

September 7

In three months, We the People will select a President to lead us through the next four years of our fragile experiment in democracy. I say "fragile" because a democracy is based on the notion that the People--and not just an elite portion of the People--will best decide the proper course our country should take.

Under our Constitution, the People are the ultimate source and reservoir of power and authority. It is they who decide who will make decisions on their behalf; it is they who will decide when government is no longer serving their best interests.

Sadly, our recent past has shown how democracy can be weakened by the twin forces of abuse and apathy. Watergate illustrates for all Americans the danger of a government which does not trust the wisdom of its People. When elected officials must lie to the People and spy on the People, it is time for "We the People" to remind such elected officials who's in charge.

But who are "We the People"? Judging by voter participation in recent elections, "We the People" are not the same as "We the Voters". Indeed, the true silent majority consists of the Americans who have chosen not to register or vote.

For example, in 1972, 62 million voting-age Americans did not vote. Of the 77 million votes cast for President in 1972,

Mr. Nixon received 47 million of those votes. Thus, the President was elected by roughly one-third of the voting-aged population. If any single figure should alert us to the crisis of voter apathy, it is the 62 million lost votes in the 1972 election.

In 1972, 63 million persons, comprising only 45% of the total eligible electorate, went to the polls and participated in the Senate and House elections.

The voting record of Americans becomes even more disturbing when compared with the record of other free world nations. In Great Britain 80% of the voting-aged citizens vote. In Australia 94%, in West Germany 85%, and Japan 74%. In comparison, American voter participation presents a very troubling picture.

The plummeting participation in Federal elections is especially tragic when we recall the struggles for this priceless privilege.

It took more than 94 years for American men of any race or color to get the right to vote. It took 144 years for women to get the vote. And it took an incredible 196 years for all Americans 18 years and older to get the vote.

After two centuries of diligent work and struggle, every adult American is finally allowed to participate directly in our political process. But something is wrong; something is very wrong. While the number of eligible voters is continually increasing, the percentage of people who go to the polls has been drastically declining.

The average turnout for Northern Congressional elections in the late 1800's was over 68%. In 1970 the rate was 55%, and by 1974 it was a dismal 45%. A comparable decline can be seen in the voting rates for Presidential elections.

To analyze this problem of voter apathy, many researchers have surveyed and categorized non-voters. In 1972, 63% of eligible adult Americans cast their ballots. But only 52% of the eligible blacks voted in 1972, and the rate for persons of Spanish origin was only 37%.

A look at other groups sheds more light on this important issue. Individuals in the South voted proportionally less than those in the North and West.

Residents of rural regions and small cities voted less than residents of metropolitan areas.

Females voted slightly less than males.

People without high school diplomas voted less than people with high school diplomas.

The unemployed voted less than jobholders.

And, finally, younger citizens voted less than older citizens. In fact, in 1974 only 21% of those between 18 and 20 years of age voted in the national elections. This last figure is perhaps the most disturbing. America's young people are the future leaders of our nation; yet the overwhelming majority of them did not bother to vote in the last major election.

What can we do to stop this trend? Why is it that women, blacks, and youth--the very people who worked so hard to acquire the right to vote--have turned their backs now that they have achieved this precious right? How can we curtail the growing alienation felt by millions of Americans?

The current method of voter registration is one obstacle to greater electoral participation. Because registration times, places, and procedures are often inconvenient, there is inherent discrimination against many people. It is undoubtedly difficult for the young, for the elderly, for sick people, for working people, for new residents, and for those without their own cars to find the time or the transportation to register. In 1974 only 62% of eligible citizens had registered to vote, a decline of 10% since 1972. The National Voter Registration Act, recently passed by the House of Representatives, would establish a system of "post card registration" and would be a major step toward making registration and participation easier.

But I am not sure if registration requirements are the principal cause of the drop in voter participation. The roots of the problem probably lie much deeper and are more alarming than one might think. When asked why they did not vote, millions of Americans responded that they weren't interested, that they disliked politics, that their vote wouldn't determine the outcome of the race, or that it really didn't matter who won anyway.

I don't buy those answers. If people believe in and want a representative democracy, they have an obligation to maintain it

by voting. They can't say they don't like the choices available to them; they can't say that the issues don't affect them personally. The specifics of any one election are not the issue. The vitality of our democratic process is.

Abraham Lincoln once said that it is not the qualified voters, but those who choose to vote, that constitute political power. And Lincoln also said, "The election is in (the people's) hands. If they turn their backs to the fire and get scorched in the rear, they'll find they have got to sit on the blisters."

But we are dealing with a vicious circle. The more people stay away from the ballot box, the less they will be able to influence the very factors which led to their alienation in the first place.

What can the leaders do to pull Americans out of their apathetic slump and rekindle their interest in voting?

First, we must shoot straight with our constituents and be truly responsive to their needs and desires.

We need to supply fresh and creative ideas.

We must abolish those registration requirements which serve no purpose except to bar voters from participation.

We must confront head-on the issues of unemployment, inflation, energy, corruption, and tax reform--the problems which have caused people to lose faith in the power of the political process.

But, perhaps above all else, we must tell the people the hard truth: if they don't make their desires known on election day, they have lost an important opportunity. There will be lobbyists and special interest groups in our offices the day after

the election, and you better believe that they will find ways of making their desires known.

But just as we don't want special interests to make our political decisions, we can't afford to have those decisions made by less than 50% of the eligible voters.

Sitting back and criticizing politicians accomplishes nothing. Citizens must take an active interest in politics and in choosing their elected officials. Politics is not out of date.


Citizens must continue to educate themselves. It's incredible that two years ago there were 232,000 registered voters who failed to vote simply because they were unaware that an election was taking place.

Citizens must believe that even in our modern, computerized world every vote does count. When the first recount was made in the 1974 New Hampshire Senatorial election, the difference between the two leading candidates was ten votes out of a total of 281,000 votes cast. Individual votes are indeed very important.

It has been said that, "Bad officials are elected by good citizens who do not vote." In this bicentennial year the responsibility for getting citizens back to the polls is two-fold. Individuals must take it upon themselves to learn about the candidates and the issues and to elect people who will do the best job.

Elected officials must prove to the people that they are responsive and worthy of the trust the public has placed in them.

Through these means I am confident that "We the People" can break the vicious circle of voter apathy and restore faith in our great political system.



Carl

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FACE THE NATION

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Republican Vice-Presidential Nominee

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CREEP

GEORGE HERMAN: Senator Dole, some wit said that the Republican ticket as now constituted runs the entire political gamut from A to B. You've got two members from the midwest, President Ford and yourself from Kansas, and I'm curious as to how you see your electoral vote strategy -- how are you going to put together a majority of the electoral votes of this country?

SEN. DOLE: Well, I think, first of all, it's fair to say that President Ford plans a national campaign. Nothing has been written off. I would guess that my selection may have been in part because of ties in the midwest in normal Republican areas that are somewhat restless now. I haven't been in on the political strategy briefings. I don't know just how they add up the electoral votes, but certainly can't win without the midwest. Now if I can help in that area, then the ticket would extend beyond A and B and might go to A to Z.

ANNOUNCER: From CBS News, Washington, a spontaneous and unrehearsed news interview on FACE THE NATION with Senator Bob Dole of Kansas, Republican vice-presidential nominee. Senator Dole will be questioned by CBS News Reporter Eric Engberg, by R. W. Apple, Jr., National Political Correspondent for The New York Times, and by CBS News Correspondent George Herman.

HERMAN: Senator Dole, we had you as a guest in late July, and at the time, talking about strategies, you said the south will be very tough for Republicans whoever may be the vice-presidential candidate; the northeast, particularly with Mondale on the ticket, it's a more liberal area, will be tough; but I do believe if you look at the primaries, Carter didn't run as well in many areas in the midwest and west; and then you went on from there to say that that seems to be --

is that the core of the strategy, that you yourself would envision for this ticket?

SEN. DOLE: As I look at it, President Ford of course comes from a northern industrial state, Michigan -- many of the same problems they have in the northeast. The south will be tough with anyone on the ticket -- the south would have been tough because of Governor Carter. So we look at traditional Republican areas, the midwest, the real midwest, Michigan is the upper midwest, and we're out in the real midwest, the plains states. And then you go on southwest and further west, and I believe that may be part of the reason, whatever the reasons may have been, for my being selected to be on the ticket.

APPLE: Senator Dole, it's the usual habit of presidential candidates to pick vice-presidents who can broaden their appeal outside the party. It seems that Mr. Ford, at least in part, picked you to make a particular wing, the Reagan wing of the party, happy. Do you think you have any special appeal, any particular appeal, for Democrats and independents?

SEN. DOLE: Well, I would hope so. Again I can't say that I have any special appeal, but I do believe there is some validity in that I might provide a gap between the Reagan and the Ford forces. I'm not as conservative as some would like. I'm not as liberal of course as many would like. I have probably a moderate to conservative voting record. We have been active in revenue sharing and food stamp programs that might appeal to independents and conservatives, but again if I bring anything to the ticket, it's I think a close identification with agriculture, small towns, rural America, and that would appeal I think in those areas to Democrats and independents.

APPLE: But how is that any kind of a broadening of the base, Senator? Republican presidential candidates traditionally have appealed to small town, rural, and agricultural America. Isn't what you are saying that President Ford is in trouble with his base?

SEN. DOLE: Well, I think before you broaden a base, you have to shore it up and --

APPLE: But why?

SEN. DOLE: Well --

APPLE: Why didn't the President begin with that as his strong area? He's from a small town in the midwest.

SEN. DOLE: But I'm talking about the political base, the hard core Republican base. You know we had a very tight convention in Kansas City; it was almost 50-50. As you looked out over that podium, you didn't know who the 50 were, but you knew it was evenly divided, and it was sort of a frightening thing in a way, because there was so much genuine enthusiasm. Now how do you bridge the gap between those who were strongly for Ford and those who felt strongly about Reagan? And I would guess that those who had a part in the selection process said well, maybe Bob Dole could be the bridge. I would hope that it was a positive thing, not a negative thing, who will do us the least harm, but I understand that may be a consideration.

ENGBERG: Did you wonder how good a bridge you were when they were voting for 30 other people that got votes during the nominating procedure after President Ford had annointed you?

SEN. DOLE: Well, there are some who will not vote for the Ford-Dole ticket. There were some who will probably drop out of the party. There were some Democrats there probably as delegates who felt very

strongly about Reagan -- that's the only reason they were there -- but they are a very small minority. As I understand, recent polls indicate that 80 per cent will support the ticket, and many more than 80 will vote for the ticket.

HERMAN: Some Democrats there as delegates?

SEN. DOLE: Well, I assume there were some that had either -- maybe not card-carrying Democrats, but were one-time delegates to Republican conventions -- at least I was told that might be the case in some states.

HERMAN: Let me ask you about this bridging the gap. You are going to bridge the gap and unite one-fifth of the country which considers itself Republican. Is that enough?

SEN. DOLE: My point is that you have to bridge that immediately. You might have someone else on the ticket who might help you in Massachusetts or New York, but if you end up leaving the convention without a good feeling for both members of the ticket, it's going to take a while just to settle down the Republicans and independents and conservatives who have that view. And in my view, that's where I fit the picture.

APPLE: Senator, I wonder if we can come back to George's electoral vote question. I worked those numbers over yesterday, and the question that occurred to me immediately is which of the ten largest states, other than Michigan, and conceivably Florida, can President Ford and Bob Dole carry?

SEN. DOLE: Well, I assume at this stage it would be hard to determine that. Surveys will be taken, as you probably know, almost immediately in selected areas, but you look at Michigan, there's a

good chance in Ohio, Indiana, the Democrats are having problems in California putting that together --

APPLE: Do you think you have a shot in California?

SEN. DOLE: I would say we had a shot, depending on the degree of Governor Reagan's efforts, and he indicated that he'll make a vigorous effort for the ticket, but it's too early to tell just how many of the large, the big ten states, we can carry.

APPLE: But that's where the electoral votes are, Senator, and it seems to me that the President and now you as his associate have a real problem in most of the large states -- New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts. You speak of Ohio -- I suppose that's a shot -- but you've got to get more than two or three of them, particularly with Mr. Carter having that big bloc of electoral votes in the south.

SEN. DOLE: I believe we have a shot at those, depending on how the campaign unfolds. In my view, the polls, instead of being a 23-point spread, will soon show maybe 14 or 15, which indicates a rather dramatic change in two or three weeks, from 30-some points down to 14 points or in that area, we hope. We don't know that for a fact.

APPLE: You said at breakfast the other morning that it wasn't bad to start off as an underdog, because Barry Goldwater started off as an underdog and look how he closed the gap. You still feel that way?

SEN. DOLE: Well, I mean if the election had been postponed, Goldwater would have closed it more, but --

APPLE: You mean if it had been held in '68 instead of '64?

(LAUGHTER)

SEN. DOLE: Somewhere in that area, but we have our work cut

out for us. We're going to go out and -- but people perceive President Ford as an honest, decent person. He starts off with that big plus, and whatever may be said about it's a plus in the hearts and minds of Americans, and it was significant to me that President Ford dropped in on Russell, Kansas, really the heartland of America, to kick off the campaign, to demonstrate and underscore his concern about agriculture --

HERMAN: I thought maybe that meant you couldn't carry Russell?

SEN. DOLE: I did quite well there in '74, and I think we can count on Russell and the State of Kansas.

ENGBERG: When you talk about the President being an honest, decent person, it's obvious that that is going to be at the core of the Republican strategy this year. One of the things that happens to someone who gets named to a vice-presidential candidacy, Senator, is that people start digging through the clippings to find out what that man said about the presidential nominee, and I find in our clippings here that in '74 you were on Face the Nation, and you said that the President's biggest problem is that he has a Boy Scout image. Now what's the difference between a Boy Scout image and the honest, decent person that you're talking about, and what do you think the President ought to do about that image?

SEN. DOLE: Well, that was a bad choice of words, because I heard from every Boy Scout leader in America. I meant to say good guy image, and as it turns out that's a good image, but about that time there had been a pardon, and the embargo of wheat sales, and amnesty for draft dodgers, and I was in a race for my life in Kansas, and I think I said, you know, please don't help me any more. I've

had about all that --

HERMAN: You said, I was struggling and he threw me an anchor.

SEN. DOLE: That's right, but then he came in at the last minute in Wichita, Kansas, in the rain, and drew a tremendous crowd and did a great job on my behalf, and I think pulled my election out of the fire, so it ended up as a great plus with President Ford, and I'm just going to try to do the same for him. I've never lost an election, he's never lost an election, and we're going to try to put those two together, and see what we can do with the Carter-Mondale ticket.

APPLE: Going back to quotations all of us love, you told my newspaper about the same time that Ford was fumbling badly, he has already fumbled a couple of times, and that the best chance for 1976 would be Ford but only if he didn't kick the ball away. That does not sound like the description of a man in whom you had much confidence then. Has your confidence level improved since he picked you?

SEN. DOLE: Oh, a great -- well, it's improved before he picked me, but since then it's even gone higher. (LAUGHTER)

HERMAN: Showed good judgment.

SEN. DOLE: Extremely, but I made reference there to the same things -- the amnesty, the pardon, and the grain sales, and the President indicated in our conversations since I was named that I have been independent, that I have spoken my mind, and he doesn't disagree with that. I haven't been personal in those differences, but I have been strong. I remember refusing to go to Kansas with the President, not to insult the President, but to let the administration know I was concerned about farm problems, and they weren't getting the message. President Ford was, but some of the other people weren't.

So I've never had but the highest regard for the President. I did say that repeated actions would cause some problems, and we have problems in the farm belt, which is probably precisely the reason I'm on the ticket.

HERMAN: You have a lot of problems. When you say you -- the Republican Party. I remember you saying on one of our broadcasts here that the Republican Party doesn't reach out, doesn't reach out to the independent voter, hasn't done well with women's delegates, has failed with the blacks. Now a lot of people have said that this is why the Republican Party has about 20 per cent of the loyalties of the people of this country. How can you -- how do you plan, let me say, how do you plan to reach out to these other independent voters without whom you cannot win the election?

SEN. DOLE: Well, I've made a small effort. When I was chairman of the party, I made a lot of speeches on it but there wasn't much you could do about it. You were powerless to move because you weren't in a policy-making position, and you were critical of CREP and other organizations, and that didn't set too well most of the time. But you have to confess that we don't have a broad-base party, so we need to attract the independents and Democrats,

HERMAN: Can you --

SEN. DOLE: I mean blacks and Spanish-speaking. I've tried in the Senate through sponsoring Senator McGovern the food stamp program. I've been ridiculed and castigated by my conservative friends for doing anything in that area, but how are we going to attract the people if we don't have food stamp reform that kicks those out that shouldn't have the benefits, but brings in other people who are deprived of

benefits. Now to me, that's reform.

HERMAN: Isn't part of the problem how do you reach out to the independents, the blacks, the women and so forth without losing the Reagan followers, the extreme conservatives?

SEN. DOLE: Right, it's a very -- it's a delicate balance, and I believe most people understand that you can't just turn your back against the American people. As I said in my speech on Thurs -- it's not what we're against, we ought to articulate what we stand for in our party, and unfortunately we're in a minority position, the Democrats control the Congress, we find ourselves most of the time fighting off big spending, Carter-Mondale-type programs. It's hard to articulate when you're trying to hold down spending and these things; people translate that on the other side that we're against unem -- we're for more unemployment, we're against spending, we're against social programs -- that's not the case.

ENGBERG: It's generally assumed in Washington now that you are going to be the cutting edge of the Ford campaign. The words that come quickly to mind when people talk about Bob Dole are rapier-witted, sharp, in-fighter, tough, and so on. Is that the kind of campaign you look to be waging?

(MORE)

SEN. DOLE: Well, that comes as a complete surprise to me. I've been aggressive in a partisan sense now and then, selectively, but one criticism I've had of the Republican Party, we need more spokesmen out on the front lines, and they were hard to come by, and I found myself there even more often than I wanted to be in an effort to defend an administration position, to take on a Democrat position, not the candidate. In fact, I can recall, back in another administration where I was sent a lot of things that they wanted me to repeat, and I refused to repeat because they were personal attacks on Senator Muskie and Senator Kennedy and others.

APPLE: Senator, I'd like to go back to the era that you were talking about just a moment ago, that is, your chairmanship of the National Committee. In that role subsequently you were a very strong public defender of President Nixon, right up very close to the end. At the same time, you said to me and to other reporters privately that you thought the President was in terrific trouble. I wonder if you can tell us just a little bit about why you were not willing to disassociate yourself from him publicly earlier than you did?

SEN. DOLE: I always felt, and I someday may be--it may be proved that I was totally wrong, that I was done in by others than President Nixon. I think he had confidence in certain people surrounding him which was a mistake, but I never really felt that it was President Nixon. For example, when I went to Camp David after the big victory-- I remember the night of the massive Nixon victory, and all the Republican leaders were standing on the floor and all the CREP people were up on the platform, and we weren't even acknowledged. They didn't acknowledge the Republican Party as playing any role. Well, that

distressed me very much and I said so, and I guess because I said so at that time, hastened my exit. I was called to the mountain top and given a Camp David jacket and an autograph on what a great job I had done, and advised that it would be good if I left about inaugural day, and in the inaugural parade, if you waited long enough, you found the party chairman. I was the last car in the motorcade. So I had a bad feeling there, but I never really felt that it could be traced to Nixon. Now maybe I'm naive, but--

APPLE: How early did you conclude that Watergate itself could be traced to Nixon?

SEN. DOLE: It took some time, because I felt that, even though he was the President, there were those around him who, in effect, manipulated things and made things happen that might have been kept from the President for a long time. I don't remember the precise date, but I do remember that the longer it went on, those who kept kidding themselves that we can stonewall this thing in the Senate--and they kept talking about if you had 20-some votes, and then it went down to ten votes; I said, I don't know ten--you know, name ten people that would sustain the President at this point. So I think in that time frame it was a lost cause.

HERMAN: Senator, if your party wins this election, you'll be the Vice President and the man who would replace the President should he be out of the country or should anything happen to him. I'd like to explore your attitude on certain things. What do you think, for example, we should be doing about the incidents in--between North and South Korea in which two Americans were killed? What should be our policy?

SEN. DOLE: Well, I can only say at this point that I think the show of force by President Ford--that he personally approved--is the right thing to do. I'd draw the line there, and I'd also say that tomorrow I'll have a national security briefing by George Bush, and beyond that I can't comment. I mean, I think it's--until I really know what the ins and outs are of the Korean thing, I'm only guessing. I've read all the newspapers this morning, and we have set up a briefing tomorrow; I think it's one o'clock.

HERMAN: One other issue on which you have expressed yourself is the abortion issue. You must know that your stand on the abortion issue is at variance with the majority of the Republican Party as shown in polls, with the majority of the people. How are you going to work that?

SEN. DOLE: Well, my only stand is--and it's the one that cropped up in the '74 campaign in Kansas--that I--I've never introduced or cosponsored any legislation. I voted against using federal funds for abortions, but I believe I said on July 18 that it wouldn't be a bad idea--when I was on this program on July 18--if we had a constitutional amendment. Now we didn't try to put the wording there. Some believe there should be exceptions; some believe there should be no exceptions. And our platform says that there should be a constitutional amendment. Now I've never been able to determine what's so wrong with the people deciding the issue. That's my position, and I think it's a valid one. It seems to me whether you're for or against the issue, it's hard to quarrel with letting the people decide that. And that's why I've opted for a constitutional amendment. When we get into the specific wording of that amendment, we're going to have great

difficulties.

HERMAN: Is that, to a certain extent--well, I don't know any more elegant word--is that a sort of a cop-out, because you must know you can't get, at this point, two-thirds majority in the two houses for such an amendment.

SEN. DOLE: I--you're right, we couldn't get a two-thirds majority for such an amendment. That doesn't mean that we shouldn't pursue it if we think it's right. It was the--

HERMAN: I guess what I'm saying is, isn't it perfectly safe for you to pursue it since you know it won't happen?

SEN. DOLE: Well, I'm not--well, it may not happen this year, but those who really believe in the issue, on one side or the other, particularly those who are opposed to abortion, believe this is the right start. They're realistic; they're sophisticated; they don't expect it to happen this year.

APPLE: How much utility do you think the abortion issue will be for the Republican Party in this campaign, and how much do you intend to use it? You used it very heavily against Dr. Roy in 1974 in Kansas. There are a lot of people who've said that Carter is weak with Catholics. There are those who expect you to try to exploit that with the abortion issue.

SEN. DOLE: Well, I might first correct. We really didn't use it so heavily in '74 with Dr. Roy. We were accused of that, and accused of all sorts of things; and frankly, we ended up the last two days of our campaign disavowing ads that some of the Right to Life people were running in papers.

APPLE: But Senator, I was in a high school in one city in Kansas

listening to you speak one day, and you said at the end of your little informal talk to the kids, when Dr. Roy comes and--it was a Catholic high school, I should add that--when Dr. Roy comes here, you ought to ask him whether he's performed any abortions.

SEN. DOLE: Right, I think that's a good question if you're a doctor, and I wasn't--I raised the question but we ended up disavowing the skull and crossbones ads, and I hope some of the people who are against abortion have--and they do have a great deal more sophistication. But I've met with the campaign leaders of Ellen McCormack's campaign some months--about a month ago--and they were very concerned about the Democratic platform. Governor Carter is very concerned it. He says it doesn't represent his view. But he doesn't say what his view is, or which one of his views he's for today.

HERMAN: Senator, you have to expect, I guess, to be questioned very strongly about your performance as a member of the Finance Committee, in which you've offered a number of amendments which, I think, would have to be described as favoring special interest groups. Oil, for example--your state is a very large oil producer. You've offered a number of amendments which would provide tax breaks to oil companies. Is this going to trouble you in the campaign? Is this the kind of thing that reaches out to the independent voter?

SEN. DOLE: Well, I was directing my amendments at the independent oil producer, and it will help in that regard, because about 85, 90 per cent of our production is because of the efforts of independents; it's for the small producers. I voted for the energy bill last year that repealed, in effect, the depletion allowance for big oil companies. We had an amendment adopted that helps the handicapped. That's

special interest legislation. It helps business and it helps the handicapped.

HERMAN: But how about an amendment that you sponsored to give a five million-dollar tax break to a Kansas insurance company--

SEN. DOLE: This is--they're a corporation that has offices in 49 states and a million policyholders, and the amendment was sponsored by Congressman Wagner in the House. It cleared all the committees; even the public interest groups found it acceptable; the Treasury Department. It was a technical amendment that corrected a mistake made in '69.

HERMAN: Does it hurt you that in part of the record it shows that the chairman of that corporation gave a good-sized campaign contribution to you?

SEN. DOLE: I don't believe so. I mean, it was all out in the open. We didn't try to cover up anything. We didn't try to sneak the amendment through. It had public hearings; it went through all the processes. Mr. Grant is an outstanding citizen, and he never suggested that I'm going to give you a contribution if you'll introduce an amendment.

ENGBERG: Every four years there is talk about changing and reforming the process by which Vice Presidents are selected. Of course, I realize it's hard for you now to criticize that process. President Ford has said that he finds some merit in 16-C, the rule that would have required the nominee to put his cards out on the table early. How do you feel about that?

SEN. DOLE: Well, I believe there's some merit in his suggestion, and might have been some merit in 16-C in different circumstances, had

they both come to the convention without a running mate, and both had to say who they might have by nine o'clock in the morning. But it was obvious--a very good strategy on the part of John Sears and the Reagan forces--

ENGBERG: Would you feel better if you had been named prior to the convention?

SEN. DOLE: Well, it depends. I--

ENGBERG: Right now?

SEN. DOLE: --feel better now than I might have had I been floated before the convention and not been named in the final round.

ENGBERG: Would it have been you?

SEN. DOLE: It could have been me. It could have been Howard Baker, John Connally or a dozen others. They're all very well qualified men.

HERMAN: Thank you--

SEN. DOLE: And women--Ann Armstrong. (LAUGHTER)

HERMAN: Thank you very much, Senator Dole, for being our guest today on FACE THE NATION.

ANNOUNCER: Today on FACE THE NATION, Senator Bob Dole of Kansas, Republican Vice Presidential Nominee, was interviewed by CBS News Reporter Eric Engberg, by R. W. Apple, Jr., National Political Correspondent for The New York Times, and by CBS News Correspondent George Herman. Next week, another prominent figure in the news will FACE THE NATION.

TO: Chairman Robert S. Strauss
Democratic National Committee

FROM: Mayor Henry W. Maier, President
National Conference of Democratic Mayors

RE: CAMPAIGN GOALS FOR DEMOCRATIC MAYORS

There is, of course, a great diversity in the 1,200 or so cities which are presently governed by Democratic mayors.

In order to coordinate most effectively the efforts of all of our Mayors, and create a common framework through which to merge their efforts with the Carter-Mondale campaign, I have sought to find a common denominator through which we could guide and measure the efforts of the Mayors.

What I am suggesting is a common -- and comparable -- goal...topping the 1972 McGovern vote by a weighted formula which equalizes the situation in each of our cities.

The formula would be: 50% of the vote (in other words to carry the city for Carter) plus 40% of the 1972 McGovern vote.

This formula is on a sliding scale. It sets 1976 target goals relative to the 1972 McGovern percentage of the vote. It gives each city a goal of improving on its 1972 Democratic Presidential vote. According to this formula, all cities are expected to raise their Democratic vote relative to 1972. All cities are also expected to produce electoral majorities for Carter. The formula calls upon weak McGovern cities to produce relatively large increases for Carter. Thus, a city which gave McGovern a 30% vote is expected to produce a 62% vote for Carter. Cities giving relatively high support for McGovern are also expected to improve on their 1972 record. A city which gave 60% of its vote to McGovern is expected to raise this percentage to 74% in 1976. Weaker McGovern cities have to make greater relative gains than stronger McGovern cities. However, all cities are expected to improve upon their 1972 Democratic Presidential vote.

As the proposed draft of a memo from me to the Democratic Mayors suggests, this approach also provides an excellent method of coordinating the efforts of the National Conference of Democratic Mayors, the Democratic National Committee and the Carter-Mondale campaign organization.

We the mayors and our respective cities have more at stake in this Presidential campaign than any in modern history.

We also have the most direct appeal to our own voters on behalf of a candidate that we have ever had.

For the first time in history, a major party and its candidate have pledged themselves to a program which will relieve the local property tax of non-property related services.

Relieving local governments of the costs of welfare means relief for your taxpayers.

Encouraging state take-overs of the costs of education means relief for your taxpayers.

Establishment of the nation's first national urban policy is a Party pledge in response to a mandate of the Mayors.

The Party platform incorporates every major recommendation of our Urban Policy Statement -- in many cases in our own words.

So we have a lot at stake in this election -- not only as Democrats, but as mayors.

Now, of course, Governor Carter and National Chairman Robert Strauss are going to be looking at us to see how we produce.

Let us accept the challenge by topping the percentage of Democratic votes cast in 1972 by a weighted formula which equalizes the situation in each of our cities.

The formula would be: 50% of the vote (in other words to carry the city for Carter) plus 40% of the 1972 McGovern vote.

This formula is on a sliding scale. It sets 1976 target goals relative to the 1972 McGovern percentage of the vote. It gives each city a goal of improving on its 1972 Democratic Presidential vote. According to this formula, all cities are

expected to raise their Democratic vote relative to 1972. All cities are also expected to produce electoral majorities for Carter. The formula calls upon weak McGovern cities to produce relatively large increases for Carter. Thus, a city which gave McGovern a 30% vote is expected to produce a 62% vote for Carter. Cities giving relatively high support for McGovern are also expected to improve on their 1972 record. A city which gave 60% of its 1972 vote to McGovern is expected to raise this percentage to 74% in 1976. Weaker McGovern cities have to make greater relative gains than stronger McGovern cities. However, all cities are expected to improve upon their 1972 Democratic Presidential vote.

And to make the challenge a little more direct, and more interesting, we are going to determine -- through a comparison of the 1972 and 1976 results:

Which city in each state achieves the greatest percentage gain in Democratic vote;

Which city leads the region in percentage gain;

Which state leads the region;

Which region stands first in percentage gain in city voting;

And finally, which city records the greatest percentage gain in Democratic votes in the nation.

With National Conference of Democratic Mayors' Executive Director Jane Hartley coordinating our registration and voter turn-out efforts with Democratic National Committee, we will follow our basic organizational set-up, with National Conference of Democratic Mayors' regional coordinators responsible for the effort

in their region, and National Conference of Democratic Mayors' state coordinators directing the efforts in the states.

We will provide you with print-outs showing the 1972 vote by cities (although we may have to get the 1972 figures from you if your city is not among the 300 largest).

How you produce your Democratic turn-out is up to you, but the following activities will, of course, help swell your margins:

Helping to get the various elements of the Party, including labor, organized in a major voter registration effort;

Working with Carter and Mondale state and regional campaign coordinators to achieve maximum unity of Party efforts;

Coordinating your efforts, when necessary, and carrying out projects suggested by Carter-Mondale National Urban Director Tom Tatum;

Working with Carter and Mondale advance persons to achieve maximum turn-out and contact when candidates reach your cities;

Personalizing the direct benefits urban dwellers will gain from a Carter victory;

Involving all of the Democratic municipal officials of your city in this effort;

Uniting the efforts of Carter, Senate and Congressional campaigns and other concurrent local campaigns to maximize voter turn-out on election day.

National Chairman Robert Strauss has said that the real muscle of the Democratic Party at the grass roots is represented by the nation's mayors.

Let's prove it!

SENATOR DOLE'S VOTES ON URBAN MATTERS

DATE: August 23, 1976

For further information, contact Claudia Miller, Democratic National Congressional Committee, 225-2758.

CAVEATS:

1. I only have Dole's votes through 1974. Votes in 1969-1974 are Senate votes; those in 1961-1968 are House votes.
2. It is really hard to narrow down Dole's record to provide votes which are anti-cities per se. So much of his record is anti-people and thus should be distressing to people who live in cities. Thus, his votes on labor-related issues, education issues, energy matters, etc. have (or would have had they prevailed) impacted adversely on people who live in urban areas, but will not be included here in the interest of time and in providing a short and thus usable summary.

Housing:

On November 10, 1969 and July 7, 1970, Dole voted against amendments to increase funds for urban renewal programs.

On June 22, 1961, Dole voted against the Housing Act of 1961, authorizing \$4.9 billion over four years for housing programs.

On August 19, 1964, Dole voted against the Housing Act of 1964, authorizing \$1.1 billion to fund new and existing housing and urban renewal programs through September 1965.

On June 16, 1965, Dole voted against establishing a Cabinet-level Department of Housing and Urban Development.

On June 30, 1965, Dole voted against the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, providing rent supplements to low-income families and extending and amending laws relating to public housing, urban renewal, and community facilities.

On October 14, 1966, Dole voted against the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, a bill providing "demonstration city" grants for community renewal; incentive planning grants for orderly metropolitan development; a variety of new Federal Housing Administration home mortgage programs; and a broadening of numerous other programs providing housing and urban aids.

Poverty:

On August 8, 1964, Dole voted against the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 which authorized for three years a variety of programs to combat poverty.

On September 29, 1966, Dole voted against the Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1966, a bill to authorize \$1.75 billion in fiscal 1967 for the war on poverty.

On November 15, 1967, Dole voted against the Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1967, authorizing \$1.6 billion in fiscal 1968 for anti-poverty programs.

On December 20, 1969, Dole voted against the conference report on the Office of Economic Opportunity authorization (he was absent for the Senate vote on final passage).

In 1971, Dole voted for final passage of the Economic Opportunity Act Amendments (2-year extension of OEO programs, creation of an independent legal services corporation, and establishment of a comprehensive child development program), only after voting for weakening amendments. HOWEVER, on December 10, 1971, Dole voted to sustain Nixon's veto of this bill.

what were they?

In 1972, Dole voted for final passage of the Economic Opportunity Act Amendments of 1972, only after voting for weakening amendments.

Mass Transit:

On March 14, 1973, Dole voted against an amendment to the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1973 which sought to authorize the use of \$2.2 billion per year for three years in federal urban and rural highway funds from the highway trust fund for bus or rail transit programs as well as for highways; and Dole voted against an amendment which gave to states and cities the option of using \$850 million a year of federal urban highway funds in the highway trust fund for buses, or rail transit construction programs, as well as for highways.

On September 19, 1972, Dole voted against an amendment which permitted the use of up to \$800 million allocated for urban system funds from the highway trust fund for rail transportation facilities.

On September 10, 1973, Dole voted against a bill to authorize \$800 million over two years for distribution to cities, according to population, number of persons who use mass transit, and the number of miles serviced by the system.

On March 2, 1972, Dole voted for an amendment to the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1972 which sought to delete provisions authorizing subsidies for urban mass transit operating expenses.

Environment:

On September 22, 1970, the Senate rejected the DOLE Amendment to the Clean Air Act which sought to provide for Congressional rather than judicial review of extensions of the deadline for producing low-pollution automobiles, such amendment being designed to weaken the impact of the 1975 deadline in the bill which required that auto engines must meet certain auto emission standards.

On May 3, 1961, Dole voted against the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961 which increased the annual authorization for federal grants to help communities construct sewage treatment plants from \$50 million to \$100 million, and the over-all limit from \$500 million to \$1 billion.

On July 24, 1963, Dole voted against the Clean Air Act, to initiate and strengthen programs for the prevention and abatement of air pollution.

On September 24, 1965, Dole voted against the Clean Air and Waste Disposal Act which authorized the Secretary of HEW to set standards to control the emission of air pollutants from automobiles and to authorize \$92.5 million during fiscal 1966-69 for research on and development of methods to dispose of solid wastes. (The vote was 294-4; Dole was one of the four.)

Consumer Protection Agency:

1970: Dole voted for final passage on December 1, 1970, but his votes on three amendments indicated he wished to hamper the effectiveness of the Agency.

1972: Dole voted three times against cloture (September 29, October 3, and October 5); the bill was killed because of an inability to invoke cloture.

1974: Dole voted two times against cloture (July 30 and August 1), but on August 20 voted to invoke cloture.

Gun Control:

On August 9, 1972, Dole voted for a bill to outlaw the sale of cheap, domestically produced handguns commonly called Saturday Night Specials.

On March 13, 1974, Dole voted to table, and thus kill, an amendment to the death penalty legislation which sought to ban the manufacture in the United States of cheap handguns commonly known as Saturday Night Specials.

School Lunch:

On February 24, 1970, Dole voted against an amendment which limited to 20¢ the cost of reduced price lunches and providing that children from families with incomes under \$4,000 would be eligible for free lunches.

On September 24, 1973, Dole voted against an amendment which increased the basic federal payment for each meal served under the national school lunch program from 10¢ to 12¢.

Miscellaneous:

On October 7, 1970, Dole voted against an amendment to the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 which sought to delete the "no-knock" authorization in the bill.

A reversal of this position is found on July 11, 1974 when Dole voted for an amendment to repeal the "no-knock" provisions of the 1970 Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act and of the 1970 DC Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act.

AID TO NEW YORK CITY

Final Passage---Mondale voted Yes. Dole voted No

AMENDMENTS

Senate voted to table the Byrd amendment which would have provided that New York City submit a balanced budget for FY '77. Mondale voted to table. Dole voted not to table.

Senate agreed to a motion to table the Taft amendment in the nature of a substitute. Mondale voted to table. Dole voted to table.

Senate agreed to a motion to table the Bartlett amendment to terminate the loan as of December 31, 1976. Mondale voted to table. Dole voted not to table.

Seante agreed to a motion to table the Bartlett which would have required a GAO audit of the financial status of New York City. Mondale voted to table. Dole voted not to table.

Senate rejected Helm's amendment to reduce by 1 billion the amount of the bill. Mondale voted no on Helm's amendment. Dole voted no.

Senate rejected Allen's amendment to reduce by 1 billion the amount of the bill. Mondale voted no on Allen's amendment. Dole did not vote.

Senate rejected the Hansen amendment relative to payment in case of default by New York City. Mondale voted no on the Hansen amendment. Dole also voted no.



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