

Dec. 1980 / Jan. 1, 1981

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

[1981]

January 1, 1980

Mr. Vice President:

The Foreign Policy Breakfast will be at the usual time (7:30am) tomorrow morning. One subject to be discussed is an increase in the resumption of military aid to El Salvador. Background for this is provided in a draft memo to the President from Dr. Brzezinski at Tab A. Harold Brown's memo to the President which is part of that package provides an interesting view of the situation, and deserves your attention. At Tab B is a follow-on cable validating the fulfillment of some of the requisite conditions for resuming some military aid.

A second likely subject is the hostage situation. I have not seen the recent communication through the Algerians.

Laph Crosby

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per 7/27/06 AUC 14r
NISC-06-070
BY BIR NARA DATE 8/23/06

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: Military Assistance to El Salvador:
Friday Morning Breakfast (C)

Attached at Tab A is a cable which Christopher plans to discuss with you at the Friday breakfast. It represents a combined recommendation of State, DOD and NSC, that we deploy to El Salvador the advance helicopter MTT and the headquarters MTT once the transfer of a few key military officers (e.g., Carranza) is confirmed, as we expect on January 1. Next, as Duarte follows up his promise to expedite the investigation of the nuns, we shall sign the FY 81 FMS agreement and send the first few helicopters. (S)

The principal motivating force for taking these steps is Duarte's conversation with our chargé on December 30 (Tab B). Duarte explains that the military are taking the kinds of steps to reorganize themselves which we have urged, but they are doing it "in their fashion." He said that we would be making a serious mistake (and exposing the Christian Democrats at the same time) if we continue to withhold military aid in the light of the anticipated offensive of the Left and of our diminishing credibility with the military. Duarte makes a very strong, and to my mind persuasive, case for providing the military assistance and supporting him and his party, and I believe that, at the minimum, we ought to proceed with the cable at Tab A and consider several additional steps that might be useful to the PDC. (S)

Harold Brown has sent you a memorandum (Tab C) which has been overtaken by these new developments. Essentially, he recommends that we take the steps which we are taking. (C)

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Review December 31, 1990
Extended by Z. Brzezinski
Reason for extension: NSC 1.13(a)

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per 7/27/06 NSC 1.13
NSC 1.13-06-070
BY BAE NARA DATE 8/25/06

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ARA: JABUSHNELL: MCH
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P: DNEWSOM

ARA: WGBOWDLER

NSC:

HA: PDERIAN (INFORMED, NOT CLEARED)

DOD: FKRAMER

S/S-O:

PM-RBARTHLOMEW

NIACT/IMMEDIATE

SAN SALVADOR NIACT

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 12/31/00 (NEWSOM, D.)

TAGS: MASS, MILI, PINS, PINT, ES

SUBJECT: APPROACH TO DUARTE ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE

REF: SAN SALVADOR 7054

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. WE HAVE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED POINTS MADE TO YOU BY DUARTE REITEL AND YOU MAY COMMUNICATE THE FOLLOWING TO HIM MAKING CLEAR THAT WE ARE RELYING ON HIM TO FOLLOW UP ON THE COMMITMENTS MADE TO YOU IN THAT CONVERSATION:

3. FIRST, WE ARE PROCEEDING WITH ALL IMET TRAINING OUT OF COUNTRY FOR WHICH DEPARTURES SCHEDULED BEFORE JAN 15: THIS INCLUDES CODE OF CONDUCT COURSE IN PANAMA, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, PARACHUTE PREPARATION, VARIOUS AIR FORCE TECHNICIANS (26 SPACES), AND ONE OFFICER AT NAVAL STAFF COLLEGE. WE ALSO PREPARED APPROVE 3 ARMY COMMAND AND STAFF SPACES FOR JAN 23 COURSE IF DESIRED FOR KEY TRANSFER PURPOSES.

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WE ARE TAKING THESE STEPS TO BE RESPONSIVE TO DUARTE'S APPEAL; THEY SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN TO REFLECT SATISFACTION WITH THE CURRENT PROGRESS OF THE INVESTIGATION. (FYI. NEXT WEEK WE SHALL CONSIDER OTHER IMET SPACES WITH DEPARTURES JANUARY 15 AND THEREAFTER.)

4. SECOND, ONCE KEY TRANSFERS OUTLINED IN REFTEL ARE CONFIRMED, WHICH ARE EXPECTED ON JANUARY FIRST LIST, WE SHALL DEPLOY TO SAN SALVADOR THE ADVANCE HELICOPTER M11 AND THE M11 TO DEAL WITH GUERRILLA WARFARE AT HEADQUARTERS (BUT NOT INDIVIDUAL M11S AT EACH FIELD BRIGADE COMMAND). (PLEASE REPORT TRANSFERS AS SOON AS ANNOUNCED AND INDICATE WHEN INDIVIDUALS WILL ACTUALLY MOVE.)

5. THIRD, (A) WE WILL BE PREPARED TO SIGN EARLY IN WEEK OF JANUARY 12 FMS 81 CREDIT AGREEMENT AND BEGIN SHIPMENTS ESPECIALLY ON INDIVIDUAL CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT ITEMS ON EXPEDITED BASIS. WE ASSUME THAT DURING THIS PERIOD THERE WILL BE PROGRESS ON GOES ACTION ITEMS DISCUSSED WITH DUARTE ESPECIALLY INVESTIGATION ON NUNS, I.E. APPROACH TO CANADIANS, COOPERATION WITH FBI ON ITS RETURN, IAHRC INVITATION, ACCOUNTING FOR SECURITY PATROLS IN AREA. (B) WE SHALL ALSO DEPLOY AS SOON AS NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE FIRST TWO HELICOPTERS UNDER NO-COST LEASE. (WE SHALL FORWARD DOCUMENTATION TO PERMIT NEGOTIATION OF LEASE NEXT WEEK BUT WE REQUIRE 30 DAYS NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS ON THE LEASE BEFORE HELICOPTERS CAN MOVE.)

6. WE BELIEVE THIS IS CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE TO DUARTE'S APPEAL AND SHOULD HELP MAINTAIN HIS STANDING WITH MILITARY.

7. YOU HAVE BEEN DOING EXCELLENT JOB IN FOLLOWING UP OUR KEY CONCERNS OVER MILITARY CHANGES, CONTROL OF VIOLENCE AND INVESTIGATION OF NUN'S MURDER WITH DUARTE AND SHOULD CONTINUE DOING SO.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DEC 30 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Security Assistance to El Salvador (U)

(C) Secretary Muskie's recent memorandum to you concerning assistance to El Salvador focused heavily on the economic situation in that country. Your approval of continued economic aid, non-lethal FML pipeline military equipment and continued training of Salvadoran officers in Panama and the U.S. will be helpful. There is, however, a further military dimension which also deserves consideration.

(S) El Salvador's national security establishment consists of some 17,000 personnel divided between the military (12,000), national guard (2,000), the security police (2,000), and the treasury police (500). These forces have limited training and are extremely short on equipment and materiel (for example, many soldiers lack boots, and the entire force has only three small operational helicopters); the officer corps is very thin, and central control over the forces has been limited. The objective of these forces is to eliminate or neutralize a guerrilla insurgent force which has grown in the last year from 2,000 to 5,000 and which has been able to increase the size of its operations from attacks involving a few people to operations involving one or two hundred. The guerrillas have received training in Cuba, Nicaragua, and by the PLO, and are receiving arms from Cuba, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Viet Nam and Eastern Bloc countries, either flown in from neighboring countries or brought in by sea.

(S) The military situation is precarious. Government forces are not able to prevent the guerrillas from conducting significant operations throughout the country, although the guerrillas themselves are not yet strong enough to prevail in open battles with government forces. An increase in strength by either side could make a significant difference and, as indicated above, the guerrilla forces have been growing in strength and we anticipate this will continue. They are reportedly organized for attacks designed to disrupt this year's harvest, and are seeking to topple the present government within the next several weeks. Thus, there are both long-term and immediate reasons counseling military assistance which had not earlier existed.

(S) A special United States' military planning team was recently in El Salvador and developed with the Salvadoran military a plan to protect the crucial present harvests. Protection of the harvests

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and generation of foreign exchange from them are essential to keep El Salvador from economic chaos. The critical elements of the plan are centralized control of the military, national guard, treasury and security police; division of the entire country into five military zones with single commanders responsible for all operations in the zone; and use of increased mobility, especially helicopters, by the Salvadoran forces to let them quickly bring forces to bear against guerrilla operations. Effective implementation of the plan would require United States advisers for central headquarters and each of the zonal commanders (about five per headquarters, 30 total) and release of programmed materiel assistance and the helicopters.

(S) Such a plan is judged by the JCS to allow the security forces to conduct effective military operation against the guerrillas. There is also a political dimension to such action which needs addressing. Our entire strategy in El Salvador is premised on supporting the Christian Democrat/military coalition. It was the military itself which, in overthrowing the Romero government some 14 months ago, brought civilians into government. Since then, there has been continued pressure by some elements of the military and other security forces to eliminate civilian participation. Twice before, we have averted right-wing military coups--with significant help from senior military leaders in the high command. Again, in the last two weeks, the announcement that we had suspended aid produced significant pressure for a right-wing takeover of the government. The leader of our planning team for harvest protection was working full time with the high command, and his personal observation is that such a coup was averted only by the intervention of Colonel Garcia, the Minister of Defense; Colonel Carranza, the Sub Minister, and Colonel Castillo, Chief of Staff.

(S) The conditions we have laid down for the resumption of military aid, however, demand the removal of some or all of these persons from positions of responsibility. We should recognize that, were that to happen, there likely would be no one to restrain the pressure for a right-wing coup.

(S) Our Ambassador in El Salvador has eloquently argued that government participation in or condonation of right-wing violence must cease if the government is to win the support of the people. I wholeheartedly agree. He has also argued that withholding of military aid can be used as a stick to cause the military and security forces to bring about the necessary reforms. Here, I disagree. The military needs greater control from the center to police itself and assistance in mechanisms to make that central control effective. Insistence by us on elimination of the few officers capable of controlling the entire military/security force establishment will exacerbate, not solve, the problem. Moreover, the withholding of United States military assistance strengthens the right-wing by providing substance to its argument to the officer corps that there is little benefit in cooperating with the United States.

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(S) In sum, I would advise that we resume military aid to El Salvador because

- there is an immediate military necessity for such aid, and
- politically, the resumption of such aid is more likely to avoid a right-wing coup than its withholding.

(S) The SCC had earlier recommended that we resume our military assistance to El Salvador if the Christian Democrats were satisfied with the arrangements that they had made with the military. I propose that:

- We inform the Christian Democrats that we are willing immediately to renew security assistance if they desire. If they accept our offer, we inform them that the following measures will take place in the next few weeks:
 - The FY81 FMS loan agreement will be released next week and shipment of needed individual clothing and equipment will begin 1 January 1981.
 - In order to assist in improving the control of all security forces, we will redeploy a five-man operations and planning team to work with the Ministry of Defense by 1 January, and dispatch similar teams to each of the five operational zones as quickly as possible, certainly by late January.
 - The two-man advance party for the helicopter training team will deploy at once with the helicopters, and associated training personnel, to deploy as soon as possible thereafter.

Harold Branner

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 1/1/00 (DION, MARK) OR-M
TAGS: PINS PINT MILI MASS ES
SUBJ: MILITARY TRANSFERS IN EL SALVADOR
REF BOWLER-DION TELCON OF DECEMBER 31

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. CHARGE REACHED JUNTA PRESIDENT DUARTE BY PHONE NOONDAY JAN. 1 TO RELAY INFORMATION REGARDING RENEWAL OF IMET AND PROVISION OF THREE MILITARY SCHOLARSHIPS AUTHORIZED IN REFTELCON. PRESIDENT DUARTE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AND GRATITUDE.

3. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT MILITARY TRANSFER ORDER OF DECEMBER 31 HAD BEEN SIGNED AND ISSUED YESTERDAY EVENING (TODAY IS A HOLIDAY) DATT HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO REACH MILITARY SOURCES TO CONFIRM ORDER IS PUBLISHED AND NEWSPAPERS WILL NOT BE OUT UNTIL JANUARY 3). PRESIDENT DUARTE SAID FOLLOWING CHANGES WERE MADE IN THE LIST: COL NICOLAS CARANZA HAS BEEN REASSIGNED FROM THE POST OF SUBSECRETARY OF DEFENSE (HIS NEW CIVILIAN POST IS NOT STATED BUT WILL BE ANTEL); LT. COL. FRANCISCO ADOLFO CASTILLO HAS BEEN REASSIGNED FROM THE POST OF CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF TO SUBSECRETARY OF DEFENSE VICE CARANZA; LT. COL. OSCAR CASANOVA HAS BEEN REASSIGNED FROM THE ZACA-TECOLUCA COMMAND TO OTHER DUTIES (UNSPECIFIED); LT. COL. PENA ARVAISA HAS BEEN REASSIGNED FROM THE CHALATENANGO COMMAND TO OTHER DUTIES (UNSPECIFIED); MAJORS ZACAPA AND POZO AND CAPTAIN MAJANO OF THE TREASURY POLICE HAVE BEEN REASSIGNED TO STUDY ABROAD ALONG WITH FOUR OR FIVE OTHER "PROBLEM CASES" WHOSE NAMES DUARTE COULD NOT RECALL.

4. PRESIDENT DUARTE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT TREASURY POLICE CHIEF COL. MORAN AND MORE MID-LEVEL OFFICERS ASSOCIATED WITH OFFICIAL VIOLENCE WOULD BE TRANSFERRED ON THE JANUARY 31 LIST.

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

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HE WAS PLEASED THAT THE DECEMBER 31 ORDER HAD INCLUDED MANY OF THE KEY PEOPLE ASSOCIATED WITH EXCESSES.
COMMENT: CARRANZA, CASANOVA, POZO AND ZACAPA ARE IDENTIFIED AS EXTREME RIGHTISTS; CASANOVA WAS COMMANDER IN THE DISTRICT WHERE THE NUNS WERE KILLED; PENA ARVAISA HAS A GOOD REPUTATION FOR CONTROLLING HIS TROOPS BUT WAS PROBABLY TRANSFERRED FOR BEING A MAJANISTA. EXCEPT FOR LT. COL. FRANCISCO MORAN, HEAD OF THE TREASURY POLICE AND THE ULTRA-RIGHT MAJOR STABEN, WHO ARE SUPPOSED TO BE TRANSFERRED ON THE JANUARY 31 LIST, THESE ARE THE KEY LIGHTNING OFFICERS ASSOCIATED WITH EXCESSIVE VIOLENCE OR TOLERANCE FOR RIGHTIST DEATH SQUADS IN THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES, ACCORDING TO THE DATT.

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 12-30-00 (DION, JERROLD MARK) OR-M
TAGS: MASS MILI PINS PINT ES
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT DUARTE ON JRG'S PROGRESS OVER THE LAST THREE WEEKS
REF: A. STATE 329627, B. STATE 333735, C. STATE 330807,
D. SS 8721, E. SS 8963, F. STATE 338663, G. SS 8988,
H. STATE 340145.

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY- CHARGE MET WITH JUNTA PRESIDENT DUARTE DECEMBER 30 FOR THIRD IN SERIES OF CONVERSATIONS HELD IN RESPONSE TO INSTRUCTIONS IN STATE REFTELS. GENERAL OFFENSIVE MAY NOT HAVE BEGUN OVER LAST WEEKEND, ACCORDING TO DUARTE, BUT EVIDENCE WAS ACCUMULATING THAT CUBANS AND NICARAGUANS WERE SUPPLYING ARMS AND VOLUNTEERS FOR A MASSIVE FOREIGN-BACKED INVASION BEFORE JANUARY 20. HE APPEALED FOR USG TO STOP IMPOSING CONDITIONS ON RENEWAL OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND TO QUICKLY SUPPLY "PREVENTIVE MEDICINE" IN THE FORM OF SYMBOLIC AND SUBSTANTIVE ASSISTANCE, I.E., ADVANCE DEPLOYMENT OF ONE OR MORE OF LONG-PROMISED HELICOPTERS AND RENEWAL OF IMET. DUARTE OUTLINED SERIES OF SHIFTS IN MILITARY STRUCTURE THAT RESULT FROM PDC AND USG PRESSURES TO END RIGHTIST/ OFFICIAL VIOLENCE; ON JANUARY 1 MILITARY TRANSFER ORDER, COL. CARRANZA WILL BE REASSIGNED FROM SUBSECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO HEAD OF THE STATE TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD; COMMANDERS OF SUCH KEY DISTRICTS AS CHALANTENANGO, ZACATECOLUCA, AND LA UNION WILL BE SHIFTED; SEVERAL CAPTAIN/MAJOR LEVEL OFFICERS IDENTIFIED WITH THE FAR RIGHT WILL GO ABROAD ON ASSIGNMENTS; COL. MORAN, HEAD OF THE NOTORIOUS TREASURY POLICE, WILL ALSO BE REASSIGNED BUT NOT UNTIL THE FEBRUARY 1 TRANSFER LIST. DUARTE TOOK CAREFUL NOTE OF PENDING ACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION INTO THE DEATHS OF FOUR U.S. CHURCHWOMEN AND

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PROMISED TO BRING HIS PERSONAL INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON THE CASE. HE GAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE LAST WEEK TO INVITE THE IAHRC TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES AS OUTLINED IN REFS F AND G. EMBASSY BELIEVES IMPENDING ACTIONS SHOW JRG'S GOOD FAITH IN ALL THREE AREAS CITED IN STATE REFTELS AND RECOMMENDS IMMEDIATE RESTITUTION OF IMET AS FIRST STEP TOWARD EARLY RENEWAL OF ALL U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE UPON EVIDENCE OF FULFILLMENT OF THESE PROMISING MEASURES TO REDUCE RIGHTIST/ OFFICIAL VIOLENCE AND INVESTIGATE DEATHS OF U.S. CHURCHWOMEN. END SOMMARRY.

3. CHARGE MET FOR TWO AND HALF HOURS AT CASA PRESIDENCIAL WITH JUNTA PRESIDENT NAPOLEON DUARTE MORNING OF DECEMBER 30. A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS WERE DISCUSSED IN ROUGHLY THE FOLLOWING ORDER.

A. LEFTIST GENERAL OFFENSIVE. DUARTE SAID THAT THE FALSE REPORT ABOUT INITIATION OF THE LEFT'S LONG-PROCLAIMED GENERAL OFFENSIVE DERIVED FROM TWO SOURCES. THE FIRST CAME DIRECTLY FROM HAVANA THROUGH REUTERS AND ANNOUNCED A MASSIVE INVASION OF EL SALVADOR FROM HONDURAS BY THOUSANDS OF ARMED GUERRILLAS, INCLUDING CUBANS, PANAMANIAN, ETC. THIS WAS TOTALLY FALSE. THE SECOND REPORT WAS DONE BY THE UPI CORRESPONDENT IN SAN SALVADOR WHOSE INFORMATION WAS BASED ON AN UNKNOWN MILITARY OFFICER WHO MAY HAVE BEEN QUOTING A TELEGRAM FROM THE NATIONAL GUARD DETACHMENT AT THE FIFTH OF NOVEMBER DAM-SITE. ACCORDING TO THE NATIONAL GUARD UNIT, 2,000 ARMED GUERRILLAS WERE ATTACKING OUTPOSTS IN CHALANTENANGO AND HEADING TOWARD THE IMPORTANT HYDROELECTRIC INSTALLATION. THE NATIONAL GUARD UNIT ASKED FOR IMMEDIATE REINFORCEMENTS. THE JRG DOES NOT BELIEVE THE CORRESPONDENT WAS A PARTICIPANT IN THE LEFTIST PROPAGANDA EFFORT. IF THIS IN FACT WAS THE OPENING OF THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE, IT HAS BEEN A FAILURE THUS FAR. WHAT CONCERNS THE JRG, HOWEVER, IS THAT WHILE THE LEFT IN EL SALVADOR IS WEAKER PROBABLY THAN AT ANY TIME IN THE LAST YEAR, THE THREAT OF SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN INTERVENTION ON THE SIDE OF THE GUERRILLAS IS GROWING FAST. PRESIDENT DUARTE CITED A REPORT HE HAD RECEIVED THAT MORNING FROM THE GENRAL STAFF REGARDING DESPATCH OF 1200 HEAVILY ARMED CUBAN TROOPS FROM HAVANA TO MONTELIBAR, SOMOZA'S OLD ESTATE IN NICARAGUA. HIS REPORT STATED THAT 1300 MORE TROOPS, TO BE DISGUISED AS SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS, WILL ARRIVE SHORTLY IN NICARAGUA. DUARTE SAID THE NICARAGUAN TAKE-OVER PLAN WAS BEING FOLLOWED FAITHFULLY. WITH SIZABLE FOREIGN BACKING AND PARTICIPATION, SIMULTANEOUS INVASIONS WERE LAUNCHED AGAINST SOMOZA'S GUARDIA NACIONAL FROM HONDURAS AND COSTA RICA. WHILE SOMOZA WAS ABLE TO BLOCK BOTH INVASIONS, THE SUBSEQUENT UPRISINGS IN MANAGUA AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES PROVED IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTAIN. DESPITE THE SALVADORAN LEFT'S LACK OF POPULAR SUPPORT AND THE DWINDLING ARMED UNITS IT CAN COUNT ON, AN INVASION LAUNCHED

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WITH CUBAN, NICARAGUAN, AND PANAMANIAN "VOLUNTEERS" COULD
DRAW THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES AWAY FROM THE MAJOR
CITIES AND OPEN THEM TO A TERRORIST ASSAULT ALTHOUGH THE
PUBLIC WOULD NOT SUPPORT THE ASSAULT, THE ARMED FORCES MIGHT
COLLAPSE IN THE FACE OF SIMULTANEOUS
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NOOIS
ATTACKS IN MANY PLACES AT ONCE, PARTICULARLY IF
CONFRONTED WITH ANYTHING LIKE 2500 ARMED AND TRAINED
CUBANS, CHARGE ASKED PRESIDENT DUARTE IF SUCH A
SCENARIO WAS NOT LIKELY TO PRODUCE A FORCEFUL REACTION
ON THE PART OF THE OAS. HE AGREED THAT THE U.S. WOULD
ALMOST CERTAINLY PRESS FOR AN OAS COUNTER ASSAULT,
WHICH IT WOULD LEAD NO MATTER WHAT INTERNATIONAL
PARTICIPATION. THIS WOULD BE THE WORST THING POSSIBLE
BOTH FOR THE JRG AND THE USG BECAUSE IT WOULD ALIENATE
ALL DEMOCRATIC OPINION IN LATIN AMERICA FOR YEARS
TO COME. THE CUBANS WOULD INSIST THAT THEIR PARTICIPA-
TION WAS PROVOKED BY U.S. INTERVENTION, WHICH THEY HAVE
NEVER CEASED TO DENOUNCE IN A PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE THAT
HAS BEEN UNDERWAY FOR NINE MONTHS, ALLEGING THOUSANDS
OF U.S. MARINES ARE IN EL SALVADOR, THAT GUNSHIP
HELICOPTERS ARE BEING USED AND THAT A MASSIVE INVASION
FORCE IS STATIONED ON SHIPS OFFSHORE. SUCH A
COMMITMENT OF U.S. FORCES WOULD SUBSTANTIATE ALL
PREVIOUS CUBAN PROPAGANDA AND BLACKEN THE NAME OF THE
U.S. IN LATIN AMERICA FOR YEARS TO COME. AT VARIOUS
POINTS IN THE CONVERSATION, DUARTE RETURNED TO HIS BASIC
THEME, I.E. THAT U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE NOW WAS
CHEAP PREVENTIVE MEDICINE AS CONTRASTED WITH A
MASSIVE COMMITMENT OF U.S. FORCES LATER TO RECOUP
A DESPERATE SITUATION. HE ARGUED THAT IT MADE NO SENSE
TO IMPOSE CONDITIONS FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE ON THE
JRG WHEN THE CUBANS, SOVIETS, ETC., WERE SUPPLYING
VAST AMOUNTS OF ARMS AND NOW "VOLUNTEERS" TO THE FAR
LEFT.

8. SHIFTS IN THE MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE
PRESIDENT DUARTE SAID THAT MAJOR CHANGES IN THE MAKE-UP
OF THE ARMED FORCES COULD BE EXPECTED BEGINNING TOMORROW.
HE SAID THAT COL. CARRANZA WILL BE REASSIGNED FROM THE

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MINISTRY OF DEFENSE TO THE DIRECTORSHIP OF ANTEL, THE STATE COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTORATE. THIS REASSIGNMENT WILL BE ANNOUNCED BEFORE JANUARY 5, WHEN THE GOVERNMENT RESUMES FULL OPERATION FOLLOWING THE TWO-WEEK CHRISTMAS BREAK. THE MONTHLY ORDER REASSIGNING MILITARY OFFICERS WILL BE COMPLETED TOMORROW AND ANNOUNCED ON JANUARY 1. ONE OFFICER HAS ALREADY BEEN TRANSFERRED OUT OF HIS UNIT, A CAPTAIN VEGA OF THE NATIONAL GUARD, WHO IS SUSPECTED OF INVOLVEMENT IN EXCESSES. A NUMBER OF OTHERS IN THIS CATEGORY WILL BE SHIFTED IN THE JANUARY 1 ORDER. HE NAMED MAJOR ZACAPA AS ONE OF EIGHT CAPTAIN/MAJOR LEVEL OFFICERS TO BE TRANSFERRED. DUARTE ASKED THAT THE UNITED STATES GRANT A NUMBER OF BECAS (MILITARY SCHOLARSHIPS) FOR ASSIGNING SOME OF THESE OFFICERS TO U.S. MILITARY SCHOOLS. HE SAID HE PERSONALLY HAD ASKED THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT TO GRANT A SERIES OF BECAS FOR STUDY AT THE GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL IN CARACAS. DUARTE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF GIVING THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT A "GRACEFUL EXIT" FOR THESE OFFICERS. IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE ARMED FORCES TO ADMIT CULPABILITY IN RIGHTWING VIOLENCE AND THE CHANGES IT IS MAKING MUST THEREFORE BE PRESENTED AS NORMAL SHIFTS IN THE COMMAND STRUCTURE WITHOUT VICTIMS OR SCAPEGOATS. THUS IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THESE OFFICERS TO RECEIVE REASONABLE ONWARD ASSIGNMENTS. IN THE CASE OF THOSE ON THE FAR RIGHT, IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO HAVE THEM OUT OF THE COUNTRY AND AWAY FROM SUCH PLOTTERS AS EX-MAJOR DIAUBUIOSSON. DUARTE STRONGLY URGED THAT IMET BE RESTORED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO OPEN THE WAY FOR EDUCATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS ABROAD FOR SOME OF THESE OFFICERS. OTHER HIGH-RANKING OFFICERS WOULD ALSO BE AFFECTED BY THESE SHIFTS. COL. MORAN OF THE TREASURY POLICE WILL BE TRANSFERRED BUT NOT UNTIL PUBLICATION OF THE FEBRUARY 1 TRANSFER ORDER. THE MILITARY FEEL STRONGLY THAT HE SHOULD NOT BE MOVED AT THIS JUNCTURE LEST AN UNACCEPTABLE CHALLENGE BE POSED TO THE SECURITY FORCES AS A WHOLE. HERE DUARTE RESTATED THE STRATEGY OUTLINED IN REFTTEL E ACCORDING TO WHICH HE AND COL. GUTIERREZ HAVE AGREED TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SECURITY FORCES OVER THE COMING MONTHS. DUARTE EXPANDED UPON THIS EARLIER CONVERSATION, SAYING THAT A NEW MILITARY BARRACKS WOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN SAN SALVADOR AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, A THIRD FOCUS OF ARMY STRENGTH IN ADDITION TO THE TWO PRESENT BARRACKS, SAN CARLOS AND EL ZAPOTE. THE OBJECT WAS TO SECURE THE CAPITAL WITH ARMY FORCES, GET THE NATIONAL GUARD AND TREASURY POLICE OUT OF THE CITY AND CONFINE THE NATIONAL POLICE TO SUCH ROUTINE AND EXTRAORDINARY TASKS AS TRAFFIC CONTROL, PREVENTION

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OF BOMBINGS/ARSON AND FRUSTRATION OF EFFORTS TO BLOCK MAJOR ROUTES WITH DAMAGED BUSES. THUS THE SECURITY FORCES WOULD NO LONGER CONDUCT SEARCHES OF HOUSES, CORDON OFF NEIGHBORHOODS, ETC. REVERTING TO SENIOR LEVEL CHANGES IN THE COMMAND STRUCTURE, DUARTE SAID THAT BETWEEN THREE AND FIVE DISTRICT COMMANDERS WOULD ALSO BE MOVED BEGINNING WITH TOMORROW'S ORDER; IN PARTICULAR, THE COMMANDER AT ZACATECOLUCA, LT.COL. CASANOVA (IN WHOSE DISTRICT THE U.S. CHURCHWOMEN WERE BURIED), THE COMMANDER OF CHALATENANGO, AND THE COMMANDER AT LA UNION. DUARTE STRESSED REPEATEDLY THAT THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT MUST CARRY OUT THESE CHANGES IN ITS OWN FASHION AND THAT TO SEEM TO IMPOSE THEM UPON IT, WHETHER BY THE PDC OR USG OR ANYONE ELSE, COULD LEAD TO A REALIGNMENT OF OFFICERS AND A RIGHTWING COUP.

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C. INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATHS OF U.S. CHURCHWOMEN
PRESIDENT DUARTE TOOK CAREFUL NOTE OF THE POINTS CHARGE
MADE REGARDING FAILURE OF THE SALVADORAN INVESTIGATIVE
COMMISSION TO TAKE ACTION ON SUCH IMPORTANT ISSUES
AS FORMAL APPROACH TO THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT
AND EXHUMATION/AUTOPSIES OF THE NUNS BURIED
IN CHALATENANGO. EVIDENCE OF FAILURE OF THE SECURITY
FORCES TO COME FORWARD WITH THE NAMES OF THOSE ON DUTY
IN THE AREA OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT THE NIGHT
OF THE MURDERS WAS ALSO CITED. DUARTE SAID HE RECOGNIZED
THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS CASE FOR SALVADORAN/US RELATIONS
AND THAT, FOR THIS REASON, MINISTER OF THE PRESIDENCY
ALVERGUE HAD BEEN ASSIGNED TO THE INVESTIGATIVE COMMISS-
SION. UNFORTUNNATELY, THE NEARLY SACROSANCT SALVADORAN
CHRISTMAS OBSERVANCE HAVE INTERVENED TO SLOW DOWN THE
INVESTIGATION. DUARTE SAID THAT HE HAD THUS FAR
TRIED NOT TO INTERVENE IN THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION
DIRECTLY BUT, AS A RESULT OF CHARGE'S PRESENTATION,
HE WOULD CALL THE COMMISSION CHAIRMAN, COL. MONTERROSA,
FOLLOWING OUR MEETING. DUARTE SAID HE HAD IMMEDIATELY
INSTRUCTED SUBSECRETARY GOMEZ VIDES OF THE FOREIGN
OFFICE, FOLLOWING OUR LAST MEETING, TO INVITE THE IAHRC
TO SEND OBSERVERS. THESE INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN PASSED
TO AMBASSADOR ARRIETA AT THE OAS MISSION. ANY DELAY
AT THAT END COULD ALSO BE CHARGED TO THE CHRISTMAS
HOLIDAYS, HE FELT. LATER, AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE
CONVERSATION, PRESIDENT DUARTE ASKED CHARGE TO ASSURE
THE DEPARTMENT THAT HE WOULD TAKE A CLOSE PERSONAL
INTEREST IN THE PROSECUTION OF THE INVESTIGATION ND
SEE IT THROUGH TO ITS CONCLUSION.

D. MILITARY ASSISTANCE

PRESIDENT DUARTE SAID THAT HE HAD TAKEN FULL COGNIZANCE
OF THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE POINTS CHARGE MADE IN OUR

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MEETING LAST TUESDAY (REFTEL 8) AND THE RENEWAL OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE. HE SAW NO REASON WHY THE SAME POINTS SHOULD NOT BE MADE TO COL. GUTIERREZ. AT THIS POINT DUARTE SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK VERY FRANKLY AND FOR THE RECORD, REPEATING PRECISELY THE ARGUMENT HE HAD MADE TO PRESIDENT CARTER DURING THEIR MEETING IN WASHINGTON. DUARTE REGARDS IT AS A SERIOUS ERROR TO CONTINUOUSLY IMPOSE THESE CONDITIONS ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN FACE TO FACE ENCOUNTERS WITH THE SALVADORAN MILITARY. IT IS HUMILIATING AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO DELIVER LECTURES AND DANGLE BEFORE THEM MILITARY ASSISTANCE THAT HAS AMOUNTED SO FAR TO LITTLE OR NOTHING. CLEARLY THE MILITARY, AND THE JRG AS A WHOLE WANT THE HELICOPTERS. THEY ARE THE ONLY REALLY SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ASSISTANCE THE UNITED STATES HAS OFFERED. BUT TO LINK THEM IN AN INSULTING FASHION TO "GOOD BEHAVIOR", AND THEN TO CHANGES IN THE COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES, THE HEART AND SOUL OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, IS ALMOST TO ENSURE A NEGATIVE AND EVEN DEFIANT REACTION. IT MAKES LESS SENSE THAN EVEN RIGHT NOW WHEN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION IS IN ITS LAST DAYS AND THE SALVADORAN MILITARY FIRMLY ANTICIPATES A VERITABLE AVALANCHE OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM THE OPENING DAY OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. WITH THE COMMAND SHIFTS NEARLY IN PLACE AND A NEW STRATEGY FOR STRENGTHENING THE ARMY VERSUS THE SECURITY FORCES ALREADY IN OPERATION, IT MAKES NO SENSE TO BEAT THE MILITARY OVER THE HEAD BY INSISTING THAT THEY TAKE THESE ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO U.S. PRESSURE. THEY KNOW WHOSE PRESSURE THEY ARE RESPONDING TO AND WE DON'T NEED TO TELL THEM AGAIN. COL. GUTIERREZ IN PARTICULAR IS ACUTELY AWARE OF WHAT MUST BE DONE TO CLEAN UP THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT BUT IT HUMILIATES HIM BEFORE HIS FELLOW OFFICERS WHEN HE MUST SEEM TO BE RESPONDING TO U.S. DICTATES. PRESIDENT DUARTE SAID HE REGRETTED HAVING TO BE SO BLUNT ABOUT THIS BUT HE FELT IT HAD TO BE SAID. HIS FEAR, HE EMPHASIZED, IS THAT THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE "PREVENTIVE MEDICINE" IN THE FORM OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE NOW WILL RESULT IN A RIGHTIST TAKEOVER OR A SUCCESSFUL CUBAN-BACKED LEFTIST OFFENSIVE. IN THE LATTER CASE, DIRECT U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY FOLLOW, TO THE GREAT COST OF THE SALVADORAN PEOPLE AND THE REPUTATION OF THE UNITED STATES. PRESIDENT DUARTE EXPRESSED THE FERVENT HOPE THAT WHEN THE CHARGE CAME TO SEE HIM POST-JANUARY 20, IT WOULD NOT BE TO ADVISE HIM THAT A MASSIVE U.S. INTERVENTION WOULD SOON BE UNDERWAY, WITH FLEETS OF HELICOPTERS AND PLENTY OF MARINES. NOW, HE SAID, IS THE TIME TO

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GIVE EL SALVADOR THE MODEST MILITARY ASSISTANCE IT NEEDS TO DEFEND ITSELF AND KEEP FOREIGN FORCES OUT OF THIS COUNTRY.

E. DIALOGUE WITH THE FDR/DRU

DUARTE SAID THAT EFFORTS WERE UNDERWAY TO CONTACT BOTH THE FDR AND THE DRU AND THAT DISCUSSIONS HAD INDEED BEEN HELD IN SAN JOSE AND PANAMA CITY. HARSH AND INHERENTLY UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS HAD BEEN IMPOSED IN BOTH THESE MEETINGS. THE JRG REGARDED THE OFFER OF DIALOGUE BY THE LEFT TO BE A MERE FEINT, A WAY TO BLUFF THE U.S. AND JRG ABOUT ITS INTENTIONS WHILE A CUBAN/NICARAGUAN BACKED INVASION WAS BEING PREPARED. AT THIS POINT, DUARTE DECIDED TO GIVE CHARGE DETAILS OF SAN JOSE/PANAMA MEETINGS, ASKING THAT HIS REMARKS BE HELD VERY CLOSELY. AS AN ASIDE, HE NOTED THAT THE
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 SAN SALVADOR 9059

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FDR/DRU HAD APPROACHED AMBASSADOR WHITE SEPARATELY BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE ON VACATION AND HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT SIMILARLY UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS HAD BEEN IMPOSED. CHARGE DID NOT CONFIRM OR DENY THAT SUCH A MEETING HAD OCCURRED. DUARTE SAID THAT, WITH THE FULL KNOWLEDGE OF COL. GUTIERREZ, HE HAD SENT TWO EMISSARIES TO SPEAK WITH FDR REPRESENTATIVES IN SAN JOSE AND DRU MEN ("THE ARMED GUERRILLAS THEMSELVES") IN PANAMA CITY. DUARTE HIMSELF MET FOR THREE HOURS, VERY SECRETLY, WITH ARCHBISHOP RIVERA Y DAMAS HERE IN SAN SALVADOR. IN ALL THESE MEETINGS, THE SAME CONDITIONS HAD BEEN LEVELED ON ANY FURTHER DIALOGUE: (1) THE PDC MUST IMMEDIATELY PULL OUT OF THE JRG; (2) IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE FDR TO DEFLECT THE DRU FROM ITS PLANNED OFFENSIVE THAT IS IMMINENT; (3) A SERIES OF IMPORTANT BATTLES WILL BE FOUGHT OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, LEAVING THE DRU IN CONTROL FIRST OF MAJOR AREAS OF EL SALVADOR WHERE A GOVERNMENT WILL BE FORMED, LATER FOLLOWING THE COLLAPSE OR SURRENDER OF THE ARMED FORCES, OF THE WHOLE TERRITORY; ONLY BY LEAVING THE JRG NOW CAN THE PDC PLAY ANY ROLE IN THE NEW REGIME THAT WILL COME TO POWER SHORTLY. DUARTE SAID THAT THESE CONDITIONS ARE TOTALLY UNREALISTIC WHEN POSED BY A REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT THAT HAS LITTLE PUBLIC SUPPORT AND FEWER ARMED MEN EVERY DAY. THE ONLY WAY HE CAN UNDERSTAND THIS ULTIMATUM IS IN THE SENSE THAT A MAJOR FOREIGN INTERVENTION WILL SOON BE MOUNTED AGAINST EL SALVADOR. THE ONLY ROLE OFFERED TO THE PDC IN THESE DISCUSSIONS WAS TO ACT AS THE INTERMEDIARY IN ARRANGING THE SURRENDER AND SELF-EXTINCTION OF THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES. THIS MAKES NO SENSE UNLESS ONE BELIEVES THAT A MASSIVE FOREIGN ARMED AND BACKED INVASION IS IMPENDING. THUS, WHILE THE JRG HAS PROCLAIMED ITSELF READY FOR DIALOGUE AND HAS SENT EMISSARIES TO THE FAR LEFT, THE CONDITIONS ARE ABJECT SURRENDER, NOTHING LESS, AND THE SANCTION CAN ONLY BE A CUBAN-NICARAGUAN ONSLAUGHT INTENDED TO PROVOKE U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION. DUARTE

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REFERRED REPEATEDLY TO STATEMENTS BY TOMAS BORGE IN MANAGUA CONFIDENTLY PREDICTING AN FMLN VICTORY. PRESIDENT DUARTE SAID HE COULD ONLY SPECULATE THAT THE RUSSIANS WANT THE U.S. TO INVADE EL SALVADOR TO EXCUSE THEIR OWN OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND, PERHAPS SOON, POLAND. HE HAD NO DOUBT THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WOULD TAKE THE BAIT AND ONLY HOPED THAT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION IN ITS LAST DAYS WOULD HEAD OFF THIS THREAT BY RENEWING MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND SUPPLYING THE HELICOPTERS, EVEN IF THEIR PRESENCE IS ONLY SYMBOLIC, AS EVIDENCE OF FLAT-OUT U.S. BACKING FOR THE JRG AGAINST DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN COMMUNISTS. DUARTE SAID THAT, EVEN THOUGH THE JRG HAS NO MONEY, IT WOULD BUY THE HELICOPTERS IF THE UNITED STATES WOULD ISSUE AN EXPORT LICENSE AND THAT IT WOULD HIRE FOREIGN PILOTS TO FLY THEM EVEN IF IT HAD TO MORTGAGE THE GOLD SUPPLY TO DO SO. HE SAID, CONCLUDING THE CONVERSATION, THAT HE REGARDED RENEWAL OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AS AN IMPORTANT SIGNAL THAT WE WOULD NOT PERMIT EL SALVADOR TO BE OVERRUN BY FOREIGN-BACKED "VOLUNTEERS" AND THAT THE CONDITIONS WE HAD LAID UPON RENEWAL OF U.S. AID WOULD BE FULFILLED AS QUICKLY AS THE JRG COULD MOVE TO DO SO.

4. COMMENT: GOES HAS EFFECTIVELY CEASED TO FUNCTION DURING CHRISTMAS HOLIDAYS AND PROGRESS IN AREAS CITED IN STATE REPT'S WILL BE DIFFICULT TO DEMONSTRATE BEFORE JANUARY 5 RESUMPTION OF OFFICE SCHEDULES. ONLY SKELETON STAFFS ARE IN PLACE AT ALL MINISTRIES UNTIL THEN. NONETHELESS, IMPENDING COMMAND SHIFTS ARE ENCOURAGING EVIDENCE OF PRESIDENT DUARTE'S COMMITMENT TO SEE RECENT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN PDC AND MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT CARRIED OUT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. SO IS HIS PROMISE TO USE HIS INFLUENCE TO ASSURE THAT THE SALVADORAN INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION PRESSED INQUIRY INTO DEATHS OF U.S. MISSIONARIES TO CONCLUSION. THESE EFFORTS ARE BEING UNDERTAKEN AGAINST WHAT DUARTE AND MILITARY HERE SEE AS IMPENDING FOREIGN INVASION TO RESCUE HARD PRESSED REMAINING CADRES OF THE ARMED SALVADORAN LEFT. EMBASSY IS HIGHLY DUBIOUS ABOUT THREAT OF CUBAN/NICARAGUAN INTERVENTION OR EVEN EFFECTIVE GENERAL OFFENSIVE BY SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS/TERRORISTS. BUT WE DO BELIEVE IT MAKES SENSE TO SEND THE SIGNAL DUARTE ASKS FOR AND TO SUPPLY THE STUDY GRANTS HE IS SEEKING FOR CERTAIN SALVADORAN OFFICERS BY RENEWING IMET IMMEDIATELY. FULL RENEWAL OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE CAN FOLLOW UPON EVIDENCE THAT CHANGES HE OUTLINED IN TODAY'S CONVERSATION (AND OTHER SOURCES CONFIRM) BEGIN TO TAKE EFFECT AND REDUCE LEVEL OF OFFICIAL/RIGHTIST VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR. EMBASSY THEREFORE RECOMMENDS RESTORATION OF IMET NOW AND CAREFUL STUDY OF IMPACT OF IMPENDING CHANGES TO PERMIT FULL RESTORATION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN NEXT TWO WEEKS. DION

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