



U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Washington, D.C. 20451

76-3

Please HOLD for release
10:00 A. M. EST
Monday, February 23, 1976

In a statement prepared for delivery today before the Senate Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations and Security Agreements (Committee on Foreign Relations) Dr. Fred C. Iklé (Ee-Clay), Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, reported for the first time on two important U.S. initiatives to reduce the threat of further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

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STATEMENT OF FRED C. IKLE, DIRECTOR
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
before the
Subcommittee on Arms Control, International
Organizations and Security Agreements
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Monday, February 23, 1976

Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee, I greatly appreciate this opportunity to appear before you.

This morning I would like to comment on two kinds of initiatives undertaken by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Executive Branch to deal with nuclear proliferation.

The first concerns nuclear exports, the second, multinational fuel centers.

The United States over the years has sought to work with other countries to insure that civil nuclear exports would be used only for peaceful purposes. We have recently had a number of bilateral and multilateral discussions with nuclear exporters to develop common rules on safeguards and export controls. As a result, the United States together with other exporters has decided to apply certain principles to our future nuclear exports. Most of these are consistent with current U.S. practice; some are new. All are designed to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons while permitting nuclear exports of equipment to meet the world's growing energy needs. These principles include the following:

- The requirement that recipients must apply international (IAEA) safeguards on all nuclear imports.
- The requirement that the importer give assurances not to use these imports to make nuclear explosives for any purpose -- whether called "peaceful" or not.
- The requirement that the importer have adequate physical security for these nuclear facilities and materials to prevent theft and sabotage.
- The requirement for assurances that the importers will demand the same conditions on any re-transfer of these materials or types of equipment to third countries.

Now, on the question of more sensitive exports -- those which involve fuel enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, and heavy water. We intend to use restraint in supply of these exports, particularly when we think they could add to the risk of proliferation.

In addition, in cases where we do export sensitive technology, we require that the importers obtain our consent before they re-transfer any sensitive nuclear technology to a third country.

These are the minimum standards the US will apply to its nuclear exports. We are prepared to be more stringent when appropriate.

Together with other leading exporters of nuclear technology, we are also committed to follow-up efforts along three lines.

1. To promote international cooperation in exchanging information on physical security, on measures of protection of nuclear material in transit, and on measures for recovery of stolen nuclear material and equipment;
2. To improve the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards through special efforts that support that organization, and
3. To encourage the designers and makers of sensitive equipment to construct it in a way that will aid safeguards.

Mr. Chairman, the second kind of initiatives we are undertaking have to do with multinational fuel-cycle centers.. The idea for such centers was promoted in the final declaration of the Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty held in Geneva last year. At the United Nations General Assembly last autumn, Secretary Kissinger stressed the grave danger of national reprocessing plants to nuclear proliferation and thus to world security, and proposed establishment of multinational fuel-cycle centers as a safer alternative to national control of reprocessing facilities:

The International Atomic Energy Agency has now begun a major study of the regional multinational center concept; the United States actively supports it, and I expect it will be completed sometime next year. Preliminary results suggest that

large scale centers could bring significant economies of scale compared with smaller national reprocessing plants. But more important from my perspective -- these centers may be an attractive alternative to national reprocessing plants, particularly for countries with more limited nuclear capacity. This alternative then may encourage countries to forego national reprocessing facilities and work together. This would make safeguards -- and the protection of dangerous nuclear materials more effective. In short, if the concept proves successful, multinational centers should reduce the dangers of further nuclear proliferation and of nuclear terrorism.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has strongly supported the IAEA study by supplying experts and consultants. We have also begun our own study on a broad range of related questions. One such question is whether new approaches to storing spent fuel could forestall premature national reprocessing; another is how to better manage transportation of nuclear materials. We are also beginning a preliminary study of the practical steps the U.S. -- both government and industry -- might take to advance the concept of multinational centers abroad.

I was asked recently why ACDA wishes to build reprocessing plants. The question indicates a misunderstanding of our objectives. Our efforts for multinational approaches should not be misunderstood: we do not wish to promote the reprocessing of Plutonium. On the contrary. Our hope, in all these efforts, is to investigate practical, economic alternatives to national reprocessing, and thereby reduce the growing dangers of nuclear proliferation.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my initial remarks. I would be pleased to answer your questions concerning these initiatives or any other aspects of our non-proliferation efforts, past or present.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: FUTURE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 570) with respect to certain arms control and disarmament negotiations, as amended.

The Clerk read as follows:

H. CON. RES. 570

Whereas the operation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was reviewed in May 1975, by a special conference which included parties to such treaty;

Whereas such conference confirmed the fact that States with nuclear weapons capability have made only limited progress in pursuing "negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" as called for by such treaty;

Whereas a significant number of nonnuclear weapons states have not acceded to such treaty;

Whereas a sufficiently strong United States strategic force may provide reassurance to allies who might, in its absence, wish to acquire nuclear weapons; and

Whereas it is important that further efforts be undertaken on an urgent basis to limit the dangers involved in peaceful and military nuclear developments and that the position of the United States Congress be understood with respect to its willingness to give full effect to the terms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to take further steps to limit nuclear dangers: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That (a) the Congress of the United States, noting the positive steps embodied in the Vladivostok accord of November 24, 1974, urges their prompt embodiment, with clarification of ambiguities, in a treaty or in an agreement approved by law. The Congress further urges immediate negotiations to achieve agreements, which would be mutual and verifiable on (1) a substantial initial reduction in the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and the number of strategic missile launchers equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, and (2) the achievement of approximate equality in total strategic nuclear destructive capability as measured by the number, yield, throw-weight, and accuracy of nuclear weapons.

(b) The Congress of the United States urges a comprehensive agreement ending underground nuclear explosions under adequate verification.

(c) The Congress of the United States, in order to reinforce international actions to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, urges a halt on further transfers of nuclear fuel, technology, and equipment to any country which has not either (1) accepted on all its nuclear programs the safeguards recognized by the International Atomic Energy Agency, or (2) become a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, if other major nuclear suppliers agree to a similar halt on such transfers.

Sec. 2. The President is respectfully requested to inform the appropriate foreign countries of the declarations by the Congress of the United States with respect to arms control and disarmament negotiations and the proliferation of nuclear weapons materials which are contained in this concurrent resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is a second demanded?

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, I demand a second.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, a second will be considered as ordered.

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ZABLOCKI) and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY) will be recognized for 20 minutes each.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ZABLOCKI).

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. ZABLOCKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of House Concurrent Resolution 570, legislation with respect to the problem of nuclear proliferation. This resolution is an expression in support of a saner and more peaceful world—one free of the threat of nuclear proliferation and the scourge of possible nuclear war.

Why is this resolution important enough to merit support? Why, in other words, should Members of Congress be concerned about proliferation?

To some, proliferation is a seemingly distant issue, scientifically and technologically complex. By contract, the nations of the world are plagued with crises of food and starvation, fuels and energy, warfare, and internal unrest. Such problems have an immediate urgency. In comparison with these pressing issues, why should we in Congress turn our attention to the spread of nuclear technology and weapons?

The reason is stark and simple. All of the other world problems—serious as they are—will become moot if many more nations acquire nuclear weapons. Given the flood tide of spreading nuclear technology, the prospect of other nations soon having nuclear weapons is a real and current threat.

Evidence pointing to the seriousness of the danger is irrefutable. For example, nuclear materials, from which nuclear explosives could ultimately be made, now exist in approximately 30 countries. It is estimated that by 1985 nearly 50 countries will have at least one nuclear power plant that can produce enough plutonium each year for at least several dozen nuclear explosives. By the year 2000 the annual rate of plutonium production worldwide will be nearly 1 million kilograms—enough to make 100,000 nuclear explosive devices.

In the light of that mounting crisis, the issue is whether we should stand by, ignore the threat and permit the spread of nuclear power to go on pell mell or do we attempt to seek reasonable controls while there is still time. This may be the last chance we have to answer that question rationally.

Preventing the epidemic of nuclear proliferation and possible nuclear disaster is, I submit, the real purpose of House Concurrent Resolution 570.

At this moment, the major powers are continuing to develop and test new and improved nuclear weapons. Continued testing can generate improvements that could upset the balance of the present

nuclear armories and thereby destabilize relations between the world nuclear giants.

In terms of nuclear technology dispersal, the problem is seriously compounded. The six leading nuclear supplier states promote the international sale of their products to nations turning toward uranium as a fuel substitute for expensive and perhaps unreliable oil imports. These supplier nations offer nuclear powerplants produced by the United States, Great Britain, France, or Canada.

In addition, the Soviet Union has begun to supply nuclear powerplants to some of its satellites. Japan is expected to enter the world nuclear market soon as will many European nations.

Some nuclear suppliers seek to sweeten their deals by offering equipment and technology so that their customer nations can produce their own enriched uranium and plutonium. These tie-in sales signal a big and dangerous jump toward proliferation.

This alarming problem of escalation will continue unless the United States and other level-headed suppliers can persuade all of the supplier nations not to export such sensitive and dangerous nuclear technology.

This escalation will continue unless the customer nations can be urged to ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, or be required to place all of their nuclear activities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency providing for effective and frequent inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA.

Unless the United States, through the type of foreign policy initiatives urged by House Concurrent Resolution 570, can slow down or halt the further spread of nuclear weapons, the world will soon face the possibility of surprise nuclear attacks by unidentified nations.

Worse still are prospects that a lack of adequate protection and control might make it possible for terrorist groups to steal nuclear explosive materials without detection and so be able to make blackmail demands or take terrorist actions.

Those, in short, are the reasons Congress should be concerned about nuclear proliferation. Those are also the problems to which House Concurrent Resolution 570 is addressed as a solution.

House Concurrent Resolution 570 signals an important start for Congress both to encourage and to support the executive branch in shaping foreign policy initiatives designed to slow down the further development of new or improved nuclear weapons. It also signals the possibility of slowing down or, preferably, halting the further wanton spread of nuclear weapons and explosives beyond the six nations known to possess them.

That is why this resolution and its purpose is important. That is why it merits our support. I urge the passage of House Concurrent Resolution 570.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. FINDLEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of House Concurrent Resolution 570. This bill emerged from the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs under the able leadership of the subcommittee's chairman, CLEMENT ZABLOCKI. There, we have undertaken a series of exceptionally thorough and well-structured hearings during which testimony was taken from representatives of ACDA, the State Department, the atomic energy industry, the regulatory agencies, the Export-Import Bank, and private experts. These hearings provided the focus for the legislation before us today. In addition, they laid the groundwork for possibly broader and more binding regulatory proposals for the future.

No longer can there be any doubt about the perils that lie immanent in the indiscriminate spread of nuclear technology and materials. Our own national policy, grounded on a misguided and uncritical altruism, has itself helped to stimulate this deadly spread. Failing to balance risk against genuine need, we provide nuclear powerplants to nations whose economies are insufficiently developed to accommodate them. Often we have skewed the calculus further through massive export subsidies.

Meanwhile spent fuel continues to accumulate and with it an alarming accumulation of separable plutonium—the key ingredient for a nuclear explosive. As the technology of reprocessing becomes more widely available, these countries, their own deeply strained regional conflicts and antagonisms, will be only months away from a nuclear bomb capability—separated only by the thin membrane of political restraint or negotiated agreement.

This legislation is bound around the simple notion that nuclear supplier countries should draw the line for exports at those countries who have either become a party to the NPT regime, or else have placed full fuel cycle safeguards on all of their facilities. This alone will not comprehensively resolve our problem. But it is an important first step.

Second, this resolution notes that some nations may prefer the security of alliance relationships and nuclear guarantees to the instabilities of independent nuclear forces. Hence, the preservation of these important security arrangements is directly contingent on the viability and resilience of our strategic forces. This fact is the basis of the resolution's fourth whereas clause. Yet another strain of this concern can be found in the first resolved clause, where future arms reductions are tied explicitly to a reduction in the existing imbalance in missile throw-weight between the United States and the Soviet Union. This is the first time to my knowledge that the Congress has expressed itself formally on this important point.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. LONG).

(Mr. LONG of Maryland asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of House Concurrent Resolution 570, regarding nuclear proliferation. I commend the distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ZABLOCKI), and the members of the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs for their substantial efforts in this critical area. The committee has made an important first step toward developing a rational U.S. policy on nuclear proliferation and nuclear exports policy.

Senator RIBICOFF has stated that by 1990, reactors in the developing world alone will be generating 30,000 pounds of plutonium annually—the equivalent of 3,000 atomic bombs.

Providing a country with nuclear power gives it not only plutonium but also the scientific-engineering complex needed to make the short step to producing nuclear weapons. The committee report states that "prospects for diversion will clearly increase if and when plutonium comes into general use as a nuclear fuel." Terrorists or unfriendly nations could threaten, blackmail, or launch a surprise attack on the United States.

Our nuclear arsenal would be useless as a deterrent because we might not know the identity of our attacker and would not know at whom to strike back. Or we might strike back at an innocent country. Indeed, to provoke us into striking back at the wrong country might even be the purpose of the anonymous attack.

Irresponsible nuclear suppliers—notably France and Germany—which are licensed by U.S. firms for nuclear technology and which depend largely on the United States to fuel their own power reactors, are exporting nuclear weapons potential. Time is running out for the United States to use its leverage to curb nuclear proliferation because Europeans will soon have their own nuclear fuel facilities.

I heartily concur with the resolution's call for a halt on nuclear exports to any country that does not at least place all its nuclear facilities under international safeguards. I hope that the administration will strongly urge France, West Germany, and other nuclear suppliers to accept this principle.

This concurrent resolution embodies one of the crucial issues which led me to introduce House Resolution 951—which now has 113 cosponsors—to establish a House select committee to explore in depth U.S. nuclear exports policy and the worldwide problem of nuclear proliferation. I strongly urge the Congress to take an important first step in combating proliferation by passing House Concurrent Resolution 570.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. OTTINGER).

(Mr. OTTINGER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Speaker, I would just like to join in congratulating my friend, the gentleman from Wisconsin, on the excellent start he has made in the proper direction of obtaining control

over both nuclear materials and nuclear weapons.

I had the privilege to sit in on his subcommittee consideration of this resolution.

As he knows, I would go considerably further, particularly in the nuclear weapons field. I am sponsor of a resolution which had some 93 cosponsors, calling for a policy of renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons. But I wholeheartedly am in accord with him that we should make far greater efforts toward achieving mutual agreements with the Soviet Union and with other nuclear weapons countries in mutually reducing the number of strategic weapons and obtaining strict international control of nuclear materials.

I must, however, register my strong disagreement with paragraph (a) (2) of the resolution. There is no basis for seeking "approximate equality in total strategic nuclear destructive capability" with the Russians. This concept of keeping up with the Russians and the Russians keeping up with us is what has fueled a senseless arms race and sapped billions of dollars for needless weaponry. The accent instead should be on assuring that we have sufficient—not equal—strategic nuclear weaponry to make suicidal any first strike against us by the Soviet Union. The concept of "equality" should be dropped and replaced with the concept of "sufficiency."

I would support this resolution's proposals for a complete test ban treaty and for nonproliferation.

The problem of proliferation today is truly frightening. The fact that India exploded a bomb with materials obtained from a Canadian-supplied nuclear powerplant is a matter to give us serious concern.

I am proud to be cosponsor with my friend, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. LONG) in trying to obtain control over the proliferation of nuclear materials. I led in intervening before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to urge full hearings on its proposal to export 40,000 pounds of enriched uranium to India because it had not signed the nonproliferation treaty and all its facilities are not subject to IAEA controls. I am glad to see these proposed requirements in this bill.

I think nuclear technology is a subject which the American people have not faced. The prospects of nuclear warfare and the misuse of nuclear materials just seem to be beyond the comprehension of the average citizen, and while he is nervous about it, he does not really understand and he does not know what to do.

I think we have a tremendous responsibility here in Congress. There is no greater threat to the existence of modern civilization than exists with the possibility of abuse of nuclear weapons or the making of weapons from nuclear materials, either by irresponsible governments or by terrorists who might steal or sabotage nuclear facilities. The possibility that some terrorist group will get hold of nuclear materials and make nuclear weapons from them is real.

Therefore, I think this resolution on balance is a good start in the right direction. I support the resolution and salute the gentleman from Wisconsin for pushing forward on this subject.

Ms. ABZUG. Mr. Speaker, I support this resolution since it outlines the significant next steps which must be taken in order to begin controlling the nuclear arms danger.

Unfortunately, the nuclear arms discussion today seems dominated more by Presidential politics than by rational inquiry. Last week, President Ford requested over \$300,000,000 to continue production of the Minuteman III missile. But on January 27, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld reported to Congress that additional deployments of the Minuteman III beyond current levels "would not add significantly to the U.S. military capability"—page 63. Clearly, arms producers face a booming business as long as the Republican primaries continue.

Against this background of election hysteria, Congress has a responsibility to state its views on arms control. This resolution is a valuable statement of policy for moving ahead with arms limitation and arms reduction and for restricting the proliferation of nuclear materials without adequate safeguards.

However, I am concerned that these objectives in the abstract may be acceptable to Congress but that during this session Congress has been approving specific weapons systems which directly contradict both the letter and the spirit of this important resolution.

The particular weapons system I have in mind is the strategic-range sea-launched cruise missile—SLCM—authorized to receive \$100,000,000 for research, development, and testing in fiscal year 1977. I raised the SLCM issue during the military procurement and R. & D. debate, along with my colleague from Ohio (Mr. SEIBERLING). I feel the responsibility to raise it again today by comparing how the SLCM directly contravenes the policy objectives of this resolution—indeed, how it would put them out of reach.

"Substantial" reduction in the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles is a primary goal of the resolution. The report accompanying the resolution indicates that "substantial" means a magnitude of at least 20 percent mutual reduction. Yet the long-range SLCM now being developed by the Navy could be launched not only from strategic submarines but from attack submarines and specially outfitted surface ships as well. This would turn every vessel in the U.S. Navy into a potential strategic nuclear delivery vehicle against the Soviet Union.

Instead of leading to a "substantial" reduction, the long-range sea-launched cruise missile would cause a "substantial" increase in the numbers of potential strategic delivery vehicles.

The resolution naturally envisions that future arms agreements should be accurately and effectively verifiable. Verifiability makes arms limitation agreements enforceable. However, the SLCM would present nearly insurmountable obstacles to effective verification. The basic verification principle for SALT has been to

limit arms by controlling launchers of nuclear weapons. But, since the tactical and strategic versions of the SLCM would have identical appearances, it would be impossible for arms controllers to know which ships had been turned into strategic launching platforms. Once testing ends and production begins, emplacement of strategic SLCM's cannot be detected. Neither side would know how many SLCM's the other side had deployed or produced.

Simply stated, the SLCM is one of the most "arms control incompatible" weapons system currently being tested. Full scale production and deployment of the SLCM would be a serious drawback to the kind of arms limitation agreements envisioned by this resolution.

Proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear materials is another major concern of the resolution. Yet the SLCM could lead to a doubling of strategic nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal and could raise new dangers of spreading a nuclear delivery capability to the small nations possessing nuclear potential. Compared to nuclear submarines or intercontinental bombers, the SLCM and its counterpart, the Air Launched Cruise Missile, are relatively cheap long-range delivery systems. If a small country ever found the means to capture or duplicate cruise missile technology, it too could become a nuclear power able to threaten its neighbors and raise the level of international tensions. The cruise missile is a danger to controlling proliferation because it represents a technological breakthrough in delivery vehicle guidance, thus adding a new unknown factor to the proliferation equation.

These are some of the dangers of the Sea Launched Cruise Missile. If production is allowed to begin after the testing program, it is clear to me that the strategic SLCM could become a permanent barrier to progress on arms control as envisioned by this resolution. A moratorium on long-range SLCM testing of the SLCM would not involve any military risk to the United States whatsoever since we are so far ahead of the Soviet Union in cruise missile technology. According to Secretary Rumsfeld's posture statement, "there is no evidence as yet that the Soviets possess the technology to pursue over the near term a strategic cruise missile development"—page 56.

However, a moratorium on testing would keep open the option of eventually reaching an agreement on cruise missiles because it would give the negotiators additional time and let policy instead of technology determine our nuclear arms position. I hope my colleagues will give consideration to such a testing moratorium during the appropriations debate and, in so doing, utilize this resolution as not only a statement of general policy aims but as a yardstick to measure the desirability of specific weapons systems as well.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of House Concurrent Resolution 570, a resolution which is the product of the considerable labors of Congressman ZABLOCKI's Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, of which I am a member. The committee

conducted exhaustive hearings on nuclear proliferation last fall, and produced a hearing record which was as fascinating as it was chilling. The testimony of the experts was unanimous: It is becoming easier and easier for countries to produce plutonium, the major element of the atomic bomb. With the present accelerating international transfer of nuclear power facilities, it is only a matter of a few years until at least a score of nations will be capable, if they so choose, of developing nuclear weapons.

Nuclear power has become a technological status symbol, and its potential adaptability to military uses makes it doubly attractive to dozens of countries which are not now members of the nuclear club. Some of these countries are responding to the acquisition of a nuclear capability by a neighboring country, starting a chain reaction of decisions to go nuclear which is too often aided and abetted by the current members of the nuclear club. India may well have used her nuclear power plants and experimental reactors to develop the ability to set off a nuclear explosion as a deterrent against China, which exploded its first nuclear device some years ago. India's off-and-on enemy on the Asian continent, Pakistan, must now feel pressure to develop its own nuclear capability. And so it goes. As each country adds to its prestige, the world edges closer to the possibility of nuclear holocaust.

The United States must do everything in its power to reverse this trend. In 10 years it will almost certainly be too late; in 5 years it may well be beyond our reach. The resolution before us today is designed to put the Congress on record as supporting urgent efforts to come to grips with this problem.

Subsection 1(c) urges the United States to halt further transfers of nuclear fuel, technology or equipment to any country which has not demonstrated its commitment to use them only for peaceful purposes. The resolution suggests that acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency recognized safeguards or ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would be evidence of such a commitment. The subcommittee assumes that the United States would only undertake such a policy if other major nuclear suppliers agree to it as well, but it is to be hoped that the United States will actively seek their agreement.

Subsection 1(b) urges a comprehensive agreement ending underground nuclear explosions with adequate verification. This subsection is self-explanatory, although it should be added that verification, which used to be a stumbling block in all Soviet-American negotiations in the early 1960's, no longer presents great obstacles to a test ban agreement. Current technology makes it possible to identify underground nuclear explosions as small as 5 kilotons, and even smaller tests can often be detected. Recently the United States and the U.S.S.R. have come closer to agreement on the implementation of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974. This treaty is inadequate, and I hope it is only the forerunner of a more comprehensive

agreement. Both the U.S.S.R. and the United States have developed their nuclear warhead technology to levels where underground testing is no longer necessary, and it is incumbent on the two superpowers to lead the way to a worldwide ban.

Subsection 1(a) urges the prompt embodiment of the Vladivostok accord in a treaty or an agreement approved by law. The present negotiations seem to have reached an impasse, even though the Vladivostok accords established ceilings on the number of nuclear delivery vehicles far above the present levels on either side. The resolution is intended to underscore the importance the Congress attaches to reaching a final agreement on the principles embodied in the Vladivostok accord. Furthermore, the Congress is eager to move to the next stage in the strategic arms limitation talks, which this subsection indicates should both a substantial reduction in the number of strategic nuclear weapons on each side and the achievement of approximate equality in total nuclear destructive capability. That capability is measured by the number, yield, throw-weight and accuracy of the nuclear weapons each side possesses. It is quite possible for the United States to be ahead of the U.S.S.R. in some of these and behind in others, so long as our total destructive capabilities are roughly equal. This formulation would allow each side some flexibility to determine on which of these characteristics of its strategic forces it desires to concentrate, so long as that concentration does not result in the development of a superior destructive capability. Such an agreement would be designed to prevent an unending series of new ventures in the arms race which could occur even with a reduction in the numbers of missiles allowed on each side. The Soviets could seek to make their missiles larger and larger while the United States could seek technological improvements which would greatly increase accuracy and explosive yield, thus merely prolonging the arms race by rechanneling it away from numbers of weapons and into size and quality.

Mr. Speaker, I think this is an important and necessary resolution and it is the product of a bipartisan effort of the Members of the International Security and Scientific Affairs Subcommittee. I urge the House to accept it.

Mr. ANDERSON of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of House Concurrent Resolution 570 which expresses strengthening of international safeguards against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Ninety-seven nations have ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and 13 other nations have signed, but not yet ratified the treaty. This treaty urges the nuclear weapons states to pursue "negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament."

At the present time, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and the People's Republic of

China have all exploded nuclear weapons. India has tested nuclear devices. Mr. Speaker, the fact that several of the world's strongest and most stable nations now possess nuclear weapons is frightening enough. But we now know that nuclear materials which may be used for the production of nuclear weapons exist in approximately 30 nations. I find the prospect of nuclear proliferation to many small and unstable nations to be absolutely abhorrent. The threat of terrorist blackmail, and even all-out nuclear war, will become more and more ominous if such proliferation is not halted now.

The intent of this resolution is to urge the prompt embodiment in an agreement of the understandings contained in the Vladivostok Accord, to urge a verifiable agreement ending underground nuclear explosions, and to urge a halt on further transfers of nuclear fuel, technology, and equipment.

The time for rationally dealing with nuclear proliferation is rapidly drawing to a close. I urge adoption of this resolution.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of House Concurrent Resolution 570, arms control and disarmament negotiations. The resolution adopts a responsible, balanced approach to the problem of nuclear proliferation.

As a member of the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs that held 6 days of hearings on this subject, I urge its passage.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ZABLOCKI) that the House suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution House Congressional Resolution 570, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof), the rules were suspended and the concurrent resolution, as amended, was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the concurrent resolution just agreed to, House Congressional Resolution 570.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Wisconsin?

There was no objection.

NATURAL GAS PIPELINE SAFETY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1976

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 12168) to amend the National Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1977, as amended.

The clerk read as follows:

H.R. 12168

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act Amendments of 1976".

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 2. Section 15 of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by striking out "and" after "June 30, 1975," and by inserting "\$500,000 for the period beginning July 1, 1976, and ending September 30, 1976, and \$4,664,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1977"; and

(2) in subsection (b), by striking out "and" after "June 30, 1975," and by inserting "and \$2,500,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1977" after "June 30, 1976".

OTHER AMENDMENTS TO THE NATURAL GAS PIPELINE SAFETY ACT OF 1968

SEC. 3. (a) Section 2 of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 is amended—

(1) by striking out "and" at the end of paragraph (8) and inserting in lieu thereof "except that it shall not include any pipeline facilities within a State which transport gas from an interstate gas pipeline to a direct sales customer within such State purchasing gas for its own consumption"; and

(2) by redesignating paragraph (9) as (10), and inserting after paragraph (8) the following new paragraph:

"(9) 'intrastate pipeline transportation' means pipeline facilities and transportation of gas within a State which are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission under the Natural Gas Act, except that it shall include pipeline facilities within a State which transport gas from an interstate gas pipeline to a direct sales customer within such State purchasing gas for its own consumption; and".

(b) Section 3(a) of such Act is amended by striking out "minimum" from the first and last sentences.

(c) Section 3(b) of such Act is amended by striking out "minimum" from the first sentence, and by amending the last sentence to read as follows: "Any State agency may adopt additional or more stringent standards for intrastate pipeline transportation which are compatible with the Federal standards, but may not adopt or continue in force after the Federal standards have become effective any standards applicable to interstate transmission facilities."

(d) Section 5(a) of such Act is amended—

(1) in the first sentence, by striking out "pipeline facilities and the transportation of gas (not subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission under the Natural Gas Act) within a State" and inserting in lieu thereof "intrastate pipeline transportation";

(2) in clause (1), by striking out "pipeline facilities and transportation of gas" and inserting in lieu thereof "transportation"; and

(3) by striking out "(2) has adopted each Federal safety standard applicable to such pipeline facilities and transportation of gas established under this Act as of the date of the certification;" and inserting in lieu thereof "(2) has adopted, as of the date of the certification, each Federal safety standard established under this Act which is applicable to such transportation or, with respect to each such Federal safety standard established within one hundred and twenty days before the date of the certification, is taking steps pursuant to State law to adopt such standard;"

(e) Section 5(b) of such Act is amended by striking out "With respect to" and all that follows down through "actions to—" and by inserting in lieu thereof the following: "With respect to any intrastate pipeline



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 15, 1976

Dear Senator Mondale:

I am writing with reference to Senate Resolution 221 which was passed by the Senate on December 12, 1975. As we indicated in our November 4 report on the Resolution, the Department of State fully supports the objective of the Resolution, and especially welcomes the strong Congressional support of our current efforts to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency in its safeguard responsibilities. This Congressional endorsement will also be particularly useful in our consultations with other supplier nations as we seek common policies with respect to the transfer of nuclear equipment and technology.

We will, of course, keep the Congress fully informed as to the progress we make in these consultations, and trust that the spirit of partnership between the Executive Branch and the Congress, exemplified by this Resolution, will continue to characterize all our efforts in this most important field.

Best regards,

A handwritten signature in black ink, which appears to be "H. Kissinger", is written over a horizontal line.

Henry A. Kissinger

The Honorable
Walter F. Mondale,
United States Senate.

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary
Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We appreciated receiving your message regarding S. Res. 221, the resolution we introduced which was adopted by the Senate last December 12th. As you know, the intent of this measure was to emphasize the strong concern of the Senate about the sale of uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities to non-nuclear weapons countries and to urge the highest level effort by the United States to prevent proliferation resulting from the spread of sensitive nuclear equipment and technology.

We note with wholehearted approval the success of the Administration in persuading South Korea to forego the purchase of a plutonium reprocessing plant and would urge that maximum effort now be devoted to the transaction between West Germany and Brazil and other sales that are currently under discussion. Through such action, we would hope that a climate could be created wherein countries -- particularly supplier nations -- could reach agreement on the controls needed to protect against nuclear proliferation.

As you know, experts have recently come before the Congress to recommend a complete moratorium on the export of nuclear materials, equipment and technology. While we sympathize with the desire to demonstrate the gravity of this issue and the urgency of the need to reduce the risk of proliferation, we are concerned that certain actions could prove counterproductive. A total ban on exports could, for example, merely increase the credibility of those who argue the United States is not a reliable supplier of reactor fuel, and therefore that each nation must develop its own productive capability. A unilateral moratorium might similarly encourage countries to deal with other suppliers that have traditionally shown less restraint than the United States. Finally, we are worried that blanket criticisms of the International Atomic Energy Agency, however constructively they might be intended, may be misinterpreted abroad and that certain countries might question the value of subscribing to the I.A.E.A.'s safeguards program.

We firmly believe that the danger of proliferation deserves the highest level consideration by our government and by other nuclear supplying nations. It is our judgment that negotiation offers the only real hope of a solution to this problem. While only a short time has elapsed since the passage of S. Res. 221, we would like you to know of our concern that rapid progress may be the only way to forestall pressures that could undermine the hope of a negotiated solution. More specifically, we would hope that both President Ford and you, personally, might publicly express the priority attached by the United States to this problem, and reiterate this concern in private discussions with foreign leaders.

We would be grateful for your attention to this matter.

With best wishes,

John Pastore

Walter F. Mondale

TALKING POINTS
RESOLUTION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

Last Friday, the Senate passed a resolution which you introduced with Senator Pastore dealing with the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation.

Under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, strict international safeguards have been applied to the sale of nuclear reactors to non-nuclear weapons countries.

However, countries are now attempting to buy not only reactors, but plants that enrich uranium and separate plutonium from the spent fuel of nuclear reactors.

It is much more difficult to safeguard enrichment and plutonium separation plants than nuclear reactors. These sensitive facilities produce weapons grade materials that could easily be stolen or diverted for military purposes.

Until this year, nuclear suppliers had never agreed to fully provide enrichment and reprocessing technology to non-nuclear weapons countries. The US still maintains a moratorium on such sales because fully adequate international safeguards have not been developed.

However, this past Spring, West Germany agreed to make this technology available to Brazil, and France came to a similar agreement with South Korea.

What is behind these transactions?

It would take a \$500 million chemical separation plant serving 30 giant reactors to make plutonium separation commercially feasible.

Right now, South Korea does not have a single power reactor in operation. Brazil will have only two functioning reactors by the end of the decade.

The most plausible explanation for the recent sales is a desire on the part of Brazil and South Korea to open the door toward nuclear weapons status. Brazil, in this context, has not yet ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The resolution adopted by the Senate -- S. Res. 221 -- would urge the President to seek urgent agreement among nuclear supplying countries for a strengthening and broadening of international safeguards over sensitive nuclear equipment and technology.

PAGE 2 - Talking Points on Nuclear Non-Proliferation Resolution

In the interim, it would urge agreement among nuclear suppliers to exercise the utmost restraint over the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology until adequate safeguards can be achieved.

I am pleased that the Senate adopted this resolution, and hopeful that it will help add momentum to the drive for more control over what technology is transferred, and under what circumstances.

No nation, especially the US, can afford the chaos and instability that would result if countries the world over decided to develop an independent nuclear weapons capability.

Mr. President:

The Senate is today considering S. Res. 221, a resolution which Senator Pastore and I introduced concerning the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation as a result of the international transfer of nuclear fuel cycle facilities.

This resolution was unanimously approved by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations last week. I am gratified by the Committee's action because I believe it shows the growing Congressional and public concern about a problem that has surfaced only in the past year, one that is somewhat technical in nature, but of enormous importance in its implications for world peace and security. The problem at issue is the possibility of nuclear proliferation as a result of the international sale of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology.

Nuclear supplying nations have for many years sold traditional nuclear reactors, provided recipient nations have agreed to abide by the safeguards enforced by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Nevertheless, nuclear suppliers had never agreed to fully provide for construction of enrichment and reprocessing plants of a complete fuel cycle facility. Agreements negotiated this past spring between West Germany and Brazil, and between France and South Korea have now shattered this precedent and raised doubt about the I.A.E.A.'s ability to prevent future proliferation of nuclear weapons states.

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To understand this problem, it is necessary to take a brief look at the fuel cycle and the kind of facilities and materials involved. A standard lightwater reactor will "burn" uranium and leave behind waste products including plutonium mixed with other highly radioactive materials. The fuel for reactors is produced by enrichment plants which concentrate the fissionable material contained in natural uranium. Reprocessing plants can be used to separate plutonium from the spent fuel of nuclear reactors. This plutonium can then be mixed with enriched uranium for re-use in a reactor.

Lightwater reactors are subject to strict controls over the supply of enriched uranium. Because the waste products of these plants are so highly radioactive, there is little danger of theft or diversion of this material to military purposes. Nevertheless, ✓ if countries have the technology and the facilities to produce enriched uranium or to reprocess plutonium, the danger of proliferation, or of terrorism and nuclear blackmail are magnified a thousand times over. A quantity of plutonium the size of a grapefruit would be enough to build a bomb of enormous destructive potential. Once countries can manufacture this material, even in modest quantities, they can, without much difficulty, take the added step of manufacturing an explosive device. Unless strict physical security is maintained, small quantities could be stolen that would enable a dedicated group of criminals or terrorists to hold major cities hostage to their demands.

Because of these dangers, plutonium reprocessing technology has essentially been confined to research and to weapons production. The United States does not have a single plant licensed to reprocess plutonium for commercial use. Nor does it make sense from an economic standpoint for all but a handful of countries to develop a complete fuel cycle facility. Only a few nations have a nuclear industry that is sufficiently advanced to support an enrichment and reprocessing center. According to the New York Times "it would take a \$500 million chemical reprocessing plant serving thirty giant nuclear-powered reactors to achieve the economies of scale that would make plutonium recycling commercially feasible."

Brazil will have one, perhaps two, functioning nuclear reactors by the end of this decade. South Korea has no power reactors in operation at the present time. Why do these countries want to assume the risks and the substantial costs involved in building enrichment and reprocessing plants? If there is no valid economic reason for their decisions, what other motivation is involved? The only answer may be the perceived advantages of becoming a nuclear power or at least gaining the technology and training to exercise that option at some point in the future. Brazil's failure to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty is extremely disturbing in this context, and perhaps even more alarming is the possibility of weapons production in a potential trouble spot like South Korea.

If Brazil and South Korea were the only countries likely to purchase sensitive equipment and technology, there would be grounds

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for serious concern. But many other countries have expressed an interest in purchasing similar facilities, including Pakistan, Taiwan, Argentina and countries in the Middle East.

Should even a few of these countries obtain enrichment and plutonium separation plants, there would be an enormous temptation to build a bomb in case a rival nation were doing the same.

What checks exist to prevent such action? Many countries, like Brazil, have yet to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty. For such nations, there are no constraints other than the limitations imposed on suppliers on available technology and the effectiveness of safeguards required by suppliers including those enforced by the International Atomic Energy Agency -- IAEA.

The IAEA is now rushing to develop a program that can prevent diversion of fissionable materials from uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing plants. But the effectiveness of these safeguards has never been fully tested. I think a number of leading experts are right in asking whether this sensitive technology should be transferred to non-nuclear weapons countries under any circumstances. At a minimum, transfer of this technology should be confined to regional, rather than small, uneconomic, national centers. Such regional plants would be multinationally owned and subject to strict international control.

Earlier this year, the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference recommended a study of regional fuel cycle centers. Since that session, the United States has been meeting with other

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nuclear suppliers to try to strengthen the controls over dissemination of sensitive equipment and technology. While there has been some progress in the discussions, added public pressure is needed to ensure that this issue receives the high level attention it deserves.

The purpose of the resolution we are considering today is to help focus US and world attention on this critical problem. It would put the full weight of the Senate behind the effort to broaden and strengthen the IAEA's safeguards program and, in the interim, to secure restraint in the transfer of sensitive equipment and technology. It is meant to tell all suppliers, including France and West Germany, that they should avoid any transfer of this equipment and technology to non-nuclear weapons countries unless it is to plants that are regionally located and under multinational management.

The present international regime to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation is far from totally satisfactory, but it has taken more than a decade of cooperative effort to reach this point.

✓ These efforts have been fully justified, for no country can afford ~~the~~ chaos and instability that would follow if every nation decided to develop its own nuclear weapons capability. We have now reached a turning point: we can either build on past progress or we allow the means for nuclear weapons production to be scattered worldwide without adequate forethought, and with no convincing means of control.

I think the choice is clear, and I am hopeful that the full Senate will vote to approve unanimously the pending resolution.

RUSSELL B. LONG, LA., CHAIRMAN

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

MICHAEL STERN, STAFF DIRECTOR
DONALD V. MOOREHEAD, CHIEF MINORITY COUNSEL

September 19, 1975

Honorable John Sparkman
Chairman
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear John:

As you may know, on July 26th, Senator Pastore and I introduced S. Res. 221 concerning the international sale of plutonium separation and uranium enrichment equipment. This resolution was motivated by the recent agreement between West Germany and Brazil which could permit a country that has refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty to obtain the means to produce atomic weapons.

In June, the Committee on Foreign Relations held two days of hearings on the Brazil-West German transaction. Ample evidence was presented at that hearing of the strong concern within both the Congress and the Administration about the implications of this and future sales. That concern is prompted by the lack of any economic justification for Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, Pakistan and other countries that are reportedly interested in this technology to develop their own fuel reprocessing plants and by the inadequacy of existing, indeed perhaps any, international safeguards to assure that special nuclear materials from fuel cycle facilities are not used to build explosive devices.

Although it is too late to stop the West German-Brazilian agreement, it is not too late to ensure that enrichment and reprocessing equipment, if it is transferred to non-nuclear weapon states, would be subject to more stringent international safeguards, including a requirement for regional rather than national fuel cycle facilities.

The thrust of the Pastore-Mondale resolution would be to put the Senate clearly on record in favor of a top-level effort by our negotiators to achieve improved international safeguards to govern these sales, and to urge restraint on the part of supplier nations until effective controls are in place.

In my judgment, this is not a controversial measure. It is one I would hope the Administration could support. However, there is a danger should we fail to act that our silence following the agreement between West Germany and Brazil could be interpreted as acquiescence in the spread of this equipment without effective international control.

I would hope that the Committee might review S. Res. 221 at the earliest possible opportunity. Given the record that has already been established on this issue, it might be approved with little or no opposition. More than 30 Senators from both parties have cosponsored S. Res. 199, an earlier version of this measure.

Thank you in advance for your consideration. Please let me know if you would like additional information, or if there is anything I can do to help.

Warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Walter F. Mondale". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name.

Walter F. Mondale

C Sponsors of S. Res. 199

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* [Let them know when Resolution is to
be brought to the floor because they
would like to take part in the debate]



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