

SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

- Q. Do you have anything on fighting in the provinces in Afghanistan?
- A. -- We have a number of reports which cannot be verified of fighting between Soviet and Afghan troops and insurgent forces.
- I stress the fact that we cannot confirm any of these reports so far and hence I am unable to give you any specifics.
- We understand that residents still hear occasional firing at night in Kabul itself and there are reports of incidents in other major cities of Afghanistan as well as in the countryside.
- Q. What is your latest figure on Soviet troops in Afghanistan? Are troops still coming in?
- A. -- I have nothing beyond the 30,000 to 40,000 Soviet troops we estimated a few days ago. We do have the impression that far more Soviet troops have reached the Kabul area and are moving into other key cities.
- Q. Is mobilization continuing north of the border?
- A. -- There are indications of additional troop movements in the Soviet Union but we do not know whether or when these forces will be deployed into Afghanistan.

Q. Does the U.S. Government recognize this regime?

A. -- At this time, we are reviewing the question of our future relationship with this regime.

Q. Do you have anything more on how the Soviets pulled off this coup?

A. -- As you know, the new president, Babrak Karmal, lived in exile for over fifteen months in Eastern Europe after he was dismissed as Afghan Ambassador to Prague. We do not know precisely his whereabouts during that intervening time, but clearly he ~~enjoyed~~ *received* Soviet or Soviet-sponsored protection.

-- One additional item which has come to my attention has to do with several of the top figures in the new regime.

-- Four of the figures in the new government are former Secret Police Chief Asadullah Sarwari and three military officers who served in the Taraki government (Lt. Col. Mohammed Aslam Watanjar, Lt. Col. Sherjan Mazdooryar, and Sayed Mohammed Gulabzoi). They had disappeared after the September 14 coup in which Amin toppled Taraki. The Amin regime claimed that at least some of these officers took refuge in the Soviet Embassy in Kabul at the time of the September shootout. This assertion appears to have been true.

-- I suggest that this information raises additional questions about the Soviet Union's role in planning

executing the overthrow of former President Amin. I would also add that there is still no evidence of collaboration between Afghan and Soviet military forces in the coup. On the contrary, there are eyewitness reports of resistance by Afghan forces to attacking Soviet troops.

NEA/PAB:RLorton

P:DNewsom
NEA:JCoon
S/MS:MShulman
NEA/PAB:RPeck
NEA/P:JTuohey
INR/RNA:E.vanHollen

January 2, 1980

SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN - *CHARGES IN SOVIET PRESS*

Q. Do you have any comment on Soviet charges made in Pravda and Izvestiya that the U.S. has plotted to acquire bases in Afghanistan and has been involved in arming and training Afghan rebels?

A. -- These accusations are ~~completely false~~ ^{simply}. They are

~~also~~ a crude ruse designed to cover up a Soviet invasion of a sovereign and independent country after overthrowing its established government.

-- They underscore that Moscow has misrepresented the nature of the Afghan civil war from the very beginning. In fact the struggle in Afghanistan is an indigenous and self-sustaining uprising of the deeply religious and fiercely independent Afghan people who do not want an alien ideology imposed upon them through brute military force.

-- I trust the rest of the world will see through this Soviet veil of prevarication which is designed to obscure the basic fact of Soviet imperialist behavior.


NEA/PAB:RDLorton

P:DDNewsom
NEA:JACoon
EUR/SOV:RPerito
S/MS:MShulman
NEA/P:JTuohey
EUR:RBarry

AFGHANISTAN

Q: Do you have anything further on the Afghan request for assistance which the Soviets say they are responding to?

A: Official Soviet statements about this request for assistance say only that it came from "the leadership of the Afghan state". Other Soviet statements suggest that the request came from the government which was installed shortly after the massive Soviet airlift into Afghanistan began. Since this government was installed exclusively by the action of the Soviet armed forces, we cannot take seriously the contention that this was a genuine Afghan request for Soviet intervention.



ACTION
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INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 USNATO 08969 291657Z
ACTION EURE-12

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INFO OCT-01 NEA-06 IO-14 ADS-00 SMS-01 CIAE-00 PM-05
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C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 08969

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT-TENTATIVE DATE OF NAC MTG)

E. O. 12065: RDS-1 12/29/89 (LEGERE, LAURENCE J.) OR-P
TAGS: NATO, NAC, AF
SUBJECT: (U) NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (NAC) MEETS ON
AFGHANISTAN

REF: STATE 333528 (DTG 290033Z DEC 79) (NOTAL)

1. (C) NAC, AT US REQUEST (REFTEL), MET FROM 1100 TO 1215 SATURDAY, DECEMBER 29 ON AFGHANISTAN. SYG LUNS WAS IN CHAIR. IN ADDITION TO THE US, WHICH LUNS INVITED TO LEAD OFF, BELGIUM, CANADA, FRANCE, FRG, ITALY, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, TURKEY, AND THE UK ALL INTERVENED DURING A VERY ACTIVE DISCUSSION. CHARGE'S TALKING POINTS DREW EXTENSIVELY ON GUIDANCE PROVIDED IN REFTEL. BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS AND ITALY EMPHASIZED POSSIBILITIES FOR UN ACTION. TURKEY STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF PROFOUND ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREA IN AND AROUND AFGHANISTAN, WHILE UNDERLINING THIS AS "ONE OF THE WORLD'S MOST URGENT REGIONS." LUNS STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED CONSULTATION ON AFGHAN DEVELOPMENTS AND EXPRESSED FULL APPRECIATION FOR THE US PRESENTATION. LUNS TENTATIVELY SET NEXT MEETING OF NAC ON AFGHANISTAN FOR 1500 JANUARY 4, PROVIDED THERE WAS NOT A REQUIREMENT FOR ONE EARLIER. THERE WAS CONSENSUS ON THE PRESS STATEMENT BY LUNS WHICH IS IN THE NEXT PARAGRAPH. A FULL REPORT OF THE DECEMBER 29 NAC FOLLOWS BY SEPTTEL.

2. (U) STATEMENT ISSUED DECEMBER 29, 1979, BY SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS FOLLOWING NAC: BEGIN TEXT.

- THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MET IN SPECIAL SESSION DECEMBER 29 TO DISCUSS THE RECENT SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN. THE COUNCIL WILL CONTINUE ITS CLOSE AND EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT.

- SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS EXPRESSED HIS STRONG CONCERN OVER THE SOVIET ACTION WHICH HE SAID REPRESENTS GROSS INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN AND IS A MATTER OF MAJOR CONCERN TO THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

- HE NOTED THAT SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY ITS ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN ON THE BASIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER ARE A PERVERSION OF THE UN'S PRINCIPLES AND SHOULD BE CONDEMNED BY ALL ITS MEMBERS. END TEXT. LEGERE

CONFIDENTIAL

25-17 3
~~Statement to be made at noon briefing~~ December 26, 1979

STATE/DEFENSE MISSION TO SAUDI ARABIA/E. AFRICA

Q. What about the Bartholomew Murray trip?

IF Asked only

A. Because of some speculative stories which have appeared in the press, I wish to clarify the purpose and results of the recent trip to certain Arabian Peninsula and East African countries by a team headed by Mr. Bartholomew of this Department and Mr. Murray of the Defense Department. The team, which visited Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kenya and Somalia, returned to Washington on December 23. As I stated here earlier, the purpose of these visits was to discuss with those governments the general security situation in the region and to look at the possibility of modest, near-term increases in access to existing facilities in the region, outside Saudi Arabia, to support our force presence. Examples of such support are port calls and the use of airfields to allow logistical support flights. The team's talks were exploratory. ~~no agreements were negotiated or signed.~~ The team is now preparing its report.

* Q. Were any agreements signed?


A. No

Drafted: G. Bayer
Reviewed: PM R. Bartholomew

Approved: AF

WEEK-END CONTINGENCY GUIDANCE

- Q. Does the United States have any intention to accept President Sadat's offer--as reported in October Magazine--to let U.S. forces use bases in Egypt to support military action elsewhere in the area?
- A. We have no comment at this time. We have seen only press reports so far of what President Sadat was alleged to have said.


Drafted:MDraper:th
12/29/79

Q. Does the U.S. have a military training program with the Afghan Government.

A. No

OK. ~~just~~ TR

BACKGROUND ONLY

BABRAK, Karmal

Babrak Karmal became Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Council (RC) and Vice Prime Minister three days after the 27 April 1978 coup that ousted President Mohammad Daoud. He was Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Khalq (People) Party at the time of the coup and presumably holds the same position in the new People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. As Vice Chairman and Vice Prime Minister, he ~~was~~ ^{was} second only to President, RC Chairman and Prime Minister Nur Mohammad Taraki in importance in the party and the government.

In June of 1978 he was appointed Ambassador to Prague following a split in the PDPA which saw all of the prominent Parchamists being sent out of the country as Ambassadors. In September 1978 he was dismissed from that post and remained in Eastern Europe.

After the People's Democratic Party split in 1967, Babrak headed the Parcham (Banner) faction, and Taraki led the Khalq faction. When the factions reunited in 1977 under the Khalq designation, Babrak apparently agreed to take second place by accepting Taraki as party head.

Babrak Karmal was born in 1929 in Kanary to a prominent Pushtun family that may have been related to the late President Daoud. His father is Lt. Gen. (ret.) Mohammad Hussein Khan, who was Governor General of Paktia Province for an unknown length of time until he was removed in 1975. Babrak graduated from the German-language Nejat High School in Kabul in 1948 and entered the Faculty of Law of Kabul University in 1949. He completed his studies and graduated in 1957. During 1957-58 he served in the army, and from 1958 to 1965 he was a minor official in the Ministry of Planning.

Babrak ran for a seat in the Wolesi Jirgah (lower house of Parliament) in September 1965 and won. He was reelected to the Wolesi Jirgah in September 1969.

In March 1973 he led what may have been the largest demonstration in the history of Afghanistan to protest the Iran-Afghanistan agreement over sharing waters of the Helmand River, which he felt favored Iran. His career as a Deputy ended when Parliament was dissolved following the 1973 coup that brought Mohammad Daoud to power.

WALDHEIM MISSION TO IRAN

- Q. What can you tell us about Secretary General Waldheim's mission in Iran? The Iranians seem to be curtailing his schedule because of alleged security problems, and it is still not clear with whom he will meet apart from Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh.
- A. -- I have seen the same press reports you have seen, and I am not going to comment on the Secretary General's mission on the basis of any such day-by-day accounts.
- The December 31 Security Council resolution requests the Secretary General to report to the Security Council on his good office efforts before the Council meets again -- that is, before January 7. Obviously, we will be very interested in that report. Beyond that I have no comment except to repeat our hope that his efforts are successful.

Drafted:
NEA/P - JTuohey

Clearance:
NEA - ~~Mrs. Coon~~ PConstable
IO/PMS - NHartley
NEA/P - GFSherman

NEA PRESS GUIDANCE

January 2, 1980

IRAN

Q. What can you tell us about the Waldheim mission by way of an update?

A.--As I said before, this is not the proper forum for questions on the Secretary-General's plans or activities. I suggest you ask the United Nations.

--We ~~██████~~ hope that the Secretary-General's efforts to obtain the release of the hostages will meet with success. I cannot go beyond that.

NEA/P: WGRamsesy ^{WR}

CLEARANCES:

IWG: HPrecht ^{WR}
NEA: PConstable

NEA PRESS GUIDANCE

January 2, 1980

IRAN

Q. Any comments on Republican national chairman Bill Brock's attack on President Carter's policies?

A. --It is essential that we maintain our national unity on the hostage issue. No one wants to jeopardize or delay the release of the hostages. I hope that all Americans will stand together behind the President until we have resolved the issue of the hostages. When the hostages are free then there will be plenty of time for debate.

NEA/P: WGRamsey ^{WR}

CLEARANCES:

IWG: ^{WR}HPrecht

NEA: PConstable

JAPAN -- PURCHASES OF IRANIAN OIL

REVISED
CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE
TO BE USED ON "IF ASKED" BASIS

Q: There are press reports that Japanese companies are again signing major contracts for purchase of Iranian oil. Did they inform us of that? Did we object?

A: The Japanese Government has been in close touch with us in recent weeks about oil purchases, both from Iran and in general, and has been very cooperative. We are satisfied that the Japanese have been behaving in a responsible manner and we have been informed that, as pledged earlier, total Japanese imports of Iranian oil will not exceed the levels existing before the American hostages were seized.

Draft:EA/J:ADRomberg/EB:EJohnston
Clearances: E:RCooper
EA:RWSullivan
EUR/NE:WDamern
EB/FSE:Grosen
IWG:HPrecht

12/31/79

NEA PRESS GUIDANCE

December 31, 1979

STATEMENTS BY HOSTAGES ON TV FILM OF CLERGYMEN'S VISIT

Q. What is your reaction to the statements made by some of the hostages during the Iranian TV filming of the clergymen's Christmas visit to the Embassy in Iran?

A. -- I have on several occasions stated our position on statements made by persons who are under duress and who have been held prisoner for an extended period of time under less than humane conditions.

-- That position has not changed.

NEA/P:JTuohey

NEA/IRN:HPrecht
NEA/P:GSherman

Statement by Department of State

December 29, 1979

Congressman Hansen once more has gone to Tehran on his own and apparently without any support from Congressional leaders or appropriate Congressional committees.

We do not believe that initiatives of the kind he is undertaking, not coordinated with the actions of the U.S. Government, are helpful to achieving the release of the hostages. His plan to hold hearings, prior to the release of the hostages, on the involvement of the U.S. with the Shah, is--if correctly reported--inconsistent with the U.S. Government's position that the hostages must be released before any such proceedings take place.

PRESS GUIDANCE

SUBJECT: Press Conference Comments by Panamanian
President Royo on Iranian Extradition
Request

Response to question:

We assume that the position of the Panamanian Government is accurately reflected in the statement by President Royo on December 24 when he said that Panama would maintain its decision to give political exile to the Shah and would not extradite him.

We appreciate the position taken by Panama in connection with the release of the hostages. This is consistent with broadly expressed international opinion.

IRAN DEVELOPMENTS

- Q. Do you have any indications whether the Iranians are planning for an international tribunal before which the hostages would appear as witnesses, or for a trial in which the hostages would be prosecuted as "spies"? (Confusing stories have been coming out of Tehran on this subject.)
- A. -- We have seen conflicting stories coming out of Tehran on this. We have nothing to offer you beyond that.
- We repeat our opposition to any sort of trial [or tribunal] involving the hostages. This would be in violation of international law.
- We have stated previously that fora can be found in which Iran can air its grievances, but only after the hostages have been released.

Drafted: *WR*
NEA/P - WRamsay

Clearance:
NEA - PConstable
IWG - HPrecht *WR*
NEA/P - GFSherman *WR*

December 4, 1979

IRAN: SPY TRIALS

If the question of "spy trials" for our hostages in Tehran is raised, the substance of the November 20 White House statement should be reiterated:

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NOVEMBER 20, 1979

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

There are reports that the American citizens being illegally held as hostages in Tehran with the support of the Iranian government might soon be put through some sort of "trial." This would be a flagrant violation of international law and basic religious principles, and the Government of Iran would bear full responsibility for any ensuing consequences. The United States is seeking a peaceful solution to this problem through the UN and every other available channel. This is far preferable to the other remedies available to the United States. Such remedies are explicitly recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. The Government of Iran must recognize the gravity of the situation it has created.

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December 4, 1979

IRAN - MILITARY OPTIONS

Q: Last week the President spoke of other than political options available to us. What military options are you considering?

A: The President made clear that we are not foreclosing any of the means available to us to deal with the situation. Clearly, a peaceful solution through diplomatic means is our choice and the route we are relentlessly pursuing.

* * *

-- Nevertheless, circumstances may change and at some point it may become necessary to consider other means. I do not want to discuss these at this stage.

- Should harm come to the hostages, there would be grave consequences.

December 4, 1979

IRAN - TREATMENT OF HOSTAGES

Q: You have described the brutal treatment of the hostages in Iran. It seems that our people are now being harmed. Shouldn't we get tough with Iran?

A: -- The conditions under which our people are held are intolerable. But we must remember that our first priority is securing their safe release. We will do everything in our power to prevent harm to the hostages.

* * *

-- I believe all Americans recognize the necessity for coolness, restraint, and firmness.

Press Guidance on the Lawyers' Committees

- Q. Has the Government arranged for a group of private lawyers to begin preparation for the defense of the hostages at trials?
- A. Several bar associations and other legal groups over the past weeks volunteered their services on behalf of the hostages in the event trials are held. Our position, of course, is that any trials would be illegal and that the hostages should be immediately released. We have not encouraged the hostages' families to retain defense counsel, and we are not aware that any have. We understand that some bar groups ~~are doing some contingent~~ research or planning, but it is not a government effort.
- Q. What information, assistance, or encouragement has the Government given to such contingency planning efforts?
- A. Again, our view -- shared by the international community -- is that the hostages should be immediately released without trials or tribunals. That is our fundamental position, and we have not encouraged families to gear up for trials that we do not think can or should be held.

Q. Has the Government given inside ~~information~~ or classified information to the Lawyers' Committee?

A. No. They asked for and received some ~~unclassified~~, ~~publically available information~~ publicly available information, just as other members of the public have on various aspects of the Iran ~~emergency~~ crisis.

Q. There is a report that several major law firms quit the Lawyers' Committee effort because of lack of cooperation from the State Department. Is that true?

A. Not to our knowledge, but you ~~could~~ could direct that question to the ~~Lawyers~~ Lawyers' Committee or the firms supposedly involved.

IRAN DEVELOPMENTS

Q. Are you refusing to give the names of the hostages because some have used assumed names and also some may have escaped at the time of the embassy takeover (as suggested by a private citizen who did escape)? Are the three accused as spies among the seven not seen by the clergy on Christmas Eve?

A. -- First of all, I want to repeat that we are convinced that 50 Americans were taken hostage on the embassy compound.

-- As to giving their identity, the spokesman last Wednesday stated clearly that we have not given names out of concern for the privacy of the hostages' families, and because it is for the Iranian authorities--from their contacts with the militants who seized the Embassy--to provide the list of people they are holding hostage in violation of international law and human rights.

-- Beyond that, I have nothing more to say on the identity of the 50 people being held hostage.

Q. When is Secretary Vance seeing the returned clergymen, and do you expect to have some clarification on names and numbers of hostages after that meeting?

A. -- The Secretary will see the clergymen today, but I have no time to give you. He welcomes this opportunity to go over with them in detail their experience in Tehran, to get information about the hostages.

- 2 -

- We will wait until our talks with the clergymen. Prior to that meeting, we have nothing to say.
- I want to repeat today in the strongest possible terms-- it is the responsibility of the Iranian authorities to clear up this confusion by making available a list of those being held hostage and arranging for outside visitors to confirm both their number and well-being in the compound.

Drafted:
NEA/P - GFSherman:mj
Ext. 25150

Clearance:
IWG - HPrechtWR
NEA - PConstable

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AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 0336
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 7184
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 3247
AMEMBASSY DACCA IMMEDIATE 1571
USMISSION GENEVA 0120
USINT HAVANA 0305
AMEMBASSY KINGSTON IMMEDIATE 1901
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 2320
AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 7069
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ IMMEDIATE 1397
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 1916
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 3972
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1377
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE 4308
AMEMBASSY MANILA 1776
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1570
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 0315
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 2185
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 3749
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE IMMEDIATE 1420
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 1062
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 7130
AMEMBASSY TUNIS 1324

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 06406

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PORC, PDIP, UNSC, IR, US
SUBJECT: IRAN: TEXT OF SECRETARY VANCE'S SC STATEMENT,
DECEMBER 29, 1979
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT ON IRAN DELIVERED BY
SECRETARY VANCE IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL DECEMBER 29,
1979.
BEGIN TEXT:

* * * * * W H S R C O M M E N T * * * * *

EOB: BLOOM, THORN, PLATT, OKS, PASTOR, BREM, HUNT, LARR, SICK

PSN: 011983
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PAGE 01

TOR: 364/04:40Z

DTG: 300421Z DEC

MR. PRESIDENT:

WE MEET TODAY AT A MOMENT WHEN THE PRINCIPLES UPON WHICH THIS GREAT INTERNATIONAL BODY RESTS ARE BEING SHARPLY CHALLENGED IN IRAN.

MORE THAN EIGHT WEEKS HAVE PASSED SINCE OUR EMBASSY WAS SEIZED AND OUR PEOPLE AND THOSE FROM OTHER NATIONS WERE TAKEN HOSTAGE IN TEHRAN. ON THREE SEPARATE OCCASIONS, THIS COUNCIL HAS UNANIMOUSLY EXPRESSED THE WILL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT THE HOSTAGES BE RELEASED IMMEDIATELY.

FROM THE OUTSET, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, WITH THE FULL COOPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES, HAS LABORED UNCEASINGLY FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS TWICE URGED IRAN TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE HAS SPOKEN CLEARLY AND UNANIMOUSLY. GOVERNMENTS AND WORLD LEADERS, OF VARYING POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS FAITHS, HAVE APPEALED FOR THE RELEASE OF OUR PEOPLE. AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS, WITH DETERMINATION, PERSISTENCE AND PATIENCE, PURSUED EVERY PEACEFUL CHANNEL AVAILABLE TO US.

THE RESPONSE OF THOSE WHO PERPETRATE THIS CRISIS -- THE TERRORISTS WHO HAVE INVADDED OUR EMBASSY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN WHICH SUPPORTS THEM -- HAS BEEN DEFIANCE AND CONTEMPT. THEY HAVE PLACED THEMSELVES BEYOND THE WORLD'S LAW AND BEYOND THE MORAL IMPERATIVES THAT ARE COMMON TO THE WORLD'S CULTURES AND RELIGIONS.

AT THE HEART OF THIS MATTER ARE FIFTY MEN AND WOMEN -- STILL CAPTIVE, STILL ISOLATED, STILL SUBJECT TO THE MOST SEVERE STRAINS. THE WORLD COURT IN ITS UNANIMOUS DECISION EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT CONTINUATION OF THESE CONDITIONS OF IMPRISONMENT "EXPOSES THE HUMAN BEINGS CONCERNED TO PRIVATION, HARDSHIP, ANGUISH, AND EVEN DANGER TO LIFE AND HEALTH, AND THUS TO A SERIOUS POSSIBILITY OF IRREPARABLE HARM." CLAIMS THAT THE HOSTAGES ARE WELL RING HOLLOW, FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS BEEN DENIED EITHER CONSISTENT OR COMPREHENSIVE ACCESS TO THEM.

BUT LET US BE CLEAR: IT IS NOT ONLY FIFTY AMERICAN MEN AND WOMEN WHO ARE HELD HOSTAGE IN IRAN. IT IS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

THIS IS FAR MORE THAN A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND IRAN. IRAN HAS PLACED ITSELF IN CONFLICT WITH THE STRUCTURE OF LAW AND WITH THE MACHINERY OF PEACE ALL OF US HAVE PAINSTAKINGLY BUILT. THE TIME HAS COME FOR THE WORLD COMMUNITY TO ACT, FIRMLY AND COLLECTIVELY, TO UPHOLD INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRESERVE INTERNATIONAL PEACE.

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PAGE 02

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AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 3243
AMEMBASSY DACCA IMMEDIATE 1572
USMISSION GENEVA 0121
USINT HAVANA 0306
AMEMBASSY KINGSTON IMMEDIATE 1902
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 2331
AMEMBASSY LAOS IMMEDIATE 7070
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ IMMEDIATE 1398
AMEMBASSY LISREVILLE IMMEDIATE 1917
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 8973
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1278
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE 4839
AMEMBASSY MANILA 1777
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1571
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 0316
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 2186
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 3750
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE IMMEDIATE 1421
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 1063
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 7131
AMEMBASSY TUNIS 1325

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 06406

WE MUST GIVE PRACTICAL MEANING TO THE PRINCIPLES AND
PURPOSES OF OUR CHARTER.
AS LONG AS IRAN REMAINS INDIFFERENT TO THE VOICES OF
REASON AND MERCY THAT HAVE BEEN RAISED FROM EVERY
CORNER OF THE WORLD, AS LONG AS IT REFUSES TO RECOGNIZE
THE COMMON RULES OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR, IT MUST
ACCEPT THE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS DELIBERATE ACTIONS.
MR. PRESIDENT, ON NOVEMBER 25 THE SECRETARY-GENERAL,

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ACTING UNDER ARTICLE 99 OF THE CHARTER, TOOK THE EXTRA-ORDINARY STEP OF REQUESTING AN URGENT MEETING OF THE COUNCIL TO DEAL WITH THIS CRISIS, STATING THAT "THE PRESENT CRISIS POSES A SERIOUS THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY." THE COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION OF DECEMBER 4, ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY, EXPRESSED THE COUNCIL'S DEEP CONCERN AT THE DANGEROUS LEVEL OF TENSION AND SPOKE OF POSSIBLE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

THESE STATEMENTS, ALONG WITH THE MANY STATEMENTS OF CONCERN BY MEMBER STATES, MAKE CLEAR THE JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT IRAN'S ACT OF TAKING AND HOLDING HOSTAGES REPRESENTS A VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THREATENS INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. IF IRAN CONTINUES TO HOLD THE HOSTAGES, AFTER THE COUNCIL AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY HAVE UNANIMOUSLY CALLED FOR THEIR RELEASE, ACTION AGAINST IRAN UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER IS NOT ONLY JUSTIFIED, BUT REQUIRED TO PROMOTE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS.

IT IS THEREFORE INCUMBENT UPON ALL OF US AS MEMBERS OF THIS COUNCIL TO TAKE THE STEPS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE COUNCIL'S EARLIER UNANIMOUS DECISION IS IMPLEMENTED. MY GOVERNMENT THEREFORE SEEKS A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD CONDEMN IRAN'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH EARLIER ACTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT CALLING FOR THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF ALL THE HOSTAGES. THE RESOLUTION WOULD FURTHER PROVIDE FOR TWO ADDITIONAL STEPS: FIRST, REQUEST THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO INTENSIFY HIS GOOD OFFICES' EFFORTS, NOTING HIS READINESS TO GO PERSONALLY TO TEHRAN AND TO REPORT BACK TO THE COUNCIL BY A SPECIFIED DATE; SECOND, DECIDE THAT, IF THE HOSTAGES HAVE NOT BEEN RELEASED WHEN THE COUNCIL MEETS AGAIN AT THE SPECIFIED EARLY DATE, THE COUNCIL WILL AT THAT TIME ADOPT SPECIFIC SANCTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE CHARTER.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE CONTINUED SOLIDARITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL SERVE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT AN EARLY RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM IS TO THE BENEFIT OF ALL, INCLUDING THE PEOPLE AND LEADERS OF IRAN. THE PROLONGATION OF THIS CRISIS IS IN NO ONE'S INTEREST.

WE ARE NOT UNMINDFUL OF THE GRIEVANCES OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE. WE RESPECT IRAN'S SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE AND THE RIGHT OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE TO DECIDE THEIR OWN FORM OF GOVERNMENT. AS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED, ONCE THE HOSTAGES ARE RELEASED UNHARMED, WE ARE PREPARED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, TO SEEK A RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES BETWEEN US.

WITH THE HOSTAGES' RELEASE, THE WAY WILL BE CLEAR FOR IRAN TO PRESENT ITS GRIEVANCES IN ANY APPROPRIATE FORUM.

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THE UNITED STATES, HOWEVER, CANNOT RESPOND TO CLAIMS OF INJUSTICE WHILE OUR CITIZENS ARE HELD IN UNJUST CAPTIVITY, IN VIOLATION OF THE RESOLUTIONS AND ORDERS OF THE WORLD'S PRIMARY PEACEKEEPING INSTITUTIONS. AS A GREAT AMERICAN PRESIDENT, ABRAHAM LINCOLN -- A MAN OF DEEP COMPASSION AND UNDERSTANDING -- ONCE DECLARED: "THERE IS NO GRIEVANCE THAT IS A FIT OBJECT OF REDRESS BY MOB LAW."

MR. PRESIDENT, OUR PATIENCE AND FOREBEARANCE HAVE BEEN SEVERELY TESTED IN THESE PAST WEEKS. THEY ARE NOT UNLIMITED. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR FROM THE BEGINNING THAT WE PREFER A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE OTHER REMEDIES THAT ARE AVAILABLE TO US UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF SUCH A PEACEFUL SOLUTION THAT TODAY WE CALL UPON THIS BODY TO ACT.

LET US ACT NOW TO PRESERVE THE WEB OF MUTUAL OBLIGATION WHICH BINDS US TOGETHER, AND SHIELDS US FROM CHAOS AND DISORDER. FOR THERE CAN BE NO EVASION OF THIS CENTRAL POINT: IF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FAILS TO ACT WHEN ITS LAW IS FLOUTED AND ITS AUTHORITY DEFIED, WE NOT ONLY DIMINISH THE POSSIBILITY FOR PEACE IN THIS CRISIS; WE BELITTLE THIS INSTITUTION OF PEACE, ITSELF.

EFFECTIVE ACTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL CAN BREATHE NEW LIFE INTO THE PROVISIONS OF THE CHARTER AND THE DECISIONS OF THIS COUNCIL. IT CAN REMIND ALL OF US, NOW AND IN THE FUTURE, OF OUR SOLEMN OBLIGATION TO HEED THE JUDGMENTS OF THIS BODY AND TO PRESERVE ITS CENTRAL PLACE IN THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

LET US MOVE TOGETHER, IN A MANNER THAT IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING, TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE RULE OF LAW HAS MEANING, AND THAT OUR MACHINERY OF PEACE HAS PRACTICAL RELEVANCE. LET US PROTECT, AS WE MUST, THE BASIC PROCESS THAT PERMIT NATIONS TO MAINTAIN CIVILIZED RELATIONS WITH ONE ANOTHER.

THROUGH THE DECISION WE URGE ON THIS COUNCIL, TOGETHER WE CAN HASTEN THE DAY WHEN THIS ORDEAL IS RESOLVED. AND THROUGH OUR DEMONSTRATED COMMITMENT TO THE PURPOSES OF OUR CHARTER, WE WILL STRENGTHEN BOTH THE PRINCIPLES AND THE INSTITUTIONS THAT SERVE WORLD PEACE AND PROTECT US ALL. END TEXT

MCHENRY
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