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
On Angola, State and the NSC split on the question of diplomatic recognition - this is still unresolved.

State is grappling with options for Rhodesia (see bootleg Tony Lake papers at Tab A). You may wish to ask Vance how he sees this unfolding, particularly if a Tory government takes over in Great Britain.

#### Middle East

At my suggestion, Lake and Tarnoff are recommending to Vance that he offer State's assessment of the Saudi position. I personally see little to be gained by trying to pin the Saudis down. I do not think they know their own mind well enough to give a reasoned response at present.

I would anticipate that the question of the Middle East negotiator and how to handle the PLO may again arise at the breakfast.



#### Cyprus

You may wish to take the occasion of this breakfast to let the President, Vance and the other participants know what pressure responsible members of the Greek-American community feel they are coming under as the U.S. political season heats up - and the fact that they are pleading for the U.S. to take a Cyprus initiative, even if it fails to ease the pressure and to keep their community in the President's camp. On Thursday I met with Warren Christopher and his team. It was agreed that Christopher should meet with Waldheim next week and that he should persuade Waldheim to convene a meeting of Denktash and Kyprianou in late April. It was also agreed that State would develop its recommendations on the best strategy

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and tactics to bring a Turkish/Famagusta gesture about. (I privately told Christopher that we should be shooting for action prior to the Chicago dinner honoring Iakovos. While he did not make reference to this in meeting with his team, the timetable he is designing does have a pre-June target for completion).

Christopher's plan involves movement by the Greek Cypriots as well as the all-important gesture from the Turkish side. I think it is important that you raise Cyprus to the Friday breakfast level given the very real domestic problems it poses if we allow it to slide along at Waldheim's pace.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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April 4, 1979

NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM : S/P - Anthony Lake

SUBJECT : Rhodesia Strategy

Following up on our conversation with Allard Lowenstein, you might wish to consider the following course of action on Rhodesia.

Immediate Objectives

If we are to make progress toward a negotiated solution, we need gains on a number of fronts:

-- Agreement by Muzorewa and/or whoever holds power in post-elections Rhodesia/Zimbabwe to: a) negotiating with the Patriotic Front on the principle of "UN" or "internationally" supervised elections; b) negotiation on the modalities of these elections and their date; c) the fact that a new or significantly amended constitution would have to be written; and d) be prepared to enter such negotiations immediately. Without this agreement, it is unlikely the Front Line would press the Patriotic Front to accept the same principle and negotiate seriously, after their experiences of last spring and summer.

-- Understanding that Smith would not be a member of the new Cabinet. This is important if there is to be any trust in negotiations on the other side. It is particularly important to Kaunda.

-- Congressional willingness to cooperate with our Rhodesia strategy, including the sanctions question. If sanctions are lifted by Congress, our leverage with both sides decreases significantly.

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XDS-3 4/4/99 (LAKE, Anthony)

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per 7/14/06 NLSC / JS  
BY: [signature] NARA DATE 7/21/06

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### Strategy

Achievement of these three objectives would put us in a position to get Nyerere and the other Front Line Presidents to pressure the Patriotic Front to negotiate -- and perhaps to settle. Nothing less is likely to do so.

It is very unlikely that we can achieve this. But there may be a way to lessen the odds against us.

The nub of our problem, with both the Congress and the Salisbury parties, is that the harder we fight against lifting sanctions, the more we are perceived as favoring the Patriotic Front. In addition, our position is and has been seen as giving the Patriotic Front a veto over our sanctions policy, since we have said we would only lift sanctions willingly when "an agreed-upon and irrevocable transition process leading to UN supervised elections has begun."

Since I believe the odds are now against gaining a Rhodesian agreement before the Congress lifts sanctions (absent or even in spite of a major Administration counter-effort), why not consider extending our position to make it clear that, if the leaders elected in the April elections agreed to the principle of and to negotiate seriously toward internationally supervised elections and a new or significantly amended constitution, and the Patriotic Front refused to enter into negotiations on that basis, we would be prepared to state that the Administration could not prevent the Congress from lifting sanctions.

Such a position would be unpopular with the Africans. But it would be seen here as more fair than our current position. It would recognize the reality that in those circumstances, Congress would certainly lift sanctions anyway. And, most important, it would force Muzorewa et al. to be serious on negotiations or risk losing his Congressional support here.

At the same time, we would also make it clear that if the Patriotic Front were to accept negotiations and the principle of impartial elections, and the Salisbury parties refused, we would fight to maintain sanctions and press South Africa to use its influence to bring the Salisbury parties to an agreement.

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If both were to agree to negotiate, the same principle would hold. Congress permitting, sanctions would remain until agreement was reached. If the Patriotic Front abandoned the negotiations, or refused to talk seriously, we would not oppose the Congress' removing sanctions. If the Salisbury parties refused to be serious or broke off negotiations, the Administration would strongly support the tightening of sanctions.

In short, this approach would seek to use what remaining leverage we have from the sanctions -- to show the Salisbury parties, South Africa and the Congress that we are fair about the terms on which we would agree to their removal, and to alert the Front Line to the prospect of their removal if the Patriotic Front does not show flexibility. And if Muzorewa et al refused to accept the principle of negotiations and impartial elections, our position opposing removal of sanctions would be strengthened.

#### Scenario

If we were to adopt this position, the following tactical questions should be addressed:

1. How would we convey this position to the parties?

Since the greatest danger in this kind of approach is that we could end up even more at odds with our African friends than we are now, Allard and I agree that we should begin with Nyerere. It would be too much to ask that he commit himself to specific actions on his part. He would almost certainly not do so. But we could explain that we want to make an effort to make the most of a very difficult situation with our Congress (and a possible new government in the U.K.) on sanctions. We would ask only that Nyerere agree to our proceeding to see whether such a position would help move the South Africans and Muzorewa (or whoever wins the April elections). We should make clear that if Nyerere gives an amber light and the initiative fails, we will protect Nyerere's role as our first African contact point.

If Nyerere did not agree, Allard agrees we should then reconsider.

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If Nyerere did not ask us to desist, we would proceed to talk first to the South Africans, and then to Salisbury.

With regard to timing, the approach to Nyerere would best be made soon, to fit with the Congressional scenario suggested below. The approach to South Africa and subsequently, to Salisbury would best come in May, when it is fairly clear who the new Prime Minister will be but before a new government is formed. This would allow us to try to shape new policies before they are set; to urge that Smith not be in a new Cabinet; and to act before the President must make his Case/Javits determination.

Kaunda, Khama, and Machel would be best informed at the same time we went to the South Africans. We would go to the Patriotic Front only if the approach to Salisbury succeeded. To inform them in advance would likely kill the effort.

2. Who would convey this position?

Allard is prepared, as you know, to do so -- and is particularly concerned about how the matter is presented to Nyerere, whom he has known for many years.

There are advantages to using private emissaries for these approaches, whether Allard or some one else. Such a person could independently corroborate our good faith; could speak with a special voice when (as with the South Africans) our normal official messages are greeted with suspicion; and yet would commit less of our prestige to the effort.

On the other hand, a private emissary offers us much less control; probably less clarity in exposition and reporting; and might be discounted. Also, we will want a considered response from each party before taking the next step involved, and are more likely to get one through an official approach.

3. How and when to approach the Congress?

Our position would not be stated publicly, since it would immediately produce Nkomo's and perhaps Mugabe's denunciations. It would be likely to emerge publicly -- but the later the better.

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We could best convey a new position like this by going privately to key Senators and Congressmen (e.g. McGovern, Hayakawa, Javits, Solarz and senior leaders) to explain our thinking and to seek their private help in a) producing Muzorewa and b) not removing sanctions, and our leverage, before this approach had a chance to work. I would not approach Helms, who is unlikely to agree and would use the approach to serve his own ends.

On timing, Allard agrees that it would be better to approach Nyerere before the Congress. Otherwise, we could end up in a position in which a Nyerere block simply confirmed Congressional attitudes towards the Front Line.

Allard could, I believe, be useful in supporting our approach to Hayakawa and others.

#### 4. What would be the British role?

I do not believe this approach would have any chance of success if it were undertaken jointly with the British. Their credibility, already tattered, is now further undercut by their election prospects. And the approach is posited on our reading of our own situation vis-a-vis the Congress.

But we would certainly have to inform the British in advance -- including both David Owen and the Prime Minister's office -- explaining why we believe it is important that we act alone. We might also privately brief the Tories.

The approach would be consistent with a new Hughes mission after a new Salisbury government is installed, probably in early June. It would certainly be more attractive than our current position to a new Tory government.

#### Conclusion

In sum, this scenario could involve, in chronological order:

-- The one shift in our policy indicated above.

-- An approach to Nyerere, perhaps in mid-April, after informing the British.

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-- Congressional approach, perhaps in late April/early May, or earlier if pressures build more quickly.

-- Effort with South Africa while informing Kaunda and other Front Line leaders.

-- Approach to Salisbury.

-- Approach to Patriotic Front.

The dangers in this are clear. As in all our Rhodesian efforts, it would require agreement by a series of different parties, with very different interests. It might look to the Africans like a further erosion in our commitment to true majority rule. And perhaps most significantly, it would require a new activism on our part. If it worked, and we got into a new negotiation, we would have to make still more judgments on who was acting in "good faith" and who was not, with considerable political pressures on both sides. There is also the danger that it would imply increasing support for a new Salisbury government, if it did what we asked. We would have to be clear that such support is unlikely.

The advantage of our current position is that it is simpler and clearer. If we go down to defeat with the Congress, we can argue with the Africans that we are back to a Byrd Amendment situation, writ large, and the Administration itself remains willing to do what it can to work for peace. And we might even beat the lifting of sanctions if we stick with our current position, with a sufficient investment of time and effort by the President and you.

But the advantages of the different course I have outlined could also be significant:

-- A more persuasive position with moderate Congressmen, especially if Muzorewa and colleagues refused, with perhaps a better chance of holding off the lifting of sanctions.

-- More credibility with the South Africans and Salisbury parties.

-- Some leverage with the Front Line, albeit negative.

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-- An outside chance it could help move us toward negotiations, which would promote our interests and save lives.

With regard to African reaction, the scenario includes a fail-safe Nyerere reaction. Moderate African governments would, I think, see some of the advantages of such an approach if we presented it properly, when wider knowledge was necessary. And it might even be that Muzorewa and Mugabe could see the advantage of cutting some kind of deal in a new election campaign.

Recommendation:

That, if you decide to raise this idea with the President, you first explore it with Andy Young. His support and efforts would be very important.

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ELEMENTS OF APPROACH TO NYERERE

- Begin with review of where we stand on southern Africa -- including firm response on Namibia and positive approach to Angola.
- We are at a critical point on Rhodesia. Review its status.
- Review frankly our Congressional problem:
  - We have made clear we're opposed to lifting sanctions, assuming we were not required to do so under Case/Javits.
  - But it is not clear we can succeed.
  - If we get into a position where leaders elected in April have accepted our call for negotiations leading to UN-supervised elections, and the Patriotic Front has not, what ability we have to prevent the lifting of sanctions would be finished.
- Given this problem, we want to discuss with Nyerere where he thinks we should go.
- One possibility would be for the Administration simply to fight the lifting of sanctions in the absence of any progress in negotiations. We well may lose.
- Another possibility, which we would like his judgment on, would be to approach South Africa and Salisbury, and press on them that Salisbury should agree to:
  - a) negotiate with the Patriotic Front on the principle of "UN" or "internationally" supervised elections;
  - b) negotiate on the modalities of these elections and their date;
  - c) the fact a new or significantly amended constitution would have to be written;
  - d) enter such negotiations immediately.
- We would also press for Smith's not being part of a new Cabinet.
- We would indicate to South Africa and Salisbury that we are not asking them to make unilateral concessions. We would say we recognize the fact that if they agree to these four points, and the Patriotic Front refuses to negotiate, we could not prevent Congress from lifting sanctions.
- At the same time, we would tell them that if the Patriotic Front agrees to negotiate on the basis of the principle of UN or internationally supervised elections, and Salisbury does not, sympathy for Salisbury in the United States is likely to decline considerably; and our efforts to prevent a lifting of sanctions are more likely to succeed
- This approach would be one way to make the most of a very difficult situation with Congress. Should we go ahead as described?
- If Nyerere does not feel South Africa and Salisbury should be approached in this manner, we will not pursue it.
- We are not asking that Nyerere do anything in support of the approach, or commit himself now to future support. We will not involve him now in any way.

MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

Memo No. 283-79

March 29, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast, Friday, March 30, 1979

Gothenburg Consulate General


(If we are to have any chance of announcing that the Gothenburg Consulate will not be closed as currently scheduled, I believe you must personally ask Cy Vance and the President to weigh the pros and cons. A very strong argument can be made for keeping the Consulate open. I recommend that you make this argument at tomorrow's breakfast.)

- With my visit to the Nordic countries and the Netherlands coming up in two weeks, I am concerned about one extremely negative aspect of the Swedish visit -- the decision to close the Gothenburg Consulate General.
- Simply stated, if I go to Sweden professing good relations and at the same time we stand firm on the decision to close the Consulate, my visit will be viewed by most Swedes and the Swedish press as a sham - little more than empty talk while we demonstrate our true intent through the negative action of closing the Consulate.
- I have seen the clinical arguments ranking Gothenburg low in Consulate priorities (Tab A). These arguments miss the point that this Consulate on the pro-West, western side of Sweden is of tremendous symbolic importance to the Swedes.
- While for us its closing may be no more than an unnoticed bookkeeping operation, it will have a major negative impact on this friendly neutral country. The U.S. Consulate is the oldest of the 45 Consulates in Gothenburg. We have major shipping and trade interests in Gothenburg. The people of Gothenburg, some 340,000 and 200 company presidents have recently delivered petitions to us urging against the closing.

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT  
REVIEW ON MARCH 29, 1999

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DEC 7/11/06 NSC/Hr  
BY  NARA DATE 7/21/06

~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLY

- During the darkest days of our bilateral relationship in the early 1970s, Nixon closed the Consulate. We reopened it in 1976. The people of Sweden want it. Kennedy-Minot has stressed this point. Swedish Ambassador Wachtmeister has stressed this point. I think it is of great importance that we reverse this decision -- we are only talking about some \$150,000 in operating costs. And I would note the Soviets are in the process of building a \$4 million trade center while we are thinking of pulling out. (see clip, Tab A.)
- The loss far outweighs the gain, Mr. President. If I am able to announce that the Consulate will remain open, I believe you will see a significant, positive impact on US-Swedish relations.

#### Askew Commission

The next Ambassadorial review session of the Askew Commission takes place on Saturday. Vance may report on the posts under consideration. The posts you have been primarily interested in are in New Zealand - Neil Sherburne and Jack Vaughn for one of the African openings.

#### Middle East

Vance may raise the subject of Middle East negotiator (Bundy, Scranton, and Linowitz are among the candidates. Of importance is the EYES/ONLY memorandum from Ham Jordan to the President (Tab B) on the subject of whether or not to have a PLO official visit the U.S. at this time. I concur fully with Jordan. We are at another critical point in which State is determined to move the Palestinians issue faster than I believe the Middle East negotiators can tolerate. If we meet with the PLO now, we destroy the confidence that we have just rebuilt at least to some degree with the Israelis and the Jewish American Community. If there are to be any contacts, shouldn't they be after consultations with Israel and in the Middle East -- perhaps by our new negotiations. I recommend that, without reference to the Jordan memo, you ask Vance where we stand on this and that you register a strong objection to PLO contacts at this time.

#### SALT

Vance will have met with Dobrynin on Thursday evening to deal with the telemetry issue. He will report at the breakfast.

SECRET/EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLYAngola

Andy Young is pressing for diplomatic recognition of Angola now, with the recommendation (as I understand it) that we largely ignore the Cuban military presence. I would recommend against rushing into recognition without at least some movement led by Neto to reduce the Cuban presence.

SECRET/EYES ONLY

GOTEBORG

-- An examination of the rationale behind opening and closing constituent posts was requested by the General Accounting Office in 1977. A preliminary study, done in compliance with this request, analyzed all of our constituent posts and ranked them in order of priority according to workload levels, proximity to other posts and special factors applicable only in certain countries. This study was underway last summer at the time it became evident that the Department would be required by OMB to take significant cuts in the resources judged necessary to meet our staffing and budgetary needs.

-- It became evident during last summer's Priorities Policy Group sessions that closing posts would be one way to achieve cuts in our personnel ceiling. Of 461 position cuts demanded of the Department by OMB, the closing of the lowest-ranked 13 posts would save approximately 100 positions.

-- Closing the Consulate in Goteborg will save eight positions and about \$152,000 a year. While it might be argued that these savings are small and could be absorbed by the Department, it is unlikely that a reversal of the decision to close Goteborg would end there. Considerable pressures have been brought to bear by interested parties on the Department, Congress and, even, the President to keep open other posts, e.g., Bremen, Salzburg, and Brisbane.

Other things being equal, we would prefer to retain all of

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the posts, since they are all useful in one way or another. However, we can see no way to meet our OMB imposed resource ceilings if these closings are not included together with the other far reaching economies which we have planned.

-- In any priority ranking of posts, Goteborg would be among the lowest. It was closed in 1970 because its low workload did not, in our opinion, justify its cost; it was re-opened in 1976 in response to a Sense of the Senate Resolution, rather than any new work requirements. It has a modest consular workload (9,718 nonimmigrant visas, 318 passport applications, two arrests during 1978). It is located 3½ hours by ferry from Copenhagen or five hours by car from Stockholm.

-- Maintaining two posts in a country of fewer than eight million people seems an extravagance in a time when we must cut back on our spending. Over the past ten years, we have reduced the number of our constituent posts from 147 to 113. Some of the past closings were in cities much larger in size and with larger workloads than Goteborg. Liverpool is a recent example. *Nice IS ANOTHER.*

March 27, 1979

PREPARED TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE  
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS HEARINGS ON S. 586 authorizing  
FUNDS FOR FY '80 & '81 FOR INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES,  
MARCH 28, 1979, by David A. Nelson, U.S. Representative,  
International Swedish Trade Fair Foundation.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee now considering S. 586, authorizing funds for fiscal years 1980 and 1981 for International Agencies.

I would like to speak directly to a decision made by the State Department to close the Gothenburg, Sweden, Consulate General as one of 13 such trade and commercial consulates<sup>worldwide</sup> to be terminated by this Fall.

I cannot speak for the other scheduled closings, but I believe the decision to close down the Gothenburg Consulate is ill-advised and will end up being counter-productive to the interests of U.S. trade and foreign policy. This action, must come as an unsettling surprise to those committee members and others in Congress who will recall the spirited fight led by the late Senator Hubert H. Humphrey and others in 1975 to amend the State Department authorization bill to reopen the Gothenburg Consulate.

This was a bipartisan effort by those in Congress to restore a historic tie between the two countries established in 1797 by President George Washington as the first U.S. consulate in Europe that was severed in 1970. This committee chose to exercise its oversight prerogatives in 1975 and overcame State Department reservations to reopen the consulate in 1976. This decision was greeted warmly in both countries not only as a symbol of cordial relations, but also as a strong incentive for wider trade, cultural and political ties.

Along with the return of an American ambassador in Stockholm in 1974, the reopening of the Gothenburg Consulate has been a major factor in the improvement of American-Swedish relations which had become strained in the

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page two--

earlier years by the hostilities in Viet Nam. I was fortunate enough to attend the consulate reopening day ceremonies on June 1, 1976. One could not miss the obvious symbolism on the eve of our Bicentennial... the United States was sending to the people of Gothenburg a "thank you" for their continuing friendship and support for almost 200 years. It was not <sup>without</sup> ~~with~~ mixed emotion that Sweden sent over one-million of its sons and daughters surging from the port of Gothenburg to seek their fortunes and destinies in the "New Land" of America. Indeed, I would not be here testifying today had not my father and maternal grandfather decided to leave Sweden for wider opportunities in Minnesota. I cite this background as a way to demonstrate that the United States cannot always conduct its foreign policy strictly with an eye on economics alone. It is our sensitivity to cultural and historical traditions which enhance our claim to be a leader in the free world.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to take note of the presence of two distinguished guests from Sweden who are attending the hearings this morning. They are the Lord Mayor of Gothenburg, Olle Jansson; and Ms. Maggie Karlsson. Ms. Karlsson is a remarkable woman of extraordinary energy and persistence who organized a "grassroots" campaign to obtain over 350,000 names on a petition from the residents of West Sweden asking our government to reconsider its decision to close the Gothenburg Consulate. They have traveled many miles at personal inconvenience and expense to stress the seriousness of their cause and the sincerity of their request to keep the consulate open.

I would now like to raise some questions concerning the Administration's rationale for including Gothenburg on its list of consular posts to be closed. I submit that this decision should be made on a case-by-case basis and demonstrated that these cutbacks will result in actual savings and not damage the overall goals of improving U.S. trade and foreign policy.

I fail to see how closing the Gothenburg Consulate will improve the Administration's efforts to encourage U.S. business to increase exports and help reduce our growing balance of payments deficit... a move that is considered a major element in reducing inflation and stemming the adverse effects of a predicted recession later this year.

I am currently working with American corporations to increase and expand export markets in Scandinavia. In the coming year, the International Swedish Trade Fair Foundation will sponsor 12 different trade exhibitions ranging from electronic components to heavy machinery equipment. My experience has been that with few exceptions, the American businessman entering the foreign market for the first time needs all the help and assistance he can get. Corporate executives...particularly ones from the smaller and middle-size companies...are uncertain about export arrangements and uneasy with language barriers. There is no question in my mind that American industry can compete in this market. All we have to do is persuade them to make the first move. In Gothenburg, the International Swedish Trade Fair Foundation has excellent relations with the U.S. Consulate. Any U.S. exhibitor can literally get "one stop" service, door-to-door... no red tape or long customs delay. And, because Swedish business practices are closely alligned with that in the U.S. and the almost-universal use of English as a second language, Sweden is considered a good starting point for any U.S. manufacturer entering ~~in~~ the export market.

The closing of the consulate would be inimicable to American interests. Gothenburg is the second largest city in Sweden with a population of 700,000. The consulate's district covers and services the whole West Coast of Sweden with an additional 4,000,000 people...totaling more than half the population of Sweden. It is the main port of Sweden with one quarter of Sweden's total imports and exports. Its newly-opened \$500 million Landvetter Airport can accommodate all types of aircraft and is a major air cargo center for Scandinavia. In addition, Gothenburg is the headquarters for companies like

Volvo, SKF, Svenska Varv AB (Swedish Shipyards), Broström-koncernen. Subsidiaries of large U.S. companies like Du Pont de Nemours, Kodak and IBM are located there also. Its banks have considerable contact with American banks and this business is growing yearly.

Thus when the State Department claims it can conduct its consular business more efficiently out of the Stockholm embassy, it is pure folly. Informed estimates on the costs of transferring staff, arranging new housing accommodations, shipping of equipment and household effects, severance pay, etc., place this in the neighborhood of at least \$250,000. Add to this figure another \$250,000 start-up costs sustained two years ago and you have a half-million dollars conservatively wasted to get relatively small yearly savings in the future. This also does not take into consideration the aggravation placed on Americans and Swedes alike who will have to travel at least 300 miles to iron out any visa, passport, business and export problems. The Swedish Travel Bureau estimates that travel to the U.S. will double this year with the advent of lower air fares.

I would also like to know how the State Department justifies moving out of Gothenburg when 45 other countries have consulates there. The Soviet Union is building a \$4 million trade and cultural center and next week East Germany will present a full week of trade, cultural, scientific and sports exhibits in Gothenburg. I do not pretend that the United States must compete with this type of lavish expenditure. But, is it unreasonable to ask we maintain minimum services and modest quarters that any self-respecting country would maintain?

To the best of my knowledge, no informed person in the trade or diplomatic field recommends the closing of the consulate. Indeed, both Swedish Prime Minister Ullsten and our Ambassador Rodney Kennedy-Minott have voiced their deep reservations about this decision. While relations between the two countries will continue to remain cordial, I believe many

Swedes, particularly the younger intellectual, cultural and political leaders will question more closely the leadership of the United States in world affairs. As for the Gothenburgers, they will certainly be deeply disappointed if this decision is not reversed. There is no question in my mind that they will continue to dispense with their spritely, good-humored hospitality and friendship to Americans. They have had plenty of practice separating official rejection from cordial bonds forged over 200 years of person-to-person discourse. As one close friend of mine in Gothenburg told me, "I don't understand why your country is closing the consulate...it always seems so busy. It can't be that you've run out of money or that we've insulted any President with our opinions." I had to answer him that I don't understand the decision also.

Mr. Chairman, I urge the committee to seriously consider attaching an amendment to S. 586 that would simply restate the committee's views in 1975 that the Gothenburg Consulate General remain open. No additional monies would have to be authorized since the State Department could effect economies in other areas. I am confident the Appropriations Committee would go along with this approach as it did in 1975.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : DCM, POL, ECON, DAO  
(individual copies)

DATE: March 19, 1979

FROM : The Ambassador

93. K-M

SUBJECT: Closing of Göteborg and Expansion of Soviet Activities

It will come as no surprise to any of you that virtually everyone to whom I talked in Göteborg protested the closing, but whereas the Maggie Karlssons of the city talk in terms of bi-lateral relations, trade, etc., increasingly one hears talk of the US "retreat" in the face of "Soviet expansion." A bit dramatic, perhaps. But I think it is a theme we should get to Washington.

Commodore Hans Mallerdt, RSN, Naval Base West, was deeply concerned and stated that the Swedish Navy was extremely alarmed by our phasing out and the Soviet growth most of which he felt would be KGB activity in commercial guise. He also said the US Navy should make something other than just "routine visits."

Carl Persson, Provincial Lt. Governor and former National Police Chief, stated flatly that closing the Consulate was "a bad mistake...it confuses Swedes and makes them think not only that you don't care but that you are unaware of Soviet intentions." Persson then went on to say: "Their expansion is all out of proportion to the size of the town and the area although Göteborg's trade is increasing with them, but a building holding fifty Soviets is there for intelligence gathering purposes. I knew that before I left the police; everyone locally knows it and the Soviets make no special effort to hide it."

Marti Harju, Finnish Consulate General: "I must urge you, Mr. Ambassador, in the strongest possible terms of what a grave error you are making here. It is far more than rupturing historic ties with an area most, most friendly to the US. And the economic arguments are strong, also. But what is bothering us all is the 'hauling down of your flag' as the Russians grow and grow in this area. It is most disheartening to all of us and not just the Swedes. As

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GDS 3/19/85 (KENNEDY-MINOTT, RODNEY) OR-M

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NAHA DATE 7/2/06

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



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Page 2

a Finn I am used to the Russians and they respect one thing and only one thing: power. They laugh amongst themselves about opening and closing your office and they note the effect it has on the Swedes. I beg of you for your country's good to try and get a reversal."

Harju then went on to tell me about the new local joke in Göteborg: "We have this famous old family here, the Ekman family. Well, in the 1870s Ekman was the honorary consul for both Tsarist Russia and the USA. Today people are recalling that, but now say that perhaps the Soviets will be 'kind' enough to be 'honary consuls' for the Americans!"

AMB:RKennedy-Minott:hgs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

March 29, 1979

TO: PRESIDENT CARTER

FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN

I would like to recommend that you and Cy review your tentative decision to permit a PLO official to visit the United States at this time for the following reasons:

1. Substantively, it would seem a mistake to send a positive signal to the PLO at the very time they are directing harsh and personal rhetoric at the United States and at you personally. It would seem that a positive gesture on our part should be in response to, or in anticipation of, a positive gesture on their part. It does not seem to be the right time for us to permit an official of the PLO to visit the United States.

2. Politically, I don't think any of us have any illusions about how the goodwill resulting from the Peace Treaty will dissipate over the weeks and months ahead, but I do think that the political capital which has been accumulated should be hoarded and expended on major Mid-East issues. I am afraid that the visit of a top PLO official

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now would only signal, incorrectly, that we are preparing to begin an official dialogue with the PLO without their commitment to renounce their pledge to destroy Israel.

MEMORANDUM


OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Memo No. 199-79

March 1, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift   
SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast,  
Friday, March 2, 1979, 7:30 a.m.

Begin Visit

I would assume that the President's conversation with Prime Minister Begin on Thursday evening and the approach he plans to take during the Friday round of talks will be the centerpiece of your breakfast discussions -- as well as brief status reports by Vance on Sino-Vietnamese developments and the situation in Iran and the Yemens.

You have seen the cable from Lewis reporting Weizman's views that Begin may move if we help him to find a formula.

Your Visit to Los Angeles

On Thursday morning, March 1, I provided copies of your Los Angeles speech to Tony Lake and David Aaron. You may wish to mention some of the foreign policy and defense themes you plan to cover.

Foreign Assistance Supplement

State is planning to get to the President on Friday, March 2 its recommendation for a \$200 million supplement package, developed in building block form so as to provide the President with options.

As this supplemental, while classified Secret, is the product of an interagency effort, I think the President will have to take some fast decisions (preceded by some essential conversation with Jim McIntyre), if he is going to propose the supplemental to the Congress before the fact of its existence is leaked to the press by one or more agencies.

~~SECRET~~

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Review 3/1/99

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BY CS NARA DATE 2/21/06



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