

out ahead on this issue as a result of his many meetings in New York on the fringe of the UN General Assembly. Accordingly, I would anticipate his raising Lebanon during the breakfast.

#### Arms for Royal Ulster Constabulary

*JS* As you know, the President has put off further arms sales to the UK's police force in Northern Ireland pending a review of our policy. The British are now starting to press hard for resumption of sales, and State is inclined to agree with the British.

I disagree entirely with State. The arms sale issue is a real political problem for us. At the same time, the arms are not vital to the UK -- and a negative decision by the U.S. will not, in fact, imperil Anglo-American relations. To me, this is the classic example of the British foreign office dealing with the "U.S. Colonials" in a skillful and arrogant fashion, and with State falling for the UK line. Prime Minister Lynch of Ireland pays an official visit to the United States on November 8-9. It would be totally counterproductive both internationally and domestically for the President to announce resumed sales. I think Vance should privately let Carrington know that this is a political problem for us, that it is not a test of the U.S.-UK relationship, that we have a policy toward Northern Ireland that is correct and mindful of UK and Irish interests, that we expect this problem to be laid to rest without any public furor.

#### Pakistan

Vance can be expected to review the critical point we are reaching with Pakistan on the non-proliferation issue -- important meetings are scheduled with Zia's principal advisor next week. The key issue, as I understand it, is whether we can accept Pakistani assurances limited to no testing and no transfer, or whether we have to press for assurances on no facilities. Separately, I have asked State to develop an updated review of where we stand around the world in our non-proliferation policy -- e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan, Iraq.

#### Caribbean/Central America

I believe Vance will once again take up the need for supplemental FY 80 funds for the Caribbean and Central America. While you were in Panama you were pressed for more U.S. assistance for Nicaragua and for sophisticated U.S. involvement in El Salvador.

SECRET

I do not see the Caribbean and Central America so much as a budget issue as a strategic issue for the U.S., and an increasingly sensitive political issue in an election year. It seems to me it would be helpful if the Department of State were to provide a fresh, overall review of recent developments, anticipated developments and political trends in the region. This should help the President in his assessment of the situation and in his decisions on the nature and level of U.S. involvement both politically and economically.

#### Mexico City

Vance may raise the need to name a successor to Pat Lucey in Mexico City. (Of interest, Lucey has reported that Mexico's first choice would be Jules Katz -- soon to retire. Lucey says the Mexicans like his grasp of the issues, his no-nonsense approach, and his understanding of their concerns.) That notwithstanding, the Hispanic American Community will see the appointment of Lucey's successor as a vital test case of their interests.

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United States Senate

# COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

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## *MEDIA NOTICE*

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EMBARGOED:

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The Russian Brigade:  
Challenge and Response

An Address By  
Senator Frank Church  
Chairman, Senate Committee  
on Foreign Relations

In the United States Senate  
Thursday, October 11, 1979

## THE RUSSIAN BRIGADE: CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE

Ten days ago, President Carter discussed the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba in a broadcast to the American people. He described the deployment of these combat troops as a matter of "serious concern to us," as a "challenge...that contributes to the tension in the Caribbean and the Central American region."

I agree.

The President might well have added that our discovery of Russian combat forces so close to our shores, on an island of particular sensitivity to the United States, is an affront to our country. Whenever it was that the Soviet Union deployed the brigade in Cuba, its presence there was deliberately concealed from us. The provocation relates not only to the combat character of the brigade, but also to the method of its deployment, one of stealth and secrecy.

The combat configuration of the brigade has been confirmed by what the President describes as "persuasive evidence" obtained by our own intelligence sources. In his words:

This unit appears to be a brigade of two or three thousand men...It has been organized as a combat unit. Its training exercises have been those of a combat unit.

Senators who have wished either to diminish or dismiss this matter have asked, "Why should we be concerned? Obviously, the Russians don't intend to invade the United States with one brigade! As the President, himself, pointed out, "This is not a large force, nor an assault force. It presents no direct threat to us. It has no airborne or seaborne capability."

### The Nature of the Challenge

The answer given is correct. It is, however, the right answer to the wrong question. As soon as I learned that a Soviet combat brigade had been discovered in Cuba, the first question I asked myself was, what are Russian combat troops doing in Cuba, anyway? Why are they there? I presume this question was put to the Russian Government during the recent negotiations. If so, we are still waiting for the answer.

The presence of Soviet troops in Cuba engaged in a combat role runs cross-grain to American policy followed since 1962, namely, that the United States would not permit Cuba to become a Soviet military base on our doorstep. In that year, the covert installation by the Soviet Union of nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. The crisis stemmed from a gross miscalculation of American resolve to protect our vital interests as a nation. President Kennedy refused to tolerate the Russian use of Cuba as a missile-launching pad, not only because its proximity to the United States dangerously altered the strategic balance between the two super-powers, but also because these missiles posed a clear and present danger to every American city east of the Mississippi.

The Russians, it will be remembered, acceded to Kennedy's demands. The missiles were withdrawn, and an understanding was reached between the two governments that the Soviet Union would not again insert nuclear weapons into Cuba.

If our experience respecting agreements with the Soviet Union demonstrates nothing else, it tells us that the Russians will reach for advantage wherever they can. They will stretch an agreement to the limit to gain some slight edge, or to establish a precedent to be invoked at some future time.

We have encountered such difficulties in connection with the Russian pledge relating to Cuba. Twice since 1962, the understanding has been tested and Soviet compliance questioned: once in 1970 when the Russians appeared to be installing a permanent naval base in Cuba capable of servicing submarines armed with nuclear missiles, and again in 1978 when they equipped the Cubans with MIG-23s, an advanced aircraft suspected of having nuclear capability. In each of these cases, we pressed hard, and the Soviet Government took action to satisfy our concerns.

To be sure, ever since 1962 we have known that the Soviet Union has maintained a military presence in Cuba which did not conflict with the modus vivendi we had established with them. The Russians retained in Cuba military advisers and instructors, including electronic specialists, pilots, various kinds of technicians, and security personnel. But it never occurred to the American Government that the Russians would deploy combat forces in Cuba. Accordingly, the U.S.-Soviet understandings worked out in 1962 and 1970 do not expressly forbid their presence. Still, Russian training cadres are one thing; organized combat units are something else. The Soviet Union understands the difference, along with the military and political implications associated with forces which possess combat capability.

Nevertheless, I have heard it argued that we should take no offense, since the United States has stationed combat forces around the globe, including a few at our Guantanamo base in Cuba, itself. But the analogy does not hold. We make no secret of our military presence abroad. Our deployments openly implement mutual security pacts with foreign governments, known to the whole world. Even at Guantanamo, our legal rights are based upon a leasehold granted to the United States by a Cuban Government which preceded Castro.

The Soviet brigade, on the other hand, was inserted, or assembled, surreptitiously. Its presence in Cuba was kept hidden. A more relevant analogy, if any is needed, would be an American decision to secretly dispatch the Marines to sensitive points near the Soviet border, say, Finland or even Yugoslavia. Were we to do that, I have no doubt about the indignation of the Russians, once our presence had been detected. Does anyone really think they would react to such an affront as a trivial matter, or dismiss it as an incident of little or no consequence?

Moreover, we have even greater reason to be disturbed, since the Caribbean is a highly volatile and unstable region, where the island governments cling to office in the face of precarious odds. Endemic poverty, tropical disease and illiteracy make the entire area a seedbed for revolution. In these circumstances, the presence of a Soviet combat force in the midst of the Caribbean does not bode well for the United States. Fidel Castro has been furnished a Russian shield. If we fail to respond adequately to the challenge, I have no doubt that he will be encouraged to exploit, more aggressively than ever, future revolutionary opportunities in both the Caribbean and Central America.

### The American Response

These were the considerations which led me, upon learning of the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, to urge President Carter to call for the withdrawal of these troops. I also saw little likelihood that the Senate would ratify the SALT II Treaty, while Russian combat forces remained deployed on the island.

And I said so.

The negotiations which ensued never came to grips with the issue of withdrawal, since the Soviet Government would never admit -- or deny -- the existence of the brigade. It insisted, instead, that all Russian military personnel stationed in Cuba were engaged in training and other non-combat activities. Secretary Vance held several sessions with the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Dobrynin, and met twice with the Russian Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, but to no avail.

It was not until the eleventh hour, about a day before President Carter was scheduled to address the country, that the Soviet Government, "from the highest level," delivered a message which spoke to our concerns.

In the President's words, the message contained the following Soviet assurances:

--That the unit in question is a training center, that it does nothing more than training, and can do nothing more;



- That they will not change its function or status as a training center. We understand this to mean that they do not intend to enlarge the unit or to give it additional capabilities;
- They have said that the Soviet personnel in Cuba are not and will not be a threat to the United States or to any other nation;
- That they reaffirm the 1962 understanding and the mutually agreed upon confirmation in 1970 and will abide by it in the future. We, for our part, reconfirm this understanding."

President Carter then went on to say that "we shall not rest on these Soviet statements alone," and announced that he would take the following measures. Again, I use his words:

"First, we will monitor the status of the Soviet forces by increased surveillance of Cuba. Second, we will assure that no Soviet unit in Cuba can be used as a combat force to threaten the security of the United States or any other nation in this hemisphere."

The President added that he was establishing a joint task force headquarters at Key West, Florida; that he would expand our military maneuvers in the region; and that for other governments in the Caribbean, we would "increase our economic assistance to alleviate the...unmet human needs." This, he said, would "ensure the ability to troubled peoples to resist social turmoil and possible communist domination."

#### Has the Status Quo Changed?

As for the Russian brigade in Cuba, the position of the Carter Administration, before negotiations with the Soviet Union began, was that "the status quo was unacceptable" to the United States. Now that the negotiations are concluded, we must ask, in what way has the status quo changed?

The Soviet brigade is still in Cuba. It has not been stood down; its combat configuration remains intact. Clearly, this status quo in the Caribbean has not been changed by any Russian action.

But it is contended by our Secretary of State, and others, that the status quo has in fact been altered by these Soviet assurances and President Carter's countermeasures. It is incumbent upon us, therefore, to examine them in this context.

Increased surveillance of Cuba, though appropriate, hardly changes the status quo, while expanded American military maneuvers in the region and the establishment of a joint task force headquarters at Key West, Florida, do not affect the status of the Russian brigade. The statement that "we will assure that no Soviet unit in Cuba can be used as a combat force to threaten...any nation in this hemisphere" is both relevant and significant. Once again, however, it neither alters nor adds to obligations assumed by the United States years ago.

President Carter admitted as much in his broadcast to the nation, when he said, "This policy is consistent with our responsibilities as a member of the Organization of American States and a party to the Rio Treaty." In fact, he did not establish a new, or different, doctrine; he simply reiterated a long established one.

#### The Remedy is Up to the Senate

The Senate, then, must rectify and strengthen the American position. If Soviet intrusions into this hemisphere are not counteracted in an adequate manner, the repercussions will be felt for many years to come. We can

anticipate only further probing -- more testing of U.S. resolve, and renewed attempts to stretch the limits of the 1962 and 1970 understandings until they have no meaning or validity whatever. Like it or not, the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba constitutes a test of U.S. determination to protect its neighborhood.

I regret that this development has had such a chilling effect on the prospects for ratifying the SALT II Treaty. It had been my view that the Treaty should be judged on its own merits, not used as a referendum on the character of the Soviet Union or as a plebiscite on Russian behavior in the Third World.

There are those who would link the SALT II Treaty with every Soviet move that displeases us. They set an impossible test for ratification: that the Russians must first conform to our prescription for their behavior everywhere. To say the very least, this kind of universal linkage is extremely unrealistic.

But Soviet adventures in such distant places as Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan are one thing; the appearance of a Russian combat brigade at our very doorstep is another. From the moment I heard this news -- and disclosed it to the American people -- I have known it was inevitable that the Treaty would be linked to the brigade by the Senate.

The Foreign Relations Committee is about to complete its hearings on the SALT II Treaty. This complex agreement between the Soviet Union and ourselves, the product of some seven years of intense negotiations, has been studied thoroughly by the Committee. We have held twenty days of hearings, questioned more than eighty witnesses, and compiled a hearing record of almost two thousand pages. The objective of these extensive hearings has been to focus attention to one central issue: Does the Treaty serve our own national security?

The expert witnesses we have heard, pro and con, have managed to place the Treaty in perspective. From them we have learned that it is no panacea, nor even a treaty that will do much to dampen down the feverish nuclear arms race.

We have also learned that, if the United States is not to fall perilously behind the Soviet Union in nuclear power during the next decade, it will be necessary for us to build new weapons systems, such as cruise missiles, instead of bombers, that can penetrate Russian defenses after 1982; Trident submarines that need not cruise close by Russian coastal waters in order to keep the Soviet Union in range; and a mobile MX missile system, with which to preserve the invulnerability of our land-based nuclear deterrent against the threat of some future pre-emptive strike.

The SALT II Treaty will not interfere with the construction of these expensive new weapons. However, much higher military budgets will be required, and a guarantee that they will be forthcoming is the price that some Senators intend to extract for their vote in favor of the Treaty. This particular form of "linkage" has, on the whole, been treated as both fashionable and praiseworthy.

#### The Case for SALT II

Why, then, should a treaty which has become the stimulant for such enlarged military spending, be urged upon the Senate in the name of arms control?

The answer to this riddle can be found in the testimony of our Joint Chiefs of Staff. Looking ahead to the larger expenditures the United States will have to make in the 1980's in order to preserve nuclear parity with the Soviet Union, the Chiefs concluded we would be better off with the treaty than without it.

For the treaty does impose some useful restraints on the continuing nuclear arms race. It establishes equal aggregate ceilings on the number of delivery systems permitted both sides, thus eliminating the numerical advantage heretofore conferred on the Soviet Union, under the terms of SALT I. The Treaty also achieves, for the first time, a maximum on the number of warheads either side may attach to their missiles. True enough, the ceilings are much too high, but by keeping the SALT process alive, we can make the substantial reduction of these ceilings our goal for SALT III.

Finally, the Treaty sets a unique and valuable precedent for the future. Under its terms, the Soviet Union must dismantle and destroy about 250 ICBM launchers, a force of sufficient size to obliterate every major American city.

Moreover, ensuring Russian compliance will not be a matter of trust. The evidence has persuaded me that we possess highly sophisticated national technical means, carefully focused on the Soviet Union, making the Treaty verifiable. In fact, the Senate Intelligence Committee has concluded that "the SALT II Treaty enhances the ability of the United States to monitor those components of Soviet strategic weapons forces which are subject to the limitations of the Treaty." Its Chairman and Ranking Republican Member, Senators Birch Bayh and Barry Goldwater, so testified before the Foreign Relations Committee yesterday.

To sum up, I believe that the SALT II Treaty, on balance, serves the national interests of the United States. More evident still is that the rejection of the Treaty by the Senate would be a grave disservice to the country. For rejection would furnish the Soviet Union with a propaganda trump card to play against us all over the world, and it would have the most unsettling effect on our alliances, especially NATO.

#### A Proposed Solution

Therefore, it falls to the Senate to find a way to deal satisfactorily with the challenge posed by the Russian combat brigade in Cuba, and, at the same time, to clear the way for ratification of the SALT II Treaty.

I believe this can be done by attaching to the resolution by which the Senate gives its consent to the Treaty a condition which must be satisfied before the Treaty may take effect. The condition would be binding on our own government, making the Treaty subject to the following understanding:

That, prior to the exchange of the instruments of ratification, the President shall affirm that the United States will assure that Soviet military forces in Cuba (1) are not engaged in a combat role, and (2) will not become a threat to any country in the Caribbean or elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere.

It will be said that the adoption of this condition will make the Treaty hostage to a satisfactory Russian response respecting the brigade.

I say that, without this condition, the Treaty cannot garner the two-thirds vote necessary for its ratification.

Let the Senate adopt this condition, and it will be put squarely to the Soviet Union to decide which matters most, the SALT II Treaty or a brigade of combat troops in Cuba. If it is the latter, then we had best know it before committing ourselves to the Treaty.

In a confrontation of this kind, where the facts are in dispute, the solution must allow both sides to save face. Nothing in the understanding I propose requires that the Soviet government submit to humiliation, or even to acknowledge the existence of Russian combat forces in Cuba. Just as the brigade has been covertly configured and equipped to perform a combat role,



so can it discreetly cease playing such a role.

It is to our own President, in any case, that the Senate must look for a certification of the facts, as we obtain them through ongoing surveillance of Russian activity in Cuba.

As President Carter observed in his recent address to the nation, although we have "persuasive evidence that the unit in question is a combat unit, the Soviet statements about the future noncombat status of the unit are significant."

So let it be.

So let the United States Senate insist upon it. Then it cannot be said of us that we faltered when we should have stood firm, or that we engaged in reckless retaliation by rejecting, without recourse, a treaty which appears to serve the mutual interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Memo No. 904-79

INFORMATION

October 25, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift *DC*  
SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast  
Friday, October 26, 1979, 7:30 a.m.

Personnel

Pat Lucey has been offered the CSCE job. It is my understanding that he has not yet said yes or no.

State is still grappling with someone to fill Lucey's position in Mexico City. Apodaca and Esteban Torres are both candidates, as is Sol Linowitz.

Brezhnev's Health

Earlier this week Secretary Vance sent a paper to the President addressing the contingency of President Brezhnev's death, U.S. representation at the funeral, messages and other U.S. actions. The paper recommended that you head the delegation. It is my understanding that the President has reviewed the document and indicated that he prefers to take decisions on the delegation composition and related matters at the time such decisions may be required.

Pakistan

Vance can be expected to comment on the options relating to the Pakistan nuclear program. The majority view seems to be that non-proliferation should have priority over other aspects of US-Pakistani relations, such as arms sales. I believe that

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256/706 NISC-HR  
6/29/06

*Mina Martin*  
*Schultz*  
*Brog/Harmon*

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

it is also felt that even if we get tough with the Paks on the nuclear issue, this will not jeopardize the status of our monitoring operations. On a "real politik" note, I would observe that now that Zia has discarded democracy - and turned toward a muslim dictatorship - realistically there may be greater stability in Pakistan than was foreseen a few months ago. With this the case, we are in a better position to be tough on the Paks on nuclear matters without risking greater destabilization in the sub-continent.

Note: At my request, the Department of State has prepared (Tab A) a status report on major non-proliferation issues which I forward for your background.

#### SALT II

Vance and Cutler will wish to comment on the SALT hearings. You indicated last week that when your schedule permits you will wish to resume informal meetings with Senators on Capitol Hill. If the timing seems right, you may wish to comment on this.

#### Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

Secretary Vance will wish to comment on the Lancaster House talks (State analysis at Tab B), which are in their critical stage as the UK's November 15 Parliamentary deadline draws closer. We seem to be working well tactically with the British. At this point, I think the President should give careful thought as to how he might best present the U.S. position in the middle of next month -- and I think he should look at an invitation to the Black Caucus, prior to any announced U.S. decision, to follow through on his promise of consultations. If you agree, you may wish to mention the need for involvement of the Black Caucus if U.S. policy is to realize maximum effectiveness.

#### Angola

It is my understanding that Vance may touch on Angola, advancing State's view that the time has come for a step forward - normalization of relations. I think you would find it helpful to have Don McHenry's views on this. When he was named by President Carter to the UN post, you sent him a message from Hong Kong saying that you looked forward to meeting with him in Washington. You may wish to invite him to your office for a meeting in the relatively near future to touch on Angola and other issues.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

President's Visit to Canada

You may wish to comment briefly on your meeting with Peter Towe on October 24:

- the importance the Canadians attach to the President's visit;
- their interest in putting together "an energy package" that will underscore the benefits to both countries resulting from "Canadian-US energy self-sufficiency";
- on energy, Towe said the Canadians hope both sides would make an announcement on financing of the northern gas pipeline at the time of the visit (you noted our problem with a pre-building surcharge);
- he said they would wish to discuss a west-to-east pipeline, that they wanted to reach greater flexibility oil swap procedures, that they want to set cooperation on coal liquification and tar sands (Canada needs technology);
- on environment, they will want to discuss acid rain;
- they want us to move ahead with more lenient convention tax legislation not linked to the border broadcasting revenue problem; they want us to move fisheries/boundaries treaties (negotiated by Lloyd Cutler) through the Senate. You told Towe you would raise the treaty question with Senator Church this Saturday;
- you might also note that Towe gave your staff a paper on security arrangements for the visit which has been passed to Jerry Parr and his colleagues in the Secret Service.





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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~~SECRET~~/NODIS  
EYES ONLY

October 12, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR DENNIS CLIFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Status Report on Current Non-Proliferation Issues

In response to your request, we have prepared the following brief summary of current non-proliferation issues. Please let me know if you wish further elaboration on any of these issues.

Pakistan (SECRET/NODIS)

Pakistan continues to pursue a nuclear explosive capability, including development of enrichment and reprocessing facilities to acquire weapons useable material and development of the non-nuclear elements of a nuclear explosive device. We believe that Pakistan will not be able to accumulate enough fissile material from its enrichment and reprocessing activities for a nuclear explosive for at least two to three years, but there are recurring reports that Pakistan might test a device within the next six months, perhaps with material acquired from abroad. We cannot exclude this possibility.

We have terminated foreign assistance to Pakistan in accordance with the Symington amendment (PL-480 continues), and we have repeatedly told high levels of the Pakistan government that we will not be able to respond to its legitimate security and economic development needs as long as it continues its present nuclear activities. Some of our allies, the PRC and the Soviet Union have also expressed their concerns to the GOP.

Foreign Affairs advisor Agha Shahi will be in Washington next week for consultation on security questions, including the nuclear issue. We are also consulting with our allies with a view to developing a common approach to the Pakistan problem.

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NODIS/EYES ONLY  
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per 6/7/06 NSC H-  
BY CS NADA, DATE 6/29/06

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NODIS/EYES ONLY

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India (CONFIDENTIAL)

The Non-Proliferation Act requires that we terminate nuclear cooperation by March 1980 with any non-nuclear weapon state that does not have all its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. India will not place all its nuclear activities under safeguards for the foreseeable future, and we therefore face the prospect of having to terminate the supply of enriched uranium to its Tarapur power reactors under our 1963 nuclear cooperation agreement with India. India has stated that termination of supply will constitute abrogation of the agreement, and that India will therefore be released from its obligations under the agreement to maintain safeguards on the US spent fuel without US consent. Termination will also have a negative impact on broader US-Indo relations.

The law provides for a Presidential waiver, subject to Congressional veto, of the "full-scope" safeguards requirement. However we believe that such a waiver would do serious damage to the credibility of our non-proliferation policy and would undermine our efforts with other states (Argentina, Spain, and Brazil in particular) to obtain their agreement to such safeguards. Moreover our soundings on the Hill indicate that there would be considerable Congressional opposition to an indefinite waiver.

We are exploring internally and informally with the Congress possible interim supply arrangements in return for which we would seek Indian agreement to specific commitments including maintaining safeguards on the US supplied material and not to reprocess the US material without our consent. We have no assurance that the Indians will find any of our proposed arrangements acceptable, particularly in view of the present uncertain political situation in India.

Argentina (CONFIDENTIAL)

Argentina has been negotiating with Canada and the FRG for the supply of its next power reactor and with these countries plus the Swiss for the supply of heavy water production technology. Heavy water production technology will

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NODIS/EYES ONLY

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NODIS/EYES ONLY

- 3 -

eventually facilitate Argentina's developing its nuclear program independent of outside supply. For this reason we have urged Canada, the FRG, and the Swiss to require Argentine acceptance of NPT-type full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply of either the reactors or the heavy water technology. This would ensure that all of Argentina's nuclear activities, including the reprocessing facility that it is developing indigenously, would be under safeguards, thereby helping to prevent it's possible misuse.

Canada, as a matter of national policy, requires full-scope safeguards for all significant nuclear supply. The FRG has taken the position that it will require full-scope safeguards for supply of the heavy water technology but not for the supply of the reactors alone. The Swiss, however, maintain that for supply of heavy water technology they will not go beyond the minimum requirements of the Nuclear Supplier Guidelines\* that safeguards be applied only to the supplied technology, material and equipment.

Last week Argentina announced that it would purchase the reactors from the FRG and the heavy water production technology from the Swiss, thereby avoiding full-scope safeguards. We have approached both the Swiss and the Germans to urge that they reconsider their position on full-scope safeguards, and we will continue this effort, but the prospects are not bright.

South Africa (SECRET/NODIS EYES ONLY)



\* An agreement entered into by 15 major suppliers in 1976-77 concerning requirements for safeguards and controls on exported nuclear material, equipment and technology.

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NODIS/EYES ONLY

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NODIS/EYES ONLY

- 4 -

conclusively what has taken place. We have informed key Allies of these indications and are now attempting to verify the indications by independent means. This information is being very closely held.

This development complicates an already difficult situation in regard to South Africa's nuclear activities. South Africa has not moved forward with a package settlement we proposed last year by which it would place its enrichment facility (which is capable of producing weapons-useable material) under safeguards and adhere to the NPT in return for resumed US supply of fuel for its research reactor and fulfillment of our commitment to supply fuel for the two power reactors it is acquiring from France.

We have prodded South Africa toward resolutions of the nuclear issue and have also discussed the problem with France, the only other state with leverage in the nuclear area with South Africa. France has informed South Africa that it will not undercut the position we have taken. We are now considering internally additional steps that might be taken.

Harmonization of Policies with Key States on the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (Confidential)

The International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) will formally end next February but most of its reports have been written. INFCE has played a useful role in developing a basis for fuel cycle decisions, but it is a technical study, not a negotiation, and as such will not, in itself, resolve differences on fuel cycle issues. It has, however, provided for a pause and a number of useful conclusions from a non-proliferation point of view.

We have begun informal consultations with key countries (primarily France, UK, FRG and Japan) on developing common approaches to outstanding nuclear issues. The key issues involve ground rules and institutions for sensitive nuclear facilities and material, particularly reprocessing plants and plutonium. Most of the other major countries are also now looking for ways to resolve remaining issues, and we need to accelerate our discussions if we are to have maximum impact.

We are seeking a consensus including (1) plutonium use is appropriate in breeder and advanced reactor development in states with large electrical grids; (2) recycle of plutonium in light water reactors should be avoided because it is only

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SECRET/EYES ONLY

- 5 -

marginally economic and poses a serious proliferation risk (it could result in early separation and use of plutonium in any state with a reactor); (3) development of new reprocessing capacity should thus be limited to the requirements for plutonium for breeder and advanced reactor R&D and development of both enrichment and reprocessing facilities should be related to international capacity rather than strictly national needs; and (4) sensitive facilities be subject to appropriate institutional arrangements and incorporate feasible technical barriers to misuse and improved safeguards.

We are making progress, but key issues remain to be resolved. Ambassador Gerard Smith is planning shortly to begin consultations with key countries on a post-INFCE framework. We hope to reach agreement on elements of such a framework before the seven-nation Summit next summer in Venice.



Peter Tarnoff  
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~


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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTONINFORMATION~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Memo No. 927-79

November 1, 1979

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast,  
Friday, November 2, 1979, 7:30 a.m.

Cy Vance departed for Korea Thursday morning and Warren Christopher will be representing the Department of State in his place.

Shah of Iran

On Wednesday evening I informed you that I had recommended to State and the NSC that they move quickly to avert a crisis between the U.S. and Iran by quietly arranging to keep the Shah in comfortable quarters at his New York hospital rather than allowing him to move out of the hospital to a New York apartment. On Thursday morning I was advised that Christopher, Newsom and others have accepted this recommendation and are acting on it. If we keep the Shah in the hospital (where I am certain a comfortable apartment can be provided), we have not broken faith with anyone. The Shah receives the medical treatment he deserves on humanitarian grounds. At the same time we can emphasize to Khomeini and the Iranians that he is a very sick man and that he will be hospitalized while he is in the U.S. Christopher may have a report on this at the breakfast.

Saudi Arabia

As you know from recent reports, the Saudis are at odds with North Yemen, and the North Yemenis may be turning to the USSR for military equipment. The Saudis are critical to US interests in terms of continued high oil production levels and the upcoming OPEC meeting. The Saudis continue to be distressed with Sadat, a distress they manifest by denying assistance both to Egypt and Sudan. The Saudis remain critical of the Camp David process, and deeply concerned over the future of Jerusalem. The Saudis internally have considerable illness among their leadership, and we see continuing signs of conflicting pressures within the leadership over foreign policy direction.

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Review 11/1/99

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All of this leads me to recommend that you ask Christopher for State's reading of the Saudis, and that you suggest that it is ever important to demonstrate to the Saudis that we have their interests very much in mind. I think the time has come for another high level mission to Saudi Arabia for the purpose of consultations. I believe such missions have paid off, albeit modestly, in the past and they should be continued. The Saudis like them. In considering a new mission, I think State should pull together a report from [REDACTED] on the status of their consultations with the Saudis. This information should prove useful in helping the President to decide who might best head a new mission to Saudi Arabia, what the timing for that mission should be and what the contents of the agenda for fresh US-Saudi consultations should be.

#### SALT/Senate

Christopher will report on the status of the SFRC. As you know, Senators Percy and Javits are pressing the White House to agree that the President will seek two-thirds Senate vote concurrence on any termination of SALT. When you consider that we are presently appealing the US District Court's ruling on termination of US defense agreement with Taiwan, I believe it would be a disaster for that judicial process if we were now to agree to give the Senate a voice in SALT termination. It would seem to me that this point could be made discreetly and effectively to Percy and Javits.

#### Zimbabwe/Rhodesia

Christopher will probably wish to report on the status of the Lancaster House talks. Dick Moose's most recent message to the field providing his overview of the situation is at Tab A.

#### Personnel

- (1) Lucey - It is my understanding that Lucey has turned down the CSCE post.
- (2) US Ambassador to Mexico - Based on my talks with State, the feeling seems to be that the President still is obliged to name a Mexican-American and that Esteban Torres seems to be the only candidate left. It is my personal view that in one way or another the Administration has fallen behind the power curve with the Hispanic-American community -- witness the uproar over the Education post -- and that with this the case, even if the President picks someone acceptable to the community for Mexico City, it will grudgingly pocket this and not give the President the return he is seeking. Clearly, I may be wrong, but I think this is a point worth discussing when you consider that Torres

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is probably better suited for his White House staff role than he would be for the Mexico City post.

If a Hispanic candidate is essential, I believe everyone has been overlooking a Mexican-American -- Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ralph Guzman -- who came to State with excellent press, and who has presided most recently over the Hispanic Conference. If he seems a possibility, the President might wish to build him up a bit with a Presidential mission, a meeting in the Oval Office, and the right interaction with the Hispanic community.

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NODIS  
FOR AMBASSADORS FROM DICK MOOSE  
E.O. 12065: GDS 10/31/85 (KEELEY, ROBERT V.)

TAGS: PDEV, RH

SUBJECT: LANCASTER HOUSE: AN UPDATE

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. I WOULD LIKE TO REVIEW BRIEFLY WHERE WE STAND ON  
THE LANCASTER HOUSE TALKS AND HOW WE ARE POSITIONING  
OURSELVES FOR THE CRITICAL PERIOD WHICH WE FACE IN THE  
NEXT TWO TO THREE WEEKS.

3. OUR OVERRIDING INTEREST AT THIS POINT IS FOR THE  
BRITISH TO ADVANCE POSITIONS ON THE TRANSITION AND  
CEASE-FIRE WHICH ARE PERCEIVED TO BE FAIR BY THE FRONT  
LINE AND ON WHICH THE FRONT LINE HAS SUFFICIENT  
BASIS TO PRESS VIGOROUSLY FOR PF COOPERATION. TO THE  
EXTENT THAT THIS OBJECTIVE IS ACHIEVED, WE SHALL NOT  
ONLY BE ABLE TO MAXIMIZE THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR A SUCCESSFUL  
SETTLEMENT BUT SHALL ALSO BE IN A DEFENSIBLE POSITION  
WITH RESPECT TO OUR INTERESTS IN AFRICA AND ON THE HILL  
IF THE TALKS SHOULD FAIL. IN SAYING THIS, I REALIZE

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UK/ZIMBABWE Rhodesia

THIS IS AN OPTIMUM POSITION AND THAT ALL FRONT LINE VIEWS CANNOT BE FULLY SATISFIED BY THE BRITISH. BUT, ON BALANCE, THE TOTALITY OF THE BRITISH PACKAGE SHOULD

BE PERCEIVED AS FAIR AND IMPARTIAL AS POSSIBLE IN WHAT IS AN ENORMOUSLY DIFFICULT NEGOTIATING SITUATION.

4. WITH THIS OBJECTIVE IN MIND, WE WERE INITIALLY CONCERNED THAT THE OCTOBER 22 BRITISH PROPOSALS ON THE TRANSITION, WHILE SETTING FORTH A POSITIVE FRAMEWORK (IN THE SENSE OF ESTABLISHING FIRM BRITISH AUTHORITY DURING THE TRANSITION) WERE THIN AND NOT SUFFICIENT TO MEET FRONT LINE AND PF FEARS OF A BIAS TOWARD THE SALISBURY SIDE. IN OUR VIEW, THE KEY ISSUES IN THIS AREA ARE THE LENGTH OF THE TRANSITION AND THE ADEQUACY OF OUTSIDE (COMMONWEALTH) MONITORING OF THE ELECTIONS SO THAT ALL PARTIES COULD BE ASSURED THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO FREELY AND FAIRLY PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS. WHILE WE UNDERSTOOD THE FRONT LINE POSITION ON THE DESIRABILITY OF HAVING VOTER REGISTRATION AND THE DELIMITATION OF CONSTITUENCIES PRIOR TO THE HOLDING OF ELECTIONS, WE HAVE ACCEPTED THE BRITISH VIEW THAT THIS IS SIMPLY NOT POSSIBLE WITHOUT HAVING AN EXCESSIVELY LONG TRANSITION PERIOD. THE FRONT LINE IS UNLIKELY TO GO TO THE MAT FOR PF ON DELIMITATION AND CONSTITUENCIES.

5. WITH RESPECT TO THE CEASE-FIRE AND THE ROLE OF THE RESPECTIVE MILITARY FORCES, WE WERE ALSO AWARE OF FRONT LINE NEED TO GAIN SOME FORM OF LEGITIMACY FOR THE PF FORCES DURING THE CEASE-FIRE.

6. QUITE FRANKLY, OUR INITIAL RESERVATIONS ON THE BRITISH POSITION HAVE BEEN EASED SIGNIFICANTLY. WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY THE REPORTS WHICH WE HAVE BEEN RECEIVING IN THE LAST TWO DAYS WHICH INDICATE THAT THE BRITISH ARE ELABORATING THEIR PROPOSALS IN A MANNER WHICH MOVES IMPORTANTLY IN THE DIRECTION OF FRONT LINE AND PF CONCERNS. PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT IS THATCHER'S LETTER TO NYERERE IN WHICH SHE SPELS OUT PROPOSALS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CEASE-FIRE COMMISSION ON WHICH THE COMMANDERS OF THE FORCES OF BOTH SIDES WOULD BE REPRESENTED AND WHICH WOULD ALSO MAKE THE PF FORCES RESPONSIBLE TO THE GOVERNOR DURING THE CEASE-FIRE. IN ADDITION TO COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS FOR THE ELECTIONS (TO WHICH WE HOPE THE BRITISH WILL GIVE AN ADDED PROMINENCE), THE BRITISH ARE ALSO CONSIDERING SOME FORM OF CEASE-FIRE MONITORING ARRANGEMENT WHILE THIS HAS

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UK/Zimbabwe/Kenya

NOT BEEN SPELLED OUT, THE AUSTRALIANS HAVE TOLD US PRIVATELY THEY ARE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN A CEASE-FIRE MONITORING FORCE, AND HAVE SO INDICATED IN A LETTER FROM FRASER TO THATCHER. WE ASSUME THAT OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES MAY ALSO BE ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH AN EFFORT.

7. OF THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES, WE BELIEVE THAT THE BRITISH WOULD EXTEND SOMEWHAT THE LENGTH OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD IF THIS ISSUE PROVES TO BE THE PRINCIPAL STUMBLING BLOCK TO AN AGREEMENT.

8. GIVEN THE EVOLUTION OF BRITISH THINKING (AT EACH STAGE, I WOULD NOTE, THEY HAVE GONE FURTHER THAN WE ORIGINALLY ANTICIPATED), WE MUST CONTINUE TO INDICATE PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY TO ALL PARTIES THAT WE BELIEVE THE BRITISH REMAIN COMMITTED TO FAIR AND IMPARTIAL SETTLEMENT ARRANGEMENTS. THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION ON THIS SCORE. HOWEVER, I ALSO BELIEVE IT IS REASONABLE FOR US TO RESERVE OUR POSITION ON THOSE ISSUES WHICH THE BRITISH HAVE NOT FULLY ELABORATED AND DISCUSSED WITH THE PARTIES, THE FRONT LINE, OR INDEED WITH OURSELVES. WHILE OUR FREEDOM OF MANOEUVRE IS ADMITTEDLY LIMITED, WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT SOME OF OUR IDEAS AND SUGGESTIONS IN THE PAST HAVE BEEN HELPFUL TO THE FCO IN OBTAINING CABINET-LEVEL CONCURRENCE TO PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION. I DO NOT BELIEVE WE SHOULD ABANDON THE POSSIBILITY OF ADVANCING FURTHER SUGGESTIONS WHICH WOULD BE THE RESULT IF WE WERE TO GIVE A BLANK CHECK NOW.

9. A BRIEF WORD ON SANCTIONS. THE NOVEMBER 15 DEADLINE IS RAPIDLY APPROACHING AND THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER TO DETERMINE THAT SANCTIONS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED OR TO LET THEM AUTOMATICALLY BE LIFTED. UP TO THIS POINT, WE HAVE BEEN OPERATING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE BRITISH WILL ALLOW THEIR ORDERS IN COUNCIL TO LAPSE BY MID-NOVEMBER (THOUGH CONCEIVABLY ALLOWING OTHER BILATERAL SANCTIONS TO REMAIN IN PLACE FOR A LIMITED PERIOD) AND WE HAVE BEEN REVIEWING VARIOUS CONTINGENCIES AND OPTIONS OPEN TO THE PRESIDENT IF THAT SHOULD BE THE CASE. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME RECENT SIGNS, HOWEVER, WHICH INDICATE THAT THE BRITISH COULD POSSIBLY SEEK A LIMITED RENEWAL OF SANCTIONS IF THIS IS NECESSARY TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. OUR POSITION WILL OBVIOUSLY DEPEND IN LARGE MEASURE ON THE UK'S HANDLING OF THEIR

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SANCTIONS SITUATION AND THE STATE OF PLAY AT LANCASTER HOUSE. WE MAY HAVE TO MAKE SOME VERY QUICK DECISIONS ON THIS ISSUE BUT I WILL DO MY BEST TO KEEP YOU INFORMED AND OBTAIN YOUR VIEWS BEFORE A DECISION IS TAKEN.

10. PLEASE TREAT THIS MESSAGE AS CLOSE-HOLD ABSOLUTELY REPEAT ABSOLUTELY NOT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH ANYONE OTHER

THAN YOUR DCM. AS YOU KNOW, I VALUE AND SOLICIT YOUR COMMENT AND ADVICE AS WE TRY TO PLAY OUR LIMITED CARDS. WITH THAT IN MIND, WE PUT TOGETHER THE ABOVE MESSAGE SO THAT YOU MAY HAVE A FRAME OF REFERENCE AGAINST WHICH YOU CAN CONTRIBUTE FROM YOUR VARIOUS PERSPECTIVES. FOR MYSELF, I HAVE A SENSE OF BEING AT THE TOP OF A TWO WEEK TOBOGGAN RUN.

11. FOR PRETORIA: AMBASSADOR EDMONDSON MAY SHARE WITH DAVIDOW. VANCE  
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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON


THE V. P. HAS SEEN

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Memo No. 947-79

November 8, 1979

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast,  
Friday, November 9, 1979, 7:30 a.m.

Iran

Iran will be the principal point of discussion, with Secretary Vance providing the status report. His statement of November 8 is at Tab A. I am also including at Tab A the reactions of various US political figures as reported by AP.

For your background, our Charge in Tehran, Ambassador Bruce Laingen, is a Minnesotan (biography at Tab B). Many months ago before he took the position in Iran, I brought him in for a quick photo and greeting. Bruce's wife, Penelope Laingen, has remained in Washington. Since the beginning of the crisis last Sunday, she has been staying in touch with State's task force and early this week she spoke to her husband. Following the breakfast you may wish to consider placing a telephone call to her to offer such reassurances as you can and to state how proud everyone is of how Ambassador Laingen is performing.

Indochina/Kampuchea

State will probably have received the first reports from Mrs. Carter's current mission to Thailand.

Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

Secretary Vance can be expected to comment on the state of play at Lancaster House. State shortly will be forwarding an options paper to the President as he nears the November 15 deadline for an announcement on Rhodesian sanctions. The British have said they will not renew their Orders in Council -- this means that British domestically imposed sanctions will be lifted -- at the same time, 80 to 85% of the U.K.'s current sanctions will remain in effect because of the U.K.'s international obligations.

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Classified by A. Denis Clift  
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SALT

The SFRC reports SALT II out on Friday, November 9. Now that the President has postponed his visit to Canada, you may wish to recommend that he attend the meeting you are scheduled to have with the Union of Concerned Scientists at 10:30 a.m. I see it as a very dramatic, very newsworthy meeting, coming as it does as the treaty moves out of committee, and involving as it does the favorable endorsement of SALT II by some 4,000 U.S. scientists.

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# VANCE STATEMENT

November 8, 1979

Since the first word that our Embassy had been taken over in Tehran, the President, aided by his senior advisers, has been directing the efforts of our government to secure the safe release of our people.

We have been assured repeatedly that those being held have not been physically harmed. We expect those assurances to be observed.

The situation is extremely difficult and delicate. I am sure that all Americans understand that the efforts we are pursuing cannot take place in the glare of publicity. Let me assure you, however, that we are pursuing every avenue open to us to secure their safe and early release. Our actions will continue to be guided by that overriding objective.

Let me say, in particular, to the families of those being held in Tehran that we understand fully your anguish and we will continue to work around the clock to achieve their release.

We have announced our readiness to have the personal

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representatives of the President go to Iran to discuss with the Iranian authorities the release of our Embassy people.

Many governments and others have been helping. We appreciate those efforts.

We need the continued support of the American people as we pursue these efforts. It is a time, not for rhetoric, but for quiet, careful and firm diplomacy.

In this situation, the United States has no higher obligation than to do all that it can to protect the lives of

American citizens. We will honor that obligation.

The situation is extremely difficult and delicate.

We are sure that all Americans understand that the efforts we are

pursuing cannot take place in the glare of publicity. Let me

assure you, however, that we are pursuing every avenue open

to us to secure their safe and early release. Our actions will

continue to be guided by that overriding objective.

Let me say, in particular, to the families of those

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