeking to flee Cuba today.

From the very moment that the thousands of Cubans took refuge in the Peruvian Embassy, we have been working with nations of Latin America. We immediately agreed to have 3,500 Cubans admitted to the United States. The governments of Peru and Costa Rica, working with international refugee organizations, have informed Cuba of their willingness to receive all who sought refuge in the Peruvian Embassy. This is a top priority humanitarian issue - just as the boat people of Indochina, the Cambodian refugees, the Afghan refugees and refugees elsewhere around the world are top priority issues for President Carter. We are committed, working with other nations, to providing refuge for those seeking to flee Cuba.

Q: You haven't answered my question, why is the Administration threatening to arrest boat owners who are bringing these refugees across?

A: We are dedicated to assisting these people, but, if we are to succeed, we must do so in a way that does not

violate US laws and the rights of US citizens. It is for this reason that we have strongly urged that the illegal transit of undocumented persons by private boats from Cuba be suspended. We are giving top priority to assisting the Cuban refugees. In this process, we cannot allow U.S. laws and U.S. policies to be broken.

We are a nation that takes pride in our humanitarian values and in our ability to get any job done and done right, but we must do so in a way that respects our laws.

DRAFT STATEMENT

Small craft from Florida are currently proceeding to Cuba to bring to this country a portion of those Cubans who have sought refuge from the present Cuban system in the Peruvian Embassy.

Those boat owners and captains who are taking people out of Cuba and trying to land them in the U.S. are playing into the hands of the Cuban authorities. The Cuban government does not permit free emigration from Cuba and arbitrarily determines who may leave the country through issuance of exit permits. It has, furthermore, not held to its earlier agreement to permit those who were in the Peruvian Embassy to proceed to any country willing to receive them.

While we are deeply sympathetic with those in this country who want to expedite the departure from Cuba of those who are seeking freedom from Castro's regime, we cannot condone this procedure.

The transportation of undocumented persons to this country is contrary to U.S. law and policy. It is a felony to bring into the United States any alien not duly admitted by an immigration officer and is punishable by penalties of up to five years in prison, fines of \$2,000 and the forfeiture of the vessel.

The Governments of Peru and Costa Rica, working with international refugee organizations, have made clear to the Cuban government their willingness to receive all the persons who sought refuge in the Peruvian Embassy. The United States has agreed to take 3,500 as part of this international effort.

We strongly desire to resolve the question of the Cubans in the Peruvian Embassy in a manner thoroughly consistent with the humanitarian needs and in accordance with U.S. law.

We strongly urge that the illegal transit of undocumented persons by boat from Cuba be suspended and that the Government of Cuba permit the resumption of flights to Costa Rica or other countries immediately.

April 23, 1980

CUBA

Q Are you going to prosecute those who bring and have already brought refugees into the U.S.?

A We intend to apply the law in these cases. Section 1324 of Title 8 United States Code makes it a crime to bring undocumented aliens into the U.S. The law provides for up to 5 years and a \$2,000 fine for each alien brought in and forfeiture of the vessel used.

Q Why did it take so long to decide to prosecute?

A We studied this complex legal matter thoroughly before reaching the decision.

Q Wasn't the delay really caused by domestic political considerations?

A I have already mentioned the factors which affected this decision.

Q Are you going to seize the other vessels as they arrive?

A We will enforce the law.

Q What are you going to do if the Cuban Government does not reinstate the airlift?

A At this point, we hope the airlift will be reinstituted and are continuing to prepare to process refugees in San Jose is part of the international effort for their resettlement.

Q Have the refugees who have already arrived directly from Cuba been allowed to enter the US?

A Those who have entered have been conditionally admitted into the country subject to inspection.

Q Is the USG planning to send airplanes directly to Havana?

A There are no plans to begin flights from the US to Havana. Our effort is directed to preparing for the reinstitution of the Havana-San Jose airlift.

Q We understand some of the boat crews may be charging up to \$5,000 per refugee to bring them to the U.S. Do you have a comment?

A We deplore those who seek to profit from the plight of the refugees.

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Middle East Negotiations Policy Group

Meeting April 25 - The Situation Room

Agenda

1. Our Strategy for May 26 and Beyond
(Discussion Paper at Tab A)
2. Positions the U.S. Might Recommend
to Resolve the Negotiating Issues
(Tab B)
3. (if time) Actions We Might Consider
to Influence the Palestinians Outside
of the Autonomy Negotiations
(Discussion Paper at Tab C)

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per 7/27/06 NSC 14r.
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OUR STRATEGY FOR MAY 26 AND BEYOND

Discussion Paper

As we move through this period of intensive negotiations toward May 26, it will become increasingly clear how much or how little we are going to achieve in a Heads of Agreement. Thus, we will be able to estimate more precisely what kinds of options will be realistically open to us as of May 26--but we will also have to decide and to act in a very brief period in order to pursue a preferred option.

This paper, therefore, is intended to begin the necessary process of examining the various options that may be available and consider their merits and liabilities. Our object, in any case, is to maximize the extent of agreement and exploit whatever degree of success we achieve to validate and move forward the Camp David process through the device of a Heads of Agreement. Thus, we need to look at the objective we set for ourselves in terms not only of the document produced, but also on the manner in which events unfold on the ground on the basis of that document during the period following May 26.

As we enter this final phase there are several questions about strategy for U.S. policymakers that are best addressed sequentially.

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-- Given a realistic appraisal of Palestinian attitudes and what we know about Israeli positions on the key negotiating issues, how likely is it that we can obtain an agreement by May 26 that would lead directly to elections and establishment of the SGA?

-- In spite of what may be long odds that we can achieve this, should we adhere to this objective, or would it be preferable for us to lower our sights to an outcome in May that might require less far-reaching results yet still constitute a significant step in the negotiations?

-- What do we judge to be the minimum required in an agreement to give us a reasonable chance of achieving the latter objective?

-- If we find as the negotiations proceed that the likely outcome falls below even this minimum, should we press ahead to get an agreement in any event by the target date (assuming Sadat can be persuaded), or are we better off extending the negotiations or, alternatively, suspending them on the theory that it is better to have no agreement than one that is certain to be rejected by the Palestinians and Arabs?

-- How well would the U.S. be positioned under the various options to exploit success or to minimize the cost should success remain elusive?

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Although the merits and the prospects of these alternatives will become clearer in the weeks ahead, an initial assessment is possible and desirable now.

A. Prospects for an Agreement that would directly Produce an SGA.

Our preferred strategy aims at a Heads of Agreement substantial enough to induce the Palestinians to hold elections for an SGA, and to continue thereafter more detailed negotiations on issues not covered in the Heads of Agreement. At least three of the problems that must be solved to achieve that goal are quite clear:

-- Either Begin must agree to voting rights for the residents of East Jerusalem or the Palestinians must withdraw their insistence on that principle. Neither seems likely by May 26.

-- Even should the Israelis be more forthcoming on this and other critical issues than is now in prospect, we would be presenting the Palestinians with a document prepared by Israel, Egypt, and the U.S., with many important problems still unresolved. They would be required to take a critically decisive step on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. It is hard to see where support for this decision would come from in the present politics of the West Bank and Gaza.

-- For the Palestinians, the prospect of negotiating

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the remaining important range of issues in the Continuing Committee is, itself, a formidable one. Having made a fateful commitment to the SGA, their leverage with the Israelis in the further negotiations would be very limited while their need to establish their legitimacy with their constituents would be great. While they might hope for some sympathy and support from Egypt and the U.S., they would know that the U.S. at least could not support fully many of their claims.

These and related problems make it clear that the obstacles to the actual election of an SGA through a Heads of Agreement are great and the prospects of success not high. This is not, however, sufficient reason to give up our fullest effort to achieve by May 26 the best Heads of Agreement possible. We can and should continue to do so.

Even if it does not succeed in gaining Palestinian participation in elections for the SGA, Israeli-Egyptian agreement on such a document would help, at least in the short run, to solidify the relationship between the two nations. President Sadat could argue that, having discharged his obligation to the Palestinians, there is no obstacle to continuing the process of normalization mandated by the bilateral treaty. We, the Israelis and the Egyptians could point to the Israeli concessions in the Heads of Agreement as putting on the Palestinians the onus

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for blocking further progress, and intemperate Palestinian denunciations of the agreement might help buttress our claim.

While this is one course a Heads of Agreement would permit, it may not be the best one. At least for the short run, it would make more difficult further efforts to get the Palestinians to reconsider and to take part in the SGA. Faced with a Palestinian rejection, we would have little leverage in the rest of the Arab world to seek their helpful influence on the Palestinians. Casting the agreement as a final and agreed position with no further prospect for compromise on the essential issues might further rigidify Palestinian and Arab hostility to the Camp David process.

More serious, to say on May 26 that our work is finished and the next step must be formation of the SGA would, in the absence of Palestinian agreement, leave us with no good fallback position for keeping the process alive and keeping control of the situation. The incentive to the Europeans and the Arabs to take matters in their own hands would be great. We could move very quickly from the problem of enlisting Palestinian participation in the Camp David process to the problem of a Palestinian rights resolution in New York. Perhaps the greatest disability of directly

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seeking an SGA is the extent to which failure forecloses other options and jeopardizes the whole process.

B. An Alternative Use of the Heads of Agreement with the Palestinians.

Even if, therefore, it becomes clear in the next several weeks that a fairly attractive Heads of Agreement is possible, it will be far from clear that it can achieve our optimal objective--elections and an SGA. We will need to consider, well before May 26, whether an alternative use of the Heads of Agreement is not more promising and less risky: using the evidence of progress embodied in the agreement to seek Palestinian participation in further negotiations, with the SGA decision deferred to a later stage. This is in essence the approach described by Boutros Ghali during the Sadat visit.

By asking of the Palestinians a commitment which is less difficult and is not irrevocable, we would be putting on the Heads of Agreement a less heavy and perhaps more realistic burden. We would be asking only that they participate in the further, detailed negotiations seen as essential prerequisites to establishment of the SGA, understanding that those matters not essential would be deferred until after installation of the SGA.

This would still require by May 26 substantial Israeli concessions--sufficient to persuade the Palestinians of a decision which, though less momentous than

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agreement to proceed directly with elections, would still be a very major and difficult one. This course may, nevertheless, have advantages that will make it increasingly attractive as we approach May 26.

-- This would, obviously, be a more limited and thus less difficult commitment for the Palestinians to make. It would leave them, in the event the negotiations were unsuccessful, much more of an escape hatch than would an SGA commitment. Thus, they could feel that their leverage in negotiation was greater than it would be in the former case. Their position would be, similarly, more defensible with the other Arabs.

-- Since we would be asking less, our own ability to persuade the Palestinians, and to ask other Arabs to support us with the Palestinians, would be relatively greater.

-- Even for the Israelis, this course might have attractions that would make them more flexible, both in the current negotiations and the subsequent negotiations with the Palestinians. An inherent difficulty of the present process is that, absent the Palestinians, the Israelis can reasonably feel that they are, as they have often said, put in a difficult position. Whatever bargains they may strike with us and the Egyptians will only become the starting point, once the Palestinians are involved, for further demands. The better the prospect and the sooner the date of Palestinian involvement, therefore, the easier it will

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be for the Israelis to feel that they are truly negotiating the bottom line and that whatever concessions they make are definitive.

There is no way of knowing for certain what the critical difference is between a document that might suffice as an invitation to Palestinians to join the negotiations as opposed to one aimed at the more ambitious objective of directly launching the SGA. It may simply be that the more modest goal is the most we can realistically aim for with even the best agreement now possible. And the Palestinians may still prove inflexible in their refusal to negotiate while under military occupation. Still, the potential advantages of this course are such as to make this option worth looking at closely.

--Since we would be deferring elections, we might also be able to defer for a while the question of Jerusalem voting rights.

-- In the event of Palestinian rejection, we would still not have so far foreclosed other options and continuing activity as we would with a make-or-break call to form the SGA. We could, with some plausibility, pursue further with the Palestinians and the other Arabs the issue of their joining negotiations; we could

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even lend continuing trilateral discussions of this problem some validity.

-- At worst, we would be seen as shifting the process into neutral pending further Palestinian consideration, rather than just killing the engine. The resulting pause would be relatively open-ended and would leave us with some capacity to control the timing of future moves.

-- A document pitched toward this more modest goal would, even in the absence of Palestinian acceptance, give us more leverage in trying to forestall European initiatives.

-- With a reasonably adequate document, the onus for delaying further progress would fall at least as much on the Palestinians as on the Israelis.

C. What Issues Need to be Resolved by May?

Even if we think in terms of the more modest objective suggested in (B) above, we will need to try to form some idea in our own minds of the body of agreement that will be minimally required to bring the Palestinians on board. We are looking for a document that, at minimum, the Israelis would endorse and the Palestinians perceive as making the Camp David process at least preferable to the status quo.

For the Israelis, an agreement must:

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-- preclude a successful unilateral declaration of independence by the SGA;

-- retain Israeli control of security for Israel and Israeli settlements, without dependence on Palestinian personnel;

-- protect Israel's claim on Jerusalem;

-- avoid prejudicing a future Israeli claim to sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza.

For the Palestinians, as they have consistently maintained since Camp David, any autonomy regime will be judged by its treatment of three issues: land, water, and Jerusalem.

On land, probably the most important of these issues, the bottom line for Palestinians--and other Arabs--will be a cessation of the establishment of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. This need not take the form of an overt Israeli commitment to a settlements freeze, which may be impossible to get. It would probably be sufficient to place public land under a body on which both Israel and the SGA are represented--such as the Continuing Committee--and to require unanimity in its decisions. This would have the effect of freezing new uses of land unless unanimously agreed upon and the added virtue of being seen as a

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"reasonable" solution by observers outside the region. We would need to work out some understanding that would give the SGA scope for the use of public land for normal economic and developmental purposes without having these decisions held up by an Israeli "veto."

Water. Israel is using a substantial portion of the available water and since 1967 has permitted little or no expansion in Arab usage. The Palestinians will want to redress this situation. We will need to create a body, perhaps an arm of the Continuing Committee at the outset, which will permit the SGA to make some changes in water allocation while guaranteeing a sufficient flow to existing Israeli settlements. A solution for sharing based on the technical facts--water resources common to Israel and the West Bank (and to Jordan)--should be seen as reasonable by outside observers and, provided it does not prejudice their eventual control of their "own" water and their fair share of jointly used resources, by the Palestinians themselves. The sine qua non for Palestinians can probably best be stated in negative terms--there will have to be an end to Israeli unilateral controls which have enabled Israel consistently to give priority to its own needs over West Bank/Gazan needs.

East Jerusalem, as we know, presents special problems. We judge the minimal requirement to be (a) some way of

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enabling the East Jerusalem Arabs to participate in the elections for the SGA (unless a way can be found to avoid elections altogether) and (b) an agreement that does not eliminate in Palestinian eyes the potential for in some sense "recovering" East Jerusalem as part of a final territorial settlement.

The foregoing are the three key issues for the Palestinians. On the host of other issues involved in autonomy, particularly where some coordination with Israel is a practical necessity, they will judge the quality of the agreement by the degree to which they will be able to deal with Israelis on an equal and equitable footing, no longer governed in daily life by Israeli decisions. But if the minimal requirements on the three key issues can be met, we believe there will be scope for considerable flexibility in this area.

D. Fallback Options

Realistically, we must recognize that it may not be possible to get by May 26 a Heads of Agreement that offers any practical basis for attempting to hold elections and establish an SGA; or, even, sufficient hopes of drawing in the Palestinians to warrant pursuing that course. Two obvious options present themselves as fallbacks.

First, there is an argument to be made for taking whatever agreement we can get from the Israelis, however

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inadequate (assuming Sadat would go along) and making the best of it. Even an agreement clearly unacceptable to the Palestinians might seem to Sadat enough to justify in Egypt and internationally an assertion that he has discharged his obligation to the Palestinians and that Arab rejection of it is unreasonable, thus permitting him to withdraw from the process and concentrate on Egyptian concerns. This would obviously leave us with large problems but might be worth the high risks of unpredictable Arab reactions and awkward peace initiatives from European or other quarters, in order to win time while the Palestinians digest and ponder their predicament and we muster the best damage-limiting strategy possible.

This is a high risk course and a powerful argument can be made that it is not in American interest, even if Sadat were amenable. A second and perhaps less risky course, to avoid this, would be simply to extend the negotiations, perhaps with a temporary suspension to permit all the parties to reassess their situation--putting the best face we can on the failure to achieve a significant May 26 agreement. Obviously, there would be a letdown and further damage to the standing of the Camp David process. Extension will be awkward for Sadat; suspension might be resented by the Israelis as a form of pressure. Given our other problems, however, it might be better than a more ambitious

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effort that, by failing, seemed to signal the end of the enterprise.

To the extent that we can make extension look credible, it is of some help, however modest, in trying to dampen Arab temptation for pressures or reprisals against the U.S.; and in trying to forestall a European initiative. Indeed, a suspension for several months might be sobering to all the parties in bringing them to realize how limited their alternatives to the Camp David process are. For all its inadequacies, some such course may, by May 26, commend itself simply because the alternatives are worse.

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