

ISLAMIC CONFERENCE--AFGHANISTAN

Q. Did the resolution adopted by the Islamic Conference on Afghanistan amount to a softening of its previous position on Afghanistan, in particular by setting up a committee to open talks with the Soviets and the Babrak regime?

A. -- On the essential points the resolution on Afghanistan maintains the strong position taken by the special session of the Islamic Conference in January.

-- The resolution reaffirms the January resolution; it expresses deep concern at the continued Soviet military presence; and most importantly it reiterates its demand for the "immediate, total and unconditional withdrawal of all Soviet troops" from Afghanistan.

-- We do not consider the decision to set up a mechanism to explore the possibility of a political solution to be a softening of the Islamic Conference's stand. The U.S. is fully supportive of efforts to devise a political solution as long as these efforts focus priority attention on the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet forces and the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government. This is the heart of the problem, and the resolution focuses on it.

-- We will watch with great interest how the Committee established by the IC conducts any consultations. We believe the Committee will be sensitive to the importance of not conducting itself in a way which would tend to legitimize the Babrak regime.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

Cuban Refugee Working Group

SITREP NO. 20

DECLASSIFIED

per 7/24/06 NSC/Hr
RE ALL SC-2006-072
BY CS NARA, DATE 8/9/06

Situation as of 0900hours EDT May 22, 1980

Arrivals Down Because of Stormy Weather

On May 21 twenty-eight vessels arrived in Key West carrying 1,150 refugees. The reduced flow reflected stormy weather and choppy seas throughout the Florida Straits. Total arrivals since April 21 number 67,752, of which 26,405 have been resettled in the U.S. Five hundred sixteen have been detained as suspected felons.

Two days ago the Coast Guard sighted eight southbound vessels, of which four were confirmed as headed toward Mariel, Cuba. One of the four was turned back but three others, from 30 to 35 feet in length, continued into the Cuban buffer zone.

USINT Instructed to Deliver Tripartite Note to Cuba

Becoming increasingly concerned over the delay between the San Jose Conference on Cuban refugees May 8-9 and our joint demarche with the U.K. and Costa Rica, we have instructed the U.S. Interests Section to deliver its note to the Cubans. The U.K. and Costa Rica will do the same. When the U.S. Interests Section delivered its note as instructed on May 22, the Cubans accepted it "as a courtesy" but rejected its contents.

Other Countries Asked to Make Demarches in Havana

We have asked all the countries which were represented at the San Jose Conference on Cuban Refugees to make demarches to Cuba at the earliest opportunity urging Cuba to enter into talks with the tripartite group (U.S., U.K., and Costa Rica). We are doing the same with the EC members.


In the case of Belgium the initial reaction was that the EC had little role to play, that the situation had changed by our allowing so many refugees in initially, and that Belgium's reports from San Jose were that major Latin American states had refrained from taking a leading role in the conference because they saw the dispute as an essentially U.S.-Cuban matter in which they had no need to involve themselves. Our DCM in Brussels followed up in getting across the message about the importance we attached to this issue.


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Age, Occupation, and Health Profile of Cuban Refugees

Of the 18,470 refugees currently at Ft. Chaffee, Arkansas, 86 percent are male, 3.6 percent are under ten years of age, 9.6 percent are between 10 and 20 years of age, and 7.9 percent are over 50 years of age, with about 79 percent in the 20 to 50 age group. From the limited information thus far available, it is apparent that the current refugees from Cuba are not of the highly skilled and trained group which arrived immediately after the Castro Revolution. Of 370 interviewed at Eglin on May 15, 328 or 87 percent were laborers such as dock workers, drivers, cooks, and semi-skilled technicians. Nineteen, or five percent, were mid-level white collar, such as clerks, office workers, nurses, students, and artisans. Six persons were professional (teachers, minor officials, and physicians), and 17 people were miscellaneous such as retirees, unemployed, and those who gave "prisoner" as their occupation.

From 5,247 refugees health screened at Eglin, it seems that the health of the refugees is good, with the tuberculosis rate about the same as in the U.S. Nine were detained for psychiatric reasons.


Christopher Russell
Cuban Working Group


S. Stapleton
Senior Watch Officer

1. CASTRO UNDER LITTLE PRESSURE TO NEGOTIATE ON REFUGEES

----- Cuba's statement of May 19 placing a solution to the refugee question in the context of long-standing Cuban grievances against the US indicates that Castro feels no compulsion to regularize the flow of emigrants to the US. He probably believes that the US is far more uncomfortable than he with the present impasse and that this will ultimately work to his advantage in dealing with Washington.

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Castro probably sees the status quo as quite tolerable in that:

- The US, not Cuba, can be held responsible for ending the flow of emigrants, and pressures from Cuban exiles anxious about their relatives will be focused on Washington, not Havana.
- The nearly 400 Cubans in the Interests Section are likely to grow increasingly impatient and burdensome as time goes on.
- Peru appears to have agreed to an accommodation on the remaining refugees in its embassy which would in effect accept the Cuban position on asylum, thereby furthering Cuba's efforts to cast the emigrant problem as a purely bilateral issue with the US.
- Other countries' interest in the issue is likely to decline rapidly as it becomes clear that their direct involvement will be minimal.

Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see much incentive for Castro to negotiate the refugee question either separately or in conjunction with relatively peripheral issues such as maritime hijackings or coast guard cooperation. While Castro probably does not expect the US to make concessions at this time on major issues -- the trade embargo, overflights and Guantanamo -- he may well see the refugee issue as an additional point of pressure to move the US toward eventual negotiations on these matters.

The rhetorical excesses of the past weeks may well have brought on something of a political hangover in Cuba. This is reflected in the reduced level of official invective against the US since the massive rally of May 17. An editorial in the official party organ Granma pointed out on May 19 that "we must not forget the tasks of production and services, the sugar harvest and other economic tasks." But, while the Cuban government clearly wants to get the population back to work after a series of major disruptions, this does not necessarily indicate a more flexible Cuban attitude vis-a-vis the US.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Deputy Secretary

FROM: EA - Richard Holbrooke *RLH*
S/R - Victor Palmieri
IO - Michael Newlin *HN*

SUBJECT: Geneva Conference on Kampuchea Relief

I. OBJECTIVES

The objective of the conference is to focus high-level international attention on the continuing plight of the Khmer people and on the impediments preventing the international effort from providing effective relief to the needy.

The donors seek to ensure that sufficient relief supplies are distributed within Kampuchea in a timely and even-handed way so that the civilian population can avoid famine and disease. They seek to reconstitute Kampuchea's agricultural production to break the cycle of famine and relief and thus avoid the perception that fleeing to Thailand is the only means of survival.

Failure to achieve these objectives will lead not only to intensified famine and disease among the civilian population, but also to a large movement of Khmer to and across the Thai-Khmer border, precipitating severe pressure on Thailand, posing resettlement and humanitarian problems for the international community, and possibly bringing Thailand to a reevaluation of its current humanitarian treatment of Khmer and cooperation with the cross-border relief effort.

Specifically we will seek to have the conference:

-- renew international attention to the situation in Cambodia, thus generating needed additional financial support to the relief effort. The program will require an estimated \$292 million in new funds this year; about \$100 million has so far been pledged;

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BY *LS* NARA, DATE *8/9/06*

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-- bring concerted private and public international pressure on the authorities in Hanoi and Phnom Penh to cooperate fully with the international relief program, specifically to allow the establishment of an adequate and effective food distribution system inside Cambodia, and to allow the creation of an effective medical care system;

-- reassure the Thai that the international community will continue to support Thailand as it cooperates with the relief effort and that Thailand will not be left alone to cope with the humanitarian and political pressures on its border;

-- improve the relief effort by pressing international agencies to sharpen their own performance and by involving Secretary General Waldheim more directly, thus strengthening the hand of Sir Robert Jackson, Waldheim's Special Representative, in his dealings with political authorities in Hanoi and Phnom Penh and with the international agencies.

II. BACKGROUND SETTING

The invasion of Kampuchea by Vietnamese forces in December 1978 prevented a normal harvest at a critical time and blocked the normal spring wet season planting. In the spring of 1979, we recognized the impending human catastrophe within Kampuchea and thereafter took the lead in alerting the international community to its potential dimensions and to the urgent need for relief effort. By the fall of 1979, the Khmer people were in dire straits: the land had not been cultivated to any significant extent; the population was moving about seeking to return to homes behind the retreating Khmer Rouge; over 100,000 Khmer had fled into Thailand because of the fighting; many thousands of others had gathered in agglomerations along the Thai-Khmer border to avoid the fighting and to search for food.

Under the joint leadership of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the international community mounted a relief effort that to date has expended over \$250 million. Approximately half of these funds and half of the relief supplies provided has had to be distributed within Thailand and along the Thai-Khmer border because of the artificial constraints imposed by the Vietnamese and Phnom Penh

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authorities on bringing relief directly to the Khmer population through the interior of Kampuchea.

III. CURRENT PROGRAM

Despite the alleviation of famine in 1979 and the gradual return to their homeland of hundreds of thousands of Khmer who came to the Thai border to be fed, a large-scale international relief program remains essential in 1980 and the need will probably persist throughout 1981. Until the current planting season brings in a harvest at the end of the year, the entire population of Kampuchea is dependent on external sources of food. The absence of adequate medical personnel and medicines in the country and the need to rehabilitate Kampuchea's agriculture all require international community assistance in addition to bilateral aid from Phnom Penh's socialist allies.

The international agencies and the Phnom Penh authorities have developed a program to bring in supplies, rice seed, basic farming and fishing equipment, and 250,000 tons of rice between April and December 1980. To date new pledging covers about 1/3 of the required \$292 million to achieve these goals and to care for Khmer on the border and inside Thailand. This shortfall is due in no small measure to donor dissatisfaction over the Kampuchean authorities' failure to cooperate in an effective relief effort, reluctance to permit equitable distribution and appropriate monitoring, and rejection of adequate access to international relief agency personnel.

IV. THE GENEVA MEETING

In response to the tragedy facing the Khmer people and to the waning of international attention, ASEAN, led by Thailand, proposed a resolution at the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) calling on Secretary General Waldheim to convene an international meeting in Geneva to consider humanitarian assistance for the Khmer people. We firmly supported ASEAN's appeal. The resolution passed 41-4 with broad international support from European, African and Latin American nations. As a means of assuring broad international support as well as active participation by the international relief agencies, we and ASEAN have stressed the essentially humanitarian nature of the conference and have made it clear that we have no intention to politicize it.

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If it becomes an issue, we will be seeking to handle Kampuchea's attendance as we did at last November's New York Pledging Conference. ASEAN and the UN Secretariat have already agreed to a formula by which UN-represented Democratic Kampuchea (DK) will sit in the meeting but without the right to speak, while the Heng Samrin authorities will be allowed to come to Geneva but not to participate in the meeting.

As noted above, both we and the ASEAN states have committed considerable support to this conference. At the session we want to guard against disruptive division among the donors, which would tend to lessen the impact of the conference, thus perhaps eroding vital Thai support for the relief effort. Should Thailand feel that international support is slipping away, Bangkok could be expected to reconsider the refuge it now provides for some 150,000 Khmer in UNHCR-run holding centers and would likely alter its support for the cross-border relief effort. Equally important, the conference will need to stimulate sufficient ongoing pledges of funds to support the relief effort inside Kampuchea by making it apparent that the program can and will overcome the obstacles which have heretofore hampered its effectiveness.

V. STRATEGY

To achieve our objectives, we are coordinating strategy with ASEAN and other like-minded donors in New York and in donor capitals.

We first hope to present parallel statements which will pinpoint key problem areas and set standards for a more effective program. A key theme will be the need for the Vietnamese, their puppets in Phnom Penh and the Soviets to cooperate more fully in establishing an effective relief program. Specifically, we will be pressing for arrangements for overland road and rail access from Thailand and Vietnam, agreement for straight-line relief flights from Bangkok to Phnom Penh and provincial airports as well as from Phnom Penh to provincial airports, permission for adequate international relief workers to enter Kampuchea and function in all areas of relief activities, greater freedom of travel/residence in Kampuchea to permit regular monitoring of distribution, and a procedure for maintaining pressure after the conference ends.

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As we and others focus our attention on these specific improvements, we will be seeking to involve the Secretary General more directly in the relief effort and providing a mandate to his Special Representative for Kampuchean Relief, Sir Robert Jackson, to return to the region and negotiate with the authorities involved--Phnom Penh, Hanoi and Moscow--the specific conditions for implementing these procedures.

To give focus to our pressures and to provide a formal statement of the consensus of the meeting we believe the conference should conclude with a statement on donor/relief agency goals for an improved relief program in Kampuchea. If Waldheim or Sir Robert chair the session, the chairman may be able to issue a summing up report, as was done at the July 1979 Geneva Refugee Conference. Such a procedure has the advantage of not having to be negotiated, but nevertheless gives formal UN focus to the results. Barring that possibility, the summing up might take some other form: a consensus statement, a communique, or a formal resolution. The approach should be to focus in a useful conclusion the recommendations that national representatives make in their speeches. To ensure that pressure is maintained we will be trying to establish a permanent donors committee to monitor the results we hope to see.

Based on our consultations with other key attendees, there is broad support for this largely humanitarian approach. Nonetheless, Bangkok has also indicated that it may raise in the corridors the issue of safehavens for Khmer gathered on the Thai-Kampuchea frontier which injects some measure of political controversy into the conference. Beijing can be expected to go still further in its attack on the Heng Samrin and Vietnamese authorities than others who cite problems in implementing the relief program. It will be important to keep the discussions focussed on the humanitarian issues, keeping political recriminations isolated and of short duration since any changes against Hanoi and Phnom Penh can be expected to provoke equivalent denunciations of Beijing's support for Pol Pot, and its "threat" to invade Vietnam and Laos.

Foreseeing politicization of the proceedings by the SRV and China, the ASEANs have told USUN that they understand that the Conference Chairman will ask at the opening of the first session that rights of reply be restricted to written documents.

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We have taken the lead in preparing recommendations for conference decisions and thus others will be expecting our statement to point the way toward the mutually agreed goals. We will press for better performance by the international agencies, while paying tribute to their important contribution under difficult conditions. The U.S. enunciation of its latest pledge, promise of future funding support and continued commitment to supporting the relief effort will also guide the international community response.

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AS OF 1855 EDT
20 MAY 80

INDONESIA: SKYHAWK PROGRAM. (U)

(S/NOFORN) THE FIRST 4 OF 16 SKYHAWK GROUND-ATTACK AIRCRAFT INDONESIA IS ACQUIRING ARRIVED BY SHIP AT TANJUNG PRIOK NEAR JAKARTA ON 8 MAY. THEY WERE SECRETLY MOVED TO HALIM AIR BASE, WHERE TEST FLIGHTS PROBABLY WERE CONDUCTED. ON THE 17TH, THE A-4'S, WHICH INCLUDE TWO SINGLE-SEAT AND TWO TRAINER VERSIONS, WERE TRANSFERRED TO ISWAHYUDI AIR BASE, WHERE THE SKYHAWK SQUADRON WILL BE BASED. THEY WERE PREVIOUSLY IN THE ISRAELI INVENTORY. THE AIR FORCE IS NOW SCHEDULED TO RECEIVE 4 PER MONTH OVER THE NEXT 90 DAYS.

(C/NOFORN) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE A-4 SQUADRON HAS BEEN A MAJOR MILITARY MODERNIZATION OBJECTIVE AND REPRESENTS PART OF A SIGNIFICANT UPGRADE OF CAPABILITIES AT ISWAHYUDI. THE SKYHAWKS ARE REPLACING AN AGING T-33 INTERCEPTOR UNIT AT THE FIELD AND WILL PROVIDE A HEAVIER ORDNANCE-CARRYING CAPABILITY THAN INDONESIA'S MAIN CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AIRCRAFT, THE OV-10 BRONCO. ISWAHYUDI RECENTLY RECEIVED THE FIRST 8 OF 16 F-5 TIGERS, WHICH JOINED OLDER F-86F AVON-SABRES AS THE COUNTRY'S FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT. GIVEN THE MANY AIRCRAFT AT THAT BASE, SOME A-4'S AND F-5'S MAY OPERATE FROM OTHER ISLAND BASES, PROBABLY MEDAN AND PONTIANAK. ACQUISITION OF A-4'S BY INDONESIA, SINGAPORE, AND MALAYSIA FURTHERS THE GOAL OF GREATER ARMS STANDARDIZATION BY THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS. (REVW 12 MAR 89)

PREPARED BY: MS V. WINSLETT, JSI-3B, 697-6039

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re NISC-2006-072
BY 6 NARA, DATE 8/9/06

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DA

LE F-15S

HAMPTON, VA. (AP) -- OFFICIALS AT LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE SAY THAT ABOUT 60 PERCENT OF THEIR F-15S ARE GROUNDED ON AN AVERAGE DAY FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, INCLUDING PROBLEMS OBTAINING PARTS.

THEY SAID THAT ON THE AVERAGE, SIX OUT OF 10 OF THE 72 F-15 AIRCRAFT STATIONED AT THE BASE ARE CLASSIFIED AS "NOT COMBAT-READY" AND GROUNDED UNTIL THEIR PROBLEMS ARE SOLVED.

AMONG THE RECENT DIFFICULTIES CITED BY THE OFFICIALS WERE THE LACK OF A \$1.17 RIVET AND THE FAILURE OF A SMALL BUSINESS WHICH SUPPLIED SPECIAL WASHERS.

COL. RICHARD MUSTICO, MAINTENANCE CHIEF FOR THE 1ST TACTICAL FIGHTER WING, SAID THE NUMBER OF GROUNDINGS ISN'T A FAIR INDICATION OF COMBAT READINESS, NOR AN INDICTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE FOR BUYING A COMPLEX AIRPLANE.

"IN PEACETIME, OUR VERY FIRST OBJECTIVE IS THE SAFETY OF THE PILOT AND AIRCRAFT," HE SAID. "IN A COMBAT SITUATION, I WOULD THINK NOTHING OF LETTING MANY OF THOSE AIRPLANES FLY."

BUT MUSTICO SAID THAT GIVEN A "STRATEGIC WARNING," THE LANGLEY UNIT COULD GET MOST OF ITS AIR-TO-AIR JET AIRCRAFT IN FIGHTING SHAPE.

HE BLAMED THE SHORTAGE OF PARTS ON THE GOVERNMENT IN GENERAL AND THE NATION'S INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY.

THE SPECIAL WASHERS, MADE OF COBALT, WERE MANUFACTURED BY A COMPANY UNDER A SPECIAL GOVERNMENT PROGRAM TO HELP SMALL BUSINESSES. WHEN THE BUSINESS COULD NOT PAY THE RISING COST OF COBALT, IT CLOSED -- AND LANGLEY'S F-15S LOST A VITAL PART UNTIL ANOTHER SUPPLIER WAS FOUND.

WHEN PROBLEMS DEVELOPED IN THE SUPPLY OF RIVETS, MUSTICO SAID HE FOUND ONLY TWO COMPANIES IN THE U.S. MANUFACTURING THEM. ONE WORKED EXCLUSIVELY FOR A LARGE COMPANY AND THE SECOND ALREADY WAS TIED DOWN UNDER A GOVERNMENT CONTRACT.

BECAUSE OF INADEQUACIES IN THE NATION'S INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY, ESPECIALLY IN ELECTRONICS AND METAL FORGING, MANY F-15 PARTS HAVE TO BE ORDERED 22 TO 44 MONTHS IN ADVANCE.

"TO HAVE A SPARE ON THE SHELF EVERY TIME YOU NEED IT HAS BECOME AN ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE CONCEPT -- BECAUSE OF THE DOLLARS INVOLVED, THE INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY, THE TRANSPORTATION COSTS AND THE STORAGE CAPACITY," MUSTICO SAID.

"WE KNOW WHAT WE WILL PAY IN BLOOD TO DEFEND FREEDOM -- WE'VE DONE THAT OVER THE YEARS -- BUT WHAT WILL WE PAY IN DOLLARS? THAT'S THE UNKNOWN."

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

May 22, 1980

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TO : The Secretary
THROUGH: S/MS - Dr. Shulman
FROM : INR - Ronald I. Spiers

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per 7/24/06 NSC/HR
CE NLTC-2006-072
BY 12 NARA, DATE 8/9/06

Soviet Highlights

The Soviets apparently feel they are starting to get results from their effort to build up a dialogue with the West Europeans--an effort designed to slowly live down the opprobrium of their continuing presence in Afghanistan and gradually to build Allied pressure on Washington to ameliorate its anti-Soviet line. (C)

Brezhnev-Giscard Summit. Moscow valued the meeting for its political symbolism, even though it evidently consisted mostly of a restatement of old positions. The Soviet media have treated it in glowing terms as a manifestation of the continuing Franco-Soviet contribution to detente in Europe, contrasting it with Washington's cold-war policy. (C)

On Afghanistan, Paris has indicated that Brezhnev was less rigid than Gromyko had been in Paris--or perhaps had less stamina in arguing the Soviet case--but there was no substantive shift in Soviet position. Moscow will probably be tempted to read Giscard's warning against any massive increase in Soviet forces as a tacit hint that Paris will tolerate the present level of Soviet forces. (S/NODIS)

Plans for Schmidt's Visit. We expect the early announcement of a date for Schmidt's visit to Moscow (between June 30 and July 4) and State Secretary Van Well is planning a trip to Moscow next week to discuss arrangements. (C)

Brezhnev's obscure comment to Giscard about SALT III as the appropriate forum for negotiations on theater nuclear forces (TNF) may foreshadow a line he plans to take

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with Schmidt, in effect urging the Chancellor to press the US on SALT ratification in order to open the way for TNF talks. (S/NODIS)

The Soviets probably hope that Schmidt's visit will encourage other Western European contacts with the USSR. On May 15, the Soviets invited Norwegian Foreign Minister Frydenlund to visit Moscow, and he is inclined to go if the Schmidt visit takes place. Swedish Foreign Minister Ullsten plans a trip to Moscow on May 29-30. (S)

(C) Secretary Muskie. Soviet media coverage of the Secretary's talk with Gromyko in Vienna characterized the meeting as "useful." A TASS commentary on his May 20 press conference was the first critical Soviet comment on the new Secretary's actions. It defended the French by noting America's failures to consult with its Allies, and said that if de Gaulle had heeded the shouts from Washington in his day, there would not have been any detente in Europe at all. //

(C) Good Guys and Bad Guys. Soviet propaganda has predictably made much of the Warsaw Pact summit last week as a milestone in Eastern efforts to promote detente, but has not added anything of substance to the formal statements issued last week. Moscow has not said anything in public about Giscard's counterproposal of a summit of key countries instead of a world-wide affair proposed by the Pact members.

Soviet treatment of the NATO Defense Planning Committee meeting was equally predictable, stressing the theme of the American role in driving Western militarism.

(C) Islamic Foreign Ministers. Soviet media have been critical of the Islamabad conference's treatment of the Afghanistan issue, and Moscow was doubtless annoyed by Ghotbzadeh's promise of support for the rebels. On balance, however, the tenor of the press suggests that Moscow may feel that this meeting was not as bad as the last. Criticism of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was in part offset by criticism of the American action in Iran and of the Middle East peace process.

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USFEC

PASS NSC FOR OWEN, USOA IMMEDIATELY FOR STARKEY
AND HUGHES

E.O. 12065: 05/21/80 (SHARP, WAYNE W.) OR-F

TAGS: FAGR, EEC

SUBJECT: GRAIN EXPORTERS' MEETING--SOVIET GRAINS
EMBARGO

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

SENIOR AGRICULTURAL OFFICIALS FROM THE MAJOR
EXPORTING COUNTRIES (CANADA, AUSTRALIA, ARGENTINA,
EC AND US) MET IN BRUSSELS ON MAY 20, 1980. THE
MEETING WAS DESCRIBED PUBLICLY AS A CONTINUATION
OF PERIODIC CONSULTATIONS ON GENERAL GRAIN TRADE
AND PRODUCTION POLICIES, BUT WAS DOMINATED BY
DISCUSSION OF THE US PROPOSAL TO FURTHER RESTRICT
GRAIN TRADE WITH THE USSR IN THE COMING MARKETING
YEAR.

3. THE UNITED STATES (HATHANAY) REPEATED THE
PROPOSAL EARLIER COMMUNICATED TO GOVERNMENTS
THAT EACH AGREE TO CUT BACK SHIPMENTS TO THE
SOVIET UNION IN THE COMING MARKETING YEAR, WHICH
BEGINS FOR MOST COUNTRIES THIS SUMMER. THE EC
(VILLAIN), WHICH CHAIRED THE MEETINGS, PLAYED
VERY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN ENCOURAGING SUPPORT

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

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per 7/24/06 NSC/1tr
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6. HP US REQUEST. THE EC STATED IT COULD AGREE TO CUT-BACK IF OTHERS MADE SIMILAR COMMITMENTS, BUT IN THE ABSENCE OF CONSENSUS ON A CUT-BACK SUGGESTED THAT GOVERNMENTS ALSO CONSIDER A COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE SALES TO THE SOVIET UNION IN THE COMING MARKETING YEAR OVER THE CURRENT MARKETING YEAR.

4. AUSTRALIA (MOORE-WILTON) TOOK GENERALLY POSITIVE STANCE, AGREEING TO CONSIDER A COLLECTIVE CUT-BACK OR COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE SALES TO THE USSR IN THE COMING YEAR, BUT ON THE CONDITION THAT CANADA AND ARGENTINA UNDERTAKE SIMILAR COMMITMENTS.

5. CANADA (MINEP) SUGGESTED THAT ANY RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITH THE USSR IN THE COMING YEAR WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. CANADA WAS CRITICAL OF THE IMPACT AND GENERAL DESIRABILITY OF A CONTINUATION OF TRADE RESTRICTIONS. WHILE NOT OFFERING ANY OPTIMISM FOR CONCURRENCE WITH EITHER THE US OR EC PROPOSALS, IT AGREED TO OFFER EACH FOR FURTHER CABINET CONSIDERATION.

6. ARGENTINA (LACROZE) CONTINUED TO REPEAT ITS GOA POSITION BUT OFFERED THE APPARENTLY EVASIVE SUGGESTION THAT IT WAS NOT PREPARED TO CONSIDER A GRAIN EMBARGO UNLESS OTHERS WERE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE AN EMBARGO ON ALL TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION. LATER ARGENTINA INDICATED THAT INFORMALLY IT WOULD OFFER TO MINISTERS THE PROPOSALS OF THE US AND EC, BUT WOULD DENY PUBLICLY THAT IT MIGHT CONSIDER ANY CHANGE IN ITS STATED POSITION.

7. COMMENT: IN TERMS OF FUTURE STRATEGY, CANADA IS KEY TO EITHER THE US PROPOSAL TO CUT BACK SHIPMENTS TO THE USSR OR TO THE EC PROPOSAL NOT TO INCREASE SHIPMENTS IN THE NEXT MARKETING YEAR. WITHOUT CANADIAN SUPPORT BOTH AUSTRALIA, AND EVENTUALLY THE EC, WILL BE UNDER PRESSURE TO ELIMINATE ANY RESTRICTIONS ON GRAIN TRADE WITH THE USSR. IN ANY CASE, IT IS APPARENT, THOUGH, THAT CANADA'S COOPERATION WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN. AUSTRALIA PLACED A GREAT DEAL OF EMPHASIS ON THE IMMEDIACY OF A COORDINATED POLICY. IF THE OTHER EXPORTERS HAVE NOT MADE A

ION WITHIN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS, AUSTRALIA
SA THAT IT WILL BE COMPELLED TO PERMIT ITS
MARKETING BOARDS TO MAKE SALES COMMITMENTS TO
THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE NEXT YEAR UP TO THE
LEVEL OF THE PRESENT YEAR, AND MAY PERMIT
INCREASED LEVELS OVER TIME. NEAR END OF MEETING
ARGENTINA DANGLED SLIGHT HOPE OF AGREEMENT ON
AN EXPORT FIGURE, BUT ONLY ON INFORMAL BASIS
SINCE NO POSSIBILITY OF CHANGE IN ITS FORMAL
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EXDIS
POSITION.

8. EACH OF THE COUNTRIES REPRESENTED AGREED TO
OFFER FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS
THE US PROPOSAL TO CUT BACK SHIPMENTS TO THE
USSR AND THE EC ALTERNATIVE NOT TO INCREASE SALES
ABOVE THE 1979/80 LEVELS. CANADA WAS UNCERTAIN
AS TO WHEN THE MATTER MIGHT BE TAKEN UP BY ITS
CABINET, BUT WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC OF RAPID CONSI-
DERATION. IT WAS DECIDED THAT GOVERNMENTS
W COMMUNICATE THEIR POSITION DIRECTLY TO THE

9. COMMENT: US OFFICIALS SHOULD AVOID
SUGGESTING PUBLICLY THAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS ARE
IN THE PROCESS OF CONSIDERATION OF NEW POSITION.
IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY FORMAL ADVICE FROM
GOVERNMENTS TO THE CONTRARY, WE ASSUME THAT THE
COMMITMENTS MADE ON JANUARY 12 WILL BE MAINTAINED.

10. THIS MESSAGE WAS CLEARED IN DRAFT BY
UNDER-SECRETARY HATHAWAY AND THE US DELEGATION.
ENDERS
BT

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per 7/24/06 NSC 1/H
per NARA 50-2006-072
BY 6 NARA, DATE 8/9/06

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PAGE 01

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3. OUTLOOK FOR NEW GREEK GOVERNMENT

Constantine Karamanlis' continued leadership as Greece's new president promises no significant change in foreign policy, at least until national elections are held. Opposition leader Andreas Papandreou will attempt to force elections before they are constitutionally mandated (in November 1981) by attacking Prime Minister Rallis and his policies relentlessly. The party loyalty of Defense Minister Averoff, who believed he would succeed Karamanlis as Prime Minister, will be a key factor in determining whether the government can maintain its 25-seat majority in the parliament and so avoid early elections which might well bring Papandreou's party into power.

* * *

Rallis probably will continue to follow Karamanlis' lead on foreign policy. This should mean there will be little change in Greece's static positions on NATO reintegration, the Aegean, Cyprus and the status of US facilities. Any initiative which implies compromise by Greece would be an irresistible target for Papandreou and will therefore probably be avoided by the government.

Without such targets, Papandreou may be content to soft-pedal foreign policy issues. His only potential source of increased electoral support on internal issues is the same middle-of-the-road voter who tends to value Greece's ties with the West. Papandreou has muted his anti-Western rhetoric considerably since his party's strong showing in the November 1977 election to avoid alarming these moderate voters. Greece's faltering economy and the strains of full EC membership beginning next January present much more promising targets for Papandreou and other opposition leaders.

The combined criticism and votes of the opposition parties in parliament, however, cannot bring down the government or force elections before November 1981 as long as Karamanlis's New Democracy party maintains its 25-seat majority and its unity. Defense Minister Averoff can play a prominent role in maintaining, or destroying, that majority. He has led the party's right-wing as a loyal supporter of Karamanlis for many years. He has promised to support Prime Minister Rallis. But Averoff believed, until Rallis' two-vote victory over him, that he would be chosen by the party deputies as Karamanlis' successor. Averoff is reportedly very bitter about his defeat and the strong possibility that Karamanlis -- believing that he would be less amenable than Rallis to direction -- may have engineered it.

Averoff's offended pride will place a major strain on his party loyalty and political judgment in the coming months. If his disaffection should lead to the defeat of the Rallis government in parliament, early elections could lead to a government headed by Papandreou.

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re WZTC-2026-072
BY 6 NARA DATE 8/9/06

OLYMPIC COMMITTEE DECISIONS

Not going to Moscow

Albania	Federal Rep. Germany	Netherlands Antilles
Antigua	Fiji	Norway
Argentina	Gambia	Papua New Guinea
Bahamas	Haiti	Pakistan
Bahrain	Honduras	Paraguay
Barbados	Hong Kong	Philippines
Belize	Indonesia	Saudi Arabia
Bermuda	Iran	Singapore
Bolivia	Israel	Somalia
Canada	Kenya	South Korea
Cayman Is.	Liberia	Sudan
Central African Republic	Liechtenstein	Swaziland
Chad	Malawi	Taiwan
Chile	Malaysia	Thailand
China	Mauritania	Uganda
Egypt	Mauritius	Uruguay
El Salvador	Monaco	Virgin Islands
	Morocco	United States
		Zaire (54)

Going to Moscow

Afghanistan	Grenada	Mozambique
Algeria	Guatemala	Netherlands
Angola	Guyana	Nicaragua
Australia	Hungary	Nigeria
Austria	Iceland	Panama
Belgium	India	Peru
Benin	Iraq	Poland
Botswana	Ireland	Portugal
Bulgaria	Italy	Romania
Cameroon	Jamaica	San Marino
Costa Rica	Kuwait	Senegal
Cuba	Laos	Seychelles
Cyprus	Lebanon	Spain
Czechoslovakia	Lesotho	Sri Lanka
Denmark	Libya	Sweden
Ecuador	Luxembourg	Switzerland
Ethiopia	Madagascar	Syria
Finland	Mali	Tanzania
France	Malta	Trinidad and Tobago
German Dem. Rep.	Mexico	USSR
Greece	Mongolia	Vietnam
Guinea		Yugoslavia
Great Britain		Zambia
		Zimbabwe (5) 68

Andorra
Brazil
ma
ombia
Dominican Rep.
Gabon
Ghana
~~Great Britain~~

Guinea
Ivory Coast
Japan
Jordan
Nepal
New Zealand
Niger
North Korea
Puerto Rico

Sierra Leone
Surinam
Togo
Tunisia
Turkey
Upper Volta
Venezuela (~~23~~) 23

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May 23, 1980

Turkey-Olympics

Question: Please comment on the Turkish decision not to participate in the 1980 Olympics.

Answer: The Turkish Council of Ministers announced on May 22 that, in view of Soviet aggression against Afghanistan and Soviet failure to withdraw occupation forces from that country, Turkish athletes would not take part in the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow.

We are deeply gratified that the Government of Turkey has made this courageous and clear decision. Turkey has thereby joined the growing number of nations which are determined to impose a heavy price on the Soviet Union for its continuing aggression against Afghanistan.

Drafted:EUR/SE:JAWilliams:LB

Clearance:EUR/SE:CEDillery

EUR:RCEwing

S/OL:NCLedsky

MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

Memo No. 480-80

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

June 18, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 
SUBJECT: Foreign Policy/National Security Developments

President's Departure

The White House South Lawn departure ceremony for the President begins at 7:00 a.m., Thursday, June 19, with wheels up scheduled for 7:15 a.m. I have drafted brief introductory remarks for your use at the event which have been forwarded separately (including a copy of the remarks proposed for the President's use).

Venice Summit: George Vest advises that there are hard feelings between the FRG and the United States as a result of a tough message the President sent Schmidt very recently stating 1) that he was unhappy with what he had been reading in the press concerning Schmidt's statements on a TNF freeze and 2) that he wanted Schmidt to know that he would strongly reaffirm the U.S. position publicly on this issue. It is my understanding that the Germans have asked for an early bilateral meeting, including foreign ministers, prior to the main Venice Summit. You may wish to recall your own meeting with Schmidt in Belgrade and to suggest that a bilateral meeting would contribute to a positive tone for the Venice Summit.

Ceremonies for the Late Prime Minister Ohira

Prime Minister Ohira's remains have been cremated, and there has been a private ceremony in Japan. The State ceremony will not take place until after the June 22 Japanese elections, and the current U.S. thinking is that Secretary Muskie may be able to be present following his NATO meeting and before his ASEAN meeting -- otherwise Ambassador Mansfield is probably going to be designated the U.S. representative.

President's Talks with King Hussein

My reading of the President's talks with King Hussein is that the talks were very valuable in that they cleared the air, not a trivial accomplishment. At the end of the soul baring and a frank review of mistakes by both sides, the President and the

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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REVIEW ON JUNE 18, 2000

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per 7/24/06, NSC 17r
re NLTIC-2006-072
BY CS NARA, DATE 8/9/06

King agreed to put this behind them and to look to the future. Of greatest importance, the President told King Hussein that he knew the King could not directly join the Autonomy Talks peace process, but he urged him to pressure some Palestinians to become associated with the talks. The President said that the Palestinians could bargain as hard as they wish to but that it was vital that they become associated. The King replied with words to the effect "I'll think about it."

UNIFIL Mandate

On Tuesday, June 17, the Security Council moved to extend UNIFIL's mandate for another six months. There was the usual scrambling around among State, the UN mission, and the White House on the content of Ambassador McHenry's statement. This worked out satisfactorily, and to the public eye all was routine.

US-Canadian East Coast Boundary and Fisheries Treaty

Immediately prior to your departure you expressed concern over a message from Ambassador Curtis to the effect that US-Canadian relations were being soured by our foot dragging on the bilateral fisheries treaty.

As you know, Lloyd Cutler was the US negotiator, and since receipt of that message he has been taking the lead in terms of constructive US action. This issue was discussed at last Friday's foreign policy breakfast. Cutler has gone to the SFRC and said that the Administration knows the treaty is dead as presently drafted and asked what changes would be acceptable. The committee has told him to get in touch with New England fishermen on this subject. Cutler has been in the process of doing so, and has consulted with Canada at the same time. I have a fuller written report coming from State on this subject. As a first step, I would recommend that you call Lloyd Cutler. It may be that the best role you could play would be to consult with key senators at the best tactical moment. (NOTE: Cutler is going to Europe with the President.)

* * * * *

The CIA has prepared a summary of significant developments for the period June 13-17, immediately following this memo.

F-15 Sale to Saudi Arabia

Finally, we have a new, hot problem with the page 1 stories reporting a request by Saudi Arabia for a package of gear to

enhance their F-15 capabilities, gear including extended range fuel tanks, advanced air-to-air missiles and racks for handling a variety of air-to-ground weapons. Eppi has publicly condemned the sale in advance, Senators Church, Stone and Javits have issued condemnations. The Administration has publicly issued a statement confirming only the Saudi request. You may wish to ask the President if he has any guidance on this sale, as the problem will continue in Washington while he is in Europe. He may wish, of course, to keep personal charge of it in terms of public statements from Europe.



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