

**Foreign Policy Breakfasts/National Security**

National Security Developments, 5/80-6/80.

MEMORANDUM


OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

Memo No. 933-80

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

May 23, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift   
SUBJECT: National Security/Foreign Policy  
Developments

Korea

The situation remains very tense in South Korea with more than 60 dead and 400 wounded in the city of Kwangju as of Friday. On May 22 the Department of State put out a second statement of U.S. concern (Tab 1), and later in the day announced that a U.S. carrier and AWACS were deploying to the region.

Secretary Muskie's reports to the President provide a succinct review of the Korean situation, and of the decisions taken at the May 22 PRC meeting.

The Secretary's report of May 21 includes as an attachment (paper clipped) his assessment of the recent round of talks that we and our allies have had with the Soviets -- namely that we are dealing with inflexible old men and that no early positive movement on Afghanistan can be expected.

Peoples Republic of China

On Wednesday, May 28, you are scheduled to meet with Vice Premier Geng Biao (pronounced GUNg). A copy of the papers being prepared for that meeting is at Tab 2.

On a related subject, the Civil Air negotiations with the PRC continue and our experts advise that we may very well have an agreement by the end of the week of May 26-30. I have told State and the NSC that the

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT  
REVIEW ON MAY 23, 2000

DECLASSIFIED  
Per 7/24/06 NSC/Hr  
Re NLJC-06-072  
NARA, DATE 8/9/06

Secretary of State and the President should have the option of deciding how the agreement, if it is reached, should be handled -- I see this as a very positive development, and I think the President may wish, given in particular its importance to the West Coast, to announce it personally. (I have included a note to this effect in the talking points for your lunch with the President on May 27.)

#### Middle East

Mubarak met one-on-one on May 22, with a renewed request for more PL480 and military assistance to the President. Former Prime Minister Khalil in the meantime was consulting in Washington. Perhaps the most important message he brought was Sadat's view that there could be no more movement until the U.S. elections have taken place. (Given the difficulty of movement during the balance of Begin's term of office, Sadat's view, if confirmed, will make it all the more difficult to pursue an early, successful conclusion to the Autonomy Talks.) Looking to the post-May-26 time frame, Khalil said that the Egyptians are considering an international initiative -- and they are consulting with the EC countries -- to add an additional sentence to Resolution 242 to the effect: Israel recognizes the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and the Palestinians recognize Israel's right to exist.

As indicated in the items at Tab 3, King Hussein has accepted President Carter's invitation to visit on June 16-17. Tony Lewis on May 21 published a thoughtful piece in essence supporting our stand on settlements and questioning Israel's current repressive course against the Palestinians.

#### Iran

During your mission to Belgrade, Bruno Kreisky launched a proposal for a Socialist International trip to Tehran to assist in the hostage crisis. Kreisky, accompanied by Palme of Sweden and Gonzales of Spain departs Sunday, May 25 and returns Tuesday, May 27. Cables reporting on his mission are at Tab 4. Also at Tab 4 is a memorandum summarizing the results of the most recent SCC meeting on Iran. We are expecting the

World Court decision, 13-2 in our favor, on Saturday, May 24.

Finally, the President is scheduled to fly aboard the carrier U.S.S. Nimitz on Memorial Day to address the crew and embarked Air Wing. The Nimitz, of course, was the launching and recovery platform for the helicopters used in the unsuccessful hostage rescue mission.

#### Islamic Conference

Included at Tab 5 are the text of the Islamic Conference's resolution on Afghanistan together with two New York Times articles covering the conference. (The initial U.S. assessment is that the conference outcome was more positive than earlier expected.)

#### Cuba

As indicated in the papers at Tab 6, the Cubans have rejected our proposal for multilateral talks on the refugee crisis and State believes that Castro feels under little pressure to negotiate an early solution to the crisis.

#### Geneva Conference on Refugees

Warren Christopher heads the U.S. delegation to the May 26-27 Refugee Conference which is intended to focus high level international attention on the need for continuing Kampuchean relief. The strategy paper prepared for his use is at Tab 7.

#### Indonesia

Some good news: Implementing one of the most important aspects of your visit to Indonesia, we have just delivered the first four of sixteen Skyhawk A-4 aircraft to Indonesia (Defense paper at Tab 8).

#### U.S. Air Readiness

On a less positive note, reports continue to multiply (such as the May 22 AP story at Tab 9) on the increasing difficulty Defense is having in maintaining the air readiness of our front line aircraft such as the F-15.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

You will recall George Will's scathing piece of two weeks ago. This problem is bound to attain a more prominent place in the 1980 Defense debate.

#### Soviet Developments

As reported in the State analysis at Tab 10, the Soviets have officially labeled the Muskie-Gromyko talks as "useful."

On an important issue relating to the USSR, the major grain exporting nations met in Brussels on May 20 (cable at Tab 10). Canada currently is the principal stumbling block to attainment of our strategy of keeping some form of uniformed front on a continued grain embargo.

#### Greece

Included at Tab 11 is a State paper analyzing the prospects for Greece under the government of Prime Minister Rallis.

In a speech to the Greek Parliament on May 21, Rallis reaffirmed his government's commitment to the West. He said that ratification of the new US-Greek Defense Agreement hinges on his nation's return to NATO's military wing and that, in turn, hinges on Greece's NATO allies overcoming Turkey's objections to Greek re-entry. (You may wish to keep in the back of your mind -- for exploration with Christopher, Secretary Muskie, and the President the possibility of developing a scenario that could lead to a trip to Greece by you this year. Joe Biden came back saying the Greeks are pining for attention.)

#### Olympic Update

The current count by National Olympic Committee is at Tab 12.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

STATEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
12:00 EDT, May 22, 1980

Korea

-- We are deeply concerned by the civil strife in the southern city of Kwangju.

-- We urge all parties involved to exercise maximum restraint and undertake a dialogue in search of a peaceful settlement.

-- Continued unrest and an escalation of violence would risk dangerous miscalculation by external forces.

-- When calm has been restored, we will urge all parties to seek means to resume a program of political development as outlined by President Choi.

-- We reiterate that the U.S. Government will "react strongly in accordance with its treaty obligations to any external attempt to exploit the situation in the Republic of Korea."

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

CURRENT REPORTS

May 23, 1980

1. SOUTH KOREA: TALKS BEGIN IN RIOT-TORN KWANGJU

South Korean authorities report that rioting has spread to some other cities in the southwestern province of Chollanamdo, but that a measure of calm has been restored to the provincial capital of Kwangju, where the rioters have established control. Government negotiators have been meeting with representatives of the demonstrators in Kwangju to discuss their demands which include the removal of martial law troops from the city, release of all persons confined as a result of the riots, and compensation for casualties. Government figures show 60 dead and 400 wounded from the four days of riots there.

Prime Minister Park, along with three other cabinet ministers, visited the Kwangju area May 22. In a subsequent nationwide television appearance, Park:

--blamed the riots on "impure elements";

--announced the establishment of an emergency relief committee to assist Kwangju if the situation improved;

--warned of the severe economic impact of continued rioting; and

--promised that political development and economic stability can be achieved at an early date "if the people remain faithful to their duties."

Stepping up its attack on dissident leader Kim Dae-jung, the government issued a lengthy statement of particulars, accusing him of fomenting the student demonstrations and backing them financially.

Late press reports indicate that rioters in Kwangju have refused to give up their arms and the ROK army completed its encirclement of the city and moved heavy tanks to its outskirts. The martial law commander has warned that anyone carrying a gun would be shot. In the city, a division exists between youthful militants proposing a hard line in negotiations with martial law authorities and the majority of citizens who desire more conciliatory steps.

In another development, the ROK delegation took part yesterday in scheduled talks with the North Koreans.

INR Comment: The military authorities appear successful in their effort to limit rioting to the extreme southwest sector of the country, at least for the moment. While the rioting there continues, the opening of talks in Kwangju may help control the damage in other smaller cities. The widely threatened May 22 student demonstration did not take place.

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD~~

per 7/24/06 NLSCLT  
Re NLSI-2026-072  
BY: CA NARA, DATE 8/2/06



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~SECRET~~

## OPERATIONS CENTER

Korea Informal Monitoring Group

Sitrep No. 5

Situation in Korea as of 0800, 5/23/80

S (2)

D  
P  
E  
M  
C  
T

S/S (3)

S/S-O (2)

PM

INR

IO

CA (3)

AID

OC

SY

HA

ICA

L

H

EA (5)

EUR

EB

MILREP

EDITOR

WH (LOX)

DOD (LOX)

CIA (LOX)

NSA (LOX)

S/S-S

PA/HO

UNA

PA

S/P

(U) The rioting, which had spread from Kwangju throughout the southern Cholla Province, appeared to be in a lull Friday, May 23. Militants began collecting and displaying bodies of those killed, possibly with the aim of refuting ROKG reports downplaying casualties. A Reuter correspondent reported counting 57 bodies, and U.S. networks carried video coverage.

(U) Representatives of the insurrectionists in Kwangju met with military authorities, demanding amnesty, compensation, a cool-down period, prisoner releases, an end to martial law and high-level resignations. Although the government optimistically reports a breakthrough in the negotiations is likely, it has agreed to only the first three points and the militants are unlikely to be satisfied. PM Park toured the area by air, and called on all Koreans not to overreact to rumors "apparently fabricated by North Korean espionage agents," stressing a need to restore order and minimize economic damage. He reiterated the ROKG's intention to proceed with President Choi's timetable toward political liberalization.

(S) The ROK military is augmenting forces in the area. Journalists report tanks, mortars and other heavy weapons on the outskirts of Kwangju, and frequent low-level passes by fighter/bomber aircraft over the city. Reportedly these passes elicit rifle fire from the ground, although Embassy Seoul reports this is easing somewhat. Some journalists report a growing division between militants and the general populace of Kwangju and citizens apparently are beginning to turn in weapons to martial law authorities. At 1300 hours (Seoul time) the CFC released 2nd battalion, 101st regiment, 33rd division for duties in the Kwangju area.\*

(C) The Department's statement urging all parties to exercise restraint received extensive coverage throughout Korea. Japanese media included the statement in their reporting on the Korean situation. Amb. Gleysteen warned of the potential for anti-American sentiment to grow in the Korean pressurepot, and urged that USG official comment be cautious. He fears any attempt to engage in a discussion on the rights and wrongs of the Korean situation will exacerbate our problems in Kwangju and possibly evoke anti-American sentiment.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

- (C) North-South talks continued with very little progress in the May 22 meeting, but the two sides did agree to meet again June 24. Clearly with a psychological advantage, the North sharpened the rhetorical exchange. The pace of the dialogue has slowed and the prospects of a Prime Ministerial meeting appear to have diminished -- at least for the time being. Nevertheless, both sides seem inclined to keep the talks going. Meanwhile, the DPRK decried the "outrageous fascist frenzy" in the South, but reiterated its intention not to intervene "whatever confusion may be created in South Korea."
- (U) There are no reports of foreign casualties, and at least 20 missionaries (Mormons) left Kwangju without incident yesterday.



Blaine D. Porter  
Korea Informal Monitoring Group



Seton Stapleton  
Senior Watch Officer

- \* (C) The 33rd is a ready reserve division deployed in the Inchon area.

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~

May 22, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Edmund S. Muskie 

1. Korea - May 22 was a day of relative calm in Korea, although the danger remains extremely high that the situation will resume its deterioration. At the request of the Korean Foreign Minister I issued a statement at noon reaffirming our earlier position and stressing the high importance of stability. Ambassador Gleysteen believes that this statement will be useful in gaining time so the Generals can attempt to establish a dialogue with the groups now in control of the city of Kwangju. I have asked the Voice of America to broadcast the entire statement as frequently as possible. Dick Holbrooke and Leonard Woodcock saw the Chinese Ambassador today to reiterate our concerns.


How long the Generals will try to talk to the disorganized elements that now control Kwangju is not clear. Unless real progress in establishing a dialogue takes place quickly, I suspect a violent struggle to retake the city may take place within the next few days. Ambassador Gleysteen and General Wickham have encouraged the Generals to seek a dialogue but, under my instructions, they have put the restoration of stability and order and the maintenance of a strategic balance in Northeast Asia as our highest priorities.

In the PRC meeting today there was a consensus that we should stand by our present public posture and avoid comments which can be seized upon by either side to inflame the situation.

~~SECRET~~

RDS - 2/3 5/22/00 (Muskie, Edmund S.)

DECLASSIFIED

per 7/24/06 NSC 1/tr  
NSC-2006-012  
BY  NARA, DATE 8/9/06

~~SECRET~~

2

The military is taking additional steps to increase our own military forces if the Koreans divert too many troops from their primary mission against the North. We agreed that our overriding first priority at this time is to support the restoration of stability in South Korea (we all hope this can be done with a minimum of bloodshed, but we all recognize the danger of further violence is real). There was also a strong consensus that we must preserve a limited accommodation with the military who now hold power -- accepting their dominance at present but, in the longer term and assuming calm is restored, resuming an effort to move them toward a government which will have the support of the Korean people. Most of us felt this process would, at best, not be resumable for a number of months.

2. Senatorial Briefing - When Chris was briefing on the Hill late this afternoon, Robert Byrd called his attention to his statement in the Record yesterday on Tarapur. Chris pointed out the disadvantages from a non-proliferation standpoint of failing to approve the two pending licenses (Gerry Smith had briefed us earlier in the day). Byrd indicated he had an "open mind" and simply was putting on the record the need for the Administration to make a strong case if it wished to avoid a Congressional veto.

During the briefing, Jack Javits floated the suggestion, earlier mentioned by John Rhodes, that a carefully selected group of Congressional leaders might meet in a third country with Members of the Iranian Parliament after it gets organized. We will consider this proposal when we review the Iranian diplomatic approaches after Hal Saunders returns from his European trip next week.

Chris also briefed Byrd and Javits on the Korea situation. They both approved our handling of it.

3. Results of the Islamic Conference, Islamabad, 5/17-22 - According to initial reports, the results of the Conference were better than expected on Afghanistan, helpful on Iran, (despite condemnation of the rescue mission and sanctions), critical of us on the Middle East

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

and milder than expected on our military presence in the area. Last January's meeting was called specifically to discuss Afghanistan. This time the participants raised other issues where they found fault with the US.

The Conference did reaffirm the January resolution condemning Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, reiterate its demand for the "immediate, total and unconditional" withdrawal of all Soviet troops and call for the early return of the refugees to Afghanistan. Over time, however, we may have problems with a committee established by the Conference to seek "a comprehensive solution to the grave crisis" if the committee decides to hold direct discussions with the Babrak regime. I am going to make sure that the governments which attended the Conference understand our views on dealing with the Kabul authorities.

The resolutions on a wide range of Middle East issues were harsh on the US (and Egypt and Israel). The governments concerned may call for an early special meeting of the UN Security Council, and, within three months, an emergency meeting of the Islamic Conference, if Israel does not "rescind its decision to make Jerusalem its capital."

4. Japan to Impose Iran Sanctions - The Japanese Cabinet will approve tonight a proposal by Prime Minister Ohira to proceed with sanctions against Iran, including suspension of export contracts concluded after November 4. Any exceptions will presumably follow the EC lead. Implementation is likely to come June 2. This decision follows on the heels of Ohira's letter to you in which he pledged to "continue to pay my personal attention to the important matters of our mutual concern and to see to it that there will be no vacuum in the Japanese foreign policy in this most trying time." This was obviously a difficult decision for Ohira and we recommend you send a very positive reply. We will have a draft to you tomorrow.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4

5. IEA Ministerial - Charles Duncan, Henry Owen and Dick Cooper report a successful conclusion of the IEA Ministerial meeting in Paris today. We were not able to get everything we wished, but the necessity for reducing substantially the collective 1985 IEA 26.2 mbd target was formally acknowledged. It is implicit that the reduction could be by as much as 4 mbd. This will provide the basis for an effective system of "yardsticks" for oil imports and monitoring of national energy policies in the next few years. This outcome will lay a good foundation for energy discussions at the Venice Summit, which need not focus on figures as the Tokyo Summit did. Charles Duncan will provide you with a more detailed report on his return.

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~  
*The Vice President*

May 21, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Edmund S. Muskie 

1. Korea: Disorders in the southwestern city of Kwangju (Kim Dae Chung's home town) and surrounding Cholla provinces have widened and there is a distinct possibility of protests spreading to Seoul Thursday (tonight our time), not least because there are more than a million Cholla province natives in the capital city. Parts of three ROK army divisions have been diverted to riot-control duty, although no front-line units have been involved yet. At some point the release of units from the Combined Command could weaken ROK defenses.

We are manning an around-the-clock watch in the Department, and I will be chairing a full-scale review of our policy in a PRC meeting tomorrow. We are assessing the impact of developments on the region, especially Japan, China and North Korea. After the PRC has made some recommendations, I will want to talk to you, possibly at the Friday breakfast, about how we blend our public statements and private pressures so as to head off a return to military dictatorship in Korea.

2. Byrd May Oppose Tarapur Licenses: Bob Byrd gave a speech this morning on the Senate floor pointing out the role of the Senate in enacting the non-proliferation act and expressing concern about the Tarapur matter. He indicated that he wanted to talk to me about it, but the strong implication was that he is inclined to oppose us.

3. Call to Lord Carrington: EC holds to Sanctions: I called Lord Carrington today and explained "our sharp displeasure" with the British actions on the sanctions. He was upset by the description of our reaction and gave me the following explanation.

RDS 2/3 5/21/00 (Muskie, Edmund S.)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
per 7/24/06 NSC 14r  
re NLJC 2006-072  
BY Cs NARA, DATE 8/9/06

~~SECRET~~

2

He expressed regret that it wasn't possible to get the necessary votes in the Parliament to support the Naples decision. He concedes that he had agreed to support the decision and stated that it was clear that he would lose the vote in Parliament by 100 votes. The choice at that point was to risk being rebuffed by a negative vote which could result in the whole thing slipping away, or backing off the retroactive feature of the Naples decision. He stated that actually only one contract was involved and that the issue from the point of view of the Parliament was the retroactive nature of the proposed policy. It was his judgment that under the circumstances the wise course was to avoid the risk of losing the whole policy.

Despite the negative British decision on Iran trade contracts, the other European Community states agreed today in Brussels to honor their Naples decision on sanctions and to put it into effect tomorrow. Only the Irish position is apparently not 100% firm. The British expect to activate their non-retroactive sanctions late next week. The French were apparently very firm in calling on their EC partners to honor their May 18 commitments. The Italians went along, but are worried about the prospects of a bitter debate in their Parliament.

I took the opportunity to discuss the Olympics boycott with Carrington. He said that he was continuing to work on it, that he had made a speech yesterday that had received wide-spread attention, that he had approached the chairmen of all the sports associations and that Prime Minister Thatcher had been in contact with the Olympic Committee.

Note: I have attached a copy of a letter I received yesterday from Lord Carrington on the subject of the sanctions.

4. Mideast Political Issues in WHO: At the annual World Health Assembly (WHA) this week, the US sidetracked an Arab move to punish Egypt for Camp David by removing WHO's regional office from Alexandria. Working closely with Egypt, we pushed through a US resolution, 53-43-20, referring procedural aspects of the question to the International Court of Justice, thereby effectively postponing further WHA action.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

3

The US also lobbied widely against an extreme Arab resolution condemning Israel on the health of the Arab population in the occupied territories. The resolution passed, 60-24(US)-20, with 50 non-participants, a result unlikely to afford much solace to rejectionist Arabs.

5. Soviet-Western Contacts: I am attaching my analysis of the results and significance of the Brezhnev-Giscard meeting earlier this week, and of individual conversations Gromyko held last week in Vienna with Carrington, Genscher and me.

6. Your Visit to the State Department: Now that I have begun to find my own way around the building, I hope a time for your visit can be arranged. My staff is in touch with your staff. It would be nice to do this before we go to Venice next month.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Assessment of Recent Soviet Meetings  
With US and Allies and Implications for US Policy

Brezhnev's conversation with Giscard and Gromyko's conversations with Carrington, Genscher, and me were remarkably similar in tone and in substance. The Soviet tactic appears to have been to encourage further contacts with the Europeans without assuming the role of demandeur and without paying a substantive price. Brezhnev's and Gromyko's statements were mainly standard Soviet "boiler-plate" differing little from Soviet press treatments of the same subjects. Giscard's claim that he found Brezhnev more "nuanced" than Gromyko strikes me as an attempt to give the meeting a substantive justification not borne out by the reports available to us.

Afghanistan

The primary focus of discussion in all meetings was Afghanistan and its effect on East-West relations. I believe that Brezhnev's firm statement to Giscard that there would be no Soviet withdrawal until a "socialist state had been consolidated" represented a departure from the previous Soviet position that withdrawal could take place when the conditions which had made their intervention necessary ceased. If Brezhnev's formulation accurately reflects Soviet thinking on this point, it would confirm our gloomiest assessments of Soviet objectives in Afghanistan and rule out the possibility of meaningful negotiations until the Soviet view is ready to change. Moreover, to the extent they may contemplate withdrawal, Gromyko's comment to Carrington that withdrawal was a "process" which could begin only after a regional agreement was achieved appears to indicate that the Soviets view this as occurring over a long period. In short, the Allies came away with the same impression I did, that the Soviets are not now prepared to show any flexibility over Afghanistan.

Theater Nuclear Forces

Brezhnev's remarks to Giscard on Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) are perhaps the only instance where either he or Gromyko differed from the standard Soviet line. Brezhnev reportedly stated that Moscow would soon produce a formal statement indicating that TNF could only be discussed in the SALT III context. He apparently said this without the standard Soviet precondition that NATO must cancel its December 12

SENSITIVE  
RDS 3 5/21/00

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

per 7/24/06 NSC/HR  
per NIT-2006-072  
BY 6 NARA, DATE 8/9/06

~~SECRET~~

2

SENSITIVE

decision. Because of its divergence from this standard Soviet TNF line, it is possible his statement was a mistranslation or misstatement. Gromyko did take the standard line with me and Genscher.

Iran

In response to efforts by all three countries to persuade the Soviets to adopt a more supportive role on Iran, the Soviets demurred, emphasizing that they had earlier tried to be helpful in seeking the release of the hostages but had received only further criticism and no thanks from the US for their effort.

China

Not surprisingly, China was the only topic that the Soviets raised with me, but not with the Europeans. Again, however, the Soviet line was a standard reiteration of their position that the Chinese leadership wants war (preferably between the US and the USSR), and therefore any attempt to play China off against the Soviet Union will be a mistake. Gromyko also noted trends toward US military assistance to China.

US-Soviet/East-West Relations

Although Soviet comments to the Allies were remarkably similar to my conversation with Gromyko, it is evident that Brezhnev and Gromyko displayed a greater interest in continuing their dialogue with the Europeans than with us. Continuing the Soviet refrain that the Americans have "destroyed detente," Brezhnev told Giscard that it is "impossible" to talk with the Americans, but said the Soviets were interested in future European contacts. Giscard noted that, from his conversation with Brezhnev, he could never remember a time when the Soviets gave an impression that things were worse. He felt they were giving no thought to ways of improving the relationship.

Conclusion

Based on our reading of these most recent high-level contacts with the Soviets, it is clear that there is no inconsistency between their public line, as expressed in their propaganda and official statements, and their private views. They appear unprepared for the moment to show any flexibility on the major issues dividing us.

SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

SENSITIVE

As far as Afghanistan is concerned, it is clear that -- apart from their acknowledged military difficulties on the ground -- there is some unrealism in the Soviet expectation that they can build a more broadly based government in Kabul that would stand a chance of survival after Soviet withdrawal without (a) finding a substitute for Babrak Karmal (who suffers from the fatal flaw of being a Soviet instrument), and (b) committing themselves now to a scheduled withdrawal. Carrington began to push them on this point and it is useful for us to see that this message is brought home to the Soviets -- preferably through the Europeans and the Neutrals.


The rigidities of the Soviet position which have so far prevented them from showing even a moderate degree of flexibility to enable them to make their European strategy effective probably reflect the condition of the Soviet leadership in the present period -- a small group of aged and rigid men who fall back on old habits of thought and old techniques in trying to cope with their present problems.

The Soviet leadership obviously had little insight into the effects of their own actions in contributing to the present tensions. They apparently believe genuinely that it is the US that destroyed detente, even before Afghanistan. They are bitter and truculent. They apparently are fatalistically resigned to a prolonged period of poor relations with the US and they do not believe there is much they can do about it. The only steps we could take that would give some measure of stabilization to this relationship in the near term would be to give evidence of our serious intent to move toward the ratification of SALT II as soon as it becomes feasible. This puts us, as I said to the Allied ambassadors, in an impasse since we will find it difficult to move on SALT until there is a significant change in Afghanistan.

Given these circumstances, it is my judgment that we should keep the lines of communication open, partly to avoid further miscalculation on the part of the Soviets. If and when the Soviets reach the point of realization that they will have to cope more effectively with the conditions necessary to establish a more broadly based and independent government in Kabul, the time may come for productive negotiations that could lead to a Soviet withdrawal.

SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~



TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM LORD CARRINGTON OF 20 MAY

DECLASSIFIED

per 7/24/06 NSC/tr  
NICT-2006-072  
BY LS NARA, DATE 8/9/06

Begins

You may have heard from your Embassy in London of the decision not to apply retroactive sanctions against Iran which the Government was reluctantly forced to take by irresistible pressure in Parliament yesterday. I am writing personally to you at once to explain the background to this decision, which reverses the decision on this point by the European Community Foreign Ministers in Naples on 18 May.

As you know, the banning of exports under existing contracts to Iran poses difficult problems for several European countries over legal liability and compensation, if sanctions are applied without the backing of a mandatory UN Resolution. We had accordingly with our European partners to find some way of minimizing our exposure to these liabilities, by making a distinction between certain exports that would be banned and others that would be exempt. The most satisfactory way of doing this seemed to be to exempt exports made under pre-existing obligations.

The cut-off date chosen by the Nine was 4 November, the date of the seizure of the US hostages. Unfortunately, the small element of retroactivity implied in this choice of date provoked a serious reaction yesterday in Parliament, where many MPs have been under severe pressure from constituents whose firms, having entered into contracts between 4 November and now, would be affected by sanctions. Traditionally, our Parliament, as you no doubt know, dislikes and distrusts retrospective legislation. The strength of Parliamentary feeling was such that it would have been impossible for the Government to secure Parliamentary approval for legislation along these lines. I hope that you will from

/your own

your own experience understand why the Government had little choice but to amend its decision.

The result of all this has been a set back, which I much regret. As you will have heard, the Government has had to agree not to ban exports under existing contracts and to drop the cut-off date of 4 November.

I sincerely hope that this development will not be allowed to impair the impression of solidarity with the US which we, and indeed all the Nine, are striving to demonstrate. We at this end shall do our utmost to prevent any damage.

Meanwhile, I can assure you that the British Government remains completely behind the US in your efforts to secure the release of the hostages and that we shall not give up our efforts to help in any way that may prove effective to this end.

Ends

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON, D.C.

5/23/80

Mr. Vice President:

Given the fact that the President will be dropping by your meeting with Geng, I have recommended that State and NSC draft one memo for you and the President (attached). It was also at my suggestion that the Talking Points have been cast in terms of a global overview.

  
ADC

DECLASSIFIED

Per 7/24/06 NSC/tr  
Re NSC 2006-072  
BY Ca NARA, DATE 8/9/06



## MEMORANDUM

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~WITH SECRET ATTACHMENTINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Your Drop By on Chinese Vice Premier Geng Biao on Wednesday, May 28, 1:45 P.M., Roosevelt Room (U)

BACKGROUND

Vice Premier Geng Biao (pronounced: gung), a member of the Politburo and Secretary General of the Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party, is in charge of implementing China's national defense policies. Although he has been criticized in the Party recently for high living, Geng is close to Vice Premier Deng and remains at age 71 an experienced and influential soldier and diplomat. (C)

Geng is returning Harold Brown's January visit. He is here to discuss further broadening of our defense relationship and to find out what specific items of civilian technology and military equipment we are prepared to sell to China. Although we have been responsive to their requests, the Chinese will be disappointed that we are not willing, at least at this stage, to go so far as to sell jet engines for their military aircraft. (C)

The Vice President will be meeting with him for 15 minutes before you drop by to review our relationship and place it in a global perspective. (C)

Geng is probably authorized to convey no more than a courtesy message to you. But he will also be looking for signs of possible policy shifts or disharmony among your advisors in the wake of the Iran rescue effort and the Vance resignation. Although Geng is not a policymaker, his visit is an opportunity

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

ORIGINAL C. Z. Brzezinski  
☒ DECL ☒ 5/23/1986

DECLASSIFIED

per 7/24/06 AISC 115  
 re NLS-2006-072  
 BY: S NARA, DATE 8/5/06

EXT BYND 6 YEARS

to convey authoritatively to the highest levels of the PRC leadership an accurate picture of our policies and resolve. (C)

Your drop-by has several specific purposes:

-- To underline the importance we attach to the expanding defense relationship with China and to reciprocate the accessibility of China's leaders to our senior officials.

-- To reassure the Chinese leadership through Geng that we intend to remain firm in our demands for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia.

-- To make clear that a step-by-step, carefully paced approach to the expansion of the US-China defense relationship is necessary and in our mutual interest. (C)

#### PRESS PLAN

The meeting will take place in the Roosevelt Room. The press will be present with sound for the first three or four minutes. (U)

#### TALKING POINTS

(With press present)

-- I hope your talks with Secretaries Brown and Muskie and Dr. Brzezinski go well.

-- I am pleased with the results of Secretary Brown's visit to China. We have made incredible progress toward full normalization of relations since the establishment of diplomatic relations -- first in the area of trade and economics and now in defense and security.

-- This is in our mutual interest and has strategic significance as well.

-- As you will see for yourself while you are here, the people of the United States fully support this expansion of US-China relations.

-- Please give my best regards to Premier Hua Guofeng and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping.

(With the press out of the room)

-- Now that the press has left, perhaps it would not be inappropriate for me to send my congratulations and best wishes to your new Vice Premier Zhao (pronounced: jyow). I am impressed by what I have heard about him and his views from Ambassador Woodcock and look forward to the opportunity of meeting him at some point.

-- I want to say a few words directly to you about our developing security relationship.

-- This is an important area in our relations, but also perhaps the most difficult because changes in security relationships between major nations like China and the United States inevitably cause concern not just on the part of unfriendly states but even among friends.

-- We have made a good beginning and set a pace which both serves our interest and tends to minimize concern. It is essential we continue this step-by-step approach.

-- In our strategic relationship we have shown that despite our differences we can effectively consult and cooperate on matters of mutual concern.

-- You are aware of the various steps we have taken to exact a price from the Soviets for their invasion of Afghanistan and to pressure them into withdrawing their forces.

-- While we stand ready to talk to the Soviet Union about arms control or other ways to reduce tension, we are not prepared to accommodate or accede to their continued occupation of Afghanistan.

-- We agree with you that the situation in Indochina is interrelated with Afghanistan.

-- We do not favor, and no member of my Administration is going to urge, accommodation to continued Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.

-- You will see in your conversations with my advisors during your visit that there are no differences of view on these fundamental points. (C)

ATTACHMENTS:

- A - Biography
- B - List of Participants

= = = = =

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT

From: Edmund S. Muskie

Subject: Your Meeting with Chinese Vice Premier Geng Biao  
1:30 P.M., Wednesday, May 28, 1980

BACKGROUND

Your meeting with Chinese Vice Premier Geng Biao will follow my meeting and luncheon for him on May 28. I plan to discuss global political issues with him, particularly US-Soviet relations (including my meeting with Gromyko) and the specific problems of Southwest and Southeast Asia.

Your talks should, I think, stress your personal involvement in the formulation and conduct of US relations with China. Without denying our funding problems in some areas, you should accentuate the positive in our efforts to complete the framework for normalization this year. You might also comment on some global strategic issues to follow up on general themes which Secretary Brown and I will raise. Finally, you might comment on the future relationship we seek with China, which you outlined in your speech at Beijing University last August.

ISSUES

Bilateral Relations

Geng's visit is in return for Secretary Brown's visit to China in January -- a visit which resulted from your discussions with the Chinese in August. It is thus a further step in the normalization process between our defense establishments. In fact Geng's trip, together with that of the advance team earlier this month, represents the first exposure which Chinese defense personnel have ever had to the United States. We want to encourage more of such contact and exposure.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

per 7/29/06 NSC/HR  
re NSC-2006-072  
BY CS NARA, DATE 8/2/06

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Your personal involvement with the Chinese has been a key feature of the bilateral process. You may wish to note that progress has been made in some areas, despite occasional problems, and that you are following these developments closely.

Suggested Points

-- Note your pleasure that Geng has been able so quickly to reciprocate Harold Brown's January visit, which was first proposed by you.

-- Cooperation between our defense establishments has grown significantly in recent months and we expect good results as we get to know each other better.

-- We also value the regular process of consultations which Vice Minister Zhang Wenjin's visit began and Assistant Secretary Holbrooke will continue later this summer.

-- The civil aviation talks, now in progress, appear to be going well, and we are hopeful that agreement can be reached in this round.

-- The Chinese Government has finally begun to take significant steps to answer our critical need for adequate office space and housing in China. We appreciate this and look forward to the day when our staffs can expand commensurate with our expanding relationship.

-- Textile negotiations are in recess after an intensive around earlier this month. While we regret that agreement was not reached, the gaps were narrowed very significantly.

-- On EXIM financing, so far we have received only one request for EXIM financing for China, for which we have given preliminary approval. I hope that as soon as your economic plans are further along specific requests can be put forward. (FYI: The current budget does not provide funds for a program in China. But we are committed to seek supplementary funding to meet our commitment for a \$2 billion in credits for specific projects over the next two to five years. End FYI.)

-- On hydropower cooperation, we also have made a good beginning despite funding problems which result from laws which dictate that on visits and consultations, the benefitting side should pay.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-3-

### Global Strategic Issues

Competition with Moscow remains the motivating force of Beijing's foreign policy. While we do not wish to feed China's anti-Soviet appetite unreasonably, we likewise want to allay residual Chinese anxieties about our capacity and will to resist expansionism by the Soviets and their proxies. We also want to reassure them about the strength of our alliance system.

and to  
urge maxim  
retreat in  
Korean crisis

### Suggested Points

-- We remain committed to maintaining a strong defense. The Congress and the people of our country support this policy.

-- Our NATO allies are also increasing their contributions to the common defense, and our alliance system remains strong and vital despite occasional differences of view on some matters.

-- We have taken a number of steps to impose a cost to the Soviets for their Afghanistan adventure, including restrictions on technology and grain sales.

-- We also strongly support the boycott of the Moscow Olympics, and appreciate Chinese support for this effort.

-- In Southwest Asia we have moved to strengthen our ties with Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states, and to increase our presence in the Indian Ocean.

-- In Southeast Asia, we continue to demand complete Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea. We oppose any steps which would enhance the status of the Heng Samrin regime. But we cannot accept the Pol Pot regime as a viable alternative.

-- We are following closely the views of the ASEAN countries on Indochina and remain confident that their resistance to Vietnamese domination of Kampuchea will remain firm.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-4-

-- We are very concerned about developments in Korea in recent days and strongly urge that China do whatever it can to urge that the North Koreans not try to take advantage of the situation.

--We greatly value the contribution which China can make to regional stability in Asia.

#### The Future

The viability of our relationship with China will depend upon our capability to develop a broad range of contacts in many areas. While the security dimension is, and will remain, a central component, the future is likely to be affected as well by our success in drawing China into more active participation in the community of nations and in efforts to resolve the common problems of mankind: environment, energy, food, population, arms control, economic development. Your speech at Beijing University set the tone for the future and will continue to guide us.

#### Suggested Points

-- We welcome China's more active involvement in world affairs and the prospect for further mutual and separate efforts to address the major problems which affect us all.

-- As I said at Beijing University last August, we value a China which is strong, stable and secure. Our relations have evolved rapidly on the basis of equality and mutual benefit in line with the themes of my speech.

~~SECRET~~



# MINNESOTA HISTORICAL SOCIETY

Copyright in the Walter F. Mondale Papers belongs to the Minnesota Historical Society and its content may not be copied without the copyright holder's express written permission. Users may print, download, link to, or email content, however, for individual use.

To request permission for commercial or educational use, please contact the Minnesota Historical Society.



[www.mnhs.org](http://www.mnhs.org)