

**Foreign Policy Breakfasts/National Security**

National Security Developments, 1/80-5/80.

EMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Memo No. 17-80

January 12, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift   
SUBJECT: Foreign Policy/National Security Developments

Schedule of NSC Meetings

On Monday morning, January 14, the SCC will meet as follows:

- 9:00 a.m. - Iran/Pakistan/Afghanistan;
- 10:00 a.m. - Regional Security in Southwest Asia.

No papers have been distributed for either of these meetings. Zbig sees the 10:00 a.m. SCC as a prelude to a formal meeting of the National Security Council with the President later in the week to take decisions on preferred US strategic and tactical options relating to our presence and our goals in the Persian Gulf, Middle East, Southwest Asia and the Indian Ocean region. The President's choices will be difficult. Zbig, accordingly, is keeping all paperwork extremely tightly held to avoid leaks and press accounts of "the options the President decided against."


The SCC did not meet on Saturday, January 12. I have enclosed a paper summarizing the January 10 and January 11 SCC meetings.

Meeting with President Suarez of Spain

I have enclosed papers for your participation in the President's luncheon for President Suarez of Spain on Monday, January 14 at 12:30 p.m.

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Classified by Source  
Review 1/10/2000

DECLASSIFIED  
NLT-2006-071  
per 7/24/06 NISC/HF  
BY  NARA, DATE 8/4/06

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### Intelligence Charters

As you know, there is mounting press play on the need for a strengthened CIA, the repeal of Hughes-Ryan and the question of the respective positions of the Administration and the Congress on intelligence charter legislation.

Richard Burt's story in the January 11 New York Times is enclosed together with an NSC paper to David Aaron which reviews growing sentiment to move on repeal of Hughes-Ryan, while at the same time, noting reluctance in the House to proceed with charter legislation in 1980. I think you will wish to discuss the state of play with David, and to have Dee Huddleston's assessment, and possibly Tip O'Neill's, before forming a judgment on the best avenue to pursue.

### Economic Embargo Against USSR

At the Monday SCC, there should be a report on the results of the weekend meeting of grain exporting nations - where we hope to receive a commitment from Argentina to support the grain embargo. On Friday afternoon the Department of State expressed the hope and the belief that Argentina would cooperate, noting, however, that we would not cut deals with Argentina involving tradeoffs on human rights and other extraneous issues for their support on the grain issue. On Friday Commerce Secretary Klutznick announced the denial of applications for 8 high technology export licenses to the USSR. The text of his announcement is also enclosed.

### Criteria for Review and Denial of Exports to USSR

I have attached to this memorandum the criteria developed under State's leadership for review and denial on foreign policy grounds of exports to the Soviet Union.

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Criteria for Review and Denial on Foreign Policy  
Grounds of Exports to the Soviet Union

1. Guidance for Review

The following cases involving items requiring validated export licenses will be reviewed for denial for foreign policy reasons in accordance with Section 6 of the Export Administration Act:

- a. all cases exceeding \$10 million in value;
- b. civil aircraft, engines;
- c. high technology items exceeding \$1 million in value;
- d. any crime control and detection items;
- e. grain and agricultural items;
- f. any petroleum equipment item exceeding \$1 million in value.

2. Guidance for Denial

Upon review, the following cases will be denied except where special circumstances warrant other action:

- a. high technology items obtainable solely, or at much lower cost, in the United States, provided they would contribute significantly to the Soviet agricultural or industrial resource base or its transport and communications infrastructure;
- b. items on the crime control list;
- c. grains exceeding the 8 million ton annual commitment; agricultural items on the prohibited list; and other agricultural items necessary to prevent replacement of prohibited items;
- d. items necessary to make effective other aspects of our policies toward the Soviet Union.

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3. The special circumstances which shall be taken into account in the review shall include;

- a. foreign availability: in quantity, quality, and at prices comparable to those in the United States;
- b. the extent to which denial impacts upon the Soviet Union;
- c. significant U.S. foreign policy and national objectives;
- d. avoidance of controls on items of trivial economic, technological or political importance;
- e. such other considerations as may be necessary to give effect to the policies and provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1979.

## OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT


Memo No. 676-80

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

February 5, 1980

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy/National Security Developments

PL-480 for Israel

Henry Owen met with Ambassador Evron on Tuesday morning to discuss Israel's PL-480 request. In Henry's words, he "thinks the meeting worked." He reviewed how little PL-480 is available, and the fact that we have programmed it for countries much poorer than Israel. It is Henry's impression (subject of course to the Ambassador's reporting back to Jerusalem) that the Israelis will no longer seek PL-480. Henry discussed CCC credits. An aide accompanying Evron noted that there was some interest, that they had been in touch with Agriculture, and that they were seeking a variant -- i.e., 10-year rather than 3-year terms. Henry says he will facilitate Evron's contacts with Hathaway on this. Henry has prepared a report on his meeting (Tab A).

SCC Meetings

The principal focus of the SCC meetings on February 4-5 has been the issue of how best to bring our allies along on aid for Pakistan and sanctions against the USSR.

The President has indicated that he wants to send a full and explicit message to each ally laying out those areas where we hope for positive allied action. Drafts of letters to the allies were being prepared and revised on Tuesday afternoon, February 5 (current drafts attached at Tab B).

As you know, Giscard d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt have just concluded three days of talks. We do not yet know what their position is on a meeting of the seven foreign ministers, although it is anticipated that the French will oppose such a meeting. With this the case, the SCC favored recommending the following scenario to the President:

- 1) Strong message from President, along lines of attached, to each major allied leader -- i.e., the seven,
- 2) A visit by a sub-Cabinet official to capitals, possibly Dick Cooper, to review in a non-confrontational way what is feasible and what is not feasible for each of the allies,

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CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT  
REVIEW ON FEBRUARY 5, 2000

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Per 7/24/06 NISC/HF  
BY LS NARA, DATE 8/4/06

BY            DATE

- 3) A visit subsequently by Secretary Vance to capitals to confirm agreement at the political level on US-allied agreement actions.

All of the above was still quite tentative as of the February 5 SCC.

#### Summer Olympics

State Department was tasked with identifying Third World countries that could be recommended to the President as the best candidates from which to choose a chairman for an international steering committee on relocating the summer Olympics. Aaron indicated that it is desired that such a steering committee be formed as early as next week.

#### President's Decision on Selective Service Revitalization

OMB is working with other members of the White House Staff to have all preparations in place for a Presidential announcement either Thursday or Friday of this week, with contacts from the White House tentatively planned as shown on the first page at Tab C. The President, of course, is holding his decision very tightly at this point.

One point I would flag: With Congress heading off on its mid-February recess this Friday, it is important to consider how members of the Senate would react to the Thursday versus Friday announcement date, i.e., would some interpret a Friday announcement as somewhat discourteous, and an effort to duck the issue, given the Congressional recess schedule?

The papers at Tab C also include a memo to you from Jim McIntyre. I touched base with Jim Johnson and told OMB that you would have no further comments during February 5.

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Dear Margaret:

It has been about six weeks since the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. In the intervening period, we have had a number of conversations, as have our associates, on how we and our principal allies should respond to the Soviet action. I believe we agree on the serious implications of the Russian move and on a concerted strategy for dealing with the consequences.

Our short-term objectives have been three-fold. First, we have taken measures aimed at making clear to Soviet leaders that we intend to make them pay a price for breaking the international rules of conduct. While we would hope that these measures could have the coercive effect of hastening the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, at the very least they should deter any further moves the Soviets might be tempted to take in adjacent areas in southwest Asia or the Persian Gulf. Second, we are seeking to strengthen the capacity of Pakistan to defend its territory against potential aggression from occupied Afghanistan. Third, we are strengthening our naval presence in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf area, as well as our ability to place additional forces there rapidly, should the need arise.

These and other immediate actions are designed to serve our longer-term goals.

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NLJC-2006-071  
per 7/24/06 NSC 1/H  
BY 12 NARA, DATE 8/4/06  
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Per: Don R. ...  
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BY: ... DATE: ...



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The first of these is not to punish the Soviets per se, but to influence their behavior in ways that will make the eventual resumption of constructive relations possible. Thus, while making clear that aggression carries a heavy cost, we must also hold out the hope of resuming better relations when possible. Keeping open our arms control offers (such as those for TNF and MBFR) is an important contribution to this end. I also believe that we should sustain and, whenever possible, improve the increasingly productive relations we have developed with Eastern Europe. This will help signal to the Soviets that ours is not a bloc-to-bloc quarrel, and help the East European states themselves develop their own integrity and freedom of action as increasingly independent nations.

Our second long-term goal is to contribute to the stability of the southwest Asian and Persian Gulf region. Our immediate military aid to Pakistan and the increase in the Western military presence in the area will help provide the backdrop of physical security against which we can address some of the most pressing economic problems and regional disputes. Our efforts to find a comprehensive Middle East settlement and to resolve the hostage issue with Iran are important parts of this policy, as is material Western support for Turkey's courageous new economic moves.

Finally, it is important that we seize this immediate crisis as a catalyst for action on some of the West's

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most pressing problems, especially our defense and energy needs. I am gratified by recent decisions to accelerate NATO's Long Term Defense Program, and by cooperation among us to reduce our energy dependence. But, more must be done in both areas.

These goals are all reinforcing. Pressing Moscow back toward more constructive policies requires not only inflicting punishment for misbehavior and improving Western defenses, but also stabilizing southwest Asia and the Gulf in order to deny the Soviets further opportunities for aggression or subversion. Southwest Asian and Gulf rulers, in turn, will be reassured not only by Western efforts in their region, but also by signs of our firmness vis-a-vis Soviet aggression and our determination with regard to Western defense and energy needs. In this context, I wanted to share with you my thoughts on next steps.

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With regard to the situation in the Persian Gulf, Reg Bartholomew and others have already briefed members of your government regarding our desires to expand US facilities on Diego Garcia. I understand that your people have been favorably responsive to the broad outline of our plans, which include increased facilities for aircraft, fuel storage, ship-docking and an improved water supply. We will be in close touch on the details of these proposals in the coming weeks and I hope we can continue to count on your support.

I have been pleased to learn that your government is giving serious thought to increased economic assistance to Pakistan, which we would hope would be in the range of \$70 million this year. You might want to explore the possibilities of at least a small extension of military credits as well, although I recognize that the extent of such aid may be affected by your close ties with India. Also, we each must continue to look closely at the needs of Turkey, which remains a keystone in Middle East stability and European defense.

Also, I very much hope that your government will see its way to augment our increased presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf with British deployments as well. I assume you will not wish to drawdown your ground forces committed to NATO, and therefore that your emphasis would be on naval and air commitments. In this

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regard, we would be pleased to share facilities with you, and to assist in logistic support of your deployments in the region. This, too, is an area which would need to be discussed in detail by our experts over coming weeks.

I also believe that we should, both in our security interests and in order to send a clear and unmistakable message to Moscow, take steps to tighten substantially the COCOM restrictions on sales of advanced technology and equipment to the USSR. Specifically, I believe we should agree among ourselves that until further notice, we would neither propose nor approve exceptions to the COCOM lists. [In addition, I think it would be desirable for our experts to consider whether the existing list should not be expanded somewhat to cover certain items of industrial equipment which make a major contribution to certain heavy industrial sectors in the USSR.]

(Presidential  
decision  
required  
on expansion  
State and  
Defense  
to rewrite)

In closing, let me reiterate the deep appreciation we Americans feel for the numerous actions your government has already taken to make evident your deep condemnation of recent Soviet actions. In particular, we applaud your leadership in getting the ball rolling on an Olympic boycott, which seems now to be gaining strength. I stress again my deep personal appreciation for your words in the Commons on January 28 regarding the outrage of current Soviet behavior, and my country's efforts to evoke a firm Allied response to it.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

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Dear Valery:

It has been about six weeks since the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. In the intervening period, we have had a number of conversations, as have our associates, on how we and our principal allies should respond to the Soviet action. I believe we agree on the serious implications of the Russian move and on a concerted strategy for dealing with the consequences.

Our short-term objectives have been three-fold. First, we have taken measures aimed at making clear to Soviet leaders that we intend to make them pay a price for breaking the international rules of conduct. While we would hope that these measures could have the coercive effect of hastening the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, at the very least they should deter any further moves the Soviets might be tempted to take in adjacent areas in southwest Asia or the Persian Gulf. Second, we are seeking to strengthen the capacity of Pakistan to defend its territory against potential aggression from occupied Afghanistan. Third, we are strengthening our naval presence in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf area, as well as our ability to place additional forces there rapidly, should the need arise.

These and other immediate actions are designed to serve our longer-term goals.

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per 7/24/06 NSC/Hr  
BY W NARA, DATE 8/4/06

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The first of these is not to punish the Soviets per se, but to influence their behavior in ways that will make the eventual resumption of constructive relations possible. Thus, while making clear that aggression carries a heavy cost, we must also hold out the hope of resuming better relations when possible. Keeping open our arms control offers (such as those for TNF and MBFR) is an important contribution to this end. I also believe that we should sustain and, whenever possible, improve the increasingly productive relations we have developed with Eastern Europe. This will help signal to the Soviets that ours is not a bloc-to-bloc quarrel, and help the East European states themselves develop their own integrity and freedom of action as increasingly independent nations.

Our second long-term goal is to contribute to the stability of the southwest Asian and Persian Gulf region. Our immediate military aid to Pakistan and the increase in the Western military presence in the area will help provide the backdrop of physical security against which we can address some of the most pressing economic problems and regional disputes. Our efforts to find a comprehensive Middle East settlement and to resolve the hostage issue with Iran are important parts of this policy, as is material Western support for Turkey's courageous new economic moves.

Finally, it is important that we seize this immediate crisis as a catalyst for action on some of the West's

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most pressing problems, especially our defense and energy needs. I am gratified by recent decisions to accelerate NATO's Long Term Defense Program, and by cooperation among us to reduce our energy dependence. But, more must be done in both areas.

These goals are all reinforcing. Pressing Moscow back toward more constructive policies requires not only inflicting punishment for misbehavior and improving Western defenses, but also stabilizing southwest Asia and the Gulf in order to deny the Soviets further opportunities for aggression or subversion. Southwest Asian and Gulf rulers, in turn, will be reassured not only by Western efforts in their region, but also by signs of our firmness vis-a-vis Soviet aggression and our determination with regard to Western defense and energy needs. In this context, I wanted to share with you my thoughts on next steps.

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First, it is of fundamental importance that each of us make a strong public gesture of support for a coordinated Western response to ensure that the Soviet leadership realizes that we are not divided on the seriousness of their actions.

Second, France has an especially important role to play, as you and I have discussed, in the common effort to bolster regional stability in Southwest Asia. In this regard, I hope you will give special consideration to the following issues, many of which are currently under discussion between us and our western colleagues:

*Economic*  
-- ~~Military~~ assistance to Pakistan is vitally important. I hope France can double such assistance this year.

*Relocate -  
rewrite  
to sharpen.*

-- We are appreciative of the interest your government has shown in consideration of increased economic assistance to Turkey. It will be very important that assistance be flexible enough to assure its quick absorption.

-- I appreciate your government's willingness to speed up discussions of the provision of high performance aircraft for Pakistan. I am hopeful financing for this project can be arranged by France, possibly in tandem with the Saudis.

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-- The French naval presence in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean is especially important to Western interests. Any effort your government can make to strengthen this presence would be most valuable. We hope you will also consider the possibility of French participation in joint naval maneuvers with the UK and US in the Indian Ocean.

Include language on access to Djibouti and pass-through.

-- Your continuing efforts to encourage a truly non-aligned Indian policy and to allay Indian fears about western assistance to Pakistan <sup>will be</sup> ~~are~~ particularly important.

Third, in the area of commercial policy, I am eager to develop more fully earlier conversations involving the commitment of your government not to undercut our commercial policy toward the Soviets. In this same vein, I hope France will join in efforts to enforce stringent controls on high technology sales to the USSR, through application of the COCOM lists without exceptions. [Further, I hope you will consider with us the possibility of an expanded list that would include heavy industrial items that contribute to Soviet strategic capacity or have important military applications.]

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Sharpen [ It is particularly important that the Allies not step in to complete projects from which U.S. and other firms have withdrawn, i.e., the proposed aluminum plant at Sayansk where U.S., German, and French firms all have a potential stake and the Alcoa steel plant.

Finally, you know the importance I attach to denying the Soviet Union the privilege of hosting the Olympic games, as long as their military forces remain in Afghanistan. This issue is a difficult and emotional one and I appreciate the thoughtfulness with which it is being discussed in France.

I look forward to continued consultations with you and other allied leaders as we continue to consider the western response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Our specific actions must of course reflect the interests of each of our countries, but I know you share my view that the Soviet threat must not go unanswered and that we must be united and unshakable in our resolve.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

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Dear Helmut:

It has been about six weeks since the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. In the intervening period, we have had a number of conversations, as have our associates, on how we and our principal allies should respond to the Soviet action. I believe we agree on the serious implications of the Russian move and on a concerted strategy for dealing with the consequences.

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NLSC-2006-021  
per 7/24/06 NLSC/Ar  
BY        NARA DATE 8/4/06

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I share your view that a "division of labor" among the Allies is needed to ensure that each of us makes a maximum contribution to our common effort. You are aware of the steps which the United States has taken or plans to take both bilaterally with the USSR, in the NATO context, and in Southwest Asia itself to respond to the Soviet invasion. My decision, despite the economic problems and conflicting pressures which we face in the United States, to seek a five percent real growth in our 1981 defense budget is an example of the type of action which I hope our Allies will be prepared to take. I understand that you and your colleagues are giving renewed consideration to the possibility of a supplemental appropriation which would bring the real growth in the FRG's 1980 defense budget (slightly) above the three percent commitment we adopted at the 1978 NATO summit. I hope that the Federal government will carry through with this program and that it will be exclusive of funds covering higher fuel costs and more funds for military assistance for Turkey. You will appreciate the problems for Allied solidarity which would doubtless arise should the United States Congress and people gain the impression that our Allies were not prepared to match the additional burden which we are assuming.

*Strengthen*

I was very pleased to learn from Ambassador Stoessel's conversation with Finance Minister Matthoefer that the FRG plans a substantial increase in its 1980 assistance to Turkey and that you are already taking steps to carry out your responsibility for coordinating Western assistance to Turkey

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this year. You may be sure that the United States will again make a major contribution to Turkey, both in economic and military assistance, during 1980. Finance Minister Matthoefer indicated to Ambassador Stoessel that he believed that it would be necessary for the United States contribution, again this year, to exceed that of the Federal Republic. I hope you will agree with me, given the very great overall efforts which we will be making elsewhere, that it would be appropriate for the Federal Republic not only to take the lead role organizationally but to be the largest single contributor to Turkish assistance this year.

In the case of Pakistan, the United States will almost certainly emerge as the major Western contributor, although the size of our contribution will depend upon the willingness of others to participate in this program. In this case, I hope you will agree that a substantial increase in the Federal Republic's contribution, beyond what you previously planned to do for Pakistan during 1980, would be in order. Given that country's enormous needs and the very dangerous situation in the area, I would hope that the Federal Republic would be in a position at least to double its assistance to Pakistan this year.

As you know, the United States has already taken very significant steps in the economic area designed to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that "business as usual" is impossible in light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. I hope that

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(more than double to —)



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(Fall off, trading for other issues.)

the Federal Republic will also be able to take some steps in your very extensive economic relationship with the Soviet Union which would complement the measures which we are taking. While I would not propose that the Federal Republic end its program of Hermes guarantees for private bank credits to the Soviet Union, it would seem to me that some informal limit on the total volume of these credits, as well as a ceiling on each individual guarantee would be consistent with your treaty obligations to the USSR and would at the same time send a very useful message to Moscow.

I also believe that we should, both in our security interests and in order to send a clear and unmistakable message to Moscow, take steps to tighten substantially the COCOM restrictions on sales of advanced technology and equipment to the USSR. Specifically, I believe we should agree among ourselves that until further notice, we would neither propose nor approve exceptions to the COCOM lists. [In addition, I think it would be desirable for our experts to consider whether the existing list should not be expanded somewhat to cover certain items of industrial equipment which make a major contribution to certain heavy industrial sectors in the USSR.]

I also hope that the Western countries can take some symbolic step in the economic area which would strengthen the signal which we have been attempting to send to Moscow. Specifically, I believe we should all agree among ourselves

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that we would not, for the time being, allow our companies to bid on or participate in major Soviet projects from which one or another of our companies have withdrawn. I would welcome your thoughts on this possibility. One specific example which comes to mind is the Sayansk aluminum project in the USSR on which our company ALCOA, together with the FRG firm Gutehoffnungshutte, was competing against a French group headed by Pechiney/Ugine Kuhlmann. As you know, ALCOA has already advised the Soviet authorities that it will not be in a position to proceed with discussions on this project. If both ALCOA's German partners and its French competitors made a similar undertaking, I believe this message would be understood in Moscow.

You know how strongly I feel about the total inappropriateness of international participation in the Moscow Olympic games at the same time that Soviet troops are attempting to subjugate the people of Afghanistan. In recent days, I have noted that my view is gaining support throughout the world.

Finally, I believe it is important that we move quickly to adopt our common program. I hope that the Foreign Ministers meeting, which we have discussed previously, can be held in the very near future and that our Ministers will be able to reach firm agreement on a coordinated plan of action.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

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FRIDAY

<u>TIME</u>	<u>ACTION</u>	<u>RESPONSIBILITY</u>
8:00 a.m.	Announcement to Senior Staff of President's decision	Jordan/McDonald
8:00 a.m.	Cabinet notification: Defense, SSS, JCS Other PRM-47 agencies (DOL, DOJ, DOS, DHEW, NSC, ACTION, FEMA) Other Cabinet	J. White J. White (PAD's)  H. Wellford (PAD's)
9:00 a.m.	Congressional Leadership Notification Sens. Byrd, Stennis, Nunn The Speaker Reps. Price, White	Frank Moore
10:00 a.m.	Interest Group Notification Women Political Selected Governors Veterans, Students, Educators Religious Black Hispanic Labor	L. Tarr-Whelan B. Albers G. Eidenberg Chanin/Ryor Chanin/Ryor L. Martin E. Torres Butler/Aronson
11:00 a.m.	Background press briefing	J. White
11: <sup>30</sup> <del>45</del> a.m.	PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF SSS REVITALIZATION DECISIONS	

DECLASSIFIED

1045C-2006-071  
per 7/24/06 NSC/TC  
BY CS NARA, DATE 8/4/06

DECLASSIFIED

Per Dec 2006  
EASON: MLC  
BY \_\_\_\_\_ NARA, DATE \_\_\_\_\_



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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

February 5, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT ✓

ZBIG BRZEZINSKI  
STU EIZENSTAT  
JACK WATSON  
ANNE WEXLER  
SARAH WEDDINGTON  
FRANK MOORE  
AL McDONALD  
LLOYD CUTLER

FROM:

James T. McIntyre, Jr. *Jim*

SUBJECT:

Presidential Decisions on Selective Service Revitalization

A draft memorandum on additional Selective Service Revitalization issues is attached for your review.

To assure timely review by the President, your comments are requested by 5:00 P.M. TODAY at my office (Room 246, Old Executive Office Building).

DECLASSIFIED

*NSC-2006-071*  
*per 8/24/06 NSC ltr*  
BY *VS* NARA, DATE *8/4/06*



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

DRAFT

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL -- SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: James T. McIntyre, Jr.

SUBJECT: Selective Service Revitalization Issues

You have reviewed my memorandum of February 2, 1980 on whether to seek legislative authority to register women. This memorandum places that decision in the context of Selective Service Revitalization and the military manpower issues considered by PRM-47, due the Congress by February 9, and presents options for decision on several sensitive registration implementation issues. We will send the final report incorporating relevant decisions to you for final approval on Friday, February 8.

PRM-47 Context:

Congress posed the women's registration issue last fall in the debate on return to peacetime registration. Subsequent events in Southwest Asia and your decision on resuming male registration heightened the immediacy of the issue; it was no longer a decision that could be put off until mobilization.

Registration of women, because of the strong emotions it evokes, should not obscure the fact that it is but one aspect of the Selective Service System revitalization and of the other military manpower issues you have considered. PRM-47 will point out that with respect to trained manpower, the AVF remains our fundamental policy. The FY 1981 budget calls for \$500 M of new authority to continue strengthening the AVF. The improvements which have been achieved or are planned for this year for Selective Service include: the execution of interagency support agreements with the Post Office and Social Security (a first in your Administration); expanded ADP support capability (to be on line this year); and selection, appointment and training of local board members in accordance with principles of community representativeness, equity and consistency of decisionmaking (to be implemented for the first time in your Administration).

DECLASSIFIED  
NLJC-2008-071  
DEC 7/29/06 NSC/Hr  
BY LT NARA, DATE 8/4/06

## Legislative Actions

To implement registration, we will submit an appropriation request with sufficient funds to register males and females. It will be accompanied by a bill seeking authority to register women under the Military Selective Service Act. To meet our registration schedule for men, we will need Appropriations Committee approval by early March.

## ISSUES:

### 1. WHAT AGE GROUPS SHOULD BE REGISTERED?

The Military Selective Service Act permits you to register all males between age 18 and 26 or any age group within that population. Steps taken to revitalize the Selective Service System are sized to register up to three age groups. If a decision were made to register all eligible age groups, it could not be completed until next year.

Selective Service is planning to operate under the 1971 reforms which eliminated student and occupational deferments, instituted the national random lottery and replaced the "oldest first" policy with a one year of vulnerability/20 year olds first policy. This reduced the unfairness and the years of uncertainty which characterized earlier drafts.

We estimate that registering 19 and 20 year olds will create a pool large enough to meet DOD needs and would reinforce our position that we are reinstituting registration only to support the mobilization needs of DOD. Following initial registration, we would institute continuous registration of 18 year olds next year.

Including older age groups would delay implementation and significantly add to costs. It could not be justified by the needs of Defense, would generate greater demands for occupational and hardship deferments, and would rekindle the controversy that was successfully addressed by the 1971 reforms which limited the prime vulnerability to a single year.

## RECOMMENDATION

OMB, DOD, and SSS recommend that only 19 and 20 year olds be registered now.

## DECISION

\_\_\_\_\_ Approve

\_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove

## 2. WHEN SHOULD REGISTRATION BE CONDUCTED?

Selective Service and the Postal Service recommend that registration commence in June to assure smooth implementation. This would facilitate registration by spreading the workload more evenly around the country, since the resident college population would be generally dispersed to their home communities.

### RECOMMENDATION

OMB, SSS and the Postal Service recommend that we announce publicly that registration will commence as soon as it is administratively feasible and that this will not be before the end of May. We should plan on June.

### DECISION

\_\_\_\_\_ Approve

\_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove

## 3. ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS

The present law, enacted in 1948, defines a knowing failure to register as a felony, with penalties upon conviction ranging up to five years in prison or a \$10,000 fine or both. While we should not highlight our approach to enforcement, since careful and detailed guidance should be issued by the Attorney General, we should be prepared for questions contending that this penalty may be unduly harsh.

We recommend that no legislative changes to this provision be proposed at this time. Seeking to raise the penalty would overemphasize the confrontational aspects of the enforcement problem, and reducing it would send the wrong signal about how you view the seriousness of the duty to register. Rather, we recommend that the following be said in response to questions:

We expect that, as has been true in the past, those Americans who are required by law to register will comply with the law. For those few who fail to do so, the President will ask the Attorney General to provide guidance to United States Attorneys on an enforcement policy appropriate for peacetime registration.

To ensure that those who should register for the draft do so, we will work with the Director of Selective Service and the Attorney General to develop a more structured, consistent but not a highly publicized program to identify those who have failed to register, and report to you as appropriate.

#### RECOMMENDATION

OMB and SSS recommend that no legislative proposals on enforcement be made at this time.

#### 4. DEFENSE ACCESS TO REGISTRATION DATA

Defense wants to provide to its recruiters the names and addresses of registrants who consent to release of this information. This would help recruiters, and would not violate the Privacy Act. Selective Service disagrees with releasing the information because it would like to disassociate the registration process from the DOD.

#### RECOMMENDATION

DOD asks that you approve release of registration data of consenting persons to military recruiters. OMB and SSS oppose this policy.

#### DECISION

\_\_\_\_\_ Approve policy

\_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove policy



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