

For Oct. 23, 1980

MEMORANDUM

*No Bond Rules*  
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

Memo No. 1237-80

WASHINGTON

*1978*  
~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

October 23, 1980

*No Summary*  
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift *DC*

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast, Friday, October 24, 1980, 7:30 a.m.

Message to Kosygin

*Multiple Rejection*  
*Rach*  
Working with State I have prepared a message for your approval to Aleksey Kosygin. I will ask John Matheny to check this with you following the breakfast, and with your approval I will have the message (Tab A) on its way. You may wish to mention this at the breakfast.

Meeting with Muskie and Christopher on Israel/UN Language

On Thursday afternoon I met first with Warren Christopher and then with Christopher, Secretary Muskie, Lake and Tarnoff to discuss the language at Tab B.

Muskie is eager to give a strong speech or portion of a speech on Carter's positive record with Israel. As anticipated, he balked at the precise language of the last sentence, noting that it would be very hard to live with that language if Israel moves fast to annex the Golan Heights.

Christopher and I both impressed upon him the fact that you are looking for language that takes us a step further in our commitment. Secretary Muskie doesn't like the present, last-sentence formulation. However, he is willing to consider new formulations. He has tasked Lake with getting some language to him.

On speech timing, he will be speaking mid day in Maine on October 28 and then in New York City that same evening (coinciding with the Presidential debate). He is thinking of giving a speech on the President's leadership in foreign policy in Maine, into which he would work a strong pro-Israel section, and he would repeat this language -- sensitive to the need to get it to papers and the electronic media given the overwhelming competition to be expected from the debate -- in his New York address.

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CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT  
REVIEW ON OCTOBER 23, 2000

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*Mont Self*  
*NLS-2006-069*  
*per 8/13/06 NLS/r*  
BY *CS* NARA, DATE *8/15/06*

At present the last sentence of the statement at Tab B reads as follows: And if the United Nations is again misused and abused on Arab-Israeli issues, with fundamentally flawed and unbalanced resolutions, we will oppose them and, in the Security Council, veto them.

At the breakfast, you may wish to suggest the following.  
ALTERNATE FORMULATION FOR THE LAST SENTENCE: "Make no mistake about it, we shall oppose with all means at our disposal unbalanced resolutions that are harmful to the Arab-Israeli peace process."

(NOTE: The above coordinated with Al Moses.)

Saudi Arabia F-15s

The press language worked out between Secretary Brown and Al Moses is at Tab C.

Message to Begin on Golan Heights

A proposed telegram from the President to Begin, drafted by State and revised by Hunter and myself, is at Tab D. This will be discussed at the breakfast, with the view to obtaining the President's approval.

\* \* \* \* \*

U.S. Hostages in Iran

I recommend that you and the other breakfast participants take the time to discuss the basic public line to be taken on the hostage issue over the next few days.

I would note that you are scheduled to meet with a sister of one of the hostages in Tampa, Florida shortly after the breakfast. A copy of your paper for your meeting in Florida is at Tab E.

MESSAGE TO HIS EXCELLENCY ALEKSEY N. KOSYGIN

Dear Mr. Kosygin:

Joan and I remember with pleasure our meetings with you and regret that your health has caused you to resign your office. You made important contributions to efforts to improve understanding between our two countries and I hope you will continue to do so in the future.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Walter F. Mondale

I appeared before the UN Security Council on August 20 to seek to put an end to efforts by some to misuse and abuse the UN Security Council on Arab-Israeli issues. Prior to my appearance there had been a succession of resolutions before the Council and the Emergency Session of the General Assembly that neither aided the Camp David process nor offered a single alternative with the slightest chance of success. In my view, those resolutions failed the critical test of reason, of balance, of accounting for the concerns of both sides and of genuinely serving the objective of peace.

As I stated on August 20, and repeat again today, our government is absolutely and firmly committed to the success of the process begun at Camp David and its ultimate goal of a just and lasting peace throughout the region. Our view is that resolutions in various bodies of the United Nations, harmful to the <sup>Arab-</sup>Israeli peace process, must stop.

The statement I made on August 20 remains the bedrock of our policy in the region. I repeat now what I said then and what the Administration has said elsewhere: we will veto any resolution that would impose Chapter VII sanctions against Israel; we will veto any effort to change Resolution 242; we will oppose and, in the Security Council, veto any effort to deny Israel its rightful place in the United Nations. And if the United Nations is again misused and abused on Arab-Israeli issues, with fundamentally flawed and unbalanced resolutions, we will oppose them and, in the Security Council, veto them.

With respect to the October 22 article in the New York Times by Richard Halloran on additional equipment for the F-15's to be delivered to Saud Arabia, this is not a matter pending decision within the U.S. Government. The first of these aircraft is to be delivered to Saudi Arabia beginning in 1982.

The examination referred to in the article is a technical one, whose purpose is to develop material for use in future policy determinations. It will contain no recommendations.

Whenever we consider military equipment sales in the Middle East, especially systems with an offensive capability, we first look very carefully on the effect that such sales would have on the military balance in the region, particularly as that balance affects the security of Israel. Only after we are satisfied on this score, do we consider sales of equipment in the area. The same procedure will be followed in this case.

As Secretary Muskie stated in his July 16 letter to Senate Majority Leader Byrd, the Administration has not departed from the assurances given to the Congress by Secretary Brown in 1978, and no decisions to sell such equipment will be made without full prior consultations with the Congress.

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N O D I S

DRAFT CABLE TO EMBASSY TEL AVIV

1. Please pass the following oral message from the President to Prime Minister Begin. Begin text:

I understand that the Cabinet has been asked by the Likud Parliamentary Executive to express its views on the two bills recently introduced in the Knesset calling for the annexation of the Golan Heights. I want to share with you my own personal sense of what is at stake in this proposed legislation.

You and I have worked together for the past three years to bring to pass something which the world has never seen before: a real and genuine peace between Israel and all of its neighbors. Because of your leadership, along with that of President Sadat, we achieved the first real breakthrough -- peace between Israel and Egypt -- and are now hard at work to complete the Camp David process. We achieved this despite opposition from many quarters, and I know that you share my desire to continue our work together until it is done.

However, passage by the Knesset of legislation to annex the Golan Heights would make far more difficult our efforts to complete the Camp David process. It would undermine the principles of Resolutions 242 and 338, at the very time that we are asserting that these resolutions alone are the basis for peace. And it would give aid and comfort to those who oppose our efforts to build a secure and lasting peace.

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DECLASSIFIED  
NLSJC-2006-069  
per 8/3/06 NLSJC/HF  
BY 251 NARA, DATE 8/15/06

I know that I can count on you to act in this matter in a way that will best promote the interests of Israel, and that will preserve the chances for advancing our historic search for peace.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

October 23, 1980

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift

SUBJECT: Meeting with Anna Beth Voigts, Sister of  
Iranian Hostage Cathryn L. Coob

Ms. Voigts has asked to meet with you during your visit to Tampa on October 24, and we are arranging for her to come aboard Air Force II for a conversation over coffee. She has indicated that she simply wishes to discuss the hostage situation, given the fact that her sister is one of the Americans being held in Teheran. Before being taken hostage, Cathryn Coob was an International Communication Agency (ICA) employee with Embassy Teheran directing the English Language Program at America House.

Local news organizations in Tampa are aware of Ms. Voigts' request for a meeting with you, and the meeting takes place against the background of banner headlines playing the President against Governor Reagan against Rajai on the hostage issue.

Your purpose in this meeting with Ms. Voigts will be to underline the fact that the government is doing everything we possibly can to obtain the safe release of her sister and the other Americans, that we have the Iranian statements of this week, but that we cannot be unduly optimistic -- at the same time we do everything we can to obtain the release of her sister.

## TALKING POINTS

- The United States Government has done everything possible to obtain the release of your sister Cathryn Coob and the other hostages since they were first taken almost a year ago on November 4, 1979.
- We deeply regret the fact that our efforts thus far have not been successful.
- We sympathize deeply with the hostages and their families.
- We are hopeful that the Iranian authorities will soon agree to negotiate with us for the early release of all of the hostages.

- The Iranian Parliament has announced that it will consider the hostage issue in its meeting on Sunday.
- We hope that this marks a step which will bring this unfortunate episode to a conclusion.
- We must, however, keep from becoming unduly optimistic as to the timing of the release as we have been disappointed on previous occasions when we thought the Iranians were moving to release the hostages.

If Ms. Voigts asks why the President is publicizing the hostages during the campaign, imperiling their safety, I recommend that you reply as follows (bearing in mind that the Tampa media will be interviewing her after your meeting).

- The President, Secretary Muskie and I are being asked a number of questions by Americans across the United States on the hostages, and we are explaining our position to the American audiences in response to these questions.
- Any negotiations that take place will be through diplomatic channels.
- We are sparing no effort to obtain the release of your sister and the other hostages.

\* \* \* \* \*

By way of background, Khomeini's four conditions are:

- Return of the late Shah's wealth;
- Unfreezing of the more than \$8 billion of Iranian assets in U.S. banks;
- A U.S. pledge not to interfere in Iranian affairs;
- A U.S. apology for past actions.

For Dec. 5, 1980

## OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

Memo No. 1266-80

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

December 4, 1980

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast, Friday, December 5, 1980

Iran

Warren Christopher has already debriefed on his latest mission, and you have seen his reporting cable from Algiers. By the breakfast, he will probably have an update.

Poland

The President and Secretary Muskie have been in touch with our principal European allies on the need for contingency planning, taking into account the formidable Soviet buildup against Poland both in the USSR and East Germany. Our most detailed formulation of such contingency planning to date is in the message of instructions to Ambassador Bennett in Brussels for his consultations with the NATO permanent group (Tab A). In my opinion, this is an excellent opportunity for forceful and at the same time finely tuned allied diplomatic efforts. We have to ensure that Thatcher, Schmidt, Giscard d'Estaing, Forlani and other major foreign leaders including Suzuki forcefully impress upon the Soviets the fact that normal relations cannot continue if the Soviets invade. I also believe that the Soviets are more impressed if this word comes directly from high level emissaries and directly through head of government to head of government classified channels -- I believe public utterances become lost in the static of overall noise globally.

Our diplomatic efforts should be brought to a purposeful point of decision and action when Secretary Muskie meets with the NATO Big Four in the middle of next week on the fringe of the NATO Ministerial meeting.

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REVIEW ON DECEMBER 4, 2000

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NLJC-2006-069  
per 8/3/06 NSC/HR  
BY CS NARA, DATE 8/15/06

Middle East

F-15s - It is my understanding that the Saudis in the person of Prince Sultan have indicated that Saudi Arabia is favorably impressed with the offer contained in Harold Brown's recent letter on F-15 enhancement items. I have not seen that letter. However, I understand we have offered the improved Sidewinder missile, the conformal fuel pods and the possibility of AWACS in the future. If the above is correct, I believe the breakfast participants must address the question of Congressional consultations.

Syria-Jordan - As you know from your discussion with Warren Christopher at State on Monday, State is concerned over an inclination on the Department of Defense to provide Jordan with the AWACS. This proposal disturbs me on two counts: 1) I do not see the same AWACS role requirement in Jordan that exists in Saudi Arabia, and to send the AWACS would indicate a further "ganging up" against Iran at a time when we are trying to free the hostages; and 2) I am troubled by the idea of turning over such sensitive weapons systems to countries where we cannot guarantee against compromise. Either Defense or State may raise this during the breakfast.

Israel - USS LIBERTY Claim - Following his conversation with you, David Newsom has spoken to Ambassador Evron and provided you with a memorandum of that conversation (Tab B). In sum, David believes we may be nearing a resolution of this issue without the need to submit any provocative government-to-government notes, with Eppi having proposed a \$5 million settlement as compared to our \$7.6 million claim if we waive interest. I believe at the breakfast State will be seeking authorization to pursue a compromise with the Israelis between these two figures.

Italy - Earthquake Assistance Delegation

You have seen the latest from Dick Gardner agreeing to the notion of a technical delegation in the near future to be headed by Jenò Paulucci. By the time of the breakfast, the \$50 million assistance legislation may have arrived at the White House for the President's signature. I believe we should seek agreement on having the White House and State move ahead with plans for a trip next week to Italy by the delegation, following signature of the assistance bill by the President.

\* \* \* \* \*

Public Administration Utterances

You are aware of the bitter feelings at State over the New York Times and Washington Post interviews (Tab C) with Zbig Brzezinski last Sunday, and the initial, if gentle, "return-shot" interview given by Cy Vance in the middle of the week. State understands that Zbig will be speaking in Montreal Friday evening, and is wondering if it can expect more of the same in terms of criticism of Administration policy. I believe State is prepared to sharpen its replies. I must say I find all of this quite unbelievable. I think the President ought to put his foot down in a statesman-like way during the breakfast telling all concerned that he wants no more of this sniping and carping. The Administration is starting to sound like the losing side of a third grade softball team. If you agree, you may wish to discuss this with the President before the breakfast.

\* \* \* \* \*

UNGA Votes on Israel

Just before sending this out to you Thursday evening I was advised that there will be a number of votes in the UNGA on the Middle East and Israel on Friday, December 5. It is my understanding that one of these votes will involve the status of Jerusalem and that there may be a tug of war between our UN mission, State and the White House over our position. You should ask Warren Christopher for a report -- State should advise the President and you of the precise position the USUN delegation plans to take.

\* \* \* \* \*

Death of Prime Minister Sa Carneiro of Portugal

As reported in the wire story at Tab D the Portuguese Prime Minister died when his aircraft hit power cables during takeoff from the city of Oporto. By the time of the breakfast it is not likely that the government of Portugal will have announced funeral plans. Secretary Muskie will, of course, be in Europe next week for the NATO Ministerial meeting.

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Poland



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CHEMOKFE

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 12/3/00 (NEWSON, DAVID U.)

TAGS: NATO, MAC, PL, UR, US

SUBJECT: GUIDANCE ON POLAND CONTINGENCIES

REF: USNATO 8287

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. FOR AMBASSADOR BENNETT FROM UNDERSECRETARY NEWSON,  
WE ARE SENDING THE FOLLOWING TO YOU FOR YOUR DISCUSSION  
UNDER THE EXPLICIT UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WILL BE IN A VERY  
RESTRICTED GROUP INCLUDING ONLY PERREPS PLUS ONE PER  
COUNTRY. IT DRAWS ON THE DETAILS OF A CONTINGENCY PAPER  
WHICH IS BEING VERY CLOSELY HELD IN THE US GOVERNMENT. T

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per 8/3/06 NSC 14  
BY 21 NARA, DATE 8/15/06



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CANNOT IMPRESS UPON YOU TOO STRONGLY THE IMPORTANCE OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN DISCUSSIONS OF THIS MATTER IN NATO. IF THERE ARE LEAKS IT WILL SERIOUSLY IMPEDE OUR ABILITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO FURTHER EXCHANGES IN NATO. I DEPEND UPON YOU TO BRING THIS HOME TO YOUR COLLEAGUES. END FYI.

3. WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY GROWING INDICATIONS OF ALLIED RECOGNITION OF THE NEED FOR A STRONG, PROMPT AND UNIFIED WESTERN RESPONSE TO A SOVIET INTERVENTION IN POLAND. WE RELIEVE THAT YERODAY'S PERHAPS DISCUSSION OF CONTINGENCIES WAS MOST USEFUL AND WE WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO USE THIS FORUM FOR CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF WESTERN RESPONSES TO WHAT MUST NOW BE RECOGNIZED AS THE SINGLE MOST SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO EUROPEAN STABILITY.

4. YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT WE BELIEVE THAT STRICT CONFIDENTIALITY IS REQUIRED IN THESE DISCUSSIONS TO AVOID PROVIDING THE SOVIETS WITH ANY PRETEXT FOR CHARGING NATO INTERFERENCE IN POLISH AFFAIRS.

5. WE THINK THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISCUSSION SHOULD BE TO IDENTIFY THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF AN ALLIED RESPONSE TO SOVIET INTERVENTION. IN PUTTING FORWARD US IDEAS YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT THESE ARE TENTATIVE SUGGESTIONS DESIGNED TO ELICIT ALLIED THOUGHTS AND NOT FINAL US POSITIONS.

6. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE SOVIETS AND PERHAPS THE POLES AS WELL WILL STRIVE FOR MAXIMUM AMBIGUITY IN ANY SCENARIO SURROUNDING INTERVENTION. INDEED ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE POLISH USE OF FORCE AGAINST ELEMENTS OF THE POPULATION ESCALATING INTO LARGER SCALE DISORDERS AND EVENTUALLY CULMINATING IN SOVIET INTERVENTION WITH OR WITHOUT A POLISH GOVERNMENT INVITATION. IN SUCH A FAST-BREAKING SITUATION

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THERE WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE OVERLAP BETWEEN ONE SCENARIO AND ANOTHER. WHILE RECOGNIZING THE NEED FOR A RESPONSE TAILORED TO INDIVIDUAL CIRCUMSTANCES, WE THINK IT MORE PROFITABLE TO FOCUS OUR ATTENTION ON THE ISSUE OF WHAT WE WOULD DO IN RESPONSE TO FULL-SCALE SOVIET INTERVENTION.

7. WE WOULD NEVERTHELESS WANT TO RESPOND TO ANY SHIFT IN POLISH GOVERNMENT POLICY WHICH INDICATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS MOVING TOWARD A MAJOR CONFRONTATION WITH THE WORKERS. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT REPRESSIVE ACTS WOULD AFFECT WESTERN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH POLAND COULD HELP TO PETER SUCH ACTION. IF IT ACTUALLY TOOK PLACE THE WEST WOULD WANT TO REINFORCE THESE PROTESTS, WARN THE SOVIETS AGAINST INTERVENTION, SUSPEND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE POLISH GOVERNMENT AND POSSIBLY SEEK UNSC ACTIONS IN THE FACE OF A THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY.

8. WE THINK STEPS FOR DEALING WITH SOVIET INTERVENTION IN POLAND CAN BE SUBDIVIDED INTO THOSE DESIGNED TO PETER SUCH ACTION WHEN IT APPEARS IMMINENT AND THOSE DESIGNED TO RESPOND TO INTERVENTION AFTER IT HAS TAKEN PLACE. IN THE CATEGORY OF STEPS TO BE TAKEN WHEN INTERVENTION APPEARS IMMINENT ARE THE FOLLOWING:

-- STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY WESTERN LEADERS NOTING INDICATIONS OF IMMINENT INTERVENTION, CALLING ON SOVIETS

TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT, AND EMPHASIZING THE INCALCULABLE CONSEQUENCES OF INTERVENTION.

-- PRIVATE MESSAGES BY WESTERN CHIEFS OF STATE TO KREZHNEV STRESSING WESTERN DETERMINATION TO RESPOND FIRMLY TO SOVIET INTERVENTION IN POLAND AND URGING RESTRAINT.

-- PARALLEL PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND PRIVATE APPROACHES BY

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### WESTERN DELEGATIONS AT CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE.

-- WESTERN APPROACHES TO MAJOR NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES AND SUCH ORGANIZATIONS AS SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL, ILO, AND WORLD PEACE COUNCIL TO ENLIST THEIR ASSISTANCE IN URGING A POLICY OF RESTRAINT ON USSR AND IN STRESSING INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF INTERVENTION.

-- APPEAL FOR UNSC CONSIDERATION OF THREAT POSED BY PREPARATIONS FOR INVASION TO PEACE AND SECURITY AND FOR UN ACTIONS TO FORESTALL INTERVENTION. IN EVENT OF SOVIET VETO, APPEAL FOR UNGA SPECIAL SESSION.

-- SPECIAL MINISTERIAL SESSION OF NAC TO DISCUSS EMERGING SITUATION IN POLAND AND WESTERN RESPONSE TO IMMINENT SOVIET INVASION.

### 9. STEPS DESIGNED TO RESPOND TO SOVIET INTERVENTION COULD INCLUDE:

-- PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY WESTERN CHIEFS OF STATE DEMANDING SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN POLAND AND ANNOUNCING MAIN ELEMENTS OF ALLIED RESPONSE, TO INCLUDE SPECIFIC ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SANCTIONS COUPLED WITH DEMARCHES TO THE SOVIETS OUTLINING THE ALLIED RESPONSE.

-- WITHDRAWAL OF WESTERN AMBASSADORS FROM MOSCOW FOR CONSULTATIONS.

-- SHARP CONDEMNATION OF THE INVASION AT MAURIN, FOLLOWED BY DEPARTURE OF ALLIED DELEGATIONS. WE WOULD NOT WANT TO DESTROY THE CSCE FRAMEWORK BUT USE IT TO FOCUS OPPOSITION TO SOVIET ACTION.

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- EMERGENCY NAC MINISTERIAL TO CONDEMN INVASION, CO-ORDINATE DEFENSE AND OTHER RESPONSES.
- APPEAL FOR UNSC/UNGA RESOLUTION CONDEMNING INVASION, AND CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES FROM POLAND.
- WESTERN DEMARCHES TO NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL, ILO, ETC., TO ENLIST THEIR ASSISTANCE IN EFFORTS TO MAXIMIZE INTERNATIONAL COSTS TO THE USSR OF ITS INTERVENTION.
- REDUCTION OF WESTERN OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN USSR AND IMPOSITION OF COMMENSURATE LEVELS ON SOVIET PRESENCE IN INDIVIDUAL ALLIED COUNTRIES.
- CURRENT ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, PARTICULARLY THOSE WITH A CLEARLY EUROPEAN FOCUS WOULD HAVE TO BE REVIEWED WITH A VIEW TO DETERMINING THE CONTINUED UTILITY OR DESIRABILITY OF PURSUING THEM IN A POST-INVASION CLIMATE.
- WHILE IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS WITH MOSCOW DURING WHAT WOULD BE A PERIOD OF TENSION, HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS WOULD HAVE TO BE DROPPED FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD, OTHER OFFICIAL CONTACTS WOULD BE KEPT AT THE MINIMUM NECESSARY FOR THE CONDUCT OF BILATERAL BUSINESS.
- URGENT ALLIED DISCUSSIONS ON MORE RIGOROUS ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. WE FEEL STRONGLY THAT IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO TAKE STRONG ACTION. FOR OUR PART, THIS WOULD MEAN ABROGATION OF A RANGE OF BILATERAL ECONOMIC AND EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS. THE ALLIES, OF COURSE, COULD DO MUCH IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE AND THEIR REACTION WOULD BE CRITICAL. TWO AREAS WHERE ACTION WOULD BE APPROPRIATE WOULD BE

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CANCELLATION OF THE SOVIET-EUROPEAN GAS PIPELINE DEAL  
AND CANCELLATION OF MAJOR TURN KEY AND OTHER LARGE  
PROJECTS. & MURKIE

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

December 4, 1980

Participants

Ambassador Ephraim Evron (Israel)  
Under Secretary David D. Newsom, P

Subject: USS LIBERTY

Distribution: Vice President, L, NEA, S/S

Explaining that the Vice President had asked him to meet with Ambassador Evron to discuss the claim on the USS LIBERTY, Mr. Newsom suggested they begin by reviewing the history of the claim. Mr. Newsom noted that there were originally three types of claims, those for men killed in the attack, those for those injured, and a claim for damage to the ship. The first two had been paid respectively in 1967 and 1969.

With respect to the claim for the ship, the U.S. sent Israel a note pressing a claim for \$7,6441.46 on July 1, 1968. Israel offered to pay a nominal sum which was found unacceptable. There was a further note in February 1978 quoting the earlier damage estimate. In May of 1978 the Government of Israel replied reserving Israel's legal position by agreeing to open negotiations.

Mr. Newsom explained that the decision to deliver the note with the current claim, including interest, of \$16.2 million, was in response to the earlier Israeli agreement to open negotiations. The delivery of that note has now been held up and the Vice President has asked Mr. Newsom to explore with Ambassador Evron suggestions the Ambassador may have for resolving this issue.

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NLJC 2006-069  
Per 8/3/06 NLJC/LC  
BY 62 NARA, DATE 8/15/06

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Mr. Newsom pointed out that it had been under discussion for a long time, and that there remained interest in the Congress and a group of survivors of the LIBERTY who kept the issue alive. He expressed the view that a settlement was in the interest of both countries.

Ambassador Evron responded by expressing appreciation for the opportunity to review the matter on an informal basis. He said that he had been involved in this issue from the beginning, recalling that he had been with Ambassador Harman when they were called in by Secretary Rusk after the LIBERTY was attacked. He commented that the Israeli position reserving its legal position could "easily" be challenged since the Israelis had given the Department a note soon after the incident accepting full responsibility.

The Ambassador said that he had spoken to the Vice President, with whom he was meeting on another matter, because he had been surprised to learn that Israel was now being asked to pay substantial interest on the original claim.

Ambassador Evron said that he had spoken with Assistant Secretary Saunders on this matter a couple of months before and had spoken with Israeli Minister of Finance Horowitz. He said that he, the Ambassador, wanted to settle the matter. He felt the claim was somewhat high since the ship was in mothballs and would probably never actually be repaired. Nevertheless he recognized Israel's obligation. The Minister of Finance, however, said that Israel's financial situation at the moment was so precarious that he could not raise \$7 million. The Ambassador commented that Israel would probably have to pay the U.S. "out of your aid program." The Ambassador said, however, that he was authorized to suggest a settlement for a sum between \$4-5 million.

Mr. Newsom responded that, while it was possible that the interest might be forgiven on this, he had no authority to go below the \$7 million figure. He pointed

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out that the U.S., however, might be prepared to accept payment over a three-year period. Mr. Newsom suggested that this might make it possible for the Israelis to pay something higher than \$5 million. The Ambassador said he would be prepared to recommend \$6 million over three years, but this would mean that the matter would need to go back once more through the Ministry of Finance. The Ambassador had the authority to settle for \$5 million over three years now.

Mr. Newsom said that he would report this to the Vice President and other authorities and would be back in touch with the Ambassador.

P:DDNewsom:gm

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# Brzezinski Calls Democrats Soft Toward Moscow

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 29 — Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, says the Presidential election demonstrated that the Democratic Party must abandon what he called its escapist approach to dealing with the expansion of Soviet power and influence.

"I think the Democratic Party damages itself when it moves excessively to the left and if it becomes excessively preoccupied with what might be called the do-gooders agenda in international affairs," Mr. Brzezinski said yesterday in an interview that touched on his experience in the White House and his thoughts about the future.

Saying that President-elect Ronald Reagan's victory showed that the country was ready to support "a policy of assertive competition" with the Soviet Union, Mr. Brzezinski said that in the last four years many Democrats were traumatized by the experience of the Vietnam War because their party "was responsible for the policies that produced the debacle."

But he expressed concern over what he described as the nostalgic desire of some Republicans for military superiority. He said it would be a mistake for a Reagan administration to try to replace Mr. Carter's measured effort to expand the American presence in the Persian Gulf with a drive to build military bases and station troops there.

Discussing the Carter Administration's approach to foreign policy, Mr. Brzezinski said that he and the President had tried to combine a new concern for human rights with an effort to revive American power.

But he asserted that his attempts to expand military strength had encountered "a great deal of opposition within the Administration" and within "a party which was automatically fearful that any emphasis on competition meant you were wanting to revive the cold war."

Mr. Brzezinski said that after leaving the White House he would be active in academic work and in public affairs. He said he would probably resume teaching at Columbia University but would also establish what he called a "base" for himself in Washington.

A longtime Democrat, Mr. Brzezinski said, "I'm going to remain active in the mainstream of American political life," adding, "That's where I believe the Democratic Party ought to be."

When he entered the White House as national security adviser in 1977, he said he wanted to serve as a low-profile policy coordinator. But he emerged as one of the visible figures in the Administration, usually advocating a firmer approach to dealing with the Soviet Union than that favored by other foreign policy aides.

## Ogaden Is Linked to Arms Pact

As an example of the United States' failure to "compete assertively" with the Soviet Union, Mr. Brzezinski cited what he termed the lack of an American response to Moscow's military involvement on the side of Ethiopia in the war against Somalia in Ogaden in 1978. He said the lack of response may have doomed the strategic arms limitation treaty when it reached the Senate last year.

"One of the shorthand formulas that I've used is 'SALT lies buried in the sands of Ogaden,'" he said. "The argument that this phrase is meant to capsule is that, unless we stand up to the Soviet drive by proxy soon enough, we'll not do well in the competition and we will lose chances for effective cooperation."

Mr. Brzezinski attributed the lack of response to the fact that "the country, as a whole, fatigued by the Vietnamese War," was not ready to confront the Soviet Union.

"I think it would be greatly unfair to blame the Administration," he said, "although there were people in the Administration who were inclined to label any emphasis on competition as a manifestation of a cold war mentality."

## Sought Broad Strategic Talks

He said his most "genuine regret" was that he had not been given an opportunity to "engage the Soviet leadership in a wide-ranging, broad strategic discussion." Instead, he said, Soviet-American discussions tended to be narrow and technical, focusing "much more on the litigation of issues," an apparent allusion to the negotiating style of Cyrus R. Vance, the former Secretary of State.

While reiterating his support for the strategic arms treaty now in the Senate, Mr. Brzezinski seemed to endorse Mr. Reagan's recent support for the concept called "linkage." Arms agreements must be viewed in the context of Soviet attempts to exploit regional tensions in

such areas as the Persian Gulf, Mr. Brzezinski said.

"If we had SALT in that context," he said, "I would have considered that a positive step, but I would have worried about exaggerating the political significance to the point that we would become insensitive to the strategic challenge."

Mr. Brzezinski called the treaty "a valuable accomplishment," but said the Carter Administration had made more important gains in other areas, particularly in relations with China.

"The opening of the relationship with China ushered in a new historical era in the Far East," he said. "The normalization of relations and the beginning of a dialogue with them on geopolitical and strategic issues greatly improves America's security position in the world."

Other areas where he said he had played a useful role were Mr. Carter's decisions to develop new weapons, such as the proposed MX mobile missile, and to approve a new targeting strategy against the Soviet Union, giving greater emphasis to military targets.

"The third area in which I feel I made a contribution is an ongoing area, namely, the shaping of a regional security framework for the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area," he said.

He called the Administration's drive to build up American power in the area a legacy for Mr. Reagan to build on.

Describing his own emergence as a central figure in foreign policy, Mr. Brzezinski said it was "very largely a byproduct of the dominant role played by the President himself," and added:

"A President that is dominant and active in foreign affairs is bound to have someone next to him who helps him exercise that dominance."

Asked why he had become an unpopular figure, particularly in Democratic Party circles, Mr. Brzezinski replied:

"Because I think that many of the things that I stood for are unpopular among what is, I think, very much a minority of the American public, and now a minority of the Democratic Party. It is not a popular thing to remind people that power is important, that it has to be applied, that sometimes decisions which are not fully compatible with our concepts of what the world ideally ought to be like need to be taken."

Reflecting on future foreign policy choices, he said the United States should avoid both nostalgia and escapism.

"It is nostalgia to speak of American superiority," he said, alluding to statements made by Mr. Reagan and other Republicans during the campaign. "It is, at the same time, escapism to feel the United States can avoid the responsibilities of power."

Power, he continued, "has to be sustained, cultivated and, when need be, applied so that others find it to be credible. There is a segment of the American body politic which wishes to escape from that reality."

Sunday, November 30, 1980

# A Balanced U.S. Foreign Policy 'Much Needed,' Brzezinski Says

By Michael Getler  
Washington Post Staff Writer

"The idea of freedom," says outgoing White House national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, "has become the compelling idea of our time, the way it was 200 years ago only in a very small segment of the western world."

"Today," he believes, "tyranny is everywhere on the defensive. But whether that quest for freedom, with which it is good for the United States to identify itself, will express itself in a positive manner . . . or whether it will have the effect of generating global chaos and fragmentation is perhaps the unanswered question of the age."

"This is why a balanced American foreign policy, which combines a commitment to principle with an appreciation of power, is so terribly important and very much needed," Brzezinski said in a wide-ranging interview in his White House office.

Offering his view to a new administration that soon will get its chance to deal with the upheaval and crises that seem everywhere, Brzezinski said, "We would make a big mistake if we skewed ourselves either in the direction of emphasizing only power and forgetting the importance of ideas, or if four years hence, in a reaction to that, we again moved towards an essentially moralistic or even sentimental approach to the world like the Democratic Party did in 1972 — under presidential candidate Sen. George McGovern — when it rejected the continued relevance and need for effective American power in the world."

Brzezinski, the controversial and colorful Polish-born professor who has been perhaps the closest adviser to President Carter the past four years, has frequently been the lightning rod for criticism directed against the Carter White House and a foreign policy which, fairly or not, is widely perceived to have failed in many respects.

Brzezinski acknowledges some mistakes. At times there were also conflicting goals, such as the effort to improve cooperation with the allies while trying to stop them from exporting nuclear equipment and the problem of applying White House human rights standards equally among friend and foe.

But on the larger questions, Brzezinski strongly defends the Carter record and reflects no lack of confidence in his views, in what he has learned over these four years, and in its potential value to his successor.

"We are leaving office," he said, "with the Middle East having the first peace treaty ever between Israel and an Arab state, with normalization of relations with China and with a major expansion in those relations a reality."

Ratification of the Panama Canal treaties, he says, has added "a new relationship of mutual dignity between ourselves and Latin America." The North Atlantic military alliance is left with "the most comprehensive modernization program ever undertaken" and a new "regional security framework" for the Persian Gulf, including access to bases and a U.S. military buildup, is under way.

"We are leaving office," he continued, "with a much better relationship with African countries than ever before and with genuine progress made toward majority rule, at least in one portion of southern Africa."

Also among the pluses, he says, is a "useful policy of differentiation" between some Soviet allies in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself, the negotiating of a signed but never ratified strategic arms limitation treaty with Moscow, and the "institutionalizing" of the seven-nation economic summit meetings among western industrialized nations and Japan.

Asked to list a handful of the continuing foreign policy problems that will require the immediate attention of the Reagan administration, Brzezinski said those problems range from Central

America, which already is torn by revolt, to Central Europe, where all eyes are on the confrontation in Poland between labor unions and communist party authority.

In the Middle East, Brzezinski said, he sees "opportunity" now to make some progress both in long-range security relationships with some of the moderate Arab states and on the Arab-Israeli peace front. In large part, he said, this is because the Iran-Iraq war has diverted the global spotlight from these problems.

While the war still contains the danger of disintegration within the Arab world, "at the same time, it has highlighted the need of the region to have some sort of a subtle and indirect security relationship with the United States," Brzezinski believes Carter's "timely and gutsy" decision to send U.S. radar planes to Saudi Arabia — a decision, he points out, that was opposed by some in government — was the key event signaling this new relationship.

"At the same time, we have to be subtle and indirect," he said, keeping the region's cultural sensitivities in mind. "I think it would be a mistake for us or for the next administration to rush headlong into an effort to forge very formal security relationships, including permanent bases."

In Poland, "my estimate is that the will to compromise politically is present," Brzezinski says, "but the catastrophic economic situation may make the political compromise nonviable." Soviet intervention there certainly is not inevitable, he said, and it would be a "calamitous setback" for world stability if such intervention did take place.

Though he used diplomatic language, Brzezinski also made clear that his list of problems that will not go away with new U.S. leadership includes "potentially troublesome" conflicts with European allies about East-West relations, including "the need for a common posture on the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan."

What was needed and publicly stated, Brzezinski argues, was a national policy and obligation to defend the region which then also becomes "a warning to the other side, a deterrent warning, that if it engages in actions to exploit our weakness that they will become engaged with the United States more generally," meaning a possibly different field of battle.

"There's no other way of doing it," claims Brzezinski. "How could we do the things we have done in the past year — including a start on a costly air, sea and supply buildup — if we didn't publicly assume that commitment?"

As for dealing with Moscow, Brzezinski, under questioning, says the key lesson learned in four years is that "our willingness to cooperate with the Soviets must be carefully balanced with our willingness to compete assertively." The country, he says, must not get into a frame of mind — which he once again linked to the McGovern era — in which any firm response toward Moscow is labeled as "a cold war attitude, a charge which is frequently leveled against me." Conversely, he said, we must avoid viewing a willingness to cooperate as somehow appeasement.

Beyond that, he says, "it is very important with the Soviets to do two things: lay out your position very clearly — including the broadest notions of our vital interests and areas of possible cooperation — and stick to it."

Was this not done at the outset of the Carter administration, he is asked? "I think it was done, very much so, after Afghanistan. It started being done after Ethiopia," he answered. The invasion of Afghanistan came in December 1979, three years into the Carter administration. The Ethiopian situation developed late in 1977 when thousands of Cuban troops began moving into the country with Soviet assistance.

Whatever the record eventually will show about Brzezinski's flops or successes in the White House, his stay there has been dominated, at least in public, by the question of whether his role and personality were too influential in a job which is supposed to be that of a policy coordinator first and adviser second.

But when he is asked about the problems of self-interest within government generally, a different picture emerges.

"There is no doubt in my mind that there is an enormous institutional fragmentation in our handling of overall national security issues," he said. When broad policy decisions must go through such diverse bodies as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, aside from the departments of State and Defense and the CIA, it makes coherent policy difficult and reduction to some "common denominator" most likely.

In his view, the president's constitutional prerogatives have also been too narrowly circumscribed in recent years, making a timely policy difficult to achieve.

As for the bureaucracy, "I think everyone feels that he is for the U.S. national interest, except how that interest is perceived and defined gets very much influenced by narrow institutional interests. The typical response of the Defense Department to a problem is to try and obtain an increase in the defense budget, while at the same time often being very reluctant to use force once that budget is increased. The institutional response of State is to rely on diplomacy and to be rather skeptical of the use of power even for demonstration purposes," he says.

"That is why, ultimately, the president does need some sort of a coordinating framework or organ within which a broader vision is generated. This is one reason why, over the years, a presidential office for national security affairs emerged.

"It isn't because of the personal talents or peculiarities of individuals who have held that position," says the man who helped make a hard-to-pronounce name into a household word. Rather, Zbigniew Brzezinski says, the office emerged because of "the logic of America's engagement in the world and the president's need for a perspective that integrates the different institutional divisions."

"The basic question is whether we and our allies share the same historic and strategic vision." His view, he said, is that what is happening in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf represents a common danger that threatens Europe as well and dictates common conclusions and actions.

Brzezinski says Carter would almost certainly have tried to pull allied leaders together to get an in-depth discussion of this problem if reelected and "I would not be surprised if President-elect Reagan did something similar after the inaugural," he added.

Though Brzezinski is widely characterized as a hawk on defense and a hard-liner toward Moscow, the Carter administration has met with considerable criticism that it was soft on defense and wishy-washy toward the Soviets.

But Brzezinski counters that "it is only within the last year — after the upheaval in Iran, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. election campaign began — that it has become fashionable to speak about enhancing defense capability. You'll remember that cutting the defense budget was very popular with some of our leading newspapers. Editorially, they were thundering for a shift of priorities.

"I think in the political context in which we operated, taking into account the impact of the Vietnam war, the character of the Democratic Party itself and the finite budget, that what was done by the president, Defense Secretary Harold Brown and others was quite impressive."

Brzezinski also rejects the criticism of those who claim Carter was engaging in a dangerous bluff when he committed the United States to defense of the Persian Gulf at a time when there were serious doubts this country had the forces to carry out that pledge.

How else, he asks, does a democracy assume an obligation to defend an area ahead of the actions actually needed to defend the region? "When we assumed the defense of Berlin in 1947-48, were we really in a position to defend Berlin?"

"Similarly, are we supposed to publicly maintain the posture that we will not defend our vital interests in the Persian Gulf until some years hence? Isn't that an invitation for someone to come in and do something decisive in the meantime?"

Mr. Vice President -  
- I am having message  
of condolence drafted  
for your approval Friday.  
( I have also set  
aside the letter of  
appreciation just signed to the  
late Prime Minister. )  
RK

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AM-CARNEIRO\*\*\*\*\* SNAP

LISBON, DEC 4, REUTER -- PORTUGUESE PRIME MINISTER  
FRANCISCO SA CARNEIRO DIED TONIGHT WHEN A LIGHT AIRCRAFT TAKING  
HIM TO THE NORTHERN CITY OF OPORTO CRASHED ON TAKEOFF FROM  
LISBON, PORTUGUESE TELEVISION SAID.

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AM-CARNEIRO\*\*\*\*\* SNAP (REPEATING)

LISBON, DEC 4, REUTER -- PORTUGUESE PRIME MINISTER  
FRANCISCO SA CARNEIRO DIED TONIGHT WHEN A LIGHT AIRCRAFT TAKING  
HIM TO THE NORTHERN CITY OF OPORTO CRASHED ON TAKEOFF FROM  
LISBON, PORTUGUESE TELEVISION SAID.

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