

We regret the absence of the Kingdom of Jordan and of Palestinian representatives from these proceedings today. We hope that in due course they will join the negotiations. But their absence need not limit our progress. We are determined to move ahead and to show that these negotiations can achieve our shared objectives of peace, stability, security, and justice.

I want to assure you in the strongest possible terms that the United States understands the deep emotions and interests on all sides that are touched by the talks that begin today.

For Egypt and the Arab world the primary focus is upon the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. No peace can be either just or secure for any participant if it does not resolve this problem in its broadest sense and assure the Palestinians authority over their own affairs that responds to their just needs and aspirations.

In the United States, we believe deeply in the proposition that "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed." We believe that the Palestinian people must have the right for themselves and their descendants to live with dignity and freedom, and with the opportunity for economic fulfillment and political expression. ~~In short, as President Carter has said, there must be a home-
land for the Palestinians~~

For Israel, meanwhile, a lasting solution to the Palestinian question and the wider Arab-Israeli conflict will be possible only if there is genuine acceptance of its right to live in peace and security. Throughout Israel there is an ardent desire for peace. There is also deep anxiety that, in order to achieve that peace, Israel must make enormous sacrifices and take major risks. With regard to the Egypt-Israel treaty of peace, this desire and this anxiety will soon become tangible -- with the redeployment of Israel's forces from strategic territories three times its size, and the evacuation of vitally important airfields and oil resources.

In the United States, we also deeply share Israel's desire to ensure that, as the peace process unfolds, it will lead to a true and permanent peace which will ensure Israel's security. We share its desire to have normal and productive relations with all its neighbors.

We come to these negotiations with hope, therefore, that future generations will record that -- at Beersheva and at Al Arish -- Egypt, Israel and the United States met their responsibilities with compassion, fairness and a proper concern for the welfare, dignity and security of all the peoples of the Middle East.

The Camp David Framework imposes practical requirements on us to secure the interests of both the Palestinian people and of Israel. First, it states that the solution ultimately negotiated must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. To give reality to this goal, it provides that in the West Bank and Gaza the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn and a self-governing authority will be instituted. It also gives the Palestinians a vital role in shaping their destiny by recognizing them as participants in all aspects of the negotiations that determine their future -- in negotiations, which set up their self-governing authority, in those which determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and in those which can lead to a Jordan-Israel peace treaty. Finally, the agreement on the final status of these areas will be submitted to a vote of representatives of the peoples who live ^{there} for either ratification or rejection. (?)

We must also go beyond these negotiations to other aspects of the Palestinian problem. We must make a start in these negotiations to deal with the problem of Palestinians living outside the West Bank and Gaza. They too must have a means of political expression and economic fulfillment. They too must know that an accepted and respected place exists for them within the international community.

Second, the security of Israel is equally a central feature of the Camp David Framework. As we seek ways to solve the range of issues of the West Bank and Gaza, we must recognize that Israel's security is of critical importance to the success of these negotiations because of the special geographic and demographic factors involved. Negotiators must be sensitive to these concerns and imaginative and farsighted in proposing ways to meet them.

We ask all parties to see this process as a way of dealing with these problems in logical sequence -- making progress where this is possible, and using the success achieved at each stage to open new solutions for the next. Peace cannot be achieved by declarations or resolutions alone, as demonstrated by the experience of the last 30 years. A practical way to proceed must be devised -- one that takes advantage of the fact that the process of negotiation itself can transform the attitudes of governments and peoples. We believe that the process defined by the Camp David Framework and the joint letter signed by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin gives us this practical way of proceeding.

Finally, I am convinced that a just and secure settlement of the Palestinian question is not beyond the capabilities of people of compassion and good will. I have no doubt that solutions which the majority of Palestinians and other Arabs will consider fair can be fashioned in negotiations -- and in ways that answer as well the deepest concerns and interests of Israel.

The challenges ahead are formidable; overcoming them will tax our patience, our energies, and our fortitude. But for the first time, a practical beginning has been made toward peace for this troubled region. An unprecedented and realistic opportunity is before us. The United States is determined to make the most of this opportunity, and to remain on this road until we reach its final destination.

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EXDIS
 E.O.12065: GDS 5/23/85 (JONES, BJ) OR-P
 TAGS: PEPR, CY
 SUBJECT: WALDHEIM/NIMETZ DISCUSSION ON THE CYPRUS SUMMIT

1. C-ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: IN REVIEWING THE CYPRUS SUMMIT WITH COUNSELLOR NIMETZ, SYG WALDHEIM SAID HE INTENDS TO ASK USYG PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO CHAIR THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS STARTING JUNE 15. IF THESE BOG DOWN, HE IS PREPARED TO CONVENE ANOTHER SUMMIT MEETING. WALDHEIM BELIEVES THE SUMMIT AT LEAST PRODUCED SOME NEW FLEXIBILITY AND REALISM, BUT ANTICIPATES SIGNIFICANT DIFFICULTIES AS THE NEGOTIATORS GET DOWN TO SPECIFICS. NIMETZ CONGRATULATED WALDHEIM ON BEHALF OF THE SECRETARY AND DEPUTY SECRETARY. END SUMMARY.

3. IN MAY 23 MEETING IN THE SYG'S OFFICE, WALDHEIM PROVIDED NIMETZ WITH BRIEF RECAP OF THE SUMMIT. WALDHEIM SAID 15 HOURS OF TALKS HAD CONVINCED HIM IT WAS NECESSARY TO BE VERY TOUGH IN ORDER TO PRODUCE ANY RESULTS. THE UN'S MAJOR LEVERAGE, HE SAID, IS CLEARLY THE SYG'S PERIODIC REPORTS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE UNEASE OF THE UNFICYP TROOP CONTRIBUTORS ABOUT CONTINUING TO TAKE PART IN A PROTRACTED PEACE-KEEPING OPERATION WHICH HAS ACCUMULATED \$7 MILLION OF DEBT.

*****~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~***** WHSR COMMENT *****

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4. WALDHEIM RECOUNTED IN SOME DETAIL PERSONAL DYNAMICS OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH INCLUDING HIS SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH EACH OF THEM. ONLY HIS STRONG INSISTENCE MADE POSSIBLE AGREEMENT ON THE TEN POINTS. HE NOTED THAT A DRAFT THIRD POINT WHICH WOULD HAVE REFERRED TO A "BI-ZONAL" CYPRIOT STATE HAD TO BE DROPPED. KYPRIANOU HAD WANTED REFERENCE TO A "GENUINE FEDERAL STATE"; DENKTASH HOWEVER, INSISTED ON INCLUDING REFERENCE TO A "BI-ZONAL" STATE BUT KYPRIANOU HAD OBJECTED. DENKTASH POINTED OUT THAT MAKARIOS HAD RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR A BI-ZONAL CONCEPT AS WAS CLEAR FROM THE RECORDS OF THEIR 1977 MEETING. KYPRIANOU ACKNOWLEDGED THIS BUT NONETHELESS REMAINED ADAMANT. EVENTUALLY THIS THIRD POINT WAS DELETED. AND AN ANODYNE TENTH POINT THAT INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE HELD IN NICOSIA WAS ADDED INSTEAD.

5. WALDHEIM SAID THE HARDEST NEGOTIATIONS DEALT WITH POINTS FIVE AND SIX. DENKTASH WANTED TO LINK MOVEMENT ON VAROSHA TO THE LIFTING OF THE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE. WALDHEIM MADE CLEAR THIS JUST COULD NOT BE DONE. DENKTASH THEN WANTED IT UNDERSTOOD THAT VAROSHA WOULD REMAIN UNDER TURKISH ADMINISTRATION DURING THE RESETTLEMENT. WALDHEIM SAID IF HE WERE A GREEK CYPRIOT HE WOULD NOT RETURN UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, AND THAT THIS WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION. DENKTASH ALSO INSISTED THAT ONLY THE COASTAL SECTION OF VAROSHA COULD BE RESETTLED. ALL OF THIS WAS PAPERED OVER IN THE DRAFTING OF POINT FIVE. KYPRIANOU WAS EQUALLY DIFFICULT WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUE OF ECONOMIC DE-RESTRICTION, ALLUDED TO IN PARA SIX.

6. AS REGARDS THE FUTURE, WALDHEIM SAID HE INTENDS TO ASK USYG PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO DO THE PREPARATORY WORK AND CHAIR THE RECONVENED INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS. WALDHEIM FELT THE REAPPOINTMENT OF OHNON, WHO WAS VERY WEAK, WAS NOT A GOOD SIGN. OHNON HAD NO LATITUDE WHATSOEVER LAST YEAR IN VIENNA. WALDHEIM SAID HE THOUGHT MICHAELIDIS WOULD BE A GOOD CHOICE, BUT WAS UNCERTAIN WHO KYPRIANOU WOULD APPOINT. (HE DID NOT MENTION IOANNIDES POSSIBILITY RAISED BY SHERRY). IF THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS GET STUCK, WALDHEIM SAID HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONVENE ANOTHER SUMMIT MEETING.

7. WALDHEIM ALSO EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT THE AD REFERENDUM AGREEMENT ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE MISSING PERSONS COMMITTEE AND THE POWER OF THE SYG REPRESENTATIVE (SEE USUN 2221, PARA 8 FOR DETAILS). HE DOES NOT YET HAVE A CANDIDATE FOR HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE.

8. IN CONCLUSION, NIMETZ CONGRATULATED WALDHEIM ON BEHALF OF THE SECRETARY AND DEPUTY SECRETARY AND SAID THE U.S. WAS EAGER TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT HIS EFFORTS. USUN WOULD

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REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH URQUHART AND SHERRY. WALDHEIM
IN TURN THANKED NIMETZ FOR CONTINUING U.S. SUPPORT. YOUNG
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HEADS OF STATE WHO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

Area: Africa

President Dawda K. Jawara of The Gambia

Chief of State Didier Ratsiraka of Madagascar IV 1973

President Ibrahim Nasir of Maldives 1973

Prime Minister Seewoosagur Ramgoolam of Mauritius

President and Prime Minister Juvenal Habyarimana of
Rwanda 1966

Prime Minister Abdou Diouf of Senegal

Prime Minister Christian Kamara-Taylor of Sierra Leone 1963

State President Nicholaas Diederichs of South Africa

Prime Minister Maphevu Dlamini of Swaziland

President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania

Prime Minister Mathias Mainza Chona of Zambia

Area: East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Prime Minister John Malcolm Fraser of Australia IV 1964

President, Executive Yuan (Premier) Chiang Ching-Kuo
of China 1954

Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese K. T. Mara of Fiji IV 1964

Governor General George Ratu Sir Cakobau of Fiji 1963

Prime Minister Michael Somare of Papua New Guinea

Prime Minister Robert D. Muldoon of New Zealand

H. M. Taufaahau Tupou IV, King of Tonga

Prime Minister Taisi Efi Tupuola of Western Samoa

Area: American Republics

Premier George C. Price of Belize

Area: Western Europe

Chancellor Bruno Kreisky of Austria IV 1956

Prime Minister Leo Tindemans of Belgium IV 1966

President Valery Giscard d'Estaing of France IV 1956

Prime Minister Raymond Barre of France

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic
of Germany IV 1956

President Walter Scheel of the Federal Republic of
Germany IV 1966

Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis of Greece IV 1951

President Constantine Tsatsos of the Hellenic Republic
of Greece IV 1952

President Kristjan Eldjarn of Iceland IV 1957

Prime Minister Dominic Mintoff of Malta IV 1965

Prime Minister J. M. Den Uyl of The Netherlands IV 1956

Prime Minister Mario Soares of Portugal IV 1956

Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel of Turkey

Area: Eastern Europe

Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz of Poland

Area: North Africa, Near East and South Asia

President Anwar Sadat of Egypt

Prime Minister Abd al-Aziz al-Ghani of the Yemen
Arab Republic

President Ephraim Katzir of Israel

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memo No. 455-79

INFORMATION

May 24, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast -
Venezuelan Ambassador

President Herrera's protege, Ambassador Marcial Perez Chiriboga, is now in Washington and ready to go to work. He is confronted with the problem all new Ambassadors face -- namely, our need, because of other pressures on the President's schedule, to have at least three new Ambassadors waiting to present their credentials before a ceremony is scheduled with the President.

Given our energy interests with Venezuela and the very good start between the Carter and Herrera administrations, you may wish to recommend to the President that he schedule a credentials ceremony for the Venezuelan Ambassador in the near future rather than making him wait a minimum of another month, in all probability, before he normally might expect to present his credentials and officially get to work.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by A. Denis Clift
Review 5/24/85

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Per 7/11/06 NSC/12
BY CS NARA, DATE 7/24/06

MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT


WASHINGTON

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Memo No. 1207-79

June 21, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast, Friday, June 22, 1979

I believe that the Tokyo summit, the Korean summit, Nicaragua and preparations for Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on SALT will provide the primary topics for discussion at the Friday breakfast.


On Nicaragua, Secretary Vance will report on the results of the OAS ministerial meeting in which he participated on June 21.

On the Tokyo summit, positions the President will take on energy and on refugees are of essential importance. I have separately provided you with a paper outlining the recommended U.S. position on refugees which is being forwarded to you and the President for your Friday morning meeting with Ambassador Dick Clark. On energy, Henry Owen notes that you have been participating in the White House discussions with the President on the need for him to take bold positions on both demand restraint and increased production. At the summit, it is likely that other participants will try to water down U.S. proposals. You may wish to underline from the viewpoint of U.S. domestic policy the importance of the President holding the line on bold steps.

On the Korean summit, one of the key issues being debated within the Administration is the proposal for an announcement in Seoul of the tripartite summit -- South Korea, North Korea and the United States. The President's position on troop withdrawals from Korea becomes important in this regard. Members of the Senate, e.g., Senators Nunn and Glenn, want the President to slow withdrawal. The CIA has produced recent studies which indicate that North Korea will move quickly to South Korea if the U.S. does withdraw. Accordingly, the President will have

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to weigh whether or not changes are desirable in his troop withdrawal policy as he proceeds with the summit initiative. Former Under Secretary of State Phil Habib, who has now recovered from his heart attacks and has rejoined Secretary Vance as a senior advisor (primarily on the Caribbean and Central America), will join the breakfast to provide the President with insights on President Pak's personality and style of doing diplomatic business, this drawing on Phil's years as Ambassador in Seoul.

SALT testimony. There continues to be the feeling that the Administration has not yet successfully pulled together the SALT coordination effort with the Senate. It is my understanding that Vance is toying with the idea of recommending that Harry McPherson be tapped to become the SALT coordination czar. As you know, we had a similar debate at the time of the Panama Canal treaties debate in the Senate, and the idea of a czar was beaten back by the several White House staffers who felt the responsibility was correctly theirs.

I think it is essential that the President be satisfied that there is a good review process, perhaps coordinated with David Aaron, of the testimony that the several Executive Branch witnesses will provide to the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, a review insuring that the Administration speaks with a coordinated voice.



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