

## Acceptances

1. Highway
2. Pili
3. McIntyre
4. Pearce
5. Rodino
6. Zolinski
7. Certe
8. Bagg Boggs
9. De la Haya
10. Byrne
11. Bilevic
12. Marcone
13. Paulucci
14. Belfer
15. O'Connor
16. Hays
17. Kelly
18. Kargine
19. Koch
20. Mann
21. Bisgigi
22. Lench

23

To be invited

~~Wm. Thompson~~

Wm. Thompson

Ted Hurling

## Pending

1. Johnson
2. ~~Mason~~
2. Potendowski
3. Thompson

## Added in Rome

Herder

Senkey

Barrie

## Airplane Only

~~Simon~~

## Problems

~~Bisgigi~~

~~Wm. Thompson~~

O'Brien

Kunickiewicz

Egan

Mrs. Herder

Potendowski

A 10-14

Argentina

\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\*

TO DIRECTOR  
FROM  
SUBJECT: 001000Z 10/77  
ALL INFORMATION  
RE: 001000Z 10/77

TO DIRECTOR WASHDC WIDE INTERSTATE 2000

1. 001000Z 10/77

2. 001000Z 10/77  
SUBJECT: 001000Z 10/77  
SUBJECT: 001000Z 10/77  
SUBJECT: 001000Z 10/77  
SUBJECT: 001000Z 10/77

1. AT ABOUT 4:30 P.M. I RECEIVED A PHONE CALL FROM  
GENERAL VIELA 10/77. HE WAS REQUESTING HIS PERSONAL  
PROPERTY TO COME WITH HIM TO CHASSAY. HE MADE IT CLEAR  
SUBJECT COULD NOT BE DISCLOSED BY PHONE.

2. ABOUT FORTY-FIVE MINUTES LATER A LT. COLONEL RABIER  
APPEARED TO THE CHASSAY. AFTER PROPER IDENTIFICATION, HE  
STATED PRESIDENT VIELA HAS OCCUPATION AN AUDIENCE WITH  
VIELA RESIDENT IN CHASSAY. CHASSAY STATED VIELA  
HAS BEEN TO VIELA PRESIDENT MONTELE HAS LEADING USC  
DELEGATION TO CHASSAY WEARING IN CHASSAY. CHASSAY  
STATED WITH VIELA AND VIELA WANTED HE TO KNOW IT WAS  
THIS APPLICABLE THIS WOULD BE IDEAL SITUATION FOR A VIELA  
MONTELE THAT.

3. IMMEDIATELY, COL. RABIER OF MY LACK OF INFORMATION  
AND INFORMATION IN WORK, HE WOULD TRANSMIT PRESIDENT  
VIELA'S REQUEST IMMEDIATELY. COL. RABIER ASKED  
PRESIDENT VIELA WANTED A RESPONSE BEFORE HIS  
DEPARTURE. CHASSAY INQUIRED IF I COULD HAVE A REPLY  
BY 10:00 AM OR EARLY THURSDAY ABOUT 11. I GAVE HIM  
NO ANSWER. HE SAID VIELA WOULD SOONLY DEPART  
FOR CHASSAY TOMORROW (FRIDAY - SEPTEMBER 1).

4. I INQUIRED LT. COL. RABIER TO 10:00 AM WITH VIELA  
AND VIELA TO 10:00 AM EARLY THURSDAY ABOUT 11.

\*\*\*\*\*

7. 001000Z 10/77  
SUBJECT: 001000Z 10/77

8. 001000Z 10/77  
SUBJECT: 001000Z 10/77

\*\*\*\*\*

DECLASSIFIED

per 7/13/06 NSC 1/4.  
NSC 206-075  
BY BAC NARA, DATE 7/24/06

1. I am sure that you will find the  
information of interest to you. I have  
been in contact with the person who  
has the information and he is willing  
to provide it to you. I will be in  
contact with him again and will let  
you know the results.

2. I am sure that you will find the  
information of interest to you. I have  
been in contact with the person who  
has the information and he is willing  
to provide it to you. I will be in  
contact with him again and will let  
you know the results.

3. I am sure that you will find the  
information of interest to you. I have  
been in contact with the person who  
has the information and he is willing  
to provide it to you. I will be in  
contact with him again and will let  
you know the results.

4. I am sure that you will find the  
information of interest to you. I have  
been in contact with the person who  
has the information and he is willing  
to provide it to you. I will be in  
contact with him again and will let  
you know the results.

11

## OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

INFORMATIONSECRET

Memo No. 579-78

August 31, 1978

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift *DC*

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast, Friday,  
September 1, 1978, 7:30 a.m.

Middle East

This will be a principal focus of the breakfast.

In your meeting with Lewis and Eilts you asked that they give attention to the personal dynamics of this summit, how best and when to involve the various plans.

In your meeting with Dinitz he said that it was Israel's hope that as an opportune outcome, Sadat would agree to a statement of principles, and would agree to negotiate based on those principles whether or not Hussein is willing to participate. Dinitz politely pressed you for the U.S. position, saying that he wanted to assure his people that the U.S. is going to be working with Israel, not seeking to impose an agreement on Israel.

You told Dinitz that you would ask Secretary Vance to meet with him prior to the summit. You may wish to mention this to Vance at the breakfast.

Lebanon

Dinitz, and subsequently Lebanese elder statesman Charles Malek, urged that the U.S. take whatever steps are required to have the Syrians cool the situation in Lebanon. (Needless to say, the situation is not as simple as they portray it. There is considerable sympathy in State and the NSC for the view that uncontrollable Christian militia are, in fact, the cause of the current crisis.)

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT  
REVIEW ON AUGUST 31, 1998

Page 1 of 3

DECLASSIFIED

Per 7/13/06 NSC 14.  
NLSC-06-075  
BY BIR NARA, DATE 7/21/06

## Vatican Trip/Papal Inaugural Ceremonies

The current working list of the delegation is at Tab A for your information.

Plans for the trip are proceeding. In addition to the High Mass at 6:00 p.m. Sunday and the general audience with His Holiness, Pope John Paul I at noon Monday, we have the Vatican's agreement to a private audience for you with the new Pope at 1:00 p.m., Monday (not to be publicized until after the event), and you are scheduled to meet with Prime Minister Andreotti.

The NSC will be forwarding to the President for his signature letters to the Pope and the Prime Minister. In your meeting with Andreotti, key issues will be Italian politics (a gentle reminder of the importance we attach to the Christian Democrats keeping the communists out of the government), our interests in assisting Italy in countering terrorism, and the Middle East.

In your meeting with the Pope you will stress the importance we attach to the Church's role worldwide in the context of human rights. You will also wish to discuss the Middle East, Jerusalem and Lebanon.

Bilateral Meetings: You should raise with the President, Zbig and Vance the request you have received from President Videla of Argentina for a meeting (State cable at Tab B). Zbig, as you know, thinks it would be good for you to meet with Videla. Dave Newsom called me Thursday evening saying State supports the idea of a meeting, noting that it is the one good way to break the current impasse in US-Argentine relations that has appeared on the horizon.

In Newsom's view, concurred in by Warren Christopher, your responsibilities in such a meeting would be straightforward -- hear out Videla, say that we want to improve relations with Argentina and are prepared to demonstrate this, and add that the President would like Assistant Secretary Vaky to come to Argentina to follow up on your meeting with Videla.

It is my understanding that Secretary Vance will be prepared to address this at the breakfast.

~~SECRET~~

Jim Johnson and I continue to have serious doubts about the wisdom of such a meeting. Your time on the ground in Rome is extremely limited. The focus of your visit should be the Papal Inaugural Ceremonies and your consultations with Andreotti. There is the possibility of a questioning and critical press once the fact of such a meeting were to become known (while not a direct parallel, you will recall the beating Nixon took when he held various bilaterals while in Paris for Pompidou's funeral). It seems to us that whatever free time you have in Rome could be much better spent in meetings with the Senators, Congressmen and others on the delegation for discussions on important domestic issues.

(NOTE: Vance should be able to confirm that President Sarkis of Lebanon has not, in fact, requested a meeting). Finally, in reviewing the cons of such a meeting, you will recall Zbig's comments on State's mishandling of Latin America and, specifically, abuse of Argentina -- e.g. cancellation of the Allis-Chalmers deal. It may not be too cynical to suggest that State sees this as a good chance for you to bail them out on mistakes of the past, with you enduring Videla's lecture on our transgressions. There is also the risk that once the meeting becomes known it could become the focus of questions during your press comments following the meeting with Andreotti.

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Memo No. 954-78

October 5, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift *DC*

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast,  
Friday, October 6, 1978, 7:30 a.m.

*Rome*  
*Crece*

Middle East

Secretary Vance will be meeting with Dayan later in the day. As of 5:00 p.m. Thursday, October 5, Vance was indicating in New York that he would be in Washington on October 12 to open the Egyptian-Israeli talks and then depart the evening of the 12th for Africa. My source of information, Dick Moose, who is in New York, said that Vance's scheduling plans are still "very fluid."

The breakfast provides a good opportunity to get Vance's views on how he sees the Egyptian-Israeli talks opening, and how he plans to handle the agenda (you have seen the cables on this issue with the Egyptian-Israeli positions).

You may also wish to invite Vance's thinking on:

- his consultations with Dayan relating to the future West Bank settlements side letter,
- the schedule for moving ahead with proposed response to Hussein's questions.

Cyprus

The President is scheduled to meet with President Kyprianou of Cyprus at 10:15 Friday morning. Vance has reported that his talks with Kyprianou went well. It would be useful if Kyprianou could, for a change, say something relatively upbeat about the U.S. following his meeting with the President. This would have a good impact on the Greek-

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT  
REVIEW ON OCTOBER 5, 1998

DECLASSIFIED  
per 7/13/06 NSC 1hr.  
RELTC-06-075  
BY BAT NARA, DATE 7/24/06

American community. You may wish to suggest to the President that he advise Kyprianou during their meeting that he plans to give a favorable report to the press and that he hopes Kyprianou will do the same.

#### Rhodesia

Last year you met with former Prime Minister Garfield Todd. Todd is back in the U.S. and Arthur Krim has asked if you will see him again. I have discussed this with Dick Moose. Our feeling is, given the many complexities of the current Rhodesian situation and the fact that Smith is coming in to town, that this would not be a good idea. It would look as if the White House was deliberately going out of its way to shun Smith. I mention this by way of background for the breakfast.

\* \* \* \*

#### Further Material on Middle East

The NSC advises that the President will probably wish to focus on:

- (1) How to get negotiations on the West Bank moving in parallel with the Sinai negotiations; and
- (2) How best to answer the questions posed by Hussein.

The breakfast will carry over into the 1:00 p.m. situation room meeting on the Middle East. There are no new documents for either meeting at this point.




OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTONINFORMATION~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS~~

Memo No. 978-78

October 12, 1978

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast, Friday,  
October 13, 1978

Middle East

Secretary Vance will wish to amplify on his Evening Report of October 12 in reviewing the outcome of the opening day of Egyptian-Israeli talks at Blair House. You might wish to comment on the mutually warm and constructive tone of the opening statements by Dayan and Ali -- and to note that the President's opening ceremony set a very good tone for the negotiations.

SALT

The SCC will have met in the late afternoon of October 12 to review the outstanding SALT issues in preparation for Secretary Vance's trip to Moscow. The papers for that meeting are at Tab I. The tactics to be used by Vance in Moscow (pages 3 and 4 of the NSC cover memorandum) are of particular interest, with the NSC recommending a very firm "bottom line" position by Vance. It might be useful at the breakfast to have a brief discussion on Vance's reporting from Moscow to the President, to ensure that it is clear that the President will have the opportunity to review the negotiating situation before Vance ends his talks on either a positive or a negative note.

Africa

State's Southern African Developments memorandum for October 12 includes intelligence indications that Prime Minister P.W. Botha does not want to have a break with the West over Namibia. You may wish to ask Vance to amplify on this report.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT  
REVIEW ON OCTOBER 12, 1998

DECLASSIFIED  
per 7/13/06 NSC 14r.  
NLSJc-06-075  
BY BAC NARA, DATE 7/21/06

Intelligence and ACDA Meetings

You may wish to note that after the breakfast you will be meeting with Senators Bayh and Huddleston to review the state of play of Executive-Legislative consultations over draft intelligence charter legislation. You may also wish to comment on the ACDA meeting you will be having in the morning.

Rumors of US-Canadian Summit

There have been recent reports in the Canadian press that President Carter may visit Canada, possibly as early as November 1978. It is my understanding that this speculation is a result of Secretary Vance's conversation with Minister of External Affairs Jamieson in New York a few days ago. I would recommend against such an early date for a summit visit by the President. The Canadians are not being helpful in the fisheries negotiations, on the tax treaty issue, on Kitimat. We do not yet have enough progress in MTN to allow parallel progress on the Alberta gas front. I am fully in favor of a Canadian summit. However, I think we should make the Canadians work harder for it so that the President will have good results to point to when he makes our visit. Were he to go now, issues would not have advanced much further than the point reached as a result of your January visit.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ XGDS

INFORMATION

October 11, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: ROGER MOLANDER ~~RB~~  
REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW ~~RB~~

SUBJECT: SCC Meeting on SALT -- October 12, 1978

The purpose of this meeting is to review the outstanding SALT issues in preparation for Cy Vance's trip to Moscow later this month. A table describing the positions of the two sides on the outstanding issues is at Tab B.

In reviewing these issues, we start from the assumption that Cy's initial position in Moscow will be that the proposals which the President gave to Gromyko constitute a fully adequate means for resolving the outstanding issues, taking into account the interests of both sides. While it is possible that the Soviets will accept the position put forward by the President, this is highly unlikely, and we can expect counterproposals on several of the issues. In anticipation of such counterproposals, we have outlined the discussion agenda at Tab A which has been provided to the agencies.

Backfire

You will recall that the President used the terminology "no further increase in intercontinental capability" to describe our preferred wording on the Soviet Backfire statement. He also left Gromyko with the impression that we could accept the Soviet proposed Backfire statement (Tab C) with deletion of the claim of a 2200 km radius of action and a few other minor changes. However, as you can see from examining the text of the Soviet statement, it can really only be "fixed" with major deletions and modifications. An example is at Tab D. You will need to get agreement on our preferred language at the meeting. We suggest you distribute the version at Tab D for discussion. We will have copies available.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ XGDS (B) (3)  
Classified by Zbigniew Brzezinski

DECLASSIFIED

per 7/13/06 NSC 1A.  
NLJC 06-095  
BY BAE NARA/DATE 7/21/06

If we are going to insist on major modifications to the Soviet statement (and there seems to be no alternative), it would be prudent to communicate this to the Soviets beforehand since this is certainly not their impression of the US position.

With respect to our own statement on rights to deploy a bomber with capability comparable to the Backfire, we should probably have a statement prepared if the Soviets ask for it, but there is no compelling reason to volunteer language at this time. A draft statement for discussion at the meeting is at Tab E.

#### Number of ALCMs per Heavy Bomber

Even if the Soviets accept the averaging concept (at a level of 30 to 35), they may try to undercut the impact with further ALCM limitations such as those cited in the agenda paper. We see no reason to accept any further limitations on ALCMs beyond the averaging, even though we have no plans for deploying over 20 ALCMs through 1985. This is particularly true since the agreement as currently structured could be extended well beyond 1985 with no changes whatever. While it is certainly the President's ambition to have a follow-on agreement, we should not rule out the possibility that SALT THREE, with all of the emerging complications, will take more than the six years it has taken to negotiate SALT TWO, and we may want or need to extend SALT TWO for several years.

The Soviets know that their proposal on ALCM limits is without practical effect to 1985 because they know our programs. They are, in fact, seeking to prejudice SALT THREE and the future. Our averaging proposal is a major step towards them because it accepts their principle of a limit on ALCMs and backs off our principle of linkage to air defenses. In addition, they know we are not precluding the possibility of more restrictive ALCM limits in SALT THREE, if there are restrictive air defense limits. In sum, it would be politically damaging to go further in SALT TWO.

#### Cruise Missile Definition/Cruise Missile Range Definition

At this stage of the negotiations, we see no politically-acceptable alternative to the current US position on the

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ XGDS

cruise missile definition unless we wanted to reintroduce range limits above 600 km. In that case, we could negotiate a separate range limit (1500-2500 km) on the testing and/or deployment of conventionally-armed ALCMs on aircraft other than heavy bombers. We would prefer not to take that step and believe that Cy should make no movement whatever on this issue in Moscow.

#### Duration of Protocol

We still have negotiating room on the Protocol duration issue since long-range SLCMs and GLCMs would not be deployed before 1982. In fact, there are good political arguments for prolonging the Protocol in order to give the Alliance more time "to get its program together" (which it clearly needs) and more time to negotiate the follow-on agreement. On the other hand, since we have no intention of extending any of the Protocol limits, it may be preferable to put it behind us as soon as possible as we wrestle with SALT THREE.

#### Other Issues

While not of paramount importance (and not listed on the agenda), you might briefly review the other outstanding issues shown in the table at Tab B. With respect to the depressed trajectory issue, the Backstopping Committee cabled a depressed trajectory definition to the Delegation today which should elicit a Soviet response to this proposal in the near future.

#### Tactics in Moscow

There is little to say here. We are not at all confident that the Soviets understand that they got basically our bottom line from the President. This means they could initially take a hard line with Vance -- or even prime the pump with a few cosmetic concessions -- designed to extract from us the additional offers they think we have. The tactical imperative is that Vance disabuse them of this notion by taking a stiff line and sticking with it for as long as it takes. The fundamental imperative is that he show not even a glimmer of any possible changes in our positions -- even ones like 30 vs 35 -- until and unless the Soviets move 95% towards our position. He should play whatever 5% trading material he has only, and only if, it is crystal clear it will bring agreement.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS

In sum, Vance should make clear from the outset that he has come to hear the Soviet response, not to engage in yet another round of negotiations. Above all, Vance has to be ready to leave Moscow if the Soviets do not come around -- and to leave Moscow without setting or agreeing to another date, but saying that we will expect to hear further from the Soviets. In fact, if by the end of the first day Gromyko has not moved substantially towards our positions, Vance ought to say that the meeting should not go on to the second day since the Soviets need more time to think, and we will expect to hear further from them when they have. There are few acts or threats that sting the Soviets more than a curtailment like this. If the Soviets respond, fine: If they do not, then we are obviously up against it -- but the Soviets will understand that they have touched bed-rock.

We obviously cannot take this line unless we are truly prepared to see SALT stalemated for a time if it comes to that. But the plain fact is that the President did all he could and it would be substantively and politically damaging to him and to SALT itself if we do much more at all. And a second plain fact is that he cannot be politically hurt if he comes across as standing firm until the Soviets make the same kind of political effort he did -- and back their words about an early SALT agreement with acts.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS





AGENDA  
SCC MEETING ON SALT  
October 12, 1978

1. Backfire

a. What is our preference for the precise wording of the Soviet statement on Backfire?

b. Should we convey our preferred wording to the Soviets before Secretary Vance goes to Moscow?

c. Should we draft and provide to the Soviets the statement we would make in response to their Backfire statement regarding our rights to deploy an aircraft of comparable capability?

2. Number of ALCMs per Heavy Bomber

a. If the Soviets accept an average of 30-35 on the number of ALCMs per heavy bomber but make it contingent on other ALCM limitations, are there other ALCM limitations which we could accept?

-- US statement regarding no intention to deploy over 20 ALCMs per heavy bomber through 1985.

-- Ban on deploying heavy bombers with over 50-60 ALCMs.

-- Counting heavy bombers with over 40-60 ALCMs as "two" in the 1320.

b. If the Soviets reject the averaging concept, are there other acceptable alternatives which we might put forward?

-- Counting heavy bombers with over 40 ALCMs as "two" in the 1320.

-- Counting ALCM-carrying heavy bombers in 1320 as 1/2 for 12 or fewer ALCMs, 1 for 13-20 ALCMs, and 2 for over 20 ALCMs.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS

DECLASSIFIED  
per 7/13/04 NSC 1A  
NLSC-04-095  
BY B. B. NARA, DATE 7/21/06



3. Cruise Missile Definition/Cruise Missile Range Definition

a. Are there any acceptable alternatives to the current US position on the cruise missile definition?

b. If the Soviets do not accept our position on the cruise missile definition, should we withdraw our acceptance of their proposal on the cruise missile range definition and dropping the cruise missile range limits above 600 km?

4. Duration of Protocol

Can we accept further slippage in the date for Protocol expiration?

-- September 30, 1981.

-- December 30, 1981.

-- Three years from date of signature.

5. Tactics in Moscow



Pre-Gromyko US POSITIONCURRENT US POSITIONSOVIET POSITION

## Exemptions

-- ICBMs	Test and deploy one new type.	-	Same
-- SLBMs	No limits.	-	Same

## Fractionation

-- ICBMs	Fractionation freeze on current types and limit of 10 on new types.	No change.	Same except limit of 6 on new types.
-- SLBMs	Fractionation limit of 14 RVs/SLBM.	-	Same.

## Definition

US-proposed definition.	Work out in Geneva.	Willing to consider "more precise" definition ala that of US.
-------------------------	---------------------	---

## Size of ICBM Exemption/Heavy Mobile Missiles

Light exemption; ban heavy mobile missiles.	Work out in Geneva.	Light exemption; mute on heavy mobile missile issue.
---	---------------------	--

## Number of ALCMs per Heavy Bomber

No limits; statement on capabilities for Protocol period, SALT THREE, etc.	Averaging of 35 ALCMs or statement thru 1985.	CMCs with 21-40 ALCMs count as 2 in 1320, with 41-60 ALCMs count as 3.
--	---	--

## Cruise Missile Definition

Current US position + ALCM airframe type rule.	No change.	All limits apply to conventionally-armed cruise missiles.
--	------------	---

## Cruise Missile Range Definition

Odometer allowance + authority to include fuel reserve allowance.	Soviet position okay if US CM definition accepted.	Drop all CM range limits except for 600 km; Soviet range def. at 600 km.
---	--	--

## Intercontinental Cruise Missiles

Ban on ICCMs through 1985.	No limits on ICCMs.	No limits on ICCMs.
----------------------------	---------------------	---------------------

## Multiple Warhead Cruise Missile

No limits; statement on capabilities for Protocol period, SALT THREE, etc., regarding ALCMs only.	Statement thru 1985.	Ban on multiple warhead cruise missiles.
---	----------------------	--

## Depressed Trajectories

Ban testing SLBMs on depressed trajectories.	No change.	No position yet.
--	------------	------------------

## Dismantling to 2250/Duration of Protocol

June 30, 1981	December 30, 1981 for dismantling if inoperable by June 30, 1981; June 30, 1981 for Protocol expiration.	Dec 30, 1981 for dismantling if agreement goes into effect by March 31, 1979; 3-yr Protocol.
---------------	--	--

## Telemetry Encryption

Common Understanding required.	Reiterate need for Common Understanding.	No additional language required.
--------------------------------	--	----------------------------------

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS

DECLASSIFIED

PC 7/13/06 NSC 14.  
 NLJC-06-075  
 BY BAC NARA DATE 7/24/06



LATEST SOVIET BACKFIRE STATEMENT (May 1978)

"As a gesture of good will, the Soviet side informs the US side that the Soviet medium-range bomber TU-22-M, called Backfire in the United States, has a radius of action of 2,200 kilometers when flying at subsonic speed with a normal payload at an altitude of 8,000 to 12,000 meters, and that it, i.e., the Soviet side, does not intend to give this airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances. In this connection, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the radius of action of this aircraft in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the United States. It does not intend to give that airplane such capability in any other manner, including by way of in-flight refueling. At the same time, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the production rate of this airplane as compared to the present production rate."

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED  
Per 7/13/06 NSC 12  
NLJC 06-078  
P/M NARA DATE 7/21/06



LATEST SOVIET BACKFIRE STATEMENT (May 1978)

With respect to

~~"As a gesture of good will, the Soviet side informs~~  
~~the US side that the Soviet medium-range bomber TU-22-M,~~  
~~called Backfire in the United States, has a radius of action~~  
~~of 2,200 kilometers when flying at subsonic speed with a~~  
~~normal payload at an altitude of 8,000 to 12,000 meters, and~~  
~~that it, i.e., the Soviet side, does not intend to give this~~ states that it will not increase  
~~airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental~~ of this bomber for  
~~distances. In this connection, the Soviet side states that~~  
~~it will not increase the radius of action of this aircraft~~  
~~in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the terri-~~  
~~tory of the United States. It does not intend to give that~~  
~~airplane such capability in any other manner, including,~~  
~~by way of in flight refueling.~~ At the same time, the Soviet  
side states that it will not increase the production rate  
of this airplane as compared to the present production rate."

N.B. CLEAN-TYPED VERSION ON  
NEXT PAGE

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED  
per 7/13/06 NSC 14n  
NLK -06 -076  
BY BAC NARA, DATE 7/21/06

DRAFT -- US PREFERRED SOVIET BACKFIRE STATEMENT

With respect to the Soviet medium-range bomber TU-22-M, called Backfire in the United States, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the capability of this bomber for operating at intercontinental distances. At the same time, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the production rate of this airplane as compared to the present production rate.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS





DRAFT -- US STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET BACKFIRE  
STATEMENT

The United States takes note of the statement of Soviet Union regarding the TU-22-M medium bomber, called Backfire in the United States, and calls attention to its right to deploy a bomber of comparable capability.

DECLASSIFIED  
PR- 7/13/06 NSC 1A.  
NLJC-06-075  
BY B/R NARA, DATE 7/21/06

MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON


INFORMATION

TOP SECRET/CODEWORD/XGDS

Memo No. 1068-78

November 15, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift   
SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast, Friday,  
November 17, 1978

Middle East

Following the President's Thursday meeting with Mubarak, your meeting with Ehrlich, and with your Friday evening dinner with Mubarak in mind, it would be helpful to have Vance review the current state of play in the Middle East peace negotiations. I specifically recommend that you seek the President's guidance on points you should stress to Mubarak during your dinner conversation.

Mig 23s in Cuba

The SCC met on November 13 to assess the presence of Mig 23s in Cuba (paper for the meeting at Tab A). Following the meeting Zbig reported to the President that the SCC concluded that the Mig 23 D/F does constitute a significant and new offensive, air-to-ground attack capability and that as an offensive weapon its deployment violates the 1963 and 1970 understandings with the USSR. The SCC further agreed on the necessity of approaching the Soviets to register our concern that the introduction of the Mig 23 D/Fs will affect our relationship and could jeopardize ratification of the SALT treaty by calling into question Soviet adherence to past understandings.

Secretary Vance called Dobrynin in on November 14, asked him to check and let us know the Soviet account of the situation as soon as possible. SALT opponents have lost little time in getting the issue into the press -- see Evans and Novak column at Tab B. You may wish to ask Vance if he has had any further response from Dobrynin.

TOP SECRET/CODEWORD  
CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT  
REVIEW ON NOVEMBER 15, 1998

DECLASSIFIED  
per 7/13/06 NSC LK.  
AK-JC-06-076  
BY: BIR NARA, DATE 7-24-06

### Indochinese Refugees

U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Poul Hartling, former Danish Prime Minister, has asked to meet with you next Monday, November 20, to discuss the Indochinese refugee situation. His request comes at a time when the number of refugees is mounting dramatically.

You may wish to note this request during the breakfast to see if the President believes it would be useful for you to meet with Hartling. In my opinion, the meeting would permit you to review the responsible position being taken by the United States and to stress the importance we attach to Hartling's persuading greater numbers of nations to act responsibly to help meet this humanitarian problem.

### Namibia

On November 13, by a vote of 10-0 with the Western Five abstaining, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution:

- condemning South Africa's plan to hold elections in Namibia next month;
- warning of sanctions if South Africa fails to cooperate in the implementation of earlier council resolutions on Namibia; and
- asking the Secretary General to report on the implementation of this resolution by November 25.

Discussing South Africa's response to his efforts to arrange a meeting with a senior South African official, Secretary General Waldheim told Ambassador McHenry after the vote that Foreign Minister Botha's offer to discuss Namibia after November 27 was not satisfactory for two reasons:

- Waldheim faces a November 25 deadline imposed by the Security Council; and
- Botha, even then, will not be empowered to reach an agreement.

The UNGA also postponed its plenary debate on Namibia for at least two more weeks. No new date has been set.

SALT

Further to your conversation with David Aaron on Thursday, you may wish to ask Vance for an update on SALT -- i.e., any Soviet response to our latest position.

You may also wish to note the need to move on SALT -- if we are to do so this term -- by January if the Senate is to be expected to take action during 1979.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6805xx

~~TOP SECRET~~/ RUFF UMBRA

November 10, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR

The VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JCS  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE


SUBJECT: Background paper of SCC meeting of  
Monday, November 13.

I attach the paper that will provide the basis for  
discussion at Monday's SCC meeting.

I would particularly want to bring to your attention  
the following comment:

"DIA does not concur with the first sentence of the  
summary because, while the MIG-23 FLOGGERS with modifica-  
tion could deliver nuclear weapons, the MIG-21 FISBED  
aircraft, which have been in Cuba since 1962, could  
also be modified to deliver nuclear weapons."

The point is also made in the tick paragraph at the top  
of page 3.

  
Christine Dodson  
Staff Secretary

~~TOP SECRET~~/RUFF UMBRA  
XGDS 5B(1), (2), (3)

DECLASSIFIED  
Per 7/13/06 NSC Ltr.  
NLTC-04-075  
BY BAC NARA, DATE 7/24/06



# MINNESOTA HISTORICAL SOCIETY

Copyright in the Walter F. Mondale Papers belongs to the Minnesota Historical Society and its content may not be copied without the copyright holder's express written permission. Users may print, download, link to, or email content, however, for individual use.

To request permission for commercial or educational use, please contact the Minnesota Historical Society.



[www.mnhs.org](http://www.mnhs.org)