


OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

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SECRET/SENSITIVE
ATTACHMENT

INFORMATION

Memo No. 1070-77
June 5, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 

SUBJECT: Talking Points on European Visit for Cabinet Meeting, Monday, June 7, 1977, 9:00 a.m., The Cabinet Room

I am attaching at Tab I talking points on the results of your meetings in Europe for tomorrow morning's Cabinet meeting.

I have also included:

- Tab A, your report to the President on the European visit. The copy indicates his guidance on your recommendations.
- Tab B, the Objectives paper for your talks with Vorster.
- Tab C, the Vienna press conference following your meetings with Vorster.

(NOTE: For your background information, on page 4, Tab A, the President asked you to report the results of your request to Andy Young to raise the need for release of prisoners with Kaunda. Young, in fact, did not have the opportunity to raise this, and State has just sent out instructions to Embassy Lusaka on this issue.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT
REVIEW ON JUNE 5, 1983
(WITH SECRET/SENSITIVE
ATTACHMENT)

DECLASSIFIED
16 7/24/06 NSC 16
N255-06-074
BY: BML NARA, DATE 8/7/06

THE CABINET MEETING, JUNE 6, 1977

1. I would like briefly to run through the results of my recent meetings in Europe. Over a ten-day period from May 14-23, I visited Portugal, Spain, Austria, Yugoslavia and the United Kingdom, in behalf of the President.
2. Before getting into the details, I might note the very real enthusiasm there is abroad -- perhaps with the exception of Prime Minister Vorster who I will get to in a minute -- for the President's foreign policy initiatives. The fact that he is moving so positively on so many fronts so early in his Administration to realize desired direction and progress.
3. Our friends abroad see clearly that the President does not wish to subordinate or neglect any area requiring attention, that where he personally cannot be involved, he has sent emissaries to begin the work that must be done. (e.g., Rosalynn's current visit to Latin America; Secretary of State's SALT, Middle East, CIEC missions; Clifford mission, as well as Vice President's two overseas assignments.)
4. The talks in Vienna with South African Prime Minister Vorster were the central element in my most recent visit abroad, permitting us to carry out an important aspect of the President's African policy.
5. In all, my mission had three basic purposes:
 - to emphasize the importance we attach to human rights and our support for the return to the democratic process in Portugal and Spain,
 - to discuss our policy on Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa with Vorster in Vienna, and to continue consultations with the British on these issues,
 - thirdly, to emphasize in my meetings with Tito the importance the President attaches to Yugoslavia's independence and political unity and our respect for Yugoslavia's role in the non-aligned movement.

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CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT
REVIEW ON JUNE 6, 1997

DECLASSIFIED
per 7/24/06 NSC 14.
NLTIC-66-074
BY Btz NARA, DATE 8/7/06

Southern Africa

1. As you know, Cy Vance, Andy Young and I have been working very closely under the President's direction on African policy issues over the past several weeks. Andy and I consulted in Lisbon, and while I was in Vienna, he was at the Maputo Conference and visiting several countries in Africa, including South Africa.
2. The talks with Vorster may have produced some significant progress; time will tell.
3. On Rhodesia, he went beyond his previous position in agreeing: "To support British-American efforts to get the directly interested parties to agree to an independence constitution and the necessary transitional arrangements including the holding of elections in which all can take part equally so that Zimbabwe can achieve independence during 1978, and peace. Likewise, every effort will be made to bring about a de-escalation of violence and it is believed that the negotiating process will be the best way to achieve this end."
4. Cy Vance and the State Department are now taking the lead in working very closely with the British on consultations with the interested parties (our representative is Ambassador Low) and on the development of constitutional principles which Foreign Secretary Owen expects to have ready by June 20, after the Commonwealth Conference and prior to his travelling to Africa in July.
5. On Namibia, I emphasized our commitment to Namibian independence in the framework of UN Resolution 385.
6. We also emphasized the need for a responsible and impartial Administration that does not prejudge the structure of the permanent government and does not represent Turnhalle.
7. We stressed the need for release of political prisoners, and we stressed the need for the South Africans to set a timetable for their withdrawal.
8. Vorster agreed to meet again with the Contact Group of five Western nations -- U.S. U.K. France, FRG and Canada -- with the understanding that we want his detailed views on the nature of the interim authority. That meeting will take place in Cape Town on June 8-10.

9. On South Africa, I emphasized that unlike previous Administrations we believe there must be social progress and transformation in South Africa at the same time that there must be progress on Rhodesia and Namibia.
10. I delivered this message in a non-confrontational way, but at the same time, as clearly and candidly as possible, and I stated it again in a lengthy press conference in Vienna following the meeting with Vorster. During the meetings there was no compromise; Vorster did not yield on his commitment to apartheid.
11. Vorster has our message. He may be more helpful than in the past on Rhodesia and Namibia. On South Africa, at least in the near term, we must be prepared for further tragedy, possibly on the anniversary of the Soweto riots, June 16.

British Reaction to our African Policy

1. Because of their investments in South Africa and the vulnerability of the British economy, the British are somewhat uneasy about our new policy, but following my talks in London, Foreign Secretary Owen gave it his public support.
2. We will have to coordinate closely on the Zimbabwe development fund. The British, based on their experience elsewhere in Africa (Kenya, Tanzania) think it essential to guarantee white Rhodesian pensions.

Portugal

1. I had good talks with Eanes and Soares. Fragile democratic institutions are now in place following the 1974 revolution. Portugal's biggest problem is its economy.
2. As a result of my meetings, State and Treasury are working with our embassy in Lisbon and with the Portuguese to amend our existing loan for immediate use by the Portuguese prior to the availability of a larger consortium loan later this year.

3. Based on my talks, I believe we have the chance for early progress in renewing our Azores base agreements.
4. While this is somewhat sensitive and should not be made public, Cy Vance and the State Department, working with AID, Labor and American unions, will be working for ways to help strengthen the moderate unions in Portugal.

Spain

1. In Spain, the transformation from the Franco era to democracy is still underway; we must now await the June 15 Parliamentary elections -- the first real elections according to King Juan Carlos -- in more than fifty years.
2. I emphasized the President's support and encouragement for the King and the Spanish people in this process (and the President subsequently called the King); we emphasized our support for Spain's entry into NATO and for a larger role, generally, for Spain in Western Europe,
3. While the primary focus at present in Madrid is on the political process, Spain also faces considerable economic difficulties which I believe we as a government will have to give greater attention to later this year.

Yugoslavia

1. During my visit to Belgrade -- and based on reports we have had since the visit -- the Yugoslavs made clear their pleasure at these early high-level consultations with the Carter Administration.
2. Unlike the Ford and Nixon Administrations, we did not lump together a visit to Yugoslavia with visits to Poland, Romania or other Warsaw Pact countries.
3. A statement of support by the President for Yugoslavia's independence and integrity and our respect for Yugoslavia's nonaligned position was well received by Tito.
4. The very fact of the announcement of my visit permitted us to negotiate terms satisfactory to us on an export license for the Krsko nuclear reactor.

5. I believe we have turned to a new and more positive chapter in our relations with Yugoslavia.



THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

To VP
cc Vance, 3619
JC.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

May 24, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: The Vice President *ufr*

SUBJECT: Recommended Actions Resulting from My
European Trip

The following highlights the key points to emerge from my talks with South African Prime Minister Vorster and my meetings in Portugal, Spain, Yugoslavia and London.

Southern Africa

My talks on Southern Africa really came in two parts -- those I held with Vorster and those with Prime Minister Callaghan.

The talks with Vorster went as well as could be expected. I based my presentation on the list of objectives attached at Tab A. I believe I succeeded in conveying clearly to him your new policy: that the character of our future relations will be decided by whether there is a progressive transformation of South African society as well as progress on Rhodesia and Namibia. I hope he understands that this policy will be enduring because it expresses our values and is rooted in the changes that have taken place in our own society.

It is particularly important that our message and the discussion on apartheid, about which he was quite unyielding, did not seem in any way to provoke a negative reaction on Rhodesia or Namibia. In fact, I believe our position on these issues was strengthened by the straight talk on apartheid and our assumption that Vorster's policies are more of a plus than a minus for the Communists.

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BY 305 NARA, DATE 8/7/06

The British are very nervous about our new policy. Though Owen endorsed it strongly and publicly, almost all the British press (which is 90% Tory) was negative.

The main point of my visit to Chequers was for Callaghan to express his concern at the consequences for Great Britain of our Southern African policies. He stressed the vulnerability of the British economy, and the consequent difficulty South Africa had always posed for the Labour party.

The Prime Minister emphasized he was not proud of the fact, but he had to look to their interests, rather than their principles. He has ordered a study of the extent of British dependence on South Africa and will share it with us. He wants to consult closely on the options for putting pressure on the Vorster government.

I believe that four years from now we will be gratified that we staked out our position clearly and early. But, if there is no progress in Southern Africa, I also believe we will come under significant pressure to back off. Whatever the future holds, we should anticipate strains in our relationship with the British as this process goes forward, and we will have to make an extra effort to stay together on this issue.

Rhodesia

The main point of progress in my talks with Vorster on Rhodesia was his agreement to the following public language:

"Prime Minister Vorster agreed to support British-American efforts to get the directly interested parties to agree to an independence constitution and the necessary transitional arrangements including the holding of elections in which all can take part equally so that Zimbabwe can achieve independence during 1978, and peace. Likewise every effort will be made to bring about a de-escalation of violence and it is believed that the negotiating process will be the best way to achieve this end."

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The next step is to put forward a draft constitution, or at the minimum, the principles on which such a constitution can be drafted. I believe the statement we negotiated with Vorster will be helpful in putting pressure on Smith. I believe he has clearly made the decision to push in the right direction. But Vorster needs something, as he put it, "to sell to Smith."

*designate person
level to participate
?*

The British are working on a rather relaxed schedule. They tried to avoid being pinned down on an exact time when they would produce some draft constitutional principles. Owen finally committed himself to have a list of proposed principles provided to us by the end of June.

However, he plans to go to Southern Africa in July to sell these principles. This may leave little time for us to assure ourselves that what the British develop, we can live with.

I suggest we pursue the development of principles aggressively with the British. We must particularly be on guard against efforts on their part to build in special privileges for whites which we could find it hard to accept.

On the Zimbabwe Development Fund, the British accept that it will not be a "buy-out." However, they believe it essential to be able to assure white civil servants in Rhodesia that their pensions are valid. Otherwise, they will flee the country and the administration would collapse. Owen suggested that within the Zimbabwe Fund the role of each participant might be somewhat different. I believe he has in mind that the British, along with some of the Europeans, might underwrite the Rhodesian pensions. I believe we should study Great Britain's experience with earlier problems such as this -- e.g., in Kenya and Tanzania -- and that we should work closely with the British to develop the most effective and acceptable role for each participant in the fund.

Namibia

I believe that Namibia is the key to prompt progress in all of Southern Africa. It is the focus of UN efforts to develop proposed sanctions and, if there is no progress,

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these could be put forward in the UN Security Council as early as June. If we can make progress on Namibia, it will set a positive tone for the rest of the issues we face in Southern Africa. If we do not, we may face sanctions on South Africa that could lead to a deteriorating situation in which any progress on any subject may prove difficult.

I am encouraged by the fact that much of what is necessary to create an independent Namibia, in accordance with UN resolution 385, is almost in place. The South Africans are committed to national elections, in which all can participate (including SWAPO), for a constitutional conference to define an independent Namibia, the South Africans are willing to have the UN become involved to insure the elections are fair and internationally acceptable.

The key issue is the character of the interim administration. Vorster feels strongly it should be based on the Turnhalle Conference. Everyone else rejects that and wants a system that is impartial as to the kind of permanent government that is to be created.

Vorster said that he was personally committed to a Turnhalle-type interim authority and would resign rather than abandon it. He has already downgraded Turnhalle from a permanent to an interim government. The trick will be to find some compromise in which Vorster can say he is implementing Turnhalle and the rest of the world can feel confident that the interim administration does not prejudice the structure of the permanent government. The tradeoff is between the scope and power of the interim government and the extent to which it looks like Turnhalle.

*Any
recommendation
?*

I proposed that Vorster agree to turn over Namibian political prisoners to Namibia, and in the event of a difference of opinion whether a particular prisoner was political or criminal, that a body of international jurors review the case and make a determination. Vorster said that he would give this proposal favorable consideration. He made the point that SWAPO detainees in Zambia and elsewhere would also have to be released; if so, he would release those held in South Africa. I said this was basically a fair position but that South Africa should set the example by releasing its prisoners first. Following our talks, I asked Andy Young to raise the need for release of prisoners with Kaunda.

*Report results
to me*

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Further down the road, there is a serious question as to when and how South Africa will pull their forces out of Namibia. We thought that the Five Nation Contact Group had gotten an agreement from the South Africans to get their forces out by the time of independence, a plan which would be implemented subsequently. This could become a crucial issue, but we have time to work on it.

*Do we
still think
this?*

The interim administrative authority is far more urgent. The Five Nation Contact Group will meet on Thursday in New York, and we have proposed to Vorster that it meet in Capetown before the end of the month to discuss South African ideas about the interim authority. I believe it would be worthwhile for you to write to Vorster reflecting on the Vienna meeting in a positive way and emphasizing the importance of a constructive response to the Five on the interim authority's structure and function.

If you agree with this approach, I will work with Zbigniew Brzezinski and Cy Vance to have such a letter prepared.

*do so -
may include
all our points
in the ltr.*

South Africa

On South Africa, we created the most positive possible atmosphere for Vorster and his colleagues to hear and appreciate our message. I stressed repeatedly that we would welcome any progress, but Vorster came to defend the rightness of his cause. I must say, however, that this defense was perfunctory and, in the end, he simply said that it was "all right if we kicked him in the pants," he was used to it; but asked that we not "kick him in the teeth." I understand this to mean that we could put pressure on South Africa but we should avoid attacking him personally.

I cannot see whether there will be any progress in South Africa. My guess is that Vorster will seek to compromise on Rhodesia and Namibia, and petty apartheid to keep the wolf from the door. This, at least, is how he acted in Vienna. Paradoxically, our insistence on progress in all three areas appears to have given increased leverage, at least on Rhodesia and Namibia.

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But the prospects for South Africa are not bright and we must be prepared for further tragedy, possibly on the anniversary of the Soweto riots, June 16. It is quite likely that we will come in for some criticism should renewed demonstrations take place.

On the other hand, we will probably have to consider, in the near future, sending a warning shot across Vorster's bow on apartheid. We will need to do this to demonstrate our seriousness, both to Vorster and our public opinion. I understand the State Department will be developing some possible proposals.

After Andy Young's return, I believe that Cy Vance should put a team together to produce an assessment of where we are headed in Southern Africa, together with a set of policy options. I have prepared a memorandum to that effect to Cy Vance (at Tab B). The options paper should probably be considered by the NSC. *ok*

Portugal

President Eanes and Prime Minister Soares are moving ahead as best they can to strengthen Portugal's fragile democracy. But the revolution has left the country in serious economic difficulties, and U.S. assistance is essential. The US Treasury loan negotiated by the last administration has proven so complicated it cannot be used by the Portuguese. I recommend that State and Treasury follow up to amend the loan so that it is usable immediately. This will help to bridge the gap in Portugal's foreign exchange position prior to the availability of the multilateral loan later this year. In this regard, the United States should press all of the potential consortium loan participants to make a firm commitment at the next meeting of the consortium countries in June. *follow up*

Azores Base Negotiations. The Portuguese also indicated that they want to move ahead rapidly with a new Azores Base Agreement. They wish to avoid getting caught up in a dispute with the Azoreans over the terms of the agreement. Accordingly, they would like to negotiate realistic terms quickly through diplomatic channels, and then hold a brief, formal negotiation with the Azoreans participating to conclude the new agreement formally. I recommend that the Department of State, in coordination with the other agencies involved develop a proposed figure for your approval and then move ahead quickly with the Government of Portugal to reach the recommended terms of a new agreement for your consideration. *I agree*

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US-Portuguese Labor Cooperation. It is clear that Portugal will not regain full stability unless it is possible to break the grip the communists have on Portugal's unions. The Portuguese were receptive to the idea of having more exchange visits allowing moderate labor leaders from Portugal to visit the United States to gain a better understanding of the structure and operations of U.S. unions. I recommend that State, Labor and AID develop recommendations, on a priority basis, for exchanges, assistance and programs, that would help the moderate unions in Portugal to increase their strength and effectiveness. ok

Spain. I was pleased to learn that you had telephoned King Juan Carlos on the day after my visit to Madrid. I do not believe any other immediate actions are required as a result of the visit. We must await the June 15 Spanish parliamentary elections and the Spanish actions to establish a parliament following those elections. In my talks with King Juan Carlos he referred to the US-Spanish Friendship Agreement -- which governs our military base rights -- noting that he believes that we can expect one or more of Spain's political parties to call for changes to the agreement or for removal of the bases, and that the U.S. and Spanish governments should cooperate closely and be prepared to deal effectively with any such challenge to the agreement. I believe State and Defense should give attention to this contingency to ensure that we are not caught flatfooted should a challenge to the bases emerge as a result of the June elections. I suggest that you consider a visit to King Juan Carlos (his preference) or invite him to the United States later this year or next, by which time the Spanish democratic process should have developed considerably.

Austria. No actions are required as a result of my meetings with Chancellor Kreisky in Vienna. He clearly is pleased and flattered by the attention your Administration is giving to Austria.

Yugoslavia. On the eve of his 85th birthday, President Tito appeared in remarkable good health. On several occasions during the visit, Yugoslav officials made clear their satisfaction with the change in U.S. Administrations and your explicit statements of support for Yugoslavia's independence and political unity, and your respect for Yugoslavia's role in the non-aligned movement.

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Tito was very pleased that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has approved the license for the Krsko nuclear power plant. He took it as a symbol of the possibilities for further US-Yugoslav cooperation. I think we have already gone some distance to dispel a legacy of mistrust and suspicion from the last Administration.

I raised the question of CSCE and our plan to treat the Belgrade meeting in a constructive manner. Tito was quick to pre-empt any thought that Yugoslavia's human rights record should be criticized.

The Yugoslavs raised with me their desire to have both countries continue our bilateral scientific exchange programs. It has been funded by counterpart funds which are scheduled to run out in 1978.

Tito is pessimistic about both the Middle East and Africa. He believes the Israeli elections mark a real setback to hopes for a settlement; at the same time, he concurs that if there is to be a settlement we must move this year. The Yugoslavs said that the PLO has informed them that it will agree to recognize Israel's right to exist as soon as the timing is right tactically in the settlement process.

*now is
the time*

Tito was also pessimistic about the Horn of Africa, noting that his government was working now to encourage a peaceful resolution of the Ethiopia/Eritrea dispute, but that he thought there would be hostilities. Tito raised the question of US-Yugoslav military cooperation. This is significant because he has been reluctant on this issue in the past. He thought that this issue had been mishandled by the former Administration. He wants the cooperation to be low key and was particularly annoyed at the publicity given last year to certain Yugoslav requests -- e.g., the TOW missile.

As you know, Admiral Holloway has just concluded a visit to Yugoslavia in which he was presented with a fresh list of military items of interest to the Yugoslav Armed Forces. The fact that Tito raised it means that it is a political matter with the Yugoslavs. I recommend that you approve a priority interdepartmental study on the issue of military equipment for Yugoslavia. I don't know

*ok. I
agree that
an early
decision on this
is
important*

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if we can meet the Yugoslav requests without compromising either U.S. technology or security, but I don't think Tito would raise it if they were just fronting for Soviet intelligence. Moreover, I think it is in our strategic political interests to develop ties with the Yugoslavs in the military field to the extent possible.

cc: Secretary Vance
Dr. Brzezinski

OBJECTIVES

The purpose of this meeting is to inform the SAG of the desired objective of American foreign policy with regard to its actions in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa.

ON RHODESIA

1. South Africa support for the Owen mission--in public and private.
2. Press Smith to negotiate a settlement providing majority rule through elections in 1978.
3. Publicly accept a deadline of 1978 for the full independence of Zimbabwe.
4. Agree to work with any fairly and freely chosen government of Zimbabwe.
5. Restrain Smith's incursions into Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia.

ON NAMIBIA

Consistent with our support for UNSC Res. 385:

1. A responsible and impartial interim administration, acceptable to the parties, that does not prejudice the structure of the permanent government and, for example, does not resemble Turnhalle.
2. Election laws acceptable to UN providing fair equal participation by all Namibians in national election.
3. Release of all political prisoners (e.g. Toivo).
4. Suspension of legislation resisting full participation in the political process--e.g., the Terrorism Act, restrictions on assembly and speech, etc.
5. Agreement to a plan for a phased withdrawal of the instruments of authority of the SAG by the time of independence in consultation with those mainly involved.
6. Public agreement in principle to such a withdrawal.

ON SOUTH AFRICA

1. A progressive transformation of South African society:
2. The establishment of a new course toward full and equal political participation by all South Africans.
3. Proper initiation of a genuine dialogue about this process with leaders truly representative of all of South Africa's population.

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ON 7/24/06 BY NSC 14-
NLT-TC-06-074
BY BJS NARA DATE 8/7/06

4. The repeal of all laws and restrictions which discriminate or inhibit full political participation or interferes with human rights.

OVERALL

1. An understanding by Vorster and the SAG that their future relations with the U.S. will be determined by whether or not there is evident and early progress of the kind described in the preceding three sections. Given such progress, the SAG will have our support and our relations will improve. Without it, our relations will inevitably deteriorate.
2. The U.S. government will not defend a SAG which discriminates and denies full political participation and human rights of her people.



THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 24, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FROM: The Vice President *AM*
SUBJECT: Follow-Up Steps on Africa

As a result of Andy Young's trip to Africa and my talks with Vorster and Callaghan, we have gained a far better understanding of our current situation and of what must be done to move things along in the direction we seek.

I think it would be very helpful if you would have the State Department call together those who have been engaged in our African efforts to discuss where we are and the next steps required on the questions listed below -- this might then take the form of a paper for the NSC's consideration.

Namibia

- What should be our stance at the next round of meetings in Capetown?
- What if Vorster has nothing new to say on the central administering authority, or insists that it be Turnhalle? What, if any, plan can we advance if Vorster's is unacceptable? What accommodations are possible that would meet our objectives while at the same time giving Vorster the minimum he requires for domestic political reasons.
- What if South Africa refuses to withdraw until on or about December 31, 1978?

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PLV 7/24/06 NSC Mr.
NLS JC-06-074
BY: BAE NARA, DATE 8/11/06

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- How do we move forward to insure the release of prisoners in South Africa, Namibia, Zambia, and Tanzania? When do we establish an international body of jurors?
- When do we bring in UN Secretary General Waldheim?
- Should we delay a Security Council session on Namibia in June?
- If not, what will our position be, if there is no movement by Vorster, on a Chapter VII mandatory arms embargo?

Rhodesia

- We must be aggressive to insure we have adequate time to review Owen's "principles" between the time they are formulated at the end of the Commonwealth Conference and his travel to Africa in July.
- Study the Zimbabwe Development Fund and its specifics. Review UK experience in Kenya and Tanzania, importance UK attaches to pensions, the role the U.S. and UK should play in the fund.
- Steps to get the working group moving, on measures to tighten sanctions against Rhodesia.
- How do we move the British along on Security Council resolutions to tighten up on transshipments and mercenaries?
- What if Owen wishes to proceed without certain parties (e.g., the Patriotic Front) whom we believe to be essential to a successful agreement?

South Africa

- What next?
- Examination of the full range of our relations with South Africa, and measures which may be taken to back up our position, outside of the UN context, with specific attention to the withdrawal of Ex-Im credits?

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- What timing for such measures?
- Consultation with our allies, especially the UK bearing in mind the vulnerability of the British economy and the extent of UK investments in South Africa.

Maputo

- What follow-up steps are necessary? Increased aid.

My Trip

- Within the next few days, telegrams should go out to our posts following up on our previsit cables, briefing governments on the talks.
- I plan to meet with Congressional leaders May 25 to update them.

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ON RHODESIA

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4. Suspension of legislation resisting full participation in the political process--e.g., the Terrorism Act, restrictions on assembly and speech, etc.
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6. Public agreement in principle to such a withdrawal.

ON SOUTH AFRICA

1. A progressive transformation of South African society:
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- SECRET
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OVERALL

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2. The U.S. government will not defend a SAG which discriminates and denies full political participation and human rights of her people.

Press Conference with Vice President Mondale
May 20, 1977, Ballroom of the Vienna Hilton
Hotel

With me today are the members of our negotiating team,
Tony Lake, Director of ^{Policy Planning} ~~Plans~~ of the State Department;
Ambassador Don McHenry; David Aaron, Deputy Director of the
National Security Council; and Bill Bowdler, our Ambassador to
the Government of South Africa.

I have been meeting with South African Minister Vorster and
his government at the request of President Carter to convey
the new policies of our administration regarding Southern
Africa, specifically Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa
itself. We had a day and a half of very frank and candid
discussions. Both sides were aware before the meetings began
of possible fundamental differences and yet we pursued these
discussions in a constructive spirit in order to improve the
possibility of mutual understanding and progress. Put most
simply, the policy which the President wished me to convey
was that there was need for progress on all three issues:
majority rule for Rhodesia and Namibia and a progressive
transformation of South African society to the same end.
We believed it was particularly important to convey the depth
of our convictions. There has been a transformation in
American society of which we are very proud. It affects not

only our domestic life, but our foreign policy as well. We cannot accept, let alone defend, the governments that reject the basic principle of full human rights, economic opportunity, and political participation for all of its people regardless of race. This basic mission was accomplished during these talks. I believe our policy is clear, and I believe the South African government now appreciates that it is deeply rooted in American experience and values. I do not know how or whether this will affect the decisions that confront South Africa, particularly in regard to its own system, but I made it clear that without evident progress that provides full political participation and an end to discrimination, the press of international events would require us to take actions based on our policy and to the detriment of the constructive relations we would prefer with South Africa. As for Rhodesia and Namibia, I believe we registered some useful progress but the significance of this progress will depend on future developments. Prime Minister Vorster agreed to support British-American efforts to get the directly interested parties to agree to an independence constitution and the necessary transitional arrangements including the holding of elections in which all can take part equally so that Zimbabwe can achieve independence during 1978, and peace. Likewise every effort will be made to bring about a de-escalation of violence and it is believed that the negotiating process will be the best way to achieve this

end. We believe this is an encouraging step in a positive direction. Hopefully we will work together to bring the interested parties to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Rhodesia. The extent to which this pays off will, of course, remain to be seen as we pursue the British initiative. In this connection I made clear our support for these efforts and the closest collaboration with them. In this connection I explained that our concept of the Zimbabwe development fund is different from that of the previous American Administration. Instead of being a fund aimed at buying out the white settlers in Rhodesia, we want to reorient that fund to a development fund; one which will help build a strong economy and one that will encourage the continued participation of the white population in an independent Zimbabwe. I emphasized that the U.S. would support a constitution for Zimbabwe that would contain guarantees of individual rights such as freedom of speech, religion, assemblage, due process of law, and an independent judiciary, and that we believe these are essential to a democratic system of government. On Namibia I made clear that we supported the efforts of the so-called "contact group" which consists of the United States, West Germany, Britain, France and Canada, in their efforts to implement Security Council Resolution 385. In some respects the position of the South African government as reflected in the earlier



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