

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON


INFORMATION

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Memo No. 393-78

June 1, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 
SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast, Friday,
June 2, 1978, 7:30 a.m.

US-USSR relations, SALT negotiations, Soviet and Cuban involvement in Africa, and developments in the Middle East should provide the major focuses for the breakfast_____

On US-USSR Relations and SALT, it will be helpful to ha_____
Cy Vance's report on his talks in New York with Gromyko_____

You may wish to note that the press stories on rising t_____
between the US and USSR are getting out of hand (for
some reason press has settled on the verb attack as its
favorite headline phrasing, e.g., Mondale attacks Sovie
Carter attacks Soviets, etc.). The time has come to ca
the situation down publicly and put US-USSR relations b
in their full and proper perspective. The President's
address to the Naval Academy next week provides an
excellent forum for this message. Once the President h
delivered the message, everyone in the Administration
should understand the importance of hewing to the same
line.

Soviet/Cuban/East German Involvement in Africa - by
separate memorandum I am forwarding you summaries of
the intelligence supporting our statements that there
has been substantial Cuban and Soviet involvement in Sh

Philippines - I am attaching at Tab A the proposed lett_____
(now with Zbig) drafted by State and the NSC for the
President's signature to President Marcos.

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CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT
REVIEW ON JUNE 1, 1998

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
Per 7/13/06 NSC 14r.

NLJC-06-025

BY BAE NARA, DATE 7/24/06

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The intelligence item at Tab B on Marcos' possible release of opponents is also of interest and, I believe, can be related to your talks with Marcos.



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Memo No. 74-78

February 2, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 
SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast,
Friday, February 3, 1978

SADAT VISIT

- Ask the President how he wants to handle the briefing for members of the Senate and House following his talks with Sadat.
- You may wish to ask Secretary Vance and Zbig about reports that Sadat will request the President to hold up arms sales to Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, at least for a couple of months and until the peace process is further down the road.
- Foreign Minister Dayan has been reported in recent cables as saying that his visit is intended to balance the favorable public impression he anticipates Sadat will make during his stay in the U.S. You may wish to ask the Secretary to report on Dayan's schedule and objectives.

SOUTH AFRICA - DONALD WOODS

- Tell the President how delighted, indeed, stunned, Donald Woods was to meet with him in the Oval Office.
- Note Woods' view that there is little likelihood of any basic change by a Vorster/Botha government.
- Note Woods' comment that he is becoming increasingly aware of the difficulties and complexities involved in increasing economic pressure on South Africa.

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REVIEW ON FEBRUARY 2, 1998

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per 7/13/06 NSC 1A
NLTJC-06-095
BY BAE NARA DATE 7/21/06

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PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS

- Earlier this week, Zbig asked for your views on the draft human rights Presidential Directive (copy at Tab A). If time permits you may wish to mention that you concur in the desirability of such a PD and that you think it important that Secretary Vance personally ensure that the Interagency Group on Human Rights pursue its work with dedication and assertiveness (to ensure that the direction on human rights set at the political level of the government is also the direction followed at the bureaucratic level).

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

Presidential Directive/NSC-

TO: The Vice President
 The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense

ALSO: The Secretary of the Treasury
 The Attorney General
 The Secretary of Commerce
 The Director, Office of Management
 and Budget
 The United States Representative to
 the United Nations
 The Administrator, Agency for Inter-
 national Development
 The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Director, U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT: Human Rights

It shall be a major objective of U.S. foreign policy to promote the observance of human rights throughout the world. The policy shall be applied globally, but with due consideration to the cultural, political and historical characteristics of each individual nation, and to the significance of U.S. bilateral relations with the nation in question.

Specifically:

1. It shall be the objective of the U.S. human rights policy to reduce worldwide governmental violations of the integrity of the person (e.g., torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; lengthy detention without trial and assassination); to promote basic economic and social rights (e.g., adequate food, education, shelter and health); and to enhance civil and political liberties (freedom of speech, of religion, of assembly, of movement and of the press; and the right to basic judicial protections).
2. Greater reliance should be placed on positive inducements and incentives, rewarding improvements in human rights through demonstrations of visible U.S. gratification, preferential treatment in high level official visits and, whenever appropriate and possible, economic benefits.

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per 7/13/06 NSC 1A
NLJCL 06-075
BY BAE NARA, DATE 7/21/06

To this end, all forms of U.S. foreign assistance shall be channeled, in keeping with the restrictions of existing statute and previous Presidential policy directives, to a greater degree toward countries with a good record of human rights observance as defined above. Programs for the current and subsequent fiscal years shall be reviewed in this light, though without causing delay to existing programs.

3. In the allocation of foreign assistance, and the consequent evaluation of the human rights condition of a foreign nation, the Interagency Group shall place its primary emphasis on longer term trends, rather than individual events. However in no case shall U.S. funds be provided so as to contribute to the oppression, rather than the assistance, of the people of other nations.
4. U.S. human rights actions within the International Financial Institutions shall be designed and implemented so as not to undermine the primary U.S. interest of preserving these institutions as effective economic instruments. I therefore direct the Interagency Group to prepare a report:
 - Analyzing the effects of recent U.S. actions in the IFIs:
 - on the IFIs themselves (including an assessment of the legality of our actions);
 - on the Congress and the legislative prognosis; and
 - on the attainment of human rights objectives.
 - Proposing a strategy for future U.S. actions which will: place primary emphasis on the use of our "voice" rather than our vote; attempt to influence the Banks' actions as early as possible in the loan process; seek to engage the support of other nations and multilateral organizations.
 - Evaluating the desirability of changes in the IFIs -- including amendments to the Bank charters, and changes in management or staff.
5. The Interagency Group shall prepare and submit for review by the PRC/NSC, a paper analyzing the appropriateness of using as sanctions or incentives such other tool as:
 - The Ex-Im Bank
 - Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
 - Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)
 - Military Training Programs

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Memo No. 643-78

February 23, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 
SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast, Friday, February 24, 1978

US-USSR Relations

Following up on your Thursday conversation with Ambassador Toon, you may wish to note his observations of current Soviet behavior and his request for a written or oral message to take to Brezhnev when he returns to Moscow next Tuesday. On a scale of one to ten, Toon placed U.S.-Soviet relations at four and going down. From the Soviet perspective, he cited stalling on SALT and trade, our human rights position and our Middle East position as principal irritants.

He expects Shcharanskiy to be tried as soon as the Belgrade CSCE Review is over and to be found guilty of treason (it is his hope that the Soviets will then choose to expel him from the country rather than imprison him).

You might wish to note that the substance of the message Toon could take back might relate to the Belgrade meeting and the importance of a worthwhile result, and in this context, the importance the American people attach to Basket III and the human rights component. Toon meets with Zbig Friday afternoon.

Foreign Travel

The President's trip to Venezuela, Brazil, Nigeria and Liberia will be announced at 10:00 a.m., Friday. The tentative schedule is at Tab A. Given the recent approach to you by the Ivory Coast, as well as demarches earlier in the Administration by the French to you on the need for more U.S. attention to the francophone countries of Africa, you may wish to remind the President, Cy and Zbig of these

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approaches and to ask if it might be possible to include some sort of gesture to these countries -- e.g., a letter or a message to Houphouet-Boigny and other selected francophone leaders noting that while it will not be possible to include a stop in their countries on this visit, the President will welcome the closest possible dialogue because of the value we place on the views of these leaders and the roles of their countries.

0800 Depart Andrews AFB

1315 Arrive Caracas, Venezuela

Wednesday, March 29, 1978

1100 Depart Caracas

1640 Arrive Brasilia, Brazil

Thursday, March 30, 1978

~~1300~~ Depart Brasilia
1300

~~1430~~ Arrive Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
1430

Friday, March 31, 1978

1030 Depart Rio

2205 Arrive Lagos, Nigeria

Saturday, April 1, 1978

Lagos

Sunday, April 2, 1978

1000 Depart Lagos

1120 Arrive Kano, Nigeria

1530 Depart Kano

1700 Arrive Lagos

Monday, April 3, 1978

0900 Depart Lagos

1020 Arrive Monrovia, Liberia

1400 Depart Monrovia

1920 Arrive Andrews AFB

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

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Memo No. 161-78

March 2, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift *DC*

SUBJECT: Foreign Affairs Breakfast, Friday, - *did not occur*
March 3, 1978, 7:30 a.m.

Greek-Turkish Summit

In your meeting with Alexandrakis you stated the importance the U.S. attaches to a productive round of talks when Prime Minister Caramanlis and Prime Minister Ecevit meet in Switzerland later this month. I recommend that at tomorrow's breakfast you suggest that the President send a personal message to Caramanlis and to Ecevit, and that in his message he stress the importance that the U.S. attaches to progress in the Eastern Mediterranean because of our friendship with Greece, because of our friendship with Turkey, because of the importance of such progress to the broader interests we share in NATO and as fellow democracies.

Secretary Vance might be asked to take the lead in providing drafts of both messages. In my opinion, the messages would serve to remind Caramanlis and Ecevit that the President is "looking over their shoulders" during their talks, and I believe this would cause both leaders to work harder for such progress

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
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March 9, 1978

Memo No. 682-78

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast, Friday, March 10, 1978, 7:30 a.m.

It is probable that the Panama Canal treaties vote next week and the meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Begin will be principal topics of discussion.

Additionally, I recommend that you ask Zbig for a run-down on Israeli Defense Minister Weizman's talks with Harold Brown, given that you and the President will be meeting with Weizman later in the day.

Rhodesia

- Ask Secretary Vance for a run-down on his talks Thursday, March 9, with Patriotic Front leader Nkomo Mugabe, and how those talks fit with the earlier meeting with the UK's David Owen.

Italy and France

- On Wednesday, Zbig and David presided over an NSC committee meeting addressing political developments in Italy and France. Ask Zbig for a run-down on the key findings and proposals coming from that meeting.

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REVIEW ON MARCH 9, 1998

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Memo No. 276-78

April 6, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 
SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast, Friday, April 7,
1978, 7:30 a.m.

Peres Visit

You may wish to note that you, Zbig and Secretary Vance will be meeting with Israeli Labor Party Leader Shimon Peres in a round of meetings, with your meeting coming immediately after the breakfast.

Peres, in a recent conversation with Sam Lewis, said he did not favor introduction of an overall U.S. peace plan at this point.

You may wish to ask what approach should be taken with Peres to advance our Middle East objectives.

Middle East Arms Sales Package

With April 18 now set as the date for the Panama Canal Treaty vote, and with Secretary Vance's understanding that the Middle East arms sales package will not be submitted until after the vote, ask Vance what his current thinking is on the date for submission for the Middle East arms package to the Congress.

If you approve the revised schedule for your Pacific trip that we have forwarded separately, you will be out of Washington during the period April 29-May 10. You may wish to note this during the breakfast. If Vance does not submit the arms sales package until late April, you would be back in Washington for the latter half of the 30-day period during which the package would be before the Congress.

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BY BAE NARA, DATE 7/21/06

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Memo No. 231-78

March 23, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 

SUBJECT: Foreign Affairs Breakfast, Friday,
March 24, 1974, 7:30 a.m.

Timing of Pacific Visit

Bob Byrd's announcement that the vote on the Panama Canal Treaty will be on or before April 26, with a more precise decision of timing not to be known before April 5, forces us to reschedule your visit to the Pacific. [The current April 6-16 timing for the trip was set when our best information from the Senate was that both Canal Treaties would be acted on before the Easter recess.]

With the President about to depart on his overseas mission, with a number of domestic and foreign policy decisions to be taken into account, Dick, Mike, Jim and I think it important that you discuss the question of the timing of your Pacific visit at tomorrow's breakfast. We feel we must inform the five host governments that we will be postponing and when we do so, we will wish to offer them proposed new dates rather than leaving the trip hanging in vague and uncertain terms.

Key issues that have to be taken into account are:

- The timing of your trip in relation to the next Administration trip to the People's Republic of China;

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- The nature of the role the President wishes you to play on the Middle East arms sales package, the timing of Executive-Legislative action on that package, and the relative priority the President attaches to this issue as compared to the Pacific trip and PRC initiatives;
- The question of a possible Presidential trip to Panama;
- The question of whether or not it would be possible to get assurances from Senator Byrd that the second Canal treaty vote would not take place at least until April 20.

We see three options for rescheduling:

- (1) April 4-12 - involving departure immediately upon the President's return from his trip, no layovers in Hawaii either going or coming, with stops otherwise as planned in New Zealand, Australia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. If the host governments would be agreeable to these relatively minor shifts in time, this timing would enable you to carry out the Pacific mission in a minimum amount of time, enabling you to be back in the Capitol by April 12. It would require assurances from Byrd that the treaty vote would not take place at least until April 20, permitting you to be in Washington for intensive consultations during the critical period prior to that vote.

As it is our understanding that State is sticking to its commitment to Byrd not to formally notify the Congress of the Middle East arms sales package until after the second treaty vote, you would also be in Washington for the entire Executive-Legislative discussions on that issue. I would note that while this option has many advantages, we are not certain that Byrd will be able to give you any assurances on specific timing for the vote, either today or tomorrow.

- (2) April 29-May 10 - This option would have you depart after the last possible date, April 26, for the Canal treaty vote and after your April 28 appearance for Senator Hathaway. It would permit you to carry out a Pacific trip schedule, including the Hawaii stopover, along the lines we have been planning. It would also permit you to carry out the Pacific mission before any mid-May PRC initiative.

There would, of course, be a problem if the President were to want to go to Panama after the second treaty vote. You and he cannot be out of the country at the same time. It is my understanding that a trip to Panama with a signing ceremony might not be advisable at this point, in that this timing would involve a requirement of further action by the Congress on the treaties this Fall in the middle of the Congressional campaign. A further disadvantage would be that you would not be in Washington for the entire period during which the House and Senate are considering the Middle East arms sales package. There is also the prospect that this will be an increasingly busy time in terms of budget review and domestic programs.

- (3) July 1-9 - This option would have you reschedule the Pacific visit during the July 4 Congressional recess. It would permit you to be here throughout the Canal treaty and Middle East arms sales debates. Among its disadvantages, this option would not permit you to carry out the Pacific mission before the mid-May PRC trip [Zbig has stressed to me the importance he attaches to your slipping the Pacific trip by no more than a few days or weeks, and inadvisability of postponing it until July]. This timing would also force you to cancel your plans for visiting Scandinavia during the July 4 Congressional recess.

In my opinion, Option 1, is too risky; we simply cannot count at this point on a post-April 20 date for the Canal treaty vote.

If the President attaches more importance to the Pacific mission and its linkage to the PRC initiatives than he does to your role in the Middle East arms package consultations, Option 2 would seem the best.


If the President attaches more importance to your role on the Middle East arms package than he does to the Pacific trip and the PRC, then Option 3 would seem preferable.

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April 27, 1978

Memo No. 735-78

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast, Friday, April 28, 1978

Middle East

- Ask Secretary Vance to review the main points made by Foreign Minister Dayan during their meetings this week.

Greece/Turkey/Cyprus

- Note that you met last week with Archbishop Iakovos and members of the Greek-American community, on April 27 with Sarbanes, Eagleton and Brademas.
- Ask Secretary Vance for his reading on the prospects for a favorable vote on military assistance for Turkey by the HIRC on May 3.

Southern Africa

- Ask Vance for his reading of the prospects for progress on Namibia, in light of Vorster's "acceptance" of the Western proposals this week.

Revised Proposal for Dual-Purpose Terminal
at Icelandic NATO Base

- Our great concern is that if the US is not in some way responsive to the repeated Icelandic pleas on the air terminal, we risk consequences out of all proportion to the costs involved.
- Increased importance of US facilities in light of expanding Soviet presence, a matter of concern to other Scandinavian countries as well.

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BY BAE NARA DATE 7/21/06

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- Iceland's 220,000 population, narrow tax base, national budget of about \$500 million, which can't handle this project without some assistance.
- The revision drops the request for security supporting assistance, and cuts the total proposal to \$20 million (from \$30 million), all in military construction funds.
- Contingency wartime use by the US.
- Political sensitivities which could impel Iceland to invoke renegotiation clause of our agreement; result could be termination of our presence, very expensive relocations, and loss of some coverage in any event.
- Until there are separate terminal facilities, Iceland's civilian population will still be required to go through barbed wire, NATO military check points when they enter and exit from the nation's sole international airport.
- A political crisis on NATO's northern flank, added to the problems on the southern flank, would further complicate our efforts on more important tasks in the Alliance.

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 11, 1978

Memo No. 743-78

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 
SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast, Friday, May 12,
7:30 a.m.

Italy - Memorial Service for Moro - Secretary Califano will represent the United States at the funeral mass for the late Prime Minister Aldo Moro in Rome on Saturday, May 13.

Report on Your Visit to Asia and the Pacific - I have prepared a draft report (Tab 1) for your signature to the President on your visit to the Pacific. It has not yet been coordinated with David Aaron. You may wish to draw on it in reviewing results of your visit to the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand at the breakfast.

A copy of your East-West Center address is at Tab 2.

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CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT
REVIEW ON MAY 11, 1998

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per 7/13/06 NSC 1A.
NLTC-06-075
BY BPS NARA, DATE 7/24/06



THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 11, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: The Vice President

SUBJECT: Report on Visit to the Pacific

My visit to the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand involved wide ranging, substantive discussions at each stop, a number of helpful results, and a number of issues requiring further attention by the Administration.

Your letters to President Marcos, Prime Minister Kriangsak, President Suharto, Prime Minister Fraser and Prime Minister Muldoon were warmly received. Each leader welcomed your statement affirming that America would participate actively in the Pacific. Their reactions are reflected in the replies to you from President Marcos and Prime Minister Muldoon (Tabs A and B). Intelligence reports subsequent to my talks with Suharto indicate that his doubts about your policies in the Pacific region have been removed. Accordingly, I believe the principal objective of this mission -- effectively affirming the United States commitment to the Pacific, including the full honoring of bilateral and multilateral commitments -- was accomplished. The agenda for my talks dealt primarily with security, human rights, refugees, economic and trade issues, and energy cooperation, and is as follows.

The Philippines

In Manila, President Marcos and I took a step forward on the base negotiations by agreeing to a joint statement embodying the principles for these negotiations. These principles involve respect for Philippine sovereignty (of importance to Marcos) and full protection of command and control arrangements for U.S. facilities and personnel (essential to the United States). We did not get into detailed talks on the level of U.S. compensation. There

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are indications that Marcos is considering setting aside the difficult compensation and criminal jurisdiction issues to concentrate on the question of base arrangements. We agreed that military-to-military talks should begin as soon as possible, and I will separately be advising Harold Brown of the importance of moving ahead with these talks.

Marcos was concerned about the House International Relations Committee's \$5 million cut from the foreign assistance budget for the Philippines. I told him we would do our best to restore the full amount.

On human rights, my private talks were frank and Marcos' reaction was calm. He has the message that our relations can only suffer if he continues on a repressive course, and while he will be careful to avoid any hint that he is bowing to U.S. pressure, he may take some steps to improve the situation -- he indicated that a partial lifting of the marshal law, with the exception of Mindanao, might soon be forthcoming. My talks with the Philippine opposition and Church leaders were good. I told the former that we had made the visit because we felt it would have a favorable impact on human rights, and they subsequently endorsed the visit in a meeting with the press. The highly respected Cardinal Sin described his role in the Philippines as one of "critical participation." His underlying and twice-repeated message was "do not abandon us" over human rights differences; if you do, the Communists will take over.

Thailand

General Kriangsak was delighted to receive your invitation to visit Washington in 1979, and he accepted on the spot.

On security matters, he welcomed your statement of commitment to the region as well as your offer of a squadron of F-5 aircraft. He made no reference to insurgency problems; however, he stressed Thailand's exposed position in Indochina, its need for reliable arms supplies and his hope that we would make more equipment of interest to Thailand available on more favorable terms than currently provided by FMS. Without commitment on any specific item, I told him we would give careful attention to each Thai request. Additionally, in response to his inquiry, I reaffirmed our commitment to the Manila Pact.

Our most pressing problem with the Thais is refugees. I visited our refugee processing center outside of Bangkok, and it is clear that we must work harder and more effectively if

we are to deal humanely with this tragedy of growing proportions. We must help Thailand, we must keep up pressure on other nations to accept refugees, we must expedite our own in-field processing and resettlement procedures in the United States and we must find ways to make the UN High Commissioner on Refugees a more useful and effective agent. In keeping with your decisions, I informed Kriangsak that we would be sending additional INS personnel to Bangkok, I told him we would continue to take 25,000 refugees a year, and I indicated our wish to make \$2 million available to help underwrite a study on long range refugee resettlement. Subsequently, in Indonesia I urged Suharto not to turn boat people away, and in Australia and New Zealand, while praising past efforts, I urged both countries to take additional refugees -- both said they would give the matter sympathetic consideration.

Indonesia

Suharto responded positively to my review of the policies of your Administration and their impact on the Pacific, and I believe the visit to Jakarta has provided the foundation for a more positive US-Indonesian relationship, of considerable significance to U.S. interests in the Pacific. Suharto was pleased by your favorable decision on the A-4 squadron; he and his staff understood the human rights linkage and the fact that we could not accept use of such aircraft in Timor. I stressed the hope that the 20,000 political detainees would be released before the current time table of December, 1978 and December, 1979. Within 24 hours of my visit, the Indonesians officially confirmed to our Ambassador press reports that they were preparing to release an additional 5,000 before August, 1978.

While in Jakarta, I advised Suharto of your decision to make an additional 50,000 tons of PL-480 rice available. In Indonesia and in the Philippines I believe it is important that Agriculture and AID study wider use of PL-480 Title III to stimulate greater food production.

In Jakarta, as in Bangkok and the Philippines, I stressed U.S. interest in closer cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and our hopes for ministerial level consultations in Washington this August. There is still some reluctance in Thailand and Malaysia; however, toward the conclusion of my talks with Kriangsak, he seemed to be coming around to our position. I will ask State to follow up on this.

Australia and New Zealand

Security and trade were the issues foremost on the minds of Prime Ministers Fraser and Muldoon. Both leaders worry about the Soviets in the Pacific. Both welcomed our decision, announced in Canberra, to hold a joint US-Australian ANZUS naval exercise in the Indian Ocean off western Australia.

Both Australia and New Zealand are heavily dependent on their exports of beef and agricultural products. Both are bitter and frustrated over the policies of Japan and the European Community. Both insist that the MTN talks, if they are to be successful, must have a meaningful agricultural component. I agreed on this point in my private discussions and my comments to the press in both capitals.

On bilateral trade, the views of both leaders are perhaps best expressed in the letter just received from Prime Minister Fraser (Tab C) stating concern over pending meat import legislation, particularly the Bentsen Bill, in the Congress. I told them that we do not favor such legislation, and that where possible, we will be as helpful as possible in providing an outlet for additional agricultural products. At the same time, I stressed the complexities of our own agricultural situation and the concerns of our ranchers and farmers -- and I reminded them of just how generous we, in fact, are in our meat quotas for both countries.

In Australia and New Zealand, as in the other capitals, I stressed the importance that we attach to successful MTN negotiations this year, and I urged the leaders in each capital to table the most forthcoming offers possible.

Finally, in all five capitals, we reviewed domestic and international energy developments. In each capital, we identified areas for increased energy cooperation, with the emphasis on conservation and development of alternate energy sources. I will be following up with Jim Schlesinger to insure that these cooperative programs are implemented.

MALACANAN PALACE

MANILA

May 3, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I am gratified that you sent Vice-President Mondale on a state visit to the Philippines as your representative to meet with me on problems of mutual concern to our two countries. As you noted, we indeed moved the celebration of both Bataan Day and Corregidor Day so that the two occasions may be observed by us during Mr. Mondale's visit. In this way, in accord with what I have referred to as the "universality of principles" in our relations, we had hoped to symbolize the desire of the Filipino people to achieve growth and progress alongside the United States on the basis of mutual trust, mutual respect and mutual benefit.

I am writing this to you out of long-held sentiments of warmth, admiration and respect for the United States. These are feelings rooted in an American-inspired education and nourished by training in a juridical system derived largely from your country. They are feelings sealed by the sacrifices personally shared with Americans who fought for the liberation of the Philippines in World War II.

Among Filipinos of my generation, positive reactions to the United States are commonplace. But what of subsequent generations? What of the millions of Filipinos for whom World War II and the beginning of independence are not even childhood remembrances? As the years pass can the same sympathy between our countries continue?

To sustain a legacy of that kind, it is not enough to dwell on the sentimentalities of the past. Here, as in the United States, people ask for evidence of the

His Excellency
Jimmy Carter
President of the United States
Washington, D.C.

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per 7/13/06 NSC 14r
NLTC-86-075
BY BIR NARA DATE 7/24/06

relevance of any relationship to contemporary needs and aspirations. As a consequence, the meaning of the U.S.-Philippine relationship is being subjected to tests, the most important of which at this time involves the status of the military bases. Everytime an incident occurs between American military personnel and a Filipino, the value of the bases is brought into question anew. To be sure, these bases can continue to serve our security interests. They will do so, however, only as long as they are accepted here and in the United States as mutually beneficial.

To be sure the principle of Philippine sovereignty over the base areas has already long since been recognized by both nations. However, in present circumstances, that is not enough. The arrangements which govern use of the bases must also reflect the principle. I will say in all candor that the protracted negotiations have yet to come to grips with this reality.

With regard to the political situation in the Philippines, I would note that when martial law was declared in 1972, it was recognized on all sides that the nation was in the throes of a political paralysis and on the verge of a complete collapse. The economy was at a standstill. Crime and corruption were rampant. The country was fragmented into a number of private armed encampments.

Under martial law, the highest priorities have been given to providing security for the Filipino against violence to his person and to expanding the livelihood of his family. Personal security and adequate sustenance are regarded widely here as the most basic of human rights. While much remains still to be done, much has already been done in the past half-decade to give meaning to these rights.

At the same time, we have not been unaware of the need to proceed with the development of political institutions to replace those which gave way in 1972. To that end, we have experimented with a revival of the ancient Barangay system of local government and we have held various national plebiscites. In early April there took place a nationwide election for the Batasang Pambansa or interim assembly. Contrary to some superficial analyses, that election was a significant step in a

return to full popular participation in government. When the Batasang Pambansa convenes shortly, it will contain elected representatives who generally support my administration and those who do not.

The political forms which emerge in this country in the years ahead are bound to reflect influences from the United States and other nations. However, we are determined that henceforth these influences shall no longer be merely skin transplants. We are determined that they shall be blended into our institutions together with what is indigenous to our traditions. We shall not be deflected from that resolve under any circumstances.

I have written you at length because it seems to me that the relationship between our two countries has entered a period of trial. Whatever the immediate difficulties, much that is constructive for the peoples of both nations can emerge from this interlude. If that is to be the case, however, it is essential that in our reactions to each other's internal affairs we reflect a perceptive understanding of the prevailing situation and, in addition, that issues between the countries be faced and resolved without delay. I assure you, Mr. President, of my full cooperation in this respect even as I am confident that I can count on yours.

Mr. Mondale and I have met in a congenial, extensive and cordial discussion of the subjects mentioned in your letter. I am satisfied that our meeting covered ample ground, and that he will accordingly report to you our perspectives and perceptions on the base negotiations, on economic matters of mutual interest to us, and on the advancement of human rights.

I am taking this opportunity to communicate to you directly my concern over another problem. This concerns the fact that the media and the bureaucracy in the United States may be unable at the present time to convey, particularly to decision makers in your country, the true situation in the Philippines. We are consequently anxious about the likelihood that our perceptions will be misapprehended not only in respect of human rights but

MALACAÑAN PALACE

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also of the more delicate problem over the relationship of our two countries.

I sincerely hope, Mr. President, that Vice-President Mondale's visit and our discussions would bring to our country's relations with yours new dimensions and expectations.

Sincerely,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in dark ink, featuring a prominent loop and a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Prime Minister
Wellington
New Zealand

10 May 1978


Dear Mr President

Thank you very much for the letter you sent me through Vice-President Mondale. I recall with great pleasure my visit to the United States last November, and the discussions we were able to have then. I too found them extremely useful, not only as they touched our bilateral relationship, but also for the opportunity they gave us to talk about co-operation in the Pacific region.

I am delighted that the Vice President has been able to visit us in New Zealand, and that we can continue with him the dialogue that we began in Washington. His visit takes place at a difficult conjunction in world affairs. We for our part will wish to speak in particular of our concern at mounting protectionism, and the problems that that creates for our small and vulnerable economy.

I take the Vice President's visit as a further expression of the wide community of interest and the deep friendship between our two countries. I very much hope that you too will be able to visit us. You could count on the warmest of welcomes.

Yours sincerely



President Jimmy Carter
President of the United States
The White House
WASHINGTON DC

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 (b)
WHITE HOUSE GUIDELINES, AUGUST 28, 1997
BY BAC NARA, DATE 7/21/06

10 May 1978

Dear Mr Vice President,

Australia's Prime Minister, Mr Malcolm Fraser, has asked me to convey the following message to you:

"Dear Mr Vice President,

I would like to take this opportunity to thank you personally for the most useful discussions that we had with you this week. They made an important contribution to attaining mutual understanding of the political, defence and economic challenges which we jointly face. My Government looks forward to further exchanges with members of President Carter's Administration in the future.

There is one important matter which I raised with you however which I feel obliged to ask that you consider closely upon your return to Washington. That matter concerns proposals in Congress that amendments of a countercyclical nature be made to the existing meat import law and in particular the Bentsen Bill.

I understand that the Bentsen Bill was given rapid passage through the Senate on Friday 5 May with only a minimum number of Senators present. As a result this Bill will come before the House for consideration shortly.

As you appreciate proposals to change the present meat import law to introduce more restrictive provisions on imports are of great concern to my Government since almost 50 per cent of our beef exports are sent to the United States. The present legislation, though restrictive, has enabled the President to adopt a flexible approach to raising the level of permitted imports during times of high prices, to the benefit of U.S. consumers.

I was heartened by your advice that the Administration intends to maintain its opposition to the Bentsen Bill. In our view the basis of co-operation in the trade in meat which has been built up between our countries over the last decade would be jeopardised by the adoption of any countercyclical

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WHITE HOUSE GUIDELINES, AUGUST 26, 1987 ... 2/
BY BAE NARA, DATE 7/21/06

The Vice President of the
United States of America,
WASHINGTON, D.C.


approach to meat imports. No doubt any move to restrict imports of beef over the long term and to place the major burden of adjustments on imports would be seen also as compromising the basic objective of the United States in the multilateral trade negotiations to liberalise trade in agriculture.

I wish to re-affirm to you the earnest hope of my Government that the Administration will resolutely oppose the adoption of any countercyclical approach to meat imports and the Bentsen Bill in particular.

With kind regards,

Malcolm Fraser."

Yours sincerely,


(Alan Renouf)
Ambassador



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