

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. Vice President-

In a recent press interview Begin was asked if the only thing keeping him from moving to East Jerusalem was the question of suitable real estate. Begin (to my mind skillfully handling a tough question) said words to the effect "...yes, we are still looking for real estate."

I have since asked Robert Hunter to turn off State's very harsh press guidance, which had been approved by NSC and State but not used Friday. Hunter advised Friday evening that it has been turned off.

Denis Clift
3/28/80

DECLASSIFIED
ALLTC-2006-071
2007/24/06 NSC/HF
BY 10 NARA, DATE 8/4/06

March 28, 1980

POSSIBLE MOVE OF ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER TO EAST JERUSALEM

QUESTION: What is the State Department's reaction to statements by Prime Minister Begin that he hopes to move his office to East Jerusalem?

ANSWER: -- As we have made clear in the past, we cannot agree with such a step. We are opposed to any unilateral steps that would have the effect of altering the status of East Jerusalem.

-- I will have nothing further to say on this subject until our Embassy has the opportunity to clarify the Prime Minister's remarks.

*1-10
Be not sure whether we get
agreed to move to East Jerusalem
Tend the same kind of thing as we
could*

DECLASSIFIED
NLS-2006-071
per 7/24/06 NSC/Hr
BY 6 NARA, DATE 8/4/06

(A10-A11278)

(BY JIM ANDERSON)

WASHINGTON (UPI) - The SOVIETS ARE HOLDING AN ESTIMATED 15,000 POLITICAL PRISONERS IN AFGHANISTAN AND ARE EXECUTING APPROXIMATELY 10 OF THEM EVERY NIGHT, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE ARNOLD CHRISTOPHER SAID TODAY.

CHRISTOPHER TOLD A MEETING OF THE OVERSEAS WRITERS CLUB THE RUSSIANS HAVE DESTROYED "ENTIRE VILLAGES AND I EXPECT THESE ATROCITIES TO INCREASE." HE SAID THERE IS NO INDICATION THE SOVIETS INTEND TO WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN.

IN LAYING OUT WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE "BRUTAL LIFE AND DEATH FACTS" OF THE SOVIET INVASION, CHRISTOPHER EMPHASIZED THAT U.S. EFFORTS TO MAKE THE RUSSIANS PAY FOR THEIR AGGRESSION WILL CONTINUE AS LONG AS TROOPS REMAIN IN AFGHANISTAN.

HE ESTIMATED THAT 500 TO 600 RUSSIANS SOLDIERS ARE KILLED OR SERIOUSLY INJURED IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY EACH WEEK FOR A TOTAL OF BETWEEN 6,000 AND 7,000 SINCE THE SOVIET INVASION BEGAN IN LATE DECEMBER.

CHRISTOPHER SAID 500,000 AFGHANS HAVE FLED THEIR HOMELAND, GOING ONLY TO NEIGHBORING PAKISTAN. THERE ARE AN ESTIMATED 15,000 POLITICAL PRISONERS IN AFGHANISTAN AND THEY ARE BEING EXECUTED, HE SAID, AT THE RATE OF 50 EACH NIGHT.

HE ALSO SAID THERE IS MOUNTING EVIDENCE THE SOVIETS ARE USING "LETHAL POISON GAS" IN ADDITION TO AN INCAPACITATING KIND OF GAS. THE SOVIET AND LOYAL AFGHAN FORCES ARE FIRING ON MOSLEM MOSQUES, HE SAID.

CHRISTOPHER LAID OUT THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES AS THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUED EFFORTS TO BUILD SUPPORT FOR ITS "POUNISH THE RUSSIANS" CAMPAIGN, INCLUDING A BOYCOTT OF THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS THIS SUMMER.

A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL SAID THE UNITED STATES BASICALLY IS SATISFIED WITH SUPPORT IT HAS GOTTEN FROM ALLIED NATIONS, EXCEPT FOR THOSE WHICH STILL ALLOW THE RUSSIANS LOW INTEREST RATES ON MONEY BORROWED TO BUY WESTERN GOODS.

UPI 03-28 03:26 PES

DECLASSIFIED

NSIC-2006-071

per 7/24/06 NSC/HR

DATE 8/14/06

RA

CARTER-OLYMPICS

SACRAMENTO, CALIF. (AP) -- PRESIDENT CARTER TOLD A GROUP OF CALIFORNIANS HE WON'T USE LEGAL STEPS TO PREVENT AMERICAN ATHLETES FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS, THE SACRAMENTO UNION REPORTED FRIDAY.

THE PRESIDENT TOLD 189 CALIFORNIANS AT A WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING THURSDAY THAT HE THINKS HE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO STOP AMERICAN ATHLETES FROM GOING TO MOSCOW, BUT THAT HE WILL NOT INVOKE IT, THE NEWSPAPER SAID.

STATE SEN. RALPH DILLS, A DEMOCRAT FROM GARDENA, SAID CARTER TOLD THE GROUP:

"I THINK I HAVE THE AUTHORITY, BUT I WILL NOT USE IT. THE ATHLETES OUGHT TO MAKE THAT DECISION THEMSELVES."

THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN CONSIDERING LEGAL STEPS TO PREVENT AMERICAN ATHLETES FROM PARTICIPATING, INCLUDING WITHHOLDING PASSPORTS.

WHITE HOUSE SPOKESWOMAN CLAUDIA TOWNSEND SAID THE ADMINISTRATION EXPECTED THE U.S. OLYMPIC COMMITTEE TO KEEP ITS COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT THE BOYCOTT, THE UNION SAID.

ON MONDAY, WHITE HOUSE AIDE BOB BERENSON HAD SAID THAT U.S. ATHLETES "WILL NOT GO" TO MOSCOW.

BUT THE UNION SAID CARTER APPARENTLY CHANGED HIS MIND, FACED WITH THE FAILURE OF BRITISH PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER'S EFFORT TO MAINTAIN THE BOYCOTT IN HER COUNTRY.

AP-WX-0328 1228EST

DECLASSIFIED

11675-06-071
per 7/24/06 also other
BY [signature] DATE 8/24/06

INFO

047

DE MOSCOW #1602 087112Z

O 271119Z MAR 84

FM AMEMBASSY OSLO

TO SLESTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9945

UNCLAS OSLO 1092

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: OEXC, SCUL, UR, NO

SUBJECT: NORWAY AND THE OLYMPICS

REF: OSLO 0778

1. THE NORWEGIAN OLYMPIC COMMITTEE ON MARCH 26 VOTED 19 TO 13 IN FAVOR OF NORWEGIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE MOSCOW OLYMPIC GAMES. THIS DECISION WAS UNEXPECTED SINCE MOST OBSERVERS EXPECTED NO DECISION WOULD BE MADE UNTIL THE NATIONAL CONVENTION OF THE NORWEGIAN ATHLETIC CONFEDERATION TOOK PLACE IN MID-APRIL. THE EARLY DECISION WAS PRECIPITATED BY A HEATED INTERNAL DEBATE FOLLOWED BY A MOTION THAT NORWAY SHOULD PARTICIPATE FROM THE BASKETBALL FEDERATION. THIS MOTION WAS CARRIED BY A VOTE OF 19 TO 13 WITH FOUR ABSTENTIONS. A SUBSEQUENT MOTION TO BOYCOTT THE GAMES FROM THE SAILORS FEDERATION GOT ONLY 8 VOTES. ANOTHER MOTION BY THE BOARD OF THE NORWEGIAN OLYMPIC COMMITTEE TO THE EFFECT THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR NORWAY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ABSENCE OF POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT IN AFGHANISTAN, RECEIVED 16 AFFIRMATIVE VOTES AND 13 NEGATIVE ONES.

2. AFTER THE ANNUAL MEETING, THE NORWEGIAN OLYMPIC COMMITTEE RELEASED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:
"THE NORWEGIAN OLYMPIC COMMITTEE STRONGLY OPPOSES THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE EXILING OF DISSIDENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION. SUCH ACTS MAKE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION MORE DIFFICULT ON ALL LEVELS. HOWEVER, THE NORWEGIAN OLYMPIC COMMITTEE SEES SPORTS AS AN IMPORTANT MEANS OF RELAXING INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS AND THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT NORWAY TAKE PART IN THE 1980 SUMMER OLYMPICS IN MOSCOW."

3. WE ARE SEEKING AN APPOINTMENT WITH MFA OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS THE COM'S REACTION TO THIS VOTE AND SUBSEQUENT

***** WASH COMMENT *****

DEN CUTLER VP
EQH:THORN,BREM

" 01020702

PAGE 01

TOR:087/11:52Z

DTG:271719Z MAR 84

*****U N C L A S S I F I E D*****S COPY

DECLASSIFIED

MLJC-2006-074
per 10/06 MLJC #1
BY: CS NARA, DATE: 8/4/06

STATEMENT. WE WILL REPORT THIS SOONEST.

BT
NU

NORWAY

O. INFO

STH455

DE RUDKSNH 21611 0871000

O 271522Z MAR 80

FM AMEMBASSY OSLO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9948

INFO USICA WASHDC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ OSLO 1611

E.O. 12065: GDS 3/27/85 (BOYLE, JACK A.) OR-M

TAGS: DEXC, SCUL, DR, NO

SUBJECT: NORWAY AND THE SUMMER OLYMPICS

REF: A. OSLO 1602; B. OSLO 0592

1. C-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN LIGHT OF NORWEGIAN COMMITTEE DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN SUMMER OLYMPICS ACTING COM CALLED ON MEFA'S DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS LEIF MEVIK, TO DISCUSS THIS DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS.

3. MEVIK SAID THE GON HAD MAINTAINED A "HANDS OFF" POLICY REGARDING PARTICIPATION IN THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS. HE SAID PRIME MINISTER NORDLI HAD MADE EVIDENT THAT THE FINAL DECISION ON NORWEGIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE MOSCOW OLYMPIC WAS TO BE MADE BY THE NORWEGIAN OLYMPIC COMMITTEE. BASED ON THIS, MEVIK BELIEVES GON IS LIKELY TO ACCEPT WITHOUT COMMENT THE OLYMPIC COMMITTEE'S DECISION TO PARTICIPATE.

4. MEVIK STRESSED THAT THE GON DID NOT TRY TO INFLUENCE THE OLYMPIC COMMITTEE'S DECISION DIRECTLY. HE RECALLED THAT PRIME MINISTER NORDLI HAD EXPRESSED HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE NORWEGIAN OLYMPIC COMMITTEE'S ORIGINAL STATEMENT IN JANUARY "...THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR NORWAY TO PARTICIPATE IN MOSCOW WITHOUT A CHANGE OF THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND WITH REGARD TO THE EXPULSION OF DISSIDENTS FROM MOSCOW." (REF B). MEVIK SAID HE WAS PERSONALLY SURPRISED BY THE COMMITTEE'S DECISION SINCE THE AFGHANISTAN SITUATION HAS, IF ANYTHING, DETERIORATED SINCE JANUARY AND SHAKAROV'S TREATMENT IN EXILE BECAME MORE CONTENTIOUS. HE THOUGHT THE RECENT FAVORABLE DECISION BY THE BRITISH OLYMPIC COMMITTEE

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

DECLASSIFIED

DEN CUTLER VP REV
EOB:THORN,KIM,BREM

ALTC-06-071
per 7/24/06 NSC/ty
BY: CS NARA, DATE 8/4/06

020972 - PAGE 01

TOR:087/10:18Z

DTG:271522Z MAR 80

NORWAY

7 PARTICIPATE IN MOSCOW, PLUS RECURRING STORIES ABOUT THE INTENTION OF INDIVIDUAL US ATHLETES TO GO TO MOSCOW, MIGHT WELL HAVE INFLUENCED THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE NORWEGIAN COMMITTEE TO CHANGE SO DRAMATICALLY FROM ITS JANUARY POSITION. WHEN ASKED IF THERE WERE A POSSIBILITY THAT THE APRIL 18 MEETING OF THE NORWEGIAN ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, WHICH APPARENTLY IS TO FORMALLY REVIEW AND RATIFY THE DECISION OF THE NORWEGIAN OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, MIGHT PRODUCE A DIFFERENT RESULT (I.E., A DECISION NOT TO GO), MEVIK SAID HE COUNTED THIS VERY MUCH.

5. ASKED IF GON WOULD EMULATE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S EXAMPLE AND DIVORCE ITSELF OFFICIALLY FROM PROVIDING PREPARATORY OLYMPIC COORDINATION AND SUPPORT TO NORWEGIAN OLYMPIC TEAM, MEVIK SAID NO. WHEN REMINDED THAT THE US PUBLIC REACTION OF THE NORWEGIAN OLYMPIC COMMITTEE'S UNDERLINE VOLTE FACE UNDERLINE THE ISSUE MIGHT BE A NEGATIVE ONE AND THAT SOME MIGHT ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRET THIS AS A GOVERNMENTAL CHANGE IN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS, MEVIK SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE. HE SAID CLEARLY THE AFFECTED NORWEGIAN ATHLETES HAVE HAD A CHANGE OF HEART AND THIS, RATHER THAN ANY CHANGE IN THE GON PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN, IS WHAT HAS CHANGED THE SITUATION. MEVIK THOUGHT THE REAL COST IN THE NORWEGIAN OLYMPIC COMMITTEE'S DECISION IS THE LIGHTING OF THE DIVISION WHICH HAVE APPEARED AMONG ALLIED COUNTRIES ON A SECONDARY ISSUE. DIVISION ON THIS SECONDARY ISSUE (I.E., WHETHER TO GO TO THE OLYMPICS) MIGHT BE ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRETED BY THE PUBLIC IN A NUMBER OF ALLIED COUNTRIES AS APPROBATION OF SOVIET POLICIES SUCH A FAULTY READING COULD HAVE LONG TERM NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY. HE THOUGHT THIS MOST UNFORTUNATE BUT SAID THAT THIS WAS THE RISK INHERENT IN A UNILATERAL USG DECISION TO OPT FOR AN OLYMPICS BOYCOTT IN THE ABSENCE OF FIRM ASSURANCES THAT THE BOYCOTT WOULD BE UNANIMOUS. MEVIK MADE PLAIN THESE WERE HIS PERSONAL VIEWS.

5. COMMENT: FOREIGN MINISTER FRYDENLUND IS IN HELSINKI AT THE NORDIC FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING UNTIL MARCH 28 AND STATE SECRETARY HOLST IS IN WASHINGTON. BECAUSE OF THEIR ABSENCE AND THE RELUCTANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT TO GET INVOLVED, MEVIK DOUBTED THAT THE GON WOULD HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THE OLYMPIC COMMITTEE'S DECISION. SINCE THE STORTING BEGINS ITS EASTER RECESS TODAY (MARCH 27) TO APRIL 17, THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS REGARDING THE GON'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE OLYMPIC COMMITTEE VOTE. MEVIK PROMISED TO INFORM HIS SUPERIORS OF OUR CONCERNS THAT ANY GON REACTION TO THE OLYMPIC COMMITTEE DECISION TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SENSITIVITY OF

Not used

ISSUE NOT ONLY IN NORWAY BUT ALSO IN THE UNITED STATES.
 JUNE WASHINGTON GUIDANCE REGARDING ADDITIONAL STEPS
 WE MIGHT TAKE VIS-A-VIS THE SON.
 KAND
 BT

OSLO, MARCH 26, REUTER - THE NORWEGIAN OLYMPIC COMMITTEE CIDED LATE TONIGHT THAT NORWEGIAN ATHLETES SHOULD COMPETE IN THE MOSCOW SUMMER OLYMPICS.

AT ITS ANNUAL PLENARY MEETING HERE, A MAJORITY OF 19 OF THE COMMITTEE'S MEMBERS VOTED THAT NORWAY SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE GAMES, THIRTEEN VOTED AGAINST THE PROPOSAL, AND THERE WERE FOUR ABSTENTIONS.

THE MEETING HAD EARLIER REJECTED A BOYCOTT PROPOSAL AS WELL AS A MOVE TO DELAY THE DECISION.

THE VOTE CAME AS A SURPRISE, SINCE THE COMMITTEE TOGETHER WITH THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF THE NORWEGIAN SPORTS ASSOCIATION LAST JANUARY DECLARED THAT "IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR NORWAY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS UNLESS THERE WAS SOME POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT IN AFGHANISTAN."

THE STATEMENT ADOPTED TONIGHT CONTAINED A STRONG CONDEMNATION OF THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE DEPORTATION OF SOVIET DISSIDENTS, BUT THE COMMITTEE STILL MAINTAINED THAT ATHLETIC EXCHANGE IS AN IMPORTANT APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND DETENTE.

REUTER 1913

N149

RI

ZB.DARG.VP.

SHCHARANSKY

THE HAGUE, NETHERLANDS (AP) -- THE WIFE OF JAILED SOVIET DISSIDENT ANATOLY SHCHARANSKY SAID WEDNESDAY THAT ATHLETES SHOULD BOYCOTT THE OLYMPIC SUMMER GAMES IN MOSCOW BECAUSE OF SOVIET PERSECUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS.

"IN MY EYES IT IS IMMORAL TO HOLD THESE GAMES, WHICH ARE A SYMBOL OF FREEDOM, LOVE AND GOOD RELATIONS AMONG MEN, IN THE SOVIET UNION WHILE THERE ARE PEOPLE THERE WHO ARE IN PRISON WHO ARE STRIVING FOR JUST THESE THINGS," AVITAL SHCHARANSKY TOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE HERE.

SHE DECLARED HER SUPPORT FOR ALTERNATIVE GAMES OUTSIDE THE SOVIET UNION, AN IDEA BACKED BY THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE OF THE THREE-MONTH-LONG SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN.

MRS. SHCHARANSKY, IN THE DUTCH CAPITAL FOR TALKS WITH MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, LEFT THE SOVIET UNION FOR ISRAEL IN 1974. HER HUSBAND, PROMISED A VISA WITHIN A HALF YEAR, LATER WAS DENIED PERMISSION AND WAS SENTENCED IN 1977 TO THREE YEARS IMPRISONMENT AND 10 YEARS IN A LABOR CAMP.

HE WAS CHARGED WITH ESPIONAGE AFTER HE WAGED A LETTER-WRITING CAMPAIGN IN SUPPORT OF HUMAN RIGHTS.



THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20585

25 March 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Charles W. Duncan, Jr.
SUBJECT: Ottawa Trip

I spent yesterday in Ottawa meeting with the new Canadian Minister for Energy, Mines, and Resources, Marc LaLonde. The discussions were frank and friendly.

Gas Pricing. We reached an understanding on a new Canadian gas pricing approach designed to insure that Canadian price adjustments would not raise prices higher than competitive energy costs. Their \$1.02 per mcf increase on February 17 was announced with only a six-week lag time which had this result. It takes 90 days for foreign crude price increases to be reflected in the market place. The understanding reached involves a freeze on prices until July 1, 1980. The July 1 price will be based on the btu equivalent of the Canadian oil import price on April 1, 1980. Prices would be reviewed monthly with an agreed 90-day lag period for any increase. This arrangement is designed to simulate the market place and insure that future Canadian prices are no more than competitive with a reasonable mix of alternative fuels. Canadians are aware of this, and I reemphasized that our regulatory approval of any increases was dependent on our alternative costs, not Canadian oil import prices.

Price changes after July 1 would not take place unless an increase of at least 15 cents per mcf is indicated. The 15-cent trigger should insure that adjustments are infrequent. We agreed to consider increasing the trigger if price increases should occur in consecutive months or more than two times in any six-month period.

Alaskan Natural Gas Transportation System. I discussed the meeting held last week between the producers and sponsors where a tentative agreement was reached on a joint Phase I design and engineering effort, as well as the development of a schedule for resolving Phase II financing issues. The Canadians made it clear that they would be faced with a difficult decision on whether to approve the southern "prebuild" section this summer if final financing of the Alaska segment had not been arranged. They indicated a willingness, however, to consider changing their legal precondition for approval from a finding that the pipeline was financed to a finding that it could be financed if we, in turn,

DECLASSIFIED

ACJC-2006-071
per 7/24/06 DHS/176
BY: 60 NARA, DATE 8/4/06

would certify to them, in as much detail as possible, a financial plan that we thought could work. I underscored our strong commitment to the project and your willingness to reaffirm this commitment. The possibility of supportive statements by Senator Jackson and Congressman Dingell was also discussed.

Acid Rain. The Minister expressed his deep concern over the potential for adding to the acid rain problem as a result of our utility oil backout program. I reassured him that the program would be subject to our already stringent environmental laws, underscored the massive pollution abatement investment being made in conjunction with the program, and the broad range of efforts we were undertaking. We agreed to stay in close consultation on this question and to undertake jointly efforts to improve pollution abatement technology. We made clear our commitment to the utility oil backout program.

Technical Cooperation. We briefly reviewed existing and potential joint R&D programs, including cooperation on coal technologies, magnetic fusion and tar sands.

The Northern Tier Oil Pipeline. Minister LaLonde raised the Canadians' concern about tanker traffic in conjunction with either the Northern Tier or Trans-Mountain west-to-east oil pipeline projects, and inquired if the U.S. could rethink its position on the alternative Foothills overland oil route through Canada. I indicated that the economics of the Foothills line were prohibitive when compared to either Northern Tier or Trans-Mountain; surprisingly, the Minister agreed with me. This is a political issue in Canada, and Ambassador Curtis and I feel the Minister felt compelled to raise the point.

On balance, the atmosphere of the meeting was good, the gas pricing accomplishments significant, and the Canadians seemed pleased with the opportunity for an early meeting of this kind in Ottawa.

cc: Secretary Vance
Dr. Brzezinski
Ambassador Owen

CANADIAN CONCERNS OVER US COAL CONVERSION PROGRAM

Acid rain is a volatile political issue in Canada and, as a result, the Federal and Provincial Governments are under intense public pressure to take remedial action. Large areas of Ontario, Quebec, and the Maritime Provinces are susceptible to acid rain. Canadians fear that as many as 50,000 lakes could be damaged, although a thorough study on the number of threatened lakes has yet to be completed.

Emissions of sulfur dioxide from American coal-fired power plants contribute significantly to Canada's acid rain problem. (An estimated 2 million tons of sulfur dioxide are carried into Canada annually. In contrast, only about 500,000 tons enters the United States from Canada.) Consequently, Canada is concerned about the President's proposed oil backout legislation on several grounds:

- * it is likely to increase sulfur dioxide emissions, thus exacerbating their current problem;
- * an American program that allows increased emissions will make it more difficult politically for Canada to impose more stringent controls on its own sources;
- * it signals the United States may be unable to negotiate a meaningful agreement to reduce transboundary air pollution.

The Canadians have made a major effort to put their views before the Administration. On February 15, three weeks before the President's announcement of the legislation, they sent a diplomatic note to the State Department expressing their opposition to any plan which would increase acid rain. In response to the note, on February 29, representatives from the State Department, EPA, DOE and CEQ met with the Canadians, who urged that strict environmental controls be included in any coal conversion program. In another note on March 4 which set forth their position, the Canadians requested assurances that:

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 1) no program will be adopted which adds to the current damaging transboundary pollution levels or seeks to maintain the status quo through a policy of "offsets";
- 2) any program proposed will be implemented in a way which would maximize the opportunity to reduce emissions of pollutants causing acid rain in both countries;
- 3) the United States Government will study the transboundary implications of any coal conversion proposal, especially as these affect the prospects for reduction of transboundary air pollution; and
- 4) the United States Government will provide to Canada the results of such studies, as well as detailed information on the proposed coal conversion program itself and the environmental measures associated with it in keeping with normal practice, so that the Canadian Government might come to its own determination as to its transboundary implications.

In his announcement on March 6, the President earmarked \$400 million of the \$9.6 billion program to reduce emissions from existing coal-fired plants and expressed his intention to address the acid rain problem separately. However emissions of acid rain-causing pollutants still may increase significantly under the President's proposal even though applicable air quality standards may not be exceeded. The Canadians are dissatisfied not only with the substance of the legislation. Equally important, they believe they did not have an opportunity to fully consult with us before the announcement and that their views were not adequately considered.

The Canadians also may view the oil backout proposal as a break from past efforts by the United States and Canada to cooperate on reducing transboundary air pollution. In 1978, the two governments established a Bilateral Research Consultation Group to study the problem. Last July, prompted by a Congressional initiative, the US and Canada announced their intention to conclude a bilateral air quality

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-3-

agreement. Preparations for negotiations now are underway. The Canadians also point to the Tokyo Summit communique of last June in which the President and then Prime Minister Clark joined in a commitment to increase the use of coal without environmental damage. Moreover, last November, both countries signed the Transboundary Air Pollution Convention of the Economic Commission of Europe, which obliged signatories to consult before decisions are made on actions in one country which could result in increased pollution in the other.

The issue, however, remains a hot one in Canada. John Roberts, Canada's new Minister of the Environment, has asked to meet with Doug Costle to press his concerns. Arrangements are being made for him to visit Washington within the next few weeks. EPA officials have talked with their Canadian counterparts to assure them of the President's personal commitment to address the acid rain issue and that, at the President's request, EPA is accelerating its efforts to find a broad scale solution.

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT


WASHINGTON

Memo No. 417-80

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

May 15, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy/National Security Developments

SCC Meeting on Iran and Afghanistan

The May 15 SCC meeting agreed that the Administration should be doing a fuller job to increase media coverage of Soviet activities in Afghanistan. Recommendations on how to achieve this, both in the United States and in Europe, will be presented at the Tuesday, May 20 meeting of the SCC. The Administration's position on the most recent proposal for a political settlement is at Tab A.

The SCC approved a recommended statement for the President welcoming the German Olympic Committee's decision not to participate in the Moscow Olympic games. Immediately following the meeting the President released that statement (Tab B).

The SCC additionally reviewed the status of European sanctions, noting that the May 17 deadline falls this Saturday and that at this point the Europeans appear to be acting in good faith to fulfill their pledge. The Europeans are grappling with the question of how to handle "old contracts," and are currently taking the approach that such contracts should be cancelled unless 1) they were signed before November 4, 1979, 2) more than one third of the contract has already been paid, and 3) shipments under the contract have already begun. Even if these provisions are met, the contracts will again be subject to review before they are approved.

Socialist International Mission -- following up on Kreisky's approach to you in Belgrade, Hal Saunders will go to Vienna on Tuesday, May 20 for further talks with Kreisky exploring the proposed Socialist International Mission to Iran.

President's Foreign Travel

Zbig has sent the President recommendations for stops in connection with the President's travel to the Venice Summit this June,

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT
REVIEW ON MAY 15, 2000

SANITIZED

NSC-2006-071
per 7/24/06 NSC 1A
BY CS NARA, DATE 8/4/06

with State's recommendations being Yugoslavia, Spain and Portugal. Zbig recommends that the President do Yugoslavia and Spain, but not Portugal (Tab C). Given the pressures on the President's time, the importance of Yugoslavia and Spain, and the fact that you have just met with Eanes and Sa Carneiro (and that we will be following up on the points made by Eanes), I concur with Zbig's recommendation.

Hussein Visit

On May 14 King Hussein and Queen Noor accepted the President's invitation to visit Washington during the latter half of June.

IOB Meeting with President

On Monday, May 19 you are scheduled to meet with the President and the members of the Intelligence Oversight Board at 1:30 p.m. The papers for this meeting are included separately in this envelope.

Moscow Olympics

The FRG Olympic Committee's vote on May 15 to boycott the Moscow Olympics resulted on May 16 in indications from Japan that the Japanese Olympic Committee will now probably go along with the decision to boycott, with a vote to be taken on May 22. On May 16 the President met with Lord Killanin reaffirming US intention to boycott the Moscow Olympics (White House press release also at Tab B).

Middle East Speech

At your May 12 meeting with the President on the Middle East, he indicated that he would want either you or Secretary Muskie to give a speech on the Middle East in the near future. It is my understanding from State that Muskie may tell you on Sunday evening, May 18, that he would like to give the speech. If so, and if you concur, you may wish to recommend that Muskie give the speech during your lunch with the President (it is my understanding from Hunter that there is no specific date in mind, although State had suggested May 22).

Cuban Refugees

Recent intelligence would indicate that the Cubans have finally become uneasy over the refugee situation and that, as reflected

in their apology to Smith in Havana over the helicopter buzzing, they will be trying to take a more moderate approach following the May 17 demonstration outside the US Interests Section.

To say the least, we face a most unusual situation with Castro's communist Cuba, with growing hundreds of thousands of Cubans opposed to the regime now in a state of fermenting exile in Florida. It would seem to me that the President should have the NSC system take a tightly held hard look at our overt and covert options relating to Cuba. Castro's most recent performance encouraging the boat exodus has been unbelievably bad -- intelligence indicates that even the Soviets are unhappy. Castro should not be allowed to get off the hook easily, nor should the USSR. It is in our international interests in this hemisphere to ensure that other nations have the benefit of the full extent of his inhumane actions and of the discontent and failure within his society. We do not need another Bay of Pigs. But we have the opportunity for some psychological and international broadcasting actions, at the very least, to strengthen our position in the region.

Quebec Vote

On May 20, Quebecers go to the polls to vote whether or not to direct their provisional government to negotiate the sovereignty of the province. The New York Times article at Tab D provides a good summary of the positions being taken by Prime Minister Trudeau and Premier Rene Levesque. At this point, it is very much a live issue with no one predicting the outcome with any certainty. [REDACTED]

May 15, 1980

AFGHAN PROPOSAL FOR POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

Q: Please comment on the new Afghan proposal for a political settlement.

A: As far as we can tell from the press reports, this is not a new proposal at all. It appears to be designed primarily as a way to get Pakistan and Iran, among others, to recognize the Babrak Karmal regime in Afghanistan as a legitimate government under the pretext of negotiating the eventual withdrawal of the Soviet troops who are keeping that regime in place against the wishes of the Afghan people.

Iran and Pakistan, like the United States and other Western and Islamic governments, have seen through these efforts before. We do not see anything new in the Soviet-inspired Afghan offer to justify talking to a regime which has no authority or credibility. Additionally, it would appear that the offer is, in part, timed to influence discussions at the Islamic Conference in Pakistan this month.

May 15, 1980

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

We welcome the courageous decision of the West German Olympic Committee to refuse to participate in the Moscow Olympic Games. The Committee, the West German Government, and the people of West Germany deserve the admiration of all those throughout the world who believe in peace and freedom and who recognize that the achievement of these goals sometimes requires painful sacrifices.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a serious blow to peace and freedom. We hope that the other Olympic Committees of Western Europe will follow the advice of their own governments and join with the West German Olympic Committee in demonstrating their opposition to Soviet aggression.

#

#

#

MAY 16, 1980

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

The President today met with the Lord Killanin, the President of the International Olympic Committee, and Mme. Monique Berlioux, its Director, at their request. The President reaffirmed that the position of the United States in opposition to sending a team to the Twenty-Second Olympic Games in Moscow results solely from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and our belief that it was not appropriate to attend the Games in a host nation that was invading its neighbor.

The President made clear that this position does not detract in any way from our support of the international Olympic movement, and that we will welcome athletes from any eligible Olympic nation at the Twenty-Third Olympic Games in Los Angeles in 1984.

The President reaffirmed that the United States will continue to urge other governments and Olympic Committees to oppose participation in the Olympic Games in Moscow this summer. He noted that more than forty National Olympic Committees, including those of the United States, West Germany, Canada, China, Norway, Kenya, Argentina and numerous Moslem nations, have already decided not to attend the Olympic Games in Moscow. More major national committees are expected to take the same position during the next two weeks.

#

#

#

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

3019

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON

May 14, 1980

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI 25

SUBJECT: Proposals for Post-Venice Stopovers (U)

As a result of our discussion at breakfast on Friday, State has drawn up a proposal for several possible stopovers after the Venice Summit. (C)

YUGOSLAVIA

At Tab A is a proposal for a stopover in Yugoslavia. You have a standing invitation to Yugoslavia dating back to Tito's visit to the US in March 1978, and as Ambassador Loncar reiterated to you on May 5, the Yugoslavs would welcome a visit to Belgrade by you. The Venice Summit presents a unique opportunity to make such a trip, which would serve to underscore our strong and continued support for Yugoslavia's independence. It would also help to offset some of the adverse media criticism for your failure to attend Tito's funeral. (C)

The visit could be accomplished in a day. You could fly from Venice to Belgrade Monday evening (June 23) after the conclusion of the Summit and stay overnight at the Old Palace. Tuesday morning you would motorcade to Tito's grave to pay your respects (good photo opportunity) and hold substantive talks as well as a luncheon with the new Yugoslav leadership. In the afternoon you would make a visit to selected public sites, which would provide another photo opportunity, and meet with Vladimir Bakaric and a number of other leaders. You could then leave at 6:00 p.m. that evening (June 24) or stay on for a State dinner and leave the next morning (June 25). (C)

SPAIN

At Tab B is a proposal for a stopover in Spain. The Spanish are extremely anxious to have you visit Madrid. Since 1975 King Juan Carlos has been here on State and private visits, and Prime Minister Suarez has made two working visits to Washington. A visit by you would help move Spain closer to the Western alliance and pave the

CONFIDENTIAL

Review May 14, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NETC-2006-021
per 2/24/26 NSC/7
BY 6 NARA, DATE 8/4/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

way for Treaty negotiations which are scheduled to begin in the fall and which cover our overall relations, including base rights. (C)

A 24-hour visit would include a call on Prime Minister Suarez for substantive discussions and a subsequent lunch, a visit to the Cortez (Parliament) and call on Congress President Levilla, a call on Juan Carlos and a State dinner hosted by the King. Alternatively, you could make a short, six-hour stopover which would allow for a meeting with Suarez, a meeting with the King and Queen, and a State dinner at Zrzuela Palace. (C)

Ambassador Todman and the State Department believe that the visit should be as close to 24 hours as possible to achieve our purposes. Anything short of that, in their view, would have to be billed as a working visit. However, the activities included on the longer schedule are not absolutely essential, and you could leave early the next day if you wanted to include a short stopover in Portugal. (C)

PORTUGAL

At Tab C is a proposal for a stopover in Portugal. The main justification for including Lisbon is that recent press stories have suggested you might make a stopover in Spain and Portugal. A visit to Spain which did not include Portugal would be taken badly by the Portuguese, who have been very helpful to us on a number of issues and with whom we have important pending negotiations for access to military facilities. However, while the Portuguese would be obviously disappointed if you did not make a stopover, there would not be a serious adverse reaction. (C)

In my view, Yugoslavia is by far the most important of the three possible stopovers. State concurs. Spain is second, and Portugal third. I recommend including a one-day stopover in Yugoslavia (long version) and a one-day stopover in Spain (long version) but leaving off Portugal. This would give you a full day in each country and get you back to Washington by early afternoon (around 2:30) on June 26. (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you make a one-day stopover in Yugoslavia and Spain following the Venice Summit. (C)

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Proposed Presidential Visit to
Yugoslavia, Spain, and Portugal

A. Yugoslavia

1. Introduction

At the conclusion of his state visit here in March 1978, President Tito invited the President to visit Yugoslavia. And Yugoslav Ambassador Loncar raised this question directly with the President when he called on him after Tito's death. Clearly the Yugoslavs would appreciate an early visit by the President, particularly if it could be placed in the context of the continuity of U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia.

The visit should not be presented in the context of U.S.-Soviet competition or with an exaggerated emphasis on our willingness to support Yugoslavia against Soviet inroads since that would damage the Yugoslavs' nonaligned credentials.

The Venice Summit provides a unique opportunity for the President to make a Yugoslav stop. It is near geographically and does not possess the NATO connotation which the Yugoslavs would prefer to avoid. Because of the desirability of waiting for an interval after the Tito funeral before announcing the Presidential visit, we suggest that it be made at the end of this month.

The President could consider a public appearance in Yugoslavia as suggested for 1500 June 24. We believe there is no precedent for a visiting Chief of State to make a speech. In any case the Yugoslavs would want to be sure that any such speech would not touch on such sensitive issues as U.S.-Soviet relations or Soviet policies in other parts of the world. They would be more positive with regard to a speech on the Nonaligned Movement or on North-South issues.

2. Purpose

-- To demonstrate the continuity of U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia after Tito's death.

-- To show the Yugoslavs, the Soviets, and others that the U.S. has important interests in the development of the post-Tito situation.

-- To stress U.S. willingness to proceed with East-West detente, provided that the Soviets draw the necessary conclusions from their adventure in Afghanistan.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

ALL Jcr 2006-071
per 7/24/06 NSC/Hr
BY 6 NARA, DATE 8/4/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

-- To reassure the new Yugoslav leadership of our support and establish a personal relationship with them.

-- To display continued interest in the views of the nonaligned moderates and to bolster their resistance to Cuban/Soviet attempts to dominate the Nonaligned Movement.

3. People the President Should See

Cvijetin Mijatovic (after May 15),
President of the Presidency of Yugoslavia

Stevan Doronjski, Chairman,
Presidium of the League of Communists
of Yugoslavia

Veselin Djuranovic, President,
Federal Executive Council

Josip Vrhovec, Federal Secretary for
Foreign Affairs

General Nikola Ljubcic, Federal Secretary
for National Defense

Vladimir Bakaric, Member of the
Presidency and of the Presidium*

Milos Minic, Member of the Presidium*

Stane Dolanc, Member of the Presidium*

* Considered to be particularly influential. Could be invited to social events if not otherwise involved with the visit.

4. Proposed Schedule.

Many variations are possible. The following outlines show how a 36 hour visit and a 6 hour visit could be set up. If necessary, the longer schedule could be cut further eliminating the second overnight stop in Belgrade.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

A. Long schedule.

<u>Approximate Time</u>	<u>Event (* connotes obligatory event)</u>	<u>Purpose</u>
Monday, June 23		
1930	Depart from Venice	
2100	Arrive Belgrade	
2115	Airport Arrival Statement	Opportunity to state purpose of trip and make short policy statement
2125	Motorcade into Belgrade. Overnight at Old Palace.	
Tuesday, June 24		
0730	Working Breakfast with Ambassador Eagleburger, Old Palace	Discuss day's activities.
0830	*Call on President of SFRY Presidency Mijatovic, Federal Executive Council Building	Protocol requirement
0900	*Motorcade to Tito grave site. Lay wreath.	Protocol requirement. Photo opportunity.
0930	*Motorcade to nearby Tito museum. Sign Memorial Book.	Protocol requirement. Photo opportunity.
0945	*Return to Federal Executive Council Building for talks with Mijatovic and other senior GOY leaders.	Substantive talks.
1130	Call on LCY Presidium Chairman Doronjski	Yugoslavs would appreciate this since Doronjski and Mijatovic share Tito's old protocol status.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 4 -

1145	*Plant "tree of peace" at nearby Park of Friendship	Protocol requirement.
1230	Luncheon hosted by U.S. Guests would include not only Government leaders, but also members of "inner circle," e.g., Presidency Member Bakaric and Stane Dolanc, former Party Secretary.	Opportunity to meet other members of leadership. Opportunity to make public statement in toast.
1500	Short visit to selected public site, e.g., Kalemegdan Fortress and Military Museum near center of Belgrade. Alternatively, this period could be used for a speech.	Photo opportunity. Contact with people.
1700	Call on President by "elder statesman" Bakaric and others	Bakaric is the first among equal in the Yugoslav leadership, although he does not aspire to Tito's mantle. A discussion with him would be very useful.
n.b.	<i>If necessary, program could be cut at this point with departure for Madrid at 1800.</i>	
1900	*Reception for Yugoslav officials, other Yugoslav guests, and Diplomatic Corps at Federal Executive Council	Opportunity to meet representatives of Yugoslav "new class" and others. Photo opportunity.
2030	*State Dinner hosted by Yugoslavs	Opportunity to meet key Yugoslavs. Toast would represent public policy statement.
Wednesday, June 25 0830	Motorcade to airport. Departure statement. Release Joint Communique.	Daylight motorcade would provide opportunity for Yugoslav public to greet President. Photo opportunity.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 5 -

B. Short schedule.

Monday, June 23

1930	Depart from Venice
2100	Arrive Belgrade
2115	Airport Arrival Statement
2125	Motorcade into Belgrade. Overnight at Old Palace.

Tuesday, June 24

0800	*Call on President of SFRY Presidency Mijatovic
0830	*Motorcade to Tito grave site. Lay wreath.
0900	*Substantive talks at Federal Executive Council.
1100	*Plant "tree of peace"
1130	*Luncheon, hosted by Yugoslav side
1330	Motorcade to airport
1400	Airport Departure Statement. Release Joint Communique.
1415	Depart for Madrid

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Travel of President to Spain

1. Introduction

The Spanish authorities, from the King down, have expressed a strong desire to have President Carter visit Madrid. Since President Ford's 1975 trip to Spain, King Juan Carlos has been here on state and private visits and Prime Minister Suarez has made two working visits to Washington. Both men are strong advocates of close relations with the U.S. They believe that a Presidential visit would help move Spain closer to the Western alliance.

The Spanish are justifiably proud of their peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy, and they look on a Presidential visit as the much desired United States recognition of the great changes that have taken place in Spain since the Franco dictatorship. The visit itself and the public opportunities it would offer -- including a proposed "Meet the Press" type program will clearly demonstrate to the Spanish public as well as government our recognition of their substantial achievements.

Note -- Ambassador Todman and the Department believe that the duration should be as close to 24 hours as possible and in order to achieve the above purposes, include a state dinner and overnighting. Anything substantially short of that would have to be billed as a working visit, and would have at a minimum to include a working dinner with the King and a call on Suarez.

2. Purpose

-- Smooth the way for the Treaty negotiations which will begin in the fall.

-- Create a much more favorable atmosphere in Madrid for our entreaties to the Spanish for cooperation on several international issues such as Iran, Afghanistan, Central America and the Mid-East peace process.

-- Make the Spanish feel that they are valued partners on international issues, including European security and defense.

3. People the President Should See (In rank order)

-- King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia

-- Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez

-- President of the Cortez (Parliament) - Landelino Levilla

-- Leader of opposition Socialist Party - Felipe Gonzalez

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SPAIN

24-Hour Visit Scenario (State Visit)

<u>Approximate Time</u>	<u>Event</u> (* connotes obligatory event other than travel)	<u>Purpose</u>
Wednesday, June 25		
1200	Arrive Barjas International Airport (not Torrejon Air Base) Welcome by Prime Minister Suarez	
	Airport Arrival Statement	Opportunity to state purpose of trip
	Review honor guard	
1220-1230	Motorcade to Guest Palace	
1230-1245	Short Briefing by Amb. Todman	Discuss nuances of dealing with day's program
1300-1400	*Call on Prime Minister Suarez at Moncloa Palace	Substantive discussions on international and bilateral issues
1400-1600	Lunch at Moncloa with Suarez as host (guests should include, in addition to Governor of Madrid Province, and Mayor of Madrid and political and economic leaders, Guitarist Andres Segovia, and Ramon Castroviejo, world famous opthamalogist responsible for eye banks in U.S.)	Protocol requirement
1630-1700	Visit Cortez (Parliament) and call on Congress President Levilla. Meet briefly with Felipe Gonzalez	Opportunity to show U.S. supports all democratic forces, Photo opportunity
1800-1900	Address Cortez *Call on Their Royal Highnesses Juan Carlos and Sofia	Substantive talks on international issues.
2030-2300	*Dinner at Zarzuela Palace with Their Royal Highnesses as hosts.	Protocol requirement Photo opportunity

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, June 26

0840-1900	Helicopter to Toledo	
0900-1000	Tour Old City, Cathedral, etc. Meet and be photographed with Spanish residents of city, Bishop of Cathedral, and others Alternatively, hold a "Meet the Press" type interview.	Opportunity to greet public in surround- ings recognized as uniquely Spanish. Good photo and human interest opportunities
1000-1030	Helicopter to Torrejon AFB	
1030-1100	*Visit base and give address to U.S. military personnel in Spain	Important for morale of 8,000 US service- men in Spain
1100-1110	Helicopter to Barajas Airport	
1110-1140	Departure ceremonies and brief statement to and some questions from Spanish press	
1150	Wheels up	

6-Hour Scenario - (Working Visit)

Wednesday, June 25

1800	Arrive at Barajas
1800-1810	Welcome by Foreign Minister Oreja
1810-1820	Helicopter to Moncloa Palace
1830-1930	*Meet with Prime Minister Suarez
1930-2030	*Meet with King and Queen
2100-2330	*Dinner at Zarzuela Palace (over- night at Guest Palace)

Thursday, June 26

0800-1815	Helicopter to Torrejon AFB
1815-1840	*Visit and address U.S. military personnel
1840-1850	Helicopter to Barajas
0900	Wheels up

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Travel of President to Portugal

1. Introduction

Press stories attributed to the White House have stated that the President is considering stops in both Portugal and Spain, following a state visit to Yugoslavia. A Presidential visit to Portugal would recognize the significance of the Portuguese move in instituting economic sanctions against Iran, as well as their outspokenness in condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Pending requests with the GOP for U.S. access to Portuguese military facilities also could be favorably affected, increasing Southwest Asian options. Visiting only Spain, Portugal's long-standing rival, would possibly diminish Portuguese willingness to cooperate on access issues, and would be inexplicable given the GOP's exceptionally strong public support and concrete help (e.g., the Shah's stopover in the Azores).

2. Purposes

- Protect and possibly enhance American access to Portuguese bases
- Acknowledge unique Portuguese support on Iran and Afghanistan
- Highlight U.S.-Portuguese cooperation and bilateral ties (in recognition of large Luso-American community in the U.S.)

3. People the President should see (in rank order)

- President Ramalho Eanes
- Prime Minister Francisco Sa Carneiro
- Socialist Party leader Mario Soares (if requested)

4. Scenario A (would follow 6-hour or "reduced" 24-hour visit to Spain)

<u>Approximate Time</u>	<u>Event</u> (*obligatory event other than travel)	<u>Purpose</u>
Wednesday, June 25		
0930 (Madrid time)	Depart Madrid	
0930 (Lisbon time)	Arrive Lisbon	
0935	Welcoming statements	State reasons for trip and U.S. gratitude on Iran, Afghanistan

0945	.Motorcade into Lisbon	
1020	*Meeting with President Eanes	Protocol requirement
1130	*Call on Prime Minister Sa Carneiro	Substantive talks
1230	*Working luncheon including President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister	Protocol requirement
1415	Inspect AID-financed elementary school near Lisbon, visit NATO Iberlant headquarters	Photo opportunity (school)
1545	Depart for airport	
1615	Departure statements	
1700 (Lisbon time)	Depart Lisbon	
1930 (Washington time)	Arrive Andrews	

5. Scenario B

Noon, June 25 (Madrid time)	Depart Madrid
Noon (Lisbon time)	Arrive Lisbon
12:05 - 12:15 p.m.	Short welcoming statements
12:45 - 2:15 p.m.	Working luncheon with President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister
2:20 - 3:20 p.m.	Meeting with President Eanes
3:20 - 4:20 p.m.	Meeting with Prime Minister Sa Carneiro
4:20 p.m.	Depart for airport
4:50 p.m.	Arrive airport

4:50 - 5 p.m.	Departure statements
5 p.m. (Lisbon time)	Depart Lisbon
7:30 p.m. (Washington time)	Arrive Andrews

Trudeau Entreats Quebec Not to Sever Tie

By HENRY GINIGER

Special to The New York Times

MONTREAL, May 15 — Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, in one of the most impassioned speeches of his career, appealed to Quebecers last night not to break up Canada and promised them immediate moves to improve the federal system.

In his third and last appearance in an emotional and increasingly tense referendum campaign, the Prime Minister shouted for an "overwhelming no" in the vote next Tuesday on the Quebec government's request for a mandate to negotiate the sovereignty of the French-speaking province and a new and equal economic association with the rest of Canada.

Mr. Trudeau asked some 9,000 cheering supporters jammed into the Paul Sauvé sports arena in northern Montreal to persuade undecided voters and those who plan to vote yes simply to get reform talks started to vote against the proposal. He reiterated his warning that neither he nor the rest of Canada would negotiate sovereignty and association and that a yes vote would lead nowhere.

Lévesque Sees Close Race

In Drummondville, 60 miles to the east, Premier René Lévesque, the leader of the yes side, challenged Mr. Trudeau to hold a referendum in English-speaking Canada to see whether the people there would really refuse to recognize the democratically expressed will of the Quebec people.

In the last few days, however, Mr.

Lévesque has appeared less than certain that a majority of yes votes will be forthcoming next Tuesday. "It's going to be close," he said at several meetings, adding that "we can win, we must win, we shall win."

The no side is showing more optimism although independent predictions of the outcome have been made difficult by the considerable number of people who say they have not made up their minds or who refuse to answer questions about their opinion.

The emotion of those who waved red and white Canadian maple leaf flags last night was easily matched the night before in the same arena by a crowd of yes supporters who waved blue and white Quebec flags and who roared at a message from one of the province's most popular singers, Félix Leclerc, that predicted "Quebecers will vote to give themselves a country."

French speakers form 80 percent of the province's population of 6.2 million. The strong possibility that a majority of French-speaking voters will vote yes only to see their vote negated by a solid bloc of no votes by the English-speaking minority is causing tension and unease. Warnings of possible violence have increased and the provincial police and Montreal police have been mobilized as a precaution. Up to now, the campaign has been calm despite strong feelings on both sides and sharp divisions within families and between social and age groups. Only minor incidents, such as damaged posters and fistfights, have been reported.

Solidarity Is Asked

Mr. Lévesque has multiplied his appeals for a show of solidarity among French speakers, who, he says, form a nation that needs to throw off the federal "straitjacket" and achieve equality with English Canada through sovereignty.

To enhance this solidarity, the yes side has resorted to the formation throughout the province of thousands of small "regroupements," or organizations of people in a neighborhood, a workplace or a leisure activity who, it is hoped, will have a ripple effect. "Be contagious," Mr. Lévesque tells each group as he hands it a personally signed certificate attesting to its willingness to give the government "the mandate to negotiate with the rest of Canada a new agreement based on the equality of the two peoples."

The reassuring nature of the yes campaign, from which words like "independence" and "separation" have been banned, has been enhanced by the question itself, which contains the promise

that no actual change in Quebec's political status will take place until approved in a second referendum.

To anxious callers on open-line shows who have asked whether they will continue to have a Canadian passport or whether Quebec will have its own army, Mr. Lévesque has answered that these are questions for negotiation, the results of which will be submitted later for approval. "Nothing will be changed the day after the referendum," the Premier declares in denouncing the federalist "cam-



Associated Press

Pierre Elliott Trudeau

paign of fear and distortion," particularly among old people who have been told their federally paid pensions would be in danger if there is a yes vote.

But another aspect of the yes campaign does indeed appeal to nationalist pride and holds out the promise to Quebecers of "their own country," as Félix Leclerc put it. The great bulk of Quebec's community of singers, actors, writers and intellectuals have rallied around this sentiment and at last night's federalist meeting Mr. Trudeau and others tried to combat both this nationalist enthusiasm and the more tepid yes of those who cannot bring themselves to reject a proposal to negotiate more power for Quebec.

The U.N. Today

May 16, 1980

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

- Decolonization Committee — 3 P.M.
- Disarmament Commission — 10:30 A.M. and 3 P.M.
- Committee on Information — 10:30 A.M. and 3 P.M.
- Committee of the Whole — 10:30 A.M.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

- Committee on Transnational Corporations — Intergovernmental working group on a code of conduct — 10 A.M. and 3 P.M.

Tickets are available at the public desk in the main lobby, United Nations headquarters. Tours: 9 A.M.-4:45 P.M.



MINNESOTA HISTORICAL SOCIETY

Copyright in the Walter F. Mondale Papers belongs to the Minnesota Historical Society and its content may not be copied without the copyright holder's express written permission. Users may print, download, link to, or email content, however, for individual use.

To request permission for commercial or educational use, please contact the Minnesota Historical Society.



www.mnhs.org