

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

January 3, 1979

Memo No. 1353-79

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift   
SUBJECT: Foreign Policy/Defense Q's and A's

In the wake of the January 2 NSC meeting, I have updated your press guidance with new tabs immediately following this note as follows:

- SALT - January 3 letter to Byrd and Powell statement
- Jody Powell's on-the-record statement following the NSC on January 2
- The January 2 background briefing following the NSC, dealing with speculation on cutoff of grain sales, the Olympics, military action, Secretary Brown's trip to PRC

At Tab B, Middle East, I have included a new Q&A on Egyptian and Israeli base offers cleared by Newsom at State.

(I have given Marty Kaplan the Powell statement as basic guidance for your news comments in Iowa.)

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Additionally, I have updated Q's and A's on Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Waldheim mission to Teheran with State's guidance prepared for today.

Cy to: Al Eisele



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 3, 1980


Dear Senator Byrd:

In light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I request that you delay consideration of the SALT II Treaty on the Senate floor.

The purpose of this request is not to withdraw the Treaty from consideration, but to defer the debate so that the Congress and I as President can assess Soviet actions and intentions, and devote our primary attention to the legislative and other measures required to respond to this crisis.

As you know, I continue to share your view that the SALT II Treaty is in the national security interest of the United States and the entire world, and that it should be taken up by the Senate as soon as these more urgent issues have been addressed.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Jimmy Carter". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the word "Sincerely,".

The Honorable Robert Byrd  
Majority Leader of the United States Senate  
Washington, D.C.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JANUARY 3, 1980

Office of the White House Press Secretary

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THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY JODY POWELL

After consultation with the Senate leadership, the President has asked Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd to delay consideration of the SALT II Treaty on the Senate floor.

While the President continues to believe that ratification of SALT II is in the national security interest of the United States, he has concluded that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in defiance of the United Nations charter has made consideration of the SALT II Treaty inappropriate at this time.

The President has asked that the delay continue while he and the Congress assess Soviet actions and intentions and devote their attention to legislative and other measures required to respond to the crisis created by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

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January 2, 1980

STATEMENT BY JODY POWELL FOLLOWING NSC

THE PRESIDENT MET THIS AFTERNOON WITH MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND OTHER SENIOR ADVISORS TO REVIEW THE CONTINUING CRISIS IN IRAN AND TO CONSIDER THE SERIOUS THREAT TO PEACE POSED BY THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN BY ARMED FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION.

1) THE PRESIDENT HAS RECALLED OUR AMBASSADOR TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR CONSULTATIONS. AMBASSADOR WATSON WILL BE ARRIVING IN WASHINGTON TOMORROW.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE REPORTED TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON A SERIES OF DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE OVER THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER REPORTED ON HIS RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF ALLIED NATIONS.

2) THE PRESIDENT MADE A NUMBER OF DECISIONS THIS AFTERNOON ON ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET INVASION. THESE DECISIONS INVOLVE UNILATERAL ACTIONS AND ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER NATIONS.

3) THE PRESIDENT'S DECISIONS WILL BE MADE PUBLIC WHEN APPROPRIATE CONSULTATIONS AND NOTIFICATION HAVE TAKEN PLACE. THE PRESIDENT HAS DIRECTED THAT THIS PROCESS BE COMPLETED WITHOUT DELAY.



THIS BRIEFING MAY BE ATTRIBUTED  
TO ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS.  
DIRECT QUOTATION IS NOT PERMITTED.

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

AT 5:13 P.M. EST

JANUARY 2, 1980

WEDNESDAY

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I know a number of you, in fact all of you, have rather serious deadline problems. Those of you who are with networks probably are more serious than others. So let me dispose of one round of questioning, if I can, immediately, by saying that I am not in a position to discuss with you on background or in any other fashion the nature of the decisions which were reached today. I will say that in addition to the comments that were made on the record that there are necessary steps of notification and consultation which will have to take place, but there are also aspects of these basic decisions which will require further review and study.

I cannot set a deadline for you beyond what has been said earlier or more specific than to say that the President has expressed his desire that this process be completed without undue delay.

Q Why is he recalling Watson?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I beg your pardon?

Q Why is he recalling the Ambassador?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is obviously a response to the action of the Soviet Union in invading Afghanistan and it is for the purpose of consultation and as an expression of our concern over this action.

Q Does it portend a break in relations?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is for consultation.

Q How much time are you talking about, these decisions becoming known? Is this a matter of hours, a matter of days? Are we going to be finding out about this next week?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would think that you will be hearing of at least some of the decisions that were made today by tomorrow.

Q Will this require any rescheduling of the steps you plan to take regarding Iran in the United Nations? Is there any conflict?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is none at this point.

Q Were any decisions made with regard to Iran today?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The discussions on Iran, given the state of that crisis, was primarily a review of that situation, as you know, the Secretary General is in Tehran even now and it was -- I don't know if I can say with total accuracy that no decisions were made. It was primarily a review of that situation, both on its own merits and obviously in light of what is happening elsewhere in the region, specifically the invasion of Afghanistan.



Q Are some of the consultations with Congress?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Are some of the consultations with the Congress?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Of course there are discussions with the Congress.

Q Is that because you are going to delay SALT?

Q Is that because it involves SALT?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I really cannot get into options that may or may not be before the President at this point. I might --

Q Were Congressional leaders here today?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q By phone?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They usually don't attend NSC meetings. I know the President -- I know there have been consultations by phone, yes.

Q Were some of the consultations with foreign nations?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Of course. The consultations and diplomatic exchanges to which I referred, both those by the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of State, that reference was to foreign nations. As you know, it has already been indicated, you are already aware that the President has sent messages to a large number of foreign countries in addition to those Allied nations with whom the Deputy Secretary met.

Let me just say: I will try to give you as carefully as I can a comment or two on SALT. As the President has said repeatedly and earlier this week, it is his belief that the SALT II Treaty is in the National Security interest of the United States, the Soviet Union and all other nations, regardless of the state of our relationships with the Soviet Union. He has also said that we did not sign this treaty as a favor to the Russians, nor is this treaty based upon trust, since it is adequately verifiable by independent means. We signed the Treaty because we believe that its provisions are in the best interest of the United States.

The timing of the Senate debate on SALT II is affected by the situation in Iran and the more recent developments in Afghanistan. We are now discussing that timing with the Senate leadership. We will continue those consultations before final decisions are made.

Q How is the timing affected?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I beg your pardon?

Q Could you tell us how the timing is affected?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I will be able to when we finish the consultations. I mean that is obviously what is being discussed. I am not trying to be cute about it.

Q Isn't it true that there was a decision made before today's meeting to delay that?

SALT

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Absolutely not. I am aware of that report which happened to be an incorrect report.

Q What you are really saying is the President is consulting on putting aside SALT for a while?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What I am saying is that the timing of the Treaty is affected and we are in the process of discussing it.

Q Regarding the consultations with other governments, will there be a personal effort as Christopher made with some governments? In other words, will you send someone else to talk to other countries?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't rule that out. There are no such missions planned at this point, so far as I am aware.

Q I know you say you can't discuss the decisions, but are any of them -- would you describe them as very basic decisions such as a trade embargo, I mean something against the Soviet Union that --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sam, I really haven't tried to come up with, frankly, with words to characterize. I would rather not do that off the top of my head.

Q People speculate on the grain deals.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I know that one of the inevitable consequences of this situation is to increase speculation. For the record, I would urge you to be cautious in that regard. The matter with which we are dealing is a serious matter. We have already characterized it publicly as a serious threat to peace. It is important that the actions taken by the United States, both unilaterally and in conjunction with other nations around the world who share our concern about this type of behavior on the part of the Soviet Union be taken after the most careful and thorough consideration, review, and consultation. That is the process upon which we are embarked and as soon as it is concluded we will make --

Q Is there any military action contemplated?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is not consideration of a military response at this point.

Q Do you want to eliminate any other possibilities, such as cutting of grain sales or are there any other things that you want to end speculation on now?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I really don't care to go beyond that.

MORE

GRAIN SALES

Q Are these decisions tentative or binding?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am not sure what you mean.

Q Is there a possibility that they could be changed later on in light of events, for instance if there were a withdrawal or partial withdrawal?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, obviously changes in -- basic changes in a situation would have to be taken into account, but --

Q But what?

Q Are these actions being taken in consideration or belief that there will be a change in the situation or are they taken in order to chastise the Soviet Union for what it has done?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the President has already made clear that he believes that -- and I might say that it is our analysis of the consultations with other nations that a large majority of them believe that the Soviet Union must expect serious consequences from their behavior.

OLYMPICS

Q Would boycotting the Olympics be serious enough?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I really don't want to get into what may or may not be a possibility.

Q Has there been any contact with Brezhnev since his reply and was Watson informed directly after the Council meeting?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Has there been any contact with the Soviet government since the President got the Brezhnev reply?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't know whether there has been contact. There has been no direct contact that I am aware of between the President and --

Q When was Watson informed?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He was informed this morning, I believe.

Q When you say no military action is contemplated, does that mean that the U.S. is not considering putting new bases in, say, Israel or Egypt?

Q Or any military movement?

Q What do you mean when you say "no military action"?

NO MILITARY ACTION

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I interpreted your question to be related to some direct military action against forces of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

Q That is the only thing you are ruling out?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q Has there been any evidence of any instability or unrest within the Moslem communities within the U.S.S.R.?

MORE

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am really not in a position to comment on that beyond what -- well, there have been off and on reports of attitudes of Moslems within the Soviet Union. The sensitivity of the government of the Soviet Union on that issue is well documented if by no other means by the extreme restrictions they place or attempt to place upon contact between those Moslems who live in the Soviet Union and other --

Q Is there any thought being given to asking Congress to come back earlier than planned?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am not aware of any necessity for that at this point.

Q Is there any report of any instability in Moscow? Are we sure that Brezhnev is in charge?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have seen nothing that would argue to the contrary.

Q When you say "consultations" is this a case of the President ordering that consultations be held to see what we do specifically in certain areas or has he actually made decisions and we are just telling people, for instance, on the U.N.?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is a combination of both. There are obviously steps which can be taken which would have their effect if taken unilaterally but which may have an increased impact if taken in conjunction with other nations. There are, as you know, in consultations that have taken place up to this point, I think particularly the ones in Europe attended by Deputy Secretary Christopher, they were just that consultative -- as a consultative series of meetings with, certainly, serious and high level representation but not meetings at which final decisions could be reached. So it is possible from such consultations to have an understanding of the basic views and inclinations of other governments, their level of concern.

I might say that it was -- I think I can say accurately it was and has been generally the view of the majority of the nations with whom we have consulted, and you might say those in Europe in particular that this particular action by the Soviet Union, specifically invasion, the largescale invasion of Afghanistan, is an action which goes beyond other actions that have been taken over the past several years, that is, a significant step beyond other actions, although however distasteful and so forth those actions may have been.

Q Is it the primary objective of U.S. policy at the moment to contain the damage that has been done by the invasion of Afghanistan and reassure other states or is it an objective to try to achieve the departure of Soviet troops from Afghanistan itself?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there is no way that I can predict what action the Soviets may or may not take in the future. I think the President has described, and I have followed his words reasonably closely, I think, in my comments upon the fact that the Soviet Union would have to expect their action to have consequences for their relationship with us and with the world community.

Obviously, steps have been taken, of which you already know, that deal with the question of the impact upon other nations in the region and the concerns that they may have about their security. That is obviously a rather complicated business and we are proceeding on it. I think, without delay but with an appropriate appreciation of its complicated nature.

Q How long did the National Security Council meet?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: For about 2-1/2 hours.

Q Did any of the decisions that were reached today involve a change in the instructions that Secretary Brown might have on his trip to Peking later this month?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am not prepared to go into that.

Q Was that discussed in any -- that is, was the Peking --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think, as you know, the private instructions which someone might carry on a mission like that are not a fit topic for discussion even on background.

Q Well how about Bill Brock's comments yesterday and today? Any comment on those?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I will remind you that this portion of the briefing is on background, as I stated earlier. If you would like an on-the-record comment about that I will do so when the -- as the final on-the-record item.

Q Have you decided on a specific course at the U.N. or are we just discussing with the other nations what to do at the U.N.?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would just rather not get -- I don't see how I can do that. I wish I had sort of explored that a little bit.

Q Did you say you were going to the U.N.?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. As I said, I didn't -- and as I was about to say, I don't see how I can get into that without getting into the sort of options that are before us.

Q Traditionally and historically the recall of an ambassador for consultations has been a euphemism for, if not a reprimand, something even more severe, like breaking off diplomatic relations. Is this literally just for consultations or is this part of a --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think, as you point out, traditionally and historically, there is a precedent for recalling an ambassador for consultations and it means what it has meant. As I have said, it is, I think, obviously in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Q Has the hotline been used today?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not that I know of.

Q Will the President himself report to the nation in some form on this?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am really not prepared to get into by what means we will make the President's decisions known to you at this time.

Q Will you have any more statements to make this evening?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I do not. It would be my hope



to give you a lid as soon as this is completed.

Q What about on-the-record?

Q When the word begins to leak all over town will you be available?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I do not intend to cut my phone lines and lock myself in a broom closet.

Q Will the Brock thing be on camera or not on camera?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I see no need to raise it to that level.

Q What is the official population of Moslems within the Soviet Union?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it is something like 50 million. The encyclopedia is probably a better reference than I on that.

Q How many decisions did he make?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Several.

Q Before we go on the record, could you kind of give us a bottom line? Do these decisions go beyond the symbolic and the verbal? In other words, is it something more than just U.N. actions or recalling the ambassador?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would say yes.

Q Will the decisions, for example, the one or several ones that may become known as early as tomorrow, will they be announced or will they just come out?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I really haven't, frankly, had time to deal with that question.

Q Do they go beyond the President's vow never to impose a grain embargo?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am just not going to comment on options.

Q This ascendancy by military hardline factions in the Soviet Union seems to be a pretty predictable result of the policies that this Administration has taken for some time --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I was waiting for your explanation, Laura. Thank you.

Q I can give it to you in depth because it just -- excuse me. I was interrupted. I am not going to give it now, okay? But it does --

Q Let's do the Brock on the record. That is very quick, isn't it?

MORE

MR. POWELL: I really don't think there is any useful purpose to be served by the President and the White House becoming involved in what is clearly an effort to engage in an election year political debate over a matter of serious national concern. And we will attempt to restrain ourselves from so doing so long as it is possible to do so.

Q That is on the record, is it?

MR. POWELL: Yes.

Q Oh.

Q You might as well put it off the record.

MR. POWELL: I figure I may have raised expectations a little bit but I didn't have much time. Just think how disappointed Bill is going to be.

Q Thank you.

END

(AT 5:33 P.M. EST)


OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

Memo No. 1597-79

December 31, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift   
SUBJECT: Foreign Policy/Defense Qs & As

I have updated the questions and answers and important background material on key foreign policy Qs & As as follows:\*

- President's December 28 statement on Iran & Afgahnistan
- Zbig's December 30 interview

1. Afghanistan
2. Aid to Afghan Insurgents
3. U.S. Commitment to Pakistan
4. Aid REstrictions to Pakistan
5. Soviet Role in Afghanistan
6. U.S. Knowledge of Soviet Buildup
7. Effectiveness of President's Foreign Policy
8. President's Foreign Policy - US-USSR Relations
9. Impact on SALT
10. Impact on Iranian Crisis
11. Iran - U.N.S.C. Vote
12. U.S. Policy of Restraint toward Iran

-- Updated State Qs & As as of December 31 on Afghanistan Iran, Pakistan, USSR, Latin America, Asia and Africa.

\* No Qs & As were prepared for Zbig's TV appearance and there has been one recent update of the President's Qs & As (for the now cancelled Iowa debate) which is in the black briefing book.





## OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT

The Briefing Room

(AT 4:30 P.M. EST)

THE PRESIDENT: Secretary of State Vance will proceed to the United Nations tomorrow to press the world's case against Iran, in order to obtain the speediest possible release of American hostages, in accordance with the demands which have already been made earlier by the United Nations Security Council and the International Court of Justice.

IRA  
The United States reserves the right to protect our citizens and our vital interest in whatever way we consider appropriate in keeping with principles of international law and the charter of the United Nations. But our clear preference is now, and has been from the beginning of this crisis, for a quick and a peaceful solution of this problem through concerted international action. We must never lose sight of our basic goals in this crisis: the safety of our fellow citizens, and the protection of the long-term interests of the United States.

A thoughtful and determined policy which makes clear that Iran will continue to pay an increasingly higher price for the illegal detention of our people is the best policy to achieve those goals, and it is the policy that I will continue to pursue.

A. AFGHANISTAN  
Another serious development which has caused increased concern about peace and stability in the same region of the world is the recent Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, which has now resulted in the overthrow of the established government and the execution of the President of that country. Such gross interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan is in blatant violation of accepted international rules of behavior. This is the third occasion since World War Two that the Soviet Union has moved militarily to assert control over one of its neighbors. And this is the first such venture into a Moslem country by the Soviet Union since the Soviet occupation of Iranian Azerbaijan in the 1940s. The Soviet action is a major matter of concern to the entire international community.

MORE

AFGHANISTAN

Soviet efforts to justify this action on the basis of the United Nations charter are a perversion of the United Nations that should be rejected immediately by all of its members. I have discussed this serious matter personally today with several other heads of government, all of whom agree that the Soviet action is a grave threat to peace. I will be sending the Deputy Secretary of State to Europe this weekend to meet with representatives of several other nations to discuss how the world community might respond to the unwarranted Soviet behavior.

Soviet military action beyond its own borders gives rise to the most fundamental questions pertaining to international stability, and such close and extensive consultation between ourselves and with our allies are urgently needed. Thank you very much.

Q Mr. President, do we have the votes in the U.N. Security Council, and do we have the Russian promise they won't veto our resolution?

THE PRESIDENT: I expect we will have adequate support in the United Nations Security Council for our position.

Q Have you gotten in touch with Brezhnev?

THE PRESIDENT: I have sent him a message.

Q Does he understand it?

END

(AT 4:35 P.M. EST)

RAN/U.N./U.S.S.R

PLEASE CREDIT ANY QUOTES OR EXCERPTS FROM THIS ABC NEWS RADIO  
AND TELEVISION PROGRAM TO "ABC NEWS' ISSUES AND ANSWERS"

I S S U E S   A N D   A N S W E R S

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 30, 1979

GUEST:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI - Assistant to the President  
National Security Affairs

INTERVIEWED BY:

Bob Clark - ISSUES AND ANSWERS Chief Correspondent  
Ted Koppel - ABC News Diplomatic Correspondent

- - -

MR. VICE PRESIDENT - Qs&As as Follow

1. Afghanistan
2. Aid to Afghan Insurgents
3. U.S. Commitment to Pakistan
4. Aid Restrictions to Pakistan
5. Soviet Role in Afghanistan
6. U.S. Knowledge of Soviet Buildup
7. Effectiveness of President's Foreign Policy
8. President's Foreign Policy - US-USSR Relations
9. Impact on SALT
10. Impact on Iranian Crisis
11. Iran - U.N.S.C. Vote
12. U.S. Policy of Restraint toward Iran

MR. CLARK: The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan has, for the moment, overshadowed events in Iran. President Carter used the hot line to Moscow yesterday to urge the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops. How seriously do you view the situation in Afghanistan, and do you see any signs that Soviet leaders will heed the President's appeal?

①  
AFGHANISTAN  
MR. BRZEZINSKI: I cannot predict the future course of Soviet behavior. However, I can say we view the development in Afghanistan as a very serious one. It is a qualitative, new step involving direct invasion of a country outside the Warsaw Pact through the use of Soviet armed forces. This invasion which has been undertaken not only through an airlift but in the last few hours has assumed large proportions through the crossing of the frontier by Soviet ground forces, constitutes a serious problem for the international community. It is an attempt to impose Soviet will on an independent foreign country.

MR. CLARK: President Carter has warned of serious consequences to American-Soviet relations if the invasion continues. What might those consequences be?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I cannot at this moment indicate what might transpire as a consequence of this Soviet action. We are engaged in consultations with our principal allies and the Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of State Christopher is now on his way to London, and he will consult with our principal friends. We are also in touch with other governments.

We have been in touch with our Japanese friends. We have been in contact with the Chinese. We are in touch with many countries that are Islamic in character, for this is a matter of very great import, particularly to Islamic countries. It is an attempt by the Soviet Union to impose its will on an independent Moslem country. We will be guided by not only the international reaction in the course of action that we will pursue, but also by the conclusions that we reach in the next several days, and the President is engaged in a very careful study and scrutiny of this issue.

MR. KOPPEL: Dr. Brzezinski, you spoke a moment ago of border crossings within the last few hours. What are you talking about?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: We are talking about the increasing evidence that large Soviet formations have crossed the Afghanistan border from Kushka and have moved into Herat. These involve armored formations, a large number of heavy tanks, the most modern Soviet tanks, Soviet armored personnel carriers, motorized infantry, and so forth. Similarly, Soviet forces have moved from Termez across the Afghanistan frontier and are on their way to Kurghan and Kabul. We are, in effect, observing large-scale aggression.

MR. KOPPEL: How large?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Several tens of thousands of men. We don't know how many yet. As of yesterday, our estimate was between twenty and twenty-five thousand Soviet forces are involved.

AFGHANISTAN

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It is likely the numbers are now larger.

MR. KOPPEL: Why should this be a matter of any concern to the United States?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: This is a matter of concern to the international community as a whole and not just the United States.

MR. KOPPEL: The United States particularly?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: First of all, we must emphasize this is of concern to the international community as a whole. The naked use of military force to impose one's political will on a sovereign country and a sovereign government, including the physical liquidation of that government, is a matter of concern to the international community.

Secondly, it is of concern to the United States. The United States has certain interests in that part of the world which cannot be unaffected. The United States has certain commitments to that part of the world by which it will stand. It is, accordingly, a matter of concern to us.

MR. CLARK: You say we have been in touch with other Muslim countries, the Muslim rebels who have been fighting the government in Afghanistan have appealed to Muslims everywhere to join them in their efforts to stop the Russians.

Are we considering any military response such as military aid of some sort to the rebel forces?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I cannot be very specific at this stage as to what would be done tangibly; but we are concerned. We

AFGHANISTAN

AD TO  
INSURGENTS

①

②



are in the meantime, in any case, reaffirming the commitment that we have made years ago to Pakistan. The President spoke with the president of Pakistan, and in the last several weeks we have reaffirmed to the government of Pakistan the commitment that we have made previously regarding the security of that country. It is an important commitment, and the United States will stand by it.

I have been authorized to reaffirm that, and it states as follows: "In case of aggression against Pakistan, the Government of the United States, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed force as may be mutually agreed and is envisaged in the Joint Resolution, to protect peace and stability in the Middle East." In order to assist the government of Pakistan at its request.

Now, I repeat: This is in keeping with our constitutional procedures. We would, of course, consult very carefully with Congressional leadership; but we want it to be understood that the United States stands by its commitments and its friends should be sure of that, and any potential adversaries should have no illusion about it.

MR. CLARK: Well, of course, we cut off all military and economic aid to Pakistan earlier this year in a dispute over their insisting on proceeding to build their own nuclear bomb. What do you do about that? Do you now forget about that

3 U.S. COMMITMENT TO PAKISTAN

4 AID RESTRICTIONS TO PAKISTAN



and say, "We will reinforce you with arms"? And you also talked about military aid beyond that. Can you conceive of the United States sending military forces to the aid of Pakistan?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I have stated what the commitment involves. We believe that it is very important for all concerned to realize that the security of the independent countries in the region is not a matter of indifference to us, nor is it a matter of indifference to the international community.

The only way to preserve peace is for all concerned to understand that there are certain explicit limits to unilateral action, that these limits must be respected. The President has indicated already, yesterday, in his discussion with newspapermen, that we are reviewing the nature of our on-going obligations toward Pakistan, with the view in mind of expediting certain forms of military assistance.

MR. CLARK: Pardon me, but isn't there a technical legislative problem here, that the military aid to Pakistan was cut off by Act of Congress?

How can you renew that aid?

I know there is some loophole, where you might do it by cash sales of military aid.

Is that what you are talking about?

(4)  
AD RESTRICTIONS TO PAKISTAN

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Cash sales would be one formula, but we will be consulting to see what is necessary in light of these circumstances. Again, since we are dealing with developments which have transpired only in the course of the last forty-two or seventy-two hours, I cannot be more precise than that, but I do want to indicate that the United States, together with the rest of the international community, takes a serious view of this development and believes that it is important for all concerned to understand that the unilateral use of force is something which is of concern to the world as a whole.

MR. KOPPEL: I would like to tidy up a couple loose ends before I get to the question I really want to ask, but you spoke a moment ago about the liquidation of the government in Afghanistan, and you implied at least that the Soviets were behind that. Is that what you meant?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: We do know that the president of the government which earlier was closely collaborating with the Soviet Union and presumably acquiesced at least to the initial entry of Soviet military personnel into Kabul not only was overthrown but was killed. In addition to that, there are some reports indicating that some members of the late president's family were liquidated with him as well and perhaps some other members of his cabinet. Whether the Soviets were directly or indirectly involved, I do not know, but certain of the events which led to the execution of the president were precipitated

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5 — SOVIET ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN

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Soviet  
Raid

by the degree of Soviet forces into Kabul and the installation in power of a puppet brought directly by these forces from the Soviet Union.

MR. KOPPEL: Now, secondly, you spoke a moment ago about these events only having transpired within the past forty-eight hours or so. We broadcast a report some three weeks ago based upon intelligence sources that the Soviets, at that time, had the advance elements of a mechanized division moving into Afghanistan. Surely this same material was available to you.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, we have known for quite some time that Soviet forces in limited numbers were present in Afghanistan. This is not news.

MR. KOPPEL: I am speaking about the buildup of at least one, probably two Soviet divisions, a buildup that has been taking place on the border.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Oh, yes. We knew about the build-up, absolutely. We have known about that.

MR. KOPPEL: This is not as recent an event as you were suggesting with the forty-eight hours. You have had some time to consider the implications of this.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I am talking about the actual introduction of Soviet forces into Afghanistan and installation of the new government. These are new events, and one has to react to them in the light of what has transpired.

MR. KOPPEL: Soviet combat forces have been in there now

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U.S. Knowledge of Soviet Buildup

for the better part of three weeks.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Yes. We have been aware of that, and we have been considering that very carefully, but you have to take into account the specifics of the situation. The fact that not only were these forces brought in, but that these forces were then used to install a new government is an altogether new situation, one which one could not have anticipated in the precise form.

MR. KOPPEL: The question I wanted to ask is, the United States has been expressing grave concern about a number of international events over the past two years in Ethiopia, in Yemen, in Cambodia, in Iran, now in Afghanistan, but it hasn't done anything other than express concern and some parties in the world might come to the conclusion that, in fact, all the United States does any more is express serious concern. Would that be accurate?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: It would be completely inaccurate. The President, I believe, has done more in the last three years to improve the geostrategic position of the United States than has been done in the preceding eight and perhaps even the preceding fifteen. Just let me review it briefly. The President has greatly improved the capabilities of NATO and has stimulated collective NATO efforts to give NATO more punch and more resilience.

On the ground and in the last few weeks through its collective decision to acquire theater nuclear forces. We also have a long-term NATO development program which we never had before. The President has done more for our national defense than has been done for years. A bigger defense budget, the MX, the air-launched cruise missiles, the rapid deployment forces. The

⑥  
U.S. KNOWLEDGE OF  
SOVIET BUILD-UP  
SECURITY POLICY  
EFFECTIVENESS OF PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN POLICY

The President has greatly improved the strategic position of the United States by normalizing and expanding the relationship with China.

The President is now exploring ways of enhancing a broader security framework for the Middle East. These are all serious, continuing, sustained efforts which are based on the premise, the realistic premise, that we both have to compete and to cooperate with the Soviet Union. These events, as those for example, of today in Afghanistan, are not a sudden break from a longer-term historical pattern; they do represent a qualitatively new step to which we collectively have to respond. But we have not just been talking; we have been doing a great deal over the last three years.

---Announcements---

MR. KOPPEL: Dr. Brzezinski, you spoke very forcefully a moment ago of all the steps that this Administration has taken to strengthen its strategic position in the world, but I am compelled to point out that most of those steps are steps that have yet to be realized and that may in some cases be two, three or more years off.

I repeat my initial question to you, and that is: How has the United States responded, other than tough rhetoric, to Soviet troops in Cuba, Cuban troops in Ethiopia, East German and Cuban forces in Yemen, and now this massive assault into Afghanistan, other than rhetoric?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Let me, first of all, point out we live at a time in which the United States has a vital interest in

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the independence of interrelated, central, strategic zones -- Western Europe, the Far East and the Middle East. This is a new strategic reality. What I have described involves the President's efforts to make it more possible for the United States to assert that vital interest. These are not just words.

We now have forces in the Indian Ocean which we didn't used to have. We now have a relationship with the Chinese, which we didn't have. We now have a defense budget which we didn't have before. We now have collective efforts by NATO underway, which we didn't have before.

We are developing weapons which would be deployed in the early '80s. These are tangible actions for the long haul.

What you have to realize, and what the country has to realize, is that the American-Soviet relationship will remain a mixed and complex one for many years to come. We have to cooperate where we can. For example, in strategic arms limitations. But we have to compete over the longer haul and not get mesmerized by specific events and one day conclude that detente is in full bloom because we have agreement and the next day have scare headlines as we saw them today in some newspapers that detente is completely dead.

A competitive, cooperative relationship will be with us for many years to come. We have to be willing to compete toughly, assertively, forcefully, but also realistically, and we have to be prepared to enhance the operative aspects of the

8 FOREIGN POLICY - USSR RELATIONS  
PRESIDENT'S



relationship when there are opportunities; and this is what the President has been doing.

MR. CLARK: Dr. Brzezinski, if I may, you have painted an extremely grave picture of what is happening in Pakistan and implied that we might even be eyeball to eyeball with the Russians in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Now, you say we have to go on cooperating with them in other ways, such as SALT. Many Americans and certainly I think most Members of Congress now would say that is a completely unrealistic view, that SALT is dead if the Russians are going to behave as they have in Afghanistan.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, first of all, I don't accept your characterization, that we may be eyeball to eyeball. It seems to me that international stability is derived from credibility and clarity, and we want it understood that the American commitment is clear and credible, and if it is understood, then there will be no eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation.

So, let's, first of all, not overdramatize. What is needed is steady, purposeful, determined commitment; and this President and this government and this country are prepared to project it.

Secondly, yes, to the extent that we can, we should continue to enhance those aspects of the American-Soviet relationship that lend themselves to a cooperative arrangement.

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IMPACT OF DEVELOPMENTS ON SALT

SALT is not a favor to the Soviet Union. SALT is not a Soviet favor to the United States. SALT is a strategic accommodation in the most dynamic aspect of the relationship, and if that relationship was even worse than it is today or has been at some time in the past, or could be again in the future, we would need SALT even more then, because SALT introduces strategic stability which both sides need. So I think we should get it out of our heads, we should get the notion out of our heads, that SALT is somehow a favor to be pulled up and down like a yo-yo. It is an accommodation that happens to be in our interest, that is in the Soviet interest, and should be pursued if it can be pursued, whether there are Soviet troops in Kabul or whether Soviet troops are marching back to Tashkent.

MR. CLARK: We have gone too long without mentioning Iran. How would you relate what has happened in Afghanistan to the problem of getting the American hostages released in Iran? Will it help or hurt those prospects?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I cannot predict what is going to help or hurt, but I should think every sober-headed Iranian, even the most anti-American ones, ought to ask themselves, what do the events in Kabul portend for Tehran. There have been Soviet troops in Tehran before. Tehran could be next. I think every Iranian should remember that the independence of Iran, its national integrity, its territorial integrity, were assured over the last 35 years by friendship with the United States.

9 IMPACT ON SALT

10 IMPACT ON IRANIAN CRISIS



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IMPACT ON IRAN

Today, as a consequence of the irresponsible and illegal actions undertaken by some people in Tehran, Iran finds itself isolated internationally, surrounded either by foes or by countries in the deepest of turbulence. This is not a good position for Iran to be in. This is why it is very much in Iran's interest and in the region's own interest that the hostages be promptly released, and that Iran's security be promoted by stable relationships with those who are prepared to be Iran's friends.

MR. KOPPEL: Dr. Brzezinski, why was the United States not able to get a favorable vote, nine votes, in the Security Council for sanction?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I think it is inaccurate to say that the United States has been unable. Deliberations are now in progress. I think there is every reason to believe that there will be a two-stage process deliberately designed to enhance international support and to give the Iranians the opportunity to accommodate themselves to what is clearly the overwhelming will of the international community.

MR. KOPPEL: Wasn't it deliberately designed in two stages because you were unable to get the nine votes?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: No. We considered alternatives. We could have forced the issue to a head, but we felt that this imbalance is much better both in terms of the impact on the Iranians and in terms of broader support of the international

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UNSC VOTE  
IRAN

community as a whole.

MR. KOPPEL: Why is it better, Dr. Brzezinski, after 57 days, why is it necessary for the United States to still demonstrate to the world that it is showing patience, that it is ready to wait for another two weeks, that it is ready to send Kurt Waldheim, possibly two weeks from now you will want to send somebody else? Wouldn't it have been just as good if you had been able to get those nine votes, to get that vote on the record, then, if you chose, say, "Fine. Now let's wait two weeks before implementing it."

MR. BRZEZINSKI: It was the view of the people directly concerned with the negotiating process that this arrangement gives all parties concerned the needed pause for reflecting, for anticipating what will happen, and for taking the needed corrective measures.

MR. KOPPEL: You don't think there has been enough time for reflection? Fifty-seven days is not enough time?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I am not going to justify the position taken by the Iranian authorities, which is illegal and improper but you have to take into account the fact that you are dealing with a revolutionary situation in Tehran, in which there is no central government, in which there is continuous turmoil, personal uncertainty, continuous switches in positions of authority, and hence you are not dealing with a normal, rational negotiating situation.

U.S. Policy of Restraint Toward Iran



MR. CLARK: Iranian Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh said several times this week if we go forward with our efforts to get U.N. economic sanctions, the hostages will be put on trial as spies, there will be no negotiation of any sort.

Is that going to affect our effort to proceed to try to get sanctions?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Our position on that was articulated on November 20. It is clear. It is unambiguous, and it stands.

MR. KOPPEL: Is there another time, Dr. Brzezinski, at which the greater interest of the United States as a whole has to be put above even the interests of 50 American citizens?

IRAN'S POSITION ON  
HOSTAGES

U.S. POLICY  
TOWARD IRAN

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MR. BRZEZINSKI: I believe the two are related very closely. I don't think you can separate the wider American interest entirely from the fate of the hostages, but the President, in his statements as recent as yesterday, has made it very clear that he is deeply conscious not only of his own personal and moral obligation, to safeguard the lives of fifty fellow countrymen, but also he has a wider, broader, longer-range historical obligation to protect the vital interests of the United States in that part of the world. And we intend to protect both, and I can assure you that we have the means deployed to protect both.

MR. KOPPEL: If I might just follow that up for a moment. In placing this great an emphasis on the lives of these fifty hostages, and recognizing that one has to at times separate the human approach from the approach of an administration, haven't you made it inevitable that this kind of thing is going to happen again, that the United States can be held impotent for fifty-seven days because of fifty lives? What would happen if this happens in some other country, then?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I don't believe you can generalize from a specific situation of this sort. First of all, there are very peculiar political circumstances in Tehran which make a clear-cut immediate response more difficult. Secondly, there are geopolitical considerations to be taken into account. Not every country is located the way Iran is located. There are

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U.S. POLICY

also wider strategic implications, not to be ignored. For example, the fact that increasingly the Moslem world is becoming aware that the real, direct, physical threat to the Moslem world's religious and political self-expression comes not from the United States but from the Soviet Union.

MR. CLARK: But there have also been warnings from leaders of the Moslem world if we took military action of any sort it would be very counterproductive to our interests, that you would see just waves of anti-Americanism sweeping through the Moslem world. Is that tying our hands at this stage?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I don't believe it is ~~tying~~ our hands. I don't believe we can entirely ignore that factor, though most Moslem countries also have a stake in respect for international obligations and traditions.

MR. CLARK: And Iran's Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh said yesterday that he is prepared to meet with Curt Waldheim, but the students holding the hostages say they will not meet with him under any circumstances.

Doesn't that sort of get us back to square one again?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I don't think it gets us back to square one, but it does underline the proposition I stated earlier, that we are dealing with an extraordinarily volatile and complex situation in Tehran which doesn't permit us to resolve this issue as rapidly as we would normally wish.

In addition, we now have to take into account the wider

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strategic context of the problem, by which I mean the injection of Soviet forces into Afghanistan.

MR. CLARK: Sorry, we are out of time.

Thank you very much, Dr. Brzezinski, for being with us on ISSUES AND ANSWERS.

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