

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

Memo No. 791-80

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

March 21, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy/National Security Developments


1. CAMP DAVID MEETING. The papers providing background for the talks this Saturday are being forwarded separately.
2. MIDDLE EAST.
 - a) Begin's Travel Plans: Prime Minister Begin informed Ambassador Lewis on March 20 that he would be able to travel to Washington between April 9 and 15. Begin seemed to be thinking in terms of a three or four day trip between the 10th and 15th, but said it was possible, if desired, for him to stay slightly later than the 15th. He added, however, that he had to return to Israel by the 19th for Israel's Memorial and Independence Day on April 21. Lewis commented that while Begin was obviously pleased with the President's telephone call and said he had readily accepted the invitation, he seemed to be looking forward to the trip with something less than wild enthusiasm.
 - b) Possible Relocation of Prime Minister's Office: During a meeting with Hanon Bar-on on March 20, Ambassador Lewis emphasized the seriousness with which the U.S. would view any attempt to relocate the Prime Minister's office to East Jerusalem, both with regard to the peace process and its impact on U.S.-Israeli relations. Bar-on promised to look into the question of what other government offices might be operating in east Jerusalem, but said that so far as he knew there were no others except the Justice ministry. Lewis commented that a Ma'ariv source claimed that Davar was incorrect in reporting that the search for a building had been going on for several months, insisting instead that it had arisen only "on the day of the U.S. vote in the UN Security Council." Lewis added that if this is correct, it would confirm one of his worst fears about the potential repercussions of that vote.

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REVIEW ON MARCH 21, 2000

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- c) Letter from Sadat to Begin: On March 20, Ambassador Atherton forwarded the text of a letter dated March 17 from President Sadat to Prime Minister Begin. In conveying the letter, Vice President Mubarak stressed that it was being provided to us in confidence and that Egypt had no intention of publicizing it or telling the Israelis that it was given to us. Sadat's letter consisted of an expression of deep concern over the present state of the negotiations, especially over the likelihood that agreement will not be reached before May 26. He noted that failure to do so will make it difficult for Egypt to oppose or prevent any moves within the UN for the purpose of establishing new terms of reference, and will give credence to allegations that the peace accords constitute a separate peace agreement. Sadat concluded by calling for the establishment of a committee that would be charged with the task of resolving the issue of security.
- d) Khalid on Negotiating Prospects and Strategy: During discussions with Ambassador Atherton, Prime Minister Khalil expressed pessimism that anything would be achieved in the negotiations before May 26 at which time Egypt's position would become untenable. For this reason, Khalil said he was working on the idea of a Security Council resolution and had "90 percent" convinced President Sadat to adopt this course of action. He said he was working under the assumption that such a resolution was inevitable in any case, and that it was better to begin before May 26 in order to achieve a result that would be balanced, consistent with Camp David, and acceptable to the Israelis. Khalil made it clear that he was counting on an early change of government in Israel and even professed confidence that this would occur "perhaps within six weeks," producing a coalition including Peres, Burg and Weizman. Khalil recognized that Israeli elections would result in a negotiating pause, but said this would be understood and even relieve pressures on Egypt.
- e) Hussein: According to Ambassador Veliotes, the invitations to Begin and Sadat present us with an "integrity problem" in addition to our already difficult one of retaining credibility as a mediator. He believes Hussein concluded that we were trying to "set him up" by extending the April 17 invitation, especially in view of media reports which are conveying the impression that the Sadat/Begin/Hussein invitations are linked, and that Hussein's acceptance

was a foregone conclusion. He added that Hussein was clearly upset with the situation after learning of the President's invitations to Begin and Sadat, and asked that his counter proposal for a late May-early June visit be withdrawn. Hussein added that "it would be best under the circumstances just to leave it open to see what develops."

- f) Vance Testimony: A summary of Secretary Vance's testimony before the SFRC is at Tab A.
3. OLYMPICS BOYCOTT. The President met on Friday with 1980 Summer Olympic candidates. Prior to that meeting he had the benefit of Lloyd Cutler's March 20 assessment (Tab B) which reviews an unexpected, very serious problem we may have with the British Olympic Committee and the problems we face in getting international agreement both on a boycott and on alternate games.
4. TITO/YUGOSLAVIA. As you know, Tito has continued his struggle with very slight improvement over the past two days. Of importance, Yugoslavia has just launched a salvo at the USSR blasting Soviet anti-Yugoslav propaganda with text as follows: "As President Josip Broz Tito, 87, lingered in 'very grave' condition today, Yugoslavia accused the Soviet Union of putting pressure on the Belgrade government in a manner reminiscent of the 1948 'propaganda war' when Tito broke with the Kremlin. Foreign Ministry spokesman Mirko Kalezic, in the first official comment on anti-Yugoslav articles in the Vietnamese press which were reprinted in Soviet media, said the newspapers in question were official Army and Communist Party publications. 'It is not just press polemics,' he told his regular weekly news conference. 'In question is an attack on Yugoslavia.' The articles in question accused Yugoslavia of being 'an ally with the devil and imperialists' in both Washington and Peking because of its critical stand on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. They questioned the non-aligned principles on which Yugoslavia bases its foreign policy. 'It is simply unbelievable how much nonsense has been said about Yugoslavia,' Kalezic said. This was done in such insulting words that it recalls the days of the past propaganda war during the (1948) cominform when Soviet Dictator Josef Stalin expelled Tito from the Soviet bloc for disobedience. The Yugoslav press has been full of reaction to the Soviet attacks in recent days, but this was the first official reaction - and one of the sharpest. In Ljubljana, doctors said Tito was clinging to a small rally in his 'very grave' condition but officials held out no hope for a further recovery." This is of significance, underlining the importance of high level US representation at Tito's funeral.

I was advised on Friday that the Yugoslavs have quietly approached us for more of the medicines they are using to treat Tito -- they are not giving up.

5. YOUR MEETING WITH CARDINAL COOKE, SUNDAY, MARCH 23.

I have included the paper at Tab C reviewing the assistance we are giving to the Catholic Relief Service effort in Lebanon. As you will recall, this is of importance to Pope John Paul II, and you can give Cardinal Cooke positive news.

On a related subject, I met with Ambassador Bob Wagner on Friday, March 21. He wanted you to know of his proposal that the President take time during his visit to the Vatican this June to meet not only with the Pope but also with the Americans training for the priesthood at the Vatican's North American College. Wagner had earlier been advised by the President's staff that the President wanted to spend at least two hours at the Vatican. I told the Ambassador that I thought a meeting with the North American College most certainly warranted positive consideration.

6. ZIMBABWE INDEPENDENCE CEREMONIES. Following up on your request, I have done the paper at Tab D on Zimbabwe Independence Ceremonies.

HIGHLIGHTS OF SECRETARY VANCE'S TESTIMONY
BEFORE THE SFRC
March 20, 1980

SUMMARY

An unhappy but generally restrained SFRC questioned Secretary Vance about the implications of the Security Council vote for Israel, our role in the peace process and U.S. prestige overall. Only Dick Stone and, to a lesser extent, Jacob Javits, were aggressive in their questions. The Administration's policy on settlements was not challenged per se, and both Biden and Church made it clear they thought Israel's policy was wrong. Church said at the end that he thought the Secretary's testimony had helped to clear the air, and it now seems unlikely the Senate will attempt to pursue this matter much further.

The Secretary forcefully reiterated our firm and unshaken support for Israel's security and noted Israel's strategic importance to the United States. He emphasized the recommendatory nature of the UNSC Resolution, confirmed under repeated questioning that if all U.S. proposed changes were made, he would again recommend voting for the Resolution, and very gently pointed out that it was Israeli settlements activity that hindered the peace process thereby leading to our vote after it became clear that our hopes for Israeli restraint were not satisfied. END SUMMARY.

Church worried that the Security Council vote was a departure from this Administration's most impressive accomplishment, the Camp David Accords. He agreed that settlements were

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an impediment to the autonomy talks, but insisted that it was a mistake to have voted against either of the parties just now.

Javits complained that the Security Council vote was an unmitigated disaster, and that the Islamic world was trying to tell us that the hostage they wanted the West to surrender is Israel. He worried about whether the use of the term "Palestinian and other Arab territories" in the resolution implied that we were assigning to the Palestinians a sense of sovereignty that we were withholding from the Israelis, and insisted that it was not satisfactory for the President to disavow parts of the resolution without setting the balance of it aside.

McGovern was very supportive of the Camp David peace process, but felt it was wrong for the United States, having taken the role of moderator, to have censured either side. He felt that since the United States could express itself in other ways, we simply should have vetoed this resolution. He wanted assurance that the Carter doctrine in the Gulf would not be implemented at Israel's expense.

Stone was deeply disturbed that we had failed to declare in advance that we would veto any attempt to implement any part of the resolution. He would not accept that it was pointless to speculate what part of the resolution the UN might choose to follow up. Nor would he accept that the President's statement removed the need to formally disavow our vote. He is convinced that those who pursued the resolution

in the first place would do so again this fall, and that we will be "right back in the soup in September."

Biden wondered out loud--while pointedly noting that he did not expect the Secretary to comment--whether what the Administration was trying to do was to send Begin a strong signal that he had badly underestimated the depth of U.S. concern about settlements. He said he found it hard to understand the vote, but he declared explicitly that he thought Israel was "dead wrong" in its settlements policy.

Sarbanes was very critical of the process by which we participated in the drafting of the resolution, as was Moynihan. Moynihan insisted that we never should have "accepted" the settlements commission report since that was tantamount to "endorsement." He insisted that the U.S. should simply have "taken note."

In the course of responding to questions put by the members, the Secretary noted that:

-- Israel is of "major strategic value" to the U.S. and will always remain a close friend and "critically important ally";

-- Settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute would be an important factor in regional stability;

-- One reason the U.S. abstained on earlier votes concerning settlements was the hope that Israel would be encouraged to show restraint; but the subsequent lack of

restraint in itself posed a danger to the autonomy talks;

-- There is no inconsistency between our preference for an undivided Jerusalem and the statement by Yost in 1969 that East Jerusalem is occupied territory; East Jerusalem is occupied territory and its status can only be resolved through negotiations. But said that at the same time we believe Jerusalem must not become physically divided again;

-- Stated that the term "Palestinian Arab territories" is simply a demographic description, one that the U.S. has used in previous UN resolutions and which represents no change whatever in our policy;

-- Declared that the negotiations have not yet had to deal with the issue of whether Jews will be permitted to live on the West Bank. But when they come to that, he hopes that will also be permitted;

-- The resolution was recommendatory, not binding, and that we had made that point clear in our statement at the time of the vote;

-- The drafters of the resolution proposed "endorsement" of the Commission's report but we refused to do so. We agreed to "accept" the report, since to us that implied no sense of "endorsement," but only meant the UNSC had received the report.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 20, 1980

MEMORANDUM

FROM: LLOYD CUTLER
SUBJECT: OLYMPICS

On March 17-19, I attended a 12-nation meeting on planning for what we have called "alternative games," and now describe as a post-Olympics international sports festival. I also met privately in Geneva with Madame Berlioux, the Executive Director of the IOC, with Mr. Keller, the head of the Federation of International Sports Federations, with Douglas Hurd, U. K. Minister of State in the Foreign Office, and in London with Sir Dennis Follows, the Chairman of the British Olympic Committee.

The present status of our efforts is this:

I. The Boycott Itself.

a) At the moment when the Germans and French* appear to be preparing to join the boycott, we are in serious danger of losing the British.

b) According to the Chairman of the British Olympic Committee, the Committee will decide next Tuesday, March 25, to accept the invitation to Moscow. Sir Dennis is a living Colonel Blimp, whose only other international experience has been 12 years as Secretary of the British Airline Pilots Association. He is a pure Olympian who puts aside all responsibilities as a citizen of the West in favor of sports as the last hope of world peace. His views of Mrs. Thatcher and the President are visibly apoplectic, although wholly confined to how much harm they have done to sports.

c) The only chances of deterring the BOC are for Lord Carrington and the other West European Olympic Committees to persuade him to wait until the others make their decisions in May. Carrington will ask Sir Dennis to come in Friday,

* - The French "background" spokesman who said Monday it now appeared "most unlikely" a French team would go to Moscow was Francois Poncet.

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and he will meet Saturday in Brussels with the other West European NOCs (with Miller of the USOC invited as observer). Based on our meeting Wednesday, the chances of dissuading the BOC are slight.

d) The BOC has four reasons for deciding now - the effect of continuing uncertainty on the preparations of the athletes, contract liabilities to 10-15 firms who have paid for merchandizing rights (e.g., Revlon has the right to call itself the 1980 Olympic lipstick), the anxieties and potential losses of 5000 fans who have purchased Moscow tour packages, and the need to raise an additional £ 400,000 to finance the BOC's Moscow expenses. He admits that the other European NOC's have similar problems, but says he will only listen to their desire to defer their decisions if it is not motivated by governments. He is utterly unimpressed by the importance of Western unity; indeed, it strikes him as an improper "political" argument. He says he is perfectly willing to have the British team be the only Western team in Moscow, because this would show the BOC followed the Olympic principles while the other NOCs bowed to their governments.

e) The British Government realizes if the BOC decides next week to go to Moscow, the effect on the Government's prestige at home and abroad will be disastrous. Even worse, the other West European Governments and NOCs may say that this makes an effective boycott impossible, and make this an excuse for going to Moscow themselves. On the other hand, the German and French Governments may take a certain satisfaction in showing that, by making haste slowly, they will bring their own NOCs along to join the boycott while Mrs. Thatcher's imperious tactics failed.

f) As for the rest of Western Europe - and in the minds of the British public as well - there is still lingering doubt that in the end the U. S. will allow its team to go. While this doubt is to some extent wishful thinking, it is widely offered as a justification for the delay which the Europeans find more convenient in any event. We have taken many steps to make clear that the President's decision is final and that the USOC is committed to accept it, but we need to take more,

g) Among the skeptics are Madame Berlious and Mr. Keller, who rule the IOC and the international federations. Madame Berlious asked me if "now that President Carter is going to be reelected," he no longer has political need for continuing the boycott. She also noted that from her discussions with NBC, they still show every sign of expecting a U. S. team

to be in Moscow and to cover the Olympics. If the IOC receives \$3 million from NBC on April 1, she will be even more convinced.

g) Despite these doubts, Madame Berlioux and Mr. Keller do recognize the substantial risk that most of the West European governments and NOCs will join the boycott. To counteract such a development, they are preparing to change the IOC rules to allow individual athletes to attend the Moscow games even if their NOCs do not accept their invitations. The initiative for this ploy comes from Mr. Keller. The question will be discussed at an IOC-International Federation meeting in Geneva on April 21-22, and a decision will be taken at that time. While such a move would result in a number of important individual defections, it is unlikely to counteract the basic political effect of a widespread boycott.

h) In summary, the prospects for the political success of the boycott remain good, provided the impending British defection can be deferred or contained, and provided we take every step available to dispel the lingering doubt about whether a U. S. team will go to Moscow after all.

II. The Post-Olympics International Sports Festival

a) As the attached reporting cables and press reports indicate, good progress was made at the Geneva meetings. David Wolper's presence helped to show the professional competence of our efforts and the potentials for financial and technical success.

b) All the same, there remain a number of serious problems, some of which could prove insuperable unless we exercise all the authority, as well as the persuasion, within our command.

c) Foremost is the persisting opposition of the international federations. They regard government efforts to arrange or even to encourage the proposed international festival as an unwarranted intrusion on their exclusive preserve, and as a threat to the IOC as well, with which they have now achieved a harmonious as well as remunerative relationship (mostly out of our television payments).

d) The most the international federations will consider - and this is only true of some of them (fortunately the most important, such as track and swimming) - is to enlarge on a previously scheduled post-Olympic event or perhaps fit some new one into the existing schedule. But they will do even this only under great pressure, and only after it is clear that most of Western Europe has joined the boycott.

e) The federations are entrenched, ably led, Soviet-infiltrated and totally unsympathetic to the boycott. The pressure on them must include both carrots and sticks. The only carrots we have are their interest in providing opportunities for the athletes who do not go to Moscow and an ample share of the expected television revenues. Their interest in helping the athletes is not very high, compared to their interest in protecting their own turf and the IOCs, although they may be responsive to their national federations. Their appetite for television revenues has been somewhat jaded by their large receipts from the Moscow revenues and by a Los Angeles 1984 prepayment of \$20 million to the IOC, in which they have a 33% share. We have only two potential sticks. One is to acquire and, as needed, invoke the legal authority to interrupt the relationships between the international federations on the one hand and the national federations and U. S. television networks on the other. The other potential stick is to attack the joint use of the sanctioning power by all the federations and the IOC as a violation of the U. S. antitrust laws as it applies to games held in the U. S., U. S. athletes, and U. S. television rights. Of these two courses, the former involves fewer problems and would probably be more effective.

f) The other serious problem affecting the international festival is that Western European governments we need for the success of the boycott - e.g., West Germany - may conclude that a boycott without an international festival presents fewer problems with their sports organizations than a boycott plus an international festival. If such objections are raised, we may need to take them into account. The boycott and the international festival are now linked in the minds of many European sports organizations as twin evils - one as bad as the other. Fortunately, our own USOC and national sports federations appear to favor the festival if the U. S. does not go to Moscow, and we will have to rely on them to persuade the other national and international bodies.

III. The Calendar Ahead

There is much to be done in the weeks ahead, as indicated by the following calendar:

March 20 through April 15 -

12-nation working party proceeds with plans for international festival.

March 20-21

U. S. should decide on invoking IEEPA to enforce various economic and cultural exchange responses to Soviet actions, including ban on further NBC payments for Moscow telecasts.

March 21 - President receives U. S. Olympic candidates

21 - West European Sports Ministers meet in Strasbourg

22 - West Europe NOCs and USOC meet in Brussels

22 - Latin American Sports Ministers meet in Mexico City

24 - 29 - IOC and International Federation officials meet Soviet officials in Moscow on organization of Summer Olympics

25 - BOC meets to decide its position

29 - 30 - USOC meets with NGB's in Colorado Springs

April 1 - Keller in Los Angeles to meet Wolper and other LA Olympic officials

12 - USOC General Assembly meets to adopt resolution to accept President's decision on sending team to Moscow

21 - 22 - IOC and International Federations meet in Geneva

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

Memo No. 790-80

March 20, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 

SUBJECT: Meeting with Cardinal Cooke, Sunday, March 23, 1980, New York City, 5:00 p.m.

Catholic Relief Services Fund for Lebanon

A little more than a year ago Cardinal Cooke was in touch with you on behalf of His Holiness John Paul II to ask that we do everything possible to support the Catholic Relief Services Project in Lebanon. You advised him that the CRS proposal had been favorably considered and that the details were being worked out.

In your meeting with Cardinal Cooke you may wish to give him the following update.

- On August 31, 1979, AID granted an additional \$5 million (over the \$1.6 million granted in FY 77 and 78) to finance a program to repair and rehabilitate health, education and social welfare institutions that suffer as a result of the hostilities throughout Lebanon.
- On February 7, 1980, CRS presented a detailed plan to AID for procurement of goods and services, which AID approved on February 8.
- There are currently three institutions receiving funds for CRS/Beirut. One is Muslim (a Shia school), another Catholic (a home for the aged), and the third non-confessional (a school for the blind). CRS anticipates that contracts with these institutions will be signed by the end of April 1980, with rehabilitative work commencing shortly thereafter.

Cy to: Al Eisele

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BY CS NARA, DATE 8/4/06


OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

Memo No. 789-80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 20, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 

VIA: Jim Johnson

SUBJECT: Zimbabwe Independence Ceremonies

My contacts with David Aaron, Dick Moose, Peter Tarnoff, Tony Lake and Jerry Funk of the NSC staff indicate that everyone is in favor of your heading the US delegation to the April 17-18 Zimbabwe Independence Ceremonies.

At my request, Jerry Funk has done an initial paper on this subject to David and Zbig (Tab A). Given your talks with Prime Minister Vorster in 1977 and the "Zimbabwe success story" which has evolved since then, your participation would be seen as a very important substantive event not only by Mugabe but also by the front line Presidents, by the leaders of Africa, and by governments around the world. We are already beginning to receive indications that the Soviets are gearing up for full participation in the ceremonies.

You indicated that if there was agreement on the part of State and the NSC that it would be appropriate for you to head the US delegation, you might wish to mention it to the President. (We of course have to keep President Tito in mind.)

Given the remoteness of Zimbabwe, and the relative lack of facilities for a large US delegation, it is important that we take some decisions fairly early on if you are to undertake this mission. I have asked Dick Moose discreetly to do some planning that would give us a two-track set of options -- one with you heading the delegation and the other with another head of delegation -- that would permit us to consider how best to design such a mission, stopovers, talks with other leaders, the question of whether or not to stay in Salisbury or to arrive from another near by capital with better housing for the ceremonies.

RECOMMENDATION: Based on the above that you confirm with David that he and Zbig support this proposal and that you then discuss it with the President.

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REVIEW ON MARCH 20, 1986

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per 7/24/06 NSC/SC
EX-10 NARA DATE 8/9/06

MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 17, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
DAVID AARON

FROM: JERRY FUNK *JK*

SUBJECT: Delegation to Zimbabwe Independence Ceremony (U)

Prince Charles will haul down the Union Jack at midnight, April 17, in Salisbury. (U)

State is busy making short, long, and medium lists of delegations, and we are all getting lots of calls from volunteers ready to go along. (C)

It seems to me that it is to our advantage, with respect to our relations with Africa and the Third World, to send a high-level and fairly large delegation. (C)

A large delegation, with 15/20 "public" members, could also be useful in strengthening our domestic political position regarding Africa as well. (C)

After talking briefly to Denis Clift, Louis Martin, Dick Moose, and others, I am convinced that the delegation should be led by the Vice President, and should consist of something like the following:

The Vice President
Two Senators (McGovern, Javits)
Two Congressmen (Gray, Solarz)
Two State (Moose, Lake)
AID (~~Boitshen~~ *Burke*)
WHO (~~Marten~~)
NSC (Funk)
plus 15/20 "public" members (to be selected by President, in advance of the Vice President and W.H.O.)
plus 15 support staff
plus 15 press (C)

I am told that a delegation led by the Vice President would probably require two planes. If the Vice President is to go, the delegation should go and return as directly as possible, although it should stay in Salisbury for 2/3 working days, as there would be an excellent opportunity to hold serious "post-election" discussion between the Vice President and the leaders of the Front Line States, -- as the Soviets are starting to do. (C)

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Review on 3/17/86

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If this line of thinking meets with your general approval, I will get something along these lines in writing from State, and prepare appropriate proposals from you to the President and the Vice President. (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

That I work with State in staffing out proposals for a large delegation to Zimbabwe, led by the Vice President. (C)

Yes _____ No _____

MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT


WASHINGTON

Memo No. 919-80

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

March 28, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 
SUBJECT: Foreign Policy/Defense Developments

Middle East

In response to the Palestinian Rights Committee's efforts to bring a resolution on Palestinian Rights to a March 31 vote in the U.N. Security Council, State has issued firm instructions to our U.N. Mission and the capitals of other Security Council members stating that we will veto the unacceptable resolution and urging that it not even be brought to a vote (Tab 1).

Linowitz has sent a fairly positive report from the autonomy talks (Tab 2).

I believe I have successfully headed off some counterproductive State press guidance (Tab 3).

Afghanistan

Warren Christopher made an excellent statement Friday to the Overseas Writers Club on the brutal nature of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Tab 4). This is good speech material; I have provided a copy to Marty Kaplan; as John Matheny will have told you I believe it is important to keep central focus on the Soviets' unacceptable actions as we maneuver week-to-week on the Olympic Boycott issue.

Olympics

Publicly the President made a statement Friday saying that he would not use legal steps to prevent Americans from going to the Olympics (Tab 5).

The President has advised that he would prefer not to use IEEPA to block NBC's TV payments to the Soviets. Cutler has since worked out an alternative arrangement whereby NBC will not proceed with the payments. We are putting increased pressure on the FRG to move up its decision date.

The negative shift in Norway's position is at Tab 6.

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REVIEW ON MARCH 28, 2000

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BY LS NARA, DATE 8/9/06

NATO Summit

This was discussed at the Friday breakfast. The President received a call from Prime Minister Thatcher. She said she was in favor of a summit, that she would prefer Brussels to Washington as the site. Thatcher said she was in touch with Schmidt on Iran, that they would be taking action in Teheran before Monday to impress upon the Iranians our seriousness, and the need for movement.

Iran

The President is proceeding with plans to announce - possibly in person Monday afternoon - further actions against Iran if the Iranians do not meet our request for transfer of the hostages by 4 p.m. Monday EST. The steps will involve:

- formal imposition of sanctions
- census of claims against Iran preparatory to action against blocked assets
- expulsion of Iranian diplomats

On related fronts, it is my understanding that Cutler is going to meet with Church and Javits to go over the Lackland AFB assurances given the Shah, but he will not leave any paper with the Senators.

US-Canadian Relations

Charles Duncan's report to the President on his talks in Ottawa -- and some forward movement on the Alaskan Natural Gas Pipeline -- is at Tab 7, together with the background paper you requested on acid rain.

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CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT
REVIEW ON 3/28/00

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AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 0000

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AMEMBASSY TUNIS 1035

AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0324

MR. VICE PRESIDENT -

- STATE HAS
SENT INSTRUCTIONS
TO McHENRY &
TO VARIOUS CAPITALS
SAYING U.S. WILL
VETO THIS PALESTINIAN
RESOLUTION AND THAT
IT IS OUR HOPE
IT WILL NOT EVEN
BE BROUGHT TO A VOTE

- EACH OPERATIVE
PARAGRAPH IS
UNACCEPTABLE

- QDC.

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BANGKOK FOR PETREE

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: PORG, UNSC, PLO, XF

SUBJECT: UNSC MEETING ON PALESTINE RIGHTS: CURRENT
DRAFT RESOLUTION

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NLS C-2006-071
per 7/24/06 NLS/Hr
BY CS NARA, DATE 8/4/06

1. AS OF 18100, MARCH 26, PALESTINIAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

DEN,VP

EOB:BLOOM,DEAL,THORN,GREGG,SULL,BREM,HUNT,LARR,STEBBINS

1. STILL DISCUSSING TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION TO BE TABLED AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL. PARTICIPANTS EXPECT ONLY MINOR CHANGES MIGHT BE MADE IN THE CURRENT DRAFT, TEXT OF WHICH FOLLOWS IN PARA 3 BELOW.

2. WE HAVE LEARNED THAT THE COMMITTEE HAS DECIDED TO ASK THE SEVEN NON-ALIGNED SC MEMBERS AND THE EAST GERMANS TO SPONSOR THE RESOLUTION.

3. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION.
BEGIN TEXT.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE EXERCISE OF THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE,

TAKING NOTE OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 34/65,
HAVING HEARD THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED,
INCLUDING THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION,
CONVINCED THAT THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE IS THE CORE OF THE CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST,
REAFFIRMING THE URGENT NECESSITY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE THROUGH A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT BASED ON FULL RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AS WELL AS FOR ITS RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING THE PROBLEM OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND QUESTION OF PALESTINE,

EXPRESSING ITS CONCERN OVER THE CONTINUING DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND DEEPLY DEPLORING ISRAEL'S PERSISTENCE IN ITS OCCUPATION OF THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, AND ITS REFUSAL TO IMPLEMENT THE RELEVANT UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS REAFFIRMING THE PRINCIPLE OF THE INADMISSIBILITY OF ACQUISITION OF TERRITORIES BY THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE,

1. AFFIRMS:

(A) THAT THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, SHOULD BE ENABLED TO EXERCISE ITS INALIENABLE NATIONAL RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT STATE IN PALESTINE;

(B) THE RIGHT OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES WISHING TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND LIVE AT PEACE WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS TO DO SO, AND THE RIGHT OF THOSE CHOOSING NOT TO RETURN TO RECEIVE EQUITABLE COMPENSATION FOR THEIR PROPERTY;

(C) THAT ISRAEL SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM ALL THE ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED SINCE JUNE 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM;

(D) THAT APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO GUARANTEE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER OF THE

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 5966
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AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3476
AMEMBASSY DETROIT PRIORITY 7645
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AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 7321
AMEMBASSY DACCA 1626
AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1908
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2866
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 4921
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 3011
AMEMBASSY KINGSTON 2153
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2520
AMEMBASSY LISBON 9270
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2405
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 5289
AMEMBASSY MANILA 2152
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2030
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2331
AMEMBASSY OSLO 2521
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 4451
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9273
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AMEMBASSY VIENNA 6325

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK #1171
BANGKOK FOR PETREE
UNITED NATIONS, THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ALL STATES IN THE AREA,
INCLUDING THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF PALESTINE, AND THEIR
RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNIZED
BOUNDARIES;

2. REJECTS ALL AGREEMENTS PURPORTING TO DETERMINE THE

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NITC-2006-071
per 7/24/06 NSC Ltr
BY: 15 NARA, DATE 8/4/06

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P E OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE OR OF THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE 1967 WHICH IGNORE, INFRINGE UPON, VIOLATE OR DENY ANY OF THE AFOREMENTIONED INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, OR WHICH HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE;

3. DECIDES THAT THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 1 SHOULD BE TAKEN FULLY INTO ACCOUNT IN ALL INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS AND CONFERENCES ORGANIZED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST, LASTING AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST;

4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO TAKE ALL THE NECESSARY STEPS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS RESOLUTION AND TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED;

5. DECIDES TO CONVENE WITHIN A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS TO CONSIDER THE REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION, AND IN ORDER TO PURSUE ITS RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING SUCH IMPLEMENTATION.
END TEXT.

VANDEN HEUVEL

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 AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 8661
 AMEMBASSY NIAMEY IMMEDIATE 8432
 AMEMBASSY KINGSTON IMMEDIATE 1914
 AMEMBASSY DARCA IMMEDIATE 3292
 AMEMBASSY LUBAKA IMMEDIATE 8966
 AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 9335

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2895
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 AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 8716
 AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 4490
 AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2051
 AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 4829
 AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 2714
 AMEMBASSY DAFASCHS IMMEDIATE 8187
 AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 3893
 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1173
 AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 4987
 WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 4013
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 5725
 AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 1245
 AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 3842

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 001712/01

EXDII

E.O. 12065: GOS 3/26/86 (VANCE, CYRUS)

TAGS: USUN, SC, XF

SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON PALESTINIAN RIGHTS

REF: STATE 78030 AND PREVIOUS

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ALTC-2006-071
 per 7/24/06 NSC/ITC
 BY CS NARA, DATE 8/4/06

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

1. DEN, VP

DEAL, THORN, GREGG, SULL, BREN, RENT, HUNT, LARR, BLACK

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1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS USDM WILL REPORT SEPARATELY, A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING IS SCHEDULED FOR MONDAY, MARCH 31. IT APPEARS THAT THE PLO IS CURRENTLY PRESSING FOR A VOTE ON A RESOLUTION BASED ON A DRAFT WE VETED IN JANUARY 1978 BUT WITH ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE IMPLICITLY REPUDIATING CAMP DAVID. THE 1978 RESOLUTION DID NOT SPECIFICALLY REAFFIRM RES.242, AND CALLED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE. THE PLO'S INTENTION SEEMS TO BE TO FORCE A U.S. VETO, AND THEN TO CONVOKE AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, PROVIDED IT CAN SECURE THE NECESSARY NINE VOTES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. (THE VETO POWER DOES NOT APPLY IN PROCEDURAL VOTES, E.G. UNITING FOR PEACE.) FRANCE VOTED IN FAVOR OF THE JANUARY 1978 RESOLUTION, WHILE THE UK ABSTAINED, AFTER ATTEMPTING UNSUCCESSFULLY TO ADD A PARAGRAPH SPECIFICALLY REAFFIRMING RES.242.

3. WE ARE NOT SURE WHY THE PLO HAS ENBARKED ON THIS COURSE, OR WHETHER THEY CAN BE TALKED OUT OF IT. IT WILL BE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN ACTIVE BEHIND SCENES, SINCE SUCH A COURSE WOULD SERVE SOVIET OBJECTIVES BY DIVERTING ATTENTION FROM AFGHANISTAN AND ISOLATING THE U.S. INTERNAL PLO POLITICS MAY ALSO BE A FACTOR, AS WELL AS REACTION TO THE U.S. VOTE ON SETTLEMENTS IN THE COUNCIL AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS. ISRAELI CABINET ANNOUNCEMENTS ON HEBRON AND EXPROPRIATION OF LAND AROUND JERUSALEM HAVE NOT HELPED.

4. WHATEVER THE REASON, WE MUST MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO BRING THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF PRESSURE POSSIBLE ON ARAFAT TO DESIST FROM THIS COURSE.

5. FOR OSLO, PARIS, LISBON, LONDON, ROME: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER:

BEGIN TEXT: I KNOW YOU HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK IN PREPARATION FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON PALESTINIAN RIGHTS. AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO A MEETING AT THIS TIME, WHEN PRESIDENT CARTER IS PREPARING TO RECEIVE PRESIDENT SADAT AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, AND THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS ARE ENTERING A CRUCIAL PHASE. IT NOW APPEARS THAT THE PLO IS PREPARING TO PRESS A COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE RESO-

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LUTION TO A VOTE, KNOWING THAT WE WILL HAVE TO VOTE AGAINST IT, WITH THE OBJECT OF THEN SEEKING THE SUPPORT OF A MAJORITY OF THE COUNCIL FOR THE CONVENING OF AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

AS I AM SURE YOU WILL AGREE, SUCH AN OUTCOME WOULD PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THE ENEMIES OF PEACE. IT WOULD STRENGTHEN THE SOVIET POSITION IN THE AREA, DISCOURAGE MODERATE FORCES, INCLUDING MODERATE PALESTINIAN LEADERS AND WORK AGAINST OUR COMMON INTEREST IN MAINTAINING THE MOMENTUM OF THE PEACE PROCESS.

IN THIS VERY SERIOUS SITUATION, I BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE CONSULT URGENTLY TOGETHER TO SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE, AND THAT WE SEEK TO ADOPT A COMMON POSITION. I WOULD HOPE THAT YOU WOULD CONVEY YOUR VIEWS URGENTLY TO KEY ARAB GOVERNMENTS AND PALESTINIANS THROUGH WHATEVER CHANNELS YOU HAVE AVAILABLE, AND I WOULD BE VERY GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD GIVE ME THE BENEFIT OF YOUR ADVICE AND AN INDICATION OF HOW YOU BELIEVE WE SHOULD PROCEED. I
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 AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 7889
 AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 8662
 AMEMBASSY NIAMEY IMMEDIATE 4433
 AMEMBASSY KINGSTON IMMEDIATE 1918
 AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 3293
 AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE 4967
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 AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 4491
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 AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 4636
 AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 2715
 AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 8109
 AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 4894
 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1174
 AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 4988
 WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 4014
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 5096
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HOPE THAT OUR MISSIONS IN NEW YORK CAN STAY IN CLOSE
 TOUCH ON THIS. END TEXT.

6. FOR OTHER ACTION ADDRESSEES: PLEASE MAKE THE
 FOLLOWING POINTS AT A SENIOR LEVEL OF HOST GOVERNMENT:

WE BELIEVE A DEBATE NOW ON PALESTINIAN RIGHTS IN THE

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 BY: CS NARA, DATE 8/4/06

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SECURITY COUNCIL WILL ONLY SERVE TO RAISE TENSIONS IN THE AREA.

-- IF A MEETING IS HELD WE BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE LIMITED TO A DEBATE, AND THAT A RESOLUTION SHOULD NOT BE BROUGHT TO A VOTE.

-- WE MUST OPPOSE ANY RESOLUTION ON THIS ISSUE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT THIS TIME, WHEN THE PRESIDENT IS PREPARING TO RECEIVE PRESIDENT SARAT AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN IN WASHINGTON AND THE NEGOTIATIONS ON PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY ARE REACHING A CRUCIAL POINT. IF CONFRONTED WITH A RESOLUTION SIMILAR TO THE ONE PRESENTED LAST AUGUST, THE US WOULD HAVE TO VOTE AGAINST IT. FAILURE TO REACH SECURITY COUNCIL CONSENSUS WOULD NOT BE IN THE INTEREST OF MODERATE FORCES IN THE AREA OR PROSPECTS FOR FURTHERING A PEACE PROCESS WHICH HAS AS ONE OF ITS COMMITMENTS RESOLVING THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN ALL ITS ASPECTS.

-- WE ASK THAT HOST GOVERNMENTS CONVEY THIS US POSITION TO THE PLO AND OTHER ARAB STATES THROUGH PERM REPS IN NEW YORK OR IN CAPITALS.

7. FYI: WHILE WE WOULD OPPOSE AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNGA ON THIS SUBJECT, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR US TO RAISE THIS ISSUE NOW.

8. FOR KINGSTON: PLEASE MAKE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POINT: GIVEN JAMAICA'S SUPPORT FOR THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS, WE ARE PUZZLED BY PERMREP MILLS' STATEMENT THAT JAMAICA IS BOUND BY THE HAVANA NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT RESOLUTIONS. THE HAVANA DOCUMENT CONDEMNS THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS IN ALL BUT NAME, DESCRIBES ISRAEL AS A RACIST REGIME AND IMPLICITLY DENIES ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE AN ABDICATION OF JAMAICA'S RESPONSIBILITY AS A SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER TO JUSTIFY ITS POSITION BY REFERENCE TO SUCH A DOCUMENT. VANPE
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 AMEMBASSY TEL AMTV IMMEDIATE
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NO015
 CHEROKEE
 E.O. 12065: GDS 1 - 3/28/99 (WALKER, EDWARD S.)
 TAGS: OVIP (LINDWITZ, SOL M.) PEPR, IS, EG
 SUBJECT: PLENARY DISCUSSIONS
 FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM AMB. LINDWITZ

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. OUR NEGOTIATING SESSIONS MARCH 27 WERE MARKED BY A CLEAR DESIRE ON BOTH SIDES TO HELP THE PROCESS AND TO UNDERSTAND THE CONCERNS OF THE OTHER PARTY. IN CONSEQUENCE, A. K. BURG SAID AFTERWARDS, THE FEW HOURS THE HEADS OF DELEGATION SPENT TOGETHER IN ALEXANDRIA WERE THE MOST PRODUCTIVE WE HAVE HAD SINCE THE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN. IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION AGREEMENT WAS REACHED WITH ONE OR BOTH SIDES ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A) SECURITY COMMITTEE.

A SECURITY COMMITTEE IS TO BE FORMED VERY SOON. AS BURG SAID IN THE PRESS CONFERENCE, THE AGREEMENT TO DO SO WOULD BE REACHED "EITHER BEFORE, AT OR IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SUMMIT IN WASHINGTON". THIS SUPPORTED MY EARLIER IMPRESSION THAT BEGIN WAS SAYING THIS FOR HIS WASHINGTON VISIT. THE COMMITTEE WOULD DO THREE THINGS: (1) ISRAEL WOULD SPECIFY WHERE FORCES ARE TO BE PLACED FOR DEFENSE. KHALIL AGREED THAT THIS WAS ISRAEL'S BUSINESS, BUT HE LEFT UNANSWERED THE QUESTION HE HAD RAISED BEFORE ABOUT WHAT HAPPENS IF A SPECIFIED LOCATION WAS UNACCEPTABLE, SUCH AS IN THE HEART OF HEPRON; (2) DISCUSS ANTI-TERRORISM WHICH BURG STILL MAINTAINS IS ISRAEL'S SOLE PREROGATIVE;

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 BY: 13 NARA, DATE 8/4/06

AN (3) PUBLIC ORDER WHICH KHALIL MAINTAINS SHOULD BE A SOLE SGA OF POLICE PREROGATIVE. THE POSSIBILITY IS STILL OPEN THAT THE COMMITTEE WOULD BE HEADED BY WEIZMAN AND ALI. KHALIL FELT THAT THE FOUR-PART DIVISION OF SECURITY HE HAD PROPOSED -- DEFENSE, ANTI-TERRORISM, PUBLIC ORDER AND POLICE SOUNDED REASONABLE BUT HE WANTED TO STUDY THE QUESTION WITH HIS MILITARY EXPERTS.

B) TRANSFER OF POWERS.

AFTER EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION, EGYPT HAS NOW AGREED THAT IT WILL NOT DEMAND TRANSFER TO THE SGA OF ALL THE POWERS OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT. IN FACT, WE HAVE MOVED AWAY FROM THE TRANSFER OF POWER CONCEPT TO DEFINING SPECIFIC POWERS AND GIVING ATTENTION TO HOW AND BY WHOM THEY WILL BE EXERCISED. THE AGREEMENT WILL DEFINE (1) POWERS TO BE FULLY EXERCISED BY THE SGA; (2) POWERS WHICH WILL NOT BE EXERCISED BY THE SGA (DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THEREFORE BY ISRAEL) AND (3) COORDINATED AREAS OF ACTIVITY. KHALEL MADE CLEAR HE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE TERM "SHARED", AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR HELPFULLY SUGGESTED THAT HE WOULD TRY TO FIND ANOTHER WAY TO DESCRIBE THE CONCEPT.

C) POWERS UNDER AEGIS OF CONTINUING COMMITTEE:

WITHIN THE THIRD AREA ABOVE OF COORDINATED AND UNRESOLVED ACTIVITIES, EGYPT HAS SUGGESTED THAT CERTAIN UNASSIGNED AREAS -- SUCH AS WATER -- BE PLACED UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE CONTINUING COMMITTEE PROVIDED FOR IN THE COA. WITH THE SUGGESTED ADDITION OF THE US AS A MEMBER IN ITS CAPACITY AS A FULL PARTNER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN THE CASE OF WATER, FOR EXAMPLE, THE COMMITTEE WOULD UNDERTAKE TO REACH UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT ON THE RESPECTIVE ALLOCATIONS TO JORDAN, ISRAEL AND THE SGA. PENDING AGREEMENT, THE STATUS QUO IN TERMS OF USE WOULD CONTINUE. THE INITIAL ISRAELI REACTION TO THIS IDEA WAS FAVORABLE. THE IDEA WILL ALSO BE CONSIDERED FURTHER BY THE EGYPTIANS. THEY CLAIM IT IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE PALESTINIANS, WHOSE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IS TO OBTAIN A "SEAT AT THE TABLE" ON A RELATIVELY EQUAL BASIS, RATHER THAN AS REPRESENTATIVES OF AN OCCUPIED PEOPLE. WE ASKED THEM TO EXPLORE THIS FURTHER WITH PALESTINIANS TO ENCOURAGE THEIR PARTICIPATION.

D) RESIDUAL POWERS.

THE EGYPTIANS ALSO ARE INCLINED TO PLACE RESIDUAL POWERS (IF ANY) UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE CONTINUING COMMITTEE. THEY ALLUDED TO THIS BRIEFLY TO DR. BURG AND MR. SHAMIR. THIS IS WORTH CAREFUL EXPLANATION SINCE IT MAY OFFER AN AVENUE FOR DEALING WITH A DIFFICULT BASIC ISSUE.

3. SOURCE OF AUTHORITY:

WE PROPOSED, AND THE EGYPTIANS TENTATIVELY AGREED, THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO FINESSE THIS PROBLEM BY NOT

IGNING IT IN THE AGREEMENT AND SIMPLY SETTING FORTH POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES TO BE EXERCISED.

F. HEADS OF AGREEMENT:

BOTH THE ISRAELIS (SUBJECT TO BEGIN'S AGREEMENT) AND THE EGYPTIANS ARE INTRIGUED BY THE IDEA OF WORKING FOR AN AGREEMENT BY MAY 26 WHICH COULD BE STRUCTURED IN THE FORMAT OF "HEADS OF AGREEMENT", A FRAMEWORK OF ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES WITH NEGOTIATION OF THE DETAIL TO FOLLOW WHEN THE PALESTINIANS ARE PARTICIPATING. BOTH SIDES SEE THIS AS A POSSIBLE WAY TO REACH THE MAY 26 GOAL AND REACTED FAVORABLY TO MY "HEADS OF AGREEMENT" APPROACH. SIGNIFICANTLY SADAT USED PRECISELY THOSE TERMS IN ENDORSING SUCH AN IDEA DURING MY SECOND MEETING WITH HIM MARCH 22.

G. PALESTINIAN STATE:

ISRAEL NOW UNDERSTANDS THAT THE EGYPTIAN MODEL AS THEY HAD PERCEIVED IT -- I.E., "SETTING UP A PALESTINIAN STATE IN ALL BUT NAME" IS NOT THE BASIS FOR OUR NEGOTIATIONS. KHALIL MADE CLEAR THAT THE EGYPTIAN SIDE HAD NOT INTENDED TO SUBJECT IDF DEPLOYMENTS TO SPECIFIED AREAS DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD TO SGA APPROVAL. HE ALSO ADAMANTLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY ASSERTED THAT THE SGA WOULD NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DECLARE AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE UNDER THE AUTONOMY PROVISIONS, AS THIS WAS PROHIBITED BY THE CDF AGREEMENT. HIS SENTATION ON THIS POINT WAS FAR MORE FORCEFUL THAN I HAVE EVER MADE TO THE ISRAELIS AND IMPRESSED THEM.

3. IT WOULD NOT SURPRISE ME IF WE SAW SOME BACKTRACKING FROM THE POSITIONS OUTLINED ABOVE IN THE DAYS AHEAD, BUT I BELIEVE BOTH SIDES ARE BEGINNING TO SEE SOME ANSWERS TO THE PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE ESSENTIALLY STALLED PROGRESS ON POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE PAST TEN MONTHS. HOW WE FOLLOW UP ON THESE DISCUSSIONS WILL BE CRUCIAL OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, AND THE SUMMIT MEETINGS. BUT I AM BEGINNING TO SEE THE POSSIBILITY OF REAL PROGRESS FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S SUMMIT WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN IF SOME ESSENTIAL POLITICAL AGREEMENTS CAN BE REACHED.

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