

PRESS GUIDANCE

Q: Is consideration being given to a program of assistance for the several hundred thousand Afghan refugees who are in Pakistan?

A: The US is deeply concerned about this problem and strongly supports international efforts to assist with relief for these refugees. Their number is now approaching 400,000, and is likely to grow under the impact of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees office is the focal point of international refugee relief efforts, and we are working closely with them. UNHCR has initiated a program, to which the US is contributing as part of its general support for UNHCR. With the substantial increase in the numbers of refugees in the past few weeks, we expect that it will be necessary to take another look at the adequacy of the support the international community has been providing. We are consulting with the Pakistan Government as well on this issue.

Drafted by: NEA/PAB: TCSchaffer: de
1/3/80 ext. 29823

Clearance: NEA/PAB: RA Peck *RA*
NEA: JACoon
S/R: RDavidson *RD*

PAKISTAN

Q: Is the US expediting military supplies to Pakistan?

A: We are taking steps to speed up delivery of previously ordered and approved items which had been "in the pipeline" for Pakistan. I am not in a position to discuss further sales at this time.

Q: Will the Administration be selling A-7 or F-5 aircraft to Pakistan?

A: I cannot at this time be specific on what items might be involved.

December 31, 1979

NOON PRESS BRIEFING

Q. What is your comment on the Evans and Novak column today with regard to U.S. assistance to Pakistan and the Afghan Moslem guerrillas?

A. Concerning Pakistan, as Dr. Brzezinski said yesterday, we are looking at ways we can improve Pakistan's ability to withstand the current difficult situation in that area.

I have no comment or speculation about
how we may react to the Afghan situation.
Our whole reaction is under study at this
time.

Q. Do you exclude assistance to the Afghan guerrillas?

A. I am just not going to comment on any of our options.

PAKISTAN

Q: Do you have anything further on the 1959 US commitment to Pakistan?

A: National Security Advisor Brzezinski has publicly reaffirmed the 1959 US/Pakistan Agreement for Cooperation. In case any of you are interested, the text of this agreement will be posted. One point worth noting is the reference in Article I ^{+ 1951} to the Joint Resolution ^{to} promote peace and stability in the Middle East. ~~This resolution, popularly known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, dealt with threats of aggression from communist countries.~~ This has special significance in the context of recent developments in Afghanistan.

SOVIET UNION

Sperry Univac computer
possible mis-use

PRESS GUIDANCE
12/27/79

Q. Do you have any comment on the story in the December 31 issue of Newsweek about an alleged diversion of a Sperry-Univac computer to military use?

A. Whenever a report of any alleged diversion is brought to our attention we attempt to determine the validity of the allegation. In this case, the Department of Commerce, which is the agency responsible for investigating possible non-compliance with US exports control regulations, started looking into the matter immediately on receipt of the initial report. ~~The fact that the information is now public will not make the investigation easier. It would be inappropriate for us to comment further on the substance of the allegations.~~ Further questions should be referred to the Department of Commerce.

EB/EWT:BFurness
x20442

Cleared:EB/EWT:WRoot
EB:EJohnston
EUR/SOV:JColbert
Commerce:KNKnowles (subs)

US/SOVIET MILITARY BALANCE

Q: What is the Administration planning to do to reverse the impression of the US as a declining military power, an impression that has been highlighted by recent events in Cuba and Iran?

A: The US remains the strongest single military power in the world in terms of the capabilities of its nuclear forces, and the long reach of its conventional forces. The US also possesses the most formidable economic and technology base for creating military power. Moreover we have other non-military forms of influence -- economic, political, cultural -- that our main competitor, the USSR lacks.

But, because US military efforts steadily declined under two previous Administrations, we face some important adverse trends that must be turned around. Therefore:

-- This Administration is systematically increasing the level of real defense spending. President Carter has committed this country and persuaded our Allies to commit themselves to real defense growth of at least 3% per year.

-- We are steadily modernizing our strategic forces with the air launched cruise missile, the M-X and the Trident programs.

-- We are leading our Allies in planning modernization of theater nuclear forces to offset Soviet force increases.

-- Early in this Administration we moved on the Long-Term Defense Program to improve NATO's conventional forces.

-- We are now improving rapid deployment forces to deter and, if required, react to trouble spots in distant areas.

-- If genuine military needs require greater levels of defense effort -- we shall make them.

November 10, 1979

TNF: BREZHNEV'S SPEECH AND 1,000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL

Q: What do you think of the continuing Soviet statements that they want to negotiate about nuclear missiles in Europe? What's going to be our reply? Are we going to take out 1,000 weapons in Europe as has been reported?

A: The Soviets have been conducting quite a campaign to keep the NATO Alliance from taking the necessary steps to close the gap created by Russian deployment of the SS-20 and Backfire. Our Allies have not been intimidated by this campaign, and I believe will go forward at the NATO meeting in December to take the necessary action.

This will include an offer on our part to negotiate a reduction in Soviet weapons. If we can close the gap through negotiations we would obviously prefer to do it that way as much as possible. But we can't accept the Russian idea that we do nothing while we negotiate.

In this connection, the United States is discussing the possibility of rationalizing our nuclear stockpile in Europe by reducing 1,000 warheads in connection with the modernization that we believe is necessary to fill the gap created by the SS-20 and Backfire.

November 9, 1979

SOVIET DISSIDENTS

Q: What is your reaction to the arrest of the three Soviet dissidents (Tatyana Velikanova, Anatanas Terleskas and Father Gleb Yakunin) last week? What is the United States doing about it?

A: While all the details of the arrest of the three human rights activists are not clear, anytime individuals are prevented from exercising their fundamental human rights it is a cause for concern. I have asked the State Department to monitor this recent development closely. We have also made the Soviets aware that we regard their action as a violation of Principle 7 of the Helsinki Final Act.

November 10, 1979

COMPUTER SALE TO SOVIETS BLOCKED?

Q: Recent press reports indicate that Defense Secretary Harold Brown "blocked the sale of advanced computer technology to the Soviet Union in a decision evidently made in retaliation against the Soviet position regarding its military personnel in Cuba." (New York Times, October 4). Would you comment on these stories?

A: The Secretary of Defense has made a decision that this export is not in our national security interests. I have no reason to challenge his judgment, and I am fully backing his decision.

Background:

This application is, in fact, a request by Control Data Corporation (CDC) to increase the processing rate of a computer, known as a CYBER 73-1, which was sold to the Soviet Ministry of Geology by CDC for installation at a seismic data center southwest of Moscow in 1976. It would be located adjacent to an ABM site and one of the Soviet laser test locations.

Secretary Brown has rejected the application.

Commerce officials have reportedly been agitating with CDC to sue the government on this case.

MFN FOR USSR?

Q. Will the United States extend MFN to the Soviet Union?

A. -- The Trade Act of 1974 gives me the authority in certain circumstances to waive the emigration restrictions on the extension of MFN.

-- Any steps we take in this regard will be consistent with our overall foreign policy objectives toward the Soviet Union and the overall state of our relations.

Q. Will the presence of the Soviet brigade in Cuba affect your decision to grant MFN to the Soviet Union?

A. I will have no comment on that at this time.

SOVIET GRAIN PURCHASES

- Q. In view of Soviet actions in Cuba, why did the United States recently authorize the sale of 25 million tons of grain to the USSR?
- A. Continuing agricultural trade with the Soviet Union serves our nation's economic interests. I emphasize that these are cash sales for commodities that we have in abundant supply. It is mutually advantageous trade; it helps us as much as the USSR.

* * *

- The Soviet Union is faced with sharply reduced grain harvests. We expect they will import from the U.S. as much as 8 million tons of wheat and 17 million tons of corn by the end of next year. While these purchases will create record export levels for U.S. grain, we will have a record corn crop and a near record wheat crop this year.

- These exports will have a strong beneficial effect on our balance of payments and farm income without causing our grain prices to rise sharply.

- All relevant agencies and departments agreed to permit USDA to offer the Soviets up to 25 million tons. There was no linkage between this agricultural negotiation and military/political issues between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Background:

Under the US-USSR Grain Agreement, the Soviet Union must buy at least six million metric tons of wheat and corn each agreement year, beginning October 1. This minimum purchase is to be about half wheat and half corn. To buy more than eight million tons during a crop year, prior agreement of the U.S. Government must be obtained. In the last agreement year, the Soviets were offered the opportunity to purchase 17 million metric tons; they have purchased close to this ceiling.

Grain Sales to the Soviet Union: Inflationary Impact?

- Q. Will the decision to permit the Soviets to buy 25 million metric tons of wheat and corn fuel inflation in the United States?
- A. We expect the inflationary impact to be minimal. The decision will boost farm incomes, in a year of record U.S. harvests. The decision will help the U.S. balance payments and the value of the dollar.

Under Secretary of Agriculture Dale Hathaway announced that the supply level for the Fourth Year of the U.S.-Soviet Grains Agreement (October 1, 1979 - September 30, 1980) will have little or no significant impact on the general level of grain prices, since world markets have already recognized a probable rise in both world grain trade and USSR imports from all origins in the year ahead. The President's Council of Economic Advisors and Council on Wage and Price Stability agreed with Hathaway's assessment.

- The fact that world markets had fully anticipated this decision is confirmed by the way markets performed in the days following the October 3rd announcement: For all major grains and oil-seeds, the markets have been steady to slightly below earlier prices.

- This decision has been incorporated into recent U.S. farm program decisions.

ASAT

Q: Will we and the Soviets sign an anti-satellite treaty in the near future?

A: In the three rounds of talks the two sides have held thus far on this very complicated subject, several differences of opinion have surfaced which require further study and consultation. I expect that the two sides will meet again later on to continue their discussions. I remain convinced that an equitable and verifiable ASAT agreement to help curb an arms race in space is in the best interests of both sides.

October 8, 1979

SALT: CONSEQUENCES OF DELAY

Q: What would be the consequences of delaying Senate consideration of the SALT Treaty until next year?

A: It is in our own interest to have the Treaty provisions come into effect as soon as possible, so that reductions in Soviet systems can begin and the risk of the Treaty unravelling is minimized.

* * *

-- Our European allies would be concerned if we do not reach a decision of ratification reasonably soon, since this could directly affect their own security interests. They face important theater nuclear force (TNF) and arms control decisions in December. Defeat or inordinate delay of this treaty will undermine the Alliance effort to improve its conventional and theater nuclear forces.

-- I believe it is important that the Senate move forward with its consideration of the Treaty as rapidly as possible. I hope we could complete ratification before the end of the year.

October 8, 1979

SALT - LINKAGE

Q: Why shouldn't support for SALT be dependent upon Soviet behavior in other areas?

A: The SALT II Treaty is not an attempt to please the Soviet Union; it is a step that serves the national interests of the United States. It is precisely because our interests and those of the Soviet Union conflict in so many areas that the need to limit the competition in strategic arms is so compelling.

* * *

-- The presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba is a serious matter. But it is not nearly so serious as the consequences for the United States if the SALT treaty is rejected.

-- Our policy has been to neutralize the Soviet brigade - to strengthen our vigilance and our ability to respond swiftly and decisively if these forces are used outside of Cuba, thus depriving the brigade of significant political or military meaning beyond Cuba's shores.

-- Let me stress one point: the SALT II treaty should be judged on its merits. It is of vital importance to this country. We should not risk losing it by trying to use it for ends the SALT process was never designed to accomplish.

October 8, 1979

SOVIET NAVAL FACILITY AT CIENFUEGOS

Q: Is the Soviet Union building facilities at the Cienfuegos naval facilities for the storage of nuclear missiles? Is the new construction at the naval facility at Cienfuegos a violation of the 1962 or 1970 understandings?

A: Storage of nuclear missiles at the Cienfuegos facility would be a clear violation of our 1962 and 1970 understandings with the USSR.

We have no information that the Soviets are pursuing such a course but we are watching this matter very closely. We also have not seen any evidence that the new construction at Cienfuegos is related to the housing or servicing of Soviet nuclear submarines, which would also be a clear violation of the 1962 and 1970 understandings.

October 8, 1979

CUBA - SOVIET/U.S. UNDERSTANDING

Q: Does the presence of Soviet ground forces and MIG-23s in Cuba, and visits by Soviet submarines, constitute a violation of the agreement which ended the Cuban missile crisis?

A: The Soviets agreed in 1962 that offensive weapons could not again be introduced into Cuba. In 1970 it was made clear that this understanding included sea-based systems. There is no evidence that current Soviet naval and other military activities, or the presence of a Soviet combat unit at its present strength, are in direct violation of these agreements, but they do raise questions about the spirit of the agreements.

September 24, 1979

SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA

Q. Why are you so concerned with the presence of a single Soviet brigade in Cuba? Don't we have as many troops in Cuba at Guantanamo?

A. The presence of a Soviet combat force in Cuba is a source of great concern to us first because it is a significant intrusion of a foreign military force in a country in the Western Hemisphere.

It also must be seen against the backdrop of increased military and political collaboration between Cuba and the Soviet Union. The Cubans have become the "vanguard" of the Soviet foreign policy, and thus we are deeply concerned about the implications of a Soviet combat force in Cuba.

Our Naval base in Guantanamo was established in 1903 and our presence is legal under treaties which were reaffirmed by the Cuban government in 1934 and accepted by Premier Castro when he assumed power.

The increasing Cuban intervention in internal affairs of the countries in Central America and the Caribbean is, in turn, financed and supported by the Soviet Union. Cuba is the only country in the world that gets its military equipment for free from the USSR and, in return, Cuba provides military and intelligence facilities and communications to the Soviets, sometimes for their exclusive use.



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