

talks was encouraging. In those talks they agreed to free elections to be held on a nation-wide basis for a constituent assembly which would develop a national constitution for an independent Namibia. They agreed that all Namibians inside and outside the country could participate including SWAPO. They agreed that the UN could be involved in the electoral process to assure that it was fair and internationally acceptable. However, potentially important differences over the structure and character of the interim administrative authority that would run Namibia while this process takes place became much clearer in the process of our talks. South Africa wants an administrative arrangement that draws upon the structure developed at the Turnhalle conference. This structure in the conference that proposed it is based on ethnic and tribal lines and as it stands it is unacceptable to us. We emphasize that any interim administrative arrangement must be impartial as to the ultimate structure of the Namibian Government. Moreover, it must be broadly representative in order to be acceptable to all Namibians and to the international community. For his part Mr. Vorster felt quite strongly that any such structure should be based on the work of the Turnhalle conference. We agreed to propose that the five nation contact group meet with the South African Government before the end of the month

in Capetown at a time to be determined if the other members of that group agree to hear South Africa's views and the details of the proposed interim administrative authority, to see if an impartial broadly based and internationally acceptable structure can be found. We hope that it can be. It is my view that the South African position in Namibia is involved in a positive direction in certain important respects. But unless this last issue can be satisfactorily resolved by the South African Government, fair free elections will be difficult if not impossible. I hope that the most serious effort will be made to find a solution that provides an impartial broadly representative and internationally acceptable interim authority in Namibia. I also raised question of political prisoners with regard to Namibia. I said that the US believes that all/^{political}prisoners should be released. Mr. Vorster said he believes that what he called political detainees some of which are held in other African countries, should be released. He said he would favorably consider our suggestion that all Namibian political prisoners be turned over to Namibia and that in the event of a difference in view of whether a particular prisoner was political or criminal a body of international jurors review the case and make a determination. This suggestion will be pursued as well when the contact group meets in Capetown. South African prospects are much less bright for progress toward the change of course which we believe

is essential to provide justice, stability and peace in that country. We hope that South Africa will carefully review the implications of our policy and the changed circumstances which it creates. We hope that South Africans will not rely on any illusions that the U.S. will in the end intervene to save South Africa from the policies it is pursuing, for we will not do so. I think the message is now clear to the South African government. They know that we believe that perpetuating ^{an} ~~and~~ unjust system is the surest incentive to increase Soviet influence and even racial war but quite apart from that is unjustified on its own grounds. They know that we will not defend such a system and in all honesty, however, I do not know what conclusions the South African Government will draw. It is my hope that it will lead to a reassessment, to a change of course which enables us to be helpful and supportive in the difficult times that change inevitably entails. But I cannot rule out the possibility that the South African Government will not change, that our paths will diverge and our policies come into conflict should the South African Government so decide. In that event we would take steps true to our beliefs and values. We hope to be able to see progress in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. But the alternative is real, much as we dislike it. For a failure to make progress will lead to a tragedy of human history.

Thank you.

Q. Mr. Vice President, I wonder if you would tell us if these talks which appear indeed to have been extremely tough, what the atmosphere was, whether it was accrimonious or whether you could tell us that it really wasn't as tough as it seemed to be.

A. We were very anxious as I indicated earlier to conduct these talks in a constructive environment, in a non-confrontational environment. We were anxious at the same time that this meeting be one in which we could very clearly define American policy and further make clear the depth and the permanence of our commitment to human rights as a central element in our relations with the Government of South Africa. And as a policy guiding our affairs in Southern Africa. The talks were candid and they were frank and I think they were non-confrontational. We think there may be some progress in Rhodesia. We think the statement indicated today indicates hope. We are hopeful that the talks surrounding the details which I mentioned in Namibia will produce results that are effective and will permit the independence of Namibia within the outline and framework of UN Resolution 385 and that the upcoming talks in Capetown will bring that result about. On the issue of South African policies, it is our position that separate-ness and apartheid are inherently discriminatory and that that policy of apartheid cannot be acceptable to us.

We also are of the opinion strongly held that full political participation by all the citizens of South Africa -- equal participation in the election of its national government and its political affairs is essential to a healthy, stable and secure South Africa. South Africans take the view that their apartheid policies are not discriminatory. There is a basic and fundamental disagreement. They take the position that they have different nations within South Africa and that the full participation that we discussed is irrelevant. There is a fundamental and a profound disagreement and what we had hoped to do in these talks was to make it clear to the South African leadership the profound commitment that my nation has to human rights to the elimination of discrimination and to full political participation and to explain to them how our nation went through essentially the same dispute and the elimination of discrimination and the achievement of full political participation has contributed enormously to the health, vitality, the stability, the economic growth, the social health and the spiritual health of our country and we are convinced that those same policies will have the same effect in other societies. That was the nature of the discussion; it was very frank, it was very candid.

Q. Mr. Vice President, were you afraid at any time that the talks might break down?

No, at no time, As a matter of fact, the talks went on longer than scheduled. We added an hour to the discussion this morning, we added some extra time yesterday, there were points when it was quite difficult, but there was no point when there was a break-down. As a matter of fact, the basic civility of the meeting was there at all times.

Question: What steps would you take in South Africa if it doesn't go along with our policy? _____

Answer: The purpose of this meeting was not to provide a list of remedies that this nation, that is the United States, might take by itself or in cooperation with the others through the United Nations or in other ways, to pursue its values as I have described them, of human rights. We did, however, make it very clear. First of all, we hope that there would be progress in these areas that would permit an improved relationship. In other words, our basic objective is not to have a confrontation, but to have an understanding that will lead to progress and that we hope for improved relations. We also said that these values that we hold, and these objectives for an independent Rhodesia, with an independent constitution, with a freely elected government, and a Namibian government established under the general outlines of UN Resolution 385 with a freely elected government, and the social transformation

of the South African government as we described it, were important objectives, crucial objectives, affecting the relationship of our two countries. Any progress will be helpful, but we need progress in all three categories and the failure to achieve it will lead to several elements: We think, increasing instability, increasing violence and bitterness, increasing opportunity for international caprice, and a worsening of U.S. relations with the government of South Africa and of relations between that government and the international communities. We did not go into what those steps would be because it is our hope that we can have progress and that that will not be necessary and there will be other occasions on which that policy in the case of deteriorating relations will be described.

Question: In regard to the transformation or progress that you speak of with South Africa itself, how is that to be measured and specifically, did you suggest or outline any possible things that you would like to see done there on a step by step basis or are you leaving this to the South Africans to ponder? And the second part of the question is, did they give any sign during these talks that they would possibly modify such elements that would permit the joint participation and unify South Africa politically?

Answer: Let me answer the last part of your question first: the answer was that they did not intend to do so. What I said was that we see two fundamental principles as essential: the elimination of discrimination, and we think Apartheid is discriminatory, and full political participation by all of its citizens on an equal basis were essential to the transformation that would be the prerequisite to a stable South Africa and to the best possible relations with this country. We also talked about steps, but not in detail, because we did not want to get into the position of prescribing what particular steps they should be taking. We said any progress would be helpful. For example, I said if the Pass Laws were repealed so that the citizens of South Africa could travel in and around South Africa as they chose, that would be helpful. We mentioned the retaining of political dissidence^{ts}, Mrs. Mandela, and the intimidation of political dissidents as an example. I did not get into a specific list of particular laws and schools, the set-aside of certain jobs, I forget the exact name, that can only be held by certain people of certain race. There is a long list that we could get into, but I did not want to do that because I wanted to get the emphasis on the principles, the long-term objectives that we see crucial to fundamental reform in South Africa.

Question: You pointed out that Apartheid and full participation were two separate matters. Now you said that the Prime Minister offered you no hope on full participation politically. You said he did not want to get into detail on questions of Apartheid. But did he tell you that he plans any progress at all on certain race discrimination?

Answer: He will be here shortly to describe his position. He went into some detail about the number of black Africans within South Africa now going to school. The income of South African minorities compared to the income elsewhere in Africa, the meetings that they have had with certain black leaders. One of the proposals I made in response, I should have made this point to the earlier question, was that they should meet early with a broad range of the legitimate non-white leaders of South Africa to hear from them as to the process and the approach and the steps to be taken. His answer to that was that they had already had such meetings. But it is our opinion that many of the legitimate leaders of the non-white community have not engaged in such a conference, and that such a conference would be very helpful. That was the nature of his discussion, but I would have to be very candid, that on the issue of Apartheid and on the issue of full political participation in the sense we are talking, namely, voting for the national government, they were very

very direct in its rejection.

Question: He offered you nothing new in the area of positive participation?

Answer: He talked generally along the lines that I discussed.

Question: If there is no progress on full participation, would that produce the deterioration in our relations that you had spoken of? Even if there had been some progress on Apartheid or on Namibia and Rhodesia?

Answer: We see all three issues of basic importance. We don't think progress on one issue excuses no progress on another. But any progress of significance will be appreciated, will be valuable, and will have to be recognized as such. If we are able to create a healthy, independent Rhodesia based on majority rule, that's something that is very important. If we are able to achieve the objectives of an independent Namibia based on the principles of UN Resolution 385, that's a very important objective. If the South African government helps achieve those objectives they should be commended for it. If there is progress within South Africa to remove laws such as the Pass laws, discrimination laws, these job set-aside laws; laws to permit active political expression without intimidation;

those things should be encouraged and appreciated, but I thought it was important and I believe it to be fundamental, that the basis of the problems in South Africa stem from two fundamental principles, discrimination, and the absence of full political participation, rights available to all their citizens.

Question: Did you come to agreement on a time-table on the independence of Namibia and Rhodesia and did you come to an agreement on a specific next step on Rhodesia as you did on Zimbabwe?

Answer: On Rhodesia, and I think I'll read this again if I might because it spells out the terms of our agreement: Prime Minister Vorster agreed to support British-American efforts to get the directly interested parties to agree to an independence constitution and the necessary transitional arrangements, including the holding of elections in which all can take part equally, so that Zimbabwe can achieve independence during 1978 and peace. And then it goes on... In other words, the objective in support of the Owen mission is for the establishment of a constitution which will provide for elections and independence in 1978.

Question: And in Namibia?

Answer: In Namibia, the only specific time frame agreed on there was the prospective meeting with the contact group in South Africa, hopefully by the end of this month, to see if we can resolve most problems to which I made reference. If those problems are solved, then the other elements of a free election, national election, in which all can participate, to establish a constituent assembly to develop a constitution with a UN presence, will be in place and I think the prospects of peaceful transformation of UN Resolution 385 are very hopeful, and the progress could come quite quickly. So there is an element of hope here that it all depends upon the success in resolving what could be major differences of the kind that I discussed in my earlier remarks.

Q. Have you specifically discussed the possibility of withdrawing South American -- South African troops from Namibia before the coming of elections in that part?

A. One of the matters that would be discussed at Capetown is the phased withdrawal of the South African Government instrumentalities within Namibia. There is not a schedule for that yet. It would be hoped that terms and the phasing of that process could be more particularly discussed at that meeting.

Q. Is there any possibility of a further meeting between yourself and Mr. Vorster or between President Carter and Mr. Vorster?

A. We have no plans for such a meeting.

Q. Mr. Vice President, could you possibly go into slightly full more detail on your concept of/participation as opposed to one man one vote? ~~xxxxxxsxxxxxx~~ Do you see some kind of a compromise?

A. No, no. It's the same thing. Every citizen should have the right to vote and every vote should be equally weighted.
weighted. Thank you very much.

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON


INFORMATION

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Memo No. 1206-77

July 7, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 
SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast with President,
Friday, July 8, 1977

Financial Assistance for Portugal

Ambassador Carlucci reported yesterday that the Portuguese economic situation is seriously deteriorating (Tab A). Portuguese officials have proposed to him that the Federal Reserve agree to a SWAP arrangement of \$250 million for three months to avoid political and economic collapse.

Within the U.S. government, Treasury and other economic officials favor austerity measures by Portugal over external assistance -- the problem, of course, with such austerity measures is that they would probably bring down the Soares government.

As a result of the Carlucci report, an interdepartmental working group was addressing the problem on July 7 with a view to developing an agreed approach to Arthur Burns on a SWAP arrangement for Portugal, with the understanding that the Portuguese would have to sell some of their gold and put gold as collateral as part of the arrangement.

I recommend that you ask Secretary Vance and Zbig where this stands. I think it is very much in our interest to invest in Portugal's future at this point by supporting the Soares government. Carlucci notes, paragraph 8, that the economy is showing first signs of recuperation. He adds that the Portuguese government will need a preliminary reading from us on possible assistance by Friday afternoon, July 8.

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REVIEW ON JULY 7, 1983

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per 7/24/06 NSC 1A
NLS-06-074
BY BAK NARA DATE 8/1/06

Namibia

Ambassador Bowdler reports (Tab B) that the South Africans have named Judge Marthinuis Steyn as Administrator-General of Southwest Africa/Namibia.

The South Africans continue to move ahead with useful actions on Namibia. I recommend that you ask Secretary Vance the progress, if any, being made by UN Secretary General Waldheim in preparing for the UN's Namibian role.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 LISBON 5177

LIMDIS
PASS TREASURY FOR SYVRUD
OPORTO FOR AMBASSADOR CARLUCCI
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: EFING, PD
SUBJ: FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR PORTUGAL
REF: LISBON 5089

SUMMARY: MINISTER OF FINANCE AND CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR MET WITH ME URGENTLY AFTERNOON JULY 6 TO DISCUSS SERIOUSLY DETERIORATING RESERVE SITUATION. AVAILABLE RESERVES DOWN TO \$60 MILLION AND DEFAULT IS REAL POSSIBILITY. OFFICIALS SUGGEST POSSIBLE FED SWAP ARRANGEMENT OF \$250 MILLION FOR THREE MONTHS TO AVOID POSSIBLE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COLLAPSE. I URGE STRONGLY THAT DEPARTMENT SEEK MEANS TO ASSIST, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF REQUEST BY GOP TO VP MONDALE AND IN VIEW OF RECENT VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IN PORTUGAL BY OECD COUNTRIES AND VENEZUELA.
END SUMMARY.

1. MINISTER OF FINANCE MEDINA CARREIRA AND BANK OF PORTUGAL GOVERNOR SILVA LOPES CHARTERED PLANE TO MEET URGENTLY WITH ME IN NORTHERN PORTUGAL ON JULY 6 (WHERE I WAS ON 4TH JULY OFFICIAL TRIP) TO DISCUSS GRAVE FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE POSITION. GOP OFFICIALS MADE APPEAL FOR US ASSISTANCE TO ALLEVIATE SITUATION.

2. ACCORDING GOP OFFICIALS, RESERVE POSITION IS AS FOLLOWS: AS OF JULY 5, BANK OF PORTUGAL HAD \$60.9 MILLION AVAILABLE IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE IN ADDITION TO ONE CREDIT LINE OF \$25 MILLION. THIS CREDIT LINE WILL BE UTILIZED TO MAKE PAYMENT ON JULY 11. BANK OF PORTUGAL HAS LOST \$30 MILLION SINCE JULY 1 AND THIS PACE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE THROUGH JULY. PRINCIPAL CAUSES ARE PAYMENTS OF SHORT TERM (6 MONTH) TRADE CREDITS CONTRACTED

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BY: BJR NARA, DATE 8/7/06

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DURING HEAVY IMPORT MONTH OF DECEMBER 1976 AND CONTINUED FLIGHT OF CAPITAL AND SPECULATION IN EXPECTATION OF ANOTHER DEVALUATION. DEVALUATION RUMORS CONTINUE TO BE NOURISHED BY PRESS. HEAVY OUTFLOW OCCURRED IN JUNE IN SPITE OF SATISFACTORY EARNINGS FROM TOURISM AND IMMIGRANT IMMITTANCES.

3. BANK OF PORTUGAL ESTIMATES OF MONTHLY DEFICITS HAVE BEEN LOW DUE TO DEFICIENT STATISTICAL SERVICE AND DIFFICULTY IN ESTIMATING SHORT-TERM TRADE CREDITS (WHICH DO NOT HAVE TO BE REGISTERED WITH BANK) IN ADDITION TO UNEXPECTED ATTACK AGAINST ESCUDO.

4. GOP MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO OBTAIN SHORT-TERM LIQUIDITY.
(A) SILVA LOPES VISITED BIS IN BASLE ON JULY 4 TO REQUEST SHORT-TERM LOAN. REQUEST WILL BE DISCUSSED JULY 11 BY CENTRAL BANKS. SILVA LOPES REPORTS THAT AT BEST PORTUGAL WILL GET \$100 MILLION AND EVEN THAT IS "VERY DOUBTFUL."
(B) BANK OF PORTUGAL HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO ACCELERATE GOLD SALES TO AS MUCH AS MARKET WILL BEAR. GOP HOPES MONTHLY SALES CAN REACH \$50 MILLION BUT EVEN THIS WILL NOT SOLVE SHORT-TERM LIQUIDITY SHORTAGE.
(C) GOP HAS ASCERTAINED THAT NONE OF BILATERAL LOANS AGREED UPON AT JUNE 22 MEETING CAN BE DISBURSED FAST ENOUGH (SEE REFTEL).

5. GOP OFFICIALS ESTIMATE SHORT-TERM (3 MONTH) REQUIREMENT IS \$250 MILLION -- \$100 MILLION TO RESTORE WORKING BALANCES AND \$150 MILLION TO FINANCE OUTFLOW UNTIL OCTOBER. OFFICIALS SUGGESTED POSSIBLE \$250 MILLION CURRENCY SWAP FOR 3 MONTHS WITH US FEDERAL RESERVE BANK.

6. GOP WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE ECONOMIC MEASURES NECESSARY FOR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS TURN AROUND. REVISED BUDGET JUST APPROVED BY ASSEMBLY KEEPS BUDGET DEFICIT AT ORIGINAL LEVEL. FOREIGN INVESTMENT CODE HAS BEEN LIBERALIZED BY COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND PROGRESS BEING MADE ON RESOLUTION OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (ESPECIALLY ITT). GOP CONTINUES TO PUSH FOR QUICK PASSAGE ON ALL IMPORTANT LEGISLATIVE BILLS INCLUDING AGRARIAN REFORM, INDEMNIFICATION AND WORKER CONTROL. INDICATION OF DEGREE OF BELT-TIGHTENING IS MARKED DROP IN CONSUMPTION AND REAL WAGES IN LAST SIX MONTHS. ADDITIONALLY, MINISTERS WILL MEET WITH SOARES NIGHT OF JULY 6 TO DEVELOP NEW, TOUGH MEASURES. THESE WILL BE PRESENTED TO PRESIDENT ON JULY 8. UNFORTUNATELY, MOST MEASURES WILL NOT BE ABLE SHOW RESULTS OVER NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS WHEN LIQUIDITY CRUNCH WILL BE SEVEREST.

7. OFFICIALS STATED THAT IF NO EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE IS FORTHCOMING, GOP HAS ONLY TWO ALTERNATIVES, BOTH OF WHICH COULD LEAD TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COLLAPSE. GOP COULD EITHER ADOPT EXTREMELY RESTRICTIVE AUSTERITY MEASURES WHICH WOULD

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IMMEDIATELY INCREASE UNEMPLOYMENT SUBSTANTIALLY OR DEFAULT
ON PAYMENTS WHICH WOULD RUIN CREDIT STANDING AND MAKE LONGER
TERM PROSPECTS BLEAK.

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8. COMMENT: GOP CONTINUES TO TAKE RATIONAL ECONOMIC MEASURES AND HAS CLEARLY STATED INTENTION TO INSTITUTE ADDITIONAL ONES. THEY ARE ALSO SELLING AS MUCH GOLD AS THEY CAN. THIS PROBLEM SHOULD BE VIEWED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE REQUEST TO VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE DURING HIS MAY TRIP ALTHOUGH AT THAT TIME NO ONE FORE-
SAW THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION. WHAT IS
DOUBLY UNFORTUNATE IS THAT THIS SEVERE LIQUIDITY PROBLEM
COMES AT A TIME WHEN THE ECONOMY IS SHOWING THE FIRST SIGNS OF
RECOVERY AND JUST AFTER THE GOP HAS RECEIVED A STRONG,
PUBLIC VOTE OF CONFIDENCE FROM OECD COUNTRIES.

9. THERE IS NO QUESTION IN MY JUDGEMENT, THAT PORTUGAL'S
FUTURE DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED
IF IT HAS TO TAKE THE EXTREME MEASURES OUTLINED IN PARA 7.
I THEREFORE URGE AS STRONGLY AS POSSIBLE THAT THE DEPARTMENT
MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO DEVELOP MEASURES TO HELP THE GOP THROUGH
THIS GRAVE PERIOD. THE GOP NEEDS AT BEST A PRELIMINARY READING
ON POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE BY FRIDAY AFTERNOON JULY 8 BEFORE MEETING
WITH PRESIDENT.
CARLUCCI
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South Africa

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AMEMBASSY GABORONE 3193
AMEMBASSY LAGOS 579
AMEMBASSY LONDON 2648
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 3328
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 1599
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 118
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 57
AMEMBASSY PARIS 2388

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PRETORIA 3312

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, POEV, SF, WA
SUBJECT: SAG APPOINTS NAMIBIAN ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL
REF: LONDON 11133

1. SUMMARY: IN SURPRISE ANNOUNCEMENT SAG DURING NIGHT OF JULY 6-7 INFORMED MEDIA OF APPOINTMENT OF JUDGE MARTINDAIS T. STEYN, MEMBER OF THE ORANGE FREE STATE DIVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT, AS ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF SWA/NAMIBIA. END SUMMARY.

2. SABC AND MORNING PRESS CARRY SURPRISE ANNOUNCEMENT FROM PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE ISSUED SOMETIME DURING NIGHT OF JULY 6-7, THAT THE STATE PRESIDENT HAD NAMED MARTINDAIS T. STEYN (57), MEMBER OF THE ORANGE FREE STATE DIVISION OF THE S.A. SUPREME COURT, TO BE THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL FOR NAMIBIA/SWA.

3. WE HAVE VERY LITTLE BIO INFORMATION ON JUDGE STEYN IN OUR CURRENT RECORDS. THESE SHOW HE WAS BORN IN THE FREE STATE NOVEMBER 12, 1920. HE OBTAINED AN LLB DEGREE FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN IN 1944. DURING WORLD WAR II HE SERVED AS A LIEUTENANT IN THE SIXTH SOUTH AFRICAN DIVISION WHICH WAS

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PART OF THE FIFTH ARMY UNDER GENERAL MARK CLARK. WE UNDERSTAND THAT HE RETURNED TO SA IN 1947 AND JOINED THE SA HAZARD IN 1948. HE BECAME SENIOR COUNSEL IN 1965 AND WAS APPOINTED TO PRESENT POSITION IN 1974.

4. HIS FAMILY BACKGROUND IS OF SPECIAL INTEREST. HE IS THE GRANDSON OF THE FREE STATE'S LAST PRESIDENT MARTINUS STEYN. HIS FATHER WAS COLIN STEYN, WHO SERVED IN THE SMUTS CABINET AS MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER. WE UNDERSTAND THAT HE HAS NO AFFILIATION WITH THE NATIONAL PARTY. HE MARRIED YVONNE MAARTENS IN 1949 AND THEY HAVE FOUR CHILDREN. HIS FAMILY BACKGROUND, UCT EDUCATION AND WORLD WAR II RECORD SUGGEST A LIBERAL RATHER THAN A STAUNCH NATIONAL PARTY ORIENTATION. ALTHOUGH WE WANT TO LOOK INTO THIS ASPECT MORE CLOSELY.

5. COMMENT: NONE OF THE FIVE-POWER AMBASSADORS RECEIVED ANY ADVANCE INDICATION OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT. WHEN I TALKED TO FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA EARLIER IN WEEK, HE INDICATED THAT CHOICE WOULD STILL BE A JUDGE BUT DECLINED TO MENTION NAMES OR SPECIFY TIMING OTHER THAN THAT "HE WOULD BE IN PLACE BY AUGUST 1." SIR DAVID SCOTT TALKED WITH BOTHA YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND RECEIVED NO HINT THAT ANNOUNCEMENT WAS IMMINENT.
BOWLER
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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
CODEWORD

Memo No. 1240-77

July 14, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift *DK*

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast, Friday, July 15, 1977

Namibia

The telegram at Tab A contains the proposed text of letters that the Foreign Ministers of the U.S., Canada, France, FRG and the U.K. would send to Waldheim noting that SWAPO has been invited to New York for talks and urging Waldheim to take action now on defining the outline of the U.N. machinery for Norway and the role to be played by the special representative of the U.N. Secretary General. I recommend that you ask Secretary Vance how he plans to proceed on this.

Rhodesia

The State memorandum at Tab B reviews recent southern African developments.

Secretary Vance is scheduled to meet with U.K. Foreign Secretary Owen on July 23. Considering the tactical posturing by the Rhodesians and the Nationalists and the reluctance of the British Cabinet to support vigorously the initiatives by Owen (page 4, Tab B), I believe it would be helpful to have Secretary Vance's thinking on the approach he plans to take with Owen.

Chad

You are scheduled to meet with the Vice President of Chad at 2:00 p.m., Friday. As of Thursday afternoon, there was still disagreement within the government on the level of assistance, if any, the U.S. might be able to offer. Vance will have met with Vice President Djime. I recommend that you invite a brief report on his meeting.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/CODEWORD
CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT
REVIEW ON JULY 14, 1997

DECLASSIFIED
per 7/24/06 NSC 14r
NLTC-06-074
BY BAE NARA, DATE 8/7/06

Korea

I recommend that you ask Zbig for an update on the downed helicopter.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4468

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 2999
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 2452
AMEMBASSY GABORONE 375
AMEMBASSY LAGOS 2445
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4167
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 1259
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 617
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 2733
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 6245
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 6692
USMISSION GENEVA 5322

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EXDIS
GENEVA FOR YOUNG
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, US, SF, WA
SUBJECT: WESTERN FIVE LETTER TO SYG WALDHEIM
REF: USUN 2207 (EXDIS)

1. DURING WESTERN FIVE MEETING AM JULY 13 CONTACT GROUP
AGREED UPON DRAFT TEXT OF LETTER TO BE SENT, SUBJECT TO
CONCURRENCE OF CAPITALS, TO SYG WALDHEIM FROM WESTERN FIVE
FORNINS. AS INDICATED REPTEL, LETTER WOULD BE DELIVERED TO
SYG IN NEW YORK BY USUN EARLY IN WEEK OF JULY 18.

2. TEXT FOLLOWS: QUOTE
DEAR KURT:

ON MY OWN BEHALF AND ON THE BEHALF OF THE FOREIGN
MINISTERS OF CANADA, FRANCE, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, I AM WRITING ABOUT THE CURRENT STATUS
OF OUR EFFORTS TO REACH AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION
TO THE NAMIBIAN QUESTION.

AS YOU KNOW, OUR REPRESENTATIVES HAVE INVITED THE PRESI-
DENT AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF SWAPO

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

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per 7/24/06 NSC 12
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BY DAE NARA DATE 8/7/06

A MEETING, BUT NO DATE HAS BEEN SET. WE ATTACH SPECIAL IMPORTANCE TO THESE TALKS AND HOPE TO IMPRESS UPON SWAPO THAT THE EFFORT UNDERTAKEN COULD RESULT IN A FAIR POLITICAL PROCESS, LEADING TO A SATISFACTORY AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE NAMIBIA QUESTION.

OUR TALKS WITH SWAPO WILL STAND A BETTER CHANCE OF SUCCESS IF ITS LEADERSHIP HAS A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROLE WHICH A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS STAFF MIGHT PLAY. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHAT IS NOW NEEDED IS AN OUTLINE OF THE U.N. MACHINERY WHICH MIGHT BE NECESSARY SHOULD A RESOLUTION OF THE NAMIBIA QUESTION EMERGE ALONG THE LINES CURRENTLY BEING EXPLORED.

WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE DEVELOPMENT BY YOU, OF SUCH AN OUTLINE, IN ADVANCE OF A FORMAL MANDATE, COULD GIVE RISE TO SOME DIFFICULTIES. NEVERTHELESS, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT NOW IS THE TIME WHEN YOUR INITIATIVE COULD MAKE A DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF STATURE, EXPERTISE AND OBJECTIVITY, AN INDICATION FROM YOU AND THE U.N. MACHINERY WHICH MIGHT BE NECESSARY FOR THIS PURPOSE STANDS THE BEST CHANCE OF BEING PERSUASIVE. ON BEHALF OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE FIVE, I URGE YOU, THEREFORE, TO DEVELOP SUCH AN OUTLINE. UNQUOTE

LEONARD

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