

Foreign Policy Breakfasts/National Security

Foreign Policy Breakfasts, 7/80-1/81.

Folder 2

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 21, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: AL MOSES *al*
SUBJECT: Friday Morning Breakfast

file

If you have an opportunity at the breakfast, I suggest you raise with the President the overall need for a strategy to deal with the Jewish vote for this November, in order to sensitize the President to think this through to the end.

The issue of most immediate concern is the oil agreement, where the two sides are at the moment very far apart. This has the risk of Israel's charging us with bad faith unless we move forward with constructive discussions with the Israelis. There is, however, still disagreement between State and the Department of Energy on the terms and conditions to be recommended to the President. This will need to be resolved promptly. See attached TAB A for draft memo to the President.

Some other ideas you might want to raise with the President at some point, though perhaps not at the breakfast, would be:

(a) lifting the ban on Naval training exercises with Israel. Exercises were set last spring and then deferred largely at the suggestion of Don McHenry who felt they would be made public and would embarrass us in the Arab world;

(b) a visit to Israel by General Jones, who will be visiting Saudi Arabia in September;

(c) a further demonstration of our capacity to get aircraft (fighters and transports) to Israel in short order. We are presently doing this with the Egyptians. A similar exercise in Israel would be a positive move.

(I will, of course, have further ideas for you later in my longer memorandum, but I wanted you to have these now.)

With regard to the problem with the Muskie statement related to the Islamic countries, I believe the most effective way to handle it would be to seek to belittle the point -- which

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BY *CS* NARA, DATE *8/15/06*

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was also raised today by Foreign Minister Shamir with Sam Lewis. It should be pointed out simply that, of course, Muskie was referring only to those specific countries directly involved in a comprehensive peace. The phrase "Islamic states ... their legitimate goals" was a shorthand reference that the Israelis are making much to do about.

Attachment

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stringent invocation criteria, we believe we can safely drop the concurrence clause altogether. Its presence implies a lack of confidence in Israel's good faith and sets a bad tone for this and other negotiations. (If this is not possible, we suggest that the concurrence clause be restated as a negative presumption instead of the present positive one; such a clause might read: "The agreement will be activated unless the U.S. determines that for unforeseeable reasons these criteria are not valid at the time as they effect Israel's ability to assure itself of a reliable supply of oil.")

Having these as negotiating positions would allow us to show the Israelis that we remain committed to their supply of oil in a real emergency while at the same time protect our own interests. We believe we should adopt these changes and then meet with the Israelis to explore them. We cannot go back to the negotiating table with the same set of proposals we had in Jerusalem in early summer without opening our side to the charge of moving away from our prior commitment.

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

Memo No. 558-80

 ~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
(WITH TOP SECRET/
CODEWORD ATTACHMENT)

August 21, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: John Matheny/Ralph Crosby

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast, Friday, August 22,
1980, 7:30 a.m.Middle East

Robert Hunter and Al Moses are sending you under separate cover the status on our situation with Israel. Their initial official reaction (Foreign Minister Shamir to Sam Lewis) is included in this evening's intelligence cables. The gist is that "if you have so many good arguments against the resolution, why didn't you veto it?"

Iran

We doubt this subject will arise. There will be an SCC chaired by Zbig after the breakfast to discuss what steps we might take to raise the decision threshold for the Soviets should they be tempted to threaten Iran. Attached at Tab A are the key intelligence community judgments as to where we stand at present.

Mugabe Visit

With the visit of Robert Mugabe impending (in New York from August 24-26 and in Washington from the 26th to the 27th), it is likely that the issue of our level of aid to Zimbabwe may be brought up. State is preparing a paper for the President, but in Secretary Muskie's absence the final position has not yet coalesced. Should the issue come to the fore, however, increased aid is an item which you would support. For 1980 we are providing \$5 million for repatriation

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(WITH TOP SECRET/
CODEWORD ATTACHMENT)
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REVIEW ON AUGUST 21, 2000

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per 8/3/06 NSC/Hr
BY CO NARA, DATE 8/15/06

of refugees and another \$20 million for the Emergency Security Fund. The request for ESF for next year is \$25-30 million. A substantial increase would do much to demonstrate our good faith, as well as our support for the moderation which Mugabe has demonstrated over the first months of his regime.

China

China continues to present opportunities of both a political and diplomatic nature. After the statements made this week by Mr. Reagan, the potential return from a major event in mid-September in consonance with the first meeting of the US-PRC Joint Economic Committee are increasingly significant. Should this subject be broached, it may be an appropriate time for you to suggest the importance of this opportunity to the President. Denis' previous memorandum on this subject is at Tab B for your reference.

(2)

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

Memo No. 948-80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 15, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift *PC*

SUBJECT: U.S.-PRC Relations -- Major Milestone

You and the President should be aware that the United States has the opportunity to attain an important new milestone with the People's Republic of China at the time of the first meeting of the U.S.-PRC Joint Economic Committee in mid-September.

At that time we have the opportunity, if both sides buckle down to work now, to sign:

- a Maritime Agreement
- an OPIC Agreement
- a Consular Treaty, and
- a Civil Aviation Agreement.

The Chinese delegation will be lead by the PRC's new economic "Czar" Vice Premier Bo Yibo. Given past practice, if you are in Washington, the Vice Premier will hope to pay a courtesy call on you.

In my opinion, and I have asked State to follow up with the NSC, this progress should be recognized in a signing ceremony with both you and the President in attendance.

As you know, George Bush visits the PRC later this month. He will probably be briefed on the upcoming visit of Vice Premier Bo Yibo at that time.

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per 8/3/06 NSC 1/5
BY *CS* NARA, DATE *8/15/06*

Brzezinski, Aug. 26, 1980

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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September 2, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: The Carter Transformation
of our Strategic Doctrine

The President asked me to share the enclosed memorandum with you, especially since there is likely to be some public discussion of our current strategic doctrine. In the last three and one-half years, the President has taken a series of steps that add up to a major revision of our strategic doctrine, the third such major revision since World War II. The Administration should obtain more public credit for this than it has so far. (S)



Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attachment [Aug. 26, 1980]

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Review September 2, 1986

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ALLIC-2006-069
per 8/3/06 NSC 1/r
BY 51 NARA, DATE 8/15/06

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~
OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 26, 1980

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT:

The Carter Transformation of Our
Strategic Doctrine

I want to summarize for you the fundamental change occurring in U.S. strategic doctrine over the last three years. You may or may not want to take public credit for it, but you should have a clear view in your own mind of its historic significance. That is being obscured and confused in the public fuss over PD-59, the last of a series of related directives you have signed. (C)

The Requirement for Change

There have been two previous transformations in our strategic doctrine. The first, "massive retaliation," occurred in the 1950s under President Eisenhower. It was designed to deter the Soviets by our large lead in nuclear weapons and strategic bombers. The second, "assured destruction," was sponsored in the 1960s by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson as they watched Soviet forces grow and the U.S. lead shrink. Secretary McNamara designed the concept primarily as a budgetary instrument to decide "how much was enough?" in strategic forces. The doctrinal notion was added by others. They, however, believed the Soviets would stop their buildup at near our force levels. When they did not and when they introduced new qualitative capabilities, the doctrine lost much of its relevance. To revise our doctrine then became a critical although unpopular task in face of the continuing Soviet buildup through the 1970s. You have accomplished this through a number of directives which put much more emphasis on objective capabilities to reinforce the subjective and psychological aspects of deterrence. (C)

What Has Been Done

Based upon reviews and recommendations from the agencies, in response to conceptualization and coordination by the NSC, you have directed (a) that we maintain "essential equivalence" in general purpose and strategic force levels (PD-18); that strategic defense is part of the overall military balance (PD-41); that national objectives be met for telecommunications to support all levels of conflict (PD-53); that mobilization planning guidance be developed for all agencies, DOD being only one of them (PD-57); that a conceptually new approach be

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Review on August 26, 1986

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BY CS NARA, DATE 8/15/06

applied to "continuity of government" and maintenance of the National Command Authority under nuclear attack (PD-58); that a significant step be taken in the evolutionary process of our targeting policy (PD-59). An elaboration of each of these is important to give you a more textured appreciation of the overall policy changes. (C)

PD-18, signed in August 1977, put stress on reversing the conventional force balance adverse trends in Europe, acquiring a U.S. rapid deployment force, and maintaining strategic force "essential equivalence" in face of the continuing Soviet buildup. It directed a number of follow-on efforts, because, as PRM-10 showed, the implications of "parity" with the USSR were complex and needed several additional U.S. responses. (C)

PD-41, on civil defense policy, signed in September 1978, revived the view that defensive capabilities are part of the strategic balance, even if only a small part. The idea of "defense" was abandoned in the 1960s after serious attention to it by both President Eisenhower and, for a time, President Kennedy. Studies by CIA corroborated the Soviet open literature about Soviet civil defense capabilities, and a dispersed Soviet population, even partially dispersed, might make a difference of tens of millions of initial survivors. Changes in our targeting could not reduce the difference significantly. (C)

PD-53, national security telecommunications policy, was signed in November 1979. It set forth, for the first time, national C³I objectives which Defense, as the executive agent of the National Communications System (set up by Kennedy after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 when he found agencies with separate and non-interoperable communications systems, a paralyzing condition for his control), has the responsibility to implement, not only in its C³I programs but also with guidance to common carriers on interoperability and survivability for crisis and war. PD-53 changed fundamentally the objective of telecommunications heretofore: sufficient to communicate an execution message for a retaliatory strike but nothing more for endurance, flexibility, and a prolonged conflict. (U)

PD-57, mobilization planning guidance, signed in March 1980, tasked the first work on mobilization guidance at the national level since the 1950s. Treated as less than a serious issue, even in the Defense Department until lately, mobilization responsibilities in other agencies, although critical for wartime, had long been a joke. As the Soviet buildup cancelled our superiority, the joke became a dangerous one, undercutting our credibility in the eyes of careful foreign observers. Little concrete result has been achieved to date, but the level of serious interest is surprisingly high after PD-57's emergence. A parallel achievement in manpower mobilization has been the draft registration law. It is a major step. (C)

PD-58, Continuity of Government/C³I, signed this June, initiates a wholly new conceptual approach to making the National Command Authority and the Presidency for civil government survivable under conditions of

repeated nuclear attack. The existing system built in the 1950s, was judged vulnerable already by 1962 in a report to President Kennedy. President Nixon received a similar report in 1970 but failed to act on it. Neither report offered a solution to the problem of hardsite vulnerability. Until the new system is built and tested, it is doubtful that the U.S. could ride out a well-conceived Soviet attack on our national C³I, carry through to a third or fourth ranking successor if need be, and retaliate in a coordinated manner. Even if we were lucky enough to do that, the staff support for the Presidency to mobilize, control the forces, and govern the civil sector is lacking. PD-58 requires the development of precisely that support. (S)

PD-59, the nuclear weapons employment policy directive, completes the series. It is, to some extent, an addition to NSDM-242, the first effort at "limited" nuclear options taken in 1974 by Nixon and Schlesinger. I want to spell out for you in some detail the differences between the two directives, however, because there are claims already being made that PD-59 is nothing new, just a rehash of NSDM-242. (C)

NSDM-242 kept the old theoretical baggage, trying to make a limited "retaliatory" or even a first-use strike more credible as the SIOP became less credible. Could the U.S. public sit calmly through such LNOs, having not even civil defense protection? NSDM-242 was a misconceived document. It merely exaggerated the flaws of the SIOP. PD-59 is fundamentally different, while not designed to be a "war fighting" doctrine, it takes into account Soviet employment doctrine because, with the Soviet acquisition of such large and accurate forces, that doctrine cannot be ignored if deterrence is to be maintained. To fail to make this change would be to risk drifting into a situation where our doctrine and capabilities could, in a crisis, deter ourselves more than the Soviets. (C)

In summary, you have taken a series of steps that add up to a major revision of our strategic doctrine, the third one since World War II. The previous two, like this one, have been driven by Soviet force development. This is the first phase of the task. The second, the programmatic phase, will be a major task of your second-term defense policy. (C)

For Sept. 12, 1980

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT


WASHINGTON

Memo No. 576-80

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

September 11, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast, Friday, September 12, 1980

NSC Meeting

One hour after the breakfast, there will be a formal meeting of the National Security Council to review recommendations flowing from a series of SCC meetings on US regional security policy in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. Zbig has taken personal charge of the papers being prepared for the President and you for this meeting and has undertaken to get your paper to you by Thursday afternoon, September 11.

Within this general subject area, there is one issue that has the potential to become a campaign problem if not handled properly. State is not happy with the current assurances we have received from Somalia on Somalia's conduct vis-a-vis her neighbors as we enter into the facilities access agreement and increased US economic and military assistance. We will have to report on these assurances next month when we seek Congressional approval for our assistance to Somalia. If we cannot offer the Congress a clean and clear statement of the assurances we have received, I see the potential for mischief on the Hill and a fresh charge of incompetence in the Administration's foreign policy. You may wish to ask Ed Muskie to comment on this.

Middle East/US-Israeli Relations

You have received a report on the proposed timetable for the Autonomy Talks (Tab A). This breakfast provides an important opportunity for a review of US diplomatic strategy and tactics in the coming weeks with Israel and Egypt and, more importantly, a review of the public line that the Administration will take, and how that public line will be coordinated.

Foreign Minister Shamir will be here on the 17th and 18th (Egyptian Minister Ali is also here). The 18th is the

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REVIEW ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2010

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per 8/3/06 NSC ltr
BY CS NARA, DATE 8/15/06

anniversary of the Camp David signing. (Muskie will see Shamir; nothing has been arranged with the President -- this could be useful, though he would also need to see Ali, as well.)

US-Israeli Strategic Relationship

Coupled with our Camp David/Autonomy Talks diplomatic and public strategy will be the steps that we take publicly with Israel in the coming weeks to underline the US-Israeli strategic relationship. I recommend that you raise this during the breakfast to see if agreement can be reached on some of these steps.

1. Under Secretary of Defense Komer will be in Israel October 1; General Jones will be in Israel October 5, after his visits to Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Egypt.

- These visits could usefully continue the strategic dialogue;
- Jones could visit the Negev bases;
- Jones could hold a press backgrounder.

? 2. The attack carrier USS JOHN F. KENNEDY is scheduled for a visit to Israel October 15-20. Sam Lewis recommends -- and this has merit -- that it stand off Tel Aviv, welcome aboard senior GOI leaders, and stage an air show for the local populace.


3. We could send USAF planes on a "training mission," some time in October. This is the most difficult of the three ideas.

- It could be either F-4s or F-15s. The former would be easier for the Air Force to do (less associated equipment); the latter would be more impressive;
- It would cost quite a bit, however, and would be difficult to put on in short order;
- Its military merit would lie in either a) combat exercises, i.e., U.S. vs Israeli -- though comparisons might not be helpful; or b) low-level attack training -- e.g., in the Sinai, which has a political down-side with the Egyptians, even though Israel still controls the part that would be used. (This might be done in the Negev.)
- To justify this exercise, one idea would be to use this as a demonstration of Sixth Fleet air coverage.

That would reduce charges about a possible Gulf contingency; at the same time it would be less appealing to the Israelis. In setting up such a training exercise (especially with F-15s), the Israelis might press for Red Sea exercises, which would be out of bounds politically.

- The aircraft "training mission" would be open to charges of politics, especially since great effort would be required to do it before November (the F-4 exercise in Egypt took more than three months to set up).

4. A variant could be a joint Sixth Fleet-IAF exercise. This gets into the problem of joint exercises, however, on which there is already a ruling. Ditto for any naval joint exercises.



PLO/International Financial Institutions

You may wish to ask Secretary Muskie for a status report on the PLO's efforts to gain observer status in the international financial institutions.

Boeing Sales to Iraq

✓ You may wish to comment on your discussions with Boeing representatives last week, and their statement that their bargaining room will run out at the end of September with the Iraqis. What sort of assurances can be given to Boeing, and to the Iraqis, while we review the case?

Administration Addresses at the United Nations

✓ You are scheduled to give an address at the ceremonies honoring Ralph Bunche at the United Nations on September 15.

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September 9, 1980

Status of Middle East Autonomy Talks (U)

During his visit last week to the Middle East, Sol got agreement that the autonomy talks would resume (at an unspecified date), and that discussions would move forward on the holding of a summit. Thus this gave Begin what he wanted (restart of the talks despite the Cohen Bill and other so-called "obstacles"); and Sadat what he wanted (acceptance in principle of his face-saving idea of a summit). Although the President conditioned the summit in his B'nai B'rith speech ("if necessary"), that qualification has been lost in the noise. (S)

Since the Linowitz trip, both sides have been attempting to narrow the agreement. The Israelis are insisting on some sort of trilateral meeting in the near future (which we are attempting to provide through a "housekeeping" meeting of the so-called Steering Committee); while Sadat's team -- which after the fact stoutly opposed Sadat's acceptance of the deal -- is characterizing the "resumed talks" as simply summit preparation. We can expect more of this nibbling in the next few weeks -- though it is currently unlikely that this will in itself cause the deal to come unstuck. (S)

Our proposed schedule of events is laid out in the attached cable (with a summit notionally assumed but not stated to be in December some time). We will see whether it is acceptable to the Egyptians; Burg is in agreement, at least in outline. (C)

Two other factors will have an important bearing on keeping the scenario on track: whether the Egyptians are genuinely willing to show some progress on "normalization" -- especially in the commercial and Egyptian-tourists-to-Israel categories -- which is the issue of greatest concern in the Israeli body politic; and whether the Israelis hold off on creation of further "obstacles" -- e.g. the move of Begin's office to East Jerusalem; annexation of the Golan Heights by the Knesset in October; and (possibly) settlements activity in Gaza (since the "only four more settlements" agreement technically applies only to the West Bank, and Israeli attention is turning to Gaza). On normalization, Sadat gave Sol his pledge that there would be forward movement, and is directing his people to act -- though they will again nibble at it. Begin did not give Sol any pledges on the two issues raised -- East Jerusalem and Golan -- but did surround them with enough verbiage to indicate that he understands their sensitivity. On the East Jerusalem move, there is opposition from some Israeli Cabinet members, but -- like the Cohen Bill -- they would probably cave if Begin pushed it. On the Golan Bill, Begin's own attitude will carry a lot of weight and will

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Classified and Extended By: Z. Brzezinski
Review September 9, 2010
Reason for Extension: NSC 1 12 (a) (1) (c)

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per 8/3/06 NSC LR
BY: CS NARA, DATE 8/15/06

probably turn on his judgment of the domestic politics vs. his stake in the peace process. While there is more of a spontaneous constituency in Israel on Golan annexation than there was on reasserting Jerusalem's status, at least Golan will not be a "motherhood" issue once the Knesset is faced with it, as happened with the Cohen Bill. (The Gwertzman article in the Times on Tuesday, implying that the fix is in on both issues, could start to unravel these partial "understandings," however, since Begin is at pains to assert that he made no deals). (S)

Demonstrating how expectations change, the Linowitz mission was considered a "success" simply because of the talks/summit package. There has been virtually no narrowing of differences on the key issues (and in fact they were hardly discussed): security, land, settlements, water, size/character/"source of authority" for the Self-Governing Authority; and the role of East Jerusalem Arabs in voting/setting-up of the SGA. (S)

Sol has now put in play a U.S. document -- originally called "heads of agreement," but now renamed "memorandum of understanding." In an earlier short-form (which got essential Israeli agreement, but was not worked through with Egypt), it was basically a restatement of the language in the Camp David Accords dealing with autonomy, but set up in a way that made it an agenda for future work. In the current draft, the MOU also includes a list of the powers for which the SGA will be "responsible" -- which in itself would give the MOU some newsworthiness. It also has U.S. language on principles for dealing with land, water, dispute resolution, and limitations on the SGA (e.g. no military forces, no declaration of sovereignty). (S)

Sol will try to get this buttoned up by the October 15-16 hoped-for restart of the talks, but that is most unlikely. (If it could be done early on, it would look like a real accomplishment; achieved later -- and if it has to be severely watered down -- it might not look like much. It is most likely that the MOU will be held over for the summit and -- if it were adopted in its full expanded form -- could have a good deal of credibility). There is nothing else on the horizon in the next several weeks -- other than the proposed consultations/meetings -- that has any positive newsworthiness. (S)

Our tabling of this document is important in part for the shift of the focus to U.S. proposals with Israeli and Egyptian blessing -- a useful step, but one that will only set the talks on the road to real success when we get to an actual negotiating text. The MOU cannot serve that purpose. (S)

The course now is to: a) slowly start up the talks; b) try to keep the outside factors from disrupting the process; c) plan for a summit; and d) try to position the process to get some real work done before the "election season" in Israel gets into high gear. In Israel last week, this season was already in the air. Although Begin's mandate does not expire until November 1981, the betting (and hence the

political positioning) is on May -- even Begin referred to this date. Thus there is likely to be a very narrow "window" -- if at all -- between a post-election summit and a close-down of Israeli politics for the elections. The one bright spot is some Likud concern, expressed most eloquently by Sharon, that autonomy be completed before the Israeli elections, lest Labor win and try a partition approach, which would put in jeopardy both the possibility of retaining all of the West Bank and the maintenance of all the settlements. (S)

Of course, during the next few weeks we will again face issues with the Israelis in our bilateral relations; and one factor that could tilt the balance in favor of steps like East Jerusalem and Golan is Begin's telling Sol that his standing in the polls has gone up -- i.e. that his tactics have been working for him domestically. (S)

Attachment

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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S/SN:ESWALKER
9/9/80 X25324
S/SN:AMB:SMLINOWITZ

NEA:MSTERNER

S/S-0

CLEARANCES

CLEARANCES

IMMEDIATE CAIRO, TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

NODIS
FOR ATHERTON AND LEONARD FROM LINOWITZ

E.O. 11652: GDS 9/9/86 {WALKER, EDWARD S} S/SN

TAGS: PEPR, EG, IS

SUBJECT: SCENARIO FOR THE COMING MONTH

DECLASSIFIED

MLJC-2066-069

per 8/2/06 NISC/Hr
BY 61 NARA, DATE 8/15/06

1. {S - ENTIRE TEXT}

2. I CALLED BURG THIS MORNING TO CLARIFY OUR THINKING ABOUT THE RESUMPTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE WEEK OF OCT 13 AND EVENTS LEADING UP TO THAT DATE. I GAVE HIM THE FOLLOWING TENTATIVE SCHEDULE WHICH HE APPEARED TO WELCOME.

3. PROPOSED SCHEDULE:

SEPT 9-10	SHAMIR-GHALI MEETING TO DISCUSS NORMALIZATION
SEPT 14-16	DISCUSSIONS WITH GHALI IN NEW YORK ON MOU AND PALESTINIANS
SEPT 17-18	DISCUSSIONS WITH KUBERSKY/LAPIDOT IN WASHINGTON ON MOU
SEPT 15	POSSIBLE MEETING BETWEEN SHAMIR AND ALI IN WASHINGTON
WEEK-SEPT 22	ONE DAY HOUSEKEEPING MEETING OF STEERING GROUP {KUBERSKY, ABDUL LATIF AND LEONARD} IN

~~SECRET~~

CAIRO TO DISCUSS PLANS FOR WASHINGTON MEETING

SEPT. 24-28

U.S. MOU TEAM IN CAIRO AND JERUSALEM FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS

OCT 6-7

MEETING OF STEERING GROUP TO FINALIZE PLANS FOR WASHINGTON MEETING

WEEK-OCT 13

FORMAL RESUMPTION IN WASHINGTON

4. YOU BOTH SHOULD CONVEY THIS SCHEDULE TO BUTROS AND SEEK HIS APPROVAL. YOU CAN PLAY DOWN THE STEERING GROUP MEETINGS AS NONSUBSTANTIVE HOUSEKEEPING SESSIONS WHICH ARE NECESSARY TO PREPARE FOR THE WASHINGTON PLENARY AND ARE BEING PROPOSED AT U.S., NOT ISRAELI INITIATIVE. THESE SESSIONS ARE STRICTLY PREPARATORY AND DO NOT IMPLY RESUMPTION. (AS YOU ARE AWARE IT IS IMPORTANT TO GET SOMETHING MOVING IN A TRILATERAL CONTEXT IN VIEW OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS THAT MEETINGS WOULD BE HELD IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS.)

5. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO PROPOSE A BRACKETED MOU AFTER THE TALKS IN NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON SEPT 14-18 AND NARROW THE DIFFERENCES IN THE FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS IN JERUSALEM AND CAIRO SEPT 24-28. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS BOTH SIDES TO THINK IN TERMS OF ISSUING THE MOU AT THE OCT 15-16 RESUMPTION MEETING ALTHOUGH WE ANTICIPATE THAT THIS WILL PROBABLY BE HELD FOR SUMMIT CONSIDERATION AND ANNOUNCEMENT.

6. ON THE SUBJECT OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, SETTLEMENTS AND JERUSALEM WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROPER ADDRESS IN ISRAEL IS SHAMIR AND THAT WE SHOULD TAKE THIS UP WITH SHAMIR NEXT WHEN HE ARRIVES IN THE U.S. YOUR THOUGHTS AS WELL AS SAM'S ON THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL. 44

For Sept. 26, 1980

*Bob Byrd*OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON*687-47*
Green Hunter
MOA

Memo No. 1204-80

~~SECRET~~

September 25, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift *DC*

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast, Friday, September 26, 1980

Iran-Iraq. I would anticipate that the breakfast will open with a status report on the fighting, on the UN Security Council's efforts to promote a cease fire, and on our consultations with allies.

(If Warren Christopher is representing State, you may wish to thank him for having made Peter Constable available to brief you in Boston.)

Muskie-Gromyko Talks. The State representative should have a fairly detailed report on the Muskie-Gromyko talks, a subject which you may wish to pursue based on the report during your luncheon with the President (Tab A).

Middle East

- Language on Threats to Israel's Membership in UN. Earlier this week you asked Al Moses to recommend language to you, for your speech purposes, addressing challenges to Israel's membership in the UN and the US response.
- A Hunter/Moses draft (Tab B) was sent to State for comment. I have been advised that either Secretary Muskie or Warren Christopher indicated that they did not wish to clear the statement but, rather, that they wished to take it up at the breakfast. In the meantime, Israel has weathered the membership threat at UNESCO, and the heat seems a little less at the UN. You may wish to raise this with Muskie or Christopher before the breakfast formally begins, if you do not wish to have State introduce it as a formal item on the President's foreign policy breakfast agenda.
- US-Israeli Oil Negotiations. At my request, Henry Owen has provided you with a copy of his report to the President (Tab C) on the most recent round of US-Israeli oil talks

~~SECRET~~CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT
REVIEW ON SEPTEMBER 25, 2000

DECLASSIFIED

NLTC-2006-069
per 8/3/06 NSC/LR
BY *65* NARA, DATE *8/15/06*

which concluded in Jerusalem on Tuesday, September 23. As there are still outstanding issues, and as the Israeli delegation, with Begin's guidance, is taking a tough negotiating stance, this will require careful policy level attention.

- It is my understanding that the President continues to take a firm line against major concessions to Israel. These talks will require careful attention in the coming weeks. You may wish to ask Secretary Muskie or Christopher to touch on the current status of the talks -- and, separately, you may wish to call Charles Duncan for his views.
- General Jones' Visit. It is my understanding that General Jones arrives in Israel on October 4 or 5. Apparently, the Israelis have suggested that he travel to the Sinai to observe a live fire demonstration. This would have far less impact in terms of what we are doing strategically with the Israelis than a visit by Jones to one of the new bases in the Negev. You may wish to ask Harold Brown to comment on Jones' itinerary.

Tarapur

- State should have a report on India's reaction to approval of fuel for the Tarapur reactor.

Intelligence Oversight Legislation

- By the time of the breakfast, the House may have joined the Senate in approving oversight legislation -- Zbig should have an up-to-date status report.

Greece/Turkey/Cyprus

- You should ask State's representative for a report on the September 16 Intercommunal Talks, and a report on Rogers' efforts vis-a-vis Greek reintegration. Rogers earlier estimated he would have the talks wrapped up by now, it is important to keep him aware of our intense interest in success.

UI

-MUSKIE-SOVIETS,

URGENT

BY BARRY SCHWEID

UNITED NATIONS (AP) -- SECRETARY OF STATE EDMUND S. MUSKIE AND SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI A. GROMYKO REACHED AGREEMENT TODAY TO OPEN SUPERPOWER NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CUTBACK IN NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE, MUSKIE SAID.

BUT IT WAS NOT IMMEDIATELY CLEAR WHETHER MUSKIE GOT FROM GROMYKO ANY ASSURANCES THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD TRY TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO END THE SPREADING WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ.

U.S. OFFICIALS DISCLOSED, MEANWHILE, THAT THE UNITED STATES AND SOME HALF-DOZEN ALLIED GOVERNMENTS ARE HOLDING INFORMAL TALKS HERE ON SETTING UP A NAVAL TASK FORCE TO PROTECT WESTERN OIL SHIPMENTS FROM THE PERSIAN GULF REGION.

THESE OFFICIALS, WHO ASKED NOT TO BE IDENTIFIED, SAID THE OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO KEEP OIL FLOWING FROM SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND OTHER OIL COUNTRIES NOW THAT SHIPMENTS FROM IRAN AND IRAQ HAVE BEEN HALTED.

THE FORMATION OF A TASK FORCE IS A CONTINGENCY MEASURE, THEY SAID, WITH CARTER ADMINISTRATION POLICY STILL DIRECTED PRIMARILY AT SUPPORTING U.N. PEACEMAKING EFFORTS AS THE BEST HOPE FOR AN END TO THE FIGHTING.

THE NEW ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS ARE EXPECTED TO OPEN IN MID-OCTOBER IN GENEVA. MUSKIE SAID THERE WOULD BE AN ANNOUNCEMENT ON THAT SUBJECT LATER.

ON THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT, WHICH COULD IMPERIL WESTERN OIL SUPPLIES, MUSKIE TOLD REPORTERS "I THINK IT'S DIFFICULT TO FIND ANY BASIS AN IMMEDIATE RESOLVE."

MUSKIE CALLED HIS MEETING WITH GROMYKO, WHICH RAN A LITTLE MORE THAN THREE HOURS, "A VERY FRANK EXCHANGE," IN DIPLOMATIC PARLANCE, THAT KIND OF STATEMENT CAN INDICATE SOME SERIOUS DISAGREEMENT.

ASKED WHETHER HE HAD GAINED SOVIET COOPERATION, MUSKIE SAID "WE'LL HAVE TO WAIT AND SEE WHAT DEVELOPS."

HE SAID THE SOVIETS AND THE UNITED STATES "ARE BOTH APPARENTLY IN A NEUTRAL POSITION," BUT ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIETS, WHO HAVE A TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP WITH IRAQ, WERE COOPERATING TO END THE WAR, MUSKIE REPLIED: "I DON'T THINK IT'S USEFUL TO SPECULATE ON THAT."

GROMYKO, MEANWHILE, SAID NOTHING TO REPORTERS WHO WAITED IN A DRIZZLE AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE SOVIET MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS.
AP-WX-0925 1506EDT

9/24/80

In recent months, there have been repeated efforts to damage Israel in international institutions. Now there is a possibility that Israel's membership in the UN itself will be challenged. The United States is firmly and completely opposed to any such effort, should it be mounted. It would be a challenge not just to Israel, but to the whole United Nations system ~~itself~~. We shall take whatever action is required to oppose such a venture.

A similar effort to deny Israel its rightful place in UNESCO was attempted yesterday at the Belgrade conference. I am pleased to say that that effort did not succeed; and this was a direct result of action taken by the United States and like-minded nations. The result was in the best interest of UNESCO itself.

We are hard at work with other nations to forestall any similar effort at the UN General Assembly. We believe our *present* efforts will succeed in preserving Israel's rightful place in the UN family of nations. *But* ~~No~~ one should underestimate our resolve in this regard.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

September 24, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY OWEN *HO*

SUBJECT: Israel Oil Negotiations (S)

1. Attached (Tab A) is our delegation's summary report on the main negotiating session in Jerusalem yesterday on conditions for activating the oil supply agreement. Little progress appears to have been made. (S)
2. At the close of this round of talks today, a joint statement was issued by the two teams, saying the discussions had been useful and had made some progress, that both delegations were concerned over the fact that agreement had not yet been reached, and that the discussions will continue in Washington. (U)
3. In a separate report, the DOE representative stated that the Israeli hit us "very very hard;" they wanted rapid agreement, in view of the Iranian-Iraqi war; they were being "very difficult;" they were applying great pressure, and this pressure originated "at the highest level." (S)
4. Charles Duncan tells me that the Vice President indicated, a few days ago, some concern to him about the US position. (S)
5. When our team gets back Thursday, we will review our position, which might be softened somewhat without significantly increasing the chances of triggering the agreement. We will submit options to you before Israeli Energy Minister Modai comes here on October 7. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Review on
September 24, 1986

DECLASSIFIED
NHIC-2006-069
per 8/3/06 NSC/HF
BY *CS* NARA, DATE *8/15/06*

~~SECRET~~

SUMMARY REPORT
OF
US-ISRAEL OIL NEGOTIATIONS
SEPTEMBER 23, 1980
JERUSALEM

Modai began by stating the discussions would not be meaningful if any agreement reached would be subject to the concurrence of governments. Hinton responded that it could be taken as a working hypothesis that if all other differences could be resolved a way could be found to deal with the concurrence issue. Modai then proposed a complicated change in the criteria for activation so that the percentage of spot purchases and the price paid would depend on the period of time involved, e.g., Israel would be expected to buy 60 percent of its oil needs on the spot market for 15 days or 40 percent for 30 days (Modai first suggested as an "example" only, 60 percent for 30 days or 40 percent for 90 days); Israel would have to pay an average price for the most expensive 20 percent, 40 percent and 75 percent of its imports which is greater than the average price of the top 30 percent of US imports for 90 days, 60 days, and 30 days respectively. The US side said that it would consider Modai's proposals but criticized their complexity, the brief time periods involved, the lack of supporting data, and the low threshold provided by the figures shown. The Israelis claimed but could not demonstrate that this formula would not result in activation in a soft market like the present. They undertook to provide relevant data. Modai requested again that the price and spot criteria be delinked; Hinton replied that this was not possible. In response to US views that MOA was a supply rather than a price guarantee and that recent supply situations did not warrant activation, Modai asserted that a US official in July 1979 had asked Israel not to activate, thus, in Modai's opinion, implying that the conditions for activation did exist. The US side made clear that this implication was not reflected in any US record of that conversation. The remainder of the session was devoted to developing an agreed text of a working paper.

~~SECRET~~

Review on
September 24, 1986



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