

# Cuba's Mig23s

The Soviet Union is surreptitiously arming Cuba with Mig23 aircraft of the type now deployed in Europe for nuclear attack against NATO, a development casting a long shadow on President Carter's hope for Senate ratification next year of a strategic arms limitation treaty.

In a top-secret memorandum informing President Carter of this on Oct. 23, Defense Secretary Harold Brown specifically raised the question whether supplying Cuba with the high-performance Mig23 violates the "understandings" between President Kennedy and the Kremlin that ended the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. Those understandings forced Moscow to remove ballistic missiles and other nuclear-armed weapons from Cuba, including the Badger bomber.

According to U.S. intelligence findings on which Brown based his memorandum to the president, the Cuba-based Mig23 has the configuration of the nuclear-attack aircraft that makes up the Warsaw Pact's most advanced nuclear-delivery tactical strike force.

There was no suggestion in Brown's memorandum to Carter that the Cuba-based Mig23s—believed now to number some 12 to 15 aircraft—have actually been fitted or "wired," in the technical phrase, for carrying a nuclear payload. What can be said is that the Mig23 now in Cuba appears to be the same Model D or F long observed in the Warsaw Pact's nuclear-delivery training exercises: an attack, not an air-defense, aircraft.

Top Carter administration officials, not concealing their shock at discovering the Mig23 with its one-way 1,200-mile range based 90 miles off the Florida coast, are now hotly debating what to do and say about it. As Brown warned Carter in his memo, the totally unexpected Soviet move presents the president with a problem of "high political sensitivity."

To make the fact public poses this unpleasant choice: Demand that Moscow immediately remove all Mig23s, as the U.S. successfully demanded of the Soviet missiles and Badger bombers in 1962, when the strategic balance was overwhelmingly in Washington's favor, or try to explain it away as a mere upgrading or modernization of Cuba's air force, whose Mig21s are now largely in the service of Cuba's African adventures.

If Carter chose the first option, odds are prohibitive that Moscow would tell him to go jump in the lake, diplomatically or not, and probably make it stick. That would bring an instant crisis in de-

tente and put the new SALT agreement in jeopardy.

But to accept the presence of the Mig23 in Cuba, knowing its apparent capability for being fitted for nuclear-delivery, would violate the doctrine laid down by John F. Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis and by the Nixon-Kissinger strategists in 1970.

In that year, Richard Nixon and his then-national security adviser Henry Kissinger delivered what amounted to an ultimatum against Soviet-Cuban construction of submarine pens at Cienfuegos capable of servicing nuclear-missile submarines. That ultimatum was based squarely on the Kennedy doctrine: any nuclear-capable weapon—whether it was actually fitted with nuclear armaments or not—was ipso facto intolerable in Fidel Castro's Cuba. The submarine pens were not built.

It is doubtful that even a signed Cuban "pledge" that its new Mig23s would never be equipped for nuclear delivery would do much to solve Carter's political problem in the Senate when the new SALT agreement comes up for debate next year. With the southern part of the United States exposed to attack within the Mig23's nonstop, 1,200-mile range, the SALT debate might well turn into an anti-Soviet free-for-all.

Indeed, the shrewdest analysts here are hard put to explain the surreptitious deployment of the Mig23 in terms other than Soviet muscle-flexing, mixed with deterrence. It would seem to provide Moscow with a powerful option to be brandished when and if necessary as a counter to American policy anywhere in the world considered hostile by the Soviet Union.

U.S. defense officials say that the Mig23 model now in Cuba has never before been delivered to a Soviet ally. After the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973, Syria received the air-defense version of the Mig23—essentially a fighter plane not equipped for tactical strikes against ground targets. The difference is similar to that between the U.S. F4 and the F5E: The F4 has been denied to Taiwan because it could attack the Chinese mainland; the F5E, a plane designed purely for defense, is being supplied instead.

That the Soviets have chosen this critical moment in off-again, on-again détente to threaten the United States in its own back yard is a vicious irony for Jimmy Carter. Unless he can conjure up a justifiable explanation for the Mig23s where none appears today, his hopes for SALT II may turn to dust.

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NOVEMBER 15  
WASHINGTON POST

MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON


INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/XGDS

Memo No. 1126-78

November 30, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift   
SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast,  
Friday, December 1, 1978

Middle East

Middle East strategy and tactics and the immediate issue of the President's meeting with Prime Minister Khalil on Friday afternoon will be a priority at the breakfast.

I have separately forwarded you a detailed paper laying out the issues and proposing a recommended US scenario which I have coordinated with Quandt -- this scenario envisages a visit by you to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia in the week of December 11. (of note, Quandt advises that Vance does not want to go to the Middle East.)

SALT

My best reading of the situation is that the President is now moving forward with determination to finish the SALT negotiations and set up a summit meeting with Brezhnev.

I have earlier suggested that it would make sense for you to undertake an overseas mission on behalf of the President to Eastern Europe - e.g., Romania and Poland - and, perhaps to the People's Republic of China. I discussed this with David Aaron on November 30. He thinks the idea of consultations with the Romanians is an excellent one, particularly given Ceausescu's current stance in the Warsaw Pact (Tab A).

David's view is that it would make sense for you to go to the PRC a bit later on, at some point during the SALT ratification process.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT  
REVIEW ON NOVEMBER 30, 1998

DECLASSIFIED

per 7/13/06 NSC Ltr.  
NLC 5C1-06-076  
BY BAC NARA, DATE 7/21/06

I think it is of real importance to our strategy in Eastern Europe and with the PRC to have political level consultations early in 1979 if we have a US-USSR summit and a SALT II agreement. If SALT and the Soviet summit come up during the breakfast, I recommend that you offer the suggestion that it would make sense for you to undertake these missions.

Cuban Political Prisoners

The NSC staff believes that Zbig has asked you to meet with the Cuban Americans who recently met with Castro. I have spoken to Zbig and he has suggested that it would be good if you were to meet with a delegation of the political prisoners just released by Castro, together with some of the Cuban Americans involved in the transaction. Such a meeting, it has been suggested, would have a favorable domestic political impact in Florida. You may wish to raise this possibility during the breakfast to get the reaction of the President, Vance and Brzezinski. (NOTE: Zbig is not recommending that the President meet with the Cubans.)

APPEARED TODAY TO BE PUSHING FOR A SHOWDOWN WITH THE SOVIET UNION OVER MILITARY INTEGRATION, AFTER GETTING A PLEDGE OF ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORT FROM THE ROMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY.

THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE SAID HIS TOUGH STAND AT A WARSAW PACT SUMMIT MEETING IN MOSCOW LAST WEEK WAS "A BRILLIANT EXAMPLE OF DEVOTED SERVICE TO THE SUPREME INTERESTS OF THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE."

AT A SPECIAL MEETING CALLED YESTERDAY TO ENDORSE MR CEAUSESCU'S POLICIES, THE PARTY BODY SAID ROMANIA WOULD CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH THE SEVEN-NATION COMMUNIST MILITARY ALLIANCE -- ON ROMANIA'S TERMS, BASED ON FULL INDEPENDENCE.

MR CEAUSESCU HAS SPARKED A SERIOUS CRISIS IN HIS UNEASY RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW BY VETOING PLANS FOR INCREASED MILITARY SPENDING BY THE WARSAW PACT, AND IS REPORTED TO HAVE RESISTED PROPOSALS FOR A NEW TYPE OF SUPREME COMMAND UNDER SOVIET CONTROL.

HE HAS ALSO BROKEN RANKS WITH HIS ALLIES OVER CHINA AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

THE OFFICIAL AGERPRES NEWS AGENCY SAID ROMANIA'S MILITARY BUDGET FOR 1979 WOULD STAY PEGGED AT ABOUT ONE BILLION DOLLARS.

THE RULING PARTY SAID THAT TO SPEND MORE WOULD FURTHER DEPRESS ROMANIAN LIVING STANDARDS, ALREADY AMONG THE LOWEST IN THE SOVIET BLOC.

MR CEAUSESCU WAS EXPECTED TO DISCLOSE MORE DETAILS OF HIS QUARREL WITH MOSCOW IN A MAJOR PUBLIC SPEECH SCHEDULED FOR TOMORROW.

WESTERN DIPLOMATS SAID HE HAD FREQUENTLY CALLED FOR CUTS IN ARMS SPENDING, AND ACCEPTANCE OF SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR HIGHER BUDGETS WOULD HAVE CONTRADICTED STATEMENTS HE HAD MADE IN PRIVATE TO FOREIGN LEADERS.

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CEAUSESCU 3 BUCHAREST

THE DIPLOMATS SAID THE ROMANIAN LEADER'S STAND AGAINST MOSCOW ON THIS ISSUE AND IN DEFENSE OF HIGHER LIVING STANDARDS FOR HIS PEOPLE COULD ONLY GAIN HIM DOMESTIC POPULARITY.

SOME OBSERVERS NOTED THAT A PUBLIC SHOWDOWN WITH MOSCOW HELPED DIVERT ATTENTION FROM INTERNAL GRIEVANCES CAUSED BY CONSUMER GOODS AND FOOD SHORTAGES AND NEW LIMITS ON THE HOUSEHOLD USE OF ELECTRICITY.

THERE WAS WIDESPREAD SPECULATION THAT MR CEAUSESCU, A COMMUNIST MAVERICK FOR 13 YEARS, WAS SEEKING STILL WIDER ROOM FOR MANUEVER INSIDE THE WARSAW PACT AND THE 10-NATION COMMUNIST COMECON ECONOMIC GROUPING.

"ROMANIA MAY BELIEVE IT CAN GAIN MORE BY GOING PUBLIC, RATHER THAN BY NIBBLING AWAY," A SENIOR DIPLOMAT SAID.

MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/CODEWORD/EXDIS INFORMATION

Memo No. 1150-78

December 7, 1978


MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift *DC*  
SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast,  
Friday, December 8, 1978

MIDDLE EAST

Secretary Vance will be departing for London, Cairo and Jerusalem shortly after the breakfast. (U)

There have been a number of reports to the effect that Israel is planning intensive settlement activity immediately following the end of the "freeze" on December 17 (Tab A). It seems to me Vance should have instructions from the President on his position with Begin concerning settlements for his discussions in Jerusalem. If in the days immediately following December 17, when we may be very likely able to button up the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, Israel surges ahead with settlements, this could well interrupt the Egyptian-Israeli treaty process. (TS/Codeword)



~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/CODEWORD/EXDIS  
REVIEW ON DECEMBER 7, 1999  
CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES

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SANITIZED  
per 7/13/06 NSC 14.  
NLJC-06-075  
BY BAE NARA, DATE 7/21/06

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/CODEWORD/EXDIS

Anti-American Activity - There has been an increase in incidents against Americans. We have also had reports of damage/sabotage to several Iranian F-5s. On Wednesday, I provided you with Defense orders directing six US ships to remain in the Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea area. I would note that these ships -- a command ship, a small cruiser, two destroyers, and two frigates -- have no lift capability of any significance. They would be unable to participate in any substantial helicopter evacuation of Americans. The entire question of contingency plans for such an evacuation remains an important one. I recommend that you ask Zbig what the NSC is doing on this contingency. (TS/Codeword)

Mexico

You will have seen Zbig's information item to the President reporting on the December 6 PRC addressing US policy toward Mexico, and the fact that the NSC will be working with State and energy on a paper that will propose a US position and negotiating strategy on natural gas for the President's discussions in mid-February with President Lopez Portillo. Zbig also noted that the Executive Branch would take no firm decisions on immigration policy until the President and Lopez Portillo had personally discussed this issue. I recommend that you note that the PRC meeting has taken place and underline the importance of keeping White House/NSC control over the overall preparations for the summit, given the importance of these issues to US interests. (C)

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/CODEWORD/EXDIS

## OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON


~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

INFORMATION

Memo No. 1166-78

December 14, 1978

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast,  
Friday, December 15, 1978, 7:30 a.m.

Secretary Vance will be en route to Washington from Cairo, ETA 4:30 p.m. EST, as the breakfast convenes. (U)

A meeting of the Israeli Cabinet is scheduled for Friday morning in Jerusalem, and it is possible that the first reports of the deliberations/decisions resulting from that session will be on the wire by the time of your meeting. (U)

Agenda items for the breakfast will probably include:

- Middle East - Next steps in the wake of Israel's rejection of the latest US-Egyptian compromise proposals. As you know, the President gave Vance fall-back authorization to invite Begin and Sadat to the United States. (Text of controversial Articles IV and VI is at Tab A). (S)
- US-USSR/SALT - A formal meeting of the National Security Council is scheduled for Monday, December 18 at 3:00 p.m. to review the positions Vance will be authorized to take on SALT and a US-USSR summit in his meetings with Gromyko in Geneva on December 21-22. (As reflected in an article published in Defense/Space Business Daily Tuesday, Tab B, SALT II opponents are becoming increasingly vocal on the perceived contents of the agreement, with criticism focused on provisions relating to Backfire, telemetry encryption and cruise missiles per cruise missile aircraft.) (S)
- Iran - On Wednesday, The SCC convened a principals only meeting to consider Ambassador Ball's paper (forwarded to you on December 13). (S)

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY  
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REVIEW ON DECEMBER 14, 1998

DECLASSIFIED  
per 7/13/06 NSC Ltr.  
NLJC-06-075  
BY BAI NARA, DATE 7/21/06

-- US-PRC Relations (U)

- Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) - The French are a major question mark as the Tokyo round reaches its climax. Having been informed that the President would not be able to receive their Trade Minister this week, they have asked Henry Owen to come to Paris for talks on Monday. The odds are better than ever that they will inform Henry that they will oppose the MTN agreement at the Tuesday, December 19 meeting of the EC Council, and insist that their veto requires the nine to turn down the agreement. Roy Jenkins was questioned on this by US officials on December 14. He said that it is not clear that the French can make a veto stick -- it will depend on how the eight other EC members view the MTN package. (S)

Page 2 of 2



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#### ARTICLE IV

1. In order to provide maximum security for both Parties on the basis of reciprocity, agreed security arrangements will be established including limited force zones in Egyptian and Israeli territory, and United Nations forces and observers, described in detail as to nature and timing in Annex I, and other security arrangements the Parties may agree upon.

2. The Parties agree to the stationing of United Nations personnel in areas described in Annex I. The Parties agree not to request withdrawal of the United Nations personnel and that these personnel will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations, with the affirmative vote of the five Permanent Members, unless the Parties otherwise agree.

3. A Joint Commission will be established to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty, as provided for in Annex I.

4. The security arrangements provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article may at the request of either party be reviewed and amended by mutual agreement of the Parties.

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DECLASSIFIED  
per 7/13/06 NSC Ltr.  
NSC 06-075  
BY RME NARA DATE 7/21/06

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## ARTICLE VI

1. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty.

3. They further undertake to take all the necessary measures for the application in their relations of the provisions of the multilateral conventions to which they are parties, including the submission of appropriate notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations and other depositaries of such conventions.

4. The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligation in conflict with this Treaty.

5. Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.

~~SECRET~~

# Defense / Space Business Daily

Thursday, December 14, 1978

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20th Year, Vol. 101, No. 30

Page 207

## SOVIETS CONTINUE TO GAIN FROM CONCESSIONS IN SALT II

### *Backfire Still Free/Missile Encoding Continues*

**An Analysis.** President Carter makes it sound as if he is holding firm against the Soviet insistence on further U.S. concessions in the SALT II negotiations, but from the information that is leaking out on the latest developments, it is hard to find any substantive Soviet concessions, only U.S. concessions.

Carter said Tuesday: "Our position has been clear. We have harmony, I believe, among the Defense Department, State Department and the White House on what should be the United States position. If the Soviets are adequately forthcoming we will have an agreement without further delay. If they're not forthcoming then we'll continue to negotiate."

So far only the U.S. has been realistically forthcoming.

The Tupolev Backfire bomber, with its intercontinental capability, and one of the principal stumbling blocks of the past two years of negotiations, continues to remain outside the limits of the SALT II agreement, as the Soviets have steadfastly demanded. As things now stand, it will not be counted as a strategic weapon in the SALT II agreement, a major Soviet victory.

Just how the Administration hopes to accomplish an acceptable limitation on the Backfire bomber through Soviet good faith assurances is yet to be explained.

It has effectively been explained by monitors of the negotiations that it would be extremely difficult to verify Soviet compliance with a pledge from President Leonid Brezhnev, for instance, that the Backfire would not be deployed in a manner potentially threatening to the United States.

The United States still does not know what the production figure on the Backfire is at the current time and the Soviets have refused to confirm U.S. estimates. Officials fail to explain how the U.S. can hope to find acceptable good faith pledges from the Soviet leadership when the Soviets throughout SALT I and II have refused to even discuss the numbers of Soviet weapons they actually have on hand or building, forcing the U.S. to rely on its "national means of verification."

Sen. Carl Curtis (R-Neb.) recently said that Brezhnev's executive pledge could be nullified by Brezhnev or a successor without incurring the consequences of abrogating a treaty. If the U.S. does not respond to such a nullification, it would show weakness; if the U.S. then withdrew from SALT, it might appear to be the principal threat to world peace.

### **Missile Encoding**

Another major issue yet to be resolved is the Soviet practice of encoding the telemetry

of data from the flight testing of their most advanced ICBMs (Defense/Space Daily, Nov. 2).

They did this once before, several years ago, but stopped when the United States protested that it was in violation of the SALT I agreement that neither side would interfere with the other side's national means of verification.

This time the Soviets refuse to stop the practice. Also, this time the Soviets are employing the coding practice on the upgrading tests of their fourth generation ICBMs, specifically the SS-18s and SS-19s, the potential nemesis of the United States land-based ICBM force in the early 1980s.

The Soviet violation, and that is what some Defense officials say it is, comes at a time when the Soviets are engaged in an intensive ICBM test program, including the first flight test of an advanced model of the SS-18, one capable of carrying 10 MIRVed warheads on an improved Post Boost Vehicle (PBV) with increased accuracy (Defense/Space Daily, Oct. 18).

Diplomatically, the Administration has been saying that its advanced intelligence gathering network is capable of monitoring the Soviet test program "sufficiently" to make the mutual understanding on non-interference in SALT I a mute issue. Defense sources say otherwise, that vital information is being denied, information needed for a thorough evaluation of the latest Soviet ICBM upgrading. A senior defense official recently said this is one of the issues of verification that must be resolved in the SALT II agreement.

On other issues said to have been resolved in preparation for the Vance-Gromyko meeting in Geneva on Dec. 21-22, it was agreed that United States cruise missile aircraft will be allowed to carry 20-30 cruise missiles. Here again, the U.S. gave way. The U.S. wanted an average of 35 cruise missiles per aircraft, while the Soviets insisted on an average of 25 for each aircraft.

The limiting of the number of cruise missiles that the United States can put on each carrier aircraft effectively puts a ceiling on the U.S. cruise missile saturation plans. With the plan to equip 120 B-52s with air launched cruise missiles, the average of 25 per aircraft would limit the U.S. force to 3000 missiles, unless the U.S. wishes to reduce its number of ICBMs or SLBMs under the ceiling.

Paul Nitze recently explained that because the U.S. has no substantial air defenses and the Soviet Backfires are not to be counted, "the potential by 1985 of the Backfire to deliver megatonnage on U.S. targets is substantially greater than the U.S. capability to deliver megatonnage on Soviet targets with B-52s carrying cruise missiles."

Being heralded as a concession by the Soviet Union is an agreement to allow the U.S. to put up to 10 MIRVed warheads on its new missiles, instead of the six MIRV limit the Soviets wanted imposed. This could hardly be considered a concession by the Soviets. They already have a 10-MIRV capability on the SS-18 and their insistence that the U.S. be allowed considerably less was not considered a viable negotiating position.

The United States lost its negotiating position that cruise missiles equipped with conventional warheads not be considered under the SALT II limitations. Efforts would have been made to identify conventional warhead-equipped cruise missiles from their nuclear-equipped counterparts.

The cruise missile limitations that have been imposed by the Soviet Union in SALT II is a significant margin of victory in both the strategic and tactical applications of the weapon. Not only will SALT II put a cap on the degree of strategic saturation that the U.S. had hoped to develop with the cruise missile capability, unless the U.S. elected to weaken the other legs of its Triad, the Soviet imposed restrictions have a serious negative effect on the evolution of the conventional balance, Nitze has explained.

"The European NATO countries have hoped to exploit the cruise missile technology in

(To be continued on p. 212.)



(Continued from page 208.)

its theater conventional weapon applications. The fact that cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometers are to be limited in SALT favors the Soviet side; it supports the erroneous Soviet claim that weapons with ranges up to 5500 kilometers (SS-20, for instance) are not 'strategic' if in Soviet hands, while those over 600 kilometers in range are 'strategic' if in NATO hands," Nitze said.

#### SEIGNIOUS SAYS MX MOBILE ICBM NECESSARY UNDER SALT II

In a position counter to that taken by his predecessor, the new director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, retired Army Lt. Gen. George Seignious, said yesterday that it will be necessary for the United States to go ahead with an MX mobile ICBM system to counter the threat to the Minuteman ICBM force that the Soviets will be allowed to develop under SALT II.

His predecessor, Paul Warnke, was on record as being against the development and deployment of the MX ICBM system, treating it instead as a further impetus to an escalating arms buildup between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Seignious noted that the Soviet Union over the past 18 months have made warhead tests on their ICBM systems that "have substantially enhanced the accuracy" of those systems. "If the Soviet Union devotes its resources to put on their strategic systems the devices they have tested, it is axiomatic that in due course the threat of survival of our Minuteman will grow. . . A continuing arms buildup by the Soviet Union -- even if they conform to the limits set by SALT II" -- (would) "propel the United States into seeking an alternative to the vulnerability of our ICBM fields," he said.

#### SALT II To Senate In Early February

A mid-January summit between Presidents Carter and Brezhnev for the signing of a SALT II agreement is possible, and that treaty could be submitted to the Senate for ratification in early February, if the Soviet Union is forthcoming during the meeting next week between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Seignious said.

Addressing the complaints that a military officer should not hold the post of leadership of the ACDA (see Defense/Space Daily, Dec. 13), Seignious said, "I think it's terribly important that all of us come off the oversimplified viewpoint that if a person is for strong defense then he is automatically against arms control.

"I was a soldier for 32 years and grew up believing that a strong defense was a necessity for a great country and I still have that view. But I also have the view that there are more ways to gain security for a nation than from purely the production and deployment of arms."

On another issue, he said he was against the sale of military arms to the Peoples Republic of China by the NATO nations if the purpose of those sales is "the profit that would be gained from the production of that equipment." He added: "I cannot think of an instance immediately where a member of the Alliance would profit as to his security by providing arms to China." (See President Carter's views on sales to China, page 210.)

#### CARTER DEFERS \$651 MILLION IN MILITARY SALES CREDITS.

President

Carter has notified Congress that he has deferred a total of \$651 million foreign military credit sales for FY 1979 "while specific loans are reviewed and approved by the departments of State, Defense and Treasury."

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

December 14, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Warren Christopher, Acting W.C.

Yugoslavia. Earlier this week the US-Yugoslav Joint Military Committee met for the first time, in Belgrade. The agenda included the Committee's terms of reference, several pending Yugoslav equipment requests, and the question of future high-level visits by defense officials. The atmosphere was good and a draft memorandum of understanding was initialed ad referendum. We expect a significant increase in Yugoslav military purchases in coming months. The Joint Committee plans to meet next in Washington late next year.

Iran. The two leading US academic experts on Iran, James Bill and Marvin Zonis, recently were debriefed in the Department following their separate visits to Iran at the end of November. In a wide range of Iranian contacts, both men found intense rage against the Shah personally. This is a marked change from the past when Iranians were content to blame their troubles on "the Government" and the Shah's advisers. Both professors see a slim chance that the Shah might retain a minimal role as constitutional monarch, but only if he moves quickly to negotiate a political compromise. They assess the opposition as very strong and extremely well-organized. Everywhere they found an eagerness for the US to play a decisive role in promoting a political solution to Iran's crisis.

DECLASSIFIED

per 7/13/06 NSC Ltr:  
NLTC-06-075  
BY BAK NARA, DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~



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The Iranian economy continues to wind down toward total collapse. There is no sign of improvement in the oil strike. Some banks have reopened, but little business is being done. Violence continues in the provinces.

Beagle Channel. Paralleling your message to Presidents Videla and Pinochet, the Brazilians have made a similar approach to both governments, and Carlos Andres Perez has telephoned Videla. Also, the EC-9 is considering a joint demarche to both parties strongly urging a peaceful solution.

The Argentine Government has resorted to the pressure tactic employed several times in the past against Chile of closing the Argentine/Chilean border to Brazilian transit truck traffic. Chile may be planning to take the dispute to the OAS tomorrow to generate pre-emptive pressure against the possibility of Argentine military action.

Cyprus. The Security Council today renewed the mandate of the UN Force on Cyprus for another six-month period. The vote was 14-0-0, with China not participating. Cypriot Foreign Minister Rolandis also met with Waldheim today to discuss options for getting the intercommunal negotiations started again. I will see Rolandis tomorrow to explore his ideas further.

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
December 14, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ED SANDERS *Ed*  
SUBJECT: STATUS OF ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN PEACE  
NEGOTIATIONS

There is significant ferment developing in the Jewish community which is exemplified by Hy Bookbinder's memo, a copy of which I have attached. Ted Mann of the Presidents' Conference has suggested a meeting with you at the earliest possible moment--if possible, prior to the Presidents' Conference taking a public position.

Based on the numerous telephone calls that I have received since returning from Israel late last night, which include conversations with the representatives of major national Jewish organizations, I am convinced that there could be a firestorm brewing in the Jewish community.

Is it possible for me to meet with you on Friday, December 15, to discuss our current position, the attitude of the Jewish community, and possible approaches to the current situation?

Attachment:  
memo

cc: Vice President Mondale  
Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Hamilton Jordan  
Jody Powell  
Jerry Rafshoon



# THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

WASHINGTON REPRESENTATIVE • 818 18th Street, N.W., Suite 740 • Washington, D.C. 20006 • (202) 298-8787

December 14, 1978

## U R G E N T

To: Edward Sanders

Fr: Hyman Bookbinder *HB*

Subj: Current Impasse on Egyptian-Israeli Treaty

I have already discussed with Marvin Feuerwerker the substance of this memo, but wanted to get it in writing for you so that it would be on your desk the moment you returned from Israel. My comments below have been discussed this morning with Bert Gold and they reflect the position of our officers.

There is great distress — a better word would be outrage — over the developments of the last 24 hours. These hours have produced one of the worst cases of unequal treatment of Israel and of general overkill that I have ever observed. All of the headlines and broadcast reports paint Israel this morning as the party that is making final agreement impossible, as the one who is rejecting terms that Egypt and the U.S. have agreed upon, etc etc.

Apart from the substance of the immediate differences, it is simply impossible to understand why the President of the United States should choose to excoriate Israel for its present position when there was almost total silence during the past two weeks when it was Egypt who was saying no to the proposed treaty while Israel's Cabinet had approved — albeit with serious misgivings — that treaty. It was Egypt who was making new demands. And in the last 24 hours, when Egypt adds even additional demands — very critical ones, as we shall note — why should the US lose its temper and its patience without giving the Israeli Cabinet and people at least a few days to explain its position and its counter-proposals? We all know how much better it would be if the parties could make the December 17 deadline. But is making that target date more important than getting a treaty and an understanding which both parties could genuinely agree with and live with?

I do not, of course, have access to detailed information which would permit a fuller and totally reliable judgment, but from what I sense is the situation, Sadat has now added two most critical demands:

1) Egypt would make the exchange of ambassadors contingent upon the actual implementation of self-rule. Thus, he refutes the contention that any timetable for self-rule would only be a goal and would not affect Israeli-Egyptian agreements as such. After all, it is the beginning of genuine diplomatic relations that constitutes the only meaningful thing the Israelis get out of the treaty. This latest demand means that the

(more)

linkage being sought by Egypt — and presumably by the US now — would be an absolute one, making the treaty implementation totally conditional upon Palestinian developments.

2) Egypt evidently now demands that Article VI be interpreted to mean that Egypt's commitment to no-war against Israël would apply only after there is complete peace among all parties in the area. That, however, is the essence of Article VI. If there were in fact a comprehensive peace in place, why would Article VI be needed?

As you know, Ed, the Jewish community has had some serious problems with Administration policy in recent weeks, but it has chosen to be relatively silent and hopeful that it will all work out right. But these latest developments might very well lead to a major resistance and outcry. The statement of Majority Leader Byrd only adds to the anguish, especially since he went to the Middle East as an emissary of the President. I urge the immediate review of the present stance of the White House and a modification of this anti-Israeli campaign.

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLYINFORMATION

Memo No. 1166-78

December 14, 1978

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast,  
Friday, December 15, 1978, 7:30 a.m.

Secretary Vance will be en route to Washington from Cairo, ETA 4:30 p.m. EST, as the breakfast convenes. (U)

A meeting of the Israeli Cabinet is scheduled for Friday morning in Jerusalem, and it is possible that the first reports of the deliberations/decisions resulting from that session will be on the wire by the time of your meeting. (U)

Agenda items for the breakfast will probably include:

- Middle East - Next steps in the wake of Israel's rejection of the latest US-Egyptian compromise proposals. As you know, the President gave Vance fall-back authorization to invite Begin and Sadat to the United States. (Text of controversial Articles IV and VI is at Tab A). (S)
- US-USSR/SALT - A formal meeting of the National Security Council is scheduled for Monday, December 18 at 3:00 p.m. to review the positions Vance will be authorized to take on SALT and a US-USSR summit in his meetings with Gromyko in Geneva on December 21-22. (As reflected in an article published in Defense/Space Business Daily Tuesday, Tab B, SALT II opponents are becoming increasingly vocal on the perceived contents of the agreement, with criticism focused on provisions relating to Backfire, telemetry encryption and cruise missiles per cruise missile aircraft.) (S)
- Iran - On Wednesday, The SCC convened a principals only meeting to consider Ambassador Ball's paper (forwarded to you on December 13). (S)

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REVIEW ON DECEMBER 14, 1998

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NLTCI-06-075  
BY BAE NARA DATE 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

- US-PRC Relations (U)
- Multi<sup>A</sup>lateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) - The French are a major question mark as the Tokyo round reaches its climax. Having been informed that the President would not be able to receive their Trade Minister this week, they have asked Henry Owen to come to Paris for talks on Monday. The odds are better than ever that they will inform Henry that they will oppose the MTN agreement at the Tuesday, December 19 meeting of the EC Council, and insist that their veto requires the nine to turn down the agreement. Roy Jenkins was questioned on this by US officials on December 14. He said that it is not clear that the French can make a veto stick -- it will depend on how the eight other EC members view the MTN package. (S)

Page 2 of 2

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SECRET

ARTICLE IV

1. In order to provide maximum security for both Parties on the basis of reciprocity, agreed security arrangements will be established including limited force zones in Egyptian and Israeli territory, and United Nations forces and observers, described in detail as to nature and timing in Annex I, and other security arrangements the Parties may agree upon.

2. The Parties agree to the stationing of United Nations personnel in areas described in Annex I. The Parties agree not to request withdrawal of the United Nations personnel and that these personnel will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations, with the affirmative vote of the five Permanent Members, unless the Parties otherwise agree.

3. A Joint Commission will be established to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty, as provided for in Annex I.

4. The security arrangements provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article may at the request of either party be reviewed and amended by mutual agreement of the Parties.

SECRET

ARTICLE VI

1. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty.

3. They further undertake to take all the necessary measures for the application in their relations of the provisions of the multilateral conventions to which they are parties, including the submission of appropriate notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations and other depositaries of such conventions.

4. The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligation in conflict with this Treaty.

5. Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.

SECRET

# Defense Space Business Daily

Thursday, December 14, 1978

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## SOVIETS CONTINUE TO GAIN FROM CONCESSIONS IN SALT II

### *Backfire Still Free/Missile Encoding Continues*

**An Analysis.** President Carter makes it sound as if he is holding firm against the Soviet insistence on further U.S. concessions in the SALT II negotiations, but from the information that is leaking out on the latest developments, it is hard to find any substantive Soviet concessions, only U.S. concessions.

Carter said Tuesday: "Our position has been clear. We have harmony, I believe, among the Defense Department, State Department and the White House on what should be the United States position. If the Soviets are adequately forthcoming we will have an agreement without further delay. If they're not forthcoming then we'll continue to negotiate."

So far only the U.S. has been realistically forthcoming.

The Tupolev Backfire bomber, with its intercontinental capability, and one of the principal stumbling blocks of the past two years of negotiations, continues to remain outside the limits of the SALT II agreement, as the Soviets have steadfastly demanded. As things now stand, it will not be counted as a strategic weapon in the SALT II agreement, a major Soviet victory.

Just how the Administration hopes to accomplish an acceptable limitation on the Backfire bomber through Soviet good faith assurances is yet to be explained.

It has effectively been explained by monitors of the negotiations that it would be extremely difficult to verify Soviet compliance with a pledge from President Leonid Brezhnev, for instance, that the Backfire would not be deployed in a manner potentially threatening to the United States.

The United States still does not know what the production figure on the Backfire is at the current time and the Soviets have refused to confirm U.S. estimates. Officials fail to explain how the U.S. can hope to find acceptable good faith pledges from the Soviet leadership when the Soviets throughout SALT I and II have refused to even discuss the numbers of Soviet weapons they actually have on hand or building, forcing the U.S. to rely on its "national means of verification."

Sen. Carl Curtis (R-Neb.) recently said that Brezhnev's executive pledge could be nullified by Brezhnev or a successor without incurring the consequences of abrogating a treaty. If the U.S. does not respond to such a nullification, it would show weakness; if the U.S. then withdrew from SALT, it might appear to be the principal threat to world peace.

### **Missile Encoding**

Another major issue yet to be resolved is the Soviet practice of encoding the telemetry



of data from the flight testing of their most advanced ICBMs (Defense/Space Daily, Nov. 2).

They did this once before, several years ago, but stopped when the United States protested that it was in violation of the SALT I agreement that neither side would interfere with the other side's national means of verification.

This time the Soviets refuse to stop the practice. Also, this time the Soviets are employing the coding practice on the upgrading tests of their fourth generation ICBMs, specifically the SS-18s and SS-19s, the potential nemesis of the United States land-based ICBM force in the early 1980s.

The Soviet violation, and that is what some Defense officials say it is, comes at a time when the Soviets are engaged in an intensive ICBM test program, including the first flight test of an advanced model of the SS-18, one capable of carrying 10 MIRVed warheads on an improved Post Boost Vehicle (PBV) with increased accuracy (Defense/Space Daily, Oct. 18).

Diplomatically, the Administration has been saying that its advanced intelligence gathering network is capable of monitoring the Soviet test program "sufficiently" to make the mutual understanding on non-interference in SALT I a mute issue. Defense sources say otherwise, that vital information is being denied, information needed for a thorough evaluation of the latest Soviet ICBM upgrading. A senior defense official recently said this is one of the issues of verification that must be resolved in the SALT II agreement.

On other issues said to have been resolved in preparation for the Vance-Gromyko meeting in Geneva on Dec. 21-22, it was agreed that United States cruise missile aircraft will be allowed to carry 20-30 cruise missiles. Here again, the U.S. gave way. The U.S. wanted an average of 35 cruise missiles per aircraft, while the Soviets insisted on an average of 25 for each aircraft.

The limiting of the number of cruise missiles that the United States can put on each carrier aircraft effectively puts a ceiling on the U.S. cruise missile saturation plans. With the plan to equip 120 B-52s with air launched cruise missiles, the average of 25 per aircraft would limit the U.S. force to 3000 missiles, unless the U.S. wishes to reduce its number of ICBMs or SLBMs under the ceiling.

Paul Nitze recently explained that because the U.S. has no substantial air defenses and the Soviet Backfires are not to be counted, "the potential by 1985 of the Backfire to deliver megatonnage on U.S. targets is substantially greater than the U.S. capability to deliver megatonnage on Soviet targets with B-52s carrying cruise missiles."

Being heralded as a concession by the Soviet Union is an agreement to allow the U.S. to put up to 10 MIRVed warheads on its new missiles, instead of the six MIRV limit the Soviets wanted imposed. This could hardly be considered a concession by the Soviets. They already have a 10-MIRV capability on the SS-18 and their insistence that the U.S. be allowed considerably less was not considered a viable negotiating position.

The United States lost its negotiating position that cruise missiles equipped with conventional warheads not be considered under the SALT II limitations. Efforts would have been made to identify conventional warhead-equipped cruise missiles from their nuclear-equipped counterparts.

The cruise missile limitations that have been imposed by the Soviet Union in SALT II is a significant margin of victory in both the strategic and tactical applications of the weapon. Not only will SALT II put a cap on the degree of strategic saturation that the U.S. had hoped to develop with the cruise missile capability, unless the U.S. elected to weaken the other legs of its Triad, the Soviet imposed restrictions have a serious negative effect on the evolution of the conventional balance, Nitze has explained.

"The European NATO countries have hoped to exploit the cruise missile technology in

(To be continued on p. 212.)

(Continued from page 208.)

its theater conventional weapon applications. The fact that cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometers are to be limited in SALT favors the Soviet side; it supports the erroneous Soviet claim that weapons with ranges up to 5500 kilometers (SS-20, for instance) are not 'strategic' if in Soviet hands, while those over 600 kilometers in range are 'strategic' if in NATO hands," Nitze said.

#### SEIGNIOUS SAYS MX MOBILE ICBM NECESSARY UNDER SALT II

In a position counter to that taken by his predecessor, the new director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, retired Army Lt. Gen. George Seignious, said yesterday that it will be necessary for the United States to go ahead with an MX mobile ICBM system to counter the threat to the Minuteman ICBM force that the Soviets will be allowed to develop under SALT II.

His predecessor, Paul Warnke, was on record as being against the development and deployment of the MX ICBM system, treating it instead as a further impetus to an escalating arms buildup between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Seignious noted that the Soviet Union over the past 18 months have made warhead tests on their ICBM systems that "have substantially enhanced the accuracy" of those systems. "If the Soviet Union devotes its resources to put on their strategic systems the devices they have tested, it is axiomatic that in due course the threat of survival of our Minuteman will grow. . . . A continuing arms buildup by the Soviet Union -- even if they conform to the limits set by SALT II" -- (would) "propel the United States into seeking an alternative to the vulnerability of our ICBM fields," he said.

#### SALT II To Senate In Early February

A mid-January summit between Presidents Carter and Brezhnev for the signing of a SALT II agreement is possible, and that treaty could be submitted to the Senate for ratification in early February, if the Soviet Union is forthcoming during the meeting next week between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Seignious said.

Addressing the complaints that a military officer should not hold the post of leadership of the ACDA (see Defense/Space Daily, Dec. 13), Seignious said, "I think it's terribly important that all of us come off the oversimplified viewpoint that if a person is for strong defense then he is automatically against arms control.

"I was a soldier for 32 years and grew up believing that a strong defense was a necessity for a great country and I still have that view. But I also have the view that there are more ways to gain security for a nation than from purely the production and deployment of arms."

On another issue, he said he was against the sale of military arms to the Peoples Republic of China by the NATO nations if the purpose of those sales is "the profit that would be gained from the production of that equipment." He added: "I cannot think of an instance immediately where a member of the Alliance would profit as to his security by providing arms to China." (See President Carter's views on sales to China, page 210.)

#### CARTER DEFERS \$651 MILLION IN MILITARY SALES CREDITS.

President

Carter has notified Congress that he has deferred a total of \$651 million foreign military credit sales for FY 1979 "while specific loans are reviewed and approved by the departments of State, Defense and Treasury."



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