

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WITH SECRET ATTACHMENTS

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Your Meeting with
Chinese Vice Premier Geng Biao Wednesday,
May 28, 1:30 P.M., Roosevelt Room (U)

BACKGROUND

Vice Premier Geng Biao (pronounced: gung), a member of the Politburo and Secretary General of the Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party, is in charge of implementing China's national defense policies. Although he has been criticized in the Party recently for high living, Geng is close to Vice Premier Deng and remains at age 71 an experienced and influential soldier and diplomat. (C)

Geng is returning Harold Brown's January visit. He is here to discuss further broadening of our defense relationship and to find out what specific items of civilian technology and military equipment we are prepared to sell to China. Although we have been responsive to their requests, the Chinese will be disappointed that we are not willing, at least at this stage, to go so far as to sell jet engines for their military aircraft. (C)

You will meet with Geng for 15 minutes before the President's drop by. In that brief period I recommend you stress your personal involvement in US-China relations and in the effort Vice Premier Geng is most concerned with -- the "normalization" of our defense relationship. You should then address the perennial Chinese concern about the constancy of our foreign policy, a concern heightened by recent erroneous reports that we are encouraging the ASEAN countries to accommodate to the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. (C)

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ORIGINAL CL BY Z.Brzezinski
☐ DECL ☒ REVW ON 5/23/1986

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per 7/24/06 NSC 1A
re NSC-2086-072
BY 12 NARA, DATE 8/9/06

The Chinese remember that China policy has been an emotional issue in several Presidential campaigns going back to 1952. They therefore tend to worry more than many other countries that domestic political pressures might adversely affect our ability to conduct foreign policy. You may therefore wish to comment on the domestic scene emphasizing the American people's broadly-based support for the expanding US-China relationship and for the policies and defense spending necessary to resist Soviet challenges. (C)

I have attached at Tab A a Presentation on World Affairs modeled on a similar paper prepared for your visit to China last year. You may wish to draw on that if there is time after the President's drop by. (C)

Tab B - Biography
Tab C - List of Participants
Tab D - Copy of Memo to the President
Tab E - State Department Briefing Paper

PRESENTATION ON WORLD AFFAIRS

Introduction

-- Much has happened since my visit to China last August:

- the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the resultant worldwide condemnation of Soviet aggression (UN vote and Islamic summit);
- gradual disintegration of the Iranian political system and the holding of our hostages;
- a change of government in India;
- emergence of an independent Zimbabwe;
- death of Tito;
- developments on the Korean peninsula;
- temporary postponement of SALT;
- your Fifth Plenum, with its important policy pronouncements and some changes in our personnel.

-- Much remains the same:

- Vietnam still seeks to dominate Kampuchea militarily, and as we thought last August, the resistance forces continue their opposition, exacting a high price from the Vietnamese;
- the Camp David accords still govern the search for a Mideast peace accord;
- in spite of some differences with our Allies over the Mideast, progress continues to be made toward strengthening NATO;

-- There have also been constructive developments in Sino-American relations:

- Brown trip and decision to broaden defense relationship including the sale of certain types of military equipment to PRC;
- signing of trade agreement and extension of MFN early this year (as you indicated would happen last August);

- negotiations on Civair, maritime agreements and EXIM loans are going forward;
- PRC accession to IMF, World Bank membership which we welcome;
- cultural, scientific exchanges continue to flourish;
- opening of PRC Consulates in Houston and San Francisco, and through mutual effort, progress can be made swiftly to alleviate space and accommodation problems in Beijing, Houston, and San Francisco;
- Most importantly, US and PRC are cooperating on Afghanistan. PRC is not going to the Olympics. PRC has good relations with Zia and is seeking to improve relations with India. These independent PRC moves converge with our policies.

US Foreign Policy

- Last August, you reviewed with Deng and Hua our foreign policy and national security policy. Harold Brown reiterated many of the same points in the wake of Afghanistan. And Ed Muskie will have briefed Geng on our global strategy, with particular reference to his Vienna meeting with Brezhnev, Southwest Asia, and Indochina.
- You therefore may wish to give one- to two-sentence authoritative summaries of our policy on each of the key global issues to assure the Chinese of the continuity and coherence of our policy.
- Let us be clear about the priority we assign to securing a Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan and in pursuit of that objective, making Moscow pay a very high price, a far higher price than they expected, in their effort to occupy Afghanistan. We have undertaken numerous measures to this end -- Olympic boycott, restricted grain sales and technology transfers.
- We also attach high priority to the return of our hostages in Iran. The real threat to Iran, of course, is the Soviet Union, and resolution of the hostage issue would enable Iran to devote its attention to its real security concerns.
- In pursuing our objectives in Southwest Asia, we recognize that our own behavior and rhetoric must not provoke what we seek to deter. Prudence and steadiness are crucial.

- We also recognize the relationship between the Iranian-Afghan situation and the Palestinian issue. Until progress on the Palestinian question is made, it will be hard to galvanize proper united Arab attention to the Soviet threat to the region. We will continue to give proper attention to the Mideast and the Palestinian question.
- In the wake of Tito's death and Afghanistan, I recently assured the leaders in Belgrade of our continued commitment to the independence of Yugoslavia.
- In South Asia, we recognize the need to give adequate backing to Pakistan, in which the PRC also has an important role to play. We also believe it essential that India play a more assertive role in resisting Soviet efforts to dominate the region, and with that purpose in mind, we are cultivating good relations with Madame Gandhi.
- On Indochina, our view remains unchanged. We are very concerned with the increased Soviet presence in Vietnam. We will not recognize the Heng Samrin regime. We seek a Kampuchea that is not threatening to either Thailand or Vietnam. To achieve this goal, maximum pressure must continue to be exerted on Hanoi. In order to convince Hanoi and their Soviet backers that they cannot achieve their objectives in Kampuchea, the resistance forces play a positive role. Ultimately, an international conference on the situation may prove desirable.
- We approach the Indochina situation recognizing that the ASEAN states must play the genuine, leading role. In making decisions on tactics (such as how we will vote on the Kampuchean credential issue in the UNGA next fall) you can be sure we will be guided by the views expressed by ASEAN.
- Moreover, we recognize the link between our approach to the Kampuchean situation and the Afghan situation. Any sign of yielding to Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea or pressuring Thailand will embolden the Soviets in Afghanistan, discourage Pakistan, and dishearten the Afghan rebels.
- We face a delicate situation in South Korea. Our Ally is encountering domestic uncertainties, but our commitment to the defense of the South in case of an attack

from the North is unshakable. We have talked to the PRC many times about our shared interest in the maintenance of stability on the Peninsula.

Bilateral Relations

- PRC Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin was recently here to review bilateral matters as well as our common strategic interests. I need not repeat those conversations.
- By and large, we are pleased with the rapid development of our economic, scientific, cultural, and now military contacts. You may wish to note you are particularly pleased that the Civil Air negotiations are going well and that we may have an agreement soon.
- To be sure, irritants exist from time to time. But as long as we deal with them swiftly, frankly, and within the framework of our normalization agreement, our relationship will move forward.
- In Beijing, you said "Normalization can mean a lot, or it can mean a little". In the months since the August visit, it is clear both sides want an enduring, extensive relationship. The entire Administration and the public support this policy.
- And our relationship will continue to grow because it is based on realism, equality, and a long-term vision of the strategic importance of our strengthened ties.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

US

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Muskie
Dr. Brzezinski
Ambassador Leonard Woodcock
Assistant to the Vice
President Denis Clift
Assistant Secretary of State
Richard Holbrooke
Assistant Secretary of
Defense David McGiffert
Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense Nicholas Platt
Roger W. Sullivan, NSC Staff

PRC

GENG Biao, Vice Premier, State
Council
CHAI Zemin, Chinese Ambassador to
the United States
LIU Huaqing, Vice-Chief of General
Staff
CHAI Chengwen, Director of Foreign
Affairs Bureau, Ministry of the
National Defense
CHEN Lai, Deputy Chief of Staff,
General Logistics Department
HAN Xu, Director, Department of
American & Oceanian Affairs, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs
HUANG Zhengji, Deputy Director,
Intelligence Department, The General
Staff
XU Yimin, Defense and Military Attache
Chinese Embassy to the United States
LIN Zhaonan, Minister, Chinese Embassy
to the United States
NI Yaoli, Interpreter, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs

BOSTON, May 21 — An important phenomenon in the Middle East problem is the difference between attitudes inside Israel and among Israel's organized supporters in the United States. In Israel one finds vigorous debate, criticism of policy, adjustment to changed realities. In the American groups there is unchanging refusal to disagree publicly with whatever an Israeli Government does.

A striking example was provided recently by Theodore R. Mann, chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. Mr. Mann wrote an article for *The Wall Street Journal* denying that the Begin Government's policy of building settlements in the occupied West Bank is "an obstacle to peace."

"It is Arab refusal to accept Israel," Mr. Mann said, "not the settlements, that is and always has been the only obstacle to peace. It is Arab unwillingness to accept Israel's legitimacy, not the 'Palestinian issue' that is the heart of the problem in the Middle East."

Mr. Mann made a sensitive point about the Camp David plan for West Bank autonomy. Its purpose, he said, was "to give Israelis and Palestinians the opportunity to overcome the psychological barriers that have separated them." But can he really believe that psychological acceptance is enhanced when one side claims, and exercises, the right to plant settlements by armed force wherever it wishes in disputed territory?

"Israel's settlements are an obstacle to the P.L.O.," Mr. Mann wrote, "not to peace." That is, he believes the settlements are effective devices against terrorism or military assault on Israel. But militarily or politically, that is a dubious proposition.

Many military experts in Israel think the settlements of the Begin years, most of them isolated outposts of religious zealots, are in fact a security burden. In the event of a surprise attack, Israel's small standing army would have to send units to

ABROAD AT HOME

Israel And Its Friends

By Anthony Lewis

many remote points to defend these settlements. More likely the high command would order them evacuated — as it did some front-line settlements on the Golan Heights in the 1973 war.

Politically, the settlement policy has been a boon to the extreme elements of the P.L.O. The most moderate Palestinians have been outraged at the imposition of settlements in their midst.

"Israel is not so suicidal," Mr. Mann said, "as to withdraw from territories that separate her from her avowed enemies in the absence of peace." Certainly peace and security guarantees should accompany withdrawal. But how can that mutual arrangement be approached when Israel follows a settlement policy that seems to exclude withdrawal forever?

Mutuality has to be the basis for solving any such political conflict. Palestinians are closer now than they have ever been to doing what Mr. Mann rightly says they must: accept Israel. They can go the rest of the way only when Israel accepts their political reality — when Israel's friends do not dismiss the "Palestinian issue."

Theodore Mann very likely understands all this, or so I suspect. A pre-eminent American Jewish leader, he has the reputation of being a sensible and sensitive person. But he operates

within a tradition that evidently demands solidarity above all.

There is a tragic cost to Israel — the adjective is not too strong — in the American Jewish community's reluctance to apply its usual test of wisdom to Israeli Government policy.

The other day a 17-year-old Palestinian boy, Tariq Shumali, was charged with throwing a stone at the car of the Israeli military governor in Bethlehem. He was so severely beaten by Israeli soldiers that he needed surgery. Then his whole family, his parents and two sisters, were taken from their middle-class home and dumped in a roofless mud hut in an abandoned refugee camp near the Dead Sea.

Collective punishment and savage beating for throwing a stone at an Israeli occupier — surely that is not Theodore Mann's dream of Zionism. I see in the story an endless cycle of repression and violence, destroying the moral and eventually the political fabric of Israel.

That is the fear not just of a commentator with affection for Israel but of prominent Israelis. This week 250 of them, including two former chiefs of military intelligence, signed a powerful statement calling for "peace and security through compromise" on territorial issues. One of its drafters said it recognized "that two peoples live between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River."

"Extremists in the public and the Government distort Zionism," said the statement. "Their way endangers and isolates Israel, undermining the ethical basis for our claims to a life of peace and security. Their way leads to divisions within the Jewish people, alienates friends of Israel and strengthens the extremists among our enemies."

The statement called for a "return to mainstream Zionism" and said it was time for those who agreed to "stand up and be counted." Among them should be Theodore Mann and other American Jewish leaders.

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SPECIAL ENCRYPTION/CHEROKEE FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12065: ROS-183, 5/21/2000 (VELIOTES, NICHOLAS A.)OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, JO, US

SUBJECT: (S) KING MUSSEIN VISIT TO U.S.

REF: STATE 131696

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I MET WITH KING MUSSEIN AFTERNOON MAY 21 TO PRESENT LETTER FROM PRESIDENT FORMALLY INVITING KING AND QUEEN FOR AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO WASHINGTON. KING EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND ACCEPTS WITH GREAT PLEASURE OFFICIAL VISIT ON JUNE 16-17 RPT JUNE 16-17. KING WILL SEND LETTER TO PRESIDENT FORMALLY ACCEPTING WHICH WE WILL IMMEDIATELY TRANSMIT TO WASHINGTON.

3. KING ALSO CONCURS WITH PROPOSED PRESS RELEASE AND AGREES TO HOLDING PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT UNTIL FIRST WEEK IN JUNE WITH RELEASE ON SAME DAY IN AMMAN AND WASHINGTON. SHOULD LEAKS OCCUR, WE CAN QUICKLY COORDINATE ON AGREED TIME FOR SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE BEFORE FIRST WEEK IN JUNE.

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per 7/24/06 NSC Mr
per NIS-2006-072
BY CS NARA, DATE 8/9/06



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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03420 211800Z

4. WHILE AT PALACE, I HAD OPPORTUNITY FOR DISCUSSION WITH CHIEF OF PROTOCOL HIKMAT AND DREW ON PARA (4) REFTTEL TO ANSWER HIS QUESTIONS. HIKMAT APPEARED PUZZLED AT SUGGESTION THAT ARRIVAL AT WHITE HOUSE WOULD NOT CONFORM TO LEVEL OF PREVIOUS RECEPTIONS FOR KING IN GARDEN WITH STATEMENTS, HONOR GUARD, ETC. HE NOTED THAT KING HUSSEIN IS CHIEF OF STATE WHILE OHIRA, CALLAHAN AND SCHMIDT ARE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. WE LEFT IT THAT HE WOULD PREPARE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS I COULD SUBMIT TO WASHINGTON SINCE I ADMITTED I WAS WEAK ON MY PROTOCOL.

5. HUSSEIN WAS VERY PLEASED BY HIGHLIGHTS OF SCHEDULE CONTAINED IN PARA (4) WHICH I RELATED TO HIM AND CONFIRMED HIS DESIRE TO MEET WITH SECRETARY OF STATE MUSKIE, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BROWN AND ADMIRAL TURNER. RE POSSIBLE LENGTH OF STAY IN U.S., HUSSEIN NOTED HIS CURRENT THINKING IS TO MAKE THIS A RATHER SHORT VISIT WITHOUT EXTENSIVE TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE EASTERN SEABOARD. VELIOTES

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NODIS CHEROKEE

VIENNA EYES ONLY FOR AMB. KAISER

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 5/21/00 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, IQ, AU, GW

SUBJ: SAUNDERS TRIP - MEETING WITH KREISKY

1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ASST SECY SAUNDERS, AMBASSADOR, DCM AND DEPTOFF PRECHT MET FOR ALMOST TWO HOURS MAY 20 WITH KREISKY FOR DISCUSSION OF HIS PLAN TO VISIT TEHRAN. KREISKY, PALME OF SWEDEN AND GONZALES OF SPAIN LEAVE SUNDAY MORNING TO RETURN ON TUESDAY. THEY WILL NOT REPRESENT SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL AS SUCH, BUT WILL TRAVEL IN THEIR OWN CAPACITIES AS LEADERS OF SOCIALIST PARTIES FROM NEUTRAL OR NON-ALIGNED STATES.

May 25

3. RANI SAOR HAD EXTENDED AN INVITATION WITHIN HOUR OF KREISKY'S SUGGESTION AND SENT CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR NOBARI TO VIENNA. WORKING THROUGH HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE IN TEHRAN (THE EMBASSY CULTURAL ATTACHE, A SOCIALIST PARTY ASSOCIATE), KREISKY HAD APPROACHED BEHESTI, WHO ALSO SAID HE WOULD BE VERY HAPPY TO SEE KREISKY.

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per 7/24/06 NSC 14
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BY *C* NARA, DATE *8/9/06*

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4. KREISKY SAID HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC OF ACHIEVING SIGNIFICANT RESULTS BUT FELT AN OBLIGATION TO GO BEYOND MERE STATEMENTS ON THE HOSTAGE CRISIS. HE HOPED TO STRENGTHEN BANI SAOR AND AT SAME TIME TO RECOGNIZE BEHESTI, SEEKING TO BUILD A CONSENSUS ON SOLVING THE HOSTAGE ISSUE. DELEGATION WOULD MEET WITH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AS A GROUP AND SOME OF THEM SEPARATELY. IT WOULD NOT BEGIN WITH HOSTAGE ISSUE BUT WOULD EXPLORE "COOPERATION WITH DEMOCRATIC EUROPE." HE SAID NOBARI HAD ALREADY EXPRESSED INTEREST IN EDUCATION COOPERATION. MAIN THRUST WOULD BE SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS IN THE REVOLUTION. KREISKY WOULD ALSO TRY TO EXPLAIN U.S. ATTITUDES IN POSITIVE SENSE AND TO ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN EVENTUAL BETTER RELATIONSHIP.

5. NOBARI HAD SAID BANI SAOR WAS EAGER TO END IRAN'S ISOLATION AND TO DEVELOP TIES WHICH COULD SERVE AS ALTERNATIVE TO EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES WHOSE INVOLVEMENT IN IRAN HE FEARED. NOBARI HOPED DELEGATION WOULD RECEIVE A UNANIMOUS AND STRONGLY POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. HE HINTED AT POSSIBLE RELEASE OF A FEW HOSTAGES. NOBARI, WHOM KREISKY MET THROUGH ALGERIANS AND HAS CULTIVATED FOR SOME TIME, HAD HIGH HOPES FOR THE VISIT; IRANIANS, HE SAID, HAD NO INTEREST IN DOING A SERVICE FOR WALDHEIM ON THE HOSTAGE ISSUE. PRESUMABLY UNDER NOBARI'S INFLUENCE, KREISKY SAID HE WOULD NOT SEE GHOTBZADEH EXCEPT AT REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MEETING. KREISKY THOUGHT THEY WOULD SEE AHMAD KHOMEINI, BUT WOULD NOT ASK TO SEE THE AYATOLLAH.

6. IN RESPONSE, SAUNDERS COMMENTED THAT DELEGATION'S

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WORK SHOULD NOT BE JUDGED A SUCCESS ONLY IF IT OBTAINED RELEASE OF HOSTAGES. THAT WAS VERY UNLIKELY. DELEGATION COULD MAKE VERY USEFUL CONTRIBUTION TO PRESENT PHASE OF PREPARING AN IRANIAN CONSENSUS ON RELEASE WHEN NEW PARLIAMENT MEETS. SAUNDERS URGED THAT KREISKY ARRANGE FOR HIS EMBASSY CULTURAL ATTACHE TO FOLLOW THROUGH AFTER VISIT SO AS TO BUILD ON IT AND URGED KREISKY HIMSELF TO FOLLOW THROUGH. ON QUESTION OF PARTIAL RELEASE, SAUNDERS CAUTIONED STRONGLY AGAINST ENCOURAGING IRANIANS TO RELEASE SOME HOSTAGES WHILE CONTINUING TO HOLD OTHERS WHO COULD BE IN GREATER DANGER OF TRIAL. KREISKY COMMENTED HE AGREED WITH THAT POINT. HE SAID HE DID NOT WISH TO BARGAIN WITH IRANIANS.

7. SAUNDERS ASKED KREISKY TO TRY TO DETERMINE WHAT IRAN WANTED FROM U.S. HE BRIEFLY EXPLAINED U.S. POSITION ON ASSETS, ASSURANCES AGAINST RETALIATION AND GAVE KREISKY COPY OF DOCUMENT ON U.S. POSITION PREVIOUSLY GIVEN WALDHEIM AND BANI SAQR. KREISKY READ IT QUICKLY AND TERMED IT, "A FINE PAPER." KREISKY SAID HE WOULD SEEK TO DISCUSS "TERM OF REFERENCE FOR A CHANGED U.S. POLICY." THE U.S. ABOVE ALL MUST RECOGNIZE REALITY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC.

8. KREISKY SAID HE HOPED NO ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE MADE UNTIL ARRIVAL IN TEHRAN. HE AND WE AGREED THAT IF ASKED HE WOULD SAY HE HAD INFORMED US OF VISIT, BUT DECISION TO GO WAS MADE BY DELEGATES WITHOUT REFERENCE TO U.S.

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NODIS - CHEROKEE

9. KREISKY SAID ARAFAT HAD TOLD HIM IN BELGRADE THAT
PLO WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD TO ASSURE SAFETY OF HOSTAGES
AND HAD PROMISED HIM THAT NOTHING WOULD HAPPEN TO THEM.

10. OPS CENTER PLEASE REPEAT TO VIENNA, STOESSEL

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per 7/24/06 NSC/HR
per NLS-2006-072
BY CS NARA, DATE 8/9/06

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NOOIS - CHEROKEE

VIENNA EYES ONLY FOR AMB. KAISEH FROM SAUNDERS

E.O. 12065: RDS 5/21/00 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, IR, AU, GW

SUBJ: POINTS FOR FOLLOW-UP WITH KREISKY'S AIDE

1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.

2. OPS CENTER PLEASE REPEAT TO VIENNA.

3. AS PROMISED, FOLLOWING ARE POINTS YOU MAY WANT
TO COVER IN FOLLOW-UP TALK WITH GEORGE LINKH
BEFORE KREISKY'S TAKE-OFF FOR TEHRAN:

A. WE WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF LINKH^H COULD
ESTABLISH WITH AUSTRIAN CULTURAL ATTACHE IN TEHRAN
THAT HE WILL MAKE A SYSTEMATIC EFFORT TO ESTABLISH
ONGOING DIALOGUE WITH KEY RELIGIOUS FIGURES FOR
PURPOSES OF (1) ARGUING CASE AND CONTRIBUTING
TO CONSENSUS FOR RELEASE OF HOSTAGES, (2) LEARNING
HOW THEY SEE DECISION FOR RELEASE BEING HANDED, AND
(3) BUILDING ON KREISKY'S VISIT TO TURN WHATEVER
IS ACHIEVED INTO OPERATIONAL EFFORT TO ACHIEVE RELEASE
OF HOSTAGES. WE ALSO HOPE YOU MIGHT ARRANGE IN THE
CRITICAL DAYS LEADING TO BANI SAOR'S APPROACH TO THE

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per 7/24/06 NSC 1tr
re NLTJ-2006-072
BY *CS* NARA, DATE *8/9/06*

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NEW PARLIAMENT TO GET FREQUENT REPORTS ON ATTACHE'S ACHIEVEMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS.

- 9. AS AID TO SYSTEMATIZING THIS EFFORT, YOU MIGHT GIVE LINKH FOLLOWING LIST OF IRANIAN AUTHORITIES WITH A VIEW TO ASKING HIM WHEN HE RETURNS EXACTLY WHOM THE ATTACHE IS CONTACTING. RELIGIOUS MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL: BEHESTI, KHAMANEI, RAFSANJANI, MADARI-KANI, BAHONAR. SECULAR COUNCIL MEMBERS: BANI SAOR, GHOTBZADEH, HABIBI, BAZARGAN, TABATABAI, CHAMKAN, SAHARI, MONIFAR. THREE OTHER PERSONS WORTH CONTACTING: AHMAD KHOMEINI (IMAM'S SON AND "CHIEF OF STAFF"); AYATOLLAH KHOEINI, RELIGIOUS OVERSEER OF THE HOSTAGES; ADMIRAL MADANI, FORMER NAVY CHIEF AND GOVERNOR OF KRUZESTAN, PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, AND POTENTIAL HEAD OF GOVERNMENT.

- C. WHILE WE WELCOME KREISKY'S CONCENTRATION ON BANI SAOR, BEHESTI, AND AHMAD KHOMEINI, WE WOULD URGE THAT HE RECONSIDER HIS VIEW ON SEEING GHOTBZADEH. DESPITE HIS LACK OF AN INDEPENDENT POLITICAL BASE, HE IS COMMITTED TO RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES, HAS WORKED MORE BOLDLY TO THAT END THAN BANI SAOR, AND HAS SHOWN A MUCH MORE ACTIVE IMAGINATION AND LEADERSHIP.

- D. WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE WELL-BEING OF THE HOSTAGES NOW THAT THEY ARE DISPERSED AND ABOUT ESTABLISHING GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THEIR EXACT WHEREABOUTS AND HEALTH. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE DISPENSAL IMPROVED GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY BY INTRODUCING REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS INTO THE GROUP CONTROLLING THE HOSTAGES, BUT WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE

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THAT THIS IS THE CASE. ONE OBJECTIVE KREISKY, HIS GROUP, AND HIS ATTACHE MIGHT CONSIDER -- ASSUMING THEY WILL NOT ACHIEVE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES ON THIS TRIP -- IS GAINING GOVERNMENT AGREEMENT TO COMMUNICATE TO US THROUGH KREISKY OR OTHERWISE THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS ACCOUNTED FOR EACH HOSTAGE.

- E. WE WOULD URGE KREISKY NOT TO THINK OF THIS TRIP AS NECESSARILY A ONE-SHOT ENGAGEMENT. AS HE RECOGNIZES, THIS TRIP ALONE IS NOT LIKELY TO RESULT IN RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. THE QUESTION, THEREFORE, IS HOW KREISKY CAN ENGAGE BANI SAUR, BEHESTI, AND AHMAD KHOMEINI IN DISCUSSION OF STEPS THAT COULD LEAD TO RELEASE AND HOW KREISKY CAN TRY TO BUILD INTO HIS TALKS PROJECTION OF A CONTINUING INVOLVEMENT THAT WILL TEND TO PUT PRESSURE ON THEM TO MEET CERTAIN PRE-AGREED OBLIGATIONS OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, PERHAPS INCLUDING A RETURN VISIT. THERE ARE SEVERAL INITIATIVES BEING DISCUSSED IN VARIOUS QUARTERS. WHAT WE NEED NOW IS AN IRANIAN PLAN THAT WILL FIT THOSE INITIATIVES THAT CAN BE HELPFUL INTO A SCENARIO THAT THE IRANIANS CAN MANAGE.

- F. WE WOULD WELCOME ANY JUDGMENTS ON HOW KHOMEINI'S SUPPORT FOR RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES CAN BE MADE MORE CERTAIN.

- G. WE HOPE KREISKY WILL ARGUE VIGOROUSLY AGAINST DIVIDING HOSTAGES INTO DIFFERENT GROUPS FOR PHASED RELEASE OR ANY OTHER APPROACH THAT WOULD

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Dec 7/4/06 NSC/1r
FC NSC-2006-072
BY 6 NARA, DATE 8/9/06

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 21, 1980


MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Results of SCC Meeting on Iran (U)

The President has reviewed the minutes of the SCC meeting on Iran and Afghanistan of May 20, 1980, and decided as follows:

1. World Court Decision. The President concurred with the recommendation of the SCC that we should not plan to return to the Security Council following the ICJ decision, pending further review after the decision is announced. (C)
2. Iranian Visas. The President directed that very tight restrictions be maintained. He approved some additional flexibility in granting visas for medical treatment, but only for serious cases where the U.S. offers unique treatment. The President disapproved granting visas for purposes of reuniting relatives with brothers, sisters, uncles, and aunts. Granting of such visas should continue to be limited to reuniting mothers, fathers, and children. The President approved permitting the return of Iranian students who had valid visas but who were caught outside the country when the new regulations were imposed without warning. (C)
3. Iranian Claims Legislation. The President indicated that there is no hurry in submitting claims legislation to Congress. (C)
4. Public Information on Afghanistan. The President concurred with the SCC recommendations on the proposed courses of action suggested by the Public Information Committee. (C)


Christine Dodson
Staff Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on May 21, 1986

DECLASSIFIED

per 7/24/06 NSE/ltr
re NLTC-2006-072
BY 6 NARA, DATE 8/9/06

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~OPERATIONS CENTERIRAN WORKING GROUP

SITREP NO. 323

Situation in Iran as of 0500 EDT, May 23, 1980(C) Further Delay on U.K. Sanctions

The U.K. sanctions legislation against Iran will not go into effect until the implementing order is cleared with HMG and approved by the House of Commons. Parliamentary clearance is expected to last about a week until May 30. Contracts with Iran signed prior to this date will not be affected by the sanctions legislation.

(C) Trial of the Hostages

A Western Embassy in Tehran reports that the clergy-backed Islamic Republic Party and other associated parties are reportedly urging in increasingly stronger terms that the release of the hostages occur only after their trial and some sort of financial "settlement", possibly the unfreezing of assets. These same groups are also calling for economic counter-sanctions against Western nations. One measure considered would be to hike oil prices again. Career professionals at the National Iranian Oil Company have reportedly been making a concerted effort with the Revolutionary Council to convince the Council that additional raises would make it even more difficult for NIOC to sell its oil to existing customers. Today, Reuter reports Iran is not going to raise prices any further at the moment.

(U) Sanctions

Iranian reaction to the EC sanctions has been muted. Iranian leaders have made no public comment on yesterday's imposition of sanctions.

Japan's cabinet today formally imposed sanctions, retroactive to November 4. The measures will take effect June 2.

(U) Parliamentary Inauguration

The Revolutionary Council met yesterday and reaffirmed the timetable for the inauguration of the new Parliament. According to Council Spokesman Habibi, the deputies will be received by Khomeini on May 25, then proceed to the Parliament for two days of briefing by the Council prior to the formal inauguration on May 28. Habibi said the Revolutionary Council would continue its work until the Parliament opens.

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GDS 5/23/86 (Johnson, Mark)

per 7/24/06 NSC/HK
re NLTC-200-077
BY 5 NARA DATE 8/9/06

DECLASSIFIED
FOR DISSEMINATION
EXEMPT FROM GDS
BY NARA DATE

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(U) Appointment of Prime Minister to be Discussed

A UPI report datelined Tehran says that the Revolutionary Council will meet with Ayatollah Khomeini Saturday in a session expected to deal with the appointment of a prime minister. The report is attributed to Khomeini's son Ahmad who announced plans for the meeting in an interview with Pars News Agency. Earlier in the day, Khomeini and his son met with President Bani Sadr for a report on the Kurdistan situation.

Retired Admiral Ahmad Madani, one of the politicians reportedly approached by Bani Sadr to become Prime Minister, escaped an assassination attempt eight days ago, the Tehran paper Bamdad reported.

(U) Travel of U.N. Emissary to Tehran


Syrian diplomat Abid Daoudy left Damascus yesterday for a meeting in Geneva with U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim before flying to Iran. Daoudy, a member of the five man U.N. Commission that visited Iran in March, is slated to arrive in Tehran on Saturday to discuss the resumption of the Commission's work. Iran continues to insist that Daoudy's mission "is completely separate" from the hostage issue.


(U) Soviet-Iranian Shipping Talks to Begin

Pars reports that a Soviet delegation will arrive in Tehran to participate in a session for the "expansion of port and shipping cooperation" between Iran and the USSR. The two sides will negotiate shipping and transportation between Baku and the Iranian ports of Anzali and Now Shahr.

(U) Iranians March to Support "Struggle" of American Blacks

Thousands of Iranians rallied today in nationwide protests called by Islamic religious leaders "to support the brave struggle of the American blacks," an obvious reference to the riots of Miami. The main anti-American demonstration was in Tehran, where thousands gathered at Tehran University for Friday prayers before marching to the Embassy. Other rallies were scheduled in the cities where the hostages have reportedly been moved.


Mark Johnson
Iran Working Group


James Taylor
Senior Watch Officer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ISLAMIC CONFERENCE CONDEMNS U.S. MOVES

Iran Rescue Mission and Support of Israel Criticized — Soviet's Afghan Action Opposed

By MARVINE HOWE

Special to The New York Times

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, May 21 — Islamic foreign ministers reaffirmed their opposition to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan today but directed the brunt of their condemnations against the United States for its recent actions in Iran and its support of Israel on the Palestinian question.

Delegations from 38 Islamic countries and the Palestine Liberation Organization wound up their five-day conference here tonight with a considerably milder stand on the Soviet actions in Afghanistan than their sharp condemnation in an emergency session in January.

Expressing "deep concern" over the continued Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, the Islamic conference announced the establishment of a ministerial committee to begin "appropriate consultations" for a comprehensive solution to the Afghan crisis. This move was seen by conference sources as an opening by the Islamic nations to the Soviet-supported Kabul regime, which was declared "illegal" at the conference in January.

"If we really want to solve the Afghanistan problem," said the Iranian Foreign Minister, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, "there must be talks with the parties concerned: the Soviet Union, Pakistan, Iran, Kabul and the Afghan rebels."

Talks With Soviet 'Necessary'

"I don't want to talk with the Babrak Karmal regime," said Mr. Ghotbzadeh speaking to American reporters, "but you've done it with the Vietcong." The Iranian Minister, who has emerged as one of the prime movers of the Islamic conference, declared that consultations with the Soviet Union "are not only understandable but necessary; he stressed, however, that it was the Soviet Union that had refused to discuss the Afghan problem and was "constantly hiding behind the so-called Karmal Government."

Mr. Ghotbzadeh, who brought Afghan guerrilla leaders into his delegation in an open challenge to the Soviet Union, insisted that the rebels be included in any consultations on Afghanistan.

However, Abdul Rasoul Sayef, the spokesman here for the Afghan mujahideen, or insurgent fighters, appeared openly disdainful of the decision to set up a committee to resolve the Afghan problem. "Our only negotiation is jihad," he told reporters, using the Arabic word for a holy war. "The Russians must get out."

The conference also "vehemently condemned the recent American aggression against Iran." It also condemned the threat to use force or any other threat of intervention or of economic sanctions against Iran.

"It was impossible to avoid an Islamic condemnation this time because nobody here could approve of the use of force to try to rescue the hostages," a senior Pakistani official remarked somewhat sadly.

In January several Islamic states rebuked Iran for holding the American hostages, and a resolution at that time expressed the hope that the United States and Iran would resolve their problems "by peaceful means."

The United States was also condemned on the issue of the Middle East peace process and the Camp David accords, as in past Islamic conferences. The P.L.O. delegate, Abdel Mohsen Abu Maizer, told reporters, "We explained to our Moslem brothers the aggressive attitude of the United States against the people of Palestine." He specifically mentioned the recent United States veto in the United Nations Security Council of the resolution for the creation of a Palestinian state, the United States role in the Camp David accords and American financial and military support of Israel.

The Palestinian representative also said that the conference had accepted an urgent resolution calling for an emergency session of the Security Council to declare "null and void" Israel's plans to change the status of Jerusalem.

The conference called on all Moslem countries to sever relations with any state that transferred its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and said an extraordinary Islamic conference would be held within three months if "the Israeli enemy" carried out its decision to declare Jerusalem Israel's undivided capital.

'Main Enemy Is the U.S.'

The P.L.O. and four countries belonging to the so-called "Steadfastness Front," which opposes Israeli-Egyptian peace efforts and which has close relations with the Soviet Union, expressed reservations on the Afghanistan resolution. "The Islamic countries must distinguish between their friends and enemies," Mr. Abu Maizer said. "The main enemy is the United States; we can never believe that Carter can be with the Moslems in Afghanistan and against Moslems in Palestine and in Iran."

The only consolation American diplomatic circles found in this 11th Islamic conference was the fact that the attacks were often leveled against the two superpowers. For example, the conference expressed "deep regret" over "the increase in the military presence and escalation of naval forces of the superpowers in the Indian Ocean as well as the attempt by the superpowers to establish new military bases and extend old ones in the Indian Ocean."

Hanoi Said to Favor U.S. Talks

BANGKOK, Thailand (UPI) — The Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach, said today that Hanoi was ready to move toward establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States but had received no similar signals from Washington. Mr. Thach, who is winding up a tour of Southeast Asia, said at a news conference, "We are prepared at any time to see the Americans, but we have received no such proposals so there have been no such meetings."

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Islamic Conference Ends; Afghanistan Talks Proposed

By MARVINE HOWE

Special to The New York Times

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, May 22 — The 11th Islamic Conference ended today with the establishment of a ministerial committee empowered to open negotiations with all parties involved in Afghanistan, including the Soviet Union.

The decision to open talks with the Soviet Union and the Soviet-installed authorities in Kabul represented a substantial pullback from the condemnation during an emergency meeting in January on the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. However, the conference chairman, Agha Shahi, Pakistan's chief foreign policy adviser, called the new resolution "a major step forward in the search for a political solution of the problem." He expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would respond.

After an all-night session, prolonged by debates on the Afghan issue, the foreign ministers met today for the formal closing ceremony. The 39 delegations agreed that, despite their internal frictions, they had achieved "a balanced and constructive" approach to the main issues.

Hope to Defuse Tension

Mr. Shahi said in his closing speech, "We have taken measures which will lead to the defusing of the tense situation that presently exists in a large and geostrategic part of the world."

The conference unanimously condemned the "recent military aggression" by the United States against Iran, a reference to the aborted rescue mission by American forces. However, a Saudi appeal to Iran "to continue to work toward the solution" of the question of the American hostages being held in Iran was accepted by Iran and the rest of the conference. An Iranian amendment called on the United States to heed the frequent appeals by the Islamic countries "to refrain from any action that might hamper the solution of the problem of the hostages."

"Most countries here expressed the

wish that the hostage issue be resolved," said Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister. "We hope quiet diplomacy can be used to resolve the question."

The conference passed three resolutions: The first reaffirmed the principal elements of peace in the Middle East and called for the restoration of the "inalienable national rights" of Palestinians, including their right to self-determination and statehood.

The second resolution opposed any action against the sovereignty, territorial

integrity or independence of Iran, and warned against the imposition of economic sanctions against that country. It also deplored what it called the increased military presence of great powers in the region.

The third measure reaffirmed January's resolution condemning the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, and set up a committee to resolve the situation on the basis of four principles.

These were the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; recognition of the right of the Afghan people to

choose their own socio-economic system and form of government; respect for the independence, territorial integrity and nonaligned status of Afghanistan, and creation of conditions within that country that would enable the refugees to return safely.

The committee's main functions, according to Prince Saud, would be to review the problem of the Soviet presence and talk to all Afghan factions in an effort to achieve a consensus. "This is an important test of will of the Soviet Union if they want to get out of Afghanistan," the Prince said. "The Moslem world has shown it is willing to cooperate."

Iran's Foreign Minister, Sadegh Ghotb-

Text of Islamic Parley's Resolution on Afghanistan

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, May 22 (Reuters) — Following is the official text of the resolution on Afghanistan adopted today at the conference of Islamic foreign ministers:

EXPRESSING its deep conviction that termination of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and respect for the political independence, sovereignty and nonaligned status of Afghanistan and for the inalienable national right of the Afghan people to choose their own political and socio-economic system and form of government without outside interference or coercion are imperative for bringing about conditions of peace and stability in the region and for defusing current international tensions;

SERIOUSLY CONCERNED at the sufferings of the Afghan people and at the continuing influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan and Iran;

DEEPLY CONSCIOUS of the objective enshrined in the charter of the Islamic conference requiring the member states to strengthen the struggle of all Moslem peoples with a view to safeguarding their dignity, independence and national rights;

CALLING UPON all states to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, nonaligned status and Islamic identity of Afghanistan;

REAFFIRMING the determination of the Islamic states to pursue a policy of nonalignment and to oppose superpower interference in the affairs of Islamic countries;

EXPRESSING its hope that the non-aligned movement will play an active role in the search for a comprehensive solution to the Afghan crisis consistent with this resolution in order to strengthen peace and stability in the region and in the world and the purposes and objectives of the movement;

1. REAFFIRMS the resolution on the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and on its ensuing effects, adopted at the extraordinary session of the Islamic conference;

2. EXPRESSES its deep concern at the continued Soviet military presence in Afghanistan;

3. REITERATES its demand for the immediate, total and unconditional withdrawal of all Soviet troops stationed on the territory of Afghanistan;

4. REAFFIRMS respect for the inalien-

able national right of the people of Afghanistan to determine their own form of government and choose their economic, political and social system free from outside interference or coercion;

5. STRONGLY URGES the creation of the right conditions that would permit the early return of the Afghan refugees to their homeland in security and honor;

6. REITERATES its appeal to all states and peoples to provide assistance in order to alleviate the sufferings of the Afghan refugees;

7. DECIDES, in order to give effect to the provisions of this resolution, to establish a committee comprising the foreign ministers of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to seek ways and means, including appropriate consultations as well as the convening of an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations or otherwise, for a comprehensive solution of the grave crisis with respect to Afghanistan, provided that it is not inconsistent with this resolution.

zadeh, expressed skepticism over contacts with the Soviet Union, adding that he had already taken such an initiative and the response had been "the arrogance" of a superpower.

"We're not going to beg the Soviet Union to negotiate," he stressed.

Mr. Ghotbzadeh also said that the committee would not only talk to the Soviet-

backed authorities in Kabul but also would insist on talking to the Afghan rebels. "We are not going to legitimize the puppet Government in Kabul," he said.



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