



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

Bill Smith
Office of the Vice
President

February 15, 1979

MEMORANDUM

TO: Doug Bennet

FROM: Peggy Lampl *PL*

SUBJECT: China/Taiwan Legislative Task Force Meeting,
February 14, 1979
Issues Discussed and Taskings

Omnibus Bill

Beckel and Bennet discussed House and Senate Committee and floor prospects. It was agreed that with the strong possibility that the Omnibus Bill would come to a House floor vote first it would be advantageous to gear up external contacts -- particularly individuals and organizations involved in Wexler organized briefings and other events. State will furnish list of representatives and freshmen plus talking points. Action: Kenney.

Bennet and Free will also see Lester Wolff to discuss his security resolution prior to HFAC markup now postponed to 9:45 a.m., Wednesday, February 21. SFRC markup is scheduled for Tuesday, February 20, 10:00 a.m.

Woodcock Nomination

Bennet reported on Committee approval, 12-1.
Note: We now expect nomination to come to the Senate floor the week of February 20th.

Reprogramming

Hollings action to "temporarily disapprove" reprogramming funds could, if not lifted, bring Taiwan operations to a halt after March 1 and has also curtailed transition activities. It was agreed that SFRC action may affect Hollings' decision but, in

any event, he should be recontacted on the consequences of disapproval. Action: White House.

Slack has requested GAO opinions on legality of contract which is due this week.

War Reserves Materials

It was agreed that WRM amendment should be handled as part of Security Assistance and not as separate bill.

Next Meeting

Wednesday, February 2, 4:00 p.m., 305 EOB.

Drafted: H:PLampl:dp
2/15/79 x23436

Mr. Smith



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

5 February 1979

MEMORANDUM

TO: Members-China Legislative Task Force

FROM: H - Peggy Lamp *PL*

SUBJECT: Schedule of Meetings

The next meeting of the Task Force will be held on February 8th, Thursday, at 5:30 p.m., Room 308 EOB. Listed below, for your information, are subsequent meetings to be held.

Wednesday -14 February - 4:00 p.m., Room 308, EOB

Wednesday -21 February - 4:00 p.m., Room 305, EOB

Wednesday -28 February - 4:00 p.m., Room 308, EOB
and
thereafter, every Wednesday, same time,
same place.

DRAFT AGENDA

CHINA LEGISLATIVE TASK FORCE MEETING

Room 308, EOB
February 1, 1979

Assessment - Deng Visit: Roger Sullivan

Status Taiwan Negotiations/
post March 1 scenario: Roger Sullivan

Hearings

Omnibus Bill - SFRC, HIRC: Peggy Lampl

Woodcock - SFRC

Reprogramming - Hollings

Hill Resolutions:

Kennedy/Cranston

Others

Privileges & Immunities: Steve Orlins

Claims & Assets, MFN - Status

Next meeting - February 8, at 5:30, EOB.

n (11:15 a.m.)





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 1, 1979

MEMORANDUM

TO: Members, China Legislative Task Force

FROM: Peggy Lampl

Following is a tentative schedule for House action on the Omnibus Bill (HR 1614):

- February 7 - 1:00 p.m. Administration witnesses
Christopher
- February 8 - Additional Administration and public
witnesses
- February 14 - Wolff Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific
and 15 Affairs - Witnesses to include Holbrooke,
Nixon, Ford, Kissinger
- February 16 - Mark-up
- February 19 - To the floor
to 26

Senate action (S. 245) is:

- February 5 - SFRC hearings, 10:00 a.m.
Administration witnesses:
Warren Christopher
Harold Brown (11:15 a.m.)
- Afternoon - Administration witnesses
hearings
Herbert Hansell
Ambassador Unger
John Thomas
Roger Sullivan
(Jim Michel)
- February 6 - Public witnesses
- February 7 - Mark-up
- February 8 - Woodcock hearings

Administration Comments Concerning

Senate Joint Resolution 17

This Resolution is incompatible with the foreign policy of the United States enunciated in the Joint Communique of December 15, 1978 establishing diplomatic relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

The Resolution calls for the establishment of liaison offices with Taiwan. Liaison offices, such as were used by the US and PRC to conduct relations from 1973 to 1978, are government organizations. It was clearly understood and stated at the time of the exchange of US and PRC liaison offices that they were intended as a transitional arrangement, pending establishment of full relations. That situation is not analogous to our withdrawal of recognition from the Republic of China. The existence of liaison offices would be incompatible with the unofficial, people-to-people relationship between the people of the US and the people on Taiwan which the December 15 Joint Communique specifies. The unofficial relationship would also preclude the "diplomatic relations" with Taiwan which the

fourth "Whereas" clause asserts to be the position supported by the majority of the American people.

Sec. 2 of S.J. Res. 17 essentially duplicates language of Article V of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the Republic of China. The US has given notice of its intent to terminate the Treaty in accordance with its terms, effective December 31, 1979. It would be inconsistent with the agreement on normalization with the People's Republic of China to re-enact terms of that Treaty through another instrument, such as S.J. Res. 17.

The Resolution refers to people living under the jurisdiction of the Nationalist Government in Taiwan. Since the US does not recognize "the Nationalist Government in Taiwan," this terminology is inconsistent with that policy. The Resolution further states the people "under the jurisdiction of the Nationalist Government in Taiwan" should be able "to determine their own political and economic institutions free from outside coercion." The Administration has made clear, in public statements and in statements to the People's Republic of China, its expectation that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves, including the people on Taiwan.

96TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. J. RES. 17

Relating to diplomatic relations with the Republic of China.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 18 (legislative day, JANUARY 15), 1979

Mr. ROTH introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

JOINT RESOLUTION

Relating to diplomatic relations with the Republic of China.

Whereas the President of the United States has terminated diplomatic relations with the Republic of China;

Whereas the President has notified the Republic of China that the United States will terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China;

Whereas the United States and the Republic of China have maintained valuable and mutually beneficial diplomatic, political, military, economic, and cultural relations for many decades;

Whereas the majority of the American people support the continuation of diplomatic and military relations with Taiwan;

Whereas the use of military force against Taiwan would endanger the peace and stability of the East Asia/Pacific region and thus be dangerous to the safety of the United States; and

Whereas the United States is desirous of strengthening its relations with the People's Republic of China on the basis of mutual respect and benefit: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of*
2 *the United States of America in Congress assembled, That*
3 the United States declares its good will and support for the
4 people living under the jurisdiction of the Nationalist Govern-
5 ment in Taiwan and its belief that they should be able to
6 determine their own political and economic institutions free
7 from outside coercion.

8 SEC. 2. The United States would regard an armed
9 attack against Taiwan or the Pescadores as dangerous to its
10 own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet
11 the common danger in accordance with its constitutional
12 processes.

13 SEC. 3. The United States requests and welcomes an
14 agreement with Taiwan to establish liaison offices, similar in
15 function and status to the liaison offices by the United States
16 and the People's Republic of China from 1972 and 1979, for
17 the purpose of promoting friendly and mutually beneficial re-
18 lations between the people of the United States and the
19 people of Taiwan, and

1 SEC. 4. The United States welcomes the strengthening
2 of relations with the People's Republic of China and affirms
3 that categorical assurances from the People's Republic of
4 China to resolve its differences with the government in
5 Taiwan only by peaceful means would be a significant meas-
6 ure enhancing American relations with the People's Republic
7 of China.

○

much to the chagrin of other commission members.

Yet, on balance, a federally supported effort to curb crime at local and state levels makes sense. LEAA money was largely responsible for improving the Delaware Superior Court's docketing procedures, establishing the computerized network on criminal records and motor vehicle records used by the courts and police, and LEAA is now funding Atty. Gen. Richard R. Wier Jr.'s investigation of white collar crime.

What President Carter wants to do is streamline the agency and give it some direction. Major elements of his proposal are:

—Ban the use of federal money for salary increases or construction projects and sharply reduce use of federal money for police hardware.

—Eliminate the requirement that state and local applicants submit annual plans—and instead submit three-year plans.

—Guarantee fixed allotments for cities over 100,000 and counties with populations of more than 250,000 because that's where most crime occurs.

These all make a lot of sense. If nothing else they would reduce the amount of needless, repetitious paperwork that applicants must go through year after year.

One part of the president's proposals establishing a research oriented National Institute of Justice within the Justice Department gives us some trouble. We agree with the American Bar Association that such a research unit should be clearly separated from the "action" part of anti-crime efforts. The ABA is promoting legislation that would make a National Institute of Justice a separate governmental body, not unlike the National Science Foundation or the National Institutes of Health. Such an independent body would be relatively free of the kinds of political pressure that have marred the efforts of LEAA for years. So freed it could produce valid data on ways to improve court procedures, police and corrections operations without concern for stepping on toes.

The president's proposals were introduced in the Senate by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, who is scheduled to head the Judiciary Committee next year. With that kind of backer the reorganization could be accomplished soon.

[From the Miami (Fla.) Review and Daily Record, July 19, 1978]

PUBLISHER'S DESK

JUSTICE SYSTEM NEEDS MODERNIZATION

There's many a slip twixt the cup and lip and it appears that there is also many a slip between what a candidate for president promises and what a president finally proposes.

President Carter's plan for a National Institute of Justice (NIJ) is in the words of William B. Spann Jr., president of the American Bar Association, "an inadequate retreat of LEAA's old, worn and much criticized research program."

When he was seeking office, Mr. Carter asked for an independent NIJ to take an in-depth look at the entire justice system. Now, he would bury it in the Department of Justice and deny the visibility and credibility needed for public understanding and success.

In other words, President Carter just isn't giving the nation the bold and innovative leadership needed to reform, strengthen and modernize the justice system.

By placing the NIJ within the Justice Department and closely tied to the grant-making activity of LEAA, the political needs of the Justice Department and the desires of state and local governments who receive LEAA funds are apt to dictate the research program which will be undertaken.

It's too bad the administration proposes a

weak Advisory Board for NIJ, with the real power and status vested in the staff. Spann says the authority should be placed mainly in a prestigious, independent Board of Trustees, appointed by the President and not in federal bureaucracy.

We agree with the president of the ABA that the NIJ should conduct a balanced research program covering criminal, civil, administrative and regulatory matters. Enactment of the halfway measure offered by the administration will sound the death knell for any independent agency and end the chances for solving the problems facing our justice system.

Proposals for creation of an independent, federally funded, NIJ have been introduced in Congress. We join with the ABA in urging our national legislators to weigh the two approaches carefully and select a no-strings path which should prove to be far more beneficial for the American people.

By MR. HELMS:

S.J. Res. 29. A joint resolution to establish a Commission on Security and Cooperation in China; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN CHINA

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the recognition of the Government of mainland China by President Carter has raised a great amount of anxiety over the future of the island province of Taiwan, and the Government of the Republic of China which is located there in Taipei. Despite assurances by President Carter that the mainland government is pledged not to use force against the government of Taipei, recent statements by Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping that he would not rule out the use of force as the ultimate sanction to induce negotiations have unveiled the ultimate goal.

The question is whether there are any circumstances whatsoever under which U.S. policy would like to see the peaceful unification of Taiwan with any Communist government on the mainland. The issue raises larger questions about our belief in the nature of freedom and our willingness to see any group of peoples in the world lose their right of self-determination. It is scarcely conceivable—at least to this Senator—that any people living in the relative freedom of life on Taiwan would willingly choose to be absorbed into a Communist society, even if such a fate took place peacefully.

Teng's threat that force must be reserved as the ultimate sanction to induce the government of the Republic of China to negotiate indicates that a policy of pressure will be followed, one that doubtless will include diplomatic, economic, and psychological efforts to isolate Taiwan, to restrict its freedom of action in international activities, and to destroy its economy. Taiwan cannot be said to have a choice if its freedom is strangled "peacefully" in a silken noose.

Similarly, Taiwan's choice cannot be said to be free if it is threatened militarily by a buildup of the kind of forces and armaments directed at military invasion, particularly if these forces are concentrated in regions adjacent to the Taiwan Straits. In part, Taiwan's ability to respond will depend upon the United States; but a great deal will depend

upon the actions of the Peking government.

There are those who say, hopefully, that Peking will never invade because it would disrupt relations with Japan and the United States. But no one can predict under what future circumstances Peking might decide to act.

The fact remains that the Peking government has the worst—let me repeat for the purpose of emphasis—the worst human rights record in history, one that surpasses even the graphic descriptions of witnesses to the Cambodian tragedy. A study prepared for the Senate in 1971 estimated that as many as 64 million Chinese died during the Communist programs of liquidation and purge.

Even today, Chinese Communist officials estimate that between 5 and 10 percent of the Chinese people suffer "the dictatorship of the proletariat" in forced labor camps. With a population of 900 million, 5 to 10 percent in forced labor camps is a number equivalent to one quarter to one half of the population of the United States. So that, Mr. President, is what we confront.

Those who are not in the forced labor camps live continually in the fear that they, too, might fall under surveillance or "dictatorship." Legal protections are virtually nonexistent; men and women are incarcerated by party directive (the Gang of Four being the most notorious examples).

Personal mobility is restricted not only by the poverty and failure of the Chinese economic system under communism, but also by one of the most restrictive systems of rationing basic daily necessities in the world. Indeed, the very rights which we hold to be fundamental to the nature of man are rigorously suppressed, including the following:

First. The rights of family. The Chinese sense of family runs very deep, based upon the Confucian ideal of respect for one's ancestors. The party has worked very hard to break down this tradition. The "liberation" of women, most of whom do manual work in the fields, has placed great stress on the family unit. Parents have no control over the education of their children. Millions of so-called "educated" youth have been sent from urban centers to remote villages for permanent settlement. Restrictions on marriageable ages, forced separation of married couples to job assignments hundreds of miles apart, and public pressures on individual women for abortion and contraception further erode marital rights and privacy.

Second. The rights of religion. Millions of Chinese were adherents of the Buddhist, Taoist, Moslem, and Christian faiths before 1949, and millions more were active followers of the ethical precepts of Confucius. The thousands of temples have been closed, many have been destroyed. A mere handful of religious buildings are kept open for the inspection of foreigners, but no Chinese citizen would dare to enter. Attendance at religious rites would result in job loss, discrimination, surveillance, decrease in rations, and perhaps even a trip to the labor camps.

Third. The rights of labor. No Chinese may join an independent trade union, much less enter upon a strike. Wages in China have been raised only twice in 20 years. A worker has no right to select his job or his assignment.

Fourth. The rights of property. Needless to say, the right to hold private property has completely disappeared, including peasants who may have owned only 2 or 3 acres. Forced collectivization was imposed on all agriculture. Property rights are the foundation of human liberties, and they are nonexistent in Communist China.

Fifth. The rights of political expression. There is only one party in China. There is not even an organized network of dissenters, such as in the Soviet Union. The recent, brief flowering of big character posters, under the careful guidance of Party officials, shows that free political expression on the mainland is nonexistent.

Sixth. The rights of economic self-determination. Anyone who advocates personal or private enterprise, no matter how insignificant, is considered a "capitalist roader." No individual may attempt to establish his own economic self-sufficiency outside of the collective plan.

Seventh. The rights of due process. Legal rights simply do not exist in China, and the recent calls for the establishment of legal procedures only points up the fact that, for 20 years, citizens have been at the mercy of party directives, as interpreted by local officials. There is not even a criminal code, much less a code for political offenders.

Mr. President, it is the hope of many that the total absence of human rights, as generally understood in the West, will be ameliorated as time goes by. The emergence of Teng as the strong man in China after the death of Mao has given an indication that there might be evolution toward a better situation. But no one knows how long the adherents of Teng will hold power. The historical record give little confidence that the situation will change for the better permanently. It is far too soon to decide.

All of these reasons are reasons why we should not be in haste to consign the people on Taiwan to the benevolence of the Peking regime. After all, the Republic of China has not ceased to be a legitimate government merely because the United States has withdrawn its ambassador. It remains in control of a significant part of the territory of China. I believe that it is generally accepted under international law that a country cannot be "de-recognized." A new government may be recognized once it has de facto control of territory. But once it is recognized, it is recognized as long as it has that control. The withdrawal of ambassadors is a separate act that has no bearing on recognition.

Indeed, nations may withdraw ambassadors and go to war with each other, without any implication that their opponents no longer exercise sovereignty over such territory as they control. In fact, quite the opposite is implied.

However, since the administration has chosen to withdraw the U.S. Ambassador

from Taiwan and to recognize Peking as the sole government of China, in defiance of reality and international law, special steps should be taken by Congress to safeguard the human rights of the Chinese people who are under the Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Neither that Government nor the people cease to exist because of the President's action. It is up to Congress to monitor the human rights situation on the mainland and any potential military buildup which would threaten Taiwan.

Accordingly, the resolution which I am proposing would set up a Commission on Security and Cooperation in China. It would parallel the work of the presently existing Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the so-called Helsinki Commission, which monitors human rights violations of nations which have signed the Helsinki accords.

Like the Helsinki Commission, the China Commission would be a body consisting of six Members of the Senate, six Members of the House, and three members appointed by the administration. Like the Helsinki Commission, the congressional Members would be selected in a ratio of 2 to 1 from the majority and minority parties. Again like the Helsinki Commission, there would be a small staff to perform necessary tasks to implement its mandate.

The main difference between the two commissions, of course, has to do with its goals. Since Peking looks upon human rights as a bourgeois fiction designed to impede the class struggle, the People's Republic has not signed the Helsinki agreement.

Its mandate, therefore, is based upon the implied promises of the People's Republic with regard to its aspirations toward Taiwan. Its role would be as follows:

First. To monitor the acts of the PRC to determine whether the PRC has directed any aggressive or hostile action against the territory of the Republic of China, or has taken any step which would have the purpose or effect of undermining the governing authorities;

Second. To encourage and monitor the activities of the U.S. Government and of private organizations in strengthening economic and military cooperation with such territory and to conduct liaison with the governing authorities in the territory controlled by the Republic of China, for the purpose of assuring the security of that territory; and

Third. To monitor the status of the People's Republic of China of internationally recognized human rights, including the rights of family, religion, property, labor, political expression, economic self-determination, and due process, in order to decide whether the rights of the people on Taiwan would be abridged if "unification" should take place.

It should be noted that, like its model, the Helsinki Commission, the proposed China Commission does not intrude upon the President's right to conduct foreign policy. Its function is only a monitoring function so as to collect vital information to report to Congress. It is merely an expression of congressional oversight authority, and is designed to have input

both from congressional and administration sources.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of my joint resolution be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the joint resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S.J. RES. 29

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That there is established the Commission on Security and Cooperation in China (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission").

SEC. 2. The Commission shall—

(1) monitor the acts of the Government of the People's Republic of China to determine whether such Government has directed, contrary to the understanding of the President, any aggressive or hostile action against the territory of the Republic of China or has taken any step which would have the purpose or effect of undermining the *de facto* governing authorities in such territory;

(2) encourage and monitor the activities of the United States Government and of private organizations in strengthening economic and military cooperation with such territory and to conduct liaison with the *de facto* governing authorities in the territory of the Republic of China, for the purpose of assuring the security of such territory; and

(3) monitor the status in the People's Republic of China of internationally recognized human rights, including the rights of family, religion, property, labor, political expression, economic self-determination, and due process, in order to determine whether the incorporation of the territory of the Republic of China into the People's Republic of China would have the effect of denying or abridging such rights of the people of such territory.

SEC. 3. The Commission shall be composed of fifteen members. Of the members provided for under the preceding sentence—

(1) six shall be Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, four of whom shall be selected from the majority party, and two of whom shall be selected, after consultation with the minority leader of the House of Representatives, from the minority party. The Speaker of the House of Representatives shall designate one of the Members appointed under this paragraph as Chairman of the Commission;

(2) six shall be Members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate, four of whom shall be selected from the majority party, and two of whom shall be selected, after consultation with the minority leader of the Senate, from the minority party;

(3) one shall be a member of the Department of State to be appointed by the President;

(4) one shall be a member of the Department of Defense to be appointed by the President; and

(5) one shall be a member of the Department of Commerce to be appointed by the President.

SEC. 4. (a) Members of the Commission shall serve without compensation but shall be entitled to reimbursement for travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred by them in carrying out the duties of the Commission.

(b) The Commission may appoint and fix the pay of such staff personnel as it deems desirable, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and general schedule pay rates.

Sec. 5. The Commission may, in carrying out its duties under this joint resolution, sit and act at such times and places, hold such hearings, take such testimony, and require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued over the signature of the Chairman of the Commission or any member designated by him, and may be served by any person designated by the Chairman or such member. The Chairman of the Commission, or any member designated by him, may administer oaths to any witness.

Sec. 6. The Commission shall report quarterly to the President and to the House of Representatives and the Senate with respect to the matters covered by this joint resolution and shall provide information to Members of the House of Representatives and the Senate as requested. For each fiscal year for which an appropriation is made the Commission shall submit to the Congress a report on its expenditures under such appropriation.

Sec. 7. There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission for each fiscal year and to remain available until expended, \$350,000 to assist in meeting the expenses of the Commission for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this joint resolution, such appropriation to be disbursed on a voucher to be approved by the Chairman of the Commission.

By Mr. WILLIAMS (for himself and Mr. CRANSTON):

S.J. Res. 20. A joint resolution authorizing and requesting the President to issue a proclamation designating the month of June as "National First Aid Month"; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

NATIONAL FIRST AID MONTH

• Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce a Senate joint resolution to declare the month of June as "National First Aid Month." The purpose of this observance is to increase public awareness and knowledge of basic first aid and emergency procedures.

Statistics compiled by the National Safety Council and the National Center for Health Statistics reveal much about the health of Americans.

Accidental injury is the leading cause of death among Americans aged 1 to 33. It is the fourth leading cause of death among all Americans and claims more lives among youth aged 15 to 24 than all other causes combined.

In 1976, chronic and acute illnesses or injuries resulted in an estimated 18.2 days of restricted activity or disability per person. Restricted-activity ranged from about 11 days for children under 17 years of age to approximately 46 days for persons 65 years of age or over.

Motor vehicle accidents are the major single cause of death and disability in this country, however, drownings, fires, poisoning, and firearms also inflict a heavy toll. The cost of these accidents to the individual, his family, and our society is enormous. Accidents in which deaths or disabling injuries occurred, together with noninjury motor vehicle accidents and fires, cost our Nation \$52.8 billion in 1976. Included in this total was \$31.7 billion for wage losses, medical expenses, and insurance administrative costs.

In 1973, the Congress recognized that disability, loss of health, and death from accidents, as well as from sudden illnesses such as heart failure, could be substantially reduced with an improved emergency medical services system. To help communities meet emergency situations immediately and effectively, Congress enacted the Emergency Medical Services Systems Act. Through this act, communities have been able to correct service deficiencies irrespective of the relative wealth or urban-rural nature of their local areas.

Despite the expansion of professional emergency medical services in this country, there is a need to assure that each American has an awareness and knowledge of basic first aid and emergency procedures. When an accident occurs, use of basic first aid techniques can mitigate the need for professional medical treatment. In life-threatening situations, the use of relatively simple procedures, until professional medical care can be obtained, can often make the crucial difference between life or death.

A number of voluntary organizations diligently work to teach people about basic first aid and emergency medical procedures. The resolution I am introducing today would focus concerted attention on the need for every American to obtain information about these procedures. Several voluntary organizations have already indicated their support for this effort including the National Safety Council, the Boy Scouts of America, the Salvation Army, and the American Heart Association. I am confident support for this resolution by the Congress will result in the protection of the health of countless Americans.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of this resolution be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the joint resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S.J. RES. 30

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

Whereas, accidental injuries and sudden illnesses result in loss of health, disability, or death for millions of Americans each year;

Whereas, the prompt application of first aid and emergency procedures can preserve health, reduce suffering, and save lives;

Whereas, there is a demonstrated need to increase public awareness and knowledge of basic first aid and emergency procedures; and

Whereas, basic first aid and emergency care information should be accessible to every American: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation designating the month of June of each year as "National First Aid Month" and calling upon the people of the United States and interested groups and organizations to observe such month with appropriate ceremonies and activities.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS

S. 5

At the request of Mr. CHILES, the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. HEINZ) was

added as a cosponsor of S. 5, to provide policies, methods, and criteria for the acquisition of property and services by executive agencies.

S. 10

At the request of Mr. BAYH, the Senator from Arizona (Mr. DECONCINI) was added as a cosponsor of S. 10, The Rights of Institutionalized Persons.

S. 25

At the request of Mr. BAYH, the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE), the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON), and the Senator from Ohio (Mr. METZENBAUM) were added as cosponsors of S. 25, a bill to designate the birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr. as a national holiday.

S. 48

At the request of Mr. STONE, the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON) and the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) were added as cosponsors of S. 46, a bill extending diplomatic privileges and immunities to all offices representing the Republic of China in the United States.

S. 65

At the request of Mr. BENTSEN, the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BOREN) was added as a cosponsor of S. 55, the Meat Import Act of 1979.

S. 188

At the request of Mr. STEVENSON, the Senators from Iowa (Mr. CULVER and Mr. JEPSEN) were added as cosponsors of S. 188, a bill to amend the Disaster Relief Act of 1974.

S. 198

At the request of Mr. THURMOND, the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS) was added as a cosponsor of S. 196, to provide chiropractic treatment when requested for veterans eligible for outpatient care.

S. 227

At the request of Mr. ROTH, the Senator from Arizona (Mr. DECONCINI) was added as a cosponsor of S. 227, to improve the operation of the adjustment assistance programs for workers and firm under the Trade Act of 1974.

SENATE RESOLUTION 30—SUBMISSION OF A RESOLUTION TO AMEND THE STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE

Mr. WILLIAMS (for himself, Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. PELL, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. NELSON, Mr. EAGLETON, Mr. CRANSTON, Mr. RIEGLE, Mr. METZENBAUM, Mr. SCHWEIKER, Mr. JAVITS, and Mr. ARMSTRONG) submitted the following resolution, which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration:

S. RES. 30

Resolved, That—

(1) clause (1) of paragraph 1.(1) of Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate is amended by striking out "Committee on Human Resources," and inserting in lieu thereof "Committee on Labor and Human Resources," and

(2) the table contained in paragraph 2 of such Rule is amended by striking out the item relating to the Committee on Human Resources and inserting in lieu thereof "Labor and Human Resources".

Sec. 2. The standing committee described in paragraph 1.(1) (1) of Rule XXV of such

TENTATIVE

WETA
television
Full Radio

February 5, 1979

10:00 a.m.

4221 DSOB

The Honorable Warren Christopher
Deputy Secretary of State

The Honorable Harold Brown
Secretary of Defense

February 5

Afternoon Session

2:00 p.m.

Legal and Administrative Aspects of U. S. Relations With Taiwan

The Honorable Herbert J. Hansell
Legal Advisor
Department of State

Professor Victor Li
Stanford University Law School
Palo Alto, California

The Honorable John M. Thomas
Assistant Secretary for Administration
Department of State

The Honorable Leonard Unger
Ambassador to the Republic of China

February 6, 1979

10:00 a.m.

4221 DSOB

Senator Barry Goldwater

Senator Robert Dole

Senator Dennis DeConcini

Senator John Danforth

Panel: The Economic and Political Future of Taiwan

Professor Parris H. Chang
Department of Political Science
Pennsylvania State University; *University Park, Pennsylvania*

Ralph ^{N.} Clough
Senior Fellow, The Woodrow Wilson ^{International} Center for Scholars
Washington, D. C.

Robert P. Parker
President, American Chamber of Commerce in the Republic of
China
Taiwan

Richard H. Solomon
Chief, Social Science Department
The RAND Corporation
Santa Monica, California

David Kennedy
Chairman of the Board
US/ROC Economic Association
Salt Lake City, Utah

(Former Secretary of the Treasury)

February 7, 1979

10:00 a.m.

4221 DSOB

Panel: Diplomatic Prospects and the Security of Taiwan

Ray S. Cline
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Georgetown University

Col. Angus M. Fraser, USMC (Ret)
Author on Chinese Military Matters and Former Consultant
to the RAND Corporation
Alexandria, Virginia

Admiral Theodore Snyder, USN (Ret)
Former Head of Taiwanese Defense Command
Arlington, Virginia

Robert A. Scalapino
Director, Institute for East Asian Studies
University of California at Berkeley

Professor Alan S. Whiting
Center for Chinese Studies
University of Michigan

Doak Barnett

February 7, 1979

Afternoon Session

2:00 p.m.

Mark-up of Legislation

COSPONSORSHIP FOR CHINA RESOLUTION

Kennedy (MASS)
Cranston (CA)

Baucus (Mont)
Bayh (Ind)
Bentsen (Tex)
Biden (Del)
Bumpers (Ark)

Durkin (NH)
Eagleton (MO)
Gravel (Alaska)
Hayakawa (CA)
Inouye (Hawaii)

Johnston (LA)
Levin (Mich)
McGovern (S DAK)
Metzenbaum (OHIO)
Nelson (WIS)

Pell (RI)
Pressler (S DAK)
Proxmire (WISC)
Randolph (WVa)
Ribicoff (CONN)

Sasser (TENN)
Stafford (VT)
Stennis (Miss)
Stevenson (ILL)
Tsongas (MASS)

Percy
Sarbanes
Stone



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

SS

January 26, 1979

UNCLASSIFIED

TO: The Deputy Secretary
EA - Mr. Holbrooke

FROM: PA - Hodding Carter III HC

Public Continues to Prefer Two-China Policy

Summary

Three nationwide polls on normalization have been made public. They show that most American adults are aware there has been a realignment of relations between the United States, China, and Taiwan. They also show that the public retains its predominant pre-normalization sentiments: approval of recognition for China and disapproval of breaking relations with Taiwan.

Before the President's announcement, the level of opposition to a break with Taiwan was quite similar among all population groups. Since the announcement, a cleavage along party lines has developed. Democrats are a good deal more amenable to the terms of normalization than either Republicans or "independents."

The fact that Taiwan will continue to receive U.S. arms does not mitigate disapproval of the diplomatic break. Americans seem more disapproving of the "breaking" of a treaty than concerned to assure that Taiwan can defend itself.

A majority of the public gives major credit for re-establishing U.S.-China relations to Mr. Nixon, rather than President Carter. This suggests that the President, while bearing a political cost for the public's disapproval of the Chinese terms to which the United States acceded, is not yet enjoying a commensurate political benefit for implementing the aspect of normalization of which the public approves.

End Summary

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- 2 -

Three national polls on the American public's reaction to normalization have been conducted: by CBS, on December 16-17; by Harris, between December 21-26; by Gallup, between January 5-8.

Public Awareness of Normalization

Within three weeks of the President's announcement, most American adults (90 percent) were aware that relations between the United States and China had been put on a new footing.

CBS completed the first poll of reactions to normalization within 48 hours of the President's announcement. Respondents were asked, "Have you heard or read about our new diplomatic relations with China that were announced by President Carter on Friday night?" CBS had asked a comparable question the day after the Camp David agreement. Awareness of Camp David right after the event was greater than the initial awareness of normalization:

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
Heard about normalization (within 48 hours)	60%	40%
Heard about Camp David (within 24 hours)	75	24

By the time Gallup asked, between January 5-8, "Have you heard or read about the decision to establish diplomatic relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China, that is mainland China?" affirmative responses reached 90 percent.

Gallup also asked several questions to test basic knowledge of how Taiwan would be affected by normalization. Forty-seven percent knew the United States would not "maintain diplomatic relations with the Nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan" (34 percent thought it would); 63 percent knew the United States will "be able to continue to trade with Taiwan" (18 percent thought it would not).

UNCLASSIFIED

Public Favors Recognition of China

The highest approval of recognition of the PRC was recorded on a Harris question that made no mention of other factors entering into normalization: "The United States and the People's Republic of China have agreed to full diplomatic recognition of each other, including the exchange of ambassadors. Do you favor or oppose our official recognition of the People's Republic of China?"

Favor	60%
Oppose	27
Not sure	13

Recognition was favored by approximately three-fourths of executives, professionals, and the college educated as a whole. The fact that a renewed relationship with China is not a politically controversial aspect of normalization is shown by the fairly similar level of approval among those with different political affiliations: recognition was favored by 54 percent of Republicans, 52 percent of Democrats, and 63 percent of self-styled "independents."

A majority of the American public has favored recognition of China since 1971. In 1966, Harris first asked a question repeated regularly through last summer: "It has been argued that we could deal with the People's Republic of China (Communist China) better if we officially recognized them. [From 1966 through 1971 the wording was "Red China."] This would allow us to have an ambassador in China as we have in other communist countries. Do you favor or oppose recognition of Communist China?"

	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>
1978 (July)	66%	25%	9%
1977 (Sept.)	62	18	20
1971	55	20	25
1968	39	44	17
1967	41	34	25
1966	43	33	24

Gallup found that the less likely that respondents considered a Chinese effort to take over Taiwan, the more likely they were to favor recognition. Yet even a majority of those who considered such an attempt "within the next five years" to be "very likely" favored "the decision to

UNCLASSIFIED

- 4 -

establish diplomatic relations." This suggests that the break with Taiwan might well become more widely accepted to the extent that the public perceives a lessening likelihood of a takeover.

Regarding a takeover, Gallup asked: "How likely do you think it is that the People's Republic will try to take over the Chinese government on Taiwan -- by either economic or military means -- within the next five years...very likely, fairly likely, not very likely, or not at all likely?"

Very likely	34%)	
Fairly likely	25)	59%
Not very likely	21)	
Not at all likely	7)	28%
No opinion	13		

The proportion favoring diplomatic relations among those with different expectations of a takeover was as follows:

<u>Expectation of a Takeover</u>	<u>Percent Favoring Relations with China</u>
Very likely	54%
Fairly likely	60
Not very likely	66
Not at all likely	82

CBS asked the only question that allowed respondents to indicate which contending government they favored in a one-China policy. Neither government received much backing for sole recognition, with half the respondents not opting for either side. The 60 percent who said they were aware of the President's announcement were asked:

"Do you think the United States should recognize the People's Republic of China as the official government of all the Chinese, or should we continue to only recognize the government in Taiwan?"

Recognize PRC only	28%
Recognize ROC only	22
Neither/Both (volunteered)	21
No opinion	29

UNCLASSIFIED

Public Opposes Break with Taiwan

The public unmistakably disapproves the steps taken vis-a-vis Taiwan. But the diverse wording of the recent questions makes it difficult to determine the extent of current disapproval or how much this attitude was altered by the fact of normalization. A benchmark against which to assess post-announcement responses is provided by the response to a Potomac poll conducted in April 1977:

"Mainland China has said it will establish diplomatic relations with the United States only if the U.S. ends its present diplomatic and defense treaty relations with Taiwan, but Mainland China has indicated that it has no objection to our continuing economic ties with Taiwan. Suppose that in order to establish diplomatic relations with Mainland China, President Carter urges that we end diplomatic and defense treaty relations with Taiwan while at the same time we continue our interest in the security of the people of Taiwan. Would you be very strongly in favor, fairly strongly in favor, fairly strongly opposed, or very strongly opposed?"

Very strongly in favor	8%	
Fairly strongly in favor	<u>20</u>	
(Total: favor)		28%
Fairly strongly opposed	25	
Very strongly opposed	<u>22</u>	
(Total: opposed)		47
Don't know	25	

Gallup's post-normalization question is quite similar in wording. The responses show a small increase in approval of breaking diplomatic relations with Taiwan:

"Some people feel that establishing relations with the People's Republic of China was an important enough reason to break off diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Other people feel that it was wrong to end relations with Taiwan in order to establish relations with the People's Republic of China. Which position comes closest to your own view?"

Establishing relations was important enough	35
Breaking relations was wrong	47%
No opinion	18

Public Uncomfortable with
Terms of Normalization

Two reasons for the relative lack of enthusiasm about normalization are (1) the belief that the United States acceded too much to Chinese demands and (2) the discomfiture over the break with Taiwan.

Both sentiments are fairly widespread in all population groups. At the same time, the extent to which the "deal" struck with China has generated political cleavages is indicated by the responses to several Harris questions on the terms of normalization.

For example, Harris asked:

"Do you feel that President Carter gave up a reasonable amount to get this agreement or that he gave up too much?"

The wording caters to Americans' predilection for believing they have been out-traded in an international negotiation. As could be anticipated, the predominant response was that "too much" was given up. But it is worth noting that a good many more Republicans took this view than Democrats:

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Repub- licans</u>	<u>Demo- crats</u>	<u>Independ- dents</u>
Gave up too much	44%	60%	39%	44%
Gave up reasonable amount	36	27	39	40
Not sure	20	13	22	16

Harris also asked:

"Now let me ask you about some of the specific parts of the U.S.-Chinese agreement [sic] to diplomatic recognition. Do you approve or disapprove of the U.S. agreeing that

	<u>Approve</u>	<u>Dis- approve</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>
"We would not sell military arms to the People's Republic of China	72%	21%	7%
"We would continue to sell military arms to the Nationalist government on Taiwan	43	47	10
"By 1980, we will cancel our defensive alliance with the Nationalist government on Taiwan"	32	52	16

As expected, the public is far more favorable to selling arms to Taiwan than to China. On the other hand, the public is more concerned with the formality of an alliance than with literally supplying arms to the ally in question, which suggests the public's primary concern is with the inferences that may be drawn from the fact of cancelling a treaty.

Among "elite" groups (professionals, executives, the college educated, the upper income) disapproval of cancelling the "defensive alliance" with Taiwan is somewhat higher than the disapproval among the general public. Each of these groups also shows sizably more approval of arms sales to Taiwan than the general public. Yet none of the "elite" groups favored arms sales to Taiwan to the same extent they opposed breaking the defensive alliance with Taiwan, a further illustration of the fact that Americans apparently are bothered more by how normalization was carried out than by the substantive changes:

	Approve Arms Sales to Taiwan	Disapprove Cancelling Defensive Alliance
Total Public	43%	52%
College Educated	51	54
Professionals	50	58
Executives	54	58
\$25,000+ Annual Income	57	59

The public does not view normalization as a package. A good many Americans see no contradiction in favoring recognition of the PRC while disapproving cancellation of the defense treaty with Taiwan; or of disapproving treaty cancellation and also disapproving arms sales to Taiwan. This capacity for holding seemingly contradictory views is illustrated in the following table, which shows the percentage of those favoring recognition of the PRC who hold diverse views on other aspects of normalization:

	Favor Recognition
Disapprove cancelling defensive alliance with Taiwan	50%
Approve continued sale of arms to Taiwan	46
Disapprove selling arms to PRC	77

UNCLASSIFIED

- 8 -

Nixon Credited with Establishing Link to China

Democrats may be more amenable to the break with Taiwan than Republicans, but they tend to step over party lines in according major credit for establishing relations with China. Gallup asked the 90 percent who said they were aware diplomatic relations had been established:

"Who do you feel deserves the most credit for the establishment of relations with the People's Republic of China, former President Nixon or President Carter?"

	<u>Total Public</u>	<u>Democrats</u>	<u>Republicans</u>
Nixon	54%	47%	69%
Carter	25	30	16

Drafted: PA/M:BRochico:reb
1/26/79 x20474



MINNESOTA HISTORICAL SOCIETY

Copyright in the Walter F. Mondale Papers belongs to the Minnesota Historical Society and its content may not be copied without the copyright holder's express written permission. Users may print, download, link to, or email content, however, for individual use.

To request permission for commercial or educational use, please contact the Minnesota Historical Society.



www.mnhs.org